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Chance in Human AffairsAuthor(s): Jerome G. Manis and Bernard N. MeltzerSource: Sociological Theory, Vol. 12, No. 1 (Mar., 1994), pp. 45-56Published by: American Sociological AssociationStable URL: http://www.jstor.org/stable/202034

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Chance in Human AffairsJEROMEG. MANIS

Western Michigan University

BERNARDN. MELTZERCentral Michigan University

Under the sway of the postulate of determinism,sociologists (with some exceptions)havegiven little directattention o sheerly ortuitousevents. Such eventsare analyticallydistinguishable rom those whichare consideredthe resultsof chanceonly because wecurrently ack knowledgeof their causation. Exemplifications f pure chance aboundin the various arts and sciences, including sociology (especially in workby symbolicinteractionists).Direct, explicit considerationof random,accidental, or chancephe-nomenarequires approachesthatemphasizeboth theprocesses of behavior and inter-action and the case-studymethodof investigation.

Is chance a useful, appropriateociological conception?Althoughrelativelyfew sociolo-gists have given attention o its impacton sociological phenomena,the conceptof chanceis exertingan increasing nfluencethroughouthe arts and sciences. Hence thispaperaimsto fill a lacunain the literature n chancein sociology. Such literaturehas tendedto defineand treatthe topic in terms thatcomportwith an assumptionof absolutedeterminism nthe universe. Ourpaper,in contrast,directs attention o a conception,or form, of chancethatchallengessuch determinism.In attemptinghis task, we discuss the natureof chance,its manifestations n variousfields of knowledge, and its implicationsfor sociology.Chance, as we use it here, refers to events that possess the following overlappingfeatures:1) absence of cause, 2) absenceof predictability,and3) absence of regularity nthe sequence of the action and its antecedentconditions. This definitiondiffers from themore common one, which equates chance with statistical"probability."The latter termimplies the possibilityof numericalstatementsof the probabilityof a given outcome as aratio to a total number of possible outcomes. Such statementsare not feasible in mostinstances of chance in our sense of the term. Synonyms for our usage include thephilosophicalconceptsof "accident" nd"contingency,"WilliamGrahamSummer's"alea-tory element," Charles S. Peirce's "tychism" from tyche, the Greek word for chance),Carl G. Jung's "synchronicity" in some of its interpretations),"coincidence,""uncer-tainty,""fortuity,""luck,""indeterminism,"near-determinism"see Burks1977, p. 577),"emergence,"and others.True chance contravenesdeterminism,a fundamentalpostulateof science. A highlypopular ociology textbookon methodsof research Babbie1983)espousesthispostulate-probably n moreextremeform than do most sociologists-as follows:

Thekindof understandinge seekas we analyze ocialresearch ata nevitablynvolvesa deterministicmodel of humanbehavior. n lookingforthe reasonswhypeopleare theway they are and do the thingsthey do, we implicitlyassume hat theircharacteristicsandactionsare determined y forces andfactorsoperating n them(p. 55).Sociological Theory 12:1 March 1994? AmericanSociological Association. 1722 N StreetNW, Washington,DC 20036

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Interestingly,subsequenteditions of the book softenedthis "harddeterminism."In the words of one philosopher(Feinberg1977, p. 334), however, "If everythingthathappenscan in principlebe explained[causally],is there then no suchthingin the universeas randomchance, genuine contingency, and uncertainty?"We argue that some eventscan be understoodmost clearly only in terms of genuine chance. At the same time, werecognize the reluctanceof many sociologists to accept the objective reality of so incal-culable, unintelligible,apparentlymeaningless, andperhapsunanalyzablea phenomenonas chance, conceived in this way. Moreover,we understand he common resistanceto aconceptionthat is almost the negationof order,of uniformity, n the universe.

THE NATUREOF CHANCEExaminationof several excellent generaltreatments f chance reveals three differentviewsof its nature(see "Chance" n Adler 1952; Edwards1967; Wiener 1973). One view isthat chance events differ from determinedevents as to the mannerof theircausation:theformeroccur by contingencyand the latterby necessity. This view has provedto be lessuseful and less provocativethan the other two in modem considerationsof chance. Asecond, more useful view holds chance events to be unpredictable r less predictableonlybecauseof our ignoranceof their causes. This conceptiondoes not grantchance events aseparateontological status; instead it distinguishesthem from other events only on thebasis of theirpredictability,given the stateof knowledge.Theoriesof probability ypicallyassume this view. Finally, a thirdconceptionregardschanceevents as those which occurtotallywithoutcause-purely spontaneousorfortuitousevents. Relativelyfew sociologists(or other scholars)subscribeto this meaningas applicableto theirwork.Two of the aboveviews, then, raise thequestionof whetherchanceis simplya reflectionof our ignoranceor is a propertyof things, partof the structureof the universe. Theseopposing conceptions of chance-the epistemic or subjectiveand the ontologicalor ob-jective-have contended since the days of the early Greek philosophers. Rather thanreviewing the debate here, we shall merely survey briefly the historyof the ontologicalview, whichrepresentsour main concern n thispaper.Thisrapidreview should illuminatethe natureand validityof this conceptionof chance. At this point we wish to make clearthat our focus on the ontological sense of chance does not precludeour recognizingtheutility of the epistemic sense of the term.Epicurusheld that the universe was composed of atoms, some of which occasionallyswerved, by their own power, from their usual downwardcourse. In his view, theseuncausedevents supported he doctrineof chance. Aristotlewas providedwithan exampleof chance by the accidentalbut desired meeting of two friends in the marketplaceafteryears of separation.In his thinking, the line of action that broughteach friend to themarkethad its causes, but the coincidence or intersectionof the two lines was uncausedor, at best, markedby indirectcausation.During the Middle Ages, the epistemic view, enunciatedby Saint Augustine, SaintThomasAquinas, and otherdominant hinkers,met with almostno opposition.Similarly,in the eighteenthandnineteenthcenturies,the view increasinglyprevailed hataggregatesof "chance"events may conform to laws. This position characterized he early doctrineof chances, which developed into the mathematical heoryof probability.In the late nineteenthcentury, CharlesS. Peirce and William James, both of whomfigureprominently n the provenanceof symbolicinteractionism,made chance events partof their theoreticalperspectives. Peirce, a thoroughgoingadvocateof indeterminism,asexpressedin his concept of "tychism,"asserted:

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Tryto verify anylaw of nature ndyouwill find hat he morepreciseyourobservations,the morecertain hey will be to show irregular eparturesrom the law. We areaccus-tomed to ascribe these . . . to errors of observation; yet we cannot account for sucherrors n any antecedentlyprobableway. Tracetheir causes back far enoughandyouwill be forced to admit they are always due to . . . chance ([1892] 1955, p. 331).Using an example of what has been called "emergence,"James([1884] 1968, p. 593)wrote: "Whatis meant by saying that my choice of which way to walk home after [a]lectureis ambiguousand a matterof chance as far as the presentmoment is concerned?. . .[T]his ambiguityof my choice is real."Accordingto James(p. 592), chance is "apurelynegativeand relativeterm, giving usno informationaboutthatof which it is predicted,exceptthat t happens o be disconnectedwith somethingelse,-not controlled,secured,or necessitatedby otherthings in advance

of its own actualpresence."Earlyin the twentiethcenturytwo physicists, LudwigBoltzmannand his successor atthe Universityof Vienna, FranzExner,anticipated he principleof indeterminacyn bothits specific and its general sense. FranzExner asserted:From a multitude of events . . . laws can be inferred which are valid for the averagestate . . . of this multitude whereas the individual event may remain undetermined. Inthis sense theprincipleof causalityholdsfor all macroscopic ccurrenceswithoutbeingnecessarilyvalidfor the microcosm. t also followsthatthe laws of themacrocosm renot absolute laws but rather laws of probability . . . (Wiener 1973, p. 588).At the presenttime, exponentsof the ontological conceptionof chance, and hence ofthe objective reality of indeterminism,find supportin modem subatomicphysics. Theuncertainty principle formulatedby Werner Heisenberg and elaboratedby others hasconvincedmanyphysicistsandotherscholars hatchance s a fundamentalactof behavior.This is not to say, however, that the epistemic view currently acks supportersamongquantumphysicists.We are not espousing an absolute antideterministposition. Rather,we consider ourpositionas one of "near-determinism,"hich ArthurV. Burks(1977, p. 577) characterizesas "the doctrinethat, though natureis for the most part governedby causally uniform

. . . laws, some events arenot predetermined." or Burks(andfor us), then, the universeis partiallya chance universe. This positionmediates between absolute determinismandabsoluteindeterminism,recognizingthat some events are determinedwhereas others arenot. In a similarvein, Mead (1938, pp. 153-168) asserted that an event can be causedpartly withoutbeing determined ully by the past.MANIFESTATIONSOF CHANCEEarlierwe mentioned that various fields of knowledge have found the idea of chancenecessaryor useful. In this section we survey some of the uses of this idea in a few ofthese fields; then we discuss how a numberof sociologists have found it useful.Our first example is provided by the recent cross-disciplinaryconcern, among somescientists, with "chaos." The term chaos is appliedin this sense to explain phenomenathat have not seemed to fit into traditionalinterpretationsof the natural world. Theunpredictability f physical turbulence,marketprices, shorelinevariations,and climaticchangesis explainedas the resultof underlying evels of both disorderand order.Systemsof phenomenamarkedby chaos arequitesensitive bothto initial conditions andto minute

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but unpredictablevariables.Thus, as statedin one monograph,"A small fluctuationmaystart an entirely new evolution that will drastically change the whole behavior of themacroscopic system . . . Far from opposing 'chance' and 'necessity,' we now see bothaspectsas essentialin thedescriptionof non-linear ystems" PrigogineandStengers1984,p. 14).As we recalled previously, the twentiethcentury began with an importantcritiqueofdeterminismandaccordinglywith an affirmationof chancein physics. Until thattime, aswell as today, classical mechanicsacceptedthe principleof continuity,the ineluctabilityof determinism,and hence cause-and-effectrelationships.Thatprinciplewas underminedby Max Planck's influentialpublicationon black-bodyradiation,which raised seriousdoubts about the continuityof physicalprocesses. Planck's views soon were substantiatedand amplified by the Heisenberg uncertaintyaxiom, which now is accepted by mostquantum heorists. As a consequence, Porter(1986, p. 150) asserts:"Clearly,chance isrecognized as a fundamentalaspect of the world in a way that it was not before." Peatstates even moredirectlythe prevailingstandpointn modemphysics:

Quantumheorydictates hat heprobabilisticnswersare absolute nd rreducible.Theyare not a measure of ignorance but of absolute chance. .. . For two hundred years,physicistshavebeensearchingorprocesses,mechanisms, nd causes within he worldaround hem.Now quantumheory s sayingthat,at thelevel of quantum rocesses,nosuch hidden causes exist . . . (1990, pp. 18-19).In all fairness, however, we must remindreadersthat Einsteinresolutelyresisted the

notion of the indeterminismof quantum heory, asserting,"God does not play dice withthe universe!"In the field of biology, we find that several evolutionarytheorists, beginning withDarwin and his notion of "accidentalvariation,"have emphasizedfortuitouschanges.PaleontologistStephen Jay Gould (1989), for example, stresses the centralityof chancein evolution as evidenced by momentous discoveries at the Burgess Shale in westernCanada. He writes of the "awesome improbabilityof humanevolution," and refers re-peatedly to the ways in which "contingencies,"or chance occurrences, have sent theevolutionaryprocessdown blindalleys. Along thesame line of reasoning,RussianbotanistArmenTakhtajan1990, p. E3) asserts:"Theoriginof mandependedon so manyrandomevents that it is difficult to imagine that the same kind of intelligencecould exist else-where."Also, as a 1981 surveyof evolutionary heory pointsout, many biologists claimthat "atany time, the directionof the next event of speciationwill be heavily dependentupon unpredictablehistoricalandgenetic accidents" Stanley 1981, p. 181).We wish next to mention the role of chance in the various arts. In music, JohnCagehas been describedas a creatorof aleatory,or chance, compositions.These compositionsemploythe elementof chancein the choice of tones, rests, durations,rhythms,dynamics,and so on. In similar fashion, aleatory poetry uses chance or haphazardmethods ofwriting,such as puttingtogether clippingsof randomnewspaper tems. The termaleatoryalso has been appliedto dance forms and to theaterproductions.As pointedout by theeditor of a volume that dealt with those spontaneousart forms, which were becomingpopular n the 1960s, "Methodicaluse of Chancemethodbeganwith Dada. Accordingtoone version of the story, the movement's name itself was chosen at randomfrom aGerman-French ictionary" Kirby 1965, p. 35). In contrastwith other forms of chancewe have consideredhere, aleatoryart, literature,andmusic entaildeliberaterandomness.Herodotus,Thucydides, Plutarch,Gibbon, and many otherhistorians,as well as Ma-chiavelli, found fortuity("historicalaccident")a useful principleof interpretation.More

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CHANCEIN HUMAN AFFAIRSrecently, several historians(e.g., Gibson 1966; Olien 1973) have described such chanceincidents as those attendingthe conquestof Peruin 1531. By happenstance, he SpanishconquistadorFrancisco Pizarro, with an armed force of about 180 men, launched hisassaulton the Incas of Peru at exactly the "right" ime. That countryhadjust emergedfrom a bloody civil conflict and froma smallpox epidemicthat decimatedthe population;both circumstancesseriously weakened its ability to resist the invasion. The collapse ofthe Soviet Union provides a much more recentexample. Sheila Fitzpatrick,a professorof moder Russianhistory,drawson chaostheory n discussingthismajorhistoricalevent:

In a chaoticsystem [such as the Soviet Unionshortlybefore its collapse], therearesudden,unpredictablehifts of pattern,periodsof turbulencewith unpredictableut-comes;theregularities r elementsof predictabilityon'tcarryover fromone patternoanother. . . After the fact, you can tracethe sequence hat ed to thedisintegrationfone patternnto turbulence,and-when enoughtime has elapsedfor a new pattern otakehold-you can trace the emergenceout of turbulence f that new pattern.Beforethe fact, however,there s no way of predictinghatexactsequence 1993, pp. 47-48).In the field of psychology, we find thatJungtook chance into account. MarianneA.Paget (1990), describing experiences in her own life, refers to Jung's designationofuncannycoincidences as "synchronicity,"by which he identifiedevents thatparalleloneanotherandhave the same meaning,but no causalconnection.Junggave the exampleofan insect's coming into view in his office duringa patient'saccount of her aversiontosuch insects, therebybreakinga therapeuticdeadlock. In Jung'swords:Synchronicitydesignatesthe parallelismof time and meaningbetweenpsychic andpsychophysicalvents. ... Thetermexplainsnothing, t simplyformulates he occur-rence of meaningful oincidenceswhich, in themselves,arechancehappenings,but soimprobablehat we mustassume them to be based on someproperty f the empiricalworld(Paget1990, pp. ).

Currently, everalpsychologistsare concernedwithfortuity, ncluding heeffectsof chanceencounterson life paths (Bandura1982), the use of chanceoccurrences n psychotherapy(HunsleyandGlueckauf1988), and the role of chance in careerdevelopment CabralandSalomone 1990).Webeginourconsiderationof manifestations f chance n thesubjectmatterof sociologywith a reminder hat William GrahamSumnerwas the earliestmajorsociologist to focusattentionon the importanceof chance for individuals and society. In Folkways([1906]1940) and, posthumously, n the four-volumeThe Scienceof Society([1910] 1927), whichhe publishedwith AlbertKeller, Sumnergave seriousattention o the aleatoryelement inhumanaffairs. It may be anticlimactic,however, to point out that he was concerned esswith chance itself than with the belief in chance, which is exhibited in variousways inall societies.Robert MacIver's influential Social Causationoffers some hypotheticalillustrations,reminiscentof Aristotle's exampleof the chance meetingin the marketplace,of "precip-itants" akin to chance or luck factors):

If A had not gone to this partyhe would not havemet Miss B, could not have marriedher,and his whole storywouldhave been different. f C hadnot travelledon the sameship with D he couldnot have recommendedD for this position,andthe subsequentevents, so profoundly mportantorD, would neverhave occurred. f thissensitiveboy

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had not injuredhis eye in an accidenthe wouldhave not become moroseandbroodingandprobablywouldnot have turned nto a delinquent.Theinstancesnwhicha particularact or event seems to determine he furtherhistoryof the individual ife are endless(1942, p. 179).In Normal Accidents (1984), Charles Perrow tells us that complex industrial,space,andmilitarysystems (andthe organizations hat administer hem) are markedby virtuallyinevitable "normal,"or system, accidents. Such occurrences arise from "interactions[within the systems] that are not only unexpected, but are incomprehensible or somecritical period of time" (p. 9). Here we have an ambiguouscase: are such occurrencesalways simplytheproductsof incompleteknowledge,orarethey trulychanceoccurrences?Anotherorganizationalheorist,politicalscientist HerbertKaufman,sumarizeshis bookTime, Chance, and Organizations n the following statement:In accounting for the longevity of old organizations. ... I appraisedthe major expla-nations(skill, flexibility,and stableecologicalniches), found themwanting,and con-cluded that chance is the principal factor in long organizational life. ... I contendedthateven if thespecified actorsare as importantn the survivalof organizationss theyare said to be, theythemselvesoccurby chance(1991, p. 180;ouremphasis).

Kaufman elucidates the final sentence in this quotationby hypothesizingthat "even ifleadersdo appear o be as importantas conventionalopinionshold them to be, the qualityof leadershipwill neverthelessproveto be randomlyrather hansystematicallydistributedamong organizations,and chance will thereforeremain the main factor in organizationalsurvival" p. 150).At this point, let us interpolatea curious fact about contemporary sociology andsociologists. Althoughthe use of chance, luck, or similarconcepts receives little direct,explicit attention n currentsociological theoryor research, ndividualsociologists appearto be awareof such concepts, at least in their own lives. This point is evident in a recentcollection of intellectualautobiographies f well-knownsociologists. Of the 20 autobiog-raphies,six explicitly statethe importanceof chance at certaincritical times in theirlives.Citationsfrom two individuals'reportsare illustrative:

Over the yearsdozensof peoplehave asked howI got into theprofessionalworldand,morespecifically, nto my sociologicalspecialty.I haverepeatedly sserted hatevery-thing happenedby accident Cressey1990, p. 235).By the luck thatseems to come my way at crucialtimes, the yearin whichI startedwork in Boston, 1936, markedhe beginningof a new administrationt the law schoolof the thenprivateUniversityof Buffalo(Riesman1990,p. 43).A much more extensive concern with luck is shown by Charles H. Page, whose

autobiographybears the subtitleA LuckyJourney.Among the eight referencesto luck inthis book, one sums up his views:The role of the luckybreak n what aregenerallyviewed as successfulcareershas beenunderplayedn many biographical ndautobiographicalccounts.Thisneglecthasbeenencouraged,as oftennoted,by preoccupation ith the impactof culturaland structuralforcesuponindividualives (1982, p. 3).

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In contrastwith most sociologists, symbolic interactionistshave devotedmuchexplicitattention o the sometimesconsequentialrole of chance in human affairs.The concept of"emergence,"with its assumptionsof humanagency, voluntarism,or free will, is centralto such attention.Meltzer and Manis (1992) point out thatemergence, the occurrenceofnovel, unpredictable-chance-behavior on both the individualand the collective level,is not derivedentirelyfrom antecedentevents or experiences.Suchconduct,they believe,"is not merely the expressionor productof people's personalitiesor of conditions ante-cedent to the given situation"(p. 366). Further, hey state that threeclosely intertwinedpropositions,acceptedas truismsby emergentistsymbolicinteractionists,help to accountfor emergence as an aspect of social life. These propositionsare that 1) humanbeingsplay an active role in shaping their own conduct; 2) human consciousness involves acreative nteractionwithoneself;and3) humanbeingsconstruct heirbehavior n the courseof its execution. Using these premises, which are testable chiefly through everydayexperiences, interactionistshave specified numerousmanifestationsof emergence. Thusthe foremostprogenitorof symbolicinteractionism,GeorgeHerbertMead(1934, p. 177),drew attention,as did HerbertG. Blumer (1969), to the familiarexperienceof findingthat one's actual behaviorin given situationsmay differ from what one expected to do,even moments before.Other manifestationsdescribedby interactionistsnclude the following actions on theindividual, interpersonal,and intergroup evels of conduct:in the performanceof socialroles, individualsengage in "rolemaking"(Turner1962) rather han simply role takingand role playing;even in situationsmarkedby coercionor unequalpower, participantsnorganizations"negotiate"Strauss1978)theirrelationships nd behaviorrather hanmerelyadhering o organizationalnorms or otherexternalconstraints;"emergentnorms"(Turnerand Killian 1987;Snow, Zurcher,and Peters1981) arisefrequently n collective behavior;novel social forms (e.g., innovativepatterns, social movements)emerge constantly inmodem societies and cultures.Insistent deterministsreject the idea of emergenceand of other terms denoting sheerchance, contending that no events are inherentlyuncaused and unpredictable.Cattonillustrates his point:

. . . the propertyof "emergence" ften attributedo "collectivephenomena"may bemorea characteristicf current heories hana traitof thephenomenahemselves.Whilesomeproperties f collectivephenomenamay indeedbe emergentn terms of a givenstate of knowledge. . ., as knowledgeof the constituentphenomenamproves,theemergent haracter f the collectivephenomenamaybe diminished.Thisyear'stheoriesoftenexplainwhat lastyear'stheoriescouldn't 1966, p. 315).Mead (1959, p. 14) describesa common, everyday process of thinkingthatmay helpus to understandwhy some sociologists remainoutragedby any hint of indeterminacynthe social realm, even despite personalexperiences that appearto confirmit. After theoccurrenceof greatly unexpectedevents-whether merely unpredictedor inherentlyun-predictable-human beings tend to symbolicallyreconstruct he events, construingthem

retrospectivelyas determined.This postdictivethought process supports he widely (anddeeply) instilled scientificpostulatesof universalcausality, predictability,andregularity.Lest readers nfer thatemergence, as purposefuland self-directedbehavior,therefore scaused behavior (and not chance), we enter a demurrer.We agree with Taylor (1983,p. 49), who asserts:"Instead . . . of speaking of agents as causing their own acts, itwould perhapsbe better to use anotherword entirely,and say, e.g., thatthey originatethem, initiatethem, or simplyperformthem."

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Contributorso symbolic interactionismalso have helped to develop the literatureofsocial contingencies, an area of social life that is filled with the possibilities of chanceevents. Thus, for example, Everett C. Hughes (1958) dealt with occupationalcareercontingencies (e.g., "beingin the right place at the righttime");HowardS. Becker(1963)and Edwin Lemert (1967) studied contingencies that arise in the course of careers indeviance;and ErvingGoffman(1961) examinedcontingenciesin the moral careerof themental patient. Still anothertype of contingency has been studied by systems theoristWalterBuckley, who approvinglyquotesmathematicianNorbertWiener on organizationalcontingency,as follows:

Organizationwe must consider as something n which there is an interdependencebetween he severalorganized artsbut n which heinterdependenceasdegrees.Certaininternalnderdependencies ust be more mportanthanothers,which is the samethingas sayingthat the internal nterdependences not complete,and that the determinationof certainquantities f the system eaves otherswith the chance o vary(Buckley1967,p. 82).

Note the resemblance of this idea to those expressedin Perrow'sexplanationof "normalaccidents"and Kaufman'stheoryof organizational ongevity.A final sphere of fortuitousevents relates to Robert K. Merton's (1977) concept of"serendipity,"he basis for fortunate hough essentiallyaccidentaldiscoveries in science.We mentionthis conceptin connectionwith the fact that it has stimulatedmuch discussionand has prompteda numberof descriptions,in sociology and in the naturalsciences, ofspecific cases of such discoveries(e.g., the discoveryof quarksby physicists). It appearsless than defensible thatsociologists readily accept the existence of serendipity(chance,luck) in scientific activitiesbut not in otherforms of human conduct.The above-mentionedexpressions of chance in human affairs are relatively clear-cutexamplesof its ontologicalform. In additionwe can list some frequentlynoted instancesof recentlarge-scalesocial changesthatmay or may not constitutepurelychance events.We have in mind severalstructuralransformationsf the twentiethcenturythat were notforeseen by the "experts."The black revolution, the rise of feminism, the collapse ofEuropeancommunism, the sharp increases in oil prices, the enormous growth of theAmerican national debt, the emergence of Japanas a world economic power, and theinvasion of Kuwaitby Iraq possibly are examplesof truechance.THE IMPLICATIONSOF CHANCEFOR SOCIOLOGYThusfar we have considereda numberof aspectsof chancethathaveengagedsociologists'attention. We have characterized hance events as those exhibitingacausality, unpredict-ability, and irregularity.Further,we have differentiated wo basic forms of such events.One derives from current ignorance of causes that may be involved; the other-lesscommonlyacknowledgedandhence emphasizedhere-implies an irreducible andomnessas ontological.Then we listed illustrationsof the recognitionof chance, in the lattersense,by various fields of knowledge, including sociology. Now it is time to suggest someimplicationsof this material.In view of sociologists' concern aboutthe formulationof generalizations-statementsof uniformitiesor regularities-it is not surprisingthat chance events typically escapetheir attention. Fortuitous occurrences are elusive by their very nature, as we haveemphasized, and apparentlyare peripheralor even epiphenomenal.Hence such eventscommonly are regarded simply as exceptionalcases, insignificant n themselves, which

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CHANCEIN HUMAN AFFAIRSmore powerful general statementseventually may comprehend.Alternatively,some so-ciologistschoose to ignoresuchevents, adheringnstead o Aristotle'sexclusionof chance,anomalousevents from thescope of science (whichtheyconceive as seekingonly constant,universalregularities).Probablyequally common is the view, mentionedearlier,thatdespite the evidence ofchance at the level of the individualactor, organization,or event, we find regularityattheaggregate level-which shouldsuffice for ourpurposes.Porter 1986, p. 150) supportsthis view by his assertionthat "the indeterminismof probability s so reliableand highlystructured hatrandomnessseems to disappear romthe end result."AlfredR. Lindesmith(1992), however, attacks this point by assertingthatthe quest for statisticalcorrelationsand the relateddevising of "causalmodels"tend to create an unfortunateperceptionof"exceptional nstances [as having] little or no meaningor function" p. 262).We contendthat a fullerunderstanding f social phenomenawarrantsa closer studyofchance. Althoughwe distinguishbetween "real"chance andepistemicchance, we freelyadmit what is obvious: the distinctioncannotbe made readilyin all cases. After all, it isimpossible to discover any conclusive evidence that all unpredictable vents never willbecome predictable. We ask, then, as does Sidney Hook (1958, p.168), is there anypracticaldifference, however, between statingthat an occurrenceis undetermined andhence unpredictable)and statingthat an occurrence s determinedso complexly that noreliablepredictionscan be made?In ourconsiderationof the ways in which sociology cantakefortuityinto account, we endeavor to maintaina primaryconcern with chancein thesense that we have stressed here. Much of what we write, however, applies as well toother senses of the term.

First, however, we cannot resist citing AbrahamKaplan's(1964) view that doctrinal,or metaphysical,determinism s of suchuncertain,undemonstrable niversalvalidityas towarrant eplacementby "methodologicaldeterminism."As Kaplanasserts, "Methodolog-ical determinism . . statesonly that laws are worthlookingfor here, not thatthey surelyexist here, and surely not thatthey necessarilyexist always andeverywhere" p. 124).How can sociologists study such a protean,adventitiousset of phenomena?To beginwith, the searchfor chance factors in social life mustnot be hastyor exaggerated.On thecontrary,a first step could be to rule out erroneously designated"fortuitous"nstances.For example, it is hardlyappropriate o describe an adjudicatedcase of alcohol-relatedmanslaughter s a purely"accidental"vent. Nor shouldwejudgeas chance theoccurrenceof occupational njurieswhereemployershave receivednumerouscitations for hazardousworkingconditions. Only circumstances nvolvingunknowablecauses shouldreceive the"chance"designation. A more subtle-and probablymore pertinent-illustrationof thispoint is providedby the monographInequality:A Reassessmentof the Effect of Family.andSchooling in America(Jencks, and MarshallSmith, HenryAcland, MaryJo Bane,David Cohen, HerbertGintis, BarbaraHeyns, and StephanMichelson 1972). Severalparticipantsn a review symposiumon thebook castigatedJencksforequatingwith "luck"the residualvariance n correlatesof financialandoccupational uccess. By ignoringmorelikely alternatives n the interpretation f residualdeviance, Jencksreachedthe question-ableconclusionthat luckoutweighspeople's social origins,cognitiveskills, andeducationin determining heirdestinies.Jencks's book brings to mind anotherimportantconsideration: he social matrix ofchance social events. As Pettigrew points out,

Muchthat is considered"luck" s probablyhe operation f "knowinghe rightpeople"andbeingin "theright" ommunicationhannels.Suchnetworks re notonlyrelated ofamiliesbutschoolcontactsas well . . . (1972, p. 1529).

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An importantquestionis whethersome theoreticaland researchperspectivesare morelikely than others to discover and to consider the manifestationsof chance describedabove. Mainstreamsociology, we have asserted, tends to slight such matters. Low-frequencyanomalous tems do not hold the attentionof surveyresearchers ndotherswhoseek to test their theoriesquantitatively.We are convinced that two familiar, closely connected staples of the interactionistapproachmustmarka sociology that aims to takechance into account;one of these staplesis substantive, the other methodological. These emphases, of course, are intended ascomplementsto contemporary mphases, not as substitutes. On the substantiveside, weadvocategreaterconcern with process and less with causality.Paul Rock, in discussingemergence-the form of chance thatpermeatesboth micro-and macro-level social behav-ior-states our position in extreme form:

Indeed he interactionistsenerally hoose to shun hevocabularyf causalityaltogether.Partof theirrejectionof causalitymaybe attributedo thetransforming orkperformedby sociation tself:the effectsof conditions reso unstablehat he invocation f causalitydoes not usefullycapture hem. Prediction annotbe basedon a foundation f originalcausesbecause he causes themselvesaretransmutedn oftenunforeseeableways(1979,pp. 55-56).What we are saying is not new. We contend that studies of processes of behaviorinboth individual andjoint actions, such as those which many interactionistshave under-taken,aremorelikely to disclose instancesof fortuityor contingency han do the standardsearches for causes and correlates. By theirvery nature,the lattertend to seek out andexaminecausal, regular,andpredictablevariables.The processualemphasis,on the otherhand, stresses both the precariouscharacterof knowledgeand the fluidityof social life;it keeps watchfor all relevantdetails, whethertypicalor atypical(see Rock 1979, p. 24).This brings us to our second recommendedemphasis. Survey research and relatedmethods, with their precoded, fixed-item questionnairesand interview schedules, leavelittle room for detailedprobingof unexpected, atypicalresponses. Unexpectedimportantevents are most likely to be observed when the inquiryis open and flexibly structured.Currentnarrative, thnographic,and otherqualitative,case-study echniques itthese broad

specifications.Such techniques, favoredby symbolic interactionismand otherphenome-nological framesof reference,may face a frequent-and valid-stricture of difficultiesofreplication,but are more likely thanquantitativemethods to uncoversocial fortuities.Sociologists increasingly have been broadeningtheir conception of the task of thediscipline. They continue to emphasize the establishmentof valid generalizations,butanotheraim has developed, which complementssuch emphasis.Humanisticallyorientedscholars and practitionersare engaging in additionalkinds of knowledge-we do notincludehere such nihilistic orientationsas postmodernism-which will, in Blumer's fre-quently used phrase, "rendermodem social life intelligible."Such knowledge includesinformationaboutphenomenathat do not fit neatly into our generalizations.

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