21492827 Constitutional Law 1 File No 5

8/6/2019 21492827 Constitutional Law 1 File No 5

1/23

CONSTITUTIONAL LAW I

File No. 5

III. POWER OF JUDICIAL REVIEW

Judicial Review the power of the courts to test the validity ofexecutive and legislative acts in light of their conformity with theConstitution.

CASES

y This case establishes the Supreme Court's power of judicial review.That means that the Court has the right to review acts of Congressand, by extension, actions of the President. If the Court finds thatthe law is unconstitutional, it can overrule the law. Marshall arguedthat the Constitution is the supreme law of the land and that theSupreme Court has the final say over the meaning of theConstitution. He wrote, it is emphatically the province and duty ofthe judicial department to say what the law is (Marbury vs. Madison, 5US 137, 2 L.Ed. 60).

y In the regular course, the regional trial courts and the SupremeCourt have concurrent jurisdiction to hear and decide petitions forquo warranto (as well as certiorari, prohibition and mandamus), anda basic deference to the hierarchy of courts impels a filing of suchpetitions in the lower tribunals. However, for special and importantreasons or for exceptional and compelling circumstances, as in thepresent case, the Supreme Court has allowed exceptions to thisdoctrine. In fact, original petitions for certiorari, prohibition,mandamus and quo warranto assailing acts of legislative officers likethe Senate President and the Speaker of the House have been

recognized as exceptions to this rule. In this country the judicialsupremacy is established, with the Supreme Court as the finalarbiter, to see that no one branch or agency of the governmenttranscends the Constitution, not only in justiceable but politicalquestions as well (Defensor-Santiago vs. Guingona, GR 134577, Nov. 18, 1998).

y The Court's power of judicial review is conferred on the judicialbranch of the government in Section 1, Article VIII of our present


2/23

1987 Constitution. The "moderating power" to "determine the properallocation of powers" of the different branches of government and "todirect the course of government along constitutional channels" isinherent in all courts as a necessary consequence of the judicialpower itself, which is "the power of the court to settle actual

controversies involving rights which are legally demandable andenforceable." The separation of powers is a fundamental principle inour system of government. It obtains not through express provisionbut by actual division in our Constitution. Each department of thegovernment has exclusive cognizance of matters within its jurisdiction, and is supreme within its own sphere. But it does notfollow from the fact that the three powers are to be kept separate anddistinct that the Constitution intended them to be absolutelyunrestrained and independent of each other. The Constitution hasprovided for an elaborate system of checks and balances to securecoordination in the workings of the various departments of the

government. And the judiciary in turn, with the Supreme Court asthe final arbiter, effectively checks the other departments in theexercise of its power to determine the law, and hence to declareexecutive and legislative acts void if violative of the Constitution(Francisco vs. House of Representatives, GR 160261, Nov. 10, 2003).

1. JUDICIAL SUPREMACY VS. CONSTITUTIONAL SUPREMACY

Doctrine of Judicial Supremacy

Although holding neither purse nor sword and so regarded as theweakest of the three departments of the government, the Judiciaryis nonetheless vested with the power to annul the acts of either theLegislative or the Executive department or both when notconformable to the fundamental law (Asso. Of Small Landowners of thePhilippines vs. Sec. of Agrarian Reform, 175 SCRA 343).

When the judiciary allocates constitutional boundaries, it neitherasserts superiority, non-nullifies an act of the legislative, it onlyasserts the solemn and sacred obligation assigned to it by the

Constitution to determine conflicting claims of authority under theConstitution and to establish for the parties in an actualcontroversy the rights which that instrument secures andguarantees to them (Laurel, Angara v. Electoral Commission, 63 Phil. 139).

Doctrine of Constitutional Supremacy


3/23

If a law or contract violates any norm of the constitution, that lawor contract whether promulgated by the legislative, or by theexecutive branch or entered into by private persons for privatepurpose is null and void and without any force or effect.

CASES

y That judicial supremacy is but the power of judicial review in actualand appropriate cases and controversies, and is the power and dutyto see that no one branch or agency of the government transcendsthe Constitution, which is the source of all authority.

The power of the courts to test the validity of executive and legislativeacts in light of their conformity with the Constitution. This is not anassertion of superiority by the courts over the other departments, but

merely an expression of the supremacy of the Constitution (Angara vs.Electroral Commission, 63 Phil.139).

2. POLITICAL VS. JUSTICIABLE QUESTION

Political Question - has two (2) aspects:

1. Those questions which, under the Constitution are to be decided bythe people in their sovereign capacity, or

2. In regard to which full discretionary authority has been delegated tothe legislature or executive branches of government (Tanada v. Cuenco,100 Phil 1101).

Justiciable Question a definite and concrete dispute touching on thelegal interest which may be resolved by a court of law through theapplication of a law (Cataran v. DENR, GR No. 134958, January 3, 2001).

CASES

y Justice William J. Brennan reformulated the political questiondoctrine, proposing a six-part test for determining which questionswere "political" in nature. Cases which are political in nature aremarked by:

1. "Textually demonstrable constitutional commitment of theissue to a coordinate political department;" as an example of this,


4/23

Brennan cited issues of foreign affairs and executive war powers,arguing that cases involving such matters would be "politicalquestions"

2. "A lack of judicially discoverable and manageable standards

for resolving it;"

3. "The impossibility of deciding without an initial policydetermination of a kind clearly for nonjudicial discretion;"

4. "The impossibility of a court's undertaking independentresolution without expressing lack of the respect due coordinatebranches of government;"

5. "An unusual need for unquestioning adherence to a politicaldecision already made;"

6. "The potentiality of embarrassment from multifariouspronouncements by various departments on one question (Baker vs.Carr, 396 US 186).

y The Court held that the question whether or not the Senate ruleviolated the US Constitution was nonjusticiable since theimpeachment clause expressly granted that the Senate shall havesole Power to try any impeachment. The clause laid out specificregulations that were to be followed and as long as those guidelineswere observed the court would not rule upon the validity of other

senate procedures regarding impeachment. Chief Justice WilliamRehnquist observed that while the Supreme Court was the ultimateinterpreter of the Constitution, a matter would be deemednonjusticiable when there was a constitutional commitment of theissue to a coordinate political department (Nixon vs. US, 506 US 224).

y Without oral argument, the divided justices found that the case wasnot justiciable. Rehnquist lead a group of four (4) others whobelieved that the issue involved a political question, namely, how thePresident and Congress would conduct the nation's foreign affairs.Justice Powell did not find the case ripe for judicial review. Congresshad not formally challenged the Carter's authority, technically therewas no conflict for the Court to resolve (Goldwater vs. Carter, 444 US 996,62 L.Ed.2d 428).

y It is now an ancient rule that the valid source of a statute Presidential Decrees are of such nature may be contested by onewho will sustain a direct injury as a result of its enforcement. At the


5/23

instance of taxpayers, laws providing for the disbursement of publicfunds may be enjoined, upon the theory that the expenditure ofpublic funds by an officer of the State for the purpose of executing anunconstitutional act constitutes a misapplication of such funds. Theinterest of the petitioners as taxpayers in the lawful expenditure of

these amounts of public money sufficiently clothes them with thatpersonality to litigate the validity of the Decrees appropriating saidfunds.

The amending process both as to proposal and ratification, raises ajudicial question. This is especially true in cases where the power ofthe Presidency to initiate the amending process by proposals ofamendments, a function normally exercised by the legislature, isseriously doubted. Under the terms of the 1973 Constitution, thepower to propose amendments to the Constitution resides in theinterim National Assembly during the period of transition (Sec. 15,

Transitory Provisions). After that period, and the regular NationalAssembly in its active session, the power to propose amendmentsbecomes ipso facto the prerogative of the regular National Assembly(Sec. 1, pars. 1 and 2 of Art. XVI, 1973 Constitution). The normalcourse has not been followed. Rather than calling the interimNational Assembly to constitute itself into a constituent assembly,the incumbent President undertook the proposal of amendments andsubmitted the proposed amendments thru Presidential Decree 1033to the people in a Referendum-Plebiscite on October 16. Unavoidably,the regularity of the procedure for amendments, written in lambentwords in the very Constitution sought to be amended, raises a

contestable issue. The implementing Presidential Decree Nos. 991,1031, and 1033, which commonly purport to have the force andeffect of legislation are assailed as invalid, thus the issue of thevalidity of said Decrees is plainly a justiciable one, within thecompetence of this Court to pass upon. Section 2 (2) Article X of thenew Constitution provides: "All cases involving the constitutionality ofa treaty, executive agreement, or law shall be heard and decided bythe Supreme Court en banc and no treaty, executive agreement, orlaw may be declared unconstitutional without the concurrence of atleast ten Members. . . .." The Supreme Court has the last word in theconstruction not only of treaties and statutes, but also of the

Constitution itself. The amending, like all other powers organized inthe Constitution, is in form a delegated and hence a limited power, sothat the Supreme Court is vested with that authority to determinewhether that power has been discharged within its limits.

Political questions are neatly associated with the wisdom, not thelegality of a particular act. Where the vortex of the controversy refersto the legality or validity of the contested act, that matter is definitely


6/23

justiciable or non-political. What is in the heels of the Court is notthe wisdom of the act of the incumbent President in proposingamendments to the Constitution, but his constitutional authority toperform such act or to assume the power of a constituent assembly.Whether the amending process confers on the President that power to

propose amendments is therefore a downright justiciable question.Should the contrary be found, the actuation of the President wouldmerely he a brutum fulmen. If the Constitution provides how it maybe amended, the judiciary as the interpreter of that Constitution, candeclare whether the procedure followed or the authority assumed wasvalid or not.

Whether, therefore, that constitutional provision has been followed ornot is indisputably a proper subject of inquiry, not by the peoplethemselves of course who exercise no power of judicial review,but by the Supreme Court in whom the people themselves vested that

power, a power which includes the competence to determine whetherthe constitutional norms for amendments have been observed or not.And, this inquiry must be done a priori not a posteriori, i.e., beforethe submission to and ratification by the people.

As to the question on whether or not the Pres. Marcos may proposeamendments to the Constitution in the absence of a grant of suchconstituent power to the President, the Court held that he could. Ifthe President has been legitimately discharging the legislativefunctions of the Interim Assembly, there is no reason why he cannotvalidly discharge the function of that Assembly to propose

amendments to the Constitution, which is an adjunct, althoughpeculiar, to its gross legislative power (Sanidad vs. COMELEC, 73 SCRA333).

y The Court, through former Chief Justice Roberto Concepcion, heldthat political questions refer "to those questions which, under theConstitution, are to be decided by the people in their sovereigncapacity, or in regard to which full discretionary authority has beendelegated to the legislative or executive branch of the government. Itis concerned with issues dependent upon the wisdom, not legality ofa particular measure." To a great degree, the 1987 Constitution has

narrowed the reach of the political question doctrine when itexpanded the power of judicial review of this court not only to settleactual controversies involving rights which are legally demandableand enforceable but also to determine whether or not there has beena grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction on the part of any branch or instrumentality ofgovernment. Heretofore, the judiciary has focused on the "thou shalt


7/23

not's" of the Constitution directed against the exercise of itsjurisdiction. With the new provision, however, courts are given agreater prerogative to determine what it can do to prevent graveabuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction on thepart of any branch or instrumentality of government. Clearly, the new

provision did not just grant the Court power of doing nothing. In syncand symmetry with this intent are other provisions of the 1987Constitution trimming the so called political thicket. Prominent ofthese provisions is section 18 of Article VII which empowers thisCourt in limpid language to "x x x review, in an appropriateproceeding filed by any citizen, the sufficiency of the factual basis ofthe proclamation of martial law or the suspension of the privilege ofthe writ (of habeas corpus) or the extension thereof x x x." (Estrada vs.Arroyo, GR 146738, March 2, 2001).

y Article VIII, Section 1 of the 1987 Constitution expands the conceptof judicial review by providing that:

SEC. 1. The judicial power shall be vested in one Supreme Court andin such lower courts as may be established by law.

Judicial power includes the duty of the courts of justice to settleactual controversies involving rights which are legally demandableand enforceable, and to determine whether or not there has beengrave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdictionon the part of any branch or instrumentality of the Government.

The Court does not agree with the posture of the respondentCOMELEC that the issue involved in the present petition is a political

question beyond the jurisdiction of this Court to review. As theleading case of Taada vs. Cuenco put it, political questions areconcerned with issues dependent upon the wisdom, not legalityof aparticular measure. The issue raised in the present petition does notmerely concern the wisdom of the assailed resolution but focuses onits alleged disregard for applicable statutory and constitutionalprovisions. In other words, that the petitioner and the petitioners-in-intervention are questioning the legality of the respondentCOMELECs administrative issuance will not preclude this Court

from exercising its power of judicial review to determine whether ornot there was grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excessof jurisdiction on the part of the respondent COMELEC in issuingResolution No. 6712. Indeed, administrative issuances must notoverride, supplant or modify the law, but must remain consistentwith the law they intend to carry out. When the grant of power isqualified, conditional or subject to limitations, the issue of whetherthe prescribed qualifications or conditions have been met or the


8/23

limitations respected, is justiciable the problem being one of legalityor validity, not its wisdom. In the present petition, the Court mustpass upon the petitioners contention that Resolution No. 6712 doesnot have adequate statutory or constitutional basis.

An administrative body or tribunal acts without jurisdiction if it doesnot have the legal power to determine the matter before it; there isexcess of jurisdiction where the respondent, being clothed with thepower to determine the matter, oversteps its authority as determinedby law. There is grave abuse of discretion justifying the issuance ofthe writ of certiorari when there is a capricious and whimsicalexercise of his judgment as is equivalent to lack of jurisdiction(Brillantes vs. Concepcion, GR 163193, June 15, 2004).

3. PRESUMPTION OF CONSTITUTIONALITY

Laws are presumed constitutional. To nullify nullification of law, theremust be a clear and unequivocal breach of the Constitution. The theoryis that, as the joint act of the legislative and executive authorities, a lawis supposed to have been carefully studied and determined to beconstitutional before it was finally enacted.

CASES

y The time-honored doctrine is that all laws (PD No. 771 included) arepresumed valid and constitutional until or unless otherwise ruled bythis Court. Not only this; Article XVIII Section 3 of the Constitutionstates:

Sec. 3. All existing laws, decrees, executive orders, proclamations,letters of instructions and other executive issuances not inconsistentwith this Constitution shall remain operative until amended, repealedor revoked.

There is nothing on record to show or even suggest that PD No. 771has been repealed, altered or amended by any subsequent law or

presidential issuance (when the executive still exercised legislativepowers (Lim vs Pacquing, GR 115044, Jan. 27, 1995).

4. REQUISITES OF JUDICIAL REVIEW

1. Actual case or controversy


9/23

a. ripenessb. mootness

2. Proper party3. Question must be raised at the earliest possible time4. Constitutional Question Must Be the Very Lis Mota of the Case

a. Actual Case or Controversy

Actual case or controversy a conflict of legal rights, an assertion ofopposite legal claims susceptible of judicial determination.

CASES

y An actual case or controversy means an existing case or controversythat is appropriate or ripe for determination, not conjectural or

anticipatory. It cannot be disputed that there is yet no actual case orcontroversy involving all or any of the private respondents on onehand, and all or any of the petitioners on the other, with respect torights or obligations under R.A. No. 8050. (Board of Optometry vs. Colet,GR 122241, July 30, 1996).

y The requirements before a litigant can challenge the constitutionalityof a law are well-delineated. They are: (1) there must be an actualcase or controversy; (2) the question of constitutionality must beraised by the proper party; (3) the constitutional question must beraised at the earliest possible opportunity; and (4) the decision on the

constitutional question must be necessary to the determination of thecase itself.

Petitioners have far from complied with these requirements. Thepetition is premised on the occurrence of many contingent events,i.e., that Mayor Binay will run again in this coming mayoraltyelections; that he would be re-elected in said elections; and that hewould seek re-election for the same post in the 1998 elections.Considering that these contingencies may or may not happen,petitioners merely pose a hypothetical issue which has yet to ripen toan actual case or controversy. Petitioners who are residents ofTaguig(except Mariano) are not also the proper parties to raise this abstractissue. Worse, they hoist this futuristic issue in a petition fordeclaratory relief over which this Court has no jurisdiction (Mariano vs.COMELEC, 242 SCRA 211).


10/23

y In actions involving constitutional issues, the firmly settled rule isthat a constitutional question will not be heard and resolved by thecourts unless the following requirements of judicial inquiry are met:

(1) the existence of an actual case or controversy;

(2) the party raising the constitutional issue must have a personaland substantial interest in the resolution thereof;(3) the controversy must be raised at the earliest reasonableopportunity; and(4) that the resolution of the constitutional issue must, beindispensable for the final determination of the controversy. 3

Appraising the present proceeding in terms of the foregoingrequirements, the Solicitor General urges that the petition at bar doesnot present a justiciable controversy for having been filedprematurely:

". . . petitioners, who claim to be performing artists, had notpreviously applied with the Secretary of Labor for exemption from thecoverage of the Circular in line with the aforequoted provision. Saidprovision connotes that the prohibition is not at all permanent orabsolute. It admits of exception . . . But to repeat, there is noallegation in the petition that petitioners had previously soughtexemption from the Secretary of Labor, from the coverage of theCircular, before filing the instant petition. Obviously, the petitionmust fail for prematurity."

The Court agrees with the Solicitor General (Fernandez vs. Torres, 215SCRA 489).

y An actual case or controversy means an existing case or controversythat is appropriate or ripe for determination, not conjectural oranticipatory, lest the decision of the court would amount to anadvisory opinion. The power does not extend to hypotheticalquestions since any attempt at abstraction could only lead todialectics and barren legal questions and to sterile conclusionsunrelated to actualities.

Legal standing or locus standihas been defined as a personal andsubstantial interest in the case such that the party has sustained orwill sustain direct injury as a result of the governmental act that isbeing challenged,alleging more than a generalized grievance. The gistof the question of standing is whether a party alleges such personalstake in the outcome of the controversy as to assure that concreteadverseness which sharpens the presentation of issues upon which


11/23

the court depends for illumination of difficult constitutionalquestions. Unless a person is injuriously affected in any of hisconstitutional rights by the operation of statute or ordinance, he hasno standing (La Bugal B'laa, Tribal Assn. vs. DENR Secretary, GR 127882, Jan.27, 2004).

y In seeking to nullify an act of the Philippine Senate on the groundthat it contravenes the Constitution, the petition no doubt raises a justiciable controversy. Where an action of the legislative branch isseriously alleged to have infringed the Constitution, it becomes notonly the right but in fact the duty of the judiciary to settle thedispute. "The question thus posed is judicial rather than political.The duty (to adjudicate) remains to assure that the supremacy of theConstitution is upheld." Once a "controversy as to the application orinterpretation of a constitutional provision is raised before this Court(as in the instant case), it becomes a legal issue which the Court is

bound by constitutional mandate to decide." The jurisdiction of thisCourt to adjudicate the matters raised in the petition is clearly setout in the 1987 Constitution which emphasizes the judicialdepartment's duty and power to strike down grave abuse of discretionon the part of any branch or instrumentality of government includingCongress. As the Court has repeatedly and firmly emphasized inmany cases, it will not shirk, digress from or abandon its sacred dutyand authority to uphold the Constitution in matters that involvegrave abuse of discretion brought before it in appropriate cases,committed by any officer, agency, instrumentality or department ofthe government. As the petition alleges grave abuse of discretion

and as there is no other plain, speedy or adequate remedy in theordinary course of law, we have no hesitation at all in holding thatthis petition should be given due course and the vital questionsraised therein ruled upon under Rule 65 of the Rules of Court.Indeed, certiorari, prohibition and mandamus are appropriateremedies to raise constitutional issues and to review and/orprohibit/nullify, when proper, acts of legislative and executiveofficials. On this, we have no equivocation. We should stress that, indeciding to take jurisdiction over this petition, this Court will notreview the wisdom of the decision of the President and the Senate inenlisting the country into the WTO, or pass upon the merits of trade

liberalization as a policy espoused by said international body. Neitherwill it rule on the propriety of the government's economic policy ofreducing/removing tariffs, taxes, subsidies, quantitative restrictions,and other import/trade barriers. Rather, it will only exercise itsconstitutional duty "to determine whether or not there had been agrave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction"


12/23

on the part of the Senate in ratifying the WTO Agreement and itsthree annexes (Tanada, et. al. vs. Angara, et. al., GR 118295, May 2, 1997) .

i) Ripeness

CASES

y Issue: Did Lyons's injunction against the use of police chokeholdsmeet the threshold requirements imposed by Article III of theConstitution? The Court held that federal courts were without jurisdiction to entertain Lyons' claim for injunctive relief. The factthat Lyons had been choked once did nothing to establish "a real andimmediate threat that he would again be stopped. . .by an officer whowould illegally choke him into unconsciousness." The Court held that

in order to establish an actual controversy, Lyons would have toshow either 1) that all Los Angeles police officers always chokedcitizens with whom they had encounters, or 2) that the City orderedor authorized officers to act in such a manner. Lyons was thuslimited to suing the police and the city for individual damages.

Lyons case is not ripe because of the speculative nature of his claim.Predictions of future behavior are beyond the courts functions. Therule is that, ripeness arises when an actual case has ripened ormatured into a controversy worthy of adjudication. (City of Los Angelesvs. Lyons, 449 US 934).

ii) Mootness

CASES

y A moot and academic case is one that ceases to present a justiciablecontroversy by virtue of supervening events, so that a declarationthereon would be of no practical use or value. Generally, courtsdecline jurisdiction over such case or dismiss it on ground ofmootness. The Court holds that President Arroyos issuance of PP1021 did not render the present petitions moot and academic.During the eight (8) days that PP 1017 was operative, the policeofficers, according to petitioners, committed illegal acts inimplementing it. Are PP 1017 and G.O. No. 5 constitutional or valid?Do they justify these alleged illegal acts? These are the vital issuesthat must be resolved in the present petitions. It must be stressed


13/23

that an unconstitutional act is not a law, it confers no rights, itimposes no duties, it affords no protection; it is in legalcontemplation, inoperative.

The moot and academic principle is not a magical formula that can

automatically dissuade the courts in resolving a case. Courts willdecide cases, otherwise moot and academic, if:

first, there is a grave violation of the Constitution;second, the exceptional character of the situation and the paramountpublic interest is involved;third, when constitutional issue raised requires formulation ofcontrolling principles to guide the bench, the bar, and the public; andfourth, the case is capable of repetition yet evading review(David vs. Macapagal-Arroyo, GR 171396, May 03, 2006).

y After being denied admission to a state-operated law school,petitioner brought this suit on behalf of himself alone for injunctiverelief, claiming that the school's admissions policy raciallydiscriminated against him in violation of the Equal Protection Clauseof the Fourteenth Amendment. The Court held that becausepetitioner will complete law school at the end of the term for which hehas registered regardless of any decision this Court might reach onthe merits, the Court cannot, consistently with the limitations of Art.III of the Constitution, consider the substantive constitutional issues,and the case is moot.

(a) Mootness here does not depend upon a "voluntary cessation" ofthe school's admissions practices but upon the simple fact thatpetitioner is in his final term, and the school's fixed policy to permithim to complete the term.

(b) The case presents no question that is "capable of repetition, yetevading review," since petitioner will never again have to go throughthe school's admissions process, and since it does not follow that theissue petitioner raises will in the future evade review merely becausethis case did not reach the Court until the eve of petitioner'sgraduation (DeFunis vs. Odegaard, 416 US 312, 40 L.Ed. 343).

b. Proper PartyConstitutional question must be raised by the proper party one whohas sustained or in imminent danger of sustaining an injury as a resultof the act complained of.


14/23

i)

CASES

y The court was tasked to determine if the rules of standing should beconsidered part of the 'case or controversy' clause of Article III of theConstitution or, apart from that, if the court can hear cases on"generalized grievances" or in the interest of third parties where noneof the complaintants have standing. The court found that as none ofthe plaintiffs could demonstrate any injury actually done to them bythe defendants, the plaintiffs were third parties to the issue and hadno standing to sue. The plaintiff's descriptions of their own meagerfinancial situations and subsequent inability to live in Penfield werefound by the Court to be the consequence of the economics and

housing market of the area rather than any wrong doing by thedefendants (Warth vs. Seldin, 422 US 490, 45 L.Ed.2d, 343).

y Tanada vs. Angara, GR 118295, May 2, 1997, supra.

ii) Representative

Standing

iii) Jus Tertii

standing

CASES

y The Supreme Court was called upon to determine whether a statutethat denies the sale of beer to individuals of the same age based ontheir gender violates the Equal Protection Clause. Additionally, theSupreme Court examined jus tertii (third party rights), in this casethe vendor of the 3.2% beer. The Court held that the gender

classifications made by the Oklahoma statute were unconstitutionalbecause the statistics relied on by the state were insufficient to showa substantial relationship between the statute and the benefitsintended to stem from it. Furthermore, the Court found that analysisof the Equal Protection Clause in this case had not been changed. Asto third party rights, the court, expanding on the doctrine ofstanding, held that the vendors of 3.2% beer will be economicallyaffected due to the restrictive nature of the sales to males between 18


15/23

and 20. To have standing, one must show a "nexus" of the injury tothemselves and the constitutional violation of the statute. In thiscase, the statute only directly affects plaintiff Craig. Only indirectlydoes it affect the vendor, Whitener, the third party. The SupremeCourt explains that Whitener and other vendors have standing "by

acting as advocates of the rights of third parties who seek access totheir market or function" (Craig vs Boren, 429 US 190, 50 L.Ed.2d. 343).

iv) Transcendental importance to thep

CASES

y Respondents claimed that petitioners had no legal standing to initiatethe instant action. Petitioners, however, countered that the actionwas filed by them in their capacity as Senators and as taxpayers.The prevailing doctrines in taxpayer's suits are to allow taxpayers toquestion contracts entered into by the national government orgovernment-owned or controlled corporations allegedly incontravention of the law and to disallow the same when onlymunicipal contracts are involved. For as long as the ruling inKilosbayanon locus standi is not reversed, we have no choice but tofollow it and uphold the legal standing of petitioners as taxpayers toinstitute the present action (Tatad vs. Garcia, 243 SCRA 436).

yOn the locus standi of the petitioners, the Court resolved the issue intheir favor. A party's standing before the Court is a proceduraltechnicality which it may, in the exercise of its discretion, set aside inview of the importance of the issues raised. In the landmarkEmergency Powers Cases, the Court brushed aside this technicalitybecause "the transcendental importance to the public of these casesdemands that they be settled promptly and definitely, brushing aside,if we must, technicalities of procedure. (Avelino vs. Cuenco, G.R. No.L-2821)." Insofar as taxpayers' suits are concerned, this Court haddeclared that it "is not devoid of discretion as to whether or not itshould be entertained," or that it "enjoys an open discretion to

entertain the same or not (Kilosbayan vs. Guingona, 232 SCRA 110).

y Issue: Whether or not petitioners possess the legal standing to filethe instant petition. The Supreme Court ruled in the negative.Standing is a special concern in constitutional law because somecases are brought not by parties who have been personally injured bythe operation of the law or by official action taken, but by concernedcitizens, taxpayers or voters who actually sue in the public interest.


16/23

Petitioners do not in fact show what particularized interest they havefor bringing this suit. And they do not have present substantialinterest in the Equipment Lease Agreement (ELA) as would entitlethem to bring this suit (Kilosabayan vs. Morato, 246 SCRA 540).

y It is insisted that this Court has in the past accorded standing totaxpayers and concerned citizens in cases involving "paramountpublic interest." Taxpayers, voters, concerned citizens and legislatorshave indeed been allowed to sue but then only

(1) in cases involving constitutional issues and(2) under certain conditions. Petitioners do not meet theserequirements on standing.

Taxpayers are allowed to sue, for example, where there is a claim ofillegal disbursement of public funds, or where a tax measure is

assailed as unconstitutional. Voters are allowed to question thevalidity of election laws because of their obvious interest in thevalidity of such laws. Concerned citizens can bring suits if theconstitutional question they raise is of "transcendental importance"which must be settled early. Legislators are allowed to sue toquestion the validity of any official action which they claim infringestheir prerogatives qua legislators. Petitioners do not have the samekind of interest that these various litigants have. Petitioners assert aninterest as taxpayers, but they do not meet the standing requirementfor bringing taxpayer's suits as set forth in Dumlao v. Comelec, 95SCRA 392, 403 (1980), to wit:

While, concededly, the elections to be held involve the expenditure ofpublic moneys, nowhere in their Petition do said petitioners allege thattheir tax money is "being extracted and spent in violation of specificconstitutional protections against abuses of legislative power", or thatthere is a misapplication of such funds by respondent COMELEC , orthat public money is being deflected to any improper purpose.Neither do petitioners seek to restrain respondent from wastingpublic funds through the enforcement of an invalid orunconstitutional law. Besides, the institution of a taxpayer's suit, perse, is no assurance of judicial review. As held by this Court in Tan vs.

Macapagal (43 SCRA 677 [1972]), speaking through our present ChiefJustice, this Court is vested with discretion as to whether or not ataxpayer's suit should be entertained. Petitioners' suit does not fallunder any of these categories of taxpayers' suits (Kilosbayan vs. Morato(Recon), GR 118910, Nov. 16, 1995).


17/23

v) Standing ofmembers of Congress

CASES

y Where the veto is claimed to have been made without or in excess ofthe authority vested on the President by the Constitution, the issue ofan impermissible intrusion of the Executive into the domain of theLegislature arises. It is true that the Constitution provides amechanism for overriding a veto (Art. VI, Sec. 27 [1]). Said remedy,however, is available only when the presidential veto is based onpolicy or political considerations but not when the veto is claimed tobe ultra vires. In the latter case, it becomes the duty of the Court todraw the dividing line where the exercise of executive power ends and

the bounds of legislative jurisdiction begin (Philconsa vs. Enriquez, 235SCRA 506).

y PETRON questions the locus standiof petitioners to file the action(Rollo, pp. 479-484). Petitioners however, countered that they filedthe action in their capacity as members of Congress.

In Philippine Constitution Association v. Hon. Salvador Enriquez, G.R.No. 113105, August 19, 1994, we held that the members of Congresshave the legal standing to question the validity of acts of theExecutive which injures them in their person or the institution of

Congress to which they belong. In the latter case, the acts causederivative but nonetheless substantial injury which can bequestioned by members of Congress (Kennedy v. James, 412 F. Supp.353 [1976]). In the absence of a claim that the contract in questionviolated the rights of petitioners or impermissibly intruded into thedomain of the Legislature, petitioners have no legal standing toinstitute the instant action in their capacity as members of Congress.

However, petitioners can bring the action in their capacity astaxpayers under the doctrine laid down in Kilosbayan, Inc. v.Guingona, 232 SCRA 110 (1994). Under said ruling, taxpayers mayquestion contracts entered into by the national government orgovernment-owned or controlled corporations alleged to be incontravention of the law. As long as the ruling in Kilosbayanon locusstandi is not reversed, we have no choice but to follow it and upholdthe legal standing of petitioners as taxpayers to institute the presentaction (Bagatsing vs. Committee on Privatization, GR 112399, July 14, 1995).


18/23

vi) Standing of Integrated Bar of thePhilippines

CASES

y The IBP has not sufficiently complied with the requisites of standingin this case.

"Legal standing" or locus standi has been defined as a personal andsubstantial interest in the case such that the party has sustained orwill sustain direct injury as a result of the governmental act that isbeing challenged. The term "interest" means a material interest, aninterest in issue affected by the decree, as distinguished from mereinterest in the question involved, or a mere incidental interest. Thegist of the question of standing is whether a party alleges such

personal stake in the outcome of the controversy as to assure thatconcrete adverseness which sharpens the presentation of issues uponwhich the court depends for illumination of difficult constitutionalquestions. In the case at bar, the IBP primarily anchors its standingon its alleged responsibility to uphold the rule of law and theConstitution. Apart from this declaration, however, the IBP asserts noother basis in support of its locus standi The mere invocation by theIBP of its duty to preserve the rule of law and nothing more, whileundoubtedly true, is not sufficient to clothe it with standing in thiscase. This is too general an interest which is shared by other groupsand the whole citizenry.

Having stated the foregoing, it must be emphasized that this Courthas the discretion to take cognizance of a suit which does not satisfythe requirement of legal standing when paramount interest isinvolved. In not a few cases, the Court has adopted a liberal attitudeon the locus standi of a petitioner where the petitioner is able to craftan issue of transcendental significance to the people. Thus, when theissues raised are of paramount importance to the public, the Courtmay brush aside technicalities of procedure. 18 In this case, areading of the petition shows that the IBP has advancedconstitutional issues which deserve the attention of this Court in view

of their seriousness, novelty and weight as precedents. Moreover,because peace and order are under constant threat and lawlessviolence occurs in increasing tempo, undoubtedly aggravated by theMindanao insurgency problem, the legal controversy raised in thepetition almost certainly will not go away. It will stare us in the faceagain. It, therefore, behooves the Court to relax the rules on standing


19/23

and to resolve the issue now, rather than later (IBP vs Zamora, GR141284, Aug. 15, 2000).

vii) Standing of the

Government toquestion its own laws

CASES

y Issue: Whether the People of the Philippines, through the SolicitorGeneral and Fiscal of the City of Manila, is a proper party in presentcase. The Court held that the People of the Philippines, representedby the Solicitor-General and the Fiscal of the City of Manila, is aproper party in the present proceedings. The unchallenged rule is

that the person who impugns the validity of a statute must have apersonal and substantial interest in the case such that he hassustained, or will sustained, direct injury as a result of itsenforcement. It goes without saying that if Act 4221 really violates theconstitution, the People of the Philippines, in whose name the presentaction is brought, has a substantial interest in having it set aside. Ofgreater import than the damage caused by the illegal expenditure ofpublic funds is the mortal wound inflicted upon the fundamental lawby the enforcement of an invalid statute. Hence, the well-settled rulethat the state can challenge the validity of its own laws (People vs. Vera,65 Phil. 56).

viii) Taxpayers SuitsTwo (2) requisites of Taxpayers suits:1. Public funds are disbursed by a political subdivision or

instrumentality, and

2. A law is violated or some irregularity is committed and that thepetitioner is directly affected by the alleged ultra viresact.

CASES

y In the case before us, petitioners failed to show, to the satisfaction ofthis Court, that they have sustained, or are in danger of sustainingany direct injury as a result of the enforcement of the VFA. Astaxpayers, petitioners have not established that the VFA involves the


20/23

exercise by Congress of its taxing or spending powers. On this point,it bears stressing that a taxpayer's suit refers to a case where the actcomplained of directly involves the illegal disbursement of publicfunds derived from taxation.

Notwithstanding, in view of the paramount importance and theconstitutional significance of the issues raised in the petitions, thisCourt, in- the exercise of its sound discretion, brushes aside theprocedural barrier and takes cognizance of the petitions, as we havedone in the early Emergency Powers Cases, 20 where we hadoccasion to rule:

". . . ordinary citizens and taxpayers were allowed to question theconstitutionality of several executive orders issued by PresidentQuirino although they were involving only an indirect and generalinterest shared in common with the public. The Court dismissed the

objection that they were not proper parties and ruled that'transcendental importance to the public of these cases demands thatthey be settled promptly and definitely, brushing aside, if we must,technicalities of procedure (Bayan vs. Zamora, GR 138570, Oct. 10, 2000).

y Petitioner has not shown that he has sustained or is in danger ofsustaining any personal injury attributable to the creation of thePreparatory Commission on Constitutional Reform (PCCR). In otherwords, petitioner must show that he is a real party in interest thathe will stand to be benefited or injured by the judgment or that hewill be entitled to the avails of the suit. Nowhere in his pleadings

does petitioner presume to make such a representation. If at all, it isonly Congress, not petitioner, which can claim any "injury" in thiscase since, according to petitioner, the President has encroachedupon the legislature's powers to create a public office and to proposeamendments to the Charter by forming the PCCR. A taxpayer isdeemed to have the standing to raise a constitutional issue when it isestablished that public funds have been disbursed in allegedcontravention of the law or the Constitution. Thus, a taxpayer'saction is properly brought only when there is an exercise by Congressof its taxing or spending power (Gonzales vs. Narvasa, GR 140835, Aug. 14,2000).

c. Question must be raised at the earliest possibleopportunity.

General Rule : must be raised in the pleadings.


21/23

Exceptions :a. criminal cases at any time at the discretion of the court;b. civil cases at any stage of the proceedings if necessary

for the determination of the case itself;c. every case (except where there is estoppel) at any stage

if it involves the jurisdiction of the court.

d. Constitutional question must the very "lismota" of

the case

lis motaa controversy begun.

Determination of constitutionality of the statute must be necessary to afinal determination of the case (People vs. Vera, 65 Phil. 56).

Therefore, the following must be avoided:Political questions;Advisory opinions;Moot and academic issues;No standing.

4. DOCTRINE OF PURPOSEFUL HESITATION

CASES

y In the exercise of this jurisdiction, lower courts are advised to actwith the utmost circumspection, bearing in mind the consequences ofa declaration of unconstitutionality upon the stability of laws, no lessthan on the doctrine of separation of powers. As the questioned act isusually the handiwork of the legislative or the executive departments,or both, it will be prudent for such courts, if only out of a becomingmodesty, to defer to the higher judgment of this Court in theconsideration of its validity, which is better determined after athorough deliberation by a collegiate body and with the concurrence

of the majority of those who participated in its discussion.

It is also emphasized that every court, including this Court, ischarged with the duty of a purposeful hesitation before declaring alaw unconstitutional, on the theory that the measure was firstcarefully studied by the executive and the legislative departmentsand determined by them to be in accordance with the fundamental


22/23

law before it was finally approved. To doubt is to sustain. Thepresumption of constitutionality can be overcome only by the clearestshowing that there was indeed an infraction of the Constitution, andonly when such a conclusion is reached by the required majority maythe Court pronounce, in the discharge of the duty it cannot escape,

that the challenged act must be struck down (Drilon vs. Lim, GR 112497,Aug. 04, 1994).

5. EFFECTS OF DECLARATION OF UNCONSTITUTIONALITY

The law is either:

1. void if on its face it does not enjoy any presumption of validitybecause it is patently offensive to the Constitution. It produces noeffect creates no office and imposes no duty. (Igot v. Comelec, 95

SCRA 392).

2. voidable if on its face it enjoys the presumption ofconstitutionality. The law becomes inoperative only upon the judicial declaration of its invalidity; the declaration produces noretroactive effect (Serrano de Agbayani v PNB, 38 SCRA 429).

Doctrine of Operative Fact

Realizes that in declaring a law or rule null and void, undue harshnessand resulting unfairness must be avoided.

CASES

y The strict view considers a legislative enactment which is declaredunconstitutional as being, for all legal intents and purposes, a totalnullity, and it is deemed as if had never existed. Here, of course, werefer to the law itself being per serepugnant to the Constitution. It isnot always the case, however, that a law is constitutionally faultyperse. Thus, it may well be valid in its general import, but invalid in itsapplication to certain factual situations. To exemplify, an otherwise

valid law may be held unconstitutional only insofar as it is allowed tooperate retrospectively such as, in pertinent cases, when it vitiatescontractually vested rights. A judicial declaration of invalidity, it isalso true, may not necessarily obliterate all the effects andconsequences of a void act occurring prior to such a declaration.Thus, in our decisions on the moratorium laws, 6 we have beenconstrained to recognize the interimeffects of said laws prior to their


23/23

declaration of unconstitutionality, but there we have likewise beenunable to simply ignore strong considerations of equity and fair play.So also, even as a practical matter, a situation that may aptly bedescribed as fait accomplimay no longer be open for further inquiry,let alone to be unsettled by a subsequent declaration of nullity of a

governing statute (Republic vs. CA, GR 79732, Nov. 8, 1993).

6. RELATIVE CONSTITUTIONALITY

CASES

y The constitutionality of a statute cannot, in every instance, bedetermined by a mere comparison of its provisions with applicableprovisions of the Constitution, since the statute may be

constitutionally valid as applied to one set of facts and invalid in itsapplication to another.

A statute valid at one time may become void at another time becauseof altered circumstances. Thus, if a statute in its practical operationbecomes arbitrary or confiscatory, its validity, even though affirmedby a former adjudication, is open to inquiry and investigation in thelight of changed conditions (Central Bank Employee Assn, Inc. vs. BSP, GR148208, Dec. 15, 2004).

21492827 Constitutional Law 1 File No 5

Documents

Transcript of 21492827 Constitutional Law 1 File No 5