MAINESUPREMEJUDICIALCOURT ReporterofDecisionsDecision: 2020ME103Docket: Yor-19-280Argued: May11,2020Decided: August11,2020Panel: MEAD,GORMAN,JABAR,HUMPHREY,HORTON,andCONNORS,JJ.,andHJELM,A.R.J.Majority: MEAD,GORMAN,andHUMPHREY,JJ.,andHJELM,A.R.J.Dissent: HORTON,JABAR,andCONNORS,JJ.

STATEOFMAINEv.

EMANUELJ.SLOBODAGORMAN,J.

[¶1] Emanuel J. Sloboda appeals from a judgment of conviction for

violating a condition of release (Class C), 15 M.R.S. § 1092(1)(B) (2020),

enteredby the trialcourt (YorkCounty,Douglas, J.)aftera jury-waived trial.

Sloboda contends that the court lacked subject matter jurisdiction over his

prosecutionbecausetheviolationat issueoccurred inNewHampshire.1 We

agree,vacatetheconviction,andremandfordismissaloftheindictment.

1BriefsofamicicuriaeweresubmittedbytheOfficeoftheMaineAttorneyGeneral;AEquitas;and

LawrenceC.Winger,Esq.

2

I.BACKGROUND

[¶2] In2019,Slobodawasindictedforviolatingaconditionofrelease

(ClassC), 15M.R.S. §1092(1)(B), towhichhepleadednot guilty.2 Duringa

one-day jury-waived trial on the indictment, Sloboda challenged the court’s

subjectmatterjurisdictionbasedonthefactthathisallegedviolationoccurred

outside Maine, in New Hampshire. Among its findings and conclusions

renderedattheendofthetrial,thecourtdeterminedthatithadjurisdiction.

[¶3] The court also found, based on competent record evidence, that

Slobodawasonpreconvictionbail,aconditionofwhichwasthathehaveno

directorindirectcontactwithaparticularindividual,when,onNovember25,

2018,heviolatedthatconditionbyhavingcontactwiththatindividualatastore

inRochester,NewHampshire.Basedonthesefacts,thecourtfoundSloboda

2Slobodawasalsochargedwithaggravatedassault(ClassA),17-AM.R.S.§§208(1)(C),1252(4-A)

(2018); domestic violence assault (Class C), 17-A M.R.S. § 207-A(1)(A) (2020); 17-AM.R.S.§1252(4-A); and two additional counts of violating a condition of release (Class C), 15 M.R.S.§1092(1)(B)(2020).Section208hassincebeenamended,P.L.2019,ch.91,§1(effectiveSept.19,2019),andsection1252hassincebeenrepealedandreplaced,P.L.2019,ch.113,§A-1(emergency,effectiveMay16,2019)(codifiedat17-AM.R.S.§1604(2020)),butthesesubsequentenactmentsdonotaffectthisappeal.TheStatedismissedthechargesofaggravatedassault,domesticassault,andonecountofviolating

aconditionofrelease.Slobodawasfoundnotguiltyoftheotherchargeofviolatingaconditionofrelease.Noneofthesechargesisatissueinthepresentappeal.

3

guiltyoftheoffenseandsentencedhimtoservesixmonthsin jail.3 Sloboda

timelyappeals.See15M.R.S.§2115(2020);M.R.App.P.2B(b)(1).

II.DISCUSSION

[¶4] Sloboda contends that the trial court lacked subject matter

jurisdictionbecausethecourtfoundthatheviolatedtheconditionofreleasein

NewHampshire.Wereviewdenovothetrialcourt’ssubjectmatterjurisdiction

by interpreting thecriminal jurisdictionstatute,17-AM.R.S.§7 (2020). See

Statev.McLaughlin,2018ME97,¶9,189A.3d262;Statev.St.Onge,2011ME

73, ¶ 13, 21 A.3d 1028; see also M.R.U. Crim. P. 12(b)(2); State v. Liberty,

2004ME 88, ¶ 7, 853A.2d 760 (stating that the issue of the trial court’s

jurisdictionmayberaisedatanytimeduringthependencyoftheproceeding).

Wefirstinterprettheprovisioninaccordancewithitsunambiguousmeaning

basedontheplainlanguageofthestatute.SeeMcLaughlin,2018ME97,¶9,

189A.3d262.

[¶5] A trialcourt’s “[t]erritorial”criminal jurisdiction is limited to the

sevenbasesforwhich17-AM.R.S.§7(1)provides:

1.Exceptasotherwiseprovidedinthissection,apersonmaybeconvictedunderthelawsofthisStateforanycrimecommitted

3 The judgment and commitment incorrectly reflects that the findingswere reached by jury

verdictratherthanbythecourt’sdetermination,thatSlobodapleadedguiltytothecharge,andthatSlobodawasconvictedofasecondcountofviolatingaconditionofrelease.

4

bytheperson’sownconductorbytheconductofanotherforwhichthepersonislegallyaccountableonlyif:

A.EithertheconductthatisanelementofthecrimeortheresultthatissuchanelementoccurswithinthisStateorhasaterritorialrelationshiptothisState;B. Conduct occurring outside this State constitutes anattempttocommitacrimeunderthelawsofthisStateandtheintentisthatthecrimetakeplacewithinthisState;C. Conduct occurring outside this Statewould constitute acriminalconspiracyunderthelawsofthisState,anovertactinfurtheranceoftheconspiracyoccurswithinthisStateorhasaterritorialrelationshiptothisState,andtheobjectoftheconspiracyisthatacrimetakeplacewithinthisState;D.ConductoccurringwithinthisStateorhavingaterritorialrelationshiptothisStatewouldconstitutecomplicityinthecommissionof, or anattempt, solicitationor conspiracy tocommitanoffenseinanotherjurisdictionthatisalsoacrimeunderthelawofthisState;E. The crime consists of the omission to perform a dutyimposedonapersonbythelawofthisState,regardlessofwherethatpersoniswhentheomissionoccurs;F.ThecrimeisbasedonastatuteofthisStatethatexpresslyprohibitsconductoutsidetheState,whenthepersonknowsorshouldknowthattheperson’sconductaffectsaninterestoftheStateprotectedbythatstatute;orG.Jurisdictionisotherwiseprovidedbylaw.

SeeGinnv.PenobscotCo.,342A.2d270,274(Me.1975)(“Thecourtiscreated

bystatute,andhasthatjurisdictiononlywhichthestatutehasconferredupon

5

it,andthatisalimitedjurisdiction.Ithasnootherauthority.”(quotationmarks

omitted));Statev.Baldwin,305A.2d555,559(Me.1973)(“Itiselementarylaw

thatthestatutesofastatehavenoextra-territorialforce,nordoitscourtshave

any jurisdiction of offenses committed in other states or foreign countries.”

(quotationmarksomitted)).

[¶6]Viewedmostsimply,section7(1)(A)setsoutfouralternativesby

whichaMainecourthassubjectmatterjurisdictioninacriminalmatter:when

(1) conduct that is an element of the crime has a territorial relationship to

Maine,(2)theresultthatisanelementofthecrimehasaterritorialrelationship

toMaine, (3) conduct that is an element of the crime occurred inMaine, or

(4)theresultthatisanelementofthecrimeoccurredinMaine.Thecourtfound

jurisdiction in this matter based specifically on one of the territorial

relationshipalternatives;itdeterminedthatMainehadasufficientnexustothe

crime because the relevant bail condition that Slobodawas alleged to have

violatedwasissuedinMaineastoanunderlyingcrimecommittedinMaine.As

17-AM.R.S. §7(4)states,however, territorial relationship jurisdictionexists

onlywhenitisimpossibletodeterminewheretheconductoccurredinrelation

tothestateboundaryline:

4. Conductor a resulthas a territorial relationship to thisStateifitisnotpossibletodeterminebeyondareasonabledoubt

6

thatitoccurredinsideoroutsideofthisState,becauseaboundarycannotbepreciselylocatedorthelocationofanypersoncannotbeprecisely established in relation to a boundary, and if the courtdeterminesthatthisStatehasasubstantialinterestinprohibitingthe conduct or result. In determining whether this State has asubstantialinterest,thecourtshallconsiderthefollowingfactors:

A.TherelationshiptothisStateoftheactororactorsandofpersons affected by the conduct or result, whether ascitizens,residentsorvisitors;B.Thelocationoftheactororactorsandpersonsaffectedbytheconductorresultpriortoandaftertheconductorresult;C. The place in which other crimes, if any, in the samecriminalepisodewerecommitted;andD. The place inwhich the intent to commit the crimewasformed.

Because,basedon thecourt’ssupported findings, it ispossible todetermine

precisely where Sloboda’s conduct occurred, the territorial relationship of

Sloboda’scrimetoMaineprovidesnobasisforjurisdiction.SeeStatev.Collin,

1997 ME 6, ¶ 10, 687 A.2d 962 (vacating the trial court’s employment of

territorial relationship jurisdiction because therewas no “reasonable doubt

aboutthelocationofaboundaryorthelocationofapersoninrelationtothe

boundary”andnotingthat“[t]hestate’ssubstantialinterestinprohibitingthe

conduct is not sufficient by itself to support a finding of a territorial

7

relationship”).Thecourt’srelianceonterritorialrelationshipjurisdictionwas

thereforeerror.

[¶7] The State argues that, despite this error, we should affirm the

convictionbecausethecourthadjurisdictionpursuanttooneoftheothertwo

alternativesinsection7(1)(A)basedonwheretheconductorresultelement

occurred.Wethereforeconsiderwhatconstitutesaconductelementoraresult

element.

[¶8]Title17-AM.R.S.§32(2020)organizestheelementsofacrimeinto

fourcategories:“theforbiddenconduct;theattendantcircumstancesspecified

in the definition of the crime; the intention, knowledge, recklessness or

negligence as may be required; and any required result.”4 A state-of-mind

element is statutorily definedwith reference to themental processes of the

defendant—i.e.,thedefendant’sawarenessofariskorwhetherthedefendant

hasa “consciousobject.” 17-AM.R.S. §35(2020)(defining“[i]ntentionally,”

“[k]nowingly,” “[r]ecklessly,” and “[c]riminal negligence”). This is

distinguishedfromthe“conduct”categoryofelements,whichistheonlyone

among the four in section 32 that could reasonably be read to refer to the

defendant’sphysicalactions. SeeModelPenalCode§1.13(5)(Am.LawInst.

4Wewillusethephrase“state-of-mind”todiscussthethirdelement.

8

1962)(defining“conduct”as“anactionoromissionanditsaccompanyingstate

ofmind, or, where relevant, a series of acts and omissions”); Conduct, New

OxfordAmericanDictionary(3ded.2010)(statingthat“conduct”means“the

mannerinwhichapersonbehaves”);seealsoStatev.Lindell,2020ME49,¶19,

---A.3d---(concludingthat“thejurywasentitledtointerpret[‘conduct’]within

itscommonmeaning”);Statev.Gladu,2014ME23,¶9,86A.3d1182(stating

that,“asageneralrule,wordsandphrasesthatarenotexpresslydefinedina

statutemustbegiventheirplainandnaturalmeaningandshouldbeconstrued

accordingtotheirnaturalimportincommonandapprovedusage,”including

accordingtodictionarydefinitions(quotationmarksomitted)).

[¶9]Attendantcircumstanceselementsrefertofactorssuchasthestatus

ofadefendant,theageorotherattributesofthevictim,ortheexistenceofprior

convictionsthatincreasetheclassofacrime.SeeStatev.Sumulikoski,110A.3d

856, 858, 862-64 (N.J. 2015) (holding that the fact that the defendant had

assumed responsibility for the victims as chaperone for a school trip

constituted an attendant circumstance rather than conduct, and defining

“status” as “a person’s legal condition, whether personal or proprietary; the

sumtotalofaperson’slegalrights,duties,liabilities,andotherlegalrelations”

(alteration omitted) (quotation marks omitted)); Attendant, New Oxford

9

American Dictionary (3d ed. 2010) (“occurring with or as a result of;

accompanying”);Circumstance,NewOxfordAmericanDictionary(3ded.2010)

(“afactorconditionconnectedwithorrelevanttoaneventoraction”).

[¶10]Astotheresultelement,17-AM.R.S.§33(2020)provides,“Unless

otherwiseprovided,whencausingaresultisanelementofacrime,causation

maybefoundwhentheresultwouldnothaveoccurredbutfortheconductof

the defendant, operating either alone or concurrently with another cause.”

Thus,aresultelementisonethatrequiresthedefendanttohavecausedsome

specifiedharmorotheroutcome.SeeResult,NewOxfordAmericanDictionary

(3ded.2010)(“aconsequence,effect,oroutcomeofsomething”).

[¶11] Interpreting section7(1)(A) against thebackdropof section32

reveals that not all elements of a crime are relevant to jurisdiction. Only

conductelementsandresultelementsaffectsubjectmatterjurisdiction;ifonly

an attendant circumstances element or a state-of-mind element occurs in

Maine,Mainehasnojurisdictionpursuanttosection7(1)(A).Forexample,ifa

defendantwithaMainefelonyconvictionthenobtainedpossessionofafirearm

in New Hampshire, Maine would not have jurisdiction over the crime

committedby the defendantbecauseonly thedefendant’sunderlying felony

status—theattendantcircumstance—occurredinMaine.

10

[¶12]Inordertodeterminewhichelementsofthecrimeofviolatinga

conditionofreleaseshouldbeconsideredindeterminingMaine’sjurisdiction,

wedetermineinwhichcategory—conduct,result,state-of-mind,andattendant

circumstances—those elements belong. Violation of a condition of release

requiresproofthatthedefendantisonpreconvictionorpostconvictionbailat

the time that he or she “in fact, violates a condition of release.” 15 M.R.S.

§1092(1)(2020);seeStatev.LeBlanc-Simpson,2018ME109,¶17,190A.3d

1015.ItisaClassCcrimewhentheunderlyingchargeonwhichthedefendant

wasbailedwas“punishablebyamaximumperiodofimprisonmentofoneyear

ormoreandtheconditionofreleaseviolatedisonespecifiedinsection1026,

subsection3,paragraphA, subparagraph(5), (8), (10-A)or (13).” 15M.R.S.

§1092(1)(B). Violation of a condition of release is a strict liability crime,

15M.R.S.§1092(3),meaningnoproofofaculpablestateofmindisrequired,

but theStatemust establish that thedefendant “hadprior knowledgeof the

relevantconditionsofrelease.”LeBlanc-Simpson,2018ME109,¶18,190A.3d

1015.

[¶13]Asdiscussedabove,theStatechargedSlobodawithaviolationof

aconditionofreleasebasedonitsallegationsthat(1)Slobodawassubjectto

preconvictionbailonNovember25,2018,thatrequiredhimtohavenocontact

11

with certain individuals; (2) the underlying bail was for a burglary charge

(ClassB),17-AM.R.S.§401(1)(B)(4)(2020),punishablebyuptotenyearsin

prison, see17-AM.R.S. § 1252(2)(B) (2018); and (3)heviolated thebail by

havingcontactwithoneoftheprohibitedindividuals.Twooftheseelements—

that Slobodawas subject to apreconvictionbail conditiononNovember25,

2018,thatrequiredhimtohavenocontactwithaparticularindividual,andthat

theunderlyingchargeonwhichhewasbailedwasforburglary,punishableby

up to ten years in prison—constitute attendant circumstances elements

pursuanttosection32.15M.R.S.§1092(1)(B).TherequirementthatSloboda

hadpriorknowledgethathewassubjecttothatconditionofreleaseiseithera

state-of-mindelementoranattendantcircumstanceselement,butweneednot

determinewhichbecausethefactthathisknowledgeoftheconditionmayhave

occurredinMaineisirrelevanttoajurisdictionanalysispursuanttotheplain

languageofsection7(1)(A).See17-AM.R.S.§32.

[¶14]TheconductelementinSloboda’scrimeistheactofhavingcontact

withthevictim,andthecourtfound,basedoncompetentrecordevidence,that

suchconductoccurredonlyinNewHampshire.Thus,thelocationofSloboda’s

conductisnobasisforthecourt’sjurisdictioninMaine.

12

[¶15]Theonlyremainingsourceofjurisdiction—andthealternativeto

which theparties dedicate their arguments—is if the crimeof violationof a

conditionofreleaserequiresproofofaresultelementandthatresultoccurred

inMaine.517-AM.R.S.§7(1)(A).

[¶16]TheStatecontendsthataresultelementexistsintherequirement

thatSloboda’scontactwiththevictim“infact,violatesaconditionofrelease,”

inMaine.Thatis,theStatearguesthatalthoughthedefendant’sconductwas

thecontactwiththevictiminNewHampshire,theresultwasabailviolationin

MainebecauseSlobodawasnotsubjecttoabailorderinNewHampshireand

5 Section7containsadditionallimitationsapplicabletojurisdictionbasedonthelocationofa

resultthatisanelement:

2.Subsection1,paragraphAdoesnotapplyif:A.Causingaparticularresultordangerofcausingthatresultisanelementandtheresultoccursorisdesignedorlikelytooccuronlyinanotherjurisdictionwheretheconductchargedwouldnotconstituteanoffense;orB.CausingaparticularresultisanelementofthecrimeandtheresultiscausedbyconductoccurringoutsidetheStatewhichwouldnotconstituteanoffenseiftheresulthadoccurredthere.

17-AM.R.S.§7(2)(2020).Bytheseexclusions,Mainehasnojurisdictionifabailviolation“wouldnotconstituteanoffense”inNewHampshire. 17-AM.R.S.§7(2)(A)-(B). Theseexclusionsdonotapply in the instant matter because violating a bail condition is an offense in New Hampshire.AlthoughitisnotacrimepursuanttoNewHampshirestatute,theNewHampshireSupremeCourthasheldthatviolatingabailconditionconstitutescriminalcontempt,whichisacommonlawcrimepunishableby finesor imprisonment. Statev.Smith,35A.3d646,649-50(N.H.2011)(“WehaveexpresslyrejectedtheargumentthatcontemptisnotacrimesimplybecauseitisnotdefinedintheCriminalCode.”);Statev.Nott,821A.2d976,978(N.H.2003)(holdingthat“violationofabailorder”constitutes“criminalcontempt”);Statev.Martina,600A.2d132,137-38(N.H.1991)(requiringthattheStatemustprovecriminalcontemptbeyondareasonabledoubtandnotingthat theresulting“impositionofafineorimprisonmentispunitiveratherthanremedial”(quotationmarksomitted)).

13

itwasMaine’sbailorderthatSloboda“infact,violate[d]”byhavingcontactwith

the victim. 15M.R.S. §1092(1). Contrary to the State’s assertion, however,

section1092(1)(B)hasnoresultelement.Aswehavealreadyconcluded,the

fact that the defendantwas on preconviction or postconviction bail is not a

result element. It is instead an attendant circumstance element. Thus, the

State’s argument fails because jurisdiction cannot be conveyed pursuant to

section 7(1)(A) based on the locus of an attendant circumstance. See

Sumulikoski,110A.3dat862(“[A]defendant’sstatusalonedoesnotprovidea

basisforjurisdiction.”).

[¶17]Althoughtherearemyriadcriminalstatutesthatexpresslyrequire

proofofaparticularharmorresultcausedbythedefendant,6theplainlanguage

ofsection1092(1)(B)doesnotrequireanyparticularharm.Therequirement

in section 1092(1)(B) that Sloboda “in fact, violates a condition of release”

refersboth to theconduct element,which, it isundisputed,occurred inNew

6 See,e.g.,17-AM.R.S.§201(1)(A)(2020)(definingmurder to include“caus[ing] thedeathof

anotherhumanbeing”);17-AM.R.S.§454(1)(A)(2020)(including,asanelementoftamperingwithawitness,thatthedefendant“[i]nducesorotherwisecauses...awitness...[t]otestifyorinforminamannertheactorknowstobefalse”);17-AM.R.S.§501-A(1)(A)(1)(2020)(statingthatonemeansofcommittingdisorderlyconductisby“caus[ing]annoyancetoothersbyintentionally...[m]akingloudandunreasonablenoises”);17-AM.R.S.§703(1)(B)(2020)(settingouttheelementsofforgery,includingthatthedefendant“causesanother,bydeception,tosignorexecuteawritteninstrument”);17-AM.R.S.§805(1)(C)(2020)(providing,asanelementofaggravatedcriminalmischief,thatthedefendant’s act “thereby causes a substantial interruption or impairment of [gas, water,transportation,etc.]servicerenderedtothepublic”);17-AM.R.S.§1002-A(1)(A)(2020)(statingthatthecriminaluseoflaserpointersiscommittedwhen,interalia,thedefendant’suseofalaserpointer“[c]ausesbodilyinjuryto[an]otherperson”).

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Hampshire,andtotheattendantcircumstanceselement,whichcannotconfer

jurisdiction.

[¶18]Pursuanttotheunambiguouslanguageofsection7(1)(A),onlythe

occurrenceof the conductor the result elements inMainewill affordMaine

jurisdiction. BecauseSloboda’sconductoccurredinNewHampshireandhis

offensecontainsnoresultelement, section7(1)(A)providesnobasis for the

court’sexerciseofsubjectmatterjurisdictionoverSloboda’sprosecution.This

conclusionisalsoconsistentwiththeholdinginCollin,inwhichthedefendant

wasconvictedoftheftbyreceivingstolenpropertythatbelongedtoavictim

fromMaine.1997ME6,¶¶2-4,687A.2d962.Althoughthedefendantacted

onlyinCanada,theStatearguedthatMainehadjurisdictiontoprosecutehim

becausetheresultofthetheftwastodepriveaMainecompanyofitsproperty.

Id.¶¶3,11.Wedeclinedtoapplysection7(1)(A)becausetheassertedresult—

losstothevictim—wasnotanelementofthecrimeoftheftbyreceivingstolen

property,and,therefore,thefactthatthevictimwasinMainewas“irrelevant.”7

Collin,1997ME6,¶11,687A.2d962.

7Thisisunliketheanalysisemployedinthosestateswhosestatutesprovideforjurisdictionwhen

theresultoccursinthatstatebutthatdonotrequirethattheresultbeanelementofthecrime.InArizona, for example, the legislature has “maximize[d] the reach of its criminal jurisdiction byomitting the restriction that the result occurring within the state must be an element of theoffense.Thus,underArizonalaw,if[thedefendant’s]conducthadadirecteffectinArizona,Arizonacanassertjurisdiction.”Statev.Flores,188P.3d706,713(Ariz.Ct.App.2008)(emphasisomitted)(citationomitted)(quotationmarksomitted).

15

[¶19]Wealsodiscernnobasisforthecourt’sexerciseofjurisdictionin

the other subdivisions of section 7. In particular, the AttorneyGeneral and

AEquitas,asamici,suggestthatthecourthadjurisdictionpursuanttosection

7(1)(E),whichapplieswhen“[t]hecrimeconsistsoftheomissiontoperforma

duty imposedona personby the lawof this State, regardlessofwhere that

personiswhentheomissionoccurs.”8Byitsplainlanguage,an“omission”is“a

failuretodosomething.” Omission,NewOxfordAmericanDictionary(3ded.

2010).Theessenceoftheamici’sargumentisthatSlobodafailedtoperform

hislegaldutytocomplywiththebailorderbyaffirmativelyactinginviolation

of thebailorder. Thisattemptedapplicationofsection7(1)(E) toSloboda’s

prosecutionis,however,anexerciseinsemanticgymnastics.

8Wenotethatneitherofthepartiesthemselvespresentedanargumentrelatingto17-AM.R.S.

§7(1)(E)(2020),eitherinthetrialcourtorinthisappeal,andonlytwooftheamicihavedonesohere. Ordinarily,wewill recognizeacontentionraisedbyanamicuscuriaeonly ifthe issuewasraisedinthetrialcourtandatleastoneofthepartiesalsopursuestheargumentonappeal.SeeRossv.AcadianSeaplants,Ltd.,2019ME45,¶5n.2,206A.3d283;Jacobsv.Jacobs,507A.2d596,597n.1(Me.1986).Jurisdictionalquestionsarenothamperedbythesepreservationprinciples,however,becausejurisdictionisfoundational.See,e.g.FordMotorCo.v.Darling’s,2014ME7,¶41,86A.3d35(statingthat“theissueofjurisdictionmayberaisedatanytimeinaproceeding,includingsuaspontebythisCourt”);GuardianshipofGabrielW.,666A.2d505,507-08(Me.1995)(“Lackofsubjectmatterjurisdictionmayberaisedatanytime,includingincollateralproceedingswhenlackofsubjectmatterjurisdictionappearsonthefaceoftherecordofthejudgmentattacked.”(citationomitted));Pedersonv.Cole,501A.2d23,25n.2(Me.1985)(“Thedefenseoflackofsubject-matterjurisdictionmayberaisedatanytime,evensuaspontebyanappellatecourt.”);Moodyv.PortClydeDev.Co.,102Me.365,384,66A.967(1907)(“Theveryfoundationofjudicialproceedingsisjurisdiction.Thequestionofjurisdictionmay therefore be raised at any stage of the proceedings by any suggestion thatwillapprisethecourtofthewantthereof.”).Here,giventhatwecouldnoticeandresolvejurisdictionalissuesevenifnototherwiseraisedatall,andgiventhattheamicihavepresentedargumentregardingsection7(1)(E)throughanestablishedproceduralmechanism,seeM.R.App.P.7A(e),weconsiderthatargument.

16

[¶20]WerejectedasimilarapproachinStatev.Branch-Wear,inwhich

the defendant was convicted of tampering with a victim by preventing her

daughterfromtestifyinginaprosecution.1997ME110,¶¶2-6,695A.2d1169.

Thedefendantargued that theStatehad impermissiblyprosecutedher fora

crimeofomissionforfailingtomeetherlegalobligationofproducingthechild

atthetrial.Id.¶8.Wecharacterizedthedefendant’sargumentas“aplayon

words,” noting that the “failures to act” that the defendant described were

instead“actsofevasion...anddeceit...thatcausedherdaughtertowithhold

testimony.”Id.¶¶8,10(“TheStateand[thedefendant]arelookingatthesame

conduct. Theyaresimplydescribingitdifferently.”). Weconcludedthatthe

State had “presented evidence of a crime of commission, not voluntary

omission,” in the defendant’s efforts to keep the child from reaching the

courthouse.Id.¶10.

[¶21] The crimes of omission to which section 7(1)(E) might apply

instead include the failure to pay taxes or child support due in Maine, for

example—instances of criminal nonfeasance rather than any affirmative

criminal act. SeeModel Penal Code& Commentaries §1.03 cmt. 5 at 52-53

(Am.LawInst.1985);cf.Lindell,2020ME49,¶25,---A.3d---(concludingthat

17

thedefendant’saffirmativeconductinfalsifyingtaxreturnsinMaineallowed

theMainecourtjurisdictionoverhisprosecutionpursuanttosection7(1)(A)).

[¶22]Ourdecisiontodayisentirelyafunctionofourconstructionand

applicationofthejurisdictionalstatuteastheLegislaturehasenactedit. For

thereasonswehavediscussed,throughitsenactments,theLegislaturehasnot

conferredMaine’scourtswithauthoritytoadjudicatethechargefiledagainst

Sloboda. In the absence of any basis for the court’s exercise of jurisdiction

pursuanttosection7(1),Sloboda’sconvictioncannotstand.9

[¶23] ContrarytotheState’ssuggestion,however,ourconclusionthat

Maine lacks jurisdiction to prosecute Sloboda on a charge of violating a

condition of release for his conduct in NewHampshire does not altogether

depriveMaineofameansofenforcingitsbailconditions.Bailconditionsare

imposed “inorder to reasonably ensure the appearanceof the defendant as

required,tootherwisereasonablyensuretheintegrityofthejudicialprocess

and, when applicable, to reasonably ensure the safety of others in the

community.”15M.R.S.§1002(2020).Where,ashere,adefendantviolatesbail

conditions—eveninNewHampshire—Maineisfreetoinitiatebailrevocation

proceedings andask that thedefendantbeheldpending trial. See15M.R.S.

9BecauseweagreewithSlobodathatthetrialcourtlackedsubjectmatterjurisdiction,wedonot

addressSloboda’schallengetothesufficiencyoftheevidencesupportinghisconviction.

18

§§1095-1097 (2020). Moreover, when a defendant’s violation of a bail

condition constitutes a new criminal act—if, for example, Sloboda had

assaultedtheprotectedindividual—thatnewcriminalactcouldbeprosecuted

as such in the appropriate jurisdiction. This, however, does not change the

conclusionthat,aswritten,theunambiguousprovisionsofsection7(1)donot

giveMainecourtssubjectmatterjurisdictioninthiscase.Forustoconclude

otherwise,wewouldberequiredtorewritethestatute,andthatwecannotdo.

Theentryis:

Judgment vacated. Remanded for entry ofdismissaloftheindictment.

HORTON,J.,withwhomJABARandCONNORS,JJ.,join,dissenting.

[¶24] I respectfully dissent from the Court’s conclusion that the trial

courtlackedstatutoryjurisdictiontoconvictEmanuelJ.Slobodaforviolating

theno-contactbailcondition.Iwouldaffirmtheconvictionbasedonthecourt’s

jurisdictionover the subjectmatter andSloboda’sperson, andbasedon the

sufficiencyoftheevidencetoprovetheallegedviolationbeyondareasonable

doubt.

19

[¶25]JurisdictionexistedbecauseSloboda’sfailuretocomplywithhis

conditionsofreleasefellwithinthestatutoryprovisionconferringjurisdiction

ontheMainecourtstoconvictadefendantofacrimeif“[t]hecrimeconsistsof

theomissiontoperformadutyimposedonapersonbythelawofthisState,

regardless of where that person is when the omission occurs,” 17-A M.R.S.

§7(1)(E)(2020);see15M.R.S.§1092(2020).10

[¶26] Thebail codeauthorizesMainecourts to imposeuponcriminal

defendants the duty to comply with conditions of release. See 15 M.R.S.

§1026(1), (3)(A) (2020) (authorizing imposition of conditions of release);

15M.R.S. § 1092 (criminalizing the failure to comply with conditions of

release). Thatdutyis“imposedonaperson”forpurposesofsection7(1)(E)

whenacourtwithjurisdictionoverthepersonissuesabailbond,commitment

order,andconditions-of-releaseformconsistentwith15M.R.S.§1026(2020).

Asistypicallytrueofadutyimposedbycourtorder,Sloboda’sdutytocomply

10AlthoughIconcludethatthecourthadjurisdiction,Idosoondifferentgroundsthanthetrial

court.SeeBouchardv.Frost,2004ME9,¶8,840A.2d109(“[W]ecanaffirmajudgmentonrationaledifferent than that relied on by the [trial c]ourt.”). I therefore do not address the trial court’sconclusion that it had jurisdiction based on a “territorial relationship” between the results ofSloboda’sconductandtheStateofMaine.See17-AM.R.S.§7(1)(A),(4)(2020).Inaddition,becauseIconcludethatthecourthadjurisdictiontoconvictSlobodapursuantto17-AM.R.S.§7(1)(E)(2020),IneednotaddresstheState’scontentionthattheresultofSloboda’soffenseoccurredinMaineandthecourtthereforehadjurisdictionpursuantto17-AM.R.S.§7(1)(A).ButIwouldnotforeclosethepossibilitythatsection7(1)(A)wasintendedtoencompassresultsinherentinoffensesthatdonotspecify a certain harm. See, e.g., Brehm v. State, 558 N.E.2d 906, 907-09 (Ind. Ct. App. 1990)(discussingastatutewithsubstantivelyidentical“result”languageandreachingaconclusionsimilartotheoneurgedbytheStateinthiscase).

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with his bail conditions, which was imposed by a court having personal

jurisdictionoverhim,11continuedtoapplyregardlessofwherehewas,within

themeaningofsection7(1)(E).SeeCommonwealthv.Maguigan,511A.2d1327,

1332(Pa.1986)(explainingthatacriminalcourt’spersonaljurisdictionover

anabsentdefendantincludestheauthoritytocompelthedefendanttoreturn

fortrial). TheCourt’sobservationthattheStatecouldorshouldhavefileda

motion to revoke Sloboda’s bail instead of prosecuting him implicitly

acknowledges that his duty to comply with bail conditions applied outside

Maine—otherwise,therewouldbenobasisfortheStatetomovetorevokebail.

SeeCourt’sOpinion¶23.

[¶27] The bail bond that Sloboda signed included the following

provision:“Asaconditionofmyrelease,Ishallcomplywithanycondition(s)

setforthontheConditionsofReleaseform.”12Theattachedcommitmentorder

andconditions-of-releaseformincludedaconditionprohibitingcontactwitha

specific person. The court found, based on competent evidence admitted

11“Itiswellsettledthata[criminal]courthaspersonaljurisdictionoveranypartywhoappears

beforeit,regardlessofhowhisappearancewasobtained.”UnitedStatesv.Lussier,929F.2d25,27(1stCir.1991).12 In signing the bail bond, Sloboda also acknowledged: “I agree to obey the following

conditionsofmyreleasesolongasthisbailbondremainsineffect.Iunderstandthatitisacrimeformetoviolateanyoftheseconditions,andthatifIviolatetheseconditionsIwillbesubjecttoarrest,jailand/orafine.”(Italicemphasisadded.)

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during a trial, that Sloboda failed to comply with the no-contact condition.

Pursuant to the plain language of section 7(1)(E), Sloboda’s conduct

constitutedan“omissiontoperform”hisdutyofcompliance.See,e.g.,Statev.

Conroy,2020ME22,¶19,225A.3d1011(“Welookfirsttotheplainlanguage

ofthestatutetodetermineitsmeaningifwecandosowhileavoidingabsurd,

illogical,orinconsistentresults.”).

[¶28]Focusingontheaffirmativeactconstitutingthebailviolation,the

Courtconcludes,tothecontrary,thatSloboda’sconductcouldnotconstitutean

“omission”toperformadutywithinthemeaningofsection7(1)(E):

The essence of [the argument that jurisdiction exists undersection7(1)(E)]isthatSlobodafailedtoperformhislegaldutytocomplywiththebailorderbyaffirmativelyactinginviolationofthebail order. This attempted application of section 7(1)(E) toSloboda’s prosecution is, however, an exercise in semanticgymnastics.

Court’sOpinion¶19.TheCourtnotesthat“[t]hecrimesofomissiontowhich

section7(1)(E)might apply instead include the failure topay taxesor child

supportdueinMaine,forexample—instancesofcriminalnonfeasancerather

thananyaffirmativecriminalact.”Court’sOpinion¶21.

[¶29]TheCourt’sconclusionisinconsistentwiththelanguageofthebail

code.Thebailcodedefinesalloftheconditionsofreleasethatitauthorizesin

mandatory terms so as to create an affirmative duty to comply with all

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conditions of release, even when the substantive effect of a condition is

prohibitory.13See15M.R.S.§1026(3)(A)(1)-(19).Indeed,theimpositionofa

no-contactconditionsuchastheoneinthiscaserequiresadefendantto

[a]voidall contactwith a victimof the alleged crime, apotentialwitness regarding the alleged crime orwith any other family orhouseholdmembersof thevictimor thedefendantor tocontactthoseindividualsonlyatcertaintimesorundercertainconditions.

15M.R.S.§1026(3)(A)(5)(emphasisadded).

[¶30] Thus, the bail code defines conditions of release as affirmative

mandates.Afailuretocomplywithabailcondition—evenafailurethattakes

the form of an affirmative act—must therefore constitute an “omission to

perform a duty” for purposes of section 7(1)(E).14 See State v. Jones,

13 For example, conditions that restrict residence or travel, impose a curfew, or prohibit

possessionof firearmsarealldefined inmandatoryrather thanprohibitory terms. See15M.R.S.§1026(3)(A)(4)(2020)(“Abidebyspecifiedrestrictionsonpersonalassociations,placeofabodeortravel”); 15 M.R.S. § 1026(3)(A)(7) (2020) (“Comply with a specified curfew”); 15 M.R.S.§1026(3)(A)(8)(2020)(“Refrainfrompossessingafirearmorotherdangerousweapon”).TheplaineffectoftheLegislature’schosenphrasingistocreateaffirmativedutiesofcompliance,suchthatafailuretocomplyisanomissiontoperformamandatedduty.14 ThisconclusionisconsistentwithourdecisioninStatev.Damon,317A.2d459(Me.1974).

There,weequated theaffirmativeactof “[e]scapeof furlough”with the“wilful failure toresumephysicalconfinementattheMaineStatePrison.” Id.at460-61. Courtsinotherjurisdictionshavealsoheld,inothercontexts,thatdefendantsomittedtoperformlegaldutiesbyactingaffirmatively,asopposedtobyfailingtoact.TheDistrictCourtofAppealofFlorida,forexample,concludedthatthe state had jurisdiction to convict a defendant of the affirmative criminal act of identity theftbecausethecrimeconstitutedanomissiontoperformadutytoobtainconsentfromthevictim.SeeStatev.Roberts,143So.3d936,936-39(Fla.Dist.Ct.App.2014);seealsoCommonwealthv.Thompson,50N.E.3d 845, 857-58 (Mass. App. Ct. 2016) (examining credit card fraud, discussing similarprinciples,anddecidingthesame);Statev.James,79P.3d169,173-77(Kan.2003)(concludingthatthestatehadjurisdictionwherethedefendantviolatedadutytorefrainfrommistreatingdependentadultsbyleavingthevictimsinahotcar,causingtheirdeaths).TheFloridacourtalsoconcludedthatthestatehadjurisdictiontoconvictadefendantofacrimeprohibitingtheremovalofchildrenfrom

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673P.2d455,456(Kan.Ct.App.1983)(notingthatastatuteextendingcriminal

jurisdiction to the omission to perform a duty imposed on a person by law

regardlessoftheperson’s location“codifiesthecommonlawprinciplethata

personmaycommitacrimewithinthisstatewhileremainingoutsideit,and

suchcrimemaybeanactofomissionaswellasanactofcommission”(emphasis

added)).

[¶31] The Court’s focus on the affirmative nature of Sloboda’s bail

violationasthesolebasisforitsconclusionthatsection7(1)(E)doesnotconfer

jurisdiction implies a view that section7(1)(E)would apply if Sloboda’sbail

violationconsistedofafailuretoact.Court’sOpinion¶¶19-21.Inthatcase,

section 7(1)(E) would confer jurisdiction to prosecute out-of-state bail

violationsinvolvinginactionbythedefendant,suchasfailingtonotifythecourt

of an address change or to take medications as prescribed, but would not

authorizeprosecutionofout-of-stateviolationssuchashavingcontactwithan

allegedvictimorcommittinganewcrime.

thestateinviolationofacourtorder,wherethedefendant’saffirmativeactsinviolationoftheorderoccurredentirelyoutsideofthestate.Statev.Costa,558So.2d525,526(Fla.Dist.Ct.App.1990)(citingaterritorialapplicabilitystatuteprovidingthat“[a]noffensethatisbasedonanomissiontoperformadutyimposedbythelawofthisstateiscommittedwithinthestate,regardlessofthelocationoftheoffenderatthetimeoftheomission”(quotationmarksomitted));see,e.g.,Peoplev.Caruso,519N.E.2d 440, 442-46 (Ill. 1987) (concluding that a child abduction crime that prohibited“violat[ing]...avalidcourtorder...byconcealingordetaining[a]childorremoving[a]childfromthejurisdictionofthecourt”was“basedonanomissiontoperformadutyimposedbythelawofthisState”(quotationmarksomitted)).

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[¶32]Butnothingineitherthebailcodeorsection7(1)(E)indicatesthat

the Legislature intended to confer jurisdiction over violations of some

conditionsofreleasebutnotviolationsofotherconditionsofrelease,andthere

wouldbenocogentbasisfortheLegislaturetodrawthatdistinction.15Infact,

itistheviolationsinvolvingaffirmativeactsthatcanresultindirectandeven

lethal harm to victims, witnesses, and others. The Legislature cannot have

intendedtoconferjurisdictiontoprosecuteanout-of-stateviolationconsisting

of failure to take medications or to report an address change but not to

prosecute an out-of-state violation consisting of contact (orworse)with an

allegedvictim,aco-defendant,orawitness.

[¶33] Atoral argument, evenSlobodaagreed that adefendant canbe

prosecutedforabailviolationinMainebasedonwhollyout-of-statecriminal

15Nordoesthelegislativehistorysuggestsuchaninterpretation.Section7(1)(E)incorporates

languagepresentinsection1.03oftheModelPenalCode. See17-AM.R.S.§7(1)(E);ModelPenalCode & Commentaries § 1.03(1)(e) (Am. Law Inst. 1985) (providing for jurisdictionwhere “theoffenseconsistsoftheomissiontoperformalegaldutyimposedbythelawofthisStatewithrespecttodomicile,residenceorarelationshiptoaperson,thingortransactionintheState”(emphasisadded)).Section1.03“propose[d]broadjurisdictionalbases,withinthelimitsofdueprocess,”based“[o]nthepremise[s]thatitisparticularlydesirableinafederatedstatetoincreasejurisdictionaloptionsandthatifastate’sassertionofjurisdictiondoesnotresultinunfairnesstothepersoncharged,thestateshould be accorded jurisdiction over all those who engage in conduct that affects the state’sinterests.”ModelPenalCode&Commentaries§1.03explanatorynote(Am.LawInst.1985).Giventhe express notice to Sloboda that he would be subject to prosecution if he violated any of theconditionsofhisrelease,andthedetrimentaleffectofthebailviolationwithinMaine,jurisdictiontoconvictSlobodainMainedoesnotpresentfairnessconcerns.SeeStrassheimv.Daily,221U.S.280,284-85(1911);UnitedStatesv.Woodward,149F.3d46,66&n.11(1stCir.1998);Statev.Vetrano,121Me.368,380,117A.460(1922).

25

conductcommittedwhileonbail.16Hisacknowledgmentissignificantbecause

a condition prohibiting criminal conduct is no different, for purposes of

section7(1)(E),fromaconditionprohibitingcontactwithaspecificperson.See

State v.West, 512 N.W.2d 207, 208-09 (Wis. Ct. App. 1993) (holding that a

defendantwhoviolatedaWisconsinbailorderbycommittingacrimeinOhio

could be prosecuted inWisconsin for the crime of “bail jumping”); see also

15M.R.S.§1026(1)(providingthat“[e]veryorderforthepretrialreleaseofany

defendantmustinclude...thecondition[]thatthedefendantrefrainfromnew

criminalconduct”).

[¶34] The Court’s interpretation means that defendants whose bail

conditionsprohibitthemfromhavingcontactwithout-of-stateallegedvictims,

co-defendants, or witnesses; from possession of firearms or dangerous

weapons;fromconsumingalcoholicbeverages;fromoperatingmotorvehicles;

fromaccessingtheInternet;orfromengaginginanyothernon-criminalactivity

can circumvent prosecution simply by violating those conditions in another

16Slobodagavethefollowingexample:“Sayit’sadomesticcase,andsomeparentneglectstheir

child. They’reprosecuted inNewHampshire . . . .They’reconvicted. You take thatconviction toMaineandthenyouprosecutethemundertheMainebailorderandsay,‘See,youdidn’tfollowyourMainebailorder;youwereconvictedofacrime.’”InresponsetoaquestionaboutwhethertheStatecouldenforcebailconditionsbymovingtorevokebail,Slobodareplied,“Ofcourse,orbyprovingthathehadcontactinRochester[NewHampshire];NewHampshiregivesfullfaithandcredittotheMaineorder;he’sconvictedofviolatingalegalorderinNewHampshire;youtakethatcertifiedconvictiontoMaine,andthenprosecutehim.”

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jurisdiction.ToprotecttheState’sabilitytoprosecutebailviolations,itwould

beunderstandableforprosecutorstoaskmorefrequentlyforbailconditions

prohibitingdefendants from leaving theStateofMaine,although theCourt’s

interpretationnowcalls intoquestionwhetheradefendantsubjecttosucha

conditioncouldbeprosecutedforleavingthestate.

[¶35] Finally, beyond the bail context, the Court’s interpretation of

section7(1)(E)alsocallsintoquestionwhetheradefendantwhoaffirmatively

violatesaMaineprotectionordercanbeprosecutedifthedefendantandthe

plaintiffarebothoutsidethestateatthetime.See17-AM.R.S.§506-B(2020);

see also 5 M.R.S. § 4659(1) (2020); 15 M.R.S. § 321(6) (2020); 19-AM.R.S.

§4011(1),(4)(2020).Iftheorderwereaqualifyingprotectionorder,thefull

faithandcreditprovisionoftheUnitedStatesCodewouldauthorizethestate

in which the violation occurred to prosecute, see 18 U.S.C.S. § 2265

(LEXISthrough Pub. L. No. 116-149), but that state might not, and Maine

definitelycouldnotundertheCourt’sinterpretation.

[¶36] For these reasons, I would affirm, because the court had

jurisdictionandtherecordevidencewassufficienttosupporttheconviction.

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Harry Center, Esq. (orally), Woodman Edmands Danylik Austin Smith &Jacques,P.A.,Biddeford,forappellantEmanuelJ.SlobodaKathryn Loftus Slattery, District Attorney, and Andrew E. Berggren, Esq.(orally),ProsecutorialDistrict#1,Alfred,forappelleeStateofMaineAaronM.Frey,AttorneyGeneral,andLauraA.Yustak,Asst.Atty.Gen.,OfficeoftheAttorneyGeneral,Augusta,foramicuscuriaeOfficeoftheMaineAttorneyGeneralJeffGoldman,Esq.,Morgan,Lewis&BockiusLLP,Boston,Massachusetts, foramicuscuriaeAEquitasLawrenceC.Winger,amicuscuriaeproseYorkCountyUnifiedCriminalDocketdocketnumberCR-2018-1073FORCLERKREFERENCEONLY