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IEEE 802.21 MEDIA INDEPENDENT HANDOVER

Title: Security Optimization During Handovers

Date Submitted: July, 2007

Presented at IEEE 802.21 session #21, San Francisco

Authors or Source(s): Yoshihiro Ohba (Toshiba),

Subir Das (Telcordia), Marc Meylemans (Intel),

Suman Sharma (Intel), Madjid Nakhjiri (Huawei),

Qiaobing Xie (Motorola), Junghoon Jee (ETRI),

Soohong Daniel Park (Samsung), Minho Lee (Samsung),

Robert Hsieh (Deutsche Telekom),

Srinivas Sreemanthula (Nokia), Michael Williams (Nokia),

Ajay Rajkumar (Alcatel-Lucent), Guyves Achtari (Nortel)

Abstract: 802.21 Security Study Group proposal

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IEEE 802.21 presentation release statementsThis document has been prepared to assist the IEEE 802.21 Working Group. It is

offered as a basis for discussion and is not binding on the contributing individual(s) or organization(s). The material in this document is subject to change in form and content after further study. The contributor(s) reserve(s) the right to add, amend or withdraw material contained herein.

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802.21 Security Study Group Proposal

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Current 802.21 WG PAR

• PAR says: “The purpose is to improve the user experience of mobile devices by facilitating handover between 802 networks whether or not they are of different media types, including both wired and wireless, where handover is not otherwise defined and to make it possible for mobile devices to perform seamless handover where the network environment supports it. These mechanisms may also be useable for handovers between 802 networks and non 802 networks.”

• IEEE 802.21 WG decided not to address the security aspect of handovers as part of the current project (see 5 Criteria document)

• Due to lack of a well defined problem space for security

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Problem Scope

• Problem 1: Security Signaling Optimization during Handover

• Problem 2: MIH level security mechanism

Related contributions: 21-06-0727-01-0000-Security_StudyGroup_proposal.ppt 21-07-0024-00-0000-Security_Issues_in_Transition.ppt 21-07-0127-00-0000-Hokey_802.21.ppt 21-07-0085-00-0000-mih-security.ppt

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Problem 1: Security Signaling Optimization during

Handovers

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What is the Problem?

• Security-related signaling can add significant delays to seamless handover efforts and in many cases service continuity can not be met, in particular, for real-time applications

• This becomes even more problematic when handovers occur between heterogeneous networks (e.g. inter-technology, inter-administrative domains with single or dual radio scenarios)

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Usage Scenario 1

• Example: A mobile device can make a transition between two different networks within the same administrative domain

• Transition between two different subnets based on the same media, e.g. 802.11

• Transition between two different subnets based on different media, e.g. 802.11 and 802.16

Authenticator1 Authenticator2

WiFi, WiMAX and/or Cellular

AAA/EAP server

MN

WiFi, WiMAX and/or Cellular

Subnet 1 Subnet 2

Single Administrative Domain*

* An administrative domain is a logical network that is administered by a single authority using its own authentication and authorization mechanisms

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Potential Solution Approach

• Key Hierarchy-based Transition• Since in the same administrative domain, no intrinsic reason

to authenticate again on transition• An already established key hierarchy is all that is needed to support

transition• Re-key is still needed between mobile device and the new point of

attachment

– New context (e.g., association parameters between mobile device and the new point of attachment) must be bound to the new key

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Usage Scenario 2

• Example: A mobile device can make a transition between two networks deployed by different administrative domains

• Transition between two administrative domains based on the same media, e.g. 802.11

• Transition between two administrative domains based on different media, e.g. 802.11 and 802.16 Authenticator1 Authenticator2

AAA/EAP server

WiFi, WiMAX and/or Cellular

WiFi, WiMAX and/or Cellular

MN

AAA/EAP server

Domain1 Domain2

Multiple Administrative Domains

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Potential Solution Approach

• Authentication-based Transition• Since different administrative domains, in general

authentication can not be avoided• There is no reason for the new domain to “trust” keys from the old

domain, and no reason for mobile device to “trust” the new domain with keys it used with its old domain

• Some administrative domains may have “roaming agreements”

– We can’t always assume appropriate “roaming agreements” that allow key hierarchy based transition across administrative domains

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What’s Available Today?

• In principle, the Key Hierarchy-based transition problem is being addressed by IETF HOKEY WG

• HOKEY is defining a key hierarchy meant to support transitions across subnet boundaries; focus is on transitions within the same administrative domain

• HOKEY key hierarchy at authenticator-level, but HOKEY will not work on key hierarchy below authenticator

• HOKEY will not define any protocol or mechanism, if required, between Point of Attachments and mobile devices to effect this

• No standards group seems chartered to work on the Authentication-based transition problem

• Some variant pre-authentication scheme (e.g., doc 21-06-0727-01) seems like one plausible approach to this problem

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Proposed Direction for Problem 1• Different 802 (e.g. 11r) and 3G (e.g. UMTS AKA) technologies have addressed

(or are addressing) latency caused by L2 security signaling in handovers (fast roaming, pre-auth etc.) but these are focused on intra-technology handover scenarios

• Needs to be looked at from a wider perspective given that • Seamless heterogeneous handovers are becoming a reality (inter-technology

and inter-administrative domains with single/dual radio operation)• E.g., Wi-Fi - 3G, Wi-Fi – WiMAX

• Each access technology has its own way of managing the security aspect

A media independent approach to reduce the security latency during handovers seems to be more appropriate

Handover among access technologies that support EAP should be our focus

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Problem 2: MIH Level Security Mechanism

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What is the Problem?• IEEE 802.21 services affects user mobility

• Service providers need to ensure users receive best user experience and satisfaction

• Mutual confidence in exchange of MIH services is a necessary requirement

• MIH peer nodes must be confident that• MIH messages are exchanged with trusted MIH peer nodes• MIH messages are not altered by some other nodes

• Security becomes an essential ingredient for deployment

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MIH Access Control

• Network operator may apply subscription policies to the user for customization, e.g.

• Users who can only use certain access technologies are allowed to query only about certain access technologies

• Policy on MIH services are important here• Addressed in 21-07-0035-00-0000-AccessControlIEs.ppt

• MIH access control is not network access control• Network access control determines whether and how user can

access the link resources• MIH access control is what the MIH services users can receive

• Related to MIH security since the policy control is based on authentication and authorization

MIH IS/ECSMobileNode

Policy functions

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Hijacking/Replay Issues

MIH IS/ECS

• An ongoing session with one MIHF can be hijacked by providing the response or future packets from a different node

• A certain packet for an event or command can be replayed later to the same node

• Not having the means to verify the authenticity of the MIHF service provider or not having replay protection can lead to negative effects

Bad GuyMIHF

MobileNode

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Denial of Service

MIHF

Good GuyMobileNode

• MIH events or commands can be originated by spoofing the MIHF node ID

• Spoofing can done as either a mobile node or a network MIHF

• Any event or command can be triggered falsely to negatively affect the mobility somehow

• Link-Going-Down, Link-Down and Handover-commit

• Not having the means to verify the authenticity of the MIHF of a MN or service provider can lead to negative effects

Bad GuyMobileNode

MIH source same as otherMobile nodes

MIHF

Good GuyMobileNode

MIH source same as MIHF

Bad GuyMIHF

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Message Modification by 3rd party

Good GuyMIH IS/ECS

Bad GuyMIHF

MobileNode

Modify the request and/or response

• Some intermediate node is capable of snooping, altering and forwarding the MIHF packets

• IE in Information services could be altered in request or response

• MIH events can be modified e.g. to change threshold values or even event IDs and parameters

• Handover-candidate response or Handover-commit from MN or network could be modified to affect mobility (packets buffered/rerouted)

• Not having the means for data protection (integrity and encryption) from the originating MIHF can lead to negative effects

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Relation to Transport security

• MIH should be independent of the underlying transport

• Transport has no knowledge of MIH semantics• Transport is opaque to MIH data, has no way to verify the MIH packet data

is authentic

• MIH can utilize one or more links/transports at the same time • E.g. state-1 query in 802.11 and 802.16 while on a serving network

• Identities used at the two layers for secure associations are different

• If an end-to-end MIH communication path is split into a sequence of hop-by-hop MIH transports and lose the info about the origination point

• Transport layer security will accordingly not be present in some cases, or at least not end-to-end

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Proposed Direction for Problem 2

• Define protocol mechanisms for • mutual authentication (needed)• Integrity and replay protection (needed)• Confidentiality (optional)• Authorization for MIH access control (if any)

• Define related IEs and TLVs

• Initial recommendations for base specification• Least impact to spec, without loss of functionality• utilize existing mechanisms from other SDO (e.g. IETF)

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Study Group Objectives

• Identify use cases and investigate issues concerning the 2 identified security problems (i.e., Problems #1 and #2)

• The SG will work on a PAR defining the scope and requirements to address the two security problems that can lead to a security Task Group under 802.21 WG

• The SG will work on a Technical Requirement document to address the two security problems

Make sure that all work identified is within the scope of 802.21 WG and does not attempt to solve a problem that is being worked in other standards forum

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Q & A?

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802.21 Security SG Motion

• Motion to get 802.21 WG approval to form an 802.21 security Study Group in July 2007 to work on a PAR defining the scope and requirements of the two identified security problems

• Moved by: • Seconded by:

• Yes:• No:• Abstain:

• Result: