2[1][1]. the Relationship Between

8/12/2019 2[1][1]. the Relationship Between

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reference +an ob)ect there does not belong only a single sign. For example,Aristotle+the referent

can be denoted by these signs/ the pupil of Platoand the teacher of Alexander the Great.

The same sensehas different lexicali@ations in different languages or e(en in the samelanguage +pass aay - die - !ic! the "uc!et.

To the sense does not always correspond a reference, i.e. in grasping a sense one is not

certainly assured of a reference +e.g. sign words such as unicorn, dragon# elf# fairy, $orld $arIII, ha(e no referents in the real world e(en though they are far from being meaningless

Frege maintains that the reference andsenseof a sign must be distinguished from the

associated idea +concept which is sub)ecti(e/ 3if the reference of a sign is an ob)ect percei(ableby the senses, my idea of it is an internal imagearising from memories of sense impressions

which = ha(e had ABC . &uch an ideais often saturated with feelingD the clarity of its separate

parts (aries and oscillates. The samesenseis not always connected, e(en in the same man with

the same idea3.8gden and Richards +$02$argue that the symbol corresponds to the &aussurian 3signifiant3

+signifier. They use the term referencefor the concept that mediates between the symbol:

word:expression and the referent. The triadic concept of meaning was represented by 8gden and

Richards in the form of a triangle.#ost linguists agree that a sign +ord or expression expresses itssense, stands for and

designates its reference.'y means of a sign we express its sense and designate its reference. sense

sign referent/reference

=dentical linguistic expressions may ha(e different referents in different contexts and at

different times +e.g. the 5ope, my neighbour, =, you, here, there, now, tomorrow. +#eyer, 2--2/

$-E.These expressions are called expressions with variable reference.To identify who is being referred to by pronouns like sheG, =G, youG, etc., we certainly

need to know a lot about the context in which these word were uttered. These words whosedenotational capability needs : requires contextual support are called deictic ords. +The term

deixiscomes from 7reek and means roughly pointing").

Thesenseof a linguistic expression is its content without reference, those features andproperties which define it. For example, the sense of girlG is a bundle of semantic features/ :

Hhuman:, :*adult:, :Hfemale:.

The referentof a sign may differ from thesense. For instance, the referent of e(ening starG is

the same as that of morning star, but not the sense. Therefore the designation of a single ob)ect can alsoconsist of se(eral words or signs. 8ther instances of references denoted by se(eral signs are 3the

pupil of 5lato3, 3the teacher of ?lexander the 7reat3 referring to ?ristotle or 3The 5rime #inisterof 7reat 'ritain3 and 3the leader of the >onser(ati(e 5arty3, both referring +in $0I0 at least to#argaret Thatcher. ?lthough the last two expressions may ha(e the same referent we would not

say that they ha(e the same sense. 4o one would maintain that the phrase 3 The 5rime #inister

of 7reat 'ritain3 could be defined as 3the leader of the >onser(ati(e 5arty3 or (ice (ersa.'esides expressions with (ariable reference, there are expressions with constant

reference+e.g. the Eiffel Toer andthe Pacific %cean and non-referring items, that is, they do

not identify entities in the world, such asso# &ery# may"e# if# not# all.


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The same sense has different lexicali@ations in different languages +


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in similarities between the order of e(ents and the word order in the sentences we use to describe

them and the principle of symbolicity accounting for the purely con(entional relation between the

form and the meaning of signs.

2.Eodels of meaning

The famous triangle of meaning of 8gden and Richards +$06K/ $$stands for a model of ananalytical and referential definition of meaningD it has been referred to in hundreds of subsequent

works and has had a powerful influence on semantic thinking.

4e(ertheless, llmann +$0K2/ Kcontends that 3for a linguistic study of meaning the basictriangle offers too little or too much3. ?s a diachronic semanticist, he obser(es that the meaning of

words may change as new knowledge is generated without a corresponding change in the referent or

real world entity +for example, atoms remain unchanged while our knowledge of their structure has

increased considerably in the present century.llmann indirectly ad(ises linguists to confine their attention to the left*hand side of the

triangle, i.e. on what he calls nameandsense, corresponding to the set %lexeme-concept%

+#agnusson and 5ersson, $0IK/ 21 or %form - content% +Marren, $002/ 1K. The implication is to

neglect the right*hand element, i.e. the thing+llmann, $0K2/ K, entity+#agnusson and 5ersson,$0IK/ 21 or referent+Marren, $0I1/ 1K, lea(ing us with a simplified model.

This model corresponds to an intra*linguistic attitude to the study of meaning where there isno room for extension, i.e. the relation between the symbol and the real world entities to which it

refers. #ore recently, cogniti(e linguists ha(e shown that the (arious beliefs that people may ha(e

about real world entities are crucial to their understanding of word meaning.Following the cogniti(e line and, at the same time, trying to reconcile componential analysis

+>? with the notions of prototypic categories and fu@@y meaning, 5ersson +$00- interestingly

combines a core model, often associated with >? +Figure $a and a prototypical model +Figure $b

in what he calls %a complementary% model. Mhat 5ersson notes is that the seemingly unimportantconnotations of the core*meaning model may become significant attributes in his complementary

model.

Figure $ a. Figure $ b.

woman women

The main disad(antage with the model in fig. $a is that it wrongly suggests that the connotati(e

concepts placed in the outer box are somehow less important than the ones in the central box. =n the

can bear children"

has a has

high* feminine

pitched features"

(oice"

has breasts

and a womb"

human

female

adult"

human female adults

who can bear

children ha(e

feminine features,

breasts and high *pitched (oices


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prototypical model in fig. $b it is precisely these concepts that gi(e salience to the meaning of the

lexeme and pro(ides it with the attributes that are typical of the category it denotes.

5ersson%s complementary model +Figure $ c is based on two different types of concept/ +a>> N categorial concept+sG originally corresponding to the core concept and +b T? N typical

attributesG standing for the set of attributes that are considered characteristic of the best examples of

the category/ Figure $c woman

=n Fig.$c omanis seen as a sense containerG$with two boxes in it. The smaller box contains the

>>, i.e. categorial concepts which ser(es to separate women from boys and men, etc. The larger of

the boxes contains the T?, consisting of attributes )udged to be generally held characteristic ofwomen. These attributes may single out typical women from untypical ones. The dotted box

enclosing the T? suggests that the set of attributes is open * ended and (ariable.

The ad(antage of using a complementary model based on a combination of categorial

concepts and typical attributes can further be pro(ed by an example, which shows the semanticde(elopment of a word in time.

For instance,spinster originally denoted a woman engaged in spinningG. &ince these female

workers were often unmarried, the word came to connote Gunmarried womanG. This connotationgradually de(eloped into the main sense of spinster#which in the $1thcentury became the legal

designation of an unmarried adult female.

This could stand for the current categorial meaning of the nounspinsterand is located in the uppersmaller box +fig.2. The lower larger box contains the (arious beliefs and pre)udices that are usually

associated with spinsters and which in traditional semantics were labelled connotationsG/

1 The idea that linguistic expressions, e.g. Mords as well as larger linguistic structures +phrases, clauses,

sentences are containers for meanings comes from Reddy +$010/2IE*62E and Lakoff and Oohnson +$0I-/$-*$6.

?ccording to Reddy"s (iew of the conduit metaphorG, ideas +or meanings are regarded as ob)ects, which can be

stored in containers and sent between language users.

?n instance of linguistic e(idence supporting this (iew is the sentence =t is (ery difficult to put this concept into

words.G

>>

T?

human female

adult"

has breasts and

a womb, can bear

children, has a high *pitched (oice, has

feminine features"


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Fig. 6. spinster

?s can be noticed, most of the T? are pe)orati(e. The fact that nowadays, unmarried career womenfirmly dissociate themsel(es from such a pe)orati(e label may explain why the word is becoming

obsolete. Therefore another perspecti(al shift of the prototypical centre is unlikely to occur due tothe statusG of the referent itself.

The analysis of a complementary model is also useful for a better understanding of a model

of meaning. Thus, an impro(ed model of meaning would place L


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The dimensions along which descripti(e meaning can (ary are 0uality# intensity#

specificity# &agueness# "asicness and &iepoint. The dimension of quality can be seen in thedifferences between red andgreen, dog and cat, appleand orange, runand al!, hateandfear,

here and there.5ure differences of quality are to be obser(ed only between items which are equal

on the scales of intensity and specificity which are discussed below.Intensitycharacteri@es itemsthat designate the same area of semantic quality space such as, arm-lu!earm-hot-"oiling.

Jariation in intensity is not confined to the domain of qualities, it is also possible in other areas/

scare-fright-horror-terror# mist-fog# "eat-thrash.Specificity shows up when one term +the more general one designates a more extensi(e area of

quality space than the other +e.g. animal-dog. Vagueness can be noticed in terms which

designate a region on a gradable scale such as middle-agedin She*s middle-aged(s. She*s in her

fifties.Basicness relates to words which are close to concrete e(eryday experience, while viewpoint can

be illustrated by deictic expressions such as this# that# here# there# noand then which are usually

claimed to encode the (iewpoint of the speaker at the moment of the utterance.

6.2.1on-descripti&e meaning

4on*descripti(e meaning is that type of meaning that shows how language reflects thepersonal feelings of the speaker, including his attitude to the listener, or his attitude to something

he is talking about. For example, one might say, as a neutral statement, = ha&e finished itor one

may say with triumph and ama@ement, I ha&e 2Actually 23inished it. Mhat is said is in other

respects the same, but the utterances differ in affective meaning.Likewise intonations or wordslike actuallyha(e, or ha(e at times an affecti(e function. ?lternati(e terms for affecti(e meaning

are attitudinal, emotiveor expressive meaning. This type of meaning is often held to fall within

the scope of stylistics or pragmatics.Lyons +$00/EEargues that natural languages (ary considerably in the degree to which

they grammaticali@e expressi(e meaning. ruse, 2--E/ I

Are you still here4

6ou mean you ha&en*t done ityet4Surely she hasn*t gone already4

;owe(er, whatstill# yet and alreadybasicallyexpress is not an emotion proper but an

expectation or a set of expectations on the part of the speaker.


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expressi(e meanings are the most important types of meaning in language and we can think of

them as what a speaker principally utili@es and directly manipulates in order to con(ey his

intended message.>ruse +$0IK/ 21Erightly belie(es that e(ery communicati(e utterance must transmit as

part of its meaning an indication of intended propositional attitude. Mithout this, an utterance

would be communicati(ely dead * it would resemble a proposition entertained" by a logicianG.

6.6.Social meaning

#any semanticists consider expressi(e meaning and social meaning not to be clearly

separated. The interconnection between expressi(e meaning and social meaning can be

understood if we reali@e that the rules of conduct constraining the expression of feelings or

attitudes in certain social situations and the use of expressi(e terms, in particular swear words asterms of address may ha(e se(ere social consequences.

?n expression or grammatical form has social meaning if and only if its use is go(erned by the

social rules of conduct or, more generally, rules for handling social interaction +Lobner, 2--2/

20.


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cars, pets, books, hobbies, food and drink but speech is most immediate and most

ob(ious. B Mords are our preferred medium, so it is perhaps significant that they should

be our primary means of signaling and recogni@ing social status. The second type of (ariation which contributes to what >ruse +$0IK calls e(oked meaning" is

register variation, that is, (ariation +within the speech of a single community according to

situation. Mhereas dialects are language (arieties associated with different characteristics ofusers, +e.g. regional affiliation, age and class, registers are (arieties of language +used by a

single speaker which are considered appropriate to different occasions and situations of use.

Components of register and synonymy

Register is usually di(ided into three main components/ field, mode and style. ieldrefers

to the topic or field of discourse/ there are lexical +and grammatical characteristics of, forinstance, legal discourse, scientific discourse, ad(ertising language sales talk, political speeches,

football commentaries, cooking recipes and so on. The difference between expert +technical

terms and their correspondents +synonyms in ordinary language is that the former may ha(e

stricter definitions +e.g. extirpate while the latter are more loosely defined +e.g. ta!e out. Termsthat differ only in respect of the fields of discourse in which they typically appear are cogniti(e

synonyms. For instance, matrimony may be considered a field-specific synonymmost frequentlyencountered in legal and religious contexts of one of the senses of marriage +state of being

marriedD edloc! o(erlaps with matrimony#but is more likely to be heard in church than in a

court of law.The second dimension of register, that is, mode, is concerned with the manner of

transmission of a linguistic message Q whether it is written, spoken, telegraphed or emailed. For

example# further tois specific of written language, wheras like is used in the spoken language

+e.g.I as!ed him# li!e# here he as going.The third dimension of register, that is, style, is a matter of the formality:informality of an

utterance. &tyle spawns the most spectacular proliferation of cogniti(e synonyms, especially in

taboo areas such as death, sex, excretory functions, money, religion, power relations, etc. Forinstance,pass aaybelongs to a higher +more formal register than dieand !ic! the "uc!etand

croa! belong to a lower register. The synonymic series of die contains items that may be

differentiated in respect of field as well as style/ !ic! the "uc!et# "uy it# snuff it# cop it# pop off#peg out# expire# perish# die# pass aay# decease#etc.

!. "ense #elations $%&' (olysemy and )omonymy

E.$ Semasiology and onomasiology - to "asic approaches to the study of ords and their senses

The terminological pair onomasiology: semasiology is a traditional one in


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but they both come from Latin pupillus# pupilla3ward, orphan*boy3 which is a diminuti(e of

pupus3child3.

The opposite case is also fairly common, namely when two lexemes deri(ed fromdifferent roots in an earlier state of the language are seen as related. For example, ear$ 3organ of

hearing3 comes form Latin auris %ear%, while ear2 3spike of corn3 is deri(ed form Latin acus,

aceris %husk% .&ynchronically, most people heat these two lexemes as one polysemous word and explain

their relation by means of metaphor, i.e. the ear corn was felt to be a metaphor of the type 3the

eye of a needle3, 3the foot of the mountain3, etc.Therefore, the etymological criterion can be misleading when deciding between

homonymy and polysemy. The latter criterion, i.e. relatedness (s. unrelatedness of meaning is

questioned by Lyons +$011 who argues that relatedness of meaning appears to be a matter of

degree, together with the fact that sometimes nati(e speaker%s intuitions are from being the trueinterpretations as has been seen with the ear example.

&imilarity:relatedness of meaning has been represented in a formali@ed manner by at@

+$012, at@ and Fodor +$0K6 who propose the decomposition of the sense of a word into its

minimal distincti(e features, i.e. into semantic components which contrast with othercomponents.

nfortunately, componential definitions of the type Aphysical ob)ectC, AconcreteC,AanimateC for the description of lexemes such as "an! or mouth are not sufficient for the

polysemy*homonymy problem.

The relatedness between the different senses of a word is not expressible in terms of H*features because there are cases in which these features are present in different degrees, not in

absolute terms. For instance, the terms "achelor,lieand motherha(e become classic examples in

the literature.

Fillmore +$0I2a analyses "achelorthat is usually defined as an unmarried adult man bybringing into discussion less typical examples of bachelors such as male participants in long*term

unmarried coupling, boys abandoned in the )ungle and grown to maturity away from contact with

human society, some priests or homosexuals.>oleman and ay +$0I$/ 2$ discuss the concept lie in terms of +a falsehood, +b

deliberateness and +c intent to decei(e. ?s these three elements may possess different degrees of

importance, there may be prototypical lies, when a statement is characteri@ed by properties +band +c and partial lies that include instances of social lie +e.g. %rop in any time%, white lie,

exaggerations, )oke, etc. ? social lie is a case where deceit is helpful and a white lie is a case

where deceit is not harmful.

Lakoff +$0I1/ 1K analyses the concept mother and concludes that it cannot be defined 3interms of common necessary and sufficient condition approach3 that can be associated with >? in

structuralist semantics. ;is argument is the existence of marginal or less typical cases of mother/

biological mothers, donor mothers +who donate an egg, surrogate mothers +who bear the childbut may not ha(e donated the egg, adopti(e mothers, unwed mothers who gi(e their children up

for adoption, and stepmothers.

The problem of relatedness of meaning should therefore be regarded as a gradient andsometimes sub)ecti(e notion. ?lthough some linguists such as Lyons+$011/ 6 question to

some extent the theoretical significance of the distinction between polysemy and homonymy, the

two phenomena differ from each other in two ma)or points/

+$ homonymy is an accident and thus highly language*specific phenomenon


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+2 polsemy is moti(ated and similar senses can be found in different e(en

typologically:historically unrelated languages.

*. "ense #elations $%%&' "ynonymy and +ntonymy

.$. 3rom concept to ord= synonymy and antonymy

"ynonymy

?s stated earlier, onomasiology deals with cases in which the same concept or similar

concepts are expressed by different words or expressions. ?ccording to one definition +usuallyattributed to Leibni@, two expressions are synonymous if the substitution of one for the other

ne(er changes the truth (alue of a sentence in which the substitution is made. 'y that definition,

true or absolute synonyms are rare, if they exist at all.

?bsolute synonyms are defined +Lyons, $0IK/ $ as 3expressions that are fully, totallyand completely synonyms3 in the sense that

+a all their meanings are identical +full synonymy+b they are interchangeable in all contexts +total synonymy

+c they are identical in all rele(ant dimensions of meaning +complete synonymy

?ctually the (ery terms %absolute synonymy%, %%full synonymy3, Gtotal synonymy3 and3complete synonymy3 +not to mention exact synonymy are themsel(es used as synonyms

whether absolute or partial in standard works in semantics or lexicology, usually without

definition.

Mithout fa(oring the hair*splitting terminological distinctions, Lyons +$0IK/ $ insistsupon the importance of +a not confusing near synonymy with partial synonymy and +b not

making the assumptions that failure to satisfy one of the conditions of absolute synonymy

necessarily in(ol(es the failure to satisfy either or both of the other conditions.To exemplify the first condition required by absolute synonymy or full synonymy +i.e.

same range of meanings we will consider the pair "ig-large, where the former term has at least

one meaning that it does not share with the latter one. =f we compare the sentence 3= will tell mybig sister3 with 3= will tell my large sister 3we notice that the polysemy of "igdoes not perfectly

o(erlap with the meaning of large.

The second condition for absolute synonymy, i.e. interchangeability of terms in all

contexts +total synonymy refers to the collocational range of an expression +the set of contexts inwhich it can occur. For example, the members in the pairs "usy*occupied, decoration*

ornamentation, li"erty *freedom do not always ha(e the same collocational range. There are

many contexts in which they are not interchangeable without (iolating the collocationalrestrictions of the one or of the other. For instance, freedom cannot be substituted for li"ertyin

%6ou are at li"erty to say hat you ant%.

>oncerning the third condition for absolute synonymy, i.e. identity:similarity of alldimensions of meaning +complete synonymy, Lyons +$0IK/ distinguishes descripti(e

synonymy and expressi(e synonymy. Two expressions are descripti(ely synonymous, i.e. they

ha(e the same descripti(e propositional:cogniti(e:referential meaning in and only if statements


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containing the other and (ice (ersa. For example, "ig can be substituted for largein %I li&e in a

"ig house%.

;owe(er, in particular instances, synonymous expressions may differ in terms of thedegree or nature of their expressi(e meaning. omplementarity can be exemplified by pairs of words like male and female, single*

married. =t is characteristic of complementaries that the denial of the one term

implies the assertion of the other and (ice (ersa. For instance, ;ohn is not married implies that;ohn is singleand also;ohn is marriedimplies that;ohn is not single.

?lthough complementaries are not gradable oppositesD there are instances that

2Hence, expressive meaning falls within the scope of semantics, stylistics and pragmatics


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do not co(er all possible cases in real life. Thus there may be other possibilities besides

complementaries, e.g.male andfemale namely hermaphrodite.

>ruse +$0IK/2-2 claims that complementaries are not normally gradable, that is, they areodd in the comparati(e or superlati(e degree or when modified by intensifiers such as extremely,

moderatelyorslightly.+e.g. extremely true, moderately female, etc. 4e(ertheless, he states, there

are instances where one member of the pair lends itself more readily to grading than the other.Thus, ali&eis more gradable than dead+(ery dead, moderately dead, deader than before (s. (ery

ali(e, moderately ali(e, more ali(e than before. For example, if someone says to us =s P still

ali(e then!". ?nd we reply Jery much so." or ?nd how" we are not thereby challenging theungradability of dead/ ali(e in the language system. Mhat we are grading, Lyons+$011/ 21I

assumes are (arious secondary implications or connotations of ali&e.

The same holds true of the pair open-shutwhereshutis less gradable than open+slightly

shut, moderately shut, more shut than before (s. wide open, slightly open, moderately open, moreopen than before.

'esides >ruse +$0IK/ 00 maintains that the relations between deadand ali&e is not at all

affected by medico* legal uncertainty as what constitutes the point of death. &uch referential

indeterminacy afflicts all words, without exceptions. The point about complementaries is thatonce a decision has been reached regarding one term, in all rele(ant circumstances a decision has

effecti(ely been made regarding the other term, too.">ruse +$0IK/ 2-- belie(es that complementarity is to some extent a matter of degree and

supports his statement by examples such asghosts and &ampiresthat existed in a state, which was

neither death nor life. &imilarly he says, the existence of hermaphrodites and totallyindeterminate sex weakens the relationships between male and female. ?n e(en weaker

relationship would hold between terms such left- handed andright- handed.

>omplementaries are, generally speaking, either (erbs or ad)ecti(es. ?ccording to >ruse

+$0IK /2-- an interesting feature of (erbal complementaries which distinguishes them fromad)ecti(al complementaries is that the domain within which the complementarity operates is often

expressible by a single lexical item e.g. the (erb commandsets the scene for the complementarity

of o"ey anddiso"ey.Further examples are "orn- li&e- die# start- !eep on- stop# learn- remem"er- forget#

arri&e- stay- lea&e# earn- sa&e- suspend# re0uest- grant- refuse# in&ite- accept- turn don# greet-

ac!noledge- snu"# tempt- yield- resist# try- succeed- fail# compete- in- loose# aim- hit- miss.? final example of lexical triplets in(ol(ing (erbal complementaries are attac!- defend-

su"mit# change- refute- admit# shoot(in foot"all)- sa&e- let in# punch- parry- ta!e.

?s can be noticed, the members of the complementary pair represent an acti(e and a

passi(e response to the original action or perhaps more re(ealing counteraction or lack ofcounteraction.

The same holds true of the pair open- shutwhereshut is less gradable thanopen+slightly

shut# moderately shut# more shut than "efore &s. ide open# slightly open# moderately open# moreopen than "efore.

8(er examples of more or less fully gradable complementary ad)ecti(es are the pairs

true- false# pure- impure# clear- dirty# safe- dangerous = moderately clean# &ery clean# fairlyclean# cleaner# slightly dirty# 0uite dirty# fairly dirty# dirtier# moderately safe# &ery safe# fairly

safe# safer# slightly dangerous# 0uite dangerous# fairly dangerous# more dangerous.

+ntonymy proper


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?ntonymy in the narrow, restricted sense of Lyons + is the second subclass of

oppositeness of meaning. The logical relationship is based on the fact that the assertion of onemember does imply the negation other, but not (ice (ersa. =n other words, for pairs of antonyms

likegood- "ad# "ig- small# high- lo, only one of the relations of implication +entailment stated

for complementarity holds.Thus,;ohn is good# implies;ohn is not "ad. 'ut;ohn is not gooddoes not necessarily

imply;ohn is "ad. Therefore, the negation: denial of one term does not necessarily imply the

assertion of the other.=n the case of antonymy proper, a third possibility exists. ?ntonymous ad)ecti(es +in the

narrow sense beha(e like comparati(es, i.e. they are fully gradable unlike complementaries that

are not.

Converseness

>on(erseness is the third subclass of oppositeness of meaning distinguished by Lyons.

The logical criterion used for the sense relation of con(erseness is the possibility of permutingnoun phrases functioning as arguments +semantic roles in sentences which remain otherwise

equi(alentD the sentences imply each other and thus ha(e the same meaning. Thus, Oohn boughtthe car from 'ill implies 'ill sold the car to Oohn and (ice (ersa. &chematically, the sentences

may be represented in the following way /

45$ bought 456 from 452.452 sold 456 from 45$.

?s can be noticed, the substitution of lexical con(erses causes a permutation of 45s

functioning as arguments. The three types of oppositeness of meaning proposed by Lyons +$0KI

are based on the relation of lexical implication or entailment. =n more recent works +Lyons, $011D>ruse, $0IK semanticists refined the classical treatment of oppositeness of meaning by

introducing a fourth type, called directional opposition. This fourth subclass is based on the

notion of contrary motion +i.e. in opposite direction / up- don# come- go# arri&e- depart.

,. )ierarchical "ense #elations' )yponymy and Meronymy

K.$5yponymy

;yponymy, like incompatibility and antonymy has been one of the topics of li(elyinterest for lexical semantics since the structuralist period. ?lthough Lyons +$0KI declared that

all sense relations were context dependent, they ha(e almost uni(ersally been treated +including

by Lyons himself as stable properties of indi(idual lexical items.Traditionally, sense relations are defined in terms of entailment, i.e. of the logical relation

between two sentences such that the truth of the second sentence follows from the truth of the

first. 8n this approach, a sentence likeIt*s a dog unilaterally entails It*s an animalso dogis ahyponym of animal. &imilarly,I alays a&oid the red s!irtsunilaterally entailsI alays a&oid

the scarlet s!irtsand;ohn punched 9illunilaterally entails;ohn hit 9ill. ?s can be noticed, the

normal direction in the entailment is from hyponym to superordinate.


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;yponymy is one of the most fundamental paradigmatic relations, corresponding to the

inclusion of one class in another. For example, terms such as daisy# daffodil and roseall contain

the meaning of floer. That is to say, they are all hyponymsof floer.The set of terms which are hyponyms of the same superordinate term are co-hyponyms,

for example, red# "lac!andyello, in the colour system, or ox# "ull# calfthat are co(ered by the

superordinate term cattle.?nother way of describing the relationship is to say that the indi(idual colours are sisters of the

parent term colouror sisters of the parent term cattle.

? hyponym is a word that is more specific +less general, which has more elements ofmeaning and is more marked than its superordinate. For example, it can be marked for age

+puppy# !itten# calf# piglet# duc!lingand cygnetare marked, while dog# cat# co# pig# duc!# san

are unmarked or for sex +"itch# dra!e# "ull# hog# so# co"# penare marked, while dog# duc!#

co# pig# sanare unmarked. ;ence, we can define hyponyms in terms of the hypernym plus asingle feature, as installionN"male horse", !ittenN"young cat".

The more general term with reference to which the subordinate term can be defined, as is

the usual practice in dictionary definitions +a cat is a type of animalB" is called the

superordinateor hypernym. &ometimes a word may be superordinate to itself in another sense.This is the case with animal, as shown in the figure below. The first occurrence, opposed to

&egeta"le, is the sense contained in the phrase the animal kingdom". The second occurrence issynonymous with mammal, and the third with "east.

&uperordinate terms in turn may become hyponyms in relation to a more generalsuperordinate term/ e.g. cattle is a hyponym of animal. 5airs of lexical items related by

hyponymy are far more frequently found among nouns than among ad)ecti(es or (erbs.;yponymy is a (ertical relationship which is fundamental to the way in which we classify things.

#ost dictionaries rely on it for the pro(ision of definitions +a chair is a type of furniture", a flute

is a type of musical instrument" and so on. ;yponymy offers a good organi@ing principle for(ocabulary learning and teaching. #ost language coursebooks use this feature of organi@ation

Li(ing things

?nimal Jegetable

'ird Fish =nsect

;uman

?nimal

?nimal


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implicitly or explicitly in grouping names of flowers together or garnments or articles of

furniture.

+utohyponymy

?utohyponymy is a (ariety of polysemy +>ruse, 2--E/ $-I and occurs when a word has adefault general sense and a contextually restricted sense which is more specific in that it denotes

a sub(ariety of a general sense. For example, dog has two senses, a general sense, member of the

canine race" as inog and cat oners must register their petsand a more specific meaning as inThat*s not a dog# it*s a "itch.

Mhat is interesting to note is that in the lexicali@ation of a distinction of sex, for some

species it is the lexeme denoting males, and for other species the lexeme that denoting females

that is semantically marked +for more details about markedness see the next chapter.?n instanceof generali@ation of a feminine term is the use of coas in those cos o&er thereor afield full of

costo refer to bo(ines of both sexes, especially when there is a mixed group.

K.2eronymy

#eronymy is a term used to describe a part*whole relationship between lexical items. For

instance, co(er and page are meronyms of book. Me can identify this relationship by usingsentence frames like P is part of S, or S has P, as in a page is a part of a book or a book has

pages.

The lexical relation of meronymy, sometimes referred to as partonymy, is usually

informally described as part*whole relation. >roft and >ruse +2--E/ $$ claim that meronymy isa relation between meanings, whereas the part*whole relation links two indi(idual entities and

generates chains of elements/ ? is a part of ', ' is a part of >, > is a part of 9 and so on. For

instance,? fingertip is a part of a finger.

? finger is a part of hand.

? hand is a part of arm.?n arm is a part of a body.

?n important point is that the networks identified as meronymy are lexical/ it is

conceptually possible to segment an item in countless ways, but only some di(isions are coined

in the (ocabulary of a language.


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of hand. Me can see that nailis a meronym of handas we can sayA hand has nails. ? non*

transiti(e example is/paneis a meronym of indo+A indo has a pane and indoof room

+A room has a indoD butpaneis not a meronym of room, for we cannot sayA room has apane. 8r hole is a meronym of "utton and "utton of shirt, but we wouldn"t say that hole is a

meronym ofshirt+A shirt has holes.

+utomeronymy

>ruse +2--E/ $-E argues that automeronymy, like autohyponymy, is a (ariety ofpolysemy. Mhile in the case of autohyponymy the more specific reading denotes a subtype, in the

case of automeronymy the more specific reading denotes a subpart. For instance, door can refer

to either the whole set*up with )ambs, lintel, threshold, hinges and the leaf panel as in 7o through

that door or )ust to the leaf, as in Take the door off its hinges. Further, a sentence such as Me tookthe door off its hinges and walked through it illustrates @eugma.

)yponymic and meronymic enrichment

The effects of context on the meaning of a word can be seen in what >ruse +2--E/ $$0

calls contextual modulation" that can manifest itself in two forms or (arieties/ enrichment, i.e.,the addition of semantic content to the meaning of a word and impo(erishment, i.e. the remo(al

of semantic content from the meaning of a word.

)yponymic enrichmentarises when the context adds features of meaning to a wordwhich are not made explicit by the lexical item itself/

%ur maths teacher is on maternity lea&e+gender is determined

y "rother alays "umps his head hen he goes through the door+height is determined

y coffee "urnt my tongue. +temperature is determined%ur house as "urgled hile e ere aay . They only too! the &ideo# though +legality is

determined

&ometimes the context points to a specific kind of the class normally denoted by thelexical item employed, rather than adding a feature, like in I ish that animal ould stop

"ar!in!8miaoing or;ohn is going ell in the >?@@:metres freestyle.

Meronymic enrichment arises when there is specification to part of what the lexical itemused normally refers to. This part may be definite and identifiable +e.g. a tyreas inA car has a

puncture or less definite +e.g. a car*s damaged areaas in The car as damaged hen ;ohn

dro&e it into a tree. This kind of narrowing down to a part, that is, meronymic enrichment, is

widespread in language use and speakers are not usually aware of this. For instance, a red "oo!has red co(ers, not red letters, whereas a red arning sign most likely has red letters. Further

examples include noun phrases made up of a colour ad)ecti(e and a head nounD (ery often the

colour does not apply globally to the ob)ect denoted by the head noun but only to a part/ a redapple+a significant portion of outer skin is red, a yello peach+inner flesh is yellow, a pin!

grapefruit+inner flesh is pink, red yes+white of eyes is red, "lue eyes+iris is blue. =n all these

examples the colour ad)ecti(e indicates that the referent of the head noun is distincti(e by (irtueof its possession of an area with certain perceptual properties.


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. "emantic rgani/ation

1.$. The Lexicon

Lexicon assumptions

The lexicon is a collection of all the words and lexical items, i.e. associations between sound and

meaning that a language has +;offman, $006/ 2K. Lehrer +$01E/$0- maintains that the lexicon

is an unordered set of lexical entries and as such it can be arranged in a number of ways Qalphabetically, as a dictionary, by semantic fields, as a thesaurus. ?ccording to Lyons +$0I6 the

information that is found in a lexical item is of three kinds/ morphological0 syntactic and

semantic.

=n generative grammar0 the lexicon has a special status and it refers to the componentcontaining all the information about the structural properties of the lexical items in a language.

Thus, a lexical entry includes phonological0 semantic and syntactic information. Recent

syntactic theories ascribe a more significant role to the lexicon, some claming that much of the

syntax is pro)ected from the lexicon +'resnan, $0I2D >homsky, $0I$. =n other words, thesemantic organi@ation of the lexicon can predict and explain at least some regularities.

?ccording to 9ir(en +$0I the lexicon has an internally structured character and is onlytheoretically finite. =t contains a number of rules for creating new lexical items or for extending

the meaning of gi(en lexical items. 4ew lexical items are formed by the rules of compounding,

deri(ation, borrowing, the creation of neologisms, acronyms. The meaning of gi(en lexical itemscan be extended by processes such as the metaphor and the metonymy.

&tarting with $00-"s there has been a surge of interest in the lexicon. The demand for a

fuller and more adequate understanding of lexical meaning required by de(elopments in

computational linguistics, artificial intelligence and cogniti(e science has stimulated a refocusedinterest in linguistics, psychology and philosophy.

The basic problem that distinguishes the different (iews of the lexicon relates to the

nature of the information in the lexicon. #urphy + argues that knowledge about words +i.e.lexical knowledge does not always o(erlap with knowledge about the things words denote

+conceptual knowledge. The lexicon contains information that is necessary for linguistic

competence, i.e. our capacity to produce grammatical and interpretable sentences.The fact that we can fail to make the association between things that we recogni@e and

words that we know for those things indicates that our means of storing and:or accessing the

name of that thing is the same of our means of storing and:or accessing other knowledge about

the thing. The piece of e(idence for this is tip*of*the tongue syndrome, i.e. the case when we ha(ecomplete access to the concept, because we can picture it, reason about it and describe it, but we

are not able to access its name. 8ther e(idence for the separation of lexical and conceptual

information is related to the lack of the one*to*one relationship between words and conceptspro(ed by the existence of polysemy and synonymy in language. Mords can be used to indicate

more than a single concept, and the name that we attach to a thing may (ary by context. =n the

first case, the word !nifecan refer to things like scalpels, daggers, butter kno(es and letteropenersD in the second, a single kind of furniture may be reffered to by a (ariety of terms like

table, bedstand, and chest of drawers.

?lthough they are two distinct types of knowledge, lexical knowledge and conceptual knowledge

interact in the processes of language production and comprehension.


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correct or at least the best semantic analysis is one that describes a speaker"s conceptual structure.

?lthough Trier opened a new phase in the histor of semantics +llmann, $0K2/1 he has been

criticised for a number of assumptions that are highly contro(ersial.68ne of them is that heassumes that lexical fields are closed, well*defined sets. The disagreement is founded especially

if one considers peripheral items in a field. For example, in the semantic field of cooking (erbs,

we ha(e "a!e# "oil# fry#butscald# carameli/e +e.g.carameli/e fruits, render +e.g,render fatandclarify +e.g.clarified "utter are peripheral.

?ccording to Lehrer +$01E/ I a semantic field as a group of words closely related in

meaning, often subsumed by a general term. For instance, the words in the field of colour in8L8R and include red# "lue# green# hite# scarlet and

do@ens other. =n their study of colour terms +$01- 'rent 'erlin and 5aul ay E found that

speakers disagree among themsel(es as to where to draw the line between colours, e.g. red and

orange. #oreo(er, the )udgments of a single speaker differ at (arious times. The solution the two?merican scholars ha(e proposed is that of focal points for colours, e.g. the most typical red or

the best example of yellow. The prototype Q based model has to be more useful for the analysis of

semantic fields because it allows for fu@@y borders among lexical items. The study by 'erlin and

ay also shows that there are some parts of the colour spectrum are not happily co(ered by anyterm or at least by any basic term. Lehrer +$01E rightly states that a (ery interesting question to

in(estigate is what speakers do when they want to express some concept not co(ered by anylexical item in the language.

Lexical gaps

The absence of a lexeme at a particular place in the structure of a lexical field is generally

referred to as a lexical gap. For instance, in


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Conceptual field0 lexical field0 semantic field

&ome of the concepts in a conceptual fieldbecome lexicali@ed to form a semantic field+7randy, $0I1D ittay, $0I1D Lehrer, $01ED Lyons, $011D #iller and Oohnson Laird, $01K. For

example, in the field for coo1", simmer" lexicali@es field for animal", mare" means horse*

female*adult" and puppy" means dog*infant".'asic to field theory is the (iew that words occupy a certain amount of semantic space

within the language, which is distributed among the specific lexical items a(ailable. &o, for

example, the field of residences is di(ided up into castle# maisonette# home# "ungaloandflat,to name )ust a few. These terms constitute the lexical set, or lexical field which realise the

semantic field. The meaning of any one of them is affected by the other terms to which it is

related. ?s a consequence, fields are constantly expanding and contracting. =f the term

maisonette" was remo(ed from the set, then one of the others, possibly house, or flat, wouldexpand to occupy the space.

Field theory is (ery useful in the contrasti(e analysis of different languages. Languages

differ quite widely e(en in apparently basic lexical di(isions, and fields such as temperature0

1inship0 colour0 parts of the body0 and animal and vegetable worlds0 di(ide the semanticspace differently with respect to them. For instance, some languages like


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categories are conceptual in nature and that many, if not all of our conceptual categories are laid

down in language as linguistic categories.

+n illustration' the semantic field of coo1ing terms

Lehrer +$01E illustrates the theory of semantic fields with words from two lexical fields/ cookingand sounds. 8ne of her arguments for this choice is that the sets seem to contain many of the

subtleties, asymmetries and indeterminacies which are characteristic of other lexical fields.

The basic words in the field of >88=47 are coo!# "a!e# "oil# roast# fryand "roil +orgrill for 'ritish ooking words can

be placed in a chart like in the figure below/

cook$ bake$ cook2steam boil$ fry broil roast bake2 simmer boil2 saute deep*fry grill grill barbeque

French*fry charcoal

poach stew braise

?s can be noticed, words are synonyms if they appear in the same squareD incompatibleterms are separated by a (ertical bar, and hyponyms appear directly under the superordinate one.Thus,steam# "oil fry# "roil# roastand "a!eB are hyponyms of coo!B. French fry and deep fry are

synonyms, etc.D cook$and bake$differ from the rest in that they refer to human acti(ities Q in one

case the preparation of food for meals and in the other the preparation of a number of items

commonly called bakery products Q bread, pastry, cookies, etc. 8nly cook$and bake$ freely occurintransiti(ely with human sub)ects. = cook and ;e bakes are more acceptable than Oohn

simmered yesterday or ;elen is frying. >ook2and all the words under it are process words which

can be analysed grammatically as causati(es. 'oil$and its subordinates differ from others in thesemantic field in that water or some water*based liquid must be used +wine, stock, milk while

the absence of water is necessary for fry, broil, roast, and bake. &immer differ from boil 2 by

specifying that the liquid is )ust below the boiling point, without the rolling bubbles thatcharacterise boil2. The hyponyms of simmer bring in highly specific aspects of meaning. 5oach

specifiesthat the food is slowly cooked in water carefully so that the shape is preser(ed. &tew is

applied when the food is to be cooked slowly for a long time usually until it is soft. 'raise is e(en

more complex Q the food is first browned +quickly fried on the outside and then allowed to cookslowly in a tightly co(ered pot with a small amount of water.

=n general, the more specific the meaning of the word, the fewer collocational possibilities

there are/ boiled meat, boiled eggs, boiled (egetables are linguistically acceptable, but poached


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(egetables and stewed eggs are less so +Lehrer, $01E/ 66. Steam and "oilare closer in meaning

than to any other basic term. &team constrast with boil in that the food, which must be a solid, is

not submergedD it is cooked by the rising (apour. 3ryand its hyponyms contrast with other in thefield by requiring the presence of fat or oil in the cooking process although the fat can be in the

food itself. Like bacon.eep-fryand its synonym3rench-fryrequire a large amount of oil or fat

Q enough to co(er the item being cooked. Saute, on the other hand, refers to quickly cookingsomething in a frying pan with a small amount of fat. 3ryis used when food is cooked in a frying

pan whether or not fat is added +in the latter case there is some fat in the food cooked, e.g. steack,

or a non*stick frying pan is used. 9roiland its hypnyms refer to cooking something directlyunder a heating unit or o(er or under an open fire. Grillhas a range of meaning that o(erlaps with

fry slightly, sincer grilled cheese sandwiches are fried, not broiled. Grillalso applies to cooking

food on an open grill, but sometimes it is used synonymously with broil. 9ar"e0ue, is one of its

senses synonymous to charcoal, and both refer to cooking food o(er hot coals. 9a!eBis applied tocooking food in an o(en, such that the heat is indirect, rather than direct as in broiling. ,oastand

broil are close in meaning.

The semantic field of cooking (erbs can finally be set up to look like a series of H:*

features as in the table below, where - means that the feature does not apply distinctly one way orthe other. For example, frying as a kind of cooking that in(ol(es the use of fat in contact with a

flame and is not ussualy gentle.

water fat o(en flame gentle

>ook - - - - -

'oil H * * H *

&immer H * * H H

Fry * H * H -

Roast * * H * -

Toast * * * H -

'ake * * H * -

Metaphorical extension

#ost of the terms in the field of >88=47 may ha(e metaphorical extensions in other semanticfields. They may be used for states of emotions +"oil# "urn# simmer# steam# ste or temperature/

e.g. t*s roasting 8 steaming in this room.

2[1][1]. the Relationship Between

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