SOUTH CENTRAL RAILWAY

VIGILVIGILVIGILVIGIL

QUARTERLY SAFETY BULLETIN NO.3

SEPTEMBER - 2013

Sl. No

Section Subject Page No.

1 A Knowledge – Extracts of Railway Board letters

1-12

2 B Important Rules – BWM instructions on procedure for obtaining line clear through control phone/VHF set

13-17

3 C Details of Amendment Slips

18

4 D Checklist – Diesel Traction

19

5 E Accident Cases 20-24 6 F Test your knowledge

with key 25-26

8 G Safety Drives Launched

27-34

9 H Accident Statistics 35

INDEX

My dear Railwaymen

The safety performance during the last two quarters recorded a slight improvement over last year. However, following areas have deteriorated when compared to the same period of previous year. This is a cause for concern. · Accidents on SC Division increased by 133% (from 3

to 7). · Accidents over GTL Division increased by 50% (from

2 to 4). · Overall yard accidents increased by 38%. · Two Averted Collisions against ‘NIL’ last year; one

over GTL & one over NED Division. · UMLC accidents remain same, i.e., 4 against 4. · SPAD cases also remain same, i.e., 2 against 2.

More than 80% of the above accidents are majorly due to human failures. It is concerning to note that inspite of spreading safety awareness at all levels; the human failures continue to occur. I, once again urge one and all to be alert all the time and follow the laid down instructions and rules to prevent human failures.

FOREWORD

In this direction, this Quarterly Safety Bulletin “VIGIL” will be of much help in updating your knowledge in day-to-day working with regard to various Railway Board letters, important rules, latest amendments to manuals, checklist, test your knowledge quiz with key, safety drives launched, details of accidents / unusual and statistics for the quarter ending September 2013.

(S. P. SAHU) CHIEF SAFETY OFFICER

1

No.2013/Safety-1/37 Date: 10.07.2013

During the present monsoon, precautions may be taken and an alert issued to all divisions to prevent accidents due to cyclonic storm, heavy rains, landslides etc,. During the drive alert emphasis should be laid on the following:-

1) Keeping a special watch on the overloading in open box wagons due to accumulation of water during the rains.

2) Creation of monsoon reserve wherever required as per Railway Board instructions.

3) Drainage in yards. 4) Failure of track circuiting due to water logging. 5) Monsoon patrolling in the identified and vulnerable sections

and posting of stationary watchmen at vulnerable locations. 6) Trimming of tree branches infringing track, OHE and

affecting signal visibility. 7) Functioning of wipers and sanding gear including filling of

sand on locomotives, EMUs and DMUs. 8) Special precautions in areas prone to land slide, Hill slip,

Boulder falling etc,. Adequate measures may be taken when the advance warning

form Indian Meteorological department is received about cyclonic storms, deep depression and heavy rain fall etc,.

After the completion of drive a compliance report may be

furnished to board showing details of abnormalities found and action taken to remove deficiencies.

Member Traffic Railway Board

Section “A” KNOWLEDGE Extracts of Railway Board letters

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No.2010/Safety (A&R)/26/7 Date: 15.07.2013 Sub: Policy for dispensation of emergency sockets

working on Indian Railways. Ref: GM/SCR letter No.SG.215.A.Vol.12 dated

13.08.13. Reference above, the matter regarding dispensation of

emergency sockets provided at every KM in the section on Quad/RE cable has been examined by Telecom Directorate. The views of Telecom directorate are as under: 1. EC socket may be dispensed with when the complete section

(end to end) is fully covered with MTRC (Mobile Train Radio Communication).

2. Quad cable will be continued to be required for reliable LC Gate communication, Control Communication & BPAC backup etc., to achieve 100% availability as per vision 2020 document & also to facilitate maintenance of block circuits without taking any blocks.

3. S C Railway may be advised to propose MTRC works in section Ballarshah – Kazipet – Secunderabad – Vijayawada - Gudur in WP 2014-15 to ensure the provision of MTRC on “A”,’B” &”C” routes as per RSRC recommendations.”

Safety Directorate is also of the view that unless there is 100%

reliable communication available between the Loco Pilot/Guard and the Control, emergency sockets should continue. Executive Director/Safety-I Railway Board

3

No.2013/Safety (DM)/6/21 Date: 18.07.2013

Sub: Video conferencing facilities from the site of accident. As per the recommendation No.98 of High Level Committee on Disaster Management, Video Conferencing facilities from the site of accident was to be initially provided in Railway Board and transportable unit to be kept in one Railway Head quarter.

In this connection, it is stated that since RDSO has finalized tendering for 25 number of video conferencing sets, Zonal Railways would like to nominate 2 ART preferably on ‘A’ route where this video conferencing facility can be provided. The list of nominated ARTs should be sent to Board’s office by return FAX for issuing further necessary directions in this regard. Director Safety-III Railway Board No.2003/Safety (DM)/6/21 Date:22.07.2013.

Sub: Details on SMDMS. Board (MT), Railway Board desired that the following details

may be uploaded on SMDMS:- 1. Disaster Management directory consisting of Nodal Officers

for Safety at Head Quarter, Divisional and Station Level in-charges of DM Control Room/Emergency Room.

2. Details of Civil Authorities consisting of names, Designation, Telephone numbers of the concerned authorities at State and District level.

3. Details of Level Crossing on GIS should be mapped as done by SECR.

Director Safety-III

Railway Board

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No.2007/Safety-I/12/2 Dated 29.07.2013 Board in their letter No.2007/Safety-I/I12/2 dated 05.05.2009

with the approval of Finance had authorized Railways to procure one digital camera costing upto Rupees fifteen thousand only for the Safety Organization of every Division and each of the Headquarters Safety Organization.

In reference to the above letter of Board, CSO/SECR has stated that in the present scenario it is always expected that when Safety Officer/Safety Counselors visit accident sites, sites of unusual incidences and during safety drives, photographs would be taken and kept in record. At times, different Officers and Safety Counselors go to different sites especially during L C Gate drives and each one of them is expected to take photographs of the infrastructure. In view of this, CSO has strongly recommended that all Officers and Safety Counsellors in the Safety Organization are provided a digital camera or a smart phone with at least 8 mega pixel cameras, providing smart phone may be a better option as it will enable quick transmission of photographs.

As proposed by CSO/SECR, much more fund is required for procurement of camera for individual officer and safety counselors of each railway. As such, before the above proposal of CSO/SECR may be referred for the consideration of Finance directorate of Board’s office, you are requested to please advise your views in the matter with proper justification to the undersigned.

Director Safety-I

Railway Board

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No.2010/Safety-I/11/2 Dated 29.07.2013 Sub: Procurement of Speed gun for monitoring of speed of

train during fog.

Please refer to Board’s letter of even no. dated 22.01.2010 advising Railways to procure Speed Gun for monitoring of speed of train during fog. Despite Advisor/Safety’s letter of even dated 25.02.10, your railway has not advised progress of the speed gun procured by your railway so far.

You are, therefore, requested to please advice in the matter to

the undersigned urgently. If Railway is facing any difficulty in procuring the speed gun, same may also be advised.

Director Safety-I

Railway Board No.2003/Safety (DM)/6/3 Date:19.08.2013 A meeting under the Chairmanship of Shri.K.M.Singh, Member, NDMA with Officials of Railways was held in NDMA on 19th February,2013 in which it was decided that HQrs – NDRF will draw an annual calendar for zone/division-wise meeting between NDRF Battalions Commandants and Railway Safety Officials for better co-ordination and management during disasters/major train accidents and each NDRF Battalion should carry out atleast one or two mock exercises / co-ordination meeting with each Zonal Railway every year.

Zonal Railways would like to take action accordingly under intimation to the undersigned.

Director Safety-III

Railway Board

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No.96/Safety-I/27/1(Vol.II) Date: 27.08.2013 Sub: Safety Audit on Indian Railways. Ref: (i) Board’s letter No.96/Safety-I/27/I dt: 23.11.13

It is observed that while in certain Railways, constitution of

Safety Audit Group continues as was advised by reference (i) above with CSO also acting departmental SAG officer in the Safety Group along with four other SAG officers one each drawn from four departments, other than the department to which CSO belongs to. However, in some other Railways SAG officers of all the five major departments (Engineering, Mechanical, S&T, Civil & Traffic) are nominated for Safety Audit with CSO as convener, irrespective of the department which CSO belongs to.

It is felt for inspections non-nomination of SAG officer of the Departments to which CSO belong does not have merit, CSO needs to pay full attention to all departmental issues rather than looking at any specific department only.

The issue was raised & discussed in Railway Board in recently held CSOs conference. In this regard, it is advised that Safety Audit Group needs to be constituted from all the five major departments, irrespective of the department to which CSO belongs to.

Advisor Safety Railway Board

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No.2009/Safety(DM)/6/12/Committee Date: 27.08.13 Sub: Policy on Drunkenness on duty. Ref: Board’s letter of even no. dt. 2.11.12, 24.1.13 & 21.02.13.

Ministry of Railways (Railway Board) constituted a Committee to review the existing policy on drunkenness on duty vide Board’s letter ERB-I/2012/23/11 dated 5.3.2010. The committee submitted its report on 28.09.2010 after deliberation at Board level including CRB, ML, Adv(ME),etc., whose suggestions have been duly incorporated in the revised Policy(2012) of drunkenness on duty. CRB has desired to know the potential aspects of holding of de-addiction camps over Indian Railways and financial implications including its appropriations in holding de-addiction camp. In your opinion, how it will be identified that which employees are habitual drunkards and Railways should take initiative of sending those employees to de-addiction camp. This information was earlier sought vide Board’s letter of even dated 02.11.2012 and only a few of the zonal Railways have submitted their reports inspite of reminder dated 24.01.2013 and 21.02.2013 and the rest have either not responded or given incomplete report even after a lapse of 6 and half months.

It is requested that above information may be furnished at the earliest without further delay by FAX No.011-23385047 and on SMDMS also.

Director Safety-III

Railway Board

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No.2011/TC-III/27/29/Ex-Gratia Date: 07.05.2013 Sub: Payment of enhanced ex-gratia and enhancement of

ex-gratia relief in case of passengers who are hospitalized for more than one month as result of train accidents/untoward incidents.

Please refer to this Ministry’s letter No.2006/TC-III/27/2

dated 20.12.2006 wherein instructions regarding rates of ex-gratia relief in case of grievously injured passengers in Train Accidents or untoward Incidents, as defined under Section123, read with Section 124/124A, of the Railways Act, 1989, who are hospitalized were issued to the railways. 2. In partial modification of the above mentioned instructions, it has now been decided by the Board that the revised rate and conditions for payment ex-gratia relief in case of grievously injured passengers who are hospitalized in case of train accidents and untoward incidents, as defined under Section123, read with section 124/124-A, of the Railways Act, 1989 will be as follows: In case of Train Accident In case of untoward incident

Rs.25,000/- lump sum for hospitalization upto 30 days to take care

Rs5,000/- upto 30 days of hospitalization.

Thereafter Rs.300/- per day to released at the end of every 10 day period or discharge, whichever is earlier.

Rs.1000/- per week or part thereof the period for indoor treatment upto further six month of hospitalization. Rs.500/- per week or part thereof the period for indoor treatment upto further five months of hospitalization.

The maximum period for which ex-gratia is payable to the grievously injured passenger will be 12 months.

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3. Other terms and conditions will remain the same as in Board’s letter dated 20.12.2003, which are as under: (i) This ex-gratia relief will be exclusively for passengers

who are grievously injured in train accidents or untoward incidents as defined under Section 123, read with Section 124/124-A, of the railway Act, 1989.

(ii) The period for treatment as indoor patient for more than 30 days would need to be certified by a Railway Doctor for the purpose of further ex-gratia payment upto the period of 11 months. In case where the injured is taking treatment in other than Railway Hospital, the treatment has to be certified by Railway Doctor.

(iii) Sr. DMOs shall also keep track of such injured person taking treatment in other than Railway hospitals, Sr.DCM/DCM shall keep co-ordination with Sr.DMO for the purpose and arrange payment of ex-gratia as per the prescribed schedule mentioned in the table in Para-2 above at the doorstep of injured person. Every care shall be taken by Sr.DCM/DCM to avoid any inconvenience to injured person in such cases.

4. This will be in supersession of the amount of ex-gratia for grievous injury in case of Train Accidents/Untoward Incidents specified in Railways Board’s letter No.2011/TC-III/27/29/Ex-gratia dated 26.07.2012.

5. It has also been decided by the board that in case of enhanced ex-gratia announced by the Minister of Railways as special case under his/her discretionary powers, the amount equivalent to the normal rate of ex-gratia ( as per the extant instructions vide Board’s Letter of even dated 26.7.2012) for death/injury of passenger in train accidents/untoward incidents and to the road users who meet with an accident due to Railway ‘s prima facie liability at manned Level Crossing Gate Accidents be paid in cash and the remaining portion of

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the enhanced ex-gratia be paid by account payee cheque. The position is tabulated as under:

S.N In case of Normal rate

of ex-gratia(as per extant instructions)

Amount of ex-gratia to be paid by cash/cheque in case of enhanced ex-gratia announced by the Hon’ble MOR By Cash By Cheque

01 In case of Train Accident (Section-124 of the Act) i) In case of

death Rs.50,000/- Rs.50,000/- Announced

amount of ex-gratia minus Rs.50,000/-

ii) In case of grievous injury

Rs.25,000/- Rs.25,000/- Announced amount of ex-gratia minus Rs.25,000/-

iii) In case of simple injury.

Rs.5000/- Rs.5000/- Announced amount of ex-gratia minus Rs.5,000/-

02 In case of Untoward Incident (Sec-124 of the Act) i) In case of

death Rs.15,000/- Announced

amount of ex-gratia minus Rs.15,000/-

ii) In case of grievous injury

Rs.5,000/- Announced amount of ex-gratia minus Rs.5,000/-

iii) In case of simple injury.

Rs.500/- Announced amount of ex-gratia minus

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Rs.5,00/- 03 In case of accident at Manned Level Crossing due to

Railways prima facie i) In case of

death Rs.50,000/- Rs.50,000/- Announced

amount of ex-gratia minus Rs.50,000/-

ii) In case of grievous injury

Rs.25,000/- Rs.25,000/- Announced amount of ex-gratia minus Rs.25,000/-

iii) In case of simple injury.

Rs.5000/- Rs.5000/- Announced amount of ex-gratia minus Rs.5,000/-

6. There is no change in other terms and conditions regarding

payment of ex-gratia contained Board’s letter of even number dated 26.07.2012.

7. This issues with the concurrence of the Finance and Health directorate of this Ministry.

Please acknowledge receipt of this letter.

(Dr.D.P.Pande) (Ashok Chowdhry) ED Health(Planning) ED (Public Grievances) Railway Board Railway Board

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No.2013/CE-IV/LX/Accident/1 Date: 15.09.13 Sub: Joint inspection of manned, non-interlocked

Engineering LC Gates by Supervisors of Traffic and Engineering Departments.

CCRS, in his recommendations in the case of accident of dashing of SH16 DN EMU Passenger train with a lorry at LC No.30/E/C between Champapukur and Harua Road stations of Barasat – Hasnabad section of Sealdah Division of Eastern Railway on 19.11.2010 has recommended: “The solution lies in frequent checking of actual working of gates by Supervisors of Engineering and Traffic. Railway should lay down frequency of joint inspection of level crossing with emphasis to find out actual method of working of level crossings”. The matter has been examined in Railway Board and Zonal Railways are advised to carry out the Joint Inspections of manned, non-interlocked LCs by Supervisors of Traffic and Engineering Departments, preferably, at least once a year to ensure safe and proper working at these LCs. There should be an element of surprise in their Joint Inspection. This issues in consultation with Traffic Directorate of Railway Board. (Anurag) Director, CE/B&S-II

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I. Procedure for obtaining Line Clear on Control

Telephone(BWMS/T Para 8.8, BWMTL Para 8.8 & BWMD Para Nos.8.6.1) Procedure for obtaining/granting Line clear using Control Telephone as a means of communication between stations ‘X’ and ‘Y’:

a. The Station Master at ‘X’ or ‘Y’ as the case may be shall intimate the Section Controller and other all concerned officials through a message about the failure of Block instrument etc. The SCOR shall record the failure on his control chart. The SCORs shall acknowledge the block instrument failures while handing/taking over charge.

b. The Station Master at ‘X’ who intends to dispatch a train shall first obtain the permission of the SCOR. The SCOR shall call SM ‘Y’ on control telephone and establish communication between stations ‘X’ and ‘Y’ through control telephone.

c. The Station Masters at stations ‘X’ and ‘Y’ shall, before obtaining/granting Line clear, call out their station name and identify each other with their full name. Then they shall repeat the arrival and departure timings of the last three preceding trains over the block section to the Section Controller, who shall cross check the correctness of the particulars of both the

Section “B” Some important rules – BWM instructions

related to the procedure of obtaining line clear through Control telephone and VHF sets

14

SMs with his Control Chart. Both SMs shall record these particulars in red ink in TSR.

d. Station Masters at ’X’ and ‘Y’ shall exchange messages in the pro-forma given vide Rule No.8.5 (d).

e. The SM at ‘X’ clearly mention the Train No. in full, description (Express/ Passenger/Goods train), direction (Up/Dn) for which Line clear is required.

f. The Station Master at ‘Y’, after complying with the conditions for granting Line clear shall grant Line clear supported by a Private Number.

g. The train number in full, description, direction (UP/DN) and the arrival/departure timings of each train dealt with between ‘X’ and ‘Y’ and the Private Number obtained / issued shall be recorded in red ink then and there in the TSR by Station Masters at ‘X’ and ‘Y’.

h. The SMs at ‘X’ and ‘Y’ shall record the above details and the means of communication through which the line clear is obtained / granted in the document T/A.1425 (outward) /T/B.1425 (inward), as the case may be.

i. After obtaining Line clear from station ‘Y’, the Station Master at station ‘X’ shall prepare Paper Line Clear Ticket (T/C.1425 for UP or T/D.1425 for DN) and arrange to deliver it to the Loco Pilot of the train after obtaining the acknowledgement in T/A 1425.

j. The serial numbers of the PLCTs issued to each train shall be recorded in the remarks column of the TSR against the entry for the train.

k. The SMs at ‘X’ and ‘Y’ shall communicate the timings of ‘Train entering block section’ and ‘Train out of block section’ in full ( eg.1410 hrs.) to each other through SCOR

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and record the same in TSR and T/A.1425 or T/B.1425 document immediately after the departure/complete arrival of train at the respective stations and also inform the SCOR.

l. Whenever the Line clear is cancelled, the Station Masters at ‘X’ and ‘Y’ stations shall record the same in the ‘D’ column of the T/A.1425 & T/B.1425 immediately and inform the section controller.

m.All trains shall be stopped for issuing PLCT. n. The Section Controller shall co-ordinate between Station

Masters ‘X’ and ‘Y’ for fulfilling the transactions mentioned under Rule No. 8.8 (a) to (f) & (k) and record the Private Number issued by Station Master ‘Y’ to Station Master ‘X’ in the control chart. Station Masters at ‘X’ and ‘Y’ shall record the name of Section Controller on duty in the Remarks column of TSR.

o. The Section Controller shall ensure that the block section is clear of trains as per the chart before line clear is granted by Station Master ‘Y’.

II. Procedure for obtaining line Clear on VHF sets: Procedure for obtaining/granting Line clear using VHF sets (Para 8.9 for BWMT, Para 8.9 for BWMTL and Para 8.9 of BWMD) as a means of communication between Stations ‘X’ & ‘Y’:

a. The Station Masters of X-Y block section shall contact each other on the *common frequency / channel allotted in their VHF sets and switch over to the **freezed channel/frequency as prescribed in the SWR for the purpose of obtaining/granting Line clear.

b. Station Masters at stations ‘X’ and ‘Y’ shall call out their station name and identify each other with their full name.

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Then they shall cross check private numbers given for line clear, for the last three preceding trains along with train numbers on the **freezed channel/frequency and record these particulars in red ink in TSR. Then they shall exchange messages in the pro-forma given vide Rule No.8.5 (d) above.

c. The SM at ‘X’ shall clearly mention to SM at ‘Y’, the Train No. in full (two / three / four digits), description (Express, Passenger, Goods train), direction (Up/Dn) for which Line clear is required.

d. The Station Master at ‘Y’, after complying with the conditions for granting Line clear shall grant Line clear supported by a Private Number.

e. The train number in full, description, direction (UP/DN) and the arrival / departure timings of each train dealt with between ‘X’ and ‘Y’ and the Private Number obtained / issued shall be recorded in red ink then and there in the TSR by Station Masters at ‘X’ and ‘Y’.

f. The SMs at ‘X’ and ‘Y’ shall record the above details and the means of communication through which the line clear is obtained / granted in the document T/A.1425 (outward) /T/B 1425 (inward), as the case may be.

g. After obtaining line clear from station ‘Y’, the Station Master at station ‘X’ shall prepare Paper Line Clear Ticket (T/C 1425 for UP or T/D 1425 for DN) and arrange to deliver it to the Loco Pilot of the train after obtaining the acknowledgement in T/A 1425.

h. The serial numbers of the PLCTs issued to each train shall be recorded in the remarks column of the TSR against the entry for the train.

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i. The serial numbers of the PLCTs issued to each train shall be recorded in the remarks column of the TSR against the entry for the train.

j. Whenever the line clear is cancelled, the Station Masters at ‘X’ and ‘Y’ stations shall record the same in the ‘D’ column of the T/A 1425 & T/B 1425 immediately.

k. All trains shall be stopped for issuing PLCT. l. The Station Masters shall switch back to the *common

frequency / channel after the necessary transactions are completed on the **freezed channel / frequency.

m. Common frequency / Channel – 13 ** Freezed channel / frequency – Channel -8 -1st adjoining section

Channel -9 - 2nd adjoining section Channel -10 - 3rd adjoining section Note:

i) VHF sets for prolonged duration of three hours or more should be permitted only in the presence of supervisory staff.

ii) VHF sets should not be used as the sole means of communication where passenger trains run. However VHF sets can be used as the only means of communication with the permission of Authorized Officer for specific sidings / sections where only freight trains run.

iii) Wherever GSMR (Global Signal Mobile Receiver) (Cell phones) has been provided, the use of VHF sets should not be permitted.

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AMENDMENT TO AC TRACTION MANUAL

Sub: Advance Correction Slip No.24 to Railways Manual of AC Traction (ACTM) Vol.III, Para 20970 -5 dated 10.01.2013.

Para 20970-5 Existing Para 20970-5 Modified

SMs/ASMs should be issued with competency certificates, after giving practical training , to enable them to operate specific isolator under instruction of TPC

SMs / ASMs / Pointsmen should be issued with competency certificates, after giving practical training, to enable them to operate specific isolator under instructions of Traction Power Controller (TPC).

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Section “C” Latest Amendments

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1. Ensure the MU2B valve of loco brake for application in ‘lead’ position.

2. Ensure the ‘open’ position of BC-3 way cocks in under truck for application of brakes.

3. Ensure 3 kg brake cylinder pressure for application of loco brakes.

4. In case of MU locos parting, ensure F1 selector valve in conjunction brake is applied in parted loco.

5. When loco is working as banker, ensure that ¾ or 1 inch BP cock is in ‘closed’ position so that effective brake power is achieved.

6. Ensure the wheel dia to be 1016 to 1095mm (minimum – maximum).

7. Ensure cattle guard height is 100mm above the rail.

8. Ensure the height of sander pipe is 60mm above rail.

9. Ensure the flange thickness of 29 to 42mm (minimum – maximum).

10. Ensure the MU2B and ¾ BP Cock in ‘dead or close’ position when dead loco is attached.

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Section “D” Checklist - Diesel Traction

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v Brief of the incident (Derailment at PRLI): On 21st July 2013 while loco no. 13514 was moving from Goods loop to Transhipment Siding, loco front trolley derailed on Point No. 106 on RH turnout. Train taken two routes.

Cause: Defective clamp (equipment failure).

Staff held responsible: No staff is held responsible.

v Brief of the incident (Averted Collision at GY station of GTL Division): On 25th August 2013, at about 1710 hours, UP CKI Goods hauled by MU 17695+17696 was signaled for reception on to Road No.6 (R&D Goods line) of GY station of GTL Division, which was already occupied by DN DNE/MKPG Goods which arrived onto Road No.6 at 16.30 hours resulting in ‘averted collision’. LP of UP Goods train timely stopped his train on noticing the obstruction near the facing point and reported about the ‘averted collision’ to ‘all-concerned’. Subsequently, the train was backed and received onto Road No.4 which was actually nominated for reception. GY station R&D lines (No.1 to 6, 9&10) are neither provided with track circuits /axle counters.

Cause: Outdoor Dy.SS/GY who is responsible to ensure that the nominated line is free of obstruction as per SWR of GY failed to ensure the same and instead exchanged PN with Platform/Dy.SS who in turn advised CASM/North Cabin to take ‘off’ the reception signals.

Section “E” Accident cases

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Staff held responsible: Outdoor Dy.SS/GY. However, enquiry report is awaited.

v Brief of the incident (Averted Collision at ADB station of NED Division): On 14.9.2013 at about 21.40 hours, Dy.SS/ADB received a full length Goods train onto an obstructed line resulting in ‘averted collision’. The brief of the incident is; one BOXN Coal loaded Goods train from PMPT direction was received on loop line No.3. Further, as per Control orders, half of the loaded formation was despatched towards MUE direction since the full load hauling requires either multi or provision of banker which was not planned. This movement took place somewhere at 18.00 hours and the outgoing Dy.SS at 21.00 hours advised incoming Dy.SS that locos are planned to come and clear the leftover load towards MUE. But, the Dy.SS/ADB thought that light engines are waiting at UMM station which will be started by Dy.SS/UMM on clearance of Krishna Express. In reality, one BOXN empty was waiting at UMM which were despatched to ADB after the arrival of Krishna Express. Dy.SS/ADB thinking that light engines are coming for clearing the load, made arrangement to receive the same on Calling-ON signal. But, due to the alertness of Traffic Gateman and the crew of Goods train, a possible collision was averted.

Cause: Dy.SS/ADB misunderstood the full length Goods as light engines and received the same onto obstructed line through Calling-on signal.

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Staff held responsible: Dy.SS/ADB under ‘Primary’ responsibility and the Engineering Gateman of LC Gate No.29 under ‘ blameworthy’ .

Matters brought to light: 1. TN No. given by the control to clear the load in two

portions was not recorded in the Control Message Register by the Dy.SS/ADB.

2. Dy.SS/ADB did not respond promptly to the enquiries made by the LP of Goods train on walkie-talkie about the reception of train.

3. Engineering Gateman of LC Gate No.29 has not informed the Dy.SS/ADB when he saw the full length Goods train coming instead of multiple light engines as told by Dy.SS/ADB while exchanging PN for the train.

4. Running of Goods train in emergency without BV is a regular practice in ADB – KNVT section. Specific orders of Sr.DOM/DOM is not being taken as per SR 4.23.

5. Availability of banker loco and train crew is not planned well in advance by the Divisional Control Organisation.

Suggestions & Recommendations: 1. TN no. given by the Controller should invariably be

written in the Control Message Register by the SMs without fail.

2. Availability of banker as well as crew should be planned well in advance by the Divisional Control Organisation.

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v Brief of the incident (Breach of block rules in NED Division): On 17.9.2013, UP 12729 PUNE-NED bi-weekly Express left Ankai (ANK) station of Central Railway towards Nagarsol station of our railway with wrong ‘authority to proceed’. Brief of the incident is; NI working was in progress at ANK station and as a result of this, block working towards Yeola of Central Railway direction was in suspended condition. SM/ANK received two express trains at the same time, one bound to NED and another one bound to PUNE. Since, block working towards Yeola was in suspended condition, he prepared PLCT for Train No. 12136 (NGP-PUNE) bi-weekly express and handed over to the Pointsman. But, the Pointsman instead of delivering it to 12136, he handed over it to 12729. LP of 12729 express pocketed the PLCT and started his train and reached Home Signal of NSL station which was at ‘on’ position since SM/NSL did not grant line clear at all for the express train. Gateman of LC Gate No.6 at KM 21/6-7 informed SM/NSL why PN was not exchanged for the train and then only SM/NSL came to know about the arrival of the train at the Home Signal. Subsequently, the train was admitted on issue of Caution Order as per SR 6.06.

Cause: SM/ANK failed to ensure that PLCT is correctly delivered to correct train; and further LP/ALP of Train No. 12729 Express also failed to ensure correct ‘authority to proceed’ is in possession before starting the train which resulted in ‘breach of block rules’.

Staff held responsible: Enquiry report is awaited.

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v Brief of the incident (Derailment of coaches in SC yard of SC Division): On 02.7.2013, while backing 5 coaches of empty rake of Train No. 17007 from Washing line No.2 to 3, one coach 3rd from engine derailed.

Cause: Defective track geometry.

Staff held responsible: SE/P.Way.

v Brief of the incident (Cattle run over leading to derailment): On 22.9.2013, while Train No. 12666 Express was on run between SVPM – KVZ stations of BZA Division, at 02.30 hours, next to engine SLR derailed.

Cause: Due to cattle run over.

Staff held responsible: None responsible.

v Brief of the incident (Derailment of MMTS empty rake at LPI station of SC Division): On 29.9.2013, when the empty rake of MMTS rolled back and derailed in trap in Spur No. II of LPI station of SC Division

Cause: LP energised the motor coach duly releasing the parking brakes and Guard removed the skids used for securing the formation. As a result of this, the rake rolled back and derailed in the trap.

Staff held responsible: Enquiry report is awaited.

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Expand the following

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Section “F” Test Your Knowledge

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KEY

1. National Electronic Fund Transfer 2. Real Time Gross Settlement 3. Hewlett-Packard 4. National Institute of Information Technology 5. Hindustan Computer Limited 6. North, East, West, South. 7. Aviation / Air Traffic Control 8. Sensitive Index 9. Western India Products Limited. 10. National Disaster Management Authority 11. Chariot, Horse, Elephant, Soldiers 12. Chronic Obstructive Lung Disease 13. Joy of Kids Entertainment 14. Ambition In Mind 15. Day And Time Evolution 16. Energy And Taste 17. Taste And Admitted 18. Power Enriched in Nib 19. Sweet Memories In Lips Expression 20. Be with You Every time

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No.Safety.387/SD/Vol.V Date: 08.07.2013.

Sub: Fortnightly Safety Drive on ‘Monsoon Patrolling’.

Divisions are advised to launch a fortnightly safety drive on ‘Monsoon Patrolling’ involving officers and supervisors of concerned departments from 10th of the month and the feedback to be given at the end of the month. The feedback need to be given bringing out the no.of drives conducted by Officer + Supervisor separately, location/station where it was conducted, date when it was conducted, items checked, items found irregular/shortfall etc., Final reply shall contain the entire details as annexure alongwith consolidated totals for the division. Emphasis should be made on quality rather than the quantity. (S.P.SAHU) CHIEF SAFETY OFFICER

No.Safety.387/SD/Vol.V Date: 10.07.2013.

In order to prevent train accidents during the present monsoon due to cyclonic storm, heavy rains, landslides etc,. Railway Board has directed Zonal Railways to launch a drive with emphasis on the following aspects:-

1) Keeping a special watch on the overloading in open box wagons due to accumulation of water during the rains.

2) Creation of monsoon reserve where required as per Railway Board instructions.

Section “G” Safety drives launched

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3) Drainage in yards. 4) Failure of track circuiting due to water logging. 5) Monsoon patrolling in the identified and vulnerable sections

and posting of stationary watchmen at vulnerable locations. 6) Trimming of tree branches infringing track, OHE and

affecting signal visibility. 7) Functioning of wipers and sanding gear including filling of

sand on locomotives, EMUs and DMUs. 8) Special precautions in areas prone to land slide, Hill slip,

Boulder falling etc,. In addition, adequate measures may be taken when the

advance warning from Indian Meteorological department is received about cyclonic storms, deep depression and heavy rains etc.,

As directed by Railway Board, drive for a fortnight may be

launched on the above aspects. In this connection, Fly Leaf was issued in June 2013 on the precautions to be taken during monsoon may be referred and implementation may be checked during the drive. On completion of the drive a consolidated reply may be advised with irregularities noticed and corrective action taken by 29.07.2013 certain. The report should also contain confirmation on the implementation measures brought out in the Fly Leaf No.6.

(S.P.SAHU) CHIEF SAFETY OFFICER

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No.Safety.387/SD/Vol.V Date: 01.08.2013.

Sub: Fortnightly Safety Drive on ‘Safe working of trains during Point/Signal/Block/Track/Axle Counter failures.

Divisions are advised to launch a fortnightly safety drive on ’safe working of trains during Point/Signal/Block/Track/Axle Counter failures’ involving Officers and Supervisors of concerned departments from 10th of the month and the feedback to be given at the end of the month. The feedback need to be given bringing out the no.of drives conducted by Officer +Supervisor separately, location/station where it was conducted, date when it was conducted, items checked, items found irregular/shortfall etc., Final reply shall contain the entire details as annexure alongwith consolidated totals for the division. Emphasis should be on quality rather than quantity. (S.P.SAHU) CHIEF SAFETY OFFICER

No.Safety.387/SD/Vol.V Date: 19.08.2013.

On 19.08.2013, there was an unusual incident reported on EC Railway in which several persons ran over by an Express train which was passing through Dhamara Station. This incident evoked serious concern at all levels.

In order to prevent such incident, it is inevitable that a drive is launched jointly by Commercial, Security and Engineering staff for a fortnight with immediate effect. The drive shall be focused on the following:-

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1. Locations of unauthorized crossing at stations/mid-section should be identified.

2. Intensive counseling should be done at such stations where trespassing is noticed.

3. Stations where heavy trespassing is noticed, wide publicity should be made through announcements via public address system, posters, electronic media and through CCTVs, for the passengers to use Foot over bridge /Foot under bridge/nominated locations, whichever is available.

4. Details of station without Foot over bridge should be identified and suitable arrangements may be made to enable the passengers to cross the track safely, duly indicating locations with notice to public for precautions to be taken while passing.

5. For Mid-section tress passing, FIRs should be lodged with local police for controlling such unsafe activities.

It should be ensured that all major stations are covered during

the drive. On completion of the drive a consolidated reply may be advised with irregularities noticed and corrective action taken by 06.09.2013.

(S.P.SAHU) CHIEF SAFETY OFFICER

No.Safety.387/SD/Vol.V Date: 04.09.2013.

Sub: Fortnightly Safety Drive on “prevention of accidents at UMLCs”.

Divisions are advised to launch a fortnightly drive on

“prevention of accidents at UMLCs” involving Officers and Supervisors of concerned departments from 10th of the month and the feedback to be given at the end of the month. The

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feedback need to be given bringing out the number of drives conducted by Officer + Supervisor separately, location/station where it was conducted, date when it was conducted, items checked, items found irregular/shortfall etc.,. Final reply shall contain the entire details along with the consolidated totals for the division. Emphasis should be on quality rather than quantity. (S.P.SAHU) CHIEF SAFETY OFFICER No.Safety.387/SD/Vol.V Date: 17.09.2013.

It is concerning to note that within a fortnight there were two averted collisions on this system due to failure of station staff. In one case(GY/GTL division) Dy.SS gave signal for reception of a train on an occupied line. In another case ASM (ADB/NED Division) mistook BOXNE Goods as Down Multi LE and arranged reception by taking ‘off’ Calling-on Signal. Hence, it is imperative that a drive is launched for fortnight with focus on the following aspects:

A. Prevention of Station Staff failure: 1. Whether SM/ASMs are careful at such stations where

running lines(especially goods R&D lines) are neither track circuited nor axle countered to ensure that the nominated line is clear of obstruction before authorizing the cabins to take ’off’ reception signals.

2. Whether the SM/ASMs and other operating staff working at the station understood their zone of responsibility as per SWR.

3. Whether station staff before authorizing the Home signal to be taken ‘off’, ensure (a) cross-checking the register

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entries and (b) physically checking that the nominated line is free from obstruction.

4. Whether SM/ASMs ensure personally for that nominated line is free from obstruction.

5. Whether SMs of both stations follow the prescribed guidelines given in the block working while granting line clear/obtaining line clear for trains-also ensure that no shortcut methods are followed.

6. Whether SMs have the habit of clearly spelling out complete details of the train, 5 digit train number in case of passenger carrying train, direction(UP/DOWN) of the train, etc.,

7. Whether SM/ASMs understand clearly the details of trains while granting/taking line clear.

B. Prevention of Loco Running Staff Failures; 1. Whether correct departure/reception signals are only

taken ‘off’. 2. Whether LP/ALP call out the signal aspects clearly and

loudly. 3. Whether Alp applies emergency brakes, in case of the LP

does not respond to the correct call given by him or does not obey the stop aspect of the signal.

4. Whether LP/ALP ensures that their train is well under control.

5. Whether LP/ALP ensure that Air-continuity test is done during shunting.

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6. Whether LP/ALP conduct ‘brake feel test’ immediately after starting the train after taking over charge of the train.

7. Whether LP/ALP availed adequate rest before coming for duty.

8. Whether crew booking authorities follow HOER norms.

On completion of the drive a consolidated reply may be advised with irregularities noticed and corrective action taken by 07.10.2013 certain.

(S.P.SAHU) CHIEF SAFETY OFFICER No.Safety.157/Safety in Operation/Vol. V Date: 27.09.2013

Sub: Unauthorised crossing of railway track at KM 256/7-8 between GTU – PRLI stations on VKB – PRLI section.

District Collector and SP, Beed of Maharashtra State were addressed requesting them to prevent trespassing of railway track by road vehicles at the above mentioned location. In this connection, it is advised to lodge a complaint with Police against unknown persons under section 153 of Indian Railways Act, 1989 for “endangering safety of persons travelling by Railway by willful act or omission”. Further, the case against unknown persons may be booked by the RPF under relevant provisions of Railway Act. It may be noted that Headquarters Safety Team during their inspection in March 2013 pointed out the unauthorized crossing of railway track at this location by public and road vehicles (4 wheelers) even after providing trenching and display

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of notice board cautioning the public at the location. An SR of 50 KMPH has been imposed by the Division at this location for the trains on account of trespassing. The unauthorized crossing of railway track at this location is going on unabated though the District Collector and SP, Beed have been addressed by Sr.DEN/West in the month of May 2013. In view of the above, it is advised to impress upon the Police to register FIR through RPF to prevent unusual of railway traffic. The local authorities may be advised to submit necessary proposal for providing sub-way / ROB across the track at feasible location on deposit terms or any other scheme / provision. A feedback on the action taken may please be advised. (S.P. SAHU) CHIEF SAFETY OFFICER

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Last Year LY; Current Year: CY Train Accidents Cumulative – (01.4.2013 to 30.9.2013)

S.No Category SC BZA GTL HYB GNT NED Total Consequential LY CY LY CY LY CY LY CY LY CY LY CY LY CY

1 Collisions … … … … … … … … … … … … … … 2 Derailments Mid-section 1 … 1 1 At stations 2 3 1 2 1 6 2

Sub-total 3 3 1 2 1 7 3 3 LC Accidents Manned 1 1 Unmanned 1 2 1 1 1 1 1 4 4

Sub-total 1 3 1 1 1 1 1 5 4 4 Fire 1 1 5 Misc. 2 2 2 2 6 Yard accidents 5 2 1 1 2 2 5 8 7 Indicative 1 1 2 1 1 3 3 8 Equip. failure 1 1

Total 3 7 11 3 2 4 2 1 2 2 4 4 24 21

Section “H” Accident Statistics