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John Christmann

Phil 1200

9/17/2014

Russells Argument in Chapter Seven

The argument in the beginning of chapter seven of The Problems of Philosophy is

stated succinctly by Russell,

In all our knowledge of general principles, what actually happens is that first of all werealize some particular application of the principle, and then we realize that the

particularity is irrelevant, and that there is a generality may equally truly be affirmed

(Russell 48-49).

Russells argument seems to break down to this: First, we, as a matter of fact, recognize the

appropriate application of a general principle in a particular circumstance. Second, we move

from particularity to generality by abstracting the irrelevant particularity from the application of

the principle. Third, we recognize the principle as such and see its truth upon reflection (they

become self-evident).

His argument appears to be a recounting of the way in which humans come to learn

general principles of reasoning or inference. Russell uses the e xample of learning 2+2=4 by

looking at particular couplings being put together. Once we recognize the general principle being

employed, we abstract it away from the particular demonstration and can apply it to any instance.

This is Russells conception o f how we come to become conscious of general principles such

that we can say we actually know them. He doesnt seem to deny some latent knowledge of

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them, but instead thinks we know of them in the particular applications of them, but we need to

reflect on these particular instances to abstract away the irrelevant bits to get at the principles. So

this is not an argument that we dont know a principle, then we learn it upon reflecting on it

instead, we implicitly know the principles by virtue of employing them in particular

circumstances and make them explicit by reflecting on various circumstances where they are

employed.

The argument is similar but not identical to Lewis Carrolls argument in his famous

paper , What Achilles said to the Tortoise . In that paper, the point seemed to be that one cant

instill knowledge of very basic inferential rules where it doesnt already exist, but instead one

must use anothers implicit knowledge of inferential rules to bring that persons knowledge of

them to the surface. By making a distinction between principles of inference and premises about

principles of inference, Achilles was able to ward off Tortoises infinite regress. One can have

knowledge-how, which is necessary to use a principle of inference without having the

propositional knowledge which is necessary to make the principle explicit in a sentence or

proposition. While Carrolls argument isnt identical to Russells, and doesnt aim at the same

target, they are in the same general area of conceptual space.

So, Russell seems to be arguing that we implicitly know general principles by virtue of

their use in particular inferences, and we require some sort of conscious reflection on particular

instances of their application to abstract the particularity away and reveal the general principle at

play.