AEI’s Critical Threats ProjectUpdate and Assessment

November 22, 2016

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TOP THREE TAKEAWAYS

1. Peace negotiations are unlikely to advance in Yemen despite an agreement on a roadmap for talks.

2. ISIS may use its safe havens in central and southern Libya to rebuild and conduct asymmetrical attacks after U.S.-backed forces seize the final neighborhood of ISIS’s former stronghold in Sirte.

3. Salafi-jihadi groups are delegitimizing municipal elections in Mali and may threaten a fragile peace accord in the country’s north.

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| ASSESSMENTAL QAEDA

Al Qaeda NetworkThe al Qaeda network continues to try and capitalize on the results of the U.S. presidential election as a recruitment tool. A pro-al Qaeda media group, al Maqalaat, published an essay on the factors contributing to the Donald Trump’s political rise and ways to exploit his presidency.

Jabhat Fatah al Sham (JFS), the successor of Syrian al Qaeda affiliate Jabhat al Nusra, continues to develop a global network. Moroccan security forces arrested an alleged JFS recruiter and financier who may have hacked foreign bank accounts in central Morocco on November 20.

Outlook: Al Qaeda will continue to use U.S. domestic issues as a propaganda tool. Al Qaeda may seek to activate JFS’s global network for external attacks in the future.

SecurityPolitical and military tensions remained high between the Indian and Pakistani governments. Cross-border firing continued along the Line of Control in Jammu and Kashmir, killing soldiers on both sides and prompting residents of several border villages to evacuate their homes. Both countries continue to accuse the other of violating the ceasefire agreement.

Outlook: Regular cross-border firing along with Line of Control will continue. High-level officials will seek to de-escalate the conflict, despite inflammatory rhetoric.

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| ASSESSMENT:

PoliticalNegotiations are unlikely to advance toward a political settlement despite an agreement on a roadmap for talks between the Saudi-led coalition and the al Houthi-Saleh faction. The combatants agreed to a 48-hour cessation of hostilities on November 19 that did not allow humanitarian aid delivery. A ceasefire attempted on November 17 collapsed when Hadi government officials denounced their exclusion from negotiations, leading the coalition to reiterate its support for military operations in Yemen. Yemeni parties continued to pursue unilateral political objectives despite expressed support for the peace process. Unresolved issues include selection of a consensus leader, disarmament, and control of terrain.

Outlook: The diplomatic process will remain stalled despite the new roadmap.

SecurityHostilities continued along major frontlines during the November 19 ceasefire, although some fighting was reduced. The coalition and the al Houthi-Saleh faction justified ceasefire violations as defensive responses to hostilities by opposing parties. Hadi government and al Houthi-Saleh forces continued to fight for control of Taiz, Yemen’s third largest city. Al Houthi-Saleh forces targeted coalition positions in Ma’rib governorate and southern Saudi Arabia during the ceasefire. The Saudi-led coalition conducted multiple airstrikes targeting al Houthi-Saleh positions in northern and central Yemen.

Outlook: Hadi government forces will continue to pursue a military victory by advancing in Taiz and northern Yemen.

Al Qaeda in the Arabian Peninsula (AQAP) and ISIS in YemenAQAP and ISIS continue to degrade security and preserve their safe havens in southern Yemen. AQAP militants claimed near daily attacks targeting Emirati-backed counterterrorism forces in northern Abyan governorate. ISIS Wilayat al Bayda disseminated images of its fighters clashing with al Houthi-Saleh forces in Qifa, western al Bayda, where ISIS seeks to claim AQAP’s role as the defender of Sunnis against invading Shia forces. ISIS Wilayat Aden-Abyan assassinated an Aden airport security official in Aden city. The group last carried out a similar assassination on September 30.

Outlook: AQAP and ISIS will continue to undermine security forces in central and southern Yemen.

GULF OF ADEN YEMEN

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| SIGNIFICANT ACTIVITY:GULF OF ADEN YEMEN

1) 19 NOV: AQAP detonated an IED targeting an al Hizam commander in Lawder district, Abyan. 2) 20 NOV: Al Houthi-Saleh forces launch Katyusha rockets into Najran region, Saudi Arabia. 3) 21 NOV: Al Houthi-Saleh forces clashed with Hadi government and allied forces in Taiz city.4) 21 NOV: An AQAP IED targeted al Houthi-Saleh forces in Ibb governorate. 5) 22 NOV: ISIS assassinated an airport security officer in Aden city.

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PoliticalWorsening violence and voter fraud are delegitimizing the Somali electoral process. Candidates’ disregard for electoral procedures is increasing. Opposing candidates’ security forces clashed following a controversial vote for Lower House representation from “HirShabelle” state on November 18. A current deputy defense minister issued death threats to a national election official. The U.S. ambassador to Somalia accused a recently elected official of replacing a list of delegates with his personal bodyguards and employees.

Outlook: Rival political forces may challenge the legitimacy of the Somali government established by the 2016 elections.

Security Somali forces and the African Union Mission in Somalia (AMISOM) contingent are attempting to regain territory recently lost to al Shabaab militants. Somali National Army (SNA) and AMISOM forces drove al Shabaab militants from a village near Mahaday town in Middle Shabelle region on November 16. Local Jubbaland forces, accompanied by Ethiopian and possibly American special forces, drove al Shabaab from Berhani village in Lower Jubba region on November 22.

Outlook: Al Shabaab militants will likely re-occupy Berhani and other villages in central and southern Somalia after security forces withdraw.

Al Shabaab Al Shabaab has freedom of movement in parts of southern Somalia despite lacking control of urban areas. Al Shabaab militants detonated an improvised explosive device (IED) targeting local security forces at a restaurant in Kismayo, Lower Jubba region on November 16. Al Shabaab also targeted AMISOM forces with an IED attack in Bulo Gadud, Lower Jubba region on November 19. Al Shabaab militants control Jilib town in Middle Jubba region, where they publicly executed a Tanzanian national accused of spying on November 21.

Outlook: Al Shabaab will continue to launch attacks from safe havens in the Lower and Middle Jubba regions.

GULF OF ADEN HORN OF AFRICA

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| SIGNIFICANT ACTIVITY:GULF OF ADEN HORN OF AFRICA

1) 16 NOV: Al Shabaab detonated an IED targeting local security forces in Kismayo, Lower Jubba region. 2) 17 NOV: Al Shabaab attacked an AMISOM base near KM50 area, Lower Shabelle region. 3) 20 NOV: Suspected al Shabaab militants detonated an IED targeting a police headquarters in Hamarweyne district, Mogadishu. 4) 20 NOV: Kenyan police forces killed four al Shabaab militants in Mandera County, Kenya.

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PoliticalAn agreement to increase Libyan oil production may help to ameliorate the country’s liquidity crisis and de-escalate tensions between rival militias in Tripoli, but challenges to its implementation remain. Government of National Accord (GNA) leadership, the Central Bank of Libya, and the Libyan National Oil Corporation will decide on a plan for oil production, institutional coordination and actions related to the collapsing dinar by December 1.

Outlook: Unrest will continue in Tripoli without an immediate solution to the liquidity crisis. Anti-GNA militias will resist efforts to reopen oil fields and terminals under their control in western Libya.

SecurityThe Libyan National Army (LNA) is waging a high-cost campaign to clear the remaining militant-held neighborhoods in Benghazi. The LNA’s seizure of the Qawarsha neighborhood and the perceived failure of civilian security institutions will bolster the LNA’s popularity in eastern Libya, though continued anti-LNA resistance by a local Islamist coalition with ties to al Qaeda will continue to drive support for a Salafi-jihadi base in the region. LNA commander Field Marshal Khalifa Haftar called for the lifting on the UN arms embargo to support the LNA’s fight against ISIS in Benghazi. Clashes between the LNA and anti-LNA forces over control of eastern Libyan oil sites remain possible.

Outlook: The LNA will continue to replace civilian institutions as the primary political and military power in eastern Libya.

Ansar al Sharia and Islamic State of Iraq and al Sham (ISIS) in LibyaU.S.-backed forces are conducting what may be their final push to clear ISIS’s remaining stronghold in Sirte city. ISIS is positioned to wage an insurgency in central Libya after the loss of Sirte. ISIS is also recruiting foreign fighters to the Fezzan region in southwestern Libya, where al Qaeda in the Islamic Maghreb (AQIM) maintains a support zone.

Outlook: ISIS will wage a campaign of ambushes and explosive attacks to disrupt security operations in central Libya.

WEST AFRICA LIBYA

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1) 17-20 NOV: Clashes between rival militias killed 48 people and wounded 60 others in Sebha. 2) 19 NOV: GNA-allied forces backed by U.S. airstrikes killed seven ISIS militants in al Jiza, Sirte.3) 20 NOV: Rival militias clashed over control of a bank branch in Hay Al Andalus, Tripoli. 4) 21 NOV: Militants detonated a VBIED that killed four people and wounded 26 others near the Benghazi Medical Center.

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Al Qaeda in the Islamic Maghreb (AQIM) and ISIS in the MaghrebJabhat Fatah al Sham (JFS), the successor of Syrian al Qaeda affiliate Jabhat al Nusra, may be recruiting in Morocco. Moroccan security forces arrested an alleged JFS recruiter and financier in Azrou, Ifrane Province on November 20.

Outlook: Al Qaeda may exploit foreign fighter networks to conduct attacks in Morocco.

TunisiaThe Tunisian Government will announce a new proposal to negotiate wage increase delays with Tunisia’s largest labor union in the coming days. Unions have threatened to strike by December 8 due to the government’s plan to delay previously agreed upon wage increases to meet debt payments. Tunisia is scheduled to pay off three billion USD by the end of 2017.

Outlook: The Tunisian government’s efforts to make debt payments will continue to drive conflict with labor groups.

Associated Movements in the Sahel (Ansar al Din, al Murabitoun, Boko Haram)Suspected Salafi-jihadi militants, likely Ansar al Din, conducted coordinated attacks on Mali’s municipal elections. Militants killed five Malian soldiers transporting ballots boxes in Mopti Region and kidnapped an electoral candidate in Timbuktu Region. Unknown groups attacked polling stations and burned election materials in multiple locations. The Coordination for the Movement of Azawad (CMA), a former separatist group, refused to recognize the outcome of the elections due to the absence of UN intermediaries that were agreed upon during peace negotiations.

The beginning of the dry season in the Lake Chad Basin is allowing Boko Haram to increase its operational tempo. The militant group conducted six attacks over the past week, including one coordinated attack in Maiduguri, Borno State, involving five suicide bombers. Boko Haram operatives travel to and from battle on motorbikes that require dry conditions.

Outlook:. The CMA will interpret the elections as a violation of the peace accords, potentially leading to renewed calls for secession. Boko Haram will conduct more frequent attacks as the dry season progresses.

WEST AFRICA MAGHREB AND SAHEL

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1) 15 NOV: Militants set up a false checkpoint on the road between Miliana and Oued Zbouj, Ain Defla Province, Algeria.2) 21 NOV: Tunisian security forces broke up a 16-member militant cell in al Dahmani, Kef Governorate.3) 20 NOV: The Moroccan Central Bureau of Judicial Investigations arrested a member of Jabhat Fatah al Sham, the successor of al Qaeda’s Syrian affiliate Jabhat al Nusra, in Azrou, Ifrane Province, Morocco.

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1) 18 NOV: Boko Haram attempted an attack with five suicide bombers in Maiduguri, Borno State, Nigeria.2) 20 NOV: Suspected Ansar al Din militants kidnapped a candidate in Gourma Rarhous, Timbuktu region.3) 21 NOV: Militants killed five soldiers in a Malian army convoy carrying ballot boxes near Douentza, Mopti region.4) 20 NOV: Militants stole two ambulances and killed one civilian in Dilli town in Koulikoro region before escaping to Mauritania.

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ACRONYMS

African Union Mission in Somalia (AMISOM)al Qaeda in the Arabian Peninsula (AQAP)al Qaeda in the Indian Subcontinent (AQIS)Coordination for the Movement of the Azawad (CMA)Imghad Tuareg and Allies Self-Defense Group (GATIA)Islamic State in Iraq and al Sham (ISIS)Libyan National Army (LNA)Arab Movement of Azawad (MAA) United Nations Multidimensional Integrated Stabilization Mission in Mali (MINUSMA)Mujahideen Shura Council in Derna (MSCD)National Movement for the Liberation of the Azawad (MNLA)The Movement for Unity and Jihad in West Africa (MUJAO)Pakistani Military (PakMil)Possible military dimensions (PMD)Somalia National Army (SNA)Tehrik-e-Taliban Pakistan (TTP)

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Katherine Zimmermanresearch managerkatherine.zimmerman@aei.org (202) 888-6576

Paul BucalaIran analystpaul.bucala@aei.org(202) 888-6573

Marie DonovanIran analystmarie.donovan@aei.org(202) 888-6572

Heather Malacariaprogram managerheather.malacaria@aei.org(202) 888-6575

Emily Estelleal Qaeda analystemily.estelle@aei.org(202) 888-6570

Caitlin PendletonIran analystcaitlin.pendleton@aei.org(202) 888-6577

For more information about AEI’s Critical Threats Project, visit www.criticalthreats.org.

Frederick W. Kagandirector

fkagan@aei.org (202) 888-6569