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WILFREDO M. CATU,                             A.C. No. 5738                         Complainant,                                                                              Present:                                                                    PUNO, C.J., Chairperson,                                                                    SANDOVAL-GUTIERREZ,             -  v e r s u s  -                                 CORONA,

                                                         AZCUNA and                                                                   LEONARDO-DE CASTRO, JJ. ATTY. VICENTE G. RELLOSA,                          Respondent.            Promulgated:                                                                  

February 19, 2008x - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - -x 

R E S O L U T I O NCORONA, J.:           Complainant Wilfredo M. Catu is a co-owner of a lot [1] and the building erected thereon located at 959 San Andres Street, Malate, Manila. His mother and brother, Regina Catu and Antonio Catu, contested the possession of Elizabeth C. Diaz-Catu[2] and Antonio Pastor[3] of one of the units in the building. The latter ignored demands for them to vacate the premises. Thus, a complaint was initiated against them in the Lupong Tagapamayapa of Barangay 723, Zone 79 of the 5th District of Manila[4] where the parties reside.

 Respondent, as punong barangay of Barangay 723, summoned the parties to conciliation meetings.[5] When

the parties failed to arrive at an amicable settlement, respondent issued a certification for the filing of the appropriate action in court.           Thereafter, Regina and Antonio filed a complaint for ejectment against Elizabeth and Pastor in the Metropolitan Trial Court of Manila, Branch 11. Respondent entered his appearance as counsel for the defendants in that case. Because of this, complainant filed the instant administrative complaint,[6] claiming that respondent committed an act of

impropriety as a lawyer and as a public officer when he stood as counsel for the defendants despite the fact that he presided over the conciliation proceedings between the litigants aspunong barangay.           In his defense, respondent claimed that one of his duties as punong barangay was to hear complaints referred to the barangay’s Lupong Tagapamayapa. As such, he heard the complaint of Regina and Antonio against Elizabeth and Pastor. As head of the Lupon, he performed his task with utmost objectivity, without bias or partiality towards any of the parties. The parties, however, were not able to amicably settle their dispute and Regina and Antonio filed the ejectment case. It was then that Elizabeth sought his legal assistance. He acceded to her request. He handled her case for free because she was financially distressed and he wanted to prevent the commission of a patent injustice against her.           The complaint was referred to the Integrated Bar of the Philippines (IBP) for investigation, report and recommendation. As there was no factual issue to thresh out, the IBP’s Commission on Bar Discipline (CBD) required the parties to submit their respective position papers. After evaluating the contentions of the parties, the IBP-CBD found sufficient ground to discipline respondent.[7]

 According to the IBP-CBD, respondent admitted that, as punong barangay, he presided over the conciliation

proceedings and heard the complaint of Regina and Antonio against Elizabeth and Pastor. Subsequently, however, he represented Elizabeth and Pastor in the ejectment case filed against them by Regina and Antonio. In the course thereof, he prepared and signed pleadings including the answer with counterclaim, pre-trial brief, position paper and notice of appeal. By so doing, respondent violated Rule 6.03 of the Code of Professional Responsibility:

 Rule 6.03 – A lawyer shall not, after leaving government service, accept engagement or

employment in connection with any matter in which he intervened while in said service. Furthermore, as an elective official, respondent contravened the prohibition under Section 7(b)(2) of RA

6713:[8] SEC. 7. Prohibited Acts and Transactions. – In addition to acts and omissions of public

officials and employees now prescribed in the Constitution and existing laws, the following shall constitute prohibited acts and transactions of any public official ands employee and are hereby declared to be unlawful:

 xxx                  xxx                   xxx

 (b)       Outside employment and other activities related thereto. – Public officials and employees during their incumbency shall not:

 xxx                  xxx                   xxx

           (2)        Engage in the private practice of profession unless authorized by the Constitution or law, provided that such practice will not conflict or tend to conflict with their official functions; xxx (emphasis supplied)

 According to the IBP-CBD, respondent’s violation of this prohibition constituted a breach of Canon 1 of the

Code of Professional Responsibility: CANON 1. A LAWYER SHALL UPHOLD THE CONSTITUTION, OBEY THE LAWS OF THE LAND, PROMOTE RESPECT FOR LAW AND LEGAL PROCESSES. (emphasis supplied) For these infractions, the IBP-CBD recommended the respondent’s suspension from the practice of law for

one month with a stern warning that the commission of the same or similar act will be dealt with more severely. [9] This was adopted and approved by the IBP Board of Governors.[10]

 We modify the foregoing findings regarding the transgression of respondent as well as the recommendation

on the imposable penalty. RULE        6.03      OF     THE         CODEOF PROFESSIONAL RESPONSIBILITY APPLIES ONLY TO FORMER GOVERNMENT LAWYERS

 Respondent cannot be found liable for violation of Rule 6.03 of the Code of Professional Responsibility. As

worded, that Rule applies only to a lawyer who has left government service and in connection “with any matter in which he intervened while in said service.” In PCGG v. Sandiganbayan,[11] we ruled that Rule 6.03 prohibits former government lawyers from accepting “engagement or employment in connection with any matter in which [they] had intervened while in said service.”

 Respondent was an incumbent punong barangay at the time he committed the act complained of. Therefore,

he was not covered by that provision.  

SECTION 90 OF RA 7160, NOT SECTION 7(B)(2) OF RA 6713, GOVERNS THE PRACTICE OF PROFESSION OF ELECTIVE LOCAL GOVERNMENT OFFICIALS 

Section 7(b)(2) of RA 6713 prohibits public officials and employees, during their incumbency, from engaging in the private practice of their profession “unless authorized by the Constitution or law, provided that such practice will not conflict or tend to conflict with their official functions.” This is the general law which applies to all public officials and employees.

For elective local government officials, Section 90 of RA 7160[12] governs:SEC. 90. Practice of Profession. – (a) All governors, city and municipal mayors are

prohibited from practicing their profession or engaging in any occupation other than the exercise of their functions as local chief executives.

(b) Sanggunian members may practice their professions, engage in any occupation, or teach in schools except during session hours: Provided, That sanggunian members who are members of the Bar shall not:

(1) Appear as counsel before any court in any civil case wherein a local government unit or any office, agency, or instrumentality of the government is the adverse party;

(2) Appear as counsel in any criminal case wherein an officer or employee of the national or local government is accused of an offense committed in relation to his office;

(3) Collect any fee for their appearance in administrative proceedings involving the local government unit of which he is an official; and

(4) Use property and personnel of the Government except when the sanggunian member concerned is defending the interest of the Government.(c) Doctors of medicine may practice their profession even during official hours of work only on occasions of emergency: Provided, That the officials concerned do not derive monetary compensation therefrom.

 This is a special provision that applies specifically to the practice of profession by elective local officials. As a

special law with a definite scope (that is, the practice of profession by elective local officials), it constitutes an exception to Section 7(b)(2) of RA 6713, the general law on engaging in the private practice of profession by public officials and employees. Lex specialibus derogat generalibus.[13]

 Under RA 7160, elective local officials of provinces, cities, municipalities and barangays are the following: the

governor, the vice governor and members of the sangguniang panlalawigan for provinces; the city mayor, the city vice mayor and the members of the sangguniang panlungsod for cities; the municipal mayor, the municipal vice mayor and the members of the sangguniang bayan for municipalities and the punong barangay, the members of the sangguniang barangay and the members of the sangguniang kabataan for barangays.

 Of these elective local officials, governors, city mayors and municipal mayors are prohibited from practicing

their profession or engaging in any occupation other than the exercise of their functions as local chief executives. This is because they are required to render full time service. They should therefore devote all their time and attention to the performance of their official duties.

 On the other hand, members of the sangguniang panlalawigan, sangguniang panlungsod or sangguniang

bayan may practice their professions, engage in any occupation, or teach in schools except during session hours. In other words, they may practice their professions, engage in any occupation, or teach in schools outside their session

hours. Unlike governors, city mayors and municipal mayors, members of the sangguniang panlalawigan, sangguniang panlungsod or sangguniang bayan are required to hold regular sessions only at least once a week.[14] Since the law itself grants them the authority to practice their professions, engage in any occupation or teach in schools outside session hours, there is no longer any need for them to secure prior permission or authorization from any other person or office for any of these purposes.

 While, as already discussed, certain local elective officials (like governors, mayors, provincial board members

and councilors) are expressly subjected to a total or partial proscription to practice their profession or engage in any occupation, no such interdiction is made on the punong barangay and the members of the sangguniang barangay.Expressio unius est exclusio alterius.[15] Since they are excluded from any prohibition, the presumption is that they are allowed to practice their profession. And this stands to reason because they are not mandated to serve full time. In fact, the sangguniang barangay is supposed to hold regular sessions only twice a month.[16]

 Accordingly, as punong barangay, respondent was not forbidden to practice his profession. However, he

should have procured prior permission or authorization from the head of his Department, as required by civil service regulations.

 A LAWYER IN GOVERNMENT SERVICE WHO IS NOT PROHIBITED TO PRACTICE LAW MUST SECURE PRIOR AUTHORITY FROM THE HEAD OF HIS DEPARTMENT            A civil service officer or employee whose responsibilities do not require his time to be fully at the disposal of the government can engage in the private practice of law only with the written permission of the head of the department concerned.[17] Section 12, Rule XVIII of the Revised Civil Service Rules provides: 

Sec. 12. No officer or employee shall engage directly in any private business, vocation, or profession or be connected with any commercial, credit, agricultural, or industrial undertaking without a written permission from the head of the Department : Provided, That this prohibition will be absolute in the case of those officers and employees whose duties and responsibilities require that their entire time be at the disposal of the Government;  Provided, further, That if an employee is granted permission to engage in outside activities, time so devoted outside of office hours should be fixed by the agency to the end that it will not impair in any way the efficiency of the officer or employee: And provided, finally, that no permission is necessary in the case of investments, made by an officer or employee, which do not involve real or apparent conflict between his private interests and public duties, or in any way influence him in the discharge of his duties, and he shall not take part in the management of the enterprise or become an officer of the board of directors. (emphasis supplied)

 As punong barangay, respondent should have therefore obtained the prior written permission of the

Secretary of Interior and Local Government before he entered his appearance as counsel for Elizabeth and Pastor. This he failed to do.

           The failure of respondent to comply with Section 12, Rule XVIII of the Revised Civil Service Rules constitutes a violation of his oath as a lawyer: to obey the laws. Lawyers are servants of the law, vires legis, men of the law. Their paramount duty to society is to obey the law and promote respect for it. To underscore the primacy and importance of this duty, it is enshrined as the first canon of the Code of Professional Responsibility.           In acting as counsel for a party without first securing the required written permission, respondent not only engaged in the unauthorized practice of law but also violated civil service rules which is a breach of Rule 1.01 of the Code of Professional Responsibility:         

Rule 1.01 – A lawyer shall not engage in unlawful, dishonest, immoral or deceitful conduct. (emphasis supplied)

           For not living up to his oath as well as for not complying with the exacting ethical standards of the legal profession, respondent failed to comply with Canon 7 of the Code of Professional Responsibility:

 CANON 7. A LAWYER SHALL AT ALL TIMES UPHOLD THE INTEGRITY AND THE DIGNITY OF THE LEGAL PROFESSION AND SUPPORT THE ACTIVITIES OF THE INTEGRATED BAR. (emphasis supplied)

 Indeed, a lawyer who disobeys the law disrespects it. In so doing, he disregards legal ethics and disgraces

the dignity of the legal profession. Public confidence in the law and in lawyers may be eroded by the irresponsible and improper conduct of a

member of the bar.[18] Every lawyer should act and comport himself in a manner that promotes public confidence in the integrity of the legal profession.[19]

 A member of the bar may be disbarred or suspended from his office as an attorney for violation of the

lawyer’s oath[20] and/or for breach of the ethics of the legal profession as embodied in the Code of Professional Responsibility.           WHEREFORE, respondent Atty. Vicente G. Rellosa is hereby found GUILTY of professional misconduct for violating his oath as a lawyer and Canons 1 and 7 and Rule 1.01 of the Code of Professional Responsibility. He is therefore SUSPENDED from the practice of law for a period of six months effective from his receipt of this resolution. He is sternly WARNED that any repetition of similar acts shall be dealt with more severely.           Respondent is strongly advised to look up and take to heart the meaning of the word delicadeza.           Let a copy of this resolution be furnished the Office of the Bar Confidant and entered into the records of respondent Atty. Vicente G. Rellosa.  The Office of the Court Administrator shall furnish copies to all the courts of the land for their information and guidance.

           SO ORDERED.

EN BANCA.C. No. 2505 February 21, 1992

EVANGELINE LEDA, Complainant, vs. ATTY. TREBONIAN TABANG, Respondent.PER CURIAM: Complainant, Evangeline Leda, squarely puts in issue respondent Atty. Trebonian Tabang's good moral character, in two Complaints she had filed against him, one docketed as Bar Matter No. 78 instituted on 6 January 1982, and the present Administrative Case No. 2505, which is a Petition for Disbarment, filed on 14 February 1983.It appears that on 3 October 1976, Respondent and Complainant contracted marriage at Tigbauan, Iloilo. The marriage, solemnized by Judge Jose T. Tavarro of Tigbauan, was performed under Article 76 of the Civil Code 1as one of exceptional character (Annex "A", Petition). The parties agreed to keep the fact of marriage a secret until after Respondent had finished his law studies (began in l977), and had taken the Bar examinations (in 1981), allegedly to ensure a stable future for them. Complainant admits, though, that they had not lived together as husband and wife (Letter-Complaint, 6 January 1982).Respondent finished his law studies in 1981 and thereafter applied to take the Bar. In his application, he declared that he was "single." He then passed the examinations but Complainant blocked him from taking his Oath by instituting Bar Matter No. 78, claiming thatRespondent had acted fraudulently in filling out his application and, thus, was unworthy to take the lawyer's Oath for lack of good moral character. Complainant also alleged that after Respondent's law studies, he became aloof and "abandoned" her (Petition, par. 5).The Court deferred Respondent's Oath-taking and required him to answer the Complaint.Respondent filed his "Explanation," dated 26 May 1982 which was received on 7 June 1982. Said "Explanation" carries Complainant's conformity (Records, p. 6). Therein, he admitted that he was "legally married" to Complainant on 3 October 1976 but that the marriage "was not as yet made and declared public" so that he could proceed with his law studies and until after he could take the Bar examinations "in order to keep stable our future." He also admitted having indicated that he was "single" in his application to take the Bar "for reason that to my honest belief, I have still to declare my status as single since my marriage with the complainant was not as yet made and declared public." He further averred that he and Complainant had reconciled as shown by her conformity to the "Explanation," for which reason he prayed that the Complaint be dismissed.

Respondent also filed a Motion to Dismiss, dated 2 June 1982. Attached to it was Complainant's Affidavit of Desistance, which stated that Bar Matter No. 78 arose out of a misunderstanding and communication gap and that she was refraining from pursuing her Complaint against Respondent.chanroblesvirtualawlibrary chanrobles virtual law libraryActing on the aforesaid Motion and Comment, the Court dismissed Bar Matter No. 78 and allowed Respondent to take his Oath in a Resolution dated 20 August 1982.On 14 February 1983, however, Complainant filed this Administrative Case, this time praying for Respondent's disbarment based on the following grounds:a. For having made use of his legal knowledge to contract an invalid marriage with me assuming that our marriage is not valid, and making a mockery of our marriage institution. b. For having misrepresented himself as single when in truth he is already married in his application to take the bar exam.c. For being not of good moral character contrary to the certification he submitted to the Supreme Court; d. For (sic) guilty of deception for the reason that he deceived me into signing of the affidavit of desistance and the conformity to his explanation and later on the comment to his motion to dismiss, when in truth and in fact he is not sincere, for he only befriended me to resume our marriage and introduced me to his family, friends and relatives as his wife, for a bad motive that is he wanted me to withdraw my complaint against him with the Supreme Court.Attached to Complainant's Petition for Disbarment, as Annex "F," is an undated and unsigned letter addressed to Complainant, allegedlywritten by Respondent after he had already taken his Oath stating, among others, that while he was grateful for Complainant's help, he "could not force myself to be yours," did not love her anymore and considered her only a friend. Their marriage contract was actually void for failure to comply with the requisites of Article 76 of the Civil Code, among them the minimum cohabitation for five (5) years before the celebration of the marriage, an affidavit to that effect by the solemnizing officer, and that the parties must be at least twenty-one (21) years of age, which they were not as they were both only twenty years old at the time. He advised Complainant not to do anything more so as not to put her family name "in shame." As for him, he had "attain(ed) my goal as a full-pledge (sic) professional and there is nothing you can do for it to take away from me even (sic) you go to any court." According to Complainant, although the letter was unsigned, Respondent's initials appear on the upper left-hand corner of the airmail envelope (Exh. "8-A-1"). Respondent denied emphatically that he had sent such a letter contending that it is Complainant who has been indulging in fantasy and fabrications. In his Comment in the present case, Respondent avers that he and Complainant had covenanted not to disclose the marriage not because he wanted to finish his studies and take the Bar first but for the reason that said marriage was void from the beginning in the absence of the requisites of Article 76 of the Civil Code that the contracting parties shall have lived together as husband and wife for at least five (5) years before the date of the marriage and that said parties shall state the same in an affidavit before any person authorized by law to administer oaths. He could not have abandoned Complainant because they had never lived together as husband and wife. When he applied for the 1981 Bar examinations, he honestly believed that in the eyes of the law, he was single. On 7 May 1984, the Court referred the Complaint to the Solicitor General for investigation, report and recommendation. On 5 March 1990, the Solicitor General submitted his Report, with the recommendation that Respondent be exonerated from the charges against him since Complainant failed to attend the hearings and to substantiate her charges but that he be reprimanded for making inconsistent and conflicting statements in the various pleadings he had filed before this Court.On 26 March 1990, the Court referred the Solicitor General's Report to the Bar Confidant for evaluation, report and recommendation. In an undated Report, the latter recommended the indefinite suspension of Respondent until the status of his marriage is settled. Upon the facts on Record even without testimonial evidence from Complainant, we find Respondent's lack of good moral character sufficiently established. Firstly, his declaration in his application for Admission to the 1981 Bar Examinations that he was "single" was a gross misrepresentation of a material fact made in utter bad faith, for which he should be made answerable. Rule 7.01, Canon 7, Chapter II of the Code of Professional Responsibility explicitly provides: "A lawyer shall be answerable for knowingly making a false statement or suppression of a material fact in connection with his application for admission to the bar." That false statement, if it had been known, would have disqualified him outright from taking the Bar Examinations as it indubitably exhibits lack of good moral character. Respondent's protestations that he had acted in good faith in declaring his status as "single" not only because of his pact with Complainant to keep the marriage under wraps but also because that marriage to the Complainant was void from the beginning, are mere afterthoughts absolutely wanting of merit. Respondent can not assume that his marriage to Complainant is void. The presumption is that all the requisites and conditions of a marriage of an exceptional

character under Article 76 of the Civil Code have been met and that the Judge's official duty in connection therewith has been regularly performed.Secondly, Respondent's conduct in adopting conflicting positions in the various pleadings submitted in Bar Matter No. 78 and in the case at bar is duplicitous and deplorable.The records show that in Bar Matter No. 78, Respondent had submitted an "Explanation," in paragraph 1, page 1 of which he admits having been "legally married" to Complainant. Yet, during the hearings before the Solicitor General, he denied under oath that he had submitted any such pleading (t.s.n., p. 21) contending instead that it is only the second page where his signature appears that he meant to admit and not the averments on the first page which were merely of Complainant's own making (ibid., pp. 59-60). However, in his Comment in this Administrative Case, he admits and makes reference to such "Explanation" (pars. 3[f]) and [g]; 4[b]). Again, while in said "Explanation" he admitted having been "legally married" to Complainant (par. 1), in this case, however, he denies the legality of the marriage and, instead, harps on its being void ab initio. He even denies his signature in the marriage contract. In Bar Matter No. 78, Respondent also averred that the fact of marriage was not to be made public so as to allow him to finish his studies and take the Bar. In this case, however, he contends that the reason it was kept a secret was because it was "not in order from the beginning." Thirdly, Respondent denies that he had sent the unsigned letter (Annex "F," Petition) to Complainant. However, its very tenor coincides with the reasons that he advances in his Comment why the marriage is void from the beginning, that is, for failure to comply with the requisites of Article 76 of the Civil Code.Fourthly, the factual scenario gathered from the records shows that Respondent had reconciled with Complainant and admitted the marriage to put a quick finish to Bar Matter No. 78 to enable him to take the lawyer's Oath, which otherwise he would have been unable to do. But after he had done so and had become a "full-pledge (sic) lawyer," he again refused to honor his marriage to Complainant.Respondent's lack of good moral character is only too evident. He has resorted to conflicting submissions before this Court to suit himself.He has also engaged in devious tactics with Complainant in order to serve his purpose. In so doing, he has violated Canon 10 of the Code of Professional Responsibility, which provides that "a lawyer owes candor, fairness and good faith to the court" as well as Rule 1001 thereof which states that "a lawyer should do no falsehood nor consent to the doing of any in Court; nor shall he mislead, or allow the court to be misled by any artifice." Courts are entitled to expect only complete candor and honesty from the lawyers appearing and pleading before them (Chavez v. Viola, Adm. Case No. 2152, 19 April 1991, 196 SCRA 10). Respondent, through his actuations, has been lacking in the candor required of him not only as a member of the Bar but also as an officer of the Court.It cannot be overemphasized that the requirement of good moral character is not only a condition precedent to admission to the practice of law; its continued possession is also essential for remaining in the practice of law (People v. Tuanda, Adm. Case No. 3360, 30 January1990, 181 SCRA 692). As so aptly put by Mr. Justice George A. Malcolm: "As good character is an essential qualification for admission of an attorney to practice, when the attorney's character is bad in such respects as to show that he is unsafe and unfit to be entrusted with the powers of an attorney, the courts retain the power to discipline him (Piatt v. Abordo, 58 Phil. 350 [1933]). WHEREFORE, finding respondent Trebonian C. Tabang grossly unfit and unworthy to continue to be entrusted with the duties and responsibilities belonging to the office of an attorney, he is hereby SUSPENDED from the practice of law until further Orders, the suspension to take effect immediately.Copies of this Decision shall be entered in his personal record as an attorney and served on the Integrated Bar of the Philippines and the Court Administrator who shall circulate the same to all Courts in the country for their information and guidance. SO ORDERED.Endnotes:1 Art. 76. No marriage license shall be necessary when a man and a woman who have attained the age of majority and who, being unmarried, have lived together as husband and wife for at least five years, desire to marry each other. The contracting parties shall state the foregoing facts in an affidavit before any person authorized by law to administer oaths. The official, priest or minister who solemnized the marriage shall also state in an affidavit that he took steps to ascertain the ages and other qualifications of the contracting parties and that he found no legal impediment to the marriage.

EN BANC[A.C. No. 4148.  July 30, 1998]

REMEDIOS RAMIREZ TAPUCAR, complainant, vs. ATTY. LAURO L. TAPUCAR, respondent.D E C I S I O N

PER CURIAM:

In a letter-complaint dated November 22, 1993, complainant Remedios Ramirez Tapucar sought the disbarment of her husband, Atty. Lauro L. Tapucar, on the ground of continuing grossly immoral conduct for cohabiting with a certain Elena (Helen) Peña under scandalous circumstances.[1]

Prior to this complaint, respondent was already administratively charged four times for conduct unbecoming an officer of the court.  in Administrative Matter No. 1740, resolved on April 11, 1980, respondent, at that time the Judge of Butuan City, was meted the penalty of six months suspension without pay,[2] while in Administrative Matter Nos. 1720, 1911 and 2300-CFI, which were consolidated,[3] this Court on January 31, 1981 ordered the separation from service of respondent.[4]

Now he faces disbarment.The records reveal the following facts:From the Report and Recommendation of the Commission on Bar Discipline, it appears that complainant and respondent were married on October 29, 1953 at the Sacred Heart Roman Catholic Church in Quezon City.  They established their residence in Antipolo, Rizal, were eight of their eleven children were born.  In 1962 respondent relocated his family to Dadiangas, Cotabato (Now General Santos City), where his last three children were born and where he practiced his profession until his appointment as a CFI Judge in Butuan City on January 30, 1976.In August, 1976, shortly after being appointed as CFI Judge, respondent began cohabiting with a certain Elena (Helen) Peña, in Nasipit, Agusan Del Norte. On December 28, 1977 Elena gave birth to their first child, named Ofelia Sembrano Peña.In view of this cohabitation, a certain Atty. Tranquilino Calo filed an administrative complaint against respondent for immorality.  After investigation, the penalty of suspension from office for a period of six months without pay was meted by this Court upon respondent.[5]

Despite this penalty, respondent still continued to cohabit with Elena, giving rise to another charge of immorality and other administrative cases, such as conduct unbecoming an officer of the court, and grossly immoral conduct.  These cases were consolidated and after investigation, this Court ordered his dismissal and separation from the service.[6]

But his dismissal as a judge did not impel respondent to mend his ways.  He continued living with Elena, which resulted in the birth on September 20, 1989, of their second child named Laella Peña Tapucar.  Moreover, he completely abandoned complainant and his children by her.Respondent later moved from Nasipit, Agusan del Norte back to Antipolo, Rizal, bringing along Elena and their two children.  And on  March 5, 1992, respondent contracted marriage with Elena in a ceremony solemnized by Metropolitan Trial Court Judge Isagani A. Geronimo of Antipolo, Rizal.  This was done while the respondent’s marriage to complainant subsists, as nothing on record shows the dissolution thereof.Complainant, in the meanwhile, had migrated to United States of America upon her retirement from the government service in 1990.  However, her children, who remained in Antipolo, kept her posted of the misery they allegedly suffered because of their father’s acts, including deception and intrigues against them.  Thus, despite having previously withdrawn a similar case which she filed in 1976, complainant was forced to file the present petition for disbarment under the compulsion of the material impulse to shield and protect her children from the despotic and cruel acts of their own father.  Complainant secured the assistance of her eldest daughter, Atty. Ma. Susana Tapucar-Baua, to represent her in this case.Consistent with Section 20, Rule 139-B of the Rules of Court, the matter was referred to the Commission on Bar Discipline of the Integrated Bar of the Philippines for investigation, report and recommendation.  After conducting a thorough investigation, the Commission through Commissioner Victor C. Fernandez recommended that respondent be disbarred, and his name be stricken off the roll of attorneys.  Mainly, this was premised on the ground that, notwithstanding sanctions previously imposed upon him by the Honorable Supreme Court, respondent continued the illicit liaison with Elena.[7]

In his report Commissioner Fernandez noted that, instead of contradicting the charges against him, respondent displayed arrogance, and even made a mockery of the law and the Court, as when he said:“I have been ordered suspended by Supreme Court for two months without pay in 1980 for having a mistress, the same girl Ms. Elena (Helen) Peña, now my wife.  Being ordered separated in later administrative case constitute double jeopardy.  If now disbarred for marrying Ms. Elena Peña will constitute triple jeopardy.  If that’s the law so be it.”[8]

Based on said report, the Board of Governors of the Integrated Bar of the Philippines, passed on May 17, 1997, a Resolution adopting the Commissioner’s recommendation, as follows:“RESOLUTION NO. XII-97-97Adm. Case No. 4148Remedios Ramirez Tapucar vs. Atty. Lauro L. TapucarRESOLVED to ADOPT and APPROVE, as it is hereby ADOPTED and APPROVED, the Report and Recommendation of the Investigating Commissioner in the above-titled case, herein made part of the Resolution/Decision as Annex “A”; and, finding the recommendation therein to be fully supported by the evidence on record and the applicable laws and rules, Respondent Atty. Lauro L. Tapucar is hereby DISBARRED and that his name be stricken off the roll of attorneys.”

We find the Report and Recommendation of Commissioner Fernandez, as approved and adopted by the Board of Governors of IBP, more than sufficient to justify and support the foregoing Resolution, herein considered as the recommendation to this Court by said Board pursuant to Rule 139-B, Sec. 12(b), of the Rules of Court.* We are in agreement that respondent’s actuations merit the penalty of disbarment.Well settled is the rule that good moral character is not only a condition precedent for admission to the legal profession, but it must also remain intact in order to maintain one’s good standing in that exclusive and honored fraternity.[9] There is perhaps no profession after that of the sacred ministry in which a high-toned morality is more imperative than that of law.[10] The Code of Professional Responsibility mandates that:Rule 1.01.     A lawyer shall not engage in unlawful, dishonest, immoral or deceitful conduct.Rule 7.03 A lawyer shall not engage in conduct that adversely reflects on his fitness to practice law, nor should he, whether in public or private life, behave in a scandalous manner to the discredit of the legal profession.*

As this Court often reminds members of the Bar, they must live up to the standards and norms expected of the legal profession, by upholding the ideals and tenets embodied in the Code of Professional Responsibility always.  Lawyers must maintain a high standards of legal proficiency, as well as morality including honesty, integrity and fair dealing.  For they are at all times subject to the scrutinizing eye of public opinion and community approbation.  Needless to state, those whose conduct – both public and private – fails this scrutiny would have to be disciplined and, after appropriate proceedings, penalized accordingly.Moreover, it should be recalled that respondent here was once a member of the judiciary, a fact that aggravates this professional infractions.  For having occupied that place of honor in the Bench, he knew a judge’s actuations ought to be free from any appearance of impropriety.[11] For a judge is the visible representation of the law, more importantly, of justice.  Ordinary citizens consider him as a source of strength that fortifies their will to obey the law.[12] Indeed, a judge should avoid the slightest infraction of the law in all of his actuations, lest it be a demoralizing example to others.[13] Surely, respondent could not have forgotten the Code of Judicial Conduct entirely as to lose its moral imperatives.[14]

Like a judge who is held to a high standard of integrity and ethical conduct,[15] an attorney-at-law is also invested with public trust.  Judges and lawyers serve in the administration of justice. Admittedly, as officers of the court, lawyers must ensure the faith and confidence of the public that justice is administered with dignity and civility.  A high degree or moral integrity is expected of a lawyer in the community where he resides.  He must maintain due regard for public decency in an orderly society.A lawyer is expected at all times to uphold the integrity and dignity of the legal profession by faithfully performing his duties to society, to the bar, to the courts and to his clients.[16] Exacted from him, as a member of the profession charged with the responsibility to stand as a shield in the defense of what is right, are such positive qualities of decency, truthfulness and responsibility that have been compendiously described as “moral character.” To achieve such end, every lawyer needs to strive at all times to honor and maintain the dignity of his profession, and thus improve not only the public regard for the Bar but also the administration of justice.On these considerations, the Court may disbar or suspend a lawyer for misconduct, whether in his professional or private capacity, which shows him to be wanting in moral character, in honesty, probity, and good demeanor, thus proving unworthy to continue as an officer of the court.[17]

The power to disbar, however, is one to be exercised with great caution, and only in a clear case of misconduct which seriously affects the standing and character of the lawyer as an officer of the Court of and member of the bar.[18] For disbarment proceedings are intended to afford the parties thereto full opportunity to vindicate their cause before disciplinary action is taken, to assure the general public that those who are tasked with the duty of administering justice are competent, honorable, trustworthy men and women in whom the Courts and the clients may repose full confidence.In the case of Obusan vs. Obusan, Jr.,[19] a complaint for disbarment was filed against a member of the bar by his wife.  She was able to prove that he had abandoned his wife and their son; and that he had adulterous relations with a married but separated woman.  Respondent was not able to overcome the evidence presented by his wife that he was guilty of grossly immoral conduct.  In another case,[20] a lawyer was disbarred when he abandoned his lawful wife and cohabited with another woman who had borne him a child.  The Court held that respondent failed to maintain the highest degree of morality expected and required of a member of a bar.In the present case, the record shows that despite previous sanctions imposed upon by this Court, respondent continued his illicit liaison with a woman other than lawfully-wedded wife.  The report of the Commissioner assigned to investigate thoroughly the complaint found respondent far from contrite; on the contrary, he exhibited a cavalier attitude, even arrogance; in the face of charges against him.  The IBP Board of Governors, tasked to determine whether he still merited the privileges extended to a member of the legal profession, resolved the matter against him.  For indeed, evidence of grossly immoral conduct abounds against him and could not be explained away.  Keeping a mistress, entering into another marriage while a prior one still subsists, as well as abandoning and/or mistreating complainant and their children, show his disregard of family obligations, morality and decency, the law and the lawyer’s oath.  Such gross misbehavior over a long period of time clearly shows a serious flaw in respondent’s character, his moral indifference to scandal in the community, and his outright defiance of established norms.  All these could not but

put the legal profession in disrepute and place the integrity of the administration of justice in peril, hence the need for strict but appropriate disciplinary action.IN VIEW THEREOF, respondent Atty. Lauro L. Tapucar is hereby DISBARRED.  The Clerk of Court is directed to strike out his name from the Roll of Attorneys.SO ORDERED.

EN BANCG.R. No. L-24114 June 30, 1970

IN THE MATTER OF PROCEEDINGS FOR DISCIPLINARY ACTION AGAINST ATTY. CLEMENTE M. SORIANO IN L-24114, People's Homesite and Housing Corporation and University of the Philippines, 

vs.HON. EULOGIO MENCIAS, ELPIDIO TIBURCIO, MARCELINO TIBURCIO, ET AL.

R E S O L U T I O NCASTRO, J.:By virtue of a pleading entitled "Appearance" filed with this Court on October 10, 1969, Clemente M. Soriano, a member of the Philippine Bar since January 19, 1954, entered his appearance in the present case (L-24114, PHHC and U.P. vs. Mencias, Tiburcio, et al.) as "chief counsel of record" for the respondents Marcelino Tiburcio, et al. This act in itself would have been innocuous were it not for the fact that it was done one year and eight months after the decision in this case became final. Wittingly or unwittingly, therefore, Atty. Soriano was in effect asking this Court to exhume this case from the archives. We thus considered it needful that he explain in full and in writing his unprecedented, if not altogether bizzare behavior.His subsequent explanation did not, however, serve to dissuade this Court from requiring him to show cause why disciplinary action should not be taken against him for entering an appearance at such a late date. He forthwith came with a recital of the circumstances under which he had agreed to have his services retained by the respondents Tiburcio, et al. He alleged that sometime during the first week of October 1969, the respondent Marcelino Tiburcio, in his own behalf and as attorney-in-fact of the other respondents, went to him to engage his professional services in two cases, to wit: this terminated case (L-24114), and the case entitled "Varsity Hills vs. Hon. Herminio C. Mariano, etc., et al." (L-30546). At their conference, Marcelino Tiburcio supposedly informed Atty. Soriano of the precise status of each of the two cases, thus: that the Varsity Hills case was set for hearing by this Court on October 27, 1969, while the present case was still pending and the date of hearing thereof was yet undetermined. In addition to Marcelino Tiburcio's representations, Atty. Soriano allegedly relied upon the assurance of a mutual acquaintance, Atty. Antonio J. Dalangpan - that indeed these two cases were pending in this Court. And so Atty. Soriano prepared a letter-contract dated October 8, 1969, by virtue of which he agreed to render professional services in the two cases in consideration of a contingent fee of 143.33 hectares of land out of the 430 hectares (more or less) involved in the two cases. It was on the same date, October 8, 1969, that he then caused the preparation of his written appearance in the present case. Parenthetically, it is interesting to note that the contingent fee of 143.33 hectares of land would find no justification if Atty. Soriano were to render his professional services solely in the Varsity Hills case, for in this latter case, the records of which we are in a position to take judicial notice, an area of only about 19 hectares is involved, 1 the bulk of the property claimed by the respondents having been litigated in the present case. The entry of appearance of a counsel in a case which has long been sealed and terminated by a final judgment, besides being an unmitigated absurdity in itself and an unwarranted annoyance to the court which pronounced the judgment, is a sore deviation from normal judicial processes. It detracts heavily from the faith which should be accorded final judgments of courts of justice, generating as it does in the minds of the litigants, as well as of the public, an illusory belief that something more can be done toward overturning a final judicial mandate.In the incident before us, we find Atty. Soriano grossly remiss and inexcusably precipitate in putting an officious finger into the vortex of the case. He was wanting in the reasonable care which every member of the Bar must needs exercise before rushing into the midst of a case already litigated or under litigation. Before taking over a case handled by a peer in the Bar, a lawyer is enjoined to obtain the conformity of the counsel whom he would substitute. And if this cannot be had, then he should, at the very least, give notice to such lawyer of the contemplated substitution. 2Atty. Soriano's entry of appearance in the present case as "chief counsel of record" for the respondents in effect sought to preempt the former counsel, Atty. Nemesio Diaz, of the premier control over the case. Although at the hearing of the present incident he averred that he exerted efforts to communicate with Atty. Diaz to no avail, we are far from being convinced that he really did so. Nowhere in his written manifestations to this Court did he make mention of such efforts on his part. His subsequent assertions to the contrary are plainly mere after thoughts. Furthermore, we note that Atty. Soriano has joined one Atty. Bonifacio T. Doria as counsel for the respondents in the Varsity Hills case now pending before this Court. Atty. Doria, who was counsel of record in that case even prior to

October 10, 1969, certainly knew the status of the present case since the scope of our decision in the latter is a prime issue raised in the Varsity Hills case. Clearly, therefore, when Atty. Soriano accepted the two cases for the respondents, especially the Varsity Hills case, he had not bothered at all to communicate with Atty. Doria, as is the befitting thing to do when a lawyer associates with another in a pending cause. 3He did not bother either to comprehend the substance of the Varsity Hills case before accepting the said case, something which is elementary in the lawyer's trade. Had he been less precipitate in his actions, he would have surely detected the existence of a final judgment in the present case. Further still, if it were true, as claimed by Atty. Soriano at the hearing of this incident, that his clients complained to him about having been left out in the cold by their former lawyer, then that circumstance of itself should have indicated to him the imperative need for verification of the true status of the present case. Atty. Soriano cannot lean on the supposed assurance of Atty. Dalangpan that the case was still pending with his Court - which assurance Atty. Dalangpan, at the hearing of this incident, categorically denied having given. What Atty. Soriano should have done, in keeping with the reasonable vigilance exacted of members of the legal profession, was to pay a verification visit to the records section of this Court, which is easily and quickly accessible by car or public conveyance from his office (May Building, Rizal Avenue, Manila). If this office were situated in the province and he did not have the time to come to the Supreme Court building in Manila, he could have posed the proper query to the Clerk of Court by registered mail or by telegram.We find Atty. Clemente M. Soriano guilty of gross negligence in the performance of his duties as a lawyer and as an officer of this Court. This inexcusable negligence would merit no less than his suspension from the practice of the law profession, were it not for his candor, at the hearing of this incident, in owning his mistake and the apology he made to this Court. It is the sense of this Court, however, that he must be as he is hereby severely censured. Atty. Soriano is further likewise warned that any future similar act will be met with heavier disciplinary sanction. Atty. Soriano is hereby ordered, in the present case, to forthwith withdraw the appearance that he has entered as chief counsel of record for the respondents Marcelino Tiburcio, et al. Let a copy of this resolution be attached to the personal record of Atty. Clemente M. Soriano on file in the Bar Division of this Court.

SECOND DIVISIONA.C. No. 3149 August 17, 1994

CERINA B. LIKONG, Petitioner, vs. ATTY. ALEXANDER H. LIM, Respondent.PADILLA, J.: Cerina B. Likong filed this administrative case against Atty. Alexander H. Lim, seeking the latter's disbarment for alleged malpractice and grave misconduct. The circumstances which led to the filing of this complaint are as follows:  Sometime in September 1984, complainant obtained a loan of P92,100.00 from a certain Geesnell L. Yap. Complainant executed a promissory note in favor of Yap and a deed of assignment, assigning to Yap pension checks which she regularly receives from the United States government as a widow of a US pensioner. The aforementioned deed of assignment states that the same shall be irrevocable until the loan is fully paid. Complainant likewise executed a special power of attorney authorizing Yap to get, demand, collect and receive her pension checks from the post office at Tagbilaran City. The above documents were apparently prepared and notarized by respondent Alexander H. Lim, Yap's counsel. On 11 December 1984, about three (3) months after the execution of the aforementioned special power of attorney, complainant informed the Tagbilaran City post office that she was revoking the special power of attorney. As a consequence, Geesnell Yap filed a complaint for injunction with damages against complainant. Respondent Alexander H. Lim appeared as counsel for Yap while Attys. Roland B. Inting and Erico B. Aumentado appeared for complainant (as defendant). A writ of preliminary injunction was issued by the trial court on 23 January 1985, preventing complainant from getting her pension checks from the Tagbilaran City post office. Yap later filed an urgent omnibus motion to cite complainant in contempt of court for attempting to circumvent the preliminary injunction by changing her address to Mandaue City. Upon motion by Yap, the court also issued an order dated 21 May 1985 expanding the scope of the preliminary injunction to prevent all post offices in the Philippines from releasing pension checks to complainant.On 26 July 1985, complainant and Yap filed a joint motion to allow the latter to withdraw the pension checks. This motion does not bear the signatures of complainant's counsel of record but only the signatures of both parties, "assisted by" respondent Attorney Alexander H. Lim.On 2 August 1985, complainant and Yap entered into a compromise agreement again without the participation of the former's counsel. In the compromise agreement, it was stated that complainant Cerina B. Likong admitted an obligation to Yap of P150,000.00. It was likewise stated therein that complainant and Yap agreed that the amount would be paid

in monthly installments over a period of 54 months at an interest of 40% per annum discounted every six (6) months. The compromise agreement was approved by the trial court on 15 August 1985. On 24 November 1987, Cerina B. Likong filed the present complaint for disbarment, based on the following allegations:7. In all these motions, complainant was prevented from seeking assistance, advise and signature of any of her two (2) lawyers; no copy thereof was furnished to either of them or at least to complainant herself despite the latter's pleas to be furnished copies of the same;  8. Complainant was even advised by respondent that it was not necessary for her to consult her lawyers under the pretense that: (a) this could only jeopardize the settlement; (b) she would only be incurring enormous expense if she consulted a new lawyer; (c) respondent was assisting her anyway; (d) she had nothing to worry about the documents foisted upon her to sign; (e) complainant need not come to court afterwards to save her time; and in any event respondent already took care of everything;  9. Complainant had been prevented from exhibiting fully her case by means of fraud, deception and some other form of mendacity practiced on her by respondent; 10. Finally, respondent fraudulently or without authority assumed to represent complainant and connived in her defeat; . . . 1  Respondent filed his Answer stating that counsel for complainant, Atty. Roland B. Inting had abandoned his client. Atty. Lim further stated that the other counsel, Atty. Enrico Aumentado, did not actively participate in the case and it was upon the request of complainant and another debtor of Yap, Crispina Acuna, that he (respondent) made the compromise agreement.Respondent states that he first instructed complainant to notify her lawyers but was informed that her lawyer had abandoned her since she could not pay his attorney's fees.Complainant filed a reply denying that she had been abandoned by her lawyers. Complainant stated that respondent never furnished her lawyers with copies of the compromise agreement and a motion to withdraw the injunction cash bond deposited by Yap. At the outset, it is worth noting that the terms of the compromise agreement are indeed grossly loaded in favor of Geesnell L. Yap, respondent's client. Complainant's original obligation was to pay P92,100.00 within one (1) year from 4 October 1984. There is no provision in the promissory note signed by her with respect to any interest to be paid. The only additional amount which Yap could collect based on the promissory note was 25% of the principal as attorney's fees in case a lawyer was hired by him to collect the loan.In the compromise agreement prepared by respondent, dated 2 August 1985, complainant's debt to Yap was increased to P150,000.00(from 92,100.00) after the lapse of only ten (10) months. This translates to an interest in excess of seventy-five percent (75%) per annum. In addition, the compromise agreement provides that the P150,000.00 debt would be payable in fifty-four (54) monthly installments at an interest of forty percent (40%) per annum. No great amount of mathematical prowess is required to see that the terms of the compromise agreement are grossly prejudicial to complainant.With respect to respondent's failure to notify complainant's counsel of the compromise agreement, it is of record that complainant was represented by two (2) lawyers, Attys. Inting and Aumentado. Complainant states that respondent prevented her from informing her lawyers by giving her the reasons enumerated in the complaint and earlier quoted in this decision. There is no showing that respondent even tried to inform opposing counsel of the compromise agreement. Neither is there any showing that respondent informed the trial court of the alleged abandonment of the complainant by her counsel. Instead, even assuming that complainant was really abandoned by her counsel, respondent saw an opportunity to take advantage of the situation, and the result was the execution of the compromise agreement which, as previously discussed, is grossly and patently disadvantageous and prejudicial to complainant. Undoubtedly, respondent's conduct is unbecoming a member of the legal profession. Canon 9 of the Code of Professional Ethics states:9. Negotiations with opposite party.A lawyer should not in any way communicate upon the subject of controversy with a party represented by counsel; much less should he undertake to negotiate or compromise the matter with him, but should deal only with his counsel. It is incumbent upon the lawyer most particularly to avoid everything that may tend to mislead a party not represented by counsel and he should not undertake to advise him as to the law.The Code of Professional Responsibility states:Rule 1.01 - A lawyer shall not engage in unlawful, dishonest, immoral, or deceitful conduct. Rule 8.02 - A lawyer shall not, directly or indirectly, encroach upon the professional employment of another lawyer; however, it is the right of any lawyer, without fear or favor, to give proper advice and assistance to those seeking relief against unfaithful or neglectful counsel.

Rule 15.03 - A lawyer shall not represent conflicting interests except by written consent of all concerned given after a full disclosure of the facts.The violation of the aforementioned rules of professional conduct by respondent Atty. Alexander H. Lim, warrants the imposition upon him of the proper sanction from this Court. Such acts constituting malpractice and grave misconduct cannot be left unpunished for not only do they erode confidence and trust in the legal profession, they likewise prevent justice from being attained.ACCORDINGLY, respondent Atty. Alexander H. Lim is hereby imposed the penalty of SUSPENSION from the practice of law for a period of ONE (1) YEAR, effective immediately upon his receipt of this decision. Let a copy of this decision be entered in respondent's personal record as attorney and member of the Bar, and furnished the Bar Confidant, the Integrated Bar of the Philippines and the Court Administrator for circulation to all courts in the country.SO ORDERED.

FIRST DIVISIONA.M. No. MTJ-93-781 November 16, 1993

EDUARDO R. SANTOS, Petitioner, vs. JUDGE ORLANDO C. PAGUIO, MTC, Meycauayan, Bulacan, Respondent.DAVIDE, JR., J.:The complainant herein is the lawyer for the defendants in Civil Case No. 90-1706, an action for unlawful detainer commenced on 5 May 1990 with the Municipal Trial Court of Meycauayan, Bulacan while the respondent is the presiding Judge of the said court. In his verified complaint filed through the Office of the Court Administrator on 18 March 1993, the complainant charges the respondent with gross ignorance of the law and gross incompetence. The complainant supports his charge with the allegation that after the answer in the said case was filed and "without notice and hearing," the latter rendered a decision on 28 June 1991, 1 the decretal portion of which reads as follows:WHEREFORE, in view of all the foregoing considerations, it is hereby respectfully prayed that judgment be rendered in accordance with plaintiff's prayer in their Complaint in the above-entitled case.SO ORDERED.He further alleges that Branch 18 of the Regional Trial Court (RTC) of Bulacan, in its Order of 19 January 1993 in Sp. Civil Action No. 03-M-93 2 - a petition for certiorari filed by the defendants in Civil Case No. 90-1706 - had already opined that the said decision is void upon its face because it:. . . would be impossible to be implemented for the simple or obvious reason that the same cannot be considered a decision at all. Instead of deciding or ordering something to be done, it merely prays that judgment be rendered.but despite this, the respondent still "changed and amended [his] final decision [of 28 June 1991] in order to nullify the order of a superior Court, the RTC of Bulacan" via a new decision in Civil Case No. 90-1706 3 promulgated on 25 January 1993. The dispositive portion of this new decision reads as follows:WHEREFORE, in view of all the foregoing, judgment is hereby rendered in favor of the plaintiff by:1. Ordering defendants and persons claiming any rights under them to vacate the premises occupied by them, more particularly the portion on which are erected their respective dwelling structure/unit, at 117 Bayugo, Meycauayan, Bulacan (or lot of plaintiff aforementioned) and to remove said dwelling structure/units from said subject premises of plaintiff; 2. Ordering defendants individually to pay the sum of P350.00 Philippine Currency, per month by way of monthly rental commencing from May 16, 1990, and thereafter until they shall have vacated the premises of the plaintiff; 3. Ordering the defendants to pay jointly and severally the sum of P2,000.00, Philippine currency, on account of plaintiff's attorney's fees (retainer) and P500.00, Philippine Currency, for every hearing/trial attended by said attorney before this Honorable Court; and 4. Ordering the defendants to pay costs.SO ORDERED.According to the complainant, the dispositive portion of the 28 June 1991 Decision exhibits the respondent's gross ignorance in "decision preparation," and that respondent's "haste to amend the same to favor plaintiff was both appalling (sic) and downright improper." The complainant then prays that the respondent "be removed from office if only to save the integrity of the judiciary." In his Comment filed on 2 July 1993, 4 the respondent denies the imputations and alleges, inter alia, that: (1) the complainant was not the original counsel for the defendants but one Atty. Adriano Javier, Sr. who represented the latter until the time that the parties were directed to file their respective position papers, specifically until 29 November 1991 when Atty. Javier filed a motion to withdraw his appearance and the complainant filed his notice of appearance as counsel for the defendants; (2) the Decision of 28 June 1991 was rendered only after a preliminary conference was held where the parties with their respective counsels discussed the possibility of an amicable settlement and after the defendants failed to comply with the 16 November 1990 Order for the parties to submit in writing their "respective position statements setting forth the law and the facts relied upon by them and to submit the affidavits of their witnesses

and other evidences in support thereof within fifteen (15) days from receipt" thereof, prompting the plaintiff to file on 5 April 1991 an ex-parte motion praying that judgment be rendered in this case; (3) the defendants did not appeal from the 28 June 1991 Decision, hence the plaintiff filed a motion for execution on 2 September 1991, which the defendants did not oppose; instead they filed a motion for reconsideration and to declare the decision null and void on the ground that the plaintiff did not file her pre-trail brief and there was no valid pre-trial order; (4) on 4 December 1991, the plaintiff's motion for execution was granted and a writ of execution was issued, a copy of which was sent to the Clerk of Court of the RTC of Malolos for service; (5) on 5 January 1991, 5 he received an order from Branch 18 of the RTC of Bulacan directing him to desist from implementing the writ of execution; (6) the presiding judge of said Branch 18, Judge Demetrio B. Macapagal, Sr., issued on 19 January 1993 its order disposing of Sp. Civil Action No. 03-M-93; (7) thereafter, he (respondent) handed down a new decision in Civil Case No. 90-1706 on 25 January 1993 that contained "completely the missing sentences needed in the dispositive portion" of its earlier decision; (8) instead of appealing therefrom, the defendants filed on 4 February 1993 a motion to set aside the decision, which the court set for its consideration and to which the plaintiff filed its opposition on 8 February 1993 together with a motion for immediate execution; (9) on 22 March 1993, the complainant filed a motion to inhibit the respondent by the former did not appear on the date it was set for consideration. He finally contends that the issue regarding the dispositive portion of the 28 June 1991 Decision was rendered moot and academic by the corrections made in the Decision of 25 January 1993; that the charge of gross ignorance is contemptuous and unfounded; and the complainant's sweeping conclusions show his disrespectful attitude.In his 17 June 1993 Rejoinder filed on 7 July 1993, 6 the complainant reiterates his charge that the respondent is incompetent because he lacks the "ability to prepare a sensible and credible decision," and maintains that the respondent's attempt to convince this Court that the dispositive portion of the 28 June 1991 Decision is permissible and proper shows "gross ignorance." Further, that the respondent believes that "he could correct the decision after its finality" and after the RTC of Bulacan had declared it to be null and void upon its face clearly manifests his "patent ignorance of our laws and jurisprudence." In his Sur-Rejoinder filed on 13 July 1993, 7 the respondent argues that while the 28 June 1991 Decision "could hardly be enforced for the reason that there is some sort of ambiguity or omission (sic) in its dispositive portion," he was not prohibited from having the defect "timely corrected and clarified," which was what he had in fact done, and that the "clarified decision" did not prejudice "the substantial rights of the parties" since they "were given their day in court and passed through the usual course of the proceedings." Accordingly, he could not be guilty of gross ignorance of the law and of lack of competence.Wanting to have the last word, the complainant filed a Reply to Sur-rejoinder and Manifestation on 28 July 1993. 8 Not to be outdone, the respondent filed a Manifestation to Reply on 9 August 1993. 9 The Court referred this to the Office of the Court Administrator for evaluation, report and recommendation.On 31 August 1993, the Office of the Court Administrator submitted its Memorandum containing its evaluation, report and recommendation. After summarizing the antecedent facts, the said office submitted that the instant complaint is meritorious, and made the following findings:It is quite unbelievable, nay, impossible for respondent to have overlooked the missing dispositive portion of his original decision which is considered the executory portion thereof. The only ineluctable conclusion is that respondent never read said decision before he signed the same. If only he devoted even only a little time to read the same, such a missing portion considered to be the most important part of a decision could not have escaped his attention. The alleged dispositive portion was a prayer. It did not have the effect of finally disposing the case. Presumably, this must have been simply copied from plaintiff's complaint.True, it was legally permissible for respondent to amend his original defective decision since the RTC dismissed the petition for certiorari although Judge Perfecto Macapagal found that what was rendered by Judge Paguio "can not be considered a decision at all." It took respondent Judge 1-1/2 years to discover and correct his error; the error could have easily been discovered at the time the Motion for Execution was filed on September 2, 1991. But the writ was nonetheless issued on December 4, 1991. Hence, the belated correction would not mitigate his liability. There is no denying that the quality of a decision rendered by the judge such as herein respondent, is a reflection on the integrity of the court in dispensing justice to whom it is due. Respondent was at the very least careless in failing to read carefully the decision that he signed. In fact, both the original and amended decisions still contained errors in grammar and syntax indicating that there was no adequate editing of the decision that was signed by him. If he had been more careful, he would have avoided such fractured phrases as: 1. Plaintiff on being opposed to this motion, countered as follows: (Page 5, Decision, June 28, 1991); 2. For a more vivid explanation showing the incidental facts (Ibid); 3. And defendants seems that they are not really sincere (Ibid); 4. But nothing has been done by the latter to renew such contract of lease of which right becomes one of a detainer plain and simple (page 6, Ibid); 5. That being the case to allow them will mean ownership over the property (Ibid).

It is possible that this is not the usual language of the Judge, for their fractured constructions have no place in a court decision. Careful editing and rewriting should have been done.and recommends that:. . . a fine of P5,000.00 be imposed upon respondent with a warning that any repetition of the same or similar infraction shall be meted with a more severe penalty of dismissal from the service. He is also admonished to exhibit greater care in the writing of his decisions.We find the above observations of the Office of the Court Administrator to be sufficiently supported by the pleadings submitted by the parties in this case.After a careful examination of the respondent's "Decision" of 28 June 1991, we do find its body to be flawed with grammatical and syntactic errors. Its "dispositive portion" disposes of, resolves or decrees nothing. It cannot even be called a dispositive or decretal portion at all. It is obviously a prayer lifted from a pleading of the plaintiff, such as the Memorandum or the ex-parte manifestation and motion praying that judgment be rendered filed after the defendants failed to file their position paper, although not from the complaint as suspected by the Court Administrator. How it gained entry into what should have been the fallo is an arcanum. Any attempt to unravel the mystery may only complicate the matter against the respondent who is only charged herein with gross ignorance or incompetence.There can, however, be no dispute behind the errors of grammar and syntax and the fatally infirmed "dispositive portion" is the inefficiency, neglect of duty or carelessness on the part of the respondent betraying the absence of due care, diligence, conscientiousness and thoroughness - qualities which Judges must, among others, possess. Respondent could have easily avoided the errors and defects had he taken a little more time and effort to at least read its original copy before he finally affixed his signature thereon. While this Court cannot expect every Judge to be an expert on the English language or an authority in grammar, he must, however, do everything he can, through constant study, extraordinary diligence, and passion for excellence, to produce a decision which fosters respect for and encourages obedience to it and enhances the prestige of the court.As we see it then, the respondent failed to comply with two standard of conduct prescribed by the Canons of Judicial Ethics, namely: that "[h]e should exhibit an industry and application commensurate with the duties imposed upon him" 10 and that he should be conscientious, studious and thorough. 11 Moreover, the respondent did not only issue a manifestly infirmed "decision," he even granted the motion for its execution and issued the corresponding writ with full knowledge that there was nothing to execute. He could not have feigned ignorance of such nothingness for it is embarrassingly self-evident. He nevertheless ordered its execution, exhibiting once more his inefficiency, carelessness, negligence, or even his incompetence.We must add, however, that it is not the respondent alone who must be blamed for such unmitigated faux pas. The counsel for the parties in the case knew or ought to have known the fatal defect of the dispositive portion and the obvious inefficacy of any writ of execution, yet, the plaintiff's counsel still filed a motion for execution, while the counsel for the defendants - the complainant herein - merely filed a motion for reconsideration based solely on the ground that the plaintiff did not file her pre-trial brief and that there was no valid pre-trial order. Obviously, the complainant initially believed in the completeness of the decision. As a matter of fact, when he assailed the 25 January 1993 Decision, he alleged that what was amended was a " final decision," a position totally inconsistent with his claim that the latter was void as declared by the RTC of Bulacan. As officers of the court who owe to it candor, fairness and good faith, 12 both attorneys should have called the court's attention to the glaring defect of the "dispositive portion" of the 28 June 1991 Decision.We thus conclude that the respondent Judge is guilty of, in the very least, inefficiency, neglect of duty and the violation of Canons 5 and 31 of the Canons of Judicial Ethics. He could not, however, be liable for ignorance of law and jurisprudence or for incompetence when he handed down a new decision on 25 January 1993. The 28 June 1991 Decision was "incomplete" since, for all legal intents and purposes, it had no fallo and could not attain finality, hence the respondent had the power to amend it to make it conformable to law andjustice. 13 It is not therefore correct to say, as the complainant suggested, that the order of the RTC of Bulacan in Sp. Civil Action No. 03-M-93 stating that the respondent's Decision of 28 June 1991 is "void upon its face" forever bars the respondent from rendering a new or amended decision in the ejectment case.We take this opportunity to stress once again that the administration of justice is a sacred task and all those involved in it must faithfully adhere to, hold inviolate, and invigorate the principle solemnly enshrined in the Constitution that a public office is a public trust and all public officers and employees must at all times be accountable to the people, serve them with utmost responsibility, integrity, loyalty and efficiency, and act with patriotism and justice and lead modest lives. 14 Every Judge should never forget that he is the visible representation of the law and, more importantly, of justice. 15 Therefore, he must constantly be the embodiment of competence, diligence, conscientiousness, thoroughness, efficiency, and integrity so as to preserve, promote and enhance the people's confidence in the Judiciary.A few words must also be made of record regarding the complainant. We note that in his complaint in this case he alleged under oath that after the defendants filed their answer, the respondent "without any hearing, or at least this

counsel was never notified of any such hearing," rendered the 28 June 1991 Decision. This is of course inaccurate, if not outright false. What the complainant conveniently left out in his complaint was that, as disclosed in the Comment which he did not refute, after the defendants' answer with counterclaim was admitted by the court, the case was set for preliminary conference and thereafter the parties were required to submit their position papers and the affidavits of their witnesses and other evidence. We find that the case was properly placed and considered under the Rule on Summary Procedure and, accordingly, the court could decide the case on the basis of the submitted position papers, affidavits and other pieces of evidence. Complainant further suppressed the fact that he entered his appearance as counsel for the defendants only after the court had conducted the preliminary conference and issued the order for the submission of the foregoing pleadings and documents. He was not, therefore, entitled to any notice before then.The failure to divulge the foregoing facts may have been intended by the complainant to give his complaint a strong prima facie case against the respondent. While he was entitled to adopt certain strategies in his pleadings, he forgot that he owes to this Court absolute candor, fairness and good faith. This Court can neither condone nor tolerate attempts to mislead it through suppression of important facts which would have a bearing on its initial action. Complainant should, therefore, be admonished to faithfully adhere to the Code of Professional Responsibility.WHEREFORE, for inefficiency and neglect of duty amounting to a violation of Canons 5 and 31 of the Canons of Judicial Ethics, respondent Judge ORLANDO C. PAGUIO is hereby sentenced to pay a FINE of Five Thousand Pesos (P5,000.00). He is further warned that a repetition of the same or similar infractions shall be dealt with more severely.Complainant is hereby ADMONISHED to be more careful in the drafting of pleadings, always keeping in mind his duty under Canon 10 of the Code of Professional Responsibility.SO ORDERED.

EN BANCA.C. No. 2837 October 7, 1994

ESTEBAN M. LIBIT, Complainant, vs. ATTYS. EDELSON G. OLIVA and FLORANDO A. UMALI, Respondent.R E S O L U T I O N

 PER CURIAM: In civil Case No. 84-24144 of the Court of First Instance of Manila, entitled "Pedro Cutingting, plaintiff versus Alfredo Tan, defendant", the Honorable Presiding Judge Domingo Panis issued the following order:The Director of the National Bureau of Investigation (NBI) is hereby ordered to conduct an investigation with the end in view of determining the author of the Sheriff's Return which appears to have been falsified and to institute such criminal action as the evidence will warrant. (p. 1, Final Report.)After conducting the necessary investigation, the National Bureau of Investigation (NBI), through herein complainant, charged respondents as follows:That sometime in May 1984 in the City of Manila, at the Regional Trial Court, Branch XLI, Manila, Philippines, the above-named Respondents, as Counsels for PEDRO CUTINGTING in Civil Case No. 84-24144, entitled PEDRO CUTINGTING, Plaintiff vs. ALFREDO TAN, Defendant, did then and there, knowingly, willfully introduced/presented in evidence before the aforesaid Regional Trial Court, a falsified Sheriff's Return of Summons during the hearing of the aforesaid Civil Case thereby impending and/or obstructing the speedy administration and/or dispensation of Justice. (p. 2, Final Report, ff. p. 69, Record.)Respondents in their respective answers denied having any hand in the falsification of the said sheriff's return.Pursuant to Rule 139-B of the Rules of Court and the resolution of the Court En Banc of April 12, 1988, the case was referred to the Commission on Bar Discipline of the Integrated Bar of the Philippines (IBP) for investigation, report, and recommendation.In view, however, of the report of the National Bureau of Investigation to the effect that the signature above the typewritten name Florando Umali on the last page of the complaint in said civil case is not his signature, complainant, through counsel, agreed to the dismissal of the case with respect to Atty. Umali.With respect to Atty. Edelson G. Oliva, the IBP submitted the following report and recommendation:There is ample evidence extant in the records to prove thatAtty. Oliva has something to do with the falsification of the Sheriff's Return on the Summons in said Civil Case No. 84-24144.The oral and documentary evidence of the complainant strongly tend to show the following: (1) The Sheriff's Return of the Summon in the said civil case was falsified as it was not signed by Deputy Sheriff Rodolfo Torella (Exh. "J" - Sworn Statement of Rodolfo Torella dated February 1, 1985, and Exh. "S", which is the falsified Sheriff's Return); (2) The summons was received from the clerk of the Court of the ManilaRTC-Branch LXI by Ronaldo Romero, a messenger in the law office of Attys. Umali and Oliva and said messenger brought the summons to the law office of the respondents (Exh. "H" - Sinumpaang Salaysay ni Ronaldo Romero, and Exh. "G", Exh. "I" - Sworn Statement dated February 28, 1985 of Mariano Villanueva, Chief Staff Asst. 2, RTC, Manila;

(3) On the basis of the falsified Sheriff's Return on the Summons, Atty. Oliva, counsel for the defendant [should be plaintiff] in said civil case, filed a typewritten Motion to Declare Defendant in Default (Exh.) "R" - Motion to Declare Defendant In Default in said civil case signed and filed by Atty. Oliva);(4) On March 29, 1984, Atty. Oliva, in his capacity as Operations Manager of Judge Pio R. Marcos Law Office, sent a final demand letter on Alfredo Tan, the defendant in said Civil case, for payment of the sum of P70,174.00 (Exh. "T" - Demand Letter dated March 28, 1984 of Atty. Oliva addressed to Alfredo Tan); (5) The demand letter of Atty. Oliva (Exh. "T"), the complaint in said civil case (Exh. "Q", "Q-1", and "Q-2"), the falsified Sheriff's Return on the Summons (Exh. "S"), the Motion To Declare Defendant In Default dated October 30, 1984 signed and filed byAtty. Oliva (Exh. "R" and "R-1") were typed on one and the same typewriter, as shown in the Questioned Document Report No. 198-585 dated 19 June 1985 (Exh. "Q", "Q-1" and "Q-2"; Exh. "V", "V-1" and"V-2").After the careful review of the record of the case and the report and recommendation of the IBP, the Court finds that respondent Atty. Edelson G. Oliva committed acts of misconduct which warrant the exercise by the Court of its disciplinary powers. The facts, as supported by the evidence, obtaining in this case indubitably reveal respondent's failure to live up to his duties as a lawyer in consonance with the strictures of the lawyer's oath, the Code of Professional Responsibility, and the Canons of Professional Ethics. A lawyer's responsibility to protect and advance the interests of his client does not warrant a course of action propelled by ill motives and malicious intentions against the other party.At this juncture, it is well to stress once again that the practice of law is not a right but a privilege bestowed by the State on those who show that they possess, and continue to possess, the qualifications required by law for the conferment of such privilege. One of these requirements is the observance of honesty and candor. It can not be gainsaid that candidness, especially towards the courts, is essential for the expeditious administration of justice. Courts are entitled to expect only complete candor and honesty from the lawyers appearing and pleading before them. A lawyer, on the other hand, has the fundamental duty to satisfy the expectation. It is essential that lawyers bear in mind at all times that their first duty is not to their clients but rather to the courts, that they are above all court officers sworn to assist the courts in rendering justice to all and sundry, and only secondarily are they advocates of the exclusive interests of their clients. For this reason, he is required to swear to do no falsehood, nor consent to the doing of any in court (Chavez vs. Viola, 196 SCRA 10 [1991].In this case, respondent Atty. Edelson Oliva has manifestly violated that part of his oath as a lawyer that he shall not do any falsehood. He has likewise violated Rule 10.01 of the Code of Professional Responsibility which provides:A lawyer shall not do any falsehood, nor consent to the doing of any in court nor shall he mislead or allow the court to be misled by any artifice.Accordingly, the Court resolved to impose upon Atty. Edelson Oliva the supreme penalty of DISBARMENT. His license to practice law in the Philippines is CANCELLED and the Bar Confidant is ordered to strike out his name from the Roll of Attorneys.The case is ordered dismissed as against Atty. Florando Umali. SO ORDERED.

EN BANCG.R. No. L-25291 January 30, 1971

THE INSULAR LIFE ASSURANCE CO., LTD., EMPLOYEES ASSOCIATION-NATU, FGU INSURANCE GROUP WORKERS and EMPLOYEES ASSOCIATION-NATU, and INSULAR LIFE BUILDING EMPLOYEES ASSOCIATION-NATU, Petitioners, vs. THE INSULAR LIFE ASSURANCE CO., LTD., FGU INSURANCE GROUP, JOSE M. OLBES

and COURT OF INDUSTRIAL RELATIONS, Respondents.CASTRO, J.: Appeal, by certiorari to review a decision and a resolution en banc of the Court of Industrial Relations dated August 17, 1965 and October 20, 1965, respectively, in Case 1698-ULP.The Insular Life Assurance Co., Ltd., Employees Association-NATU, FGU Insurance Group Workers & Employees Association-NATU, and Insular Life Building Employees Association-NATU (hereinafter referred to as the Unions), while still members of the Federation of Free Workers (FFW), entered into separate collective bargaining agreements with the Insular Life Assurance Co., Ltd. and the FGU Insurance Group (hereinafter referred to as the Companies).Two of the lawyers of the Unions then were Felipe Enaje and Ramon Garcia; the latter was formerly the secretary-treasurer of the FFW and acting president of the Insular Life/FGU unions and the Insular Life Building Employees Association. Garcia, as such acting president, in a circular issued in his name and signed by him, tried to dissuade the members of the Unions from disaffiliating with the FFW and joining the National Association of Trade Unions (NATU), to no avail.Enaje and Garcia soon left the FFW and secured employment with the Anti-Dummy Board of the Department of Justice. Thereafter, the Companies hired Garcia in the latter part of 1956 as assistant corporate secretary and legal

assistant in their Legal Department, and he was soon receiving P900 a month, or P600 more than he was receiving from the FFW. Enaje was hired on or about February 19, 1957 as personnel manager of the Companies, and was likewise made chairman of the negotiating panel for the Companies in the collective bargaining with the Unions.In a letter dated September 16, 1957, the Unions jointly submitted proposals to the Companies for a modified renewal of their respective collective bargaining contracts which were then due to expire on September 30, 1957. The parties mutually agreed and to make whatever benefits could be agreed upon retroactively effective October 1, 1957.Thereafter, in the months of September and October 1957 negotiations were conducted on the Union's proposals, but these were snagged by a deadlock on the issue of union shop, as a result of which the Unions filed on January 27, 1958 a notice of strike for "deadlock on collective bargaining." Several conciliation conferences were held under the auspices of the Department of Labor wherein the conciliators urged the Companies to make reply to the Unions' proposals en toto so that the said Unions might consider the feasibility of dropping their demand for union security in exchange for other benefits. However, the Companies did not make any counter-proposals but, instead, insisted that the Unions first drop their demand for union security, promising money benefits if this was done. Thereupon, and prior to April 15, 1958, the petitioner Insular Life Building Employees Association-NATU dropped this particular demand, and requested the Companies to answer its demands, point by point, en toto. But the respondent Insular Life Assurance Co. still refused to make any counter-proposals. In a letter addressed to the two other Unions by the joint management of the Companies, the former were also asked to drop their union security demand, otherwise the Companies "would no longer consider themselves bound by the commitment to make money benefits retroactive to October 1, 1957." By a letter dated April 17, 1958, the remaining two petitioner unions likewise dropped their demand for union shop. April 25, 1958 then was set by the parties to meet and discuss the remaining demands.From April 25 to May 6, 1958, the parties negotiated on the labor demands but with no satisfactory result due to a stalemate on the matter of salary increases. On May 13, 1958 the Unions demanded from the Companies final counter-proposals on their economic demands, particularly on salary increases. Instead of giving counter-proposals, the Companies on May 15, 1958 presented facts and figures and requested the Unions to submit a workable formula which would justify their own proposals, taking into account the financial position of the former. Forthwith the Unions voted to declare a strike in protest against what they considered the Companies' unfair labor practices.Meanwhile, eighty-seven (87) unionists were reclassified as supervisors without increase in salary nor in responsibility while negotiations were going on in the Department of Labor after the notice to strike was served on the Companies. These employees resigned from the Unions.On May 20, 1958 the Unions went on strike and picketed the offices of the Insular Life Building at Plaza Moraga.On May 21, 1958 the Companies through their acting manager and president, the respondent Jose M. Olbes (hereinafter referred to as the respondent Olbes), sent to each of the strikers a letter (exhibit A) quoted verbatim as follows:We recognize it is your privilege both to strike and to conduct picketing.However, if any of you would like to come back to work voluntarily, you may:  1. Advise the nearest police officer or security guard of your intention to do so.2. Take your meals within the office.3. Make a choice whether to go home at the end of the day or to sleep nights at the office where comfortable cots have been prepared.4. Enjoy free coffee and occasional movies. 5. Be paid overtime for work performed in excess of eight hours.6. Be sure arrangements will be made for your families.The decision to make is yours - whether you still believe in the motives of the strike or in the fairness of the Management.The Unions, however, continued on strike, with the exception of a few unionists who were convinced to desist by the aforesaid letter of May 21, 1958.From the date the strike was called on May 21, 1958, until it was called off on May 31, 1958, some management men tried to break thru the Unions' picket lines. Thus, on May 21, 1958 Garcia, assistant corporate secretary, and Vicente Abella, chief of the personnel records section, respectively of the Companies, tried to penetrate the picket lines in front of the Insular Life Building. Garcia, upon approaching the picket line, tossed aside the placard of a picketer, one Paulino Bugay; a fight ensued between them, in which both suffered injuries. The Companies organized three bus-loads of employees, including a photographer, who with the said respondent Olbes, succeeded in penetrating the picket lines in front of the Insular Life Building, thus causing injuries to the picketers and also to the strike-breakers due to the resistance offered by some picketers.Alleging that some non-strikers were injured and with the use of photographs as evidence, the Companies then filed criminal charges against the strikers with the City Fiscal's Office of Manila. During the pendency of the said cases in the fiscal's office, the Companies likewise filed a petition for injunction with damages with the Court of First Instance of Manila which, on the basis of the pendency of the various criminal cases against striking members of the Unions,

issued on May 31, 1958 an order restraining the strikers, until further orders of the said court, from stopping, impeding, obstructing, etc. the free and peaceful use of the Companies' gates, entrance and driveway and the free movement of persons and vehicles to and from, out and in, of the Companies' building.On the same date, the Companies, again through the respondent Olbes, sent individually to the strikers a letter (exhibit B), quoted hereunder in its entirety:The first day of the strike was last 21 May 1958.Our position remains unchanged and the strike has made us even more convinced of our decision.We do not know how long you intend to stay out, but we cannot hold your positions open for long. We have continued to operate and will continue to do so with or without you.If you are still interested in continuing in the employ of the Group Companies, and if there are no criminal charges pending against you, we are giving you until 2 June 1958 to report for work at the home office. If by this date you have not yet reported, we may be forced to obtain your replacement.Before, the decisions was yours to make.So it is now.Incidentally, all of the more than 120 criminal charges filed against the members of the Unions, except three (3), were dismissed by the fiscal's office and by the courts. These three cases involved "slight physical injuries" against one striker and "light coercion" against two others.At any rate, because of the issuance of the writ of preliminary injunction against them as well as the ultimatum of the Companies giving them until June 2, 1958 to return to their jobs or else be replaced, the striking employees decided to call off their strike and to report back to work on June 2, 1958.However, before readmitting the strikers, the Companies required them not only to secure clearances from the City Fiscal's Office of Manila but also to be screened by a management committee among the members of which were Enage and Garcia. The screening committee initially rejected 83 strikers with pending criminal charges. However, all non-strikers with pending criminal charges which arose from the breakthrough incident were readmitted immediately by the Companies without being required to secure clearances from the fiscal's office. Subsequently, when practically all the strikers had secured clearances from the fiscal's office, the Companies readmitted only some but adamantly refused readmission to 34 officials and members of the Unions who were most active in the strike, on the ground that they committed "acts inimical to the interest of the respondents," without however stating the specific acts allegedly committed. Among those who were refused readmission are Emiliano Tabasondra, vice president of the Insular Life Building Employees' Association-NATU; Florencio Ibarra, president of the FGU Insurance Group Workers & Employees Association-NATU; and Isagani Du Timbol, acting president of the Insular Life Assurance Co., Ltd. Employees Association-NATU. Some 24 of the above number were ultimately notified months later that they were being dismissed retroactively as of June 2, 1958 and given separation pay checks computed under Rep. Act 1787, while others (ten in number) up to now have not been readmitted although there have been no formal dismissal notices given to them.On July 29, 1958 the CIR prosecutor filed a complaint for unfair labor practice against the Companies under Republic Act 875. The complaint specifically charged the Companies with (1) interfering with the members of the Unions in the exercise of their right to concerted action, by sending out individual letters to them urging them to abandon their strike and return to work, with a promise of comfortable cots, free coffee and movies, and paid overtime, and, subsequently, by warning them that if they did not return to work on or before June 2, 1958, they might be replaced; and (2) discriminating against the members of the Unions as regards readmission to work after the strike on the basis of their union membership and degree of participation in the strike. On August 4, 1958 the Companies filed their answer denying all the material allegations of the complaint, stating special defenses therein, and asking for the dismissal of the complaint.After trial on the merits, the Court of Industrial Relations, through Presiding Judge Arsenio Martinez, rendered on August 17, 1965 a decision dismissing the Unions' complaint for lack of merit. On August 31, 1965 the Unions seasonably filed their motion for reconsideration of the said decision, and their supporting memorandum on September 10, 1965. This was denied by the Court of Industrial Relations en banc in a resolution promulgated on October 20, 1965.Hence, this petition for review, the Unions contending that the lower court erred:1. In not finding the Companies guilty of unfair labor practice in sending out individually to the strikers the letters marked Exhibits A and B; 2. In not finding the Companies guilty of unfair labor practice for discriminating against the striking members of the Unions in the matter of readmission of employees after the strike;  3. In not finding the Companies guilty of unfair labor practice for dismissing officials and members of the Unions without giving them the benefit of investigation and the opportunity to present their side in regard to activities undertaken by them in the legitimate exercise of their right to strike; and  4. In not ordering the reinstatement of officials and members of the Unions, with full back wages, from June 2, 1958 to the date of their actual reinstatement to their usual employment.

I. The respondents contend that the sending of the letters, exhibits A and B, constituted a legitimate exercise of their freedom of speech. We do not agree. The said letters were directed to the striking employees individually - by registered special delivery mail at that - without being coursed through the Unions which were representing the employees in the collective bargaining.The act of an employer in notifying absent employees individually during a strike following unproductive efforts at collective bargaining that the plant would be operated the next day and that their jobs were open for them should they want to come in has been held to be an unfair labor practice, as an active interference with the right of collective bargaining through dealing with the employees individually instead of through their collective bargaining representatives. (31 Am. Jur. 563, citing NLRB v. Montgomery Ward & Co. [CA 9th] 133 F2d 676, 146 ALR 1045)Indeed, it is an unfair labor practice for an employer operating under a collective bargaining agreement to negotiate or to attempt to negotiate with his employees individually in connection with changes in the agreement. And the basis of the prohibition regarding individual bargaining with the strikers is that although the union is on strike, the employer is still under obligation to bargain with the union as the employees' bargaining representative (Melo Photo Supply Corporation vs. National Labor Relations Board, 321 U.S. 332).Indeed, some such similar actions are illegal as constituting unwarranted acts of interference. Thus, the act of a company president in writing letters to the strikers, urging their return to work on terms inconsistent with their union membership, was adjudged as constituting interference with the exercise of his employees' right to collective bargaining (Lighter Publishing, CCA 7th, 133 F2d 621). It is likewise an act of interference for the employer to send a letter to all employees notifying them to return to work at a time specified therein, otherwise new employees would be engaged to perform their jobs. Individual solicitation of the employees or visiting their homes, with the employer or his representative urging the employees to cease union activity or cease striking, constitutes unfair labor practice. All the above-detailed activities are unfair labor practices because they tend to undermine the concerted activity of the employees, an activity to which they are entitled free from the employer's molestation.1  Moreover, since exhibit A is a letter containing promises of benefits to the employees in order to entice them to return to work, it is not protected by the free speech provisions of the Constitution (NLRB v. Clearfield Cheese Co., Inc., 213 F2d 70). The same is true with exhibit B since it contained threats to obtain replacements for the striking employees in the event they did not report for work on June 2, 1958. The free speech protection under the Constitution is inapplicable where the expression of opinion by the employer or his agent contains a promise of benefit, or threats, or reprisal (31 Am. Jur. 544; NLRB vs. Clearfield Cheese Co., Inc., 213 F2d 70; NLRB vs. Goigy Co., 211 F2d 533, 35 ALR 2d 422).Indeed, when the respondents offered reinstatement and attempted to "bribe" the strikers with "comfortable cots," "free coffee and occasional movies," "overtime" pay for "work performed in excess of eight hours," and "arrangements" for their families, so they would abandon the strike and return to work, they were guilty of strike-breaking and/or union-busting and, consequently, of unfair labor practice. It is equivalent to an attempt to break a strike for an employer to offer reinstatement to striking employees individually, when they are represented by a union, since the employees thus offered reinstatement are unable to determine what the consequences of returning to work would be. Likewise violative of the right to organize, form and join labor organizations are the following acts: the offer of a Christmas bonus to all "loyal" employees of a company shortly after the making of a request by the union to bargain; wage increases given for the purpose of mollifying employees after the employer has refused to bargain with the union, or for the purpose of inducing striking employees to return to work; the employer's promises of benefits in return for the strikers' abandonment of their strike in support of their union; and the employer's statement, made about 6 weeks after the strike started, to a group of strikers in a restaurant to the effect that if the strikers returned to work, they would receive new benefits in the form of hospitalization, accident insurance, profit-sharing, and a new building to work in.2 Citing paragraph 5 of the complaint filed by the acting prosecutor of the lower court which states that "the officers and members of the complainant unions decided to call off the strike and return to work on June 2, 1958 by reason of the injunction issued by the Manila Court of First Instance," the respondents contend that this was the main cause why the strikers returned to work and not the letters, exhibits A and B. This assertion is without merit. The circumstance that the strikers later decided to return to work ostensibly on account of the injunctive writ issued by the Court of First Instance of Manila cannot alter the intrinsic quality of the letters, which were calculated, or which tended, to interfere with the employees' right to engage in lawful concerted activity in the form of a strike. Interference constituting unfair labor practice will not cease to be such simply because it was susceptible of being thwarted or resisted, or that it did not proximately cause the result intended. For success of purpose is not, and should not, be the criterion in determining whether or not a prohibited act constitutes unfair labor practice.The test of whether an employer has interfered with and coerced employees within the meaning of subsection (a) (1) is whether the employer has engaged in conduct which it may reasonably be said tends to interfere with the free exercise of employees' rights under section 3 of the Act, and it is not necessary that there be direct evidence that any employee was in fact intimidated or coerced by statements of threats of the employer if there is a reasonable inference that anti-union conduct of the employer does have an adverse effect on self-organization and collective bargaining. (Francisco, Labor Laws 1956, Vol. II, p. 323, citing NLRB v. Ford, C.A., 1948, 170 F2d 735).

Besides, the letters, exhibits A and B, should not be considered by themselves alone but should be read in the light of the preceding and subsequent circumstances surrounding them. The letters should be interpreted according to the "totality of conduct doctrine,"... whereby the culpability of an employer's remarks were to be evaluated not only on the basis of their implicit implications, but were to be appraised against the background of and in conjunction with collateral circumstances. Under this "doctrine" expressions of opinion by an employer which, though innocent in themselves, frequently were held to be culpable because of the circumstances under which they were uttered, the history of the particular employer's labor relations or anti-union bias or because of their connection with an established collateral plan of coercion or interference. (Rothenberg on Relations, p. 374, and cases cited therein.)It must be recalled that previous to the petitioners' submission of proposals for an amended renewal of their respective collective bargaining agreements to the respondents, the latter hired Felipe Enage and Ramon Garcia, former legal counsels of the petitioners, as personnel manager and assistant corporate secretary, respectively, with attractive compensations. After the notice to strike was served on the Companies and negotiations were in progress in the Department of Labor, the respondents reclassified 87 employees as supervisors without increase in salary or in responsibility, in effect compelling these employees to resign from their unions. And during the negotiations in the Department of Labor, despite the fact that the petitioners granted the respondents' demand that the former drop their demand for union shop and in spite of urgings by the conciliators of the Department of Labor, the respondents adamantly refused to answer the Unions' demands en toto. Incidentally, Enage was the chairman of the negotiating panel for the Companies in the collective bargaining between the former and the Unions. After the petitioners went to strike, the strikers were individually sent copies of exhibit A, enticing them to abandon their strike by inducing them to return to work upon promise of special privileges. Two days later, the respondents, thru their president and manager, respondent Jose M. Olbes, brought three truckloads of non-strikers and others, escorted by armed men, who, despite the presence of eight entrances to the three buildings occupied by the Companies, entered thru only one gate less than two meters wide and in the process, crashed thru the picket line posted in front of the premises of the Insular Life Building. This resulted in injuries on the part of the picketers and the strike-breakers. Then the respondents brought against the picketers criminal charges, only three of which were not dismissed, and these three only for slight misdemeanors. As a result of these criminal actions, the respondents were able to obtain an injunction from the court of first instance restraining the strikers from stopping, impeding, obstructing, etc. the free and peaceful use of the Companies' gates, entrance and driveway and the free movement of persons and vehicles to and from, out and in, of the Companies' buildings. On the same day that the injunction was issued, the letter, Exhibit B, was sent - again individually and by registered special delivery mail - to the strikers, threatening them with dismissal if they did not report for work on or before June 2, 1958. But when most of the petitioners reported for work, the respondents thru a screening committee - of which Ramon Garcia was a member - refused to admit 63 members of the Unions on the ground of "pending criminal charges." However, when almost all were cleared of criminal charges by the fiscal's office, the respondents adamantly refused admission to 34 officials and union members. It is not, however, disputed that all-non-strikers with pending criminal charges which arose from the breakthrough incident of May 23, 1958 were readmitted immediately by the respondents. Among the non-strikers with pending criminal charges who were readmitted were Generoso Abella, Enrique Guidote, Emilio Carreon, Antonio Castillo, Federico Barretto, Manuel Chuidian and Nestor Cipriano. And despite the fact that the fiscal's office found no probable cause against the petitioning strikers, the Companies adamantly refused admission to them on the pretext that they committed "acts inimical to the interest of the respondents," without stating specifically the inimical acts allegedly committed. They were soon to admit, however, that these alleged inimical acts were the same criminal charges which were dismissed by the fiscal and by the courts..Verily, the above actuations of the respondents before and after the issuance of the letters, exhibit A and B, yield the clear inference that the said letters formed of the respondents scheme to preclude if not destroy unionism within them.To justify the respondents' threat to dismiss the strikers and secure replacements for them in order to protect and continue their business, the CIR held the petitioners' strike to be an economic strike on the basis of exhibit 4 (Notice of Strike) which states that there was a "deadlock in collective bargaining" and on the strength of the supposed testimonies of some union men who did not actually know the very reason for the strike. It should be noted that exhibit 4, which was filed on January 27, 1958, states, inter alia:TO: BUREAU OF LABOR RELATIONS DEPARTMENT OF LABORMANILAThirty (30) days from receipt of this notice by the Office, this [sic] unions intends to go on strike againstTHE INSULAR LIFE ASSURANCE CO., LTD.Plaza Moraga, Manila THE FGU INSURANCE GROUP Plaza Moraga, Manila 

INSULAR LIFE BUILDING ADMINISTRATIONPlaza Moraga, Manila .for the following reason: DEADLOCK IN COLLECTIVE BARGAINING...However, the employees did not stage the strike after the thirty-day period, reckoned from January 27, 1958. This simply proves that the reason for the strike was not the deadlock on collective bargaining nor any lack of economic concessions. By letter dated April 15, 1958, the respondents categorically stated what they thought was the cause of the "Notice of Strike," which so far as material, reads:3. Because you did not see fit to agree with our position on the union shop, you filed a notice of strike with the Bureau of Labor Relations on 27 January 1958, citing `deadlock in collective bargaining' which could have been for no other issue than the union shop." (exhibit 8, letter dated April 15, 1958.)The strike took place nearly four months from the date the said notice of strike was filed. And the actual and main reason for the strike was, "When it became crystal clear the management double crossed or will not negotiate in good faith, it is tantamount to refusal collectively and considering the unfair labor practice in the meantime being committed by the management such as the sudden resignation of some unionists and [who] became supervisors without increase in salary or change in responsibility, such as the coercion of employees, decided to declare the strike." (tsn., Oct. 14, 1958, p. 14.) The truth of this assertion is amply proved by the following circumstances: (1) it took the respondents six (6) months to consider the petitioners' proposals, their only excuse being that they could not go on with the negotiations if the petitioners did not drop the demand for union shop (exh. 7, respondents' letter dated April 7, 1958); (2) when the petitioners dropped the demand for union shop, the respondents did not have a counter-offer to the petitioners' demands. Sec. 14 of Rep. Act 875 required the respondents to make a reply to the petitioners' demands within ten days from receipt thereof, but instead they asked the petitioners to give a "well reasoned, workable formula which takes into account the financial position of the group companies." (tsn., Sept. 8, 1958, p. 62; tsn., Feb. 26, 1969, p. 49.)  II. Exhibit H imposed three conditions for readmission of the strikers, namely: (1) the employee must be interested in continuing his work with the group companies; (2) there must be no criminal charges against him; and (3) he must report for work on June 2, 1958, otherwise he would be replaced. Since the evidence shows that all the employees reported back to work at the respondents' head office on June 2, 1953, they must be considered as having complied with the first and third conditions.Our point of inquiry should therefore be directed at whether they also complied with the second condition. It is not denied that when the strikers reported for work on June 2, 1958, 63 members of the Unions were refused readmission because they had pending criminal charges. However, despite the fact that they were able to secure their respective clearances 34 officials and union members were still refused readmission on the alleged ground that they committed acts inimical to the Companies. It is beyond dispute, however, that non-strikers who also had criminal charges pending against them in the fiscal's office, arising from the same incidents whence the criminal charges against the strikers evolved, were readily readmitted and were not required to secure clearances. This is a clear act of discrimination practiced by the Companies in the process of rehiring and is therefore a violation of sec. 4(a) (4) of the Industrial Peace Act. The respondents did not merely discriminate against all the strikers in general. They separated the active from the less active unionists on the basis of their militancy, or lack of it, on the picket lines. Unionists belonging to the first category were refused readmission even after they were able to secure clearances from the competent authorities with respect to the criminal charges filed against them. It is significant to note in this connection that except for one union official who deserted his union on the second day of the strike and who later participated in crashing through the picket lines, not a single union officer was taken back to work. Discrimination undoubtedly exists where the record shows that the union activity of the rehired strikers has been less prominent than that of the strikers who were denied reinstatement.So is there an unfair labor practice where the employer, although authorized by the Court of Industrial Relations to dismiss the employees who participated in an illegal strike, dismissed only the leaders of the strikers, such dismissal being evidence of discrimination against those dismissed and constituting a waiver of the employer's right to dismiss the striking employees and a condonation of the fault committed by them." (Carlos and Fernando, Labor and Social Legislation, p. 62, citing Phil. Air Lines, Inc. v. Phil. Air Lines Emloyees Association, L-8197, Oct. 31, 1958.)It is noteworthy that - perhaps in an anticipatory effort to exculpate themselves from charges of discrimination in the readmission of strikers returning to work - the respondents delegated the power to readmit to a committee. But the respondent Olbes had chosen Vicente Abella, chief of the personnel records section, and Ramon Garcia, assistant corporate secretary, to screen the unionists reporting back to work. It is not difficult to imagine that these two employees - having been involved in unpleasant incidents with the picketers during the strike - were hostile to the strikers. Needless to say, the mere act of placing in the hands of employees hostile to the strikers the power of reinstatement, is a form of discrimination in rehiring.Delayed reinstatement is a form of discrimination in rehiring, as is having the machinery of reinstatement in the hands of employees hostile to the strikers, and reinstating a union official who formerly worked in a unionized plant, to a job in

another mill, which was imperfectly organized. (Morabe, The Law on Strikes, p. 473, citing Sunshine Mining Co., 7 NLRB 1252; Cleveland Worsted Mills, 43 NLRB 545; emphasis supplied.)Equally significant is the fact that while the management and the members of the screening committee admitted the discrimination committed against the strikers, they tossed back and around to each other the responsibility for the discrimination. Thus, Garcia admitted that in exercising for the management the authority to screen the returning employees, the committee admitted the non-strikers but refused readmission to the strikers (tsn., Feb. 6, 1962, pp. 15-19, 23-29). Vicente Abella, chairman of the management's screening committee, while admitting the discrimination, placed the blame therefor squarely on the management (tsn., Sept. 20, 1960, pp. 7-8, 14-18). But the management, speaking through the respondent Olbes, head of the Companies, disclaimed responsibility for the discrimination. He testified that "The decision whether to accept or not an employee was left in the hands of that committee that had been empowered to look into all cases of the strikers." (tsn., Sept. 6, 1962, p. 19.)  Of course, the respondents - through Ramon Garcia - tried to explain the basis for such discrimination by testifying that strikers whose participation in any alleged misconduct during the picketing was not serious in nature were readmissible, while those whose participation was serious were not. (tsn., Aug. 4, 1961, pp. 48-49, 56). But even this distinction between acts of slight misconduct and acts of serious misconduct which the respondents contend was the basis for either reinstatement or discharge, is completely shattered upon a cursory examination of the evidence on record. For with the exception of Pascual Esquillo whose dismissal sent to the other strikers cited the alleged commission by them of simple "acts of misconduct." III. Anent the third assignment of error, the record shows that not a single dismissed striker was given the opportunity to defend himself against the supposed charges against him. As earlier mentioned, when the striking employees reported back for work on June 2, 1958, the respondents refused to readmit them unless they first secured the necessary clearances; but when all, except three, were able to secure and subsequently present the required clearances, the respondents still refused to take them back. Instead, several of them later received letters from the respondents in the following stereotyped tenor:This will confirm the termination of your employment with the Insular Life-FGU Insurance Group as of 2 June 1958.The termination of your employment was due to the fact that you committed acts of misconduct while picketing during the last strike. Because this may not constitute sufficient cause under the law to terminate your employment without pay, we are giving you the amount of P1,930.32 corresponding to one-half month pay for every year of your service in the Group Company. Kindly acknowledge receipt of the check we are sending herewith.Very truly yours, (Sgd.) JOSE M. OLBESPresident, Insurance LifeActing President, FGU.The respondents, however, admitted that the alleged "acts of misconduct" attributed to the dismissed strikers were the same acts with which the said strikers were charged before the fiscal's office and the courts. But all these charges except three were dropped or dismissed.Indeed, the individual cases of dismissed officers and members of the striking unions do not indicate sufficient basis for dismissal.Emiliano Tabasondra, vice-president of the petitioner FGU Insurance Group Workers & Employees Association-NATU, was refused reinstatement allegedly because he did not report for duty on June 2, 1958 and, hence, had abandoned his office. But the overwhelming evidence adduced at the trial and which the respondents failed to rebut, negates the respondents' charge that he had abandoned his job. In his testimony, corroborated by many others, Tabasondra particularly identified the management men to whom he and his group presented themselves on June 2, 1958. He mentioned the respondent Olbes' secretary, De Asis, as the one who received them and later directed them - when Olbes refused them an audience - to Felipe Enage, the Companies' personnel manager. He likewise categorically stated that he and his group went to see Enage as directed by Olbes' secretary. If Tabasondra were not telling the truth, it would have been an easy matter for the respondents to produce De Asis and Enage - who testified anyway as witnesses for the respondents on several occasions - to rebut his testimony. The respondents did nothing of the kind. Moreover, Tabasondra called on June 21, 1958 the respondents' attention to his non-admission and asked them to inform him of the reasons therefor, but instead of doing so, the respondents dismissed him by their letter dated July 10, 1958. Elementary fairness required that before being dismissed for cause, Tabasondra be given "his day in court."  At any rate, it has been held that mere failure to report for work after notice to return, does not constitute abandonment nor bar reinstatement. In one case, the U.S. Supreme Court held that the taking back of six of eleven men constituted discrimination although the five strikers who were not reinstated, all of whom were prominent in the union and in the strike, reported for work at various times during the next three days, but were told that there were no openings. Said the Court:

... The Board found, and we cannot say that its finding is unsupported, that, in taking back six union men, the respondent's officials discriminated against the latter on account of their union activities and that the excuse given that they did not apply until after the quota was full was an afterthought and not the true reason for the discrimination against them. (NLRB v. Mackay Radio & Telegraph Co., 304 U.S. 333, 58 Sup. Ct. 904, 82 L. Ed. 1381) (Mathews, Labor Relations and the Law, p. 725, 728)The respondents' allegation that Tabasondra should have returned after being refused readmission on June 2, 1958, is not persuasive. When the employer puts off reinstatement when an employee reports for work at the time agreed, we consider the employee relieved from the duty of returning further. Sixto Tongos was dismissed allegedly because he revealed that despite the fact that the Companies spent more than P80,000 for the vacation trips of officials, they refused to grant union demands; hence, he betrayed his trust as an auditor of the Companies. We do not find this allegation convincing. First, this accusation was emphatically denied by Tongos on the witness stand. Gonzales, president of one of the respondent Companies and one of the officials referred to, took a trip abroad in 1958. Exchange controls were then in force, and an outgoing traveller on a combined business and vacation trip was allowed by the Central Bank, per its Circular 52 (Notification to Authorized Agent Banks) dated May 9, 1952, an allocation of $1,000 or only P2,000, at the official rate of two pesos to the dollar, as pocket money; hence, this was the only amount that would appear on the books of the Companies. It was only on January 21, 1962, per its Circular 133 (Notification to Authorized Agent Banks), that the Central Bank lifted the exchange controls. Tongos could not therefore have revealed an amount bigger than the above sum. And his competence in figures could not be doubted considering that he had passed the board examinations for certified public accountants. But assuming arguendo that Tongos indeed revealed the true expenses of Gonzales' trip - which the respondents never denied or tried to disprove - his statements clearly fall within the sphere of a unionist's right to discuss and advertise the facts involved in a labor dispute, in accordance with section 9(a)(5) of Republic Act 875 which guarantees the untramelled exercise by striking employees of the right to give "publicity to the existence of, or the fact involved in any labor dispute, whether by advertising, speaking, patrolling or by any method not involving fraud or violence." Indeed, it is not only the right, it is as well the duty, of every unionist to advertise the facts of a dispute for the purpose of informing all those affected thereby. In labor disputes, the combatants are expected to expose the truth before the public to justify their respective demands. Being a union man and one of the strikers, Tongos was expected to reveal the whole truth on whether or not the respondent Companies were justified in refusing to accede to union demands. After all, not being one of the supervisors, he was not a part of management. And his statement, if indeed made, is but an expression of free speech protected by the Constitution.Free speech on both sides and for every faction on any side of the labor relation is to me a constitutional and useful right. Labor is free ... to turn its publicity on any labor oppression, substandard wages, employer unfairness, or objectionable working conditions. The employer, too, should be free to answer and to turn publicity on the records of the leaders of the unions which seek the confidence of his men ... (Concurring opinion of Justice Jackson in Thomas v. Collins, 323 U.S. 516, 547, 65 Sup. Ct. 315, 89 L. Ed. 430.) (Mathews, Labor Relations and the Law, p. 591.)The respondents also allege that in revealing certain confidential information, Tongos committed not only a betrayal of trust but also a violation of the moral principles and ethics of accountancy. But nowhere in the Code of Ethics for Certified Public Accountants under the Revised Rules and Regulations of the Board of Accountancy formulated in 1954, is this stated. Moreover, the relationship of the Companies with Tongos was that of an employer and not a client. And with regard to the testimonies of Juan Raymundo and Antolin Carillo, both vice-presidents of the Trust Insurance Agencies, Inc. about the alleged utterances made by Tongos, the lower court should not have given them much weight. The firm of these witnesses was newly established at that time and was still a "general agency" of the Companies. It is not therefore amiss to conclude that they were more inclined to favor the respondents rather than Tongos. Pacifico Ner, Paulino Bugay, Jose Garcia, Narciso Da�o, Vicente Alsol and Hermenigildo Ramirez, opined the lower court, were constructively dismissed by non-readmission allegedly because they not only prevented Ramon Garcia, assistant corporate secretary, and Vicente Abella, chief of the personnel records section of the Companies, from entering the Companies' premises on May 21, 1958, but they also caused bruises and abrasions on Garcia's chest and forehead - acts considered inimical to the interest of the respondents. The Unions, upon the other hand, insist that there is complete lack of evidence that Ner took part in pushing Garcia; that it was Garcia who elbowed his way through the picket lines and therefore Ner shouted "Close up," which the picketers did; and that Garcia tossed Paulino Bugay's placard and a fight ensued between them in which both suffered injuries. But despite these conflicting versions of what actually happened on May 21, 1958, there are grounds to believe that the picketers are not responsible for what happened. The picketing on May 21, 1958, as reported in the police blotter, was peaceful (see Police blotter report, exh. 3 in CA-G.R. No. 25991-R of the Court of Appeals, where Ner was acquitted). Moreover, although the Companies during the strike were holding offices at the Botica Boie building at Escolta, Manila; Tuason Building at San Vicente Street, Manila; and Ayala, Inc. offices at Makati, Rizal, Garcia, the assistant corporate secretary, and Abella, the chief of the personnel records section, reported for work at the Insular Life Building. There is therefore a reasonable

suggestion that they were sent to work at the latter building to create such an incident and have a basis for filing criminal charges against the petitioners in the fiscal's office and applying for injunction from the court of first instance. Besides, under the circumstances the picketers were not legally bound to yield their grounds and withdraw from the picket lines. Being where the law expects them to be in the legitimate exercise of their rights, they had every reason to defend themselves and their rights from any assault or unlawful transgression. Yet the police blotter, about adverted to, attests that they did not resort to violence.The heated altercations and occasional blows exchanged on the picket line do not affect or diminish the right to strike. Persuasive on this point is the following commentary: .We think it must be conceded that some disorder is unfortunately quite usual in any extensive or long drawn out strike. A strike is essentially a battle waged with economic weapons. Engaged in it are human beings whose feelings are stirred to the depths. Rising passions call forth hot words. Hot words lead to blows on the picket line. The transformation from economic to physical combat by those engaged in the contest is difficult to prevent even when cool heads direct the fight. Violence of this nature, however much it is to be regretted, must have been in the contemplation of the Congress when it provided in Sec. 13 of Act 29 USCA Sec. 163, that nothing therein should be construed so as to interfere with or impede or diminish in any way the right to strike. If this were not so, the rights afforded to employees by the Act would indeed be illusory. We accordingly recently held that it was not intended by the Act that minor disorders of this nature would deprive a striker of the possibility of reinstatement. (Republic Steel Corp. v. N. L. R. B., 107 F2d 472, cited in Mathews, Labor Relations and the Law, p. 378)Hence the incident that occurred between Ner, et al. and Ramon Garcia was but a necessary incident of the strike and should not be considered as a bar to reinstatement. Thus it has been held that: Fist-fighting between union and non-union employees in the midst of a strike is no bar to reinstatement. (Teller, Labor Disputes and Collective Bargaining, Vol. II, p. 855 citing Stackpole Carbon, Co. 6 NLRB 171, enforced 105 F2d 167.) Furthermore, assuming that the acts committed by the strikers were transgressions of law, they amount only to mere ordinary misdemeanors and are not a bar to reinstatement. In cases involving misdemeanors the board has generally held that unlawful acts are not bar to reinstatement. (Teller, Labor Disputes and Collective Bargaining, Id., p. 854, citing Ford Motor Company, 23 NLRB No. 28.) Finally, it is not disputed that despite the pendency of criminal charges against non-striking employees before the fiscal's office, they were readily admitted, but those strikers who had pending charges in the same office were refused readmission. The reinstatement of the strikers is thus in order.[W]here the misconduct, whether in reinstating persons equally guilty with those whose reinstatement is opposed, or in other ways, gives rise to the inference that union activities rather than misconduct is the basis of his [employer] objection, the Board has usually required reinstatement." (Teller, supra, p. 853, citing the Third Annual Report of NLRB [1938], p. 211.)Lastly, the lower Court justified the constructive dismissal of Florencio Ibarra allegedly because he committed acts inimical to the interest of the respondents when, as president of the FGU Workers and Employees Association-NATU, he advised the strikers that they could use force and violence to have a successful picket and that picketing was precisely intended to prevent the non-strikers and company clients and customers from entering the Companies' buildings. Even if this were true, the record discloses that the picket line had been generally peaceful, and that incidents happened only when management men made incursions into and tried to break the picket line. At any rate, with or without the advice of Ibarra, picketing is inherently explosive. For, as pointed out by one author, "The picket line is an explosive front, charged with the emotions and fierce loyalties of the union-management dispute. It may be marked by colorful name-calling, intimidating threats or sporadic fights between the pickets and those who pass the line." (Mathews, Labor Relations and the Law, p. 752). The picket line being the natural result of the respondents' unfair labor practice, Ibarra's misconduct is at most a misdemeanor which is not a bar to reinstatement. Besides, the only evidence presented by the Companies regarding Ibarra's participation in the strike was the testimony of one Rodolfo Encarnacion, a former member of the board of directors of the petitioner FGU Insurance Group Workers and Employees Union-NATU, who became a "turncoat" and who likewise testified as to the union activities of Atty. Lacsina, Ricardo Villaruel and others (annex C, Decision, p. 27) - another matter which emphasizes the respondents' unfair labor practice. For under the circumstances, there is good ground to believe that Encarnacion was made to spy on the actvities of the union members. This act of the respondents is considered unjustifiable interference in the union activities of the petitioners and is unfair labor practice.It has been held in a great number of decisions at espionage by an employer of union activities, or surveillance thereof, are such instances of interference, restraint or coercion of employees in connection with their right to organize, form and join unions as to constitute unfair labor practice.... "Nothing is more calculated to interfere with, restrain and coerce employees in the exercise of their right to self-organization than such activity even where no discharges result. The information obtained by means of espionage is in valuable to the employer and can be used in a variety of cases to break a union." The unfair labor practice is committed whether the espionage is carried on by a professional labor spy or detective, by officials or supervisory employees of

the employer, or by fellow employees acting at the request or direction of the employer, or an ex-employee..." (Teller, Labor Disputes and Collective Bargaining, Vol. II, pp. 765-766, and cases cited.) .IV. The lower court should have ordered the reinstatement of the officials and members of the Unions, with full back wages from June 2, 1958 to the date of their actual reinstatement to their usual employment. Because all too clear from the factual and environmental milieu of this case, coupled with settled decisional law, is that the Unions went on strike because of the unfair labor practices committed by the respondents, and that when the strikers reported back for work - upon the invitation of the respondents - they were discriminatorily dismissed. The members and officials of the Unions therefore are entitled to reinstatement with back pay.[W]here the strike was induced and provoked by improper conduct on the part of an employer amounting to an 'unfair labor practice,' the strikers are entitled to reinstatement with back pay. (Rothenberg on Labor Relations, p. 418.)  [A]n employee who has been dismissed in violation of the provisions of the Act is entitled to reinstatement with back pay upon an adjudication that the discharge was illegal." (Id., citing Waterman S. S. Corp. v. N. L. R. B., 119 F2d 760; N. L. R. B. v. Richter's Bakery, 140 F2d 870; N. L. R. B. v. Southern Wood Preserving Co., 135 F. 2d 606; C. G. Conn, Ltd. v. N. L. R. B., 108 F2d 390; N. L. R. B. v. American Mfg. Co., 106 F2d 61; N. L. R. B. v. Kentucky Fire Brick Co., 99 F2d 99.)And it is not a defense to reinstatement for the respondents to allege that the positions of these union members have already been filled by replacements.[W]here the employers' "unfair labor practice" caused or contributed to the strike or where the 'lock-out' by the employer constitutes an "unfair labor practice," the employer cannot successfully urge as a defense that the striking or lock-out employees position has been filled by replacement. Under such circumstances, if no job sufficiently and satisfactorily comparable to that previously held by the aggrieved employee can be found, the employer must discharge the replacement employee, if necessary, to restore the striking or locked-out worker to his old or comparable position ... If the employer's improper conduct was an initial cause of the strike, all the strikers are entitled to reinstatement and the dismissal of replacement employees wherever necessary; ... . (Id., p. 422 and cases cited.)A corollary issue to which we now address ourselves is, from what date should the backpay payable to the unionists be computed? It is now a settled doctrine that strikers who are entitled to reinstatement are not entitled to back pay during the period of the strike, even though it is caused by an unfair labor practice. However, if they offer to return to work under the same conditions just before the strike, the refusal to re-employ or the imposition of conditions amounting to unfair labor practice is a violation of section 4(a) (4) of the Industrial Peace Act and the employer is liable for backpay from the date of the offer (Cromwell Commercial Employees and Laborers Union vs. Court of Industrial Relations, L-19778, Decision, Sept. 30, 1964, 12 SCRA 124; Id., Resolution on motion for reconsideration, 13 SCRA 258;see also Mathews, Labor Relations and the Law, p. 730 and the cited cases). We have likewise ruled that discriminatorily dismissed employees must receive backpay from the date of the act of discrimination, that is, from the date of their discharge (Cromwell Commercial Employees and Laborers Union vs. Court of Industrial Relations, supra).The respondents notified the petitioner strikers to report back for work on June 2, 1958, which the latter did. A great number of them, however, were refused readmission because they had criminal charges against them pending before the fiscal's office, although non-strikers who were also facing criminal indictments were readily readmitted. These strikers who were refused readmission on June 2, 1958 can thus be categorized as discriminatorily dismissed employees and are entitled to backpay from said date. This is true even with respect to the petitioners Jose Pilapil, Paulino Bugay, Jr. and Jose Garcia, Jr. who were found guilty only of misdemeanors which are not considered sufficient to bar reinstatement (Teller, Labor Disputes and Collective Bargaining, p. 854), especially so because their unlawful acts arose during incidents which were provoked by the respondents' men. However, since the employees who were denied readmission have been out of the service of the Companies (for more than ten years) during which they may have found other employment or other means of livelihood, it is only just and equitable that whatever they may have earned during that period should be deducted from their back wages to mitigate somewhat the liability of the company, pursuant to the equitable principle that no one is allowed to enrich himself at the expense of another (Macleod & Co. of the Philippines v. Progressive Federation of Labor, 97 Phil. 205 [1955]). The lower court gave inordinate significance to the payment to and acceptance by the dismissed employees of separation pay. This Court has ruled that while employers may be authorized under Republic Act 1052 to terminate employment of employees by serving the required notice, or, in the absence thereof, by paying the required compensation, the said Act may not be invoked to justify a dismissal prohibited by law, e.g., dismissal for union activities.... While Republic Act No. 1052 authorizes a commercial establishment to terminate the employment of its employee by serving notice on him one month in advance, or, in the absence thereof, by paying him one month compensation from the date of the termination of his employment, such Act does not give to the employer a blanket authority to terminate the employment regardless of the cause or purpose behind such termination. Certainly, it cannot be made use of as a cloak to circumvent a final order of the court or a scheme to trample upon the right of an employee who has been the victim of an unfair labor practice. (Yu Ki Lam, et al. v. Nena Micaller, et al., 99 Phil. 904 [1956].)

Finally, we do not share the respondents' view that the findings of fact of the Court of Industrial Relations are supported by substantial and credible proof. This Court is not therefore precluded from digging deeper into the factual milieu of the case (Union of Philippine Education Employees v. Philippine Education Company, 91 Phil. 93; Lu Do & Lu Ym Corporation v. Philippine-Land-Air-Sea Labor Union, 11 SCRA 134 [1964]).V. The petitioners (15 of them) ask this Court to cite for contempt the respondent Presiding Judge Arsenio Martinez of the Court of Industrial Relations and the counsels for the private respondents, on the ground that the former wrote the following in his decision subject of the instant petition for certiorari, while the latter quoted the same on pages 90-91 of the respondents' brief: .... Says the Supreme Court in the following decisions:In a proceeding for unfair labor practice, involving a determination as to whether or not the acts of the employees concerned justified the adoption of the employer of disciplinary measures against them, the mere fact that the employees may be able to put up a valid defense in a criminal prosecution for the same acts, does not erase or neutralize the employer's right to impose discipline on said employees. For it is settled that not even the acquittal of an employee of the criminal charge against him is a bar to the employer's right to impose discipline on its employees, should the act upon which the criminal charged was based constitute nevertheless an activity inimical to the employer's interest... The act of the employees now under consideration may be considered as a misconduct which is a just cause for dismissal. (Lopez, Sr., et al. vs. Chronicle Publication Employees Ass'n. et al., G.R. No. L-20179-81, December 28, 1964.) (emphasis supplied)The two pertinent paragraphs in the above-cited decision * which contained the underscored portions of the above citation read however as follows:Differently as regard the dismissal of Orlando Aquino and Carmelito Vicente, we are inclined to uphold the action taken by the employer as proper disciplinary measure. A reading of the article which allegedly caused their dismissal reveals that it really contains an insinuation albeit subtly of the supposed exertion of political pressure by the Manila Chronicle management upon the City Fiscal's Office, resulting in the non-filing of the case against the employer. In rejecting the employer's theory that the dismissal of Vicente and Aquino was justified, the lower court considered the article as "a report of some acts and omissions of an Assistant Fiscal in the exercise of his official functions" and, therefore, does away with the presumption of malice. This being a proceeding for unfair labor practice, the matter should not have been viewed or gauged in the light of the doctrine on a publisher's culpability under the Penal Code. We are not here to determine whether the employees' act could stand criminal prosecution, but only to find out whether the aforesaid act justifies the adoption by the employer of disciplinary measure against them. This is not sustaining the ruling that the publication in question is qualified privileged, but even on the assumption that this is so, the exempting character thereof under the Penal Code does not necessarily erase or neutralize its effect on the employer's interest which may warrant employment of disciplinary measure. For it must be remembered that not even the acquittal of an employee, of the criminal charges against him, is a bar to the employer's right to impose discipline on its employees, should the act upon which the criminal charges was based constitute nevertheless an activity inimical to the employer's interest.In the herein case, it appears to us that for an employee to publish his "suspicion," which actually amounts to a public accusation, that his employer is exerting political pressure on a public official to thwart some legitimate activities on the employees, which charge, in the least, would sully the employer's reputation, can be nothing but an act inimical to the said employer's interest. And the fact that the same was made in the union newspaper does not alter its deleterious character nor shield or protect a reprehensible act on the ground that it is a union activity, because such end can be achieved without resort to improper conduct or behavior. The act of the employees now under consideration may be considered as a misconduct which is a just cause for dismissal.** (Emphasis ours)It is plain to the naked eye that the 60 un-underscored words of the paragraph quoted by the respondent Judge do not appear in the pertinent paragraph of this Court's decision in L-20179-81. Moreover, the first underscored sentence in the quoted paragraph starts with "For it is settled ..." whereas it reads, "For it must be remembered ...," in this Court's decision. Finally, the second and last underlined sentence in the quoted paragraph of the respondent Judge's decision, appears not in the same paragraph of this Court's decision where the other sentence is, but in the immediately succeeding paragraph. This apparent error, however, does not seem to warrant an indictment for contempt against the respondent Judge and the respondents' counsels. We are inclined to believe that the misquotation is more a result of clerical ineptitude than a deliberate attempt on the part of the respondent Judge to mislead. We fully realize how saddled with many pending cases are the courts of the land, and it is not difficult to imagine that because of the pressure of their varied and multifarious work, clerical errors may escape their notice. Upon the other hand, the respondents' counsels have the prima facie right to rely on the quotation as it appears in the respondent Judge's decision, to copy it verbatim, and to incorporate it in their brief. Anyway, the import of the underscored sentences of the quotation in the respondent Judge's decision is substantially the same as, and faithfully reflects, the particular ruling in this Court's decision, i.e., that "[N]ot even the acquittal of an employee, of the criminal charges against him, is a bar to the employer's right to

impose discipline on its employees, should the act upon which the criminal charges were based constitute nevertheless an activity inimical to the employer's interest." Be that as it may, we must articulate our firm view that in citing this Court's decisions and rulings, it is the bounden duty of courts, judges and lawyers to reproduce or copy the same word-for-word and punctuation mark-for-punctuation mark. Indeed, there is a salient and salutary reason why they should do this. Only from this Tribunal's decisions and rulings do all other courts, as well as lawyers and litigants, take their bearings. This is because the decisions referred to in article 8 of the Civil Code which reads, "Judicial decisions applying or interpreting the laws or the Constitution shall form a part of the legal system of the Philippines," are only those enunciated by this Court of last resort. We said in no uncertain terms in Miranda, et al. vs. Imperial, et al. (77 Phil. 1066) that "[O]nly the decisions of this Honorable Court establish jurisprudence or doctrines in this jurisdiction." Thus, ever present is the danger that if not faithfully and exactly quoted, the decisions and rulings of this Court may lose their proper and correct meaning, to the detriment of other courts, lawyers and the public who may thereby be misled. But if inferior courts and members of the bar meticulously discharge their duty to check and recheck their citations of authorities culled not only from this Court's decisions but from other sources and make certain that they are verbatim reproductions down to the last word and punctuation mark, appellate courts will be precluded from acting on misinformation, as well as be saved precious time in finding out whether the citations are correct.Happily for the respondent Judge and the respondents' counsels, there was no substantial change in the thrust of this Court's particular ruling which they cited. It is our view, nonetheless, that for their mistake, they should be, as they are hereby, admonished to be more careful when citing jurisprudence in the future. ACCORDINGLY, the decision of the Court of Industrial Relations dated August 17, 1965 is reversed and set aside, and another is entered, ordering the respondents to reinstate the dismissed members of the petitioning Unions to their former or comparatively similar positions, with backwages from June 2, 1958 up to the dates of their actual reinstatements. Costs against the respondents.

EN BANCG.R. No. 100643 December 12, 1995

ADEZ REALTY, INCORPORATED, Petitioner, vs. HONORABLE COURT OF APPEALS, THE PRESIDING JUDGE, REGIONAL TRIAL COURT, Br. 79, Morong Rizal, THE REGISTER OF DEEDS FOR QUEZON CITY, and AGUEDO

EUGENIO, Respondents.R E S O L U T I O N

BELLOSILLO, J.: On 30 October 1992 the Court found movant, Atty. Benjamin M. Dacanay, guilty of intercalating a material fact in a decision of the Court of Appeals, which he appealed to this Court on certiorari, thereby altering the factual findings of the Court of Appeals with the apparent purpose of misleading this Court in order to obtain a favorable judgment. Consequently, Atty. Dacanay was disbarred from the practice of law. 1

On 20 November 1992 movant filed a Motion for Reconsideration and Leave to Offer Evidence Re Charge of Unauthorized Intercalation in a Judicial Record dated 18 November 1992. He claimed that the inserted words were written by his client, the President of Adez Realty, Inc., in the draft of the petition to be filed before the Supreme Court and unwittingly adopted by movant's secretary when the latter formalized the petition. He manifested that he would not risk committing the act for which he was found guilty considering that he was a nominee of the Judicial and Bar Council to the President for appointment as regional trial judge. 2But the Court on 3 December 1992 denied the motion for want of a compelling reason to justify a reversal of the questioned resolution. 3

On 23 February 1994 movant Dacanay filed a Motion to Lift (Disbarment) stating that he was already 62 years old, has learned his lesson from his mistake, was terribly sorry for what he had done, and in all candor promised that if given another chance he would live up to the exacting demands of the legal profession. He appended to his motion certifications of good moral character from: Fr. Celso Fernando, Parochial Vicar, Parish of St. Michael Archangel, Marilao, Bulacan; Fr. Lauro V. Larlar, OAR, Rector, San Sebastian College-Recoletos; Sis. Aniceta B. Abion, EMM, Chairperson, Center for Housing and Ecology Development Foundation, Inc.; Dean Rufus B. Rodriquez, College of Law, San Sebastian College-Recoletos; Judge Pedro T. Santiago, Executive Judge, RTC, Quezon City; Judge Teodoro P. Regino, RTC-Br. 84, Quezon City; Judge Antonio P. Solano, RTC-Br. 86, Quezon City; and Judge Gregorio D. Dayrit, MTC-Br. 35, Quezon City. 4However, on 11 August 1994 the Court denied the motion. 5

On 1 December 1994 movant again filed an Ex-Parte Motion to Lift Disbarment alleging among others that he had been deprived of his means to life; he had pursued civic, religious and community work, especially for the poor and the underprivileged short of extending legal assistance because of his incapacity; he had admitted "with profound regret and with utmost humility his commission of an unpardonable mistake and ask(ed) that he be given another chance;" and, he was "remorseful for what he has done and comes to this Honorable Court with a contrite heart." 6

His wife Norma M. Dacanay likewise wrote the Court on 1 December 1994 saying that while she did not condone what her husband had done, it had been her fervent wish that the Court took a second look into its decision disbarring her husband as her entire family had been traumatized by his disbarment. 7

On 6 March 1995 movant sent a letter addressed to the Chief Justice and the Associate Justices of the Court reiterating his Ex-Parte Motion to Lift Disbarment of 1 December 1994. Thus -I am truly penitent for the serious offense I committed and admit full responsibility for it. I realize it was dishonest and unfair to pass the blame to my secretary who was merely following my instructions. The intercalation was my own act and I am justly punished for it. Your Honors, I do not question your decision but I only beg for your mercy. I have a wife and children to support but my only means of livelihood has been withdrawn from me. I am destitute and desperate and can only turn to you for relief . . . .Looking back, I cannot imagine how I could have even thought of blackening the law profession, to which I owe so much. Please let me redeem myself by admitting me back to its precincts, where I swear to live strictly according to its canons . . . . 8  On 21 March 1995 the Court noted the letter of 6 March 1995 of movant Dacanay.On 4 August 1995 movant again prayed for his reinstatement -It has been 33 long months since my disbarment, during which time I have been struggling to make both ends meet to provide for my wife and three children. Please give me the chance to prove that I am a reformed offender who will henceforth do nothing whatsoever to dishonor the legal profession. 9 On 12 September 1995 the Court noted respondent's 4 August 1995 letter. 10

On 17 November, 1995 movant once more wrote the Court -I humbly acknowledge again that I committed a grievous offense for which I was justly punished at the time with the extreme sanction of disbarment.I have been suffering much since my disbarment more than 36 months ago, but it is my wife and children who have suffered more for my transgression. Although innocent, they bear with me the stigma and burden of my punishment. 11 The disbarment of movant Benjamin M. Dacanay for three (3) years has, quite apparently, given him sufficient time and occasion to soul-search and reflect on his professional conduct, redeem himself and prove once more that he is worthy to practice law and be capable of upholding the dignity of the legal profession. His admission of guilt and repeated pleas for compassion and reinstatement show that he is ready once more to meet the exacting standards the legal profession demands from its practitioners. Accordingly, the Court lifts the disbarment of Benjamin M. Dacanay. However he should be sternly warned that -[T]he practice of law is a privilege burdened with conditions. Adherence to the rigid standards of mental fitness, maintenance of the highest degree of morality and faithful compliance with the rules of the legal profession are the conditions required for remaining a member of good standing of the bar and for enjoying the privilege to practice law. The Supreme Court, as guardian of the legal profession, has ultimate disciplinary power over attorneys. This authority to discipline its members is not only a right, but a bounden duty as well . . . That is why respect and fidelity to the Court is demanded of its members . . . 12 WHEREFORE, the disbarment of BENJAMIN M. DACANAY from the practice of law is LIFTED and he is therefore allowed to resume the practice of law upon payment of the required legal fees. This resolution is effective immediately.SO ORDERED.

EN BANCG.R. No. L-22320           May 22, 1968

MERCEDES RUTH COBB-PEREZ and DAMASO P. PEREZ Petitioners, vs. HON. GREGORIO LANTIN, Judge of the Court of First Instance of Manila, 

RICARDO P. HERMOSO and the CITY SHERIFF OF MANILA, Respondents.CASTRO, J.: On January 10, 1964 the spouses Mercedes Ruth Cobb-Perez and Damaso P. Perez interposed the present petition for certiorari with urgent writ of preliminary injunction from the order of January 4, 1964 of the respondent Judge Gregorio T. Lantin of the Court of First Instance of Manila, which order denied a motion for reconsideration of a previous order rejecting a motion to quash the writ of execution herein controverted.A chronology of the essential antecedent events is necessary for a clear understanding of the case at bar.On February 25, 1959 the respondent Ricardo P. Hermoso commenced civil case 39407 in the Court of First Instance of Manila (Branch VII presided by the respondent Judge) against the petitioner Damaso P. Perez and one Gregorio Subong, for the recovery of the principal sum of P17,309.44 representing unpaid purchases of leather materials used in the shoe manufacturing business of the said petitioner. Because at the hearing neither the defendants nor their counsel appeared despite due notice to the latter, Hermoso was permitted to present his evidence ex parte. On April 11, 1960 judgment was rendered ordering Perez and Subong to pay Hermoso jointly and severally the sum of P17,309.44 with interest, attorney's fees and costs.

On June 21, 1960 Perez and Subong appealed to the Court of Appeals, which dismissed their appeal because it was filed beyond the reglementary period. Then on February 4, 1961 the defendants elevated the case to this Court on petition for certiorari, which was denied for lack of merit.After the case was remanded to the court of origin, Hermoso moved for execution of judgment, which was granted on July 1, 1961, and the corresponding writ of execution was issued on August 15, 1961. Meantime, on July 11, 1961, Perez and Subong filed a petition for relief from judgment, alleging excusable negligence. This petition was denied by the respondent Judge on August 3, 1961. From the order of denial, Perez and Subong on August 21, 1961 served notice of appeal to the Court of Appeals.On August 23, 1961 the respondent Sheriff of Manila levied upon 3,573 shares of common stock registered in the name of Damaso P. Perez with the Republic Bank. On August 30, 1961 Perez interposed an urgent motion to stay execution, alleging that the levy on said shares was highly excessive and unjust, considering that said shares have a total value of more than P357,300 while the judgment debt was only P17,309.44. On September 2, 1961 the Sheriff served and published the first notice of sale scheduling the auction sale of said shares for September 8, 1961. However, by order of September 7, 1961, the respondent Judge suspended the sale on execution pending resolution of the abovementioned urgent motion to stay execution. On September 29, 1961 the respondent Judge promulgated two orders: the first denied the appeal of Perez and Subong from the abovementioned order of August 3, 1961 rejecting their petition for relief from judgment, and the second denied Perez' urgent motion to stay execution. Consequently, on October 4, 1961 the respondent Sheriff served a second notice of sale resetting the auction for October 10, 1961. This was cancelled by the Court of Appeals which issued on October 9, 1961 a writ of preliminary injunction, pending hearing of Perez' petition for mandamus and certiorari with preliminary injunction (CA-G.R. 29962-R) filed on October 5, 1961 against the respondents Judge and Sheriff, in which petition Perez alleged that (1) the levy upon his 3,573 shares of stock was manifestly and patently unjust, and (2) the respondent Judge committed grave abuse of discretion in denying his statutory right to appeal.On November 15, 1962 the Court of Appeals rendered judgment sustaining Perez' position with respect to the extent of the levy at the same time that it upheld the denial of his motion to appeal. The case was remanded for the second time to the court of origin on January 14, 1963. Subsequently, on January 18, 1963, the Sheriff published the third notice of sale this time for only 210 shares of stocks, setting the public sale for January 24, 1963. Two days before the scheduled sale on execution, or on January 22, 1963, a new twist was added to the already protracted litigation when the petitioner Mercedes Ruth Cobb-Perez, the wife of Damaso P. Perez, filed with the Court of First Instance of Rizal a complaint for injunction with ex parte writ of preliminary injunction against Hermoso, the Republic Bank and the Sheriff of Manila (civil case 7532), wherein she contended that the levied shares are conjugal assets which are not answerable for the judgment debt of Damaso Perez, an obligation contracted not for the benefit or interest of their conjugal partnership. On the following day, January 23, 1963, Judge Eulogio Mencias of the Court of First Instance of Rizal granted the ex parte writ of preliminary injunction, enjoining once more the respondent Sheriff from carrying out the execution sale. However, on October 4, 1963, Judge Mencias lifted the writ, in obeisance to the doctrine enunciated in Acosta vs. Alvendia (L-21719, October 31, 1960) to the effect that courts of first instance have no power to restrain acts outside their territorial jurisdictions. Incidentally, the abovementioned civil case 7532 was dismissed on November 9, 1963, upon motion of the complainant herself.A month before the aforementioned writ was lifted, or on September 3, 1963, Mrs. Perez filed in the basic civil case 39407 an urgent motion to recall or lift the writ of execution issued on August 15, 1961, alleging the same reasons she advanced in civil case 7532 then pending in the Court of First Instance of Rizal, which are the self-same grounds upon which the herein petitioners anchor the petition at bar - the conjugal nature of the levied shares of stock and the personal nature of the obligation of Damaso Perez. Neither Mrs. Perez nor her counsel attended the scheduled hearings. On October 19, 1963 the respondent Judge promulgated an order denying the motion on the ground that "Mercedes Ruth Cobb-Perez is not a party in this case and that this (the motion to lift execution) is not the remedy prescribed by the Rules of Court in its Section 15 of Rule 39 for the protection of her right."  The writ of preliminary injunction having been lifted by the Court of First Instance of Rizal, and the urgent motion to lift the writ of execution having been denied by the court a quo, the respondent Sheriff on October 18, 1963 caused the publication for the fourth time of a notice of sale setting the execution sale of 220 shares of stock for October 29, 1963.On October 23, 1963, Mrs. Perez filed with the respondent Sheriff a third-party claim over the aforesaid 220 shares of stock, but the latter was determined to proceed with the scheduled auction sale as he was protected by an indemnity bond filed by the respondent Hermoso. On October 25, 1963 Mrs. Perez, assisted by her husband, commenced civil case 55292, denominated an action to vindicate third-party claim with petition for preliminary injunction, in Branch XXII of the Court of First Instance of Manila, presided by Judge Federico Alikpala. As a consequence of the new action, projected execution sale was suspended for the fourth time. On November 8, 1963 Judge Alikpala denied the preliminary injunction prayed for in the aforesaid civil case 55292, on the grounds that (1) he has no power to interfere

by injunction with the judgment or decree of a court of concurrent or coordinate jurisdiction and (2) the remedy of plaintiff (Mrs. Perez) is to lodge the third party claim filed by her with the court which issued the execution, "as it has the inherent control of its ministerial officers and to do all things reasonably necessary for the administration of justice." The aforesaid civil case 55292 was dismissed on March 20, 1964, upon agreement of the parties after the institution of the petition at bar.On the same day (November 8, 1963), Damaso Perez filed in the basic civil case 39407 an "Urgent Motion for Reconsideration" of the order of October 19, 1963 which denied his wife's motion to recall the controverted writ of execution. In this latest motion, Perez adopted his wife's previous motion, and at the same time offered in lieu of the levied stocks his alleged cash dividends in the Republic Bank in the sum of P19,985. In the same motion he asked for the suspension of the fifth scheduled auction sale set for November 11, 1963, which was granted ex parte. On January 4, 1964, the motion for reconsideration was denied by the respondent Judge. After the respondent Sheriff had scheduled (for the sixth time) the execution sale of the levied 240 shares of stock, the herein petitioners on January 10, 1965 interposed the present petition, which was given due course on January 15, 1964; the writ of preliminary injunction prayed for was issued upon petitioners posting a bond of P10,000.The movants-petitioners' main contention is that the respondent judge committed grave abuse of discretion in refusing to recall the controverted writ of execution despite their avowal that the levied 240 shares of stock belong to their conjugal partnership and as such cannot be made to answer for a judgment debt which is a personal obligation only of Damaso Perez.After a thorough review of the record, we hold that the respondent Judge acted correctly in refusing to quash the writ in dispute. It is conceded that courts have jurisdiction to entertain motions to quash their writs of execution because every court has the inherent power, for the advancement of justice, to correct errors of its ministerial officers and to control its own processes.1 However, the exercise of this power is well circumscribed. Thus, the proper court may quash the writ only in certain situations, as when it appears that (a) it has been improvidently issued, or (b) it is defective in substance, or (c) it has been issued against the wrong party, or (d) the judgement debt has been paid, or (e) the writ has been issued without authority, or (f) there has been a change in the situation of the parties which makes such execution inequitable, or (g) the controversy has never been submitted to the judgment of the court, and therefore no judgment at all has ever been rendered thereon.2 In the instant controversy, not one of these accepted grounds exists. Significantly, the spouses have not questioned the intrinsic validity or regularity of the writ of execution. They have alleged none of the circumstances earlier enumerated or other similar grounds which may warrant the quashal of the writ in dispute.In reality, what they attacked is not the writ of execution, the validity and regularity of which are unchallenged, but the levy made by the respondent Sheriff. In this regard, the remedy is not the recall of the writ, but an independent action to enjoin the Sheriff from proceeding with the projected sale, in which action the conjugal nature of the levied stocks should be established as a basis for the subsequent issuance of a permanent injunction, in the event of a successful claim. Incidentally, in the course of the protracted litigation, the petitioners had already availed of this remedy in civil cases 7532 and 55292, only to abandon it as they incessantly sought other, and often simultaneous, devices of thwarting satisfaction of the judgment debt. Considering the antecedent facts, particularly CA-G.R. 29962-R, even the remedy indicated above must fail, as Damaso Perez is now estopped from asserting that the levied shares are conjugal assets. All along he has nurtured the impression that the said shares are his exclusive property, which representation was enhanced by the fact that the same are registered in his name alone.It bears emphasis that in CA-G.R. 29962-R, Damaso Perez practically asserted exclusive ownership of the levied shares; although he challenged the legality and propriety of the levy with respect to its excessive coverage, he never raised the question of the conjugal nature of the levied shares. Having represented himself before the court a quo and in the Court of Appeals as the exclusive owner of the shares in dispute, he is now precluded from asserting that the levied shares are conjugal assets, an assertion that he should have advanced with expected alacrity when he first question the legality of the levy. Coming now to the other petitioner, Mrs. Perez, although she was not a party in CA-G.R. 29962-R, the judgment therein similarly binds her for she stands in privity with her husband. Moreover, she cannot feign utter ignorance of the affairs of her husband as to justify her delay in questioning the legality of the levy on the ground aforestated in civil case 7532, which case was commenced only on January 22, 1963, 17 months after the original levy was made on August 23, 1961.Even granting that the court a quo could properly take cognizance of the said motion to quash the writ of execution, the movants-petitioners failed to subtantiate their claim that the levied shares are conjugal assets and that the judgment debt is a personal obligation only of Damaso Perez.Anent their claim that the shares in question are conjugal assets, the spouses Perez adduced not a modicum of evidence, although they repeatedly invoked article 160 of the New Civil Code which provides that "All property of the

marriage is presumed to belong to the conjugal partnership, unless it be proved that it pertains exclusively to the husband or to the wife." As interpreted by this Court, the party who invokes this presumption must first prove that the property in controversy was acquired during the marriage. In other words, proof of acquisition during the coverture is a condition sine qua non for the operation of the presumption in favor of conjugal ownership. Thus in Camia de Reyes vs. Reyes de Ilano,3 it was held that "according to law and jurisprudence, it is sufficient to prove that the property was acquired during the marriage in order that the same may be deemed conjugal property." In the recent case of Maramba vs. Lozano et al.,4 this Court, thru Mr. Justice Makalintal, reiterated that "the presumption under Article 160 of the Civil Code refers to property acquired during the marriage," and then concluded that since "there is no showing as to when the property in question was acquired ... the fact that the title is in the wife's name alone is determinative." Similarly, in the case at bar, since there is no evidence as to when the shares of stock were acquired, the fact that they are registered in the name of the husband alone is an indication that the shares belong exclusively to said spouse. Conceding, however, that the shares in question are conjugal assets, they must still prove that their ganancial partnership is not liable for the payment of the aforesaid judgment debt. This, they were unable to do. Their contention that the judgment debt is a personal obligation of only one of them is devoid of evidentiary foundation. It is, to say the least, a futile attempt to rebut the presumption that the husband, as head of the family and administrator of the conjugal partnership, contracts obligations for the benefit of his family or the partnership.5 The aforesaid obligation was contracted in the purchase of leather used in the shoe manufacturing business of the petitioner husband. Said business is an ordinary commercial enterprise for gain, in the pursuit of which Damaso Perez had the right to embark the partnership.6 It is well-settled that the debts contracted by the husband for and in the exercise of the industry or profession by which he contributes to the support of the family, cannot be deemed to be his exclusive and private debts.7 We feel compelled to observe that during the protracted litigation below, the petitioners resorted to a series of actions and petitions, at some stages alternatingly, abetted by their counsel, for the sole purpose of thwarting the execution of a simple money judgment which has long become final and executory. Some of the actions were filed, only to be abandoned or withdrawn. The petitioners and their counsel, far from viewing courts as sanctuaries for those who seek justice, have tried to use them to subvert the very ends of justice.ACCORDINGLY, the instant petition is dismissed, and the writ of preliminary injunction heretofore issued is hereby dissolved. Treble costs are assessed against the petitioners, which shall be paid by their counsel.