MAINESUPREMEJUDICIALCOURT ReporterofDecisionsDecision: 2020ME53Docket: Yor-19-234Argued: February12,2020Decided: April23,2020Panel: MEAD,GORMAN,*JABAR,andHUMPHREY,JJ.**

STATEOFMAINEv.

RONALDPAQUIN

MEAD,J.

[¶1] RonaldPaquinappeals froma judgmentof conviction for eleven

counts of gross sexual misconduct (Class A), 17-A M.R.S.A. § 253(1)(B)

(Supp.1985),1enteredbythetrialcourt(YorkCounty,Douglas,J.)followinga

jurytrial.Paquincontendsthatthecourterredin(1)declininghisrequestto

compeltheStatetoobtainthevictim’scriminalhistoryontheseconddayofthe

trial; (2)admittingexpert testimonyconcerning thephenomenonofdelayed

*Althoughnotavailableatoralargument,JusticeGormanparticipatedinthedevelopmentofthis

opinion.SeeM.R.App.P.12(a)(“Aqualifiedjusticemayparticipateinadecisioneventhoughnotpresentatoralargument.”).**AlthoughChiefJusticeSaufleyparticipatedinthisappeal,sheresignedbeforethisopinionwas

certified.1 Title17-AM.R.S.A.§253hasbeenamendedmanytimessince thecriminalconductatissue

occurredandiscodifiedinitscurrentversionat17-AM.R.S.§253(2018).

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reportingbymalevictimsofsexualabuse;(3)failingtorulesuaspontethatthe

DoubleJeopardyClausebarredconvictionsonbothCounts5and30;(4)giving

adeficient“onorabout”juryinstructiononCount31;(5)decliningtoallowa

police detective to testify about whether he perceived any inconsistencies

between twoallegedvictims’ respectiveversionsofevents;and(6) allowing

theStatetodismissCounts27,28,and29duringthetrialwithouthisconsent

ratherthanenteringajudgmentofacquittalonthosecounts.

[¶2]WeagreewithPaquinthattheconvictionsonbothCounts5and30

violated his double jeopardy protections and we remand for dismissal of

Count30.WealsoagreethatthecourterredinallowingtheStatetodismiss

Counts 27, 28, and 29 during the trial and therefore remand for entry of a

judgment of acquittal on those counts. In all other respects, we affirm the

judgment.

I.BACKGROUND

[¶3]Viewingtheevidenceinthelightmostfavorabletothejury’sverdict,

seeStatev.Marble,2019ME157,¶7,218A.3d1157,thejuryrationallycould

havefoundthefollowingfacts.Intheearly1980sthevictimwasanaltarboy

attheRomanCatholicChurchinHaverhill,Massachusetts,wherePaquinwasa

priest.Whenthevictimwasnineortenyearsold,Paquin,whilediscussingwith

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thevictimahumansexualityclassthatPaquinwastaking,toldthevictimthat

“itwasperfectlynormalformentotoucheachother.”AtsomepointPaquin

committedasexualactagainstthevictiminHaverhill.

[¶4]Beginninginthewinterof1985,andcontinuinguntiljustbeforehe

turned fourteen, the victim made numerous trips to Kennebunkport with

Paquin,stayingatacampgroundinPaquin’scamperorinthemotelassociated

withthecampground.OnthosetripsPaquinroutinelyprovidedthevictimwith

alcoholandcommittedsexualactsagainsthim.

[¶5] InFebruary2017 thegrand jury returnedan indictment against

Paquin;as lateramended,theindictmentchargedPaquinwithfifteencounts

(Counts 1-13, 30-31) of gross sexual misconduct (Class A), 17-A M.R.S.A.

§253(1)(B), against the victim; and sixteen counts (Counts 14-29) of gross

sexualmisconduct(ClassB),17-AM.R.S.A.§253(2)(A)(Supp.1985),againsta

secondallegedvictim.2ThecasewastriedtoajuryonNovember26-29,2018.

Duringthetrial,thecourtgrantedPaquin’smotionforajudgmentofacquittal

on Counts 10-13, and the State dismissed Counts 27-29. The jury returned

verdictsofguiltyontheremainingcountsconcerningthevictim(Counts1-9,

2 TheconvictionsatissueinthisappealresultedfromPaquin’scrimescommittedagainstone

person,referredtointhisopinionas“thevictim.”

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30-31)andnotguiltyontheremainingcountsconcerningthesecondalleged

victim(Counts14-26).ThecourtdeniedPaquin’smotionforanewtrial.

[¶6]Atthesentencinghearing,thecourtenteredjudgmentinaccordance

withtheverdictandsentencedPaquinoneachcounttoconcurrenttermsof

twentyyears’ imprisonment,withallbutsixteenyearssuspended,andthree

yearsofprobation.Paquintimelyappealedandfiledanapplicationtoappeal

from the sentence. On August 7, 2019, the Sentence Review Panel denied

Paquinleavetoappealfromhissentence.

II.DISCUSSION

[¶7]WediscussPaquin’ssixassertionsoferrorinturn.

A. Victim’sCriminalHistory

[¶8] Inachambersconferenceontheseconddayofthetrial,Paquin’s

counsel raised the issue of his wish to cross-examine the victim using

nonspecific criminal history that the victim had disclosed in an arbitration

statement as part of his civil lawsuit against the Catholic Church. Counsel

acknowledgedthatallPaquinknewaboutthecriminalhistorywasbasedon

thearbitrationstatement.WhentheStateobjected,thecourtadviseddefense

counselthat“[y]oucan’tgoonafishingexpeditionbeforethejury....Ihaveto

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base my ruling on [M.R. Evid.] 609,3 so do you know what [the victim’s]

conviction history is, what he was convicted of and for what?” Counsel

answered,“No.”

[¶9]DefensecounselthenrequestedthattheStateproducethevictim’s

criminal history as “something that should be discoverable in this case,

somethingthattheyshouldprovideus.”TheStateobjectedonthegroundthat

ithadalreadyprovidedindiscoveryalloftheinformationithad,andargued

thatarequestfordiscoveryontheseconddayoftrialconcerninginformation

previouslyknowntoPaquinwas“notappropriate.” Thecourtsustained the

State’s objection and ruled that Paquinwould not be allowed to inquire on

cross-examination about the victim’s self-reported convictions “unless

[counselhas]somespecificinformationabouthis...criminalhistory.”

[¶10] Paquin acknowledges that “Maine’s discovery rules contain no

provisionspecificallyrequiringtheproductionofthecriminalhistoryrecordof

acomplainingwitnesswhotestifiesat trial,”andhedoesnotassert that the

StatefailedtoproduceanydiscoveryexplicitlyrequiredbyM.R.U.Crim.P.16

orbyBradyv.Maryland,373U.S.83(1963),4anditsprogeny.Rather,Paquin

3MaineRuleofEvidence609governstheimpeachmentofawitnessbyevidenceofacriminal

conviction.

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urges us to hold that Rule 16 implicitly requires the State to produce the

criminal history of a complaining witness who testifies at trial because, he

argues,theStateisalwaysinconstructivepossessionofthatinformationandit

“ispotentiallyimpactfulontheoutcomeof[the]trial.”5

[¶11]“Weaffordthetrialcourtsubstantialdeferenceinoverseeingthe

parties’discovery....”Statev.Silva,2012ME120,¶8,56A.3d1230.“Only

when the defendant can establish that the effect [of an alleged discovery

violation]issosignificantastodeprivehimofafairtrialwillwevacateonthat

basis.” Id. Furthermore, in considering Paquin’s discovery request made

duringtrialconcerningamatterofwhichhewasaware,thecourtwasentitled

toconsiderthepotentialdelayinvolved.Seeid.¶¶5,9.Withoutdecidingifor

whentheStateiseverrequiredtodoso,weconcludethatonthisrecordthe

trialcourtdidnoterrinrulingthattheStatewasnotrequiredtoproducethe

victim’scriminalhistorymid-trial.

[¶12]MaineRuleofEvidence16(a)(2)(D),theautomaticdiscoveryrule

invokedbyPaquin,requirestheStatetoproduce“[a]statementdescribingany

4Werecentlyexplainedthat“[t]hedueprocessconceptsarticulatedinBradyrequiretheStateto

disclosetothedefendantevidencethatisfavorabletotheaccused,eitherbecauseitisexculpatory,orbecauseitisimpeaching.”Statev.Reed-Hansen,2019ME58,¶13,207A.3d191(quotationmarksomitted).5Paquindoesnotargue“thattheStateisrequiredtoproducesuchrecordsofeverywitness,only

those,suchas[thevictiminthiscase],on[whose]testimonyitscasedepends.”

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matter or information known to the attorney for the State thatmay not be

known to the defendant and that tends to create a reasonable doubt of the

defendant’sguiltas to thecrimecharged.” (Emphasisadded.) Here,Paquin

knewpriortotrialthatthevictimhadaself-reportedcriminalhistory.When

thecourt inquired:“Andthiswasinformationthatyoureceivedindiscovery

earlierinthecase?”counselanswered,“Sure.”

[¶13]Furthermore,Paquinmadenoshowingthatherequestedfromthe

State or otherwise attempted to obtain the victim’s criminal record prior to

trial,6andheprofferednospecificdatesofconvictionorotherinformationthat

would allow the court to determine the admissibility of the purported

convictions pursuant to M.R. Evid. 609(a)-(b), such as whether they were

punishablebyimprisonmentformorethanoneyearorwhethertheirelements

establisheddishonesty,seeM.R.Evid.609(a).

[¶14]Insum,giventhisrecordthecourtdidnotabuseitsdiscretionin

decliningtocompeltheStatetoobtainthevictim’scriminalhistoryduringthe

trial,norinrulingthatPaquincouldnotcross-examinethevictimconcerning

6 Paquin points to M.R.U. Crim. P. 16(c)(1), which requires the State to produce, upon the

defendant’swrittenrequest,specifieditems“thatarematerialandrelevanttothepreparationofthedefense.”TherecorddoesnotcontainanysuchrequestfromPaquin.Hadhetimelyrequestedthevictim’scriminalhistorypursuanttotheruleandtheStatedeclinedtocomply,thecourtwouldhavehadtheauthority,initssounddiscretion,toissueanappropriateorder.SeeCoreyv.Norman,Hanson&DeTroy,1999ME196,¶17,742A.2d933(noting“theconsiderablediscretionvestedinthejudge”inmakingadiscoveryruling(quotationmarksomitted)).

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his nonspecific, self-reported criminal history. See Silva, 2012ME120, ¶ 8,

56A.3d1230.

B. ExpertTestimony

[¶15]Thevictimtestifiedtosexualabusethatoccurredbetween1985

and1988,morethanthirtyyearsbeforethechargesresultingfromthatabuse

wenttotrial.HereachedasettlementwiththeCatholicChurchin2010,andin

2011hereportedtotheMaineAttorneyGeneral’sOfficewhathadhappened.

[¶16] Attrial, theStatesoughttocallanexpertwitnesstotestifythat

victimsofsexualabuse,particularlymalevictims,oftendisclosetheabuselong

afteritoccurred,andtoexplainwhythatisso.Followingalengthyvoirdire,

Paquin’sobjection to the expert’s testimony,primarilyon theground that it

unfairlybolsteredthevictim’scredibility,wasoverruled. Thecourtsatisfied

itself that theStatewasnotseeking to elicit theexpert’sopinionconcerning

why the alleged victims in this particular case delayed reporting, and it

excluded, pursuant to M.R. Evid. 403, any reference by the expert, while

discussingdelayeddisclosure,totheabuserbeingamemberoftheclergy.The

expert then testified that “delayed disclosure is actually the norm . . . . It’s

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almostexpectedgiventhestatistics....[M]enactuallywaitagreatdeallonger

todiscloseabuse.”Paquin’srenewedobjectedwasoverruled.

[¶17] “Whether proffered evidence requires expert explanation is a

questionlefttothediscretionofthetrialcourt.”Statev.Wyman,2015ME1,

¶26,107A.3d641. MaineRuleofEvidence702allows “[a]witnesswho is

qualifiedas anexpertbyknowledge, skill, experience, training, or education

[to]testifyintheformofanopinionorotherwiseifsuchtestimonywillhelpthe

trieroffacttounderstandtheevidenceortodetermineafactinissue.”

[¶18]Wediscernnoabuseofdiscretioninthecourt’sdeterminationthat

theexpertwasqualifiedandcouldtestifyconcerningamatterthatwouldassist

the jury in understanding the evidence. See id.;Wyman, 2015ME 1, ¶ 26,

107A.3d641. Furthermore, thecourt limited theriskofunfairprejudice to

Paquinbyrestrictingtheexpert’stestimonytothesubjectofdelayeddisclosure

ingeneral—asopposedtoanopinionastowhythevictiminthiscasemayhave

madealatedisclosure—andexcludingfromtheexpert’sopiniontheeffectof

anabuserbeingamemberoftheclergy.7SeeM.R.Evid.403.

[¶19]Thatsaid,“[a]nexpertopinionmustberelevanttoanissueinthe

case.” State v. Napier, 1998 ME 8, ¶5, 704 A.2d 869. The trial court’s

7Theexperttestifiedthatheremployer“coordinate[s]...investigationsofchildsexualabusein

CumberlandCounty.”WerejectPaquin’sassertionthatthistestimonyunfairlybolsteredthevictim’s

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determinationof relevancy is reviewed for clear error. Id. In this case, the

expert’stestimonyregardingthephenomenonofdelayeddisclosurewasnot

relevantif,asPaquincontends,“Thereisnoevidencethat[thevictim]delayed

disclosinghisabuse.”

[¶20]Weagreethattheevidencedoesnotestablishasacertaintywhen

ortowhomthevictimmadeafirstdisclosure,butestablishesonlythathefirst

disclosedtheabusetoMainelawenforcementauthoritiesin2011,andthathe

hadreachedasettlementwiththeChurchin2010. However,attrialPaquin

acceptedthepremisethatthevictimhadinfactmadeadelayeddisclosure,and

heasserteditasafactinobjectingtotheexpert’stestimony:

[PAQUIN]: You know, we haven’t made an issue of the latedisclosure.Obviously,it’soutthere........ Andsogiventhatwedidn’thighlightthat,thatwedidn’tcallintoquestionthelatereport,wedon’treallythinkthatit’sincredibly

credibilitybecausetheexpert’stangentialconnectiontolawenforcement“allowed[her]tositasasortofhumanpolygraph,”andthevictim“[a]pparently . . .passed those truth-telling tests.” Theexpertwentontosaythatherdutiesinvolved“forensicinterviewsofchildren”(emphasisadded);here,theexperttestifiedthatshehadnevermetthevictim,who,inanyevent,wasforty-fouryearsoldatthetimeofthetrial.Giventhatevidence,wecannotconcludethatthejurywasledtobelievethattheexpertwasvouchingforthevictim’spersonalcredibility.

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probativeatthispointtohavesomeonecomeinandtestifyastoalatedisclosure..... Wewanttoavoidthesuggestionthatbecauseofthisfailuretodiscloseordelayeddisclosurethattherewereothervictimsouttherein...thisparticularcase.

(Emphasisadded.)

[¶21]Whenthecourtruledonhisobjection,Paquindidnottakeissue

withthecourt’sstatementthat

[b]asedonthetestimonyofboth[allegedvictims],itiscleartherehas been a substantial delay in reporting these alleged events.They...allegedlyoccurredinthelate1980s.Thedisclosurewasnotmadeatthetime.Itwasmadeanumberofyearslater. Thatdelayhasbeen referencedby counsel, by thedefensebothinopeningstatementandaspartofcross-examinationofatleast[adetectivewhotestified].

[¶22] Pursuant to M.R. Evid. 104(a), “[t]he court must decide any

preliminary question about whether . . . evidence is admissible.” Like the

court’srelevancydetermination,aRule104(a)decisionisreviewedforclear

error. Walton v. Ireland, 2014 ME 130, ¶ 12, 104 A.3d 883; see Napier,

1998ME8,¶5,704A.2d869.Here,thecourt’sfindingthat“therehasbeena

substantialdelayinreportingtheseallegedevents,”aprecursortotheexpert’s

opinion being relevant and therefore admissible, was not clearly erroneous

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giventheevidenceestablishingwhentheabuseoccurredandwhenthevictim

firstreportedittoMaineauthorities,coupledwithPaquin’simplicitadmission

thatthevictim’sreporthadbeensubstantiallydelayed.

C. DoubleJeopardy

[¶23] Paquin contends that the court’s entry of judgment on both

Counts5 and 30 violates his constitutional double jeopardy protections.

U.S.Const.amend.V;Me.Const.art.I,§8.Reviewingforobviouserrorbecause

thisissuewasnotraisedattrial,seeM.R.U.Crim.P.52(b),weagree.

[¶24]InStatev.Martinelli,discussingtheconstitutionaldoublejeopardy

bar against “multiplepunishments for the sameoffense,”2017ME217,¶5,

175A.3d636(quotationmarksomitted),weexplainedthat

[b]ecauseaperson,byoneactortransaction,mayviolatemultiplecriminal laws, courts apply the Blockburger test to determinewhetherthecrimesenumeratedbythosemultiplestatutesarethesame offense for purposes of double jeopardy protections. SeeBlockburger v. United States, 284 U.S. 299, 304, 52 S. Ct. 180,76L.Ed. 306 (1932). The test asks whether each statutoryprovisionrequiresproofofafactthattheotherdoesnot.Ifeachstatutoryprovisionrequiresauniqueproofoffact,theBlockburgertest is satisfied and there is no double jeopardy violation bysubsequentprosecutionsormultiplepunishments.

Id.¶7(emphasisadded)(quotationmarksomitted).

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[¶25]TheindictmentagainstPaquincharged:

Count 5: On or about between November 1, 1986 andFebruary28,1987, in Kennebunkport, YORK County, Maine,RONALDPAQUIN,didengageinasexualactwith[thevictim]...,nothisspouse,whohadnotinfactattainedhisfourteenthbirthday.Count 30: On or about between December 1, 1986 andDecember31, 1986, in Kennebunkport, YORK County, Maine,RONALDPAQUIN,didengageinasexualactwith[thevictim]...,nothisspouse,whohadnotinfactattainedhisfourteenthbirthday.To wit: Engaging in a sexual act in the form of direct physicalcontactbetweenthegenitalsof [thevictim] . . .andthemouthofRONALDPAQUIN.

[¶26]PaquinarguesthatalthoughCount30requiresproofofaspecific

typeofsexualactwhereasCount5issatisfiedbyproofofanysexualact,the

twocountsdonoteach “require[]proofofafactthattheotherdoesnot,” id.

(quotationmarks omitted), because the jury could find that a single sexual

act—Paquinputtinghismouthon thevictim’s genitals inDecember1986—

satisfied the State’s burden of proof on both counts. Put anotherway, only

Count30requiredproofofauniquefact,andifPaquincommittedthecrime

charged in Count 30, then he necessarily committed the crime charged in

Count5.

[¶27]Accordingly,applyingMartinelli,ajudgmentofconvictiononboth

countsviolatestheDoubleJeopardyClauseunlesstheStateprovedattrialthat

the convictions did not arise from “the same act or transaction.” Id. ¶ 9

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(quotationmarksomitted).AsPaquinnotes,theStatedidnot.Althoughthe

jurymighthavefoundthatseparateincidentsformedthebasisofitsverdicts

onCounts5and30,wecannotknowthat,andwillnotassumeit.

[¶28]Thetrialcourt’sinstructionfollowinganotefromthejuryduring

deliberations confirms this analysis. The note read: “Could we please get

clarification of the difference between charges 1 through 9 and charge

number30andthenchargenumber31?”Thecourtansweredthejury:“[A]ll

ofthosecharges,Counts1through9andCounts30and31,chargethesame

offense....Soallofthosechargesinvolvethesamecrime.”(Emphasisadded.)

SpecificallyconcerningCount30,thecourtcorrectlyinstructedthat“theState’s

burden is to prove beyond a reasonable doubt that [the] particular type of

sexualactoccurredandthatitoccurredwithinthedaterangespecifiedinCount

30.”ThedoublejeopardyproblemarisesbecauseifthejuryfoundthattheState

metthatexactburdenofproof,nothingmorewasrequiredforittofindPaquin

guiltyonCount5aswell.

[¶29] Because theDouble JeopardyClausedirects thatPaquin cannot

stand convicted of both Counts 5 and 30, we remand for the dismissal of

Count30.ResentencingonCount5,asurgedbyPaquin,isnotrequiredbecause

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each of the remaining ten convictions is for the same crime and resulted in

identicalconcurrentsentences.

D. JuryInstruction

[¶30]Count31charged:

OnoraboutbetweenJune1,1988andAugust21,1988...RONALDPAQUIN,didengageinasexualactwith[thevictim] . . . ,nothisspouse,whohadnot infactattainedhisfourteenthbirthday. Towit:Engaginginasexualactintheformofdirectphysicalcontactbetweentheanusof[thevictim] . . . andthegenitalsofRONALDPAQUIN.

Thevictim’sfourteenthbirthdaywasthedayfollowingthelastdaychargedin

Count31.Consequently,inordertoreturnaverdictofguiltyonCount31the

jury was required to find beyond a reasonable doubt that direct physical

contactbetweenthegenitalsofPaquinandtheanusofthevictimoccurredon

orbeforeAugust21,1988.

[¶31]Concerningtheindictmentgenerally,thecourtinstructed:

Theindictmentallegesthateachoffensewascommittedonor about a specific period of time in each particular count. Thespecificdateoftheallegedcrimeneednotbeproven.Itisenoughif the State proves beyond a reasonable doubt that the offensecharged was committed by the defendant and it happenedsometimewithinthedatessuggestedbytheevidenceofthecasewithrespecttoeachcount. The question of whether the offense was committed, notwhen it happened, must be the principal focus of your inquiry;however,youmayconsideranyevidenceofuncertaintyastothe

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datesof the allegedoffense indecidingwhether theoffensewasprovenbeyondareasonabledoubt....

[¶32] Paquin contends that the instructionwas erroneous because it

allowed the jury to return a guilty verdict even if it found that a sexual act

occurred after August 21, 1988,when the victim had reached age fourteen.

Because Paquin did not object to the instruction at trial, we review it for

obviouserror. Statev.Williams,2020ME17,¶24,---A.3d---. Theobvious

errorstandardrequiresPaquintoshowthat“thereis(1)anerror,(2)thatis

plain,and(3)thataffectssubstantialrights.Evenifthesethreeconditionsare

met,wewill set asidea jury’s verdict only ifwe conclude that (4) the error

seriously affects the fairness and integrity or public reputation of judicial

proceedings.”Id.n.6(quotationmarksomitted).Wehavesaidthat

[a]nerrorregardingjuryinstructionsisplainifthaterrorissoclearthatthetrialjudgeandprosecutorwerederelictincountenancingit,evenabsentthedefendant’stimelyassistanceindetectingit.Anerroraffectsacriminaldefendant’ssubstantialrights if theerrorwas sufficiently prejudicial to have affected the outcome of theproceeding.Inreviewingforobviouserror,ourultimatetaskistodeterminewhetherthedefendantreceivedafairtrial.

Statev.Lajoie,2017ME8,¶15,154A.3d132(citationsandquotationmarks

omitted).

[¶33] In State v. Hodgdon, we found that an instruction functionally

identicaltotheoneatissueinthiscasedidnotrisetothelevelofobviouserror,

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“consideringtheinstructionsasawhole,aswemustdo,”because“[t]hecourt

onseveraloccasionsinformedthejuryoftherequirementthattoreturnaguilty

verdict...[it]mustfindthatthevictimwasundertheageoffourteenyearsat

thetimetheoffensesoccurred.”2017ME122,¶¶11,16,164A.3d959.Here,

asinHodgdon,thetrialcourtrepeatedlyinstructedthejury,bothorallyandin

itswritteninstructions,andspecificallyconcerningCount31,thatitmustfind

beyonda reasonabledoubt that thevictimwasunder theageof fourteen in

ordertoreturnaverdictofguilty.Whenthejurysentoutanoteaskingabout

Count31,thecourtreemphasizedthattheStatewasrequiredtoprovebeyond

a reasonable doubt that thevictim “hadnot yet attainedhis14thbirthday.”

AswedidinHodgdon,weconcludethatthereisnoobviouserrordemonstrated

onthisrecord.Seeid.¶16.

[¶34]Thatsaid,wenotedinHodgdonthatthe“onorabout”instruction

commonly used in Maine courts8 is problematic, standing alone, when the

applicablestatuterequirestheStatetoprovethatthecrimechargedoccurred

onorbeforeaspecificdateinordertoavoidajudgmentofacquittal.Id.Such

isthecasehere,wherethejurywasrequiredtoreturnaverdictofnotguiltyif

it found that the sexual act charged in Count 31 occurred on or after

8SeeAlexander,MaineJuryInstructionManual§6-30at6-61(2018-2019ed.2018).

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August22,1988—thevictim’sfourteenthbirthday.Althoughweconcludethat

the court’s instructions were not clearly erroneous when considered as a

whole,abetterapproachwouldhavebeenforthecourttomakethespecific

datelimitationclearinits“onorabout”instruction,inadditiontostatingthe

“underagefourteen”requirementelsewhereinitsinstructions.9

E. InconsistentWitnessStatements

[¶35]WhenPaquincross-examinedaKennebunkportpolicedetective,

heasked,“Whenyouinterviewedthetwoallegedvictims,didyounoticeany

inconsistenciesintheirstories?Didtheymatch?”TheStateobjectedandthe

followingexchangetookplaceatsidebar:

[PAQUIN]: Judge,he’s a traineddetective. He can—he’s got theabilitytojudgewhethersomeone’scredibleornot.[STATE]: So, Judge, theState’sobjection ishe absolutely cannotjudgesomeone’scredibility.That’sthepurviewofthejuryandthejuryalone....

9Forexample,withoutrequiringthattrialcourtsemployanyparticularlanguage,thecourtinthis

case couldhavemade its instruction concerningCounts1-9 and30-31more completeby saying(modificationinitalics):

Theindictmentallegesthateachoffensewascommittedonoraboutaspecificperiodoftimeineachparticularcount.Thespecificdateoftheallegedcrimeneednotbeproven.ItisenoughiftheStateprovesbeyondareasonabledoubtthattheoffensechargedwascommittedbythedefendantandthat,concerningCounts1-9andCounts30-31, eachoffensewas committedbefore thealleged victim reachedhis fourteenthbirthday.

Seesupra¶31.

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[PAQUIN]:I’maskingforfactualinformationregardingvisitsandtimesandwhenpeoplewerethere.COURT: Is there a specific statement that you are seeking toilluminateasinconsistent,orareyoujustaskinggenerally?[PAQUIN]:Kindofaskinggenerally.COURT:Theobjection’ssustained.

[¶36]“Wereviewatrialcourt’srulingontheadmissibilityofevidence

for clear error or abuse of discretion.” State v. Tieman, 2019ME 60, ¶ 12,

207A.3d618.Itiswellestablishedthatcredibilitydeterminationsarewithin

the sole province of the jury. See State v. Sweeney, 2004 ME 123, ¶ 11,

861A.2d43 (“Questions that ask a witness to give an opinion of another

witness’s veracity are improper because determining the credibility of a

witness is the sole province of the fact-finder.”). Paquin argues that the

credibilityoftheallegedvictimswasnotimplicatedbyhisquestionbecausehe

wasnotaskingthedetectivewhetherhebelievedoneortheother,butrather

whethertherewereanyinconsistenciesintheiraccountsasafactualmatter.

[¶37]SettingasidetheissueofwhetherPaquin’squestioncalledforan

impropercredibilityopinion,thecourtdidnotabuseitsdiscretioninsustaining

the State’s objection because whether the detective discerned any

inconsistenciesintheallegedvictims’accountswasoflimitedrelevancegiven

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Paquin’sopportunitytocross-examinethem.Seeid.(“Onewitness’sopinionof

anotherwitness’struthfulnessisnothelpfultothejurywhenthejuryhasthe

opportunitytohearbothwitnesses.”);M.R.Evid.403.Paquinwasthenfreeto

highlightanyperceivedinconsistenciesintheirrespectiveaccountsduringhis

closingargument.

F. DismissalofCounts27-29

[¶38]PaquinfinallycontendsthatthecourterredinallowingtheState

todismissCounts27-29during the trial rather than entering a judgmentof

acquittalonthosecounts.Thosecountsconcernedthesecondallegedvictim;

the jury returned verdicts of not guiltyon all counts concerning the second

allegedvictimthatweresubmittedtoit(Counts14-26).

[¶39]Afterthesecondallegedvictimtestified,theStateadvisedthecourt

in chambers that it would be dismissing Counts 27-29 “with regard to [the

second alleged victim] based on his testimony of not recalling.” The court

replied,“Allright.ThenCounts27,28and29aredismissed.”WhenPaquin’s

counselraisedthequestionofwhetherPaquin’sconsenttothedismissalwas

required, the court advised: “[T]he State anticipated my thinking on this

because Iwouldbedisposed,unless theypresent awitness . . . to fill in the

blanks on Counts 27, 28 and 29, I would be dismissing those counts on a

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judgmentinresponseto[amotionforajudgmentofacquittal]anyway,soit’s

sort of moot.” The court deferred ruling pending Paquin’s response to the

proposed dismissal, but said, “I’ve already indicated I’m likely to grant the

motion for judgment of acquittal on those three counts anyway. Whether

[Paquin]agreesornot,theevidenceisnotintherecordatthispoint.”

[¶40]AftertheStateresteditscase-in-chiefonthethirddayofthetrial,

Paquinmovedforajudgmentofacquittalonallcounts.Inrulingonthemotion,

thecourtagainstatedthat“withrespecttoCounts27,28and29...Iwouldbe

inclinedtograntthemotionforacquittal.”Thisexchangefollowed:

[STATE]:Judge,wouldhave[sic]theCourtconsideritmoot,thenIthinkwewerewaitinginchamberstodetermineiftherewouldbeanobjectiontothosedismissals,andIjustwanttomakesuretherecord’sclearthat’smootedthen.COURT: Ihaven’theardanobjection, soeitherway,27either—either dismissal without objection or on the basis of [M.R.U.Crim.P.29].Counts27,28and29aredismissed.[STATE]: Judge, the State would move orally to dismiss thosewithoutobjection.COURT:27,28and29aredismissedwithoutobjection.

The court later summarized its ruling, saying in part that the motion for

judgmentofacquittal“ismootwithrespectto[Counts]27,28and29andthose

countshavebeendismissedbyagreement.”

22

[¶41] The State later filed a written dismissal for the stated reason:

“Probablecauseestablishedbutinsufficientevidencetoestablishguiltbeyond

areasonabledoubtonthoseCounts.”Thewrittendismissalinaccuratelystated

that “[c]ounsel for theDefendant indicatedon therecord that theDefendant

doesnotobjecttothedismissaloftheseCounts.”

[¶42]ContrarytothewrittendismissalandtheState’sexpressedwish

“tomakesuretherecord’sclear,”neitherofPaquin’sattorneyseverexpressly

saidwhetherPaquindidordidnotconsenttothedismissals,althoughtheState

iscorrectinarguingthattheyhadmultipleopportunitiestodoeither.Pursuant

toM.R.U.Crim.P.48(a),“adismissalmaynotbefiledduringthetrialwithout

the consent of the defendant.” The reason for the rule is that “dismissal of

chargesafterjeopardyhasattachedwithouttheconsentofthedefendantraises

aseriousdouble jeopardyproblem.” 2Cluchey&Seitzinger,MaineCriminal

Practice§48.2atIX-102(Gardnered.1995).

[¶43] Beyond the potential violation of Rule 48(a), we conclude that

PaquinwasinfactacquittedonCounts27-29.“[A]defendantonceacquitted

may not be again subjected to trial without violating the Double Jeopardy

Clause.” UnitedStatesv.Scott,437U.S.82,96(1978). TheDouble Jeopardy

Clause is implicated “when it is plain that the [trial court] evaluated the

23

[prosecution’s] evidence and determined that it was legally insufficient to

sustainaconviction.”Id.at97(quotationmarksomitted).

[¶44] The Supreme Court said in Scott that “the trial judge’s

characterization of his own action cannot control the classification of the

action,”andexplainedthat“adefendantisacquitted...whentherulingofthe

judge,whatever its label, actually represents a resolution in thedefendant’s

favor, correct or not, of some or all of the factual elements of the offense

charged.” Id. at 96-97 (alteration and quotationmarks omitted). Applying

Scott, the trial court’s characterization of its action on Counts 27-29 as a

dismissaldoesnotcontrolouranalysis,seeid.at96;rather,weconsiderthat

after the State proposed a dismissal due to insufficient evidence, the court

repeatedly said that absent a dismissal it would grant Paquin’s motion for

acquittal on those counts. The State then filed a written dismissal for the

explicitreasonthattherewasinsufficientevidencetosupportthem.

[¶45] Because “the ruling of the judge . . . actually represent[ed] a

resolutioninthedefendant’sfavor...ofsomeorallofthefactualelementsof

theoffense[s]charged”inCounts27-29,thecourt’saction—althoughtermeda

dismissal—acquitted Paquin on those counts. Id. at 97 (alteration and

quotation marks omitted). Accordingly, we vacate the dismissal of

24

Counts27-29andremandwithinstructionstoenterajudgmentofacquittalon

thosecounts.

G. Conclusion

[¶46] For the reasons set forth in this opinion, we (1) vacate the

judgmentofconvictiononCount30andremandforadismissalofthatcount,

and(2)vacatethedismissalofCounts27,28,and29andremandforentryofa

judgment of acquittal on those counts. In all other respects we affirm the

judgment.

Theentryis:

Dismissal of Counts 27, 28, and 29 vacated;remandedwithinstructionstoenterajudgmentofacquittalonCounts27,28,and29.Judgmentof conviction on Count 30 vacated; remandedwith instructions to dismiss Count 30 withprejudice. In all other respects, judgmentaffirmed.

RoryA.McNamara,Esq.(orally),DrakeLaw,LLC,Berwick,forappellantRonaldPaquinKathrynL.Slattery,DistrictAttorney,andJustinaMcGettigan,Dep.Dist.Atty.(orally),ProsecutorialDistrict#1,Alfred,forappelleeStateofMaineYorkCountyUnifiedCriminalDocketdocketnumberCR-2017-109FORCLERKREFERENCEONLY