2015€¦ · Service Delivery Protest Barometer 2007-2012, Cape Town: Multi-level government ... As...

hOLLOwInG OUt the LOCaL State:

Managerialism and Skills in the Water Sector

2015

Contents

List of figures 2

List of tables 3

Acronyms 3

Chapter 1: Introduction 5

1.1. Background 6

1.2. Understanding the unevenness 14

1.3. Summary of report 18

1.4. About our research approach 19

1.5. Acknowledgements 19

Chapter 2: Sowing the seeds of unevenness 20

2.1. Prior to democratic transition 21

2.2. Democratic transition 24

2.3. Stages of Transformation 29

2.4. Towards Crisis 32

Chapter 3: Understanding capacity: all about officials’ skills? 40

3.1. Introduction 41

3.2. Impact of the skills malaise 41

3.3. The scale of the challenge 43

3.4. Why the shortage in basic skills? 45

3.5. How do we understand the shortage in elementary skills? 48

3.6. Summary 57

Chapter 4: Conclusions 58

Bibliography 62

2 Hollowing out the local state: managerialism and skills in the water sector

Listoffigures

figure1: Levelsofsatisfactionwithwaterandsanitationservices 8

figure2: Percentageofhouseholdsthathaveaccesstopipedwater 8

figure3: Percentageofhouseholdsbytypesoftoiletfacility 9

figure4: Percentageofhouseholdswithaccesstotoiletfacilities 10

figure5: Percentageofhouseholdswithaccesstopipedwater 11

figure6: Localgovernment%accesstopipedwateringauteng 12

figure7: Municipalvulnerabilityintheprovisionofwaterandsanitationservices 13

figure8: spatialpopulationtrendsinsouthAfrica 14

figure9: operatingbudgetsofsomemunicipalitiesinthetoptenBlueDrop

index(2011) 16

figure10: rateofaccesstowaterbornesanitationinthedemocratic

transitionperiod 24

figure11: MapofformerBantustanterritories 35

figure12: Currentprovincialboundaries 36

figure13: enrolmentsforapprenticeshipexams 45&53

figure14: ratioofmanagerstoallpositionsinlocalgovernment 55

figure15: trendsinstaffingofmanagementpositionsingovanMbekiMunicipality 56

figure16: trendsinstaffingofnon-managerialpositions 56

figure17: trendsinsalariesandbenefitsinlocalgovernment 57

3Hollowing out the local state: managerialism and skills in the water sector

ListoftABLes

table1:Listoftopfivegrievancesinpublicprotests 7

table2:toptenperformersintheBlueDropindex;2010-2012 37

table3:toptengreenDropPerformers,2011-2012 38


thisreportwasproducedbythePublicAffairsresearchinstitute(PAri).theleadauthorwasnjoguMorganworkingwithivorChipkin,sarahMeny-gibert,gumanitshimomola,sunitaMenonandDineoskosana.itwassupportedbyagrantfromtheopensocietyfoundationforsouthAfrica(osf-sA).

May2014

Public Affairs Research Institute (PARI)26rhodesAvenueParktownWestJohannesburg,2193

0114821739|[email protected]|www.pari.org.zaDesign&Layout:www.prinsdesign.co.zaCoverillustration:givanLötz


Cott Centralorganisationoftechnicaltraining

Crr Cumulativeriskrating

DWAf DepartmentofWaterAffairsandforestry

eWsetA energyandWater,sectoreducationandtrainingAuthority

geAr growth,employmentandredistribution

HsrC HumansciencesresearchCouncil

inDLeLA institutefornationalDevelopmentofLearnershipsemploymentskillsand

LabourAssessments

LgsetA Localgovernment,sectoreducationandtrainingAuthority,setA

Moe Municipalownedentity

nPM newPublicManagement

osf-sA opensocietyfoundationforsouthAfrica

rDP reconstructionandDevelopmentProgramme

setA sectoreducationandtrainingAuthority

statssA statisticssouthAfrica

ACronyMs


≤ Introduction1Chapter


1.1 BACkgRoUnD

inlargepartsofsouthAfrica,themanagementofmunicipalwaterandsanitationisincrisis.thereareregularmediareportsofinterruptedwatersupplyanddysfunctionalsanitationsystems.thesedifficultieshavecoincidedwithanincreaseincivilsocietyprotests,mostofwhicharedirectedatmunicipalities.Aninitiativewhichmonitorsgrassrootsfermentfoundthatgrievancesagainstwaterandsanitationmanagementfeatureconsistentlyamongstthetopfivereasonswhyprotestsoccur,asshowninthetablebelow.

thisperceptionofmalaiseiscollaboratedbythefindingsofamajorlongitudinalsurveyconductedbytheHumansciencesresearchCouncil(HsrC)whichmeasureschangesinsocialvalues.everyyear,aspartofabroaderenquiry,southAfricansareaskedtoreportontheirsatisfactionorotherwisewithwaterandsanitationsupply.Levelsofsatisfactionaremeasuredonascalewhere1representsthehighestlevelofsatisfactionand5theleastlevelsofsatisfaction.0representsthosewhodonotreportontheirlevelsofsatisfactioninthesurvey.theresultsarereportedprovincially.ingeneral,asillustratedinthefigurebelow,between2003and2009southAfricanshavebeenunhappy.Whileinsomeprovincessuchasthefreestateandgautengtherehavebeenmarginalpositiveshiftsinlevelsofsatisfaction,inotherssuchasnorthWestlevelsofdissatisfactionhaveincreasedmarkedly.

table 1: List of top five grievances in public protests

Source: J. De Visser& D. Powell (2012) Service Delivery Protest Barometer 2007-2012, Cape Town: Multi-level government Initiative, Community Law Centre

1

2

3

4

5


inspiteoforperhapsintandemwiththeselevelsofcommunitydissatisfaction,therehasbeensignificantexpansionofwaterandsanitationservices.Asthefigurebelowshows,91.3%ofthepopulationcouldaccesspipedwaterin2011comparedto85%in2001.1

20030,00

0,50

1,00

1,50

2,00

2,50

3,00

3,50

4,00

2004 2005 2006 2007 2008 2009

Leve

l of s

atis

fact

ion:

1 is

ver

y sa

tisfie

d

eastern Cape

Free State

gauteng

kwaZulu-natal

Limpopo

Mpumalanga

north West

northern Cape

Western Cape

Figure 1: Levels of satisfaction with water and sanitation services

Source: HSRC SA Social Attitudes Survey

1 The piped water may be available inside the household, in the compound or just outside the compound.

Figure 2: percentage of households that have access to piped water

similarlytherehavebeenlargegainsinsanitationsincethedemocratictransition.Asrepresentedbelow,attheendof2011,94.9%ofthepopulationhadaccesstosometypeofsanitationsystem.thispercentageincreasedfrom86.7%in2001.

Census 2011 Census 2001

Source: Stats SA Census 2011


Figure 1: Levels of satisfaction with water and sanitation services

Asaresultofthisexpansioninwaterandsanitationservices,southAfricahasalready,aheadofthetargetdates,metitsunitednationsMillenniumDevelop-mentgoalsinthisarea.thesegoalsareto“halvetheproportionofpeoplenothavingaccesstosafedrinkingwaterby2015”andto“halvetheproportionofpeoplewithoutsustainableaccesstoabasicsanitationservice”.thewatergoalwasreachedin2005andthesanitationgoalin2008(DWAf,2009:24;DWAf,2013:24).

Howdowesquaretheseimpressivegainswiththecommunitydissatisfactionexpressedthroughprotestsandrecordedinsurveyfindings?oneansweristhatthestatisticsshowinfrastructureavailabilityandnotnecessarilyfunctionalservices(DWAf,2013:24).inotherwordspipesmaybeinplacebutnowatermaybeflowingthroughthem.orpitlatrinesmaybeavailablebuttheymaynotbeserviced.

Anothercomplicationhiddenbyhighlevelaggregatedataisgeographicalunevenness.Asthefigureonthenextpageshows,levelsofservicesintermsofaccesstotoiletfacilitiesvarydramaticallyacrossthecountry.2toputitsimply,somelocationsaremuchbetterservedthanothers.

Figure 2: percentage of households that have access to piped water

Figure 3: percentage of households by types of toilet facility


2 Refers to households with a flush toilet connected to a sewage system

and to those with pit latrines that may or may not be ventilated.

Flush toilet (connected to sewerage system)

2,1

13,3

3,9

1,92,5

22,319,3

5,68,8

3,03,1

50,057,0

2,1

5,2

Other

None

Bucket toilet system

Chemical toilet

Pit toilet without ventilation

Pit toilet withventilation (VIP)

Flush toilet (with septic tank)

Census 2001Census 2011


Figure 4: percentage of households with access to toilet facilities


Eastern Cape 33,7

Free State 46,3

Gauteng 80,1

KwaZulu-Natal 40,8

Limpopo 16,8

Mpumalanga 35,4North West 34

Northern Cape 57,8

Western Cape 86,2

Census 2001

Eastern Cape 41,3

Free State 65,8

Gauteng 80,2

KwaZulu-Natal 43,4

Limpopo 21,4

Mpumalanga 42,7North West 43,9

Northern Cape 63,4

Western Cape 85,8

Census 2011


Figure 4: percentage of households with access to toilet facilities

similarunevennessobtainswithregardtoaccesstopipedwater.3thefigurebelowrepresentspercentagesofhouseholdswithaccesstopipedwaterperprovinceinthecountry.

Figure 5: percentage of households with access to piped water

3 Refers to households with piped water in the home, inside a compound, or

immediately outside a compound.

Source: Stats SA

Eastern Cape

Free State

Gauteng

KwaZulu-Natal

Limpopo

Mpumalanga

0 10 20 30 40 50 60 70 80 90 100

North West

Northern Cape

Western Cape

% access

Pro

vinc

e

2011

2001


Figure 6: Local government percentage access to piped water in Gauteng

Census 2011

Census 2001

exploringsanitationinthesamesampleofmunicipalities,thesameunevennessisapparent.Perhapsthebestillustrationofunevennessisthefigurebelowillustratingmunicipal‘vulnerability’.theimageisbasedoninternalselfassessmentbymunicipalofficialsoftheabilityoftheirmunicipalitiestodeliverwaterservices.itmeasurescapabilitybasedonanumberofdomainsthathavebeenagreedasinfluentialininternalperformance(DWAf,2013).5

Source: http://beta2.statssa.gov.za/

5 These include water services development planning, management skills level, staff skills level, technical staff capacity, water resource management, water conservation and demand management, drinking water quality, wastewater/environmental safety, infrastructure asset management, operations and maintenance of assets, financial management, revenue collection, information management, organisational performance, water service quality and customer care.

ifwefurtherdisaggregatetomunicipallevelingautengProvince,itisclearthatherealsothepictureisdiverse.thefigurebelowisfromasampleofmunicipalitiesingautengthatarealsowaterserviceauthorities.itdoesnotcontainallofthemunicipalitiesgiventhelimiteddataavailablefromstatssAonsomeofthemunicipalities.4

4 nokengTsaTaemene Local Municipality, kungwini Local Municipality.

City of Johannesburg

City of Tshwane

Ekurhuleni

Emfuleni

Lesedi

Merafong City

Midvaal

Mogale City

Randfontein

Westonaria

84,5

79,7

81,9

90,9

74,6

74,3

77,2

84,8

86,3

63,8

91,6

89,1

87,1

94,2

92,2

83,3

82,9

87,2

89,3

64,9

Gau

teng


Figure 6: Local government percentage access to piped water in Gauteng

exploringsanitationinthesamesampleofmunicipalities,thesameunevennessisapparent.Perhapsthebestillustrationofunevennessisthefigurebelowillustratingmunicipal‘vulnerability’.theimageisbasedoninternalselfassessmentbymunicipalofficialsoftheabilityoftheirmunicipalitiestodeliverwaterservices.itmeasurescapabilitybasedonanumberofdomainsthathavebeenagreedasinfluentialininternalperformance(DWAf,2013).5

Limpopo

Mpumalanga

kwazulu natal

eastern Cape

Status

Very high vulnerability

High vulnerability

Moderate vulnerability

Low vulnerability

no of WSAs %

north West Province

northern Cape

Free State

gauteng

Western Cape

70 46,1%

32,8%

17,7%

3,3%

100%

50

17

5

152

Figure 7: Municipal vulnerability in the provision of water and sanitation services

thedominanceofpinkinthemap(46,1%)suggeststhataverylargenumbersofmunicipalitiesconsiderthemselveshighlyvulnerablewithrespecttotheirabilitytorenderwaterandsanitationservices.

Source: DWAF:2013:36


1.2. UnDeRSTAnDIng THe UneVenneSS itdiffers.youreallycan’tgeneraliseandwedon’treallyknow whysomemunicipalitiesdon’tperformandwhyothersdo. Wedon’t,wereallydon’t(respondentV,13september2013)

Howshouldweunderstandthisunevenness?HerewecanfindarangeofdifferentaccountsthatreflectthediversitythatissouthAfricanlocalgovernment.thesereasonsarecomplexandinterlockwitheachothersometimesinwaysthataredifficulttodisentangle.

southAfricaisnowanurbannationwiththemajorityofthepopulationresidingintownsandcities.thefigurebelowshowsthegrowingpercentageofthesouthAfricanpopulationthatisurbanised.

2004 2005 2006 2007

year

2008 2009 2010 2011 2012

58,78%59,26%

59,71%60,17%

60,63%61,09%

61,55%61,99%

62,43%

Source: World Bank, World Development Indicators

Figure 8: Spatial population trends in South africa

Withthisconcentrationwhichhasunfoldedunevenlyacrossurbanareas,somemunicipalitieshavebeenabletomeetthedemandbetterthanothers.inthegovanMbekiMunicipality,oneofourrespondentsnotedthat“whatisimportant…isthatyoukeepyourbulksupplyupdated.thisisthechallengethatgovan


Figure 8: Spatial population trends in South africa

Mbekiissittingwithatthemoment.thebulkdesignsforallthetownshavebeendesignedtocateruptoacertainlimitandwhathashappenednow-andiamtalkingaboutwater,sanitationandelectricity-isthattheoptimumamountofsupplyhasnowbeenreached”(respondentl,27november2013).Weshouldnotethatagainitisnotsimplyamatterofurbanisationwhichhasproducedinsomemunicipalitiesamismatchbetweeninfrastructureandcapacity.Asiswellknownmanymunicipalitiespostdemocratizationhadtosuddenlyprovideservicestomuchlargerpopulationoftenwiththesameinfrastructures.somehaveovertimeextendedtheirinfrastructurebutothershavenot.

thenationaltreasurysuggeststhatthereareeconomiesofscaleassociatedwiththeprovisionofwaterandsanitationservices.intheory,largeorganisationsservinglargerpopulationscanprovideservicesmorecosteffectively(nationaltreasury,2011:139).sizeisalsoanimportantconsiderationbecauseofoperationalissuessuchasskills,andchoiceoftechnology.thisisespeciallysoinsanitationwheregenerallymoretechnicallycomplextechnologiesarerequiredtotreatheavyvolumesofeffluent:

Joburgneedstogetthebestbiologicalnutrientremovaltechnology available;itneedstomakeitworkandhaveitworktwentyfour hoursaday,sevendaysaweek.theyhavetohavesomebodyonsite, notonlyanyoldperson:youneedatechnicalscientist,ascientific persontoactuallyoperateit.itismuchmoredifficultforthebigger municipalitiestooperatethanthesmallerones(respondentK,29 July2013).

Anotherrespondentagreedwiththisanalysis(respondentn,22october2013).thisaccountthereforesuggestsaslightlymorecomplicatedrelationshipbetweensizeandperformance.

thenatureofthelocaltaxbaseisalsothoughttoplayanimportantroleindeterminingperformance.Here,theargumentgoesthatmunicipalcontextswithmorevibranteconomiesandthereforewidertaxableindustriesandpopulationsshouldbebetterperformers.Historicallythismayhavebeenthecasebeforetheintroductionoftheequitableshareformula,thenationalsystemoflevellingoutgeo-economicdifferences.However,recentevidencesuggeststhatwhilethisformulashouldplaceallmunicipalwaterserviceauthoritiesonanevenplayingfield,therearesomeflawsinit.Asaresult“theformulaproducedallocationsperpoorhouseholdthatwerelowestformunicipalitieswiththeleastabilitytoraisetheirownrevenue”.Anewrevisedformulathatisintendedtocorrectthisdesignerroriscurrentlybeingphasedin(fanoe,2013).

Againifthiswereastraightcorrelationweshouldseethewealthiestmunicipalities–generallymetropolitanones–consistentlyoutperformingtheirpeers.ButwhenweexaminetrendsoftheBlueDropreportweseeamixedpicture.thefigurebelowshowsthatthereisnonecessarylinkagebetweenvolumeofexpenditureandperformance.


thefigureaboveillustratesoperatingbudgetexpenditurepercapita(2011)ofselectedmunicipalwaterserviceauthoritiesthatappearedinthetoptenrankingsoftheBlueDropreportbetween2010and2012.6

thenatureofthelocaltaxbasecanalsobeseenasaproxyforothersocialvariables.ratesofpoverty,location,inequality,thekindsofhistoricalrelationshipsthatexistbetweenmunicipalitiesandlocalcommunities,demographyandotherrelatedvariablesallultimatelyinfluencehowthemunicipalityoperates.forexample,itiswellknown(sAiCe,2011:12;)PetersandVannieuwenhuyzen,2012:283)asitdidcomeupinseveralofourinterviews,thatsmallruralmunicipalitiesstruggletorecruitthekindsofstaffthattheyneedwhilstlargermetropolesarespoiltforchoice(respondenty,16september2013).inaddition,endemicpovertyinsomecommunitiesoftenmeansthatmunicipalinfrastructureisaneasytargetfornotonlyoutrighttheftbutalsoasasourceofrecreation.Bothofthesedynamicscoalescedtogetherinoneinstanceinamunicipality.ourrespondentsinformedusthatthatwastewatertreatmenttanksarecommonlydamagedbychildrenwhousethemasplaygrounds–whicharenotavailableintheirneighborhoods.themunicipalitytriedtoremedythisproblembyinstallingfencingaroundoneofthewastewatertreatments.unfortunatelythetheftofthefence–madefromlucrativemetal–tookplacemorerapidlythantheinstallation(respondenti,27november2013).

City of Cape Townr1,365

r1,290

r396

r870r230

r415

r52

r797

r947

City of Tshwane

ekurhuleni

george

kgatelopele

Mogale City

Tlokwe City Council

West Coast

Witzenberg

Figure 9: Operating budgets of some municipalities in the top ten Blue Drop Index (2011)

Source: Municipal Demarcation Board, 2011 Capacity Assessment; www.demarcation.org.za

6 The Blue Drop system is a national system where “all elements in the water supply system including sampling of water at the intake and the outflow of the water treatment works, in distribution pipelines and reservoirs and at the point of use” are assessed (DWAF, 2013: 43).


Asothershaveinsisted,theapartheidlegacycontinuestohauntthepresent(ChipkinandMeny-gibert,2011).Aswewillsee,spaceswhichwerenotgovernedforWhitepopulationscontinuetoexperiencethemostseverechallengeswithwaterandsanitation.

inarecentreportwedescribedthesouthAfricanstate–asacontractstate.Herewemeantthat“servicedeliveryinsouthAfricaisdecreasinglyperformedbygovernmentadministrationsandincreasinglyperformedbyprivatecompanieswhichtenderforthisrole”(Brunetteetal.2014).ourfieldworkforthisprojectrevealedthistobealsothecaseinlocalgovernment.thedegreetowhichprivatecompaniesplayaroleinservicedeliveryinlocalgovernmentisextremelyvariablewithinandacrossdifferentmunicipalities.thereisadireneedforfurtherresearchinthisareagiventheextentoftransformationthatseemedtohaveoccurred.Howeverwhatwefoundinbroadstrokesisthatpartofthechallengesinwaterandsanitationservicesdeliverymightbeattributedtothistransformation;asmunicipalitiesrelyincreasinglyonconsultantsorcontractors,theyaredehuskedoftechnicalskills.thismeansthattheyareunabletooverseetheworkofserviceproviders.theyarethuspronetowasteresourcesonunnecessarilyexpendituresandreceiveshoddywork.Moreoveritseemsinsomecasestobedemoralisingexistingpersonnelwhomayhavetechnicalskillsbutcannotusethisknowledgeasexternalagentsarepreferred.

oneofthemostcommonlygivenreasonsforunevennessandpoorperformancehowever,inthepopularmediaandsomeliterature,istheill-definednotionof‘lackofcapacity’.generally,poorlyperformingmunicipalitiesareunderstoodto

• sufferfromhighratesofcorruptionandnepotism(CogtA,2009); • experiencesignificantskillschallengessuchasalackoftechnical knowledgeandexperience(nationalPlanningCommission,2011:22); • becharacterizedbyhighdegreesofstaff turnover(MunicipalDemarcationBoard,2012); • sufferfrompoorleadership(ibid.); • bebesetwithcouncilinterferenceinoperations (PetersandVannieuwenhuyzen,2012); • befilledwithlazy,incompetentofficials(ibid.).

Koelbleandsiddlesaythattheessenceoftheservicedeliverychallengebesettinglocalgovernmentiswiththebureaucracy.“Weargue”,theysay,

thattheabsenceofafunctioningcivilserviceatthelocallevelisaprimaryreasonforthis[localgovernment]failureandthatthereisanurgentneedtore-assesstherolethemunicipalitiesaretofulfil.ifmunicipalitiesaretobethe“developmentalarm”ofcentralgovernment,theyneedtobeequippedwithtechnical,financialandadministrativestaffthatareuptothedifficulttaskofpolicyimplementation.thefactthatsuchanadministrativeandtechnicalapparatuswasnotcreatedsoonafter1994isduelesstoalackofcommitmenttothedecentralizationprojectandmoretooversightthatsuchanapparatuswasindeedlacking”(Koelbleandsiddle,2013).


Weargueinthisreportthatsuchananalysisstopsshortofrealexplanation.itis,atbest,descriptive.Whatiswrongwiththeadministrationsinpoorlyperformingmunicipalities?thisreportgoessomewaytoidentifyingtheareasofweakness.itlaysthebasisforananalysisofservicedeliverychallengesthatdoesnotsimplyfocusonindividualsorgenerictermslike‘skillsshortages’or‘capacityconstraints’.instead,itbringsmunicipalorganisationsandgovernmentinstitutionsintoasystemsfocus,arguingthattheunevennessinwaterandsanitationmanagementistheresultoftheuneveneffectoflong-termstructuralpatterns(especiallyintheartisanaltrainingfield)combinedwithdevelopmentsinthewaythatmunicipalitieshavebeenintegratedandmodelledsince1995,howtheyarestaffed,howtheyareincentivisedandwhoisincentivised.

1.3. exeCUTIVe SUMMARy oF RePoRT

Asthequotationaboveillustrates,alackofskillsisoftengivenasthemostimportantexplanationforinadequateperformance.7Asmightbeexpected,giventhesuggestionthatcentralityofskillsisthemaincausalvariableinlocalgovernmentperformance,therehavebeenmanystudiesofthisquestion.Wefindthreebroadaccounts.thesesuggestthattheproblemarisesbecauseof(i)issuesinthesystemsofeducationandtraining,(ii)changesintheeconomy,and(iii)issueswithinmunicipalbureaucracies.

ouranalysisshowsthatitisimportanttounderstandthevariedhistoricalsourcesofthecapacitychallenge.Wearguethatwhilemunicipalitiesarefacedwithawiderangeofpersonnelneeds,inwaterservicesthemostcriticalbarriersareassociatedwithroutineoperations,andthattheskillsneededarethoseofplumbers,millwrights,electricians,pipelinemaintenanceworkersandthelike.theshortagesofskilledworkers,hollowingoutofknowledgeintheoccupationalareasandmisallocationofavailableworkersaredrivenbylonghistoricalfactorsoccurringingovernancedomainsbeyondlocalgovernmentjurisdiction.Wearguethatthecountryhaslongheldtechnicaltradesinlowregard.thislowvaluationjoinswithstatusconcernsthatstigmatisewastewaterworkandthosewhodoit.itisthereforehardlysurprisingthatnotenoughpeopleseekoutacareeroremploymentinthissector.thislowvaluationoftechnicaltradeshasbeenreinforcedorperpetuatedbybroadpoliticalandeconomicdevelopments.thisrelatestochangesovertimeinthestructureoftheeconomy,thenatureofworkinvariousindustries,thecountry’sraceandethnicrelations,andtheintroductionofnewpublicmanagement(nPM)ideasintolocalgovernment.

ifthesefactorshelpexplainthebroaderstructuralchallengesinthewatermanagementsector,wewillseethat,specifically,itishasbeen‘managerialist’reformsinlocalgovernment,andacrossthepublicsector,inthe1990sthathavethathaveexacerbatedunevenperformanceinthewaterandsanitationsector.

ourresearch,therefore,findsthattheskillschallengeinlocalgovernment,whileexacerbatedbyissuesinternaltomunicipalities,haswiderpolitical,culturalandeconomicorigins.thisaccordswithrecentstudiesofskills

7 The discourse around skills often uses the word capacity interchangeably. Much policy discourse will for instance bemoan the lack of capacity to mean a shortage of people and knowledge.


formationwhichsuggestthatskillsdevelopmentshouldbeexaminedinthecontextoftheorganisationoftheeconomiesandsocietiesinwhichtheyarelocated(Allais,2013).Wethereforesuggestthatscholarlyandpolicyattentionshouldpaygreaterattentiontothesedynamics.

1.4. ABoUT oUR ReSeARCH APPRoACH

Weundertookthisstudyforanumberofreasons.firstly,itsupportsandextendsPAri’sworkonthechangingnatureofthestateanditsrelationshipwithsociety.WehaveconductedresearchonotherarmsofthesouthAfricanstatebutnotasyetintolocalgovernment.ourmotivationherewasinparttoexploretowhatextentourfindingsaboutthenationalandprovincialdimensionsofthestatecorrespondwithdevelopmentsatlocallevel(Chipkin,2011a;Chipkin,2011b).secondly,localgovernmentandthewaterandsanitationservicesaresectorsofdeepandimmediateconcern.theintensesocialdemandsonthestateinrelationtowaterservicescompelinterest.

Weusedamixedmethodology.thisinvolvedinterviewswithkeyinformantsinthewaterandsanitationsector;documentreviewofacademicandgreyliterature;in-depthinterviewswitharangeofstakeholdersincludingofficialsfromnationalandlocalgovernment,civilsocietyactors,scientists,researchersandconsultants;andfieldworkinanumberofmunicipallocationsincludinggovanMbekiLocalMunicipalityanduthukelaDistrictMunicipality.Duetothesensitivitiesinthesector,itisimportantthatwerespecttheconfidentialityofourrespondentswhowereverygenerouswiththeirtimeandinsights.Wethereforeuseacodingsystemforidentificationpurposes,referringtoourrespondentsbyrandomlettersofthealphabet.

thereportisstructuredasfollows.thenextsectionprovidesahistoricalaccountoftheevolutionofwaterandsanitationservicesinlocalgovernment.Wefinditnecessaryandimportanttotakealongviewbecausemostanalysisandpublicdiscoursetakesaccountonlyofthepresent.thenextchapterexploresthenatureoftheskillschallengeanditsimpacts,attemptstopaintaquantitativepictureandfinallyexploresfactorsthatproducethischallenge.thefinalchapterofferssomeconclusionsandsetsoutafutureresearchagenda.thisresearchoffersapreliminaryglimpseintoaverycomplexsector.Whileweareconfidentinourarguments,aswesayintheconclusion,thisisafirstcutwhichidentifiesbroadpatternsoccurringalloverthecountry.thesepatternsareunfoldingindifferentwaysatdifferentplaces.ourlineofinquirythereforeneedstobeextended.thisshouldincludemoredetailedanalysisofparticularmunicipalities.

1.5. ACknoWLeDgeMenTS

Wewouldliketoextendaspecialthankstoourrespondentsfortheirgenerosityintakingtimeoutfromtheirverybusyschedules.

WewouldalsoliketothanktheopensocietyfoundationforsouthAfrica;thisresearchwouldnothavebeenpossiblewithoutitsgeneroussupport.


≤ Sowing the seeds of unevenness2Chapter


Historyisimportantinunderstandingcurrentchallengesconfrontinglocalgovernment.Alongviewisvitalbecausemostanalysisandpublicdiscourseonlytakesaccountofthecontemporarymoment.thisisnotsurprisinginthecontextoftheprevailingdiscourseofcrisisandtheempiricalrealityofcommunitiessufferingfromalackofservices,orinterruptedservices.totellthisstory,itisusefultoprovideahistoricalaccountintwoparts;priortoandafterdemocratictransition.Whiletheremaybeotherwaysofperiodising,thechangesintroducedwiththedemocratictransitionhavesignificantlytransformedlocalgovernment,creatingasharpbreakwithwhatcamebefore.

inthischapterwearguethatthemanychallengestolocalgovernmentwithregardtowaterandsanitationdeliveryhavedeep-seatedorigins.Apartheidpoliciescombinedwithvariedlocaleconomicdevelopmentpatternsledtouneveninstitutionaldevelopmentandthusunevenwaterservicesdelivery.Policyreformsandprocessesintroducedinthetransitionperiodalsoproducedunevenness.Whiletheyledtomassiveexpansionofservices,thescopeandpaceofchangeinitselfledtocomplicationsinservicedelivery.itledtothedestabilizationofmanylocaladministrations,with,forexample,outflowsofstaffandlossofdatabases.inotherinstancestherewasstraightforwardservicedeliveryfailure;somewastewatertreatmentplantssimplystoppedoperating.thesehistoricalfactorscombinedwithrecentdevelopmentsexplainwhythespatialpatternsinservicedeliveryapparentjustpriortothedemocratictransitionpersistinbroadlysimilarwaystoday.

2.1. PRIoR To DeMoCARATIC TRAnSITIonWaterandsanitationgovernancepriortothedemocratictransitionwascomplex.Differentinstitutionswereresponsiblefordifferentfunctionsinvariousareas,sometimesinoverlappingfashion.theinstitutionalarchitecturegenerallycorrespondedwithprevailinggovernancearrangements.Whatfollowsisashortaccountofhowdifferentarmsofgovernmentandrelatedinstitutionswereinvolvedinwaterandsanitationservices.ingeneral,despitethiscomplexity,theprovisionofwaterandsanitationservicesinurbanareashashistoricallybeenlinkedtothedevelopmentoftownsandcities.

ingeneral,waterandsanitationserviceswereprovideddirectlytohouseholds,industryandcommercebymunicipalauthorities.theseauthoritieswereusuallyself-financing,deliveringwaterandsanitationservicesonauserpayprinciple.Howevertheyreceivedfinancialsupportfromtheprovincialadministrationsandnationalgovernment,throughitsvariousdepartments.thesystemoffinancialtransfersthroughloansandgrantsappearstohavebeenadhocanduneven.Becauseofapartheidspatialpolicies,theperformanceofmunicipalauthoritiescorrespondedtotheracially-definedinequitiesimposedbygovernment(PalmerDevelopmentgroup,1993:22).

Authoritiesservingwhiteareaswerebetterresourcedthanthoseinblackareasbecausetheycoulddrawonahealthytaxbase,includingrevenuefromratepayers,industriesandothercommercialenterprises.theseauthoritieswereabletogenerateprofitsfromwatersalesandwereevenabletobuildupreserves(PalmerDevelopmentgroup,1993:55,62).


Localauthoritiescreatedinthelate1980stogovernblackareasintownshipswereontheotherhandseverelyresourceconstrained.theygenerallyoperatedatafinanciallossandresortedtoborrowingfromsourcessuchastheprovinces,theDevelopmentBankofsouthernAfrica,theindependentDevelopmenttrustandotherentities(Palmerandeberherd,1994:61).thefinancialweaknessoftheseadministrationswasadirectresultofapartheidpolicywhichdidnotallowcommercialandindustrialdevelopmentsintheseareas(MinistryofProvincialAffairsandConstitutionalDevelopment,1998:12).

Whiletheseauthoritiesweresupposedtodeliverservicesdirectly,inpractice,duetolackoftheirowncapacityforactualimplementation,theycontractedouttowhitelocalauthorities(ibid.:18).furthermore,theyalmostalwayspurchasedtheirwaterfromadjacentwhitelocalauthorities.Also,theseauthoritieswereoftenregardedverypoorlybythecommunitiestheyservedsincetheywereseenasconspiringwithapartheid.Asaresulttheyexperiencedlowlevelsofpayment8forservices(PalmerDevelopmentgroup,1993:19,29).Manycivicorganisationsarosetoprotestagainsttheircreation(vanDonkandPieterse,2006:109).Authoritiesservingcolouredandindiancommunitiesperformedbetterthanblackones.Becauseoftheirlobbyingatthetri-cameralparliamenttheyreceivedmorefunding(PalmerDevelopmentgroup,1993:20).Authoritiesservingcolouredandindianareasweredistinctfromthoseoperatinginblackareasinregardtothelevelofauthorityassignedtothem.thoughtheformerhadlessautonomythanthewhiteareas,theydidhavelimitedpowersgrantedtothembythewhitelocalauthoritiesinwhichtheywereembedded(vanDonkandPieterse,2006:108).inthelateapartheidperiod,newmunicipalauthoritiescalledregionalservicesCouncilsandJointservicesBoardswereintroduced.someanalystsseetheseashavingbeencreatedinordertodeflectgrowingcallsfordemocratisationbyexpandingservicestoblackcommunities(MinistryofProvincialAffairsandConstitutionalDevelopment,1998:13).Partoftheirmandatewasprovisionofwaterandsanitationservices.theyfunctionedindifferentwaysdependingontheregioninwhichtheyoperated.insomeareastheyprovidedsanitationservices,inothersthisfunctionwasperformedbyexistinglocalauthorities.theirfundingmodelwassimilartoallotherlocalauthorityentitiesinthattheywereexpectedtobeself-financing.theycouldraiserevenueforoperationsthroughtaxesandleviesonlocalfirmsandalsoborrowfromfinancialmarketsanddevelopmentinstitutionssuchastheDevelopmentBankofsouthernAfrica(PalmerDevelopmentgroup,1993:18).

theselfgoverningterritories(transkei,Bophuthatswana,VendaandCiskei,knowncollectivelyasthetBVCstates)andnon-independentterritories(gazankulu,Kangwane,Kwandebele,Kwazulu,LebowaandQwaqwa)hadtheirownapproaches,policiesandsystemsofadministrationwithrespecttowaterandsanitationservices(Palmerandeberherd,1994:55).inthetBVCterritories,waterandsanitationservicesweredeliveredata‘national’governmentlevelthroughdepartments(PalmerDevelopmentgroup,1993:17).thoughthetBVCstateswereindependententitiesmanywerecompletelyreliantonthenationalgovernmentofsouthAfricaforfinancialsupport(DWAf,2006:4).

8 This culture of non-payment of services in protest against authorities seen as illegitimate persists to this day. While the personnel involved are different, some of our respondents observed that they faced great difficulties in obtaining payment for services in areas that were formerly part of the homeland system (Respondent e, 21 november 2013).


Provincialadministrationsplayedaminimalroleintheactualdeliveryofwaterandsanitationservices.theyweremainlyaconduitforfinancialresourcestolocalauthorities,especiallyblacklocalauthorities.financialsupporttoblacklocalauthoritiesfromprovincialadministrationswasonlyintroducedasameansofplacatinggrowingprotestsinthe1980s(Cameron,2013:168).insomecases,however,especiallywhennolocalauthoritieshadbeenestablished,theywereinvolvedindirectdelivery(PalmerDevelopmentgroup,1993:53).thethenprovincesofthecountry,whilenotdirectlyinvolvedintheadministrationoftheself-governingterritoriesandstates,exercisedinfluencesincetheymanagedlandusedecisionsinthoseterritories,controlledfinancesandoffereddevelopmentassistance(Palmerandeberherd,1994:56).throughitsdepartmentsthenationalgovernmentofsouthAfricahadadirect,thoughminimal,roleinwaterandsanitationservicesprovision.itconcerneditselfwithoverallwaterresourcemanagementthroughthenationalDepartmentofWaterAffairsandforestry(DWAf).thisentailedmanagingwaterbasins,riversandothersourcesofwater.inaddition,itwasconcernedwithwatermanagementforbroadernationaleconomicinterests,inparticulartosupportagricultureandindustrialproduction,especiallymining.thisrole,withnationalgovernmentinvolvedinwateronlyinrelationtowhatwereseenasnationalstrategicprioritiesratherthaneverydayneeds,9hasalonghistory,withnationalgovernmentsupportingtheconstructionoflargescaleirrigationschemesinthe1930s.AfterWorldWar2significantnationalfinancialsupportwasgiventoincreasingwatersuppliestourbanareaswherekeyeconomicactivitieswereemerging.Largewaterschemeswereconstructedspecificallytomeetthewaterrequirementsofindustriessuchaseskomandsasolseenaspivotaltotheeconomy(Muller,2012:12).

graduallyovertimehowever,asdemandforurbanwatergrew,nationalgovernmentbecamemorecloselyinvolvedinurbanaffairssuchasintheconstructionoflargewaterreservoirsfromwhichmunicipalwatercouldbeextracted(Palmerandeberherd,1994).

BulkdistributionofwaterwasgenerallyundertakenbywhatwereandstillareknownasWaterBoards.10WaterBoardspurchasedwaterfromthenationalgovernmentthroughDWAf.Municipalauthoritieswouldthenpurchasewaterdirectlyfromtheseentities.Howeverinsomecases,itappearsthattherewereadhocarrangementswheresomeWaterBoardswereinvolvedindirectdistributiontoconsumers.thoughWaterBoardswereallowedthroughlegislationtoundertakebulkwastewatertreatment,fewdidso(PalmerDevelopmentgroup,1993:24).

Accesstowaterandsanitationservicesandinfrastructurecorrespondedtoapartheidgovernancearrangementsasdiscussedabove.ingeneral,ratesofaccessandqualityofprovisionwerebestinareasgovernedbywhitelocalauthorities.studiesonthestateofaccessjustpriortothedemocratictransitionillustratethis.Withregardtowater,thestudiesshowthattheWesternCaperegionhadthebestrateofaccesstowaterservices,withtheformernortherntransvaalregionbeingtheworst(Palmerandeberherd,1994:156).

9 This is also reflected in institutional forms. For example, the original

national government department with some oversight over water issues was

called the Department of Irrigation. It evolved into the Department of Water Affairs and Forestry, then

simply Department of Water Affairs.

10 Some of these included Rand Water, Umgeni Water, Bloemarea, goldfields,

Albany Coast, Duivenhoks and Ruensveld, kalahari-east, kalahari-West, karos-geelkoppan, Mhlatuze,

Pelladrift, north Transvaal and Phalaborwe, Western Transvaal Regional

Water Company, north Transvaal and Phalaborwe, and Springbok (Palmer and eberherd 1994: 58).


Again,withrespecttoaccesstosanitationservices,theWesternCapeinthesameearly1990speriodhadthebestrecordwith85%ofthepopulationenjoyingsomeaccess.theworstperformingregionwasagainthenortherntransvaalwithonly27%ofthepopulationusingwaterbornesanitationsystemsand72%usingunimprovedpits(PalmerDevelopmentgroup,1993:12,16).theimagebelowrepresentsgeographicdistributionofaccesstowaterbornesanitationsystemsinurbanareasjustbeforethetransition.

Source: Palmer Development group & University of Cape Town, 1993

Figure 10: rate of access to waterborne sanitation prior to the democratic transition period

2.2. DeMoCRATIC TRAnSITIonitwasagainstthisbackdropofraciallydefinedprovisionofservicesthatthetransformationoflocalgovernmentcommenced.Wewillseethatinthedemocraticperiodreformsinlocalgovernmentgenerallyandinthewatersectorinparticularweredrivenbytheneedtoovercomethisapartheidlegacy.Wewillseealsothatthereisgoodreasontorevisitsomeoftheservicedeliverymodelsthatcomefromthatperiodandthatarestillwith


ustoday.forthemomentitisworthwhileoutliningthebroadcontextualchallengesinrelationtowhatitwasintendedshouldoccur.thechallengesweresummarisedasfollowsintheWhitePaperonLocalgovernment:

• skewedsettlementpatternswhichare functionallyinefficientandcostly • extremeconcentrationsoftaxableeconomic resourcesinformerlywhiteareas • Hugebacklogsinserviceinfrastructure inhistoricallyunderdevelopedareas • Creatingviablemunicipalinstitutionsfordenseruralsettlements • greatspatialseparationsanddisparities betweentownsandtownships,andurbansprawl • Creatingmunicipalinstitutionswhichrecognise thelinkagesbetweenurbanandruralsettlements • entrenchedmodesofdecision-making,administrationanddelivery • inabilitytoleverageprivatesectorresourcesfordevelopment • theneedtorebuildrelationsbetweenmunicipalities andthelocalcommunitiestheyserve.(Ministryof ProvincialAffairsandConstitutionalDevelopment,1998:21).

thetransformationagenda(Powell,2012:17–18)intheperiodoftransitiontodemocracywasinformedbyvariousfactors.followingtheWhitePaperonLocalgovernment(1998),theycanbesummarisedintosixbroadobjectives.theseare(i)improvingthedemocraticanddevelopmentalnatureoflocalgovernment,(ii)re-articulatingtherelationshipwithotherspheresofgovernment,(iii)changingjurisdictioninrelationshiptospaces,(iv)reconfiguringmodesofservicedelivery,(v)transformingthepersonnelmanagementsystem,(vi)introducingnewfinancialsystems.Wediscusstheseinturnbelow.

2.2.1 iMProVingtHeDeMoCrAtiC AnDDeVeLoPMentALnAture ofLoCALgoVernMenttheoverridingcritiquewasthatlocalgovernmenthadpreviouslybeenaninstrumentofpoliticalandsocio-economicexclusion.thebroadobjectivewastomakeitdemocratic.therewerevariousaspectstothisagenda.first,serviceswouldbeexpandedtoall,withoutracialprejudice.Asaresult,accesstowaterwasenshrinedinthenewConstitutionasabasichumanright.section27oftheBillofrightsintheConstitutionstatesthat“everyonehastherighttohaveaccessto...sufficient...water”.Accordingly,the“thestatemusttakereasonablelegislativeandothermeasures,withinitsavailableresources,toachievetheprogressiverealisationofeachoftheserights”(vanDonkandPieterse,2006:109).

theseconddimensionofdemocratisinglocalgovernmentinvolvedincreasingpublicinputorparticipationingovernanceprocesses.Whileitisdifficulttogeneralise,giventhehighlyvariedpicturepresentedpreviously,somearguethat,ingeneral,municipalauthoritieswereclosedtodeliberationnotonlyinternallybutalsoinrelationtolocalcommunities.towncouncils


beforedemocratisationaresaidtohave“actedinapaternalisticmanner,makingdecisions‘forthegood’ofcommunitieswithoutactuallyconsultingwiththosecommunities,althoughsomeinputandoversightwasofferedbyratepayersassociations”.thislimitedengagementwasconfinednotonlytolocalcommunities;otherspheresofgovernment,includingprovincialandnationalauthorities,wererarelyconsulted(Lawless,2007:63,65).

thislackofexternalaccountabilitywasmirroredinpracticeswithintheadministrationwhichwereexemplifiedinanumberofways.therelationshipbetweencouncillorsandstaffseemstohavebeencharacterizedbylimitedengagementsoverpolicyandimplementationmatters.onereasonforthisisheldtohavebeenthatcouncillorswerevolunteers,involvedinanadhocmannerwiththedaytodaymanagementofmunicipalities.Withintheadministrationitself,ahierarchicalcultureobtained.thechainofcommandstartedfromthetownClerkatthetopandwasmirroredinastaffingsystemwherepositionswerefilledbasedonexperience(Lawless,2007:63).

Policymakerswerehighlyconcernedtochangethismodeofoperation.Accordingly,theWhitePaperonLocalgovernmentwhichpromulgatedtheagendafortransformationarguedthat“manymunicipaladministrationsarestillcharacterisedbyhierarchicallinedepartments,poorcoordinationbetweenlinedepartments,andauthoritarianmanagementpractices.front-lineworkersremainde-skilledanddisempowered,andwomenandblackpeoplearenotadequatelyrepresentedinmanagementechelons”(MinistryofProvincialAffairsandConstitutionalDevelopment,1998:17).thistypeofviewaboutauthoritarianhierarchicalbureaucraciesdovetailedneatlywithargumentsmadebyproponentsoforganisationalmanagementreformtheoryandpracticesknownasnewpublicmanagement(nPM).ingeneralterms,itwasarguedthatbyapplying“arangeof‘techniques’,includingmanagementpractices,developedinthebusinessworld”(Chipkin,2013:6),suchasflatterorganisationalstructuresandwithmoreautonomyassignedtoindividualswithinorganisations,greaterefficienciescouldbegained(Lowndes,1997:44).

2.2.2 re-ArtiCuLAtingtHe reLAtionsHiPWitHotHer sPHeresofgoVernMentAnotherdimensionoftransformationinvolvedthereformofthelegalstatusoflocalgovernment.Municipalauthoritieshadbeenstatutoryinstitutionsexistingatthebehestofprovincialandnationaladministrations(MinistryofProvincialAffairsandConstitutionalDevelopment,1998:37).thelegalimplicationwasthat“itrenderedalltheiractions,includingthepassingofby-laws[and]administrativeactions,subjecttojudicialreview”.thenewconstitutionpassedin1996gavelocalgovernmentfullautonomyalbeitwithsupportandsupervisionfromprovincialandnationalgovernment(sALgA,2014).

redefiningthelegalnatureoflocalgovernmentimpliedachangeinrolesandresponsibilitiesbetweenthedifferentspheres.theseweresetoutintheWhitePaperonLocalgovernment(1998).However,thekeychangewasthatlocalgovernmentbecamethecentralagentofthe‘developmental


agenda’.thatis,itwastobethefrontlineactorthroughwhichmaterialandsocialserviceswouldbedelivereddirectly.Provincialandnationalgovernmentwouldplayasupportiveregulatoryroleinthisagenda.Withrespecttowaterservices,therewasnofundamentalshiftinthecities.Municipalauthoritieshad,asindicatedpreviously,alwaysprovidedwaterservices.themajorexceptioninthisregardrelatedtoruralareaswhereDWAfhadtakenchargeofdirectservicedeliveryinthetransitionperiod.Hereoperationsweredevolveddown,withDWAfceasingtosupplywatertocommunities(MinistryofProvincialAffairsandConstitutionalDevelopment,1998:46).

2.2.3CHAngingJurisDiCtion inreLAtionsHiPtosPACesArguably,priortothetransition,municipalauthoritieswereilldesignedinorganisationalsizeandformtoengagewiththepopulationsandspacestheyadministered.reformswereinstitutedwhichaimedtoreconfigurethemtoalignbetterwiththedifferentpartsofthecountry.Broadly,consolidationtoreducethenumberofexistingmunicipalitieswasamajoritemontheagendasinceitwasthoughtthiswouldproducemoreoperationalefficiencies.forexampleitwasarguedthatinmanycases,especiallyinlargeurbancentres,municipalboundariesdidnotcorrespondtoactuallyexistingsocialandeconomicactivities(MinistryofProvincialAffairsandConstitutionalDevelopment,1998:19,52).

2.2.4 reConfiguringMoDes ofserViCeDeLiVerythewaysinwhichmunicipalauthoritiesrenderedserviceswereseenasinefficientandmonopolisticastheyweresolelyresponsibleforallcomponentsofservicedelivery.reformsweresuggestedintheWhitePaperonLocalgovernment(1998)toallowotheractorsincludingtheprivatesector,non-governmentalorganisationsandotherstateentitiestorenderservicesonbehalfofmunicipalauthorities.suchnewactorscouldforinstancebeinvolvedinsuchaspectsofmunicipalgovernanceaspolicydevelopmentorinfrastructuremaintenance.

inaddition,municipalauthoritiesthemselvescouldberedesignedtoofferservicesaccordingtodifferentlogicsandmodels.forinstance,servicedeliveryentitiescouldberemovedfromdirectdaytodaymanagementbycouncilsandcouldoperateonamorecommerciallyorientedbasis(MinistryofProvincialAffairsandConstitutionalDevelopment,1998:74-80).thisprocesswasknownascorporatisation.itledtothecreationofwhatarecurrentlycalledMunicipallyownedentities(Moes).thesetendtobelargescaleserviceprovidersinareassuchaswastemanagement,water,wastewatertreatmentandparksandrecreation.

Again,theseideasabouthowparticulartransformationsinorganisationaloperationscouldleadtobetterservicedeliveryoutcomesareclearlyinthespiritofthenPMagenda.AsLowndesnotes,the“nPMpromotesnewstructuresdesignedtofacilitateclient/contractorsplits,the


decentralisationofproviderunits,‘consumer’choiceandfeedback,andservicemonitoring”(Lowndes,1997:44).thisintellectualheritageishowevernotacknowledgedintheWhitePaper.

2.2.5 trAnsforMingtHePersonneL MAnAgeMentsysteMConsistentwiththenPMagendaofreformingmodesofservicedeliveryforgreaterefficiencyandimprovedservicedelivery,systemsofpersonnelmanagementwerealsotobetransformed.somepositions,especiallyseniorones,weretobeawardedonshort-termcontractssoastoincentivisedeliveryandfocusonjoboutputs.thiswastoberegulatedthroughperformancecontracts.Affirmativeactionpolicies,especiallytargetingseniormanagementpositions,wouldalsotransformthepersonnelmanagementsystemtoreflectthecountry’sdemographics.Movingawayfromwhatwasseenastheauthoritarian,hierarchical,operationalmodel,staffwouldbegivenmorediscretiontoexecutetheirworkindividuallyorinself-organisedteams.Communicationflowswouldalsobeimprovedallowingforalltoparticipateinorganisationallife.Atthesametime,anewstafftrainingsystemwouldbedeveloped,moreinclusivethanthepreviousmodelthathadtendedtoexcludejuniorworkers.itwouldalsoincorporateawiderangeofskillsdevelopmentrequirementsandbedeliveredmoresystematically.finally,localgovernmenttrainingwouldberationalisedfromtwoseeminglyinefficientandwastefulsystemsintoasinglenationalsystem.thenewsystemwouldbe“flexible,decentralised,demand-led,andstructuredtoensurecontinuousevaluationandimprovement”(MinistryofProvincialAffairsandConstitutionalDevelopment,1998:81).

2.2.6 introDuCingneW finAnCiALsysteMsthefinalsetsofreformstargetedmunicipalfinances.Atanationallevel,itwasrecognisedthatmunicipalitieshadunevenaccesstoincome.therefore,firstly,thecorrelationbetweenthesizeofthelocaltaxbaseandlevelofperformancewashigh.tocompoundthis,systemsoftaxationwerepoorlydesigned,targetedunevenlyfromplacetoplace,andweaklyadministered.secondly,financialmanagementpracticesweresometimespoor,characterisedby“unrealisticbudgeting,”“poorcreditcontrol”and“lackofbudgetaryandfinancialdiscipline”.thirdly,itwasarguedthatlocalgovernmentdrewonalimitedrangeofrevenuesources.somemunicipalauthoritieswereforexampleaccusedofnotexploitingtheopportunitiespresentedbyborrowingfromthecapitalmarkets(MinistryofProvincialAffairsandConstitutionalDevelopment,1998:93,94).fourthly,wheretheyexisted,incomeflowsfromdifferentspheresofgovernmentwerefragmented,unpredictable,poorlydesignedagainstobjectiveneedsandoftendidnotservedevelopmentalpurposes.


reformssoughttoaddresstheseandotherdeficienciesinmunicipalfinance.Manyoftheproposedchanges,however,didnotfundamentallyrevolutionizethemunicipalfinancialmodel,simplytinkeringattheedges.therealitywasthatingeneralexistingsystemswereredesignedorimproved.ingeneralmunicipalitieshadbeenmostlyself-financing,relyingonlocalratesandtaxes.inadditiontheywereabletoseekexternalsourcesoffundingsuchasloansorgrantsfromcapitalmarketsorfromotherarmsofgovernment.thisdidnotfundamentallychange.However,therewasonemajorchange:theintroductionoftheprincipleofequityacrossthecountry.thatis,nomunicipalitywastobeprejudicedbyaweakereconomicbasesinceresourceswouldbeprovidedthroughthenationalfiscus.thefinancialinstrumenttoachievethisobjectivewastheequitableshareofnationallyraisedrevenue(equitableshare),whichwillbediscussedmorefullyinalatersection(MinistryofProvincialAffairsandConstitutionalDevelopment,1998:84).

thesesixdomainsconstitutedthebroadparametersforchangeinlocalgovernment.Howwasthistransformationprocessesintendedtooperatewithregardtowaterandsanitationservices?

2.3. STAgeS oF TRAnSFoRMATIon

AkeylegislativedocumentguidingthetransformationagendawastheLocalgovernmenttransitionActof1993(Act209of1993)(vanDonkandPieterse,2006:110).thisactlaidoutthreephasesofchange;pre-interim,interimandfinal.

2.3.1Pre-interiMPHAsethefirst,pre-interim,phasewassupposedtounfoldbetween2february1994andmunicipalelectionsin1995/1996.inthisphase,localnegotiatingforumsweresetupandchargedwithsettinguptemporarycouncilstogoverntheirrespectivejurisdictionsuntilelections.newboundariesweretobedrawn,councillorsgivenofficethroughappointmentandfinancialsystemsestablished(vanDonkandPieterse,2006:112).theoperatingmodewassupposedtobeconsensual,with,forexample,decisionsonbudgetexpendituretobereachedbytwothirdsmajority.Akeyoutcomeinthisphasewasthecreationof842municipalities,downfromover1000(Powell,2012:14).Becauseofthismodelofdecentralisedlocalgovernment,wheretemporarycouncilsweregivenpowerstoestablishgovernancemodelsastheysawfit,ahighlyvariegatedmodeloflocalgovernmentemerged(MinistryofProvincialAffairsandConstitutionalDevelopment,1998:14).

otherpolicytransformationsunfoldedthataffectedwaterandsanitationservices.CriticalwasthereconstructionandDevelopmentProgramme(rDP).oneofthefivemainelementsintherDPwastheprovisionofbasicneeds,conceptualisedtoinclude“landreform,housingandservices,waterandsanitation,energyandelectrification,telecommunications,transport,environment,nutrition,healthcare,socialsecurityandsocialwelfare”.theproblemtherDPidentifiedwasthat12millionpeopledidnothaveaccess


tocleandrinkingwaterand21millionpeoplewerewithoutdecentformsofsanitation(o’Malley,2014).Localgovernmentwaspositionedsquarelyasthestateinstitutionwiththeresponsibilityofcorrectingthisproblem:

localgovernmentsmustbemaderesponsibleforwater distribution,provisionofadequatesanitationfacilitiesand wasteremoval,andthefinancingoftheseservices throughappropriatetariffandlocaltaxmechanisms(ibid.).

eventhoughlocalgovernmentwasseenasultimatelytheinstitutiontodischargethesefunctions,thereseemstohavebeenarecognitionofthescaleofthetaskinrelationtoavailablecapacity(o’Malley,2014).thatis,itdidnotseempossibleinthisearlyphaseofstatetransformationthatalllocalgovernmententitieswouldbeabletoperformtothisagenda.Asaresult,DWAfaswellasthewaterboards,describedearlier,weretobeauthorisedtoexecutespecialprojects.thiswasproposedintheWhitePaperonWaterandsanitation.thesespecialprojects,generallylargescaleinfrastructuredevelopmentprojectswitharuralfocus,laterknownasPresidentialLeadProjectsandthenrDPProgramme1,2,3and4wereexecutedbyDWAfincollaborationwithnon-governmentalorganisations,waterboards,andlocalgovernmentauthoritieswiththerequiredcapacity(DWAf,2006:6).

2.3.2interiMPHAse(1996-2000)theinterimphasewhichfollowedthemunicipalelectionsranfrom1996to2000,parallelingthefirstdemocraticgovernmentundertheleadershipofnelsonMandela(Powell,2012:14).itwasthoughtthatinthisphase,thetransformationagendawouldbecompleted.Councillorswouldnowbeelected.Amajorconstitutionalchangein1996wasthatlocalgovernmentnowbecameformallyautonomous.inthisperiod,giventhehistoriclegacyofunevenserviceprovision,localgovernmentwasgivenanexplicitdevelopmentalmandate(vanDonkandPieterse,2006:113).inthisperiod,awatershedpolicydevelopmentwasthepublicationoftheWaterservicesAct(Act108of1997).thisActformallysetouttheintentionsoftherDP;itprovidedanationallegislativeframeworkforhowwaterandsanitationservicesweretobegovernedanddelivered.itstipulatedthathenceforthitwastheresponsibilityoflocalgovernmenttoprovidewaterandsanitationservices,howevermakingtwokeydistinctionsaboutgovernanceanddelivery.ontheonehandtherewouldbeWaterservicesAuthoritiesandontheotherWaterservicesProviders.theformerheldlocalgovernanceauthoritysowouldultimatelydecideonstrategy,operations,fundingallocationsandrelatedgovernanceaspects.ontheotherhand,thelatterwouldberesponsiblefordeliveryofservices.suchagentscouldbeothermunicipalities,waterboards,privatecommercialentitiesandnon-governmentalorganisations.theWaterservicesAuthoritieswouldenterintocontractualarrangementswiththeWaterservicesProvidersforthegivenservice.itwashoweverpossiblethattheWaterservicesAuthorityandProviderwouldbethesameentity(DWAf,2006:16).

Anewnationalfiscalenvironmentwasalsointroducedatthistimewhichhadconsequencesforhowlocalgovernmentingeneralandwaterservices


inparticularoperated.firstthecountrypivotedtowardsthemacroeconomicgrowthemploymentandredistribution(geAr)policyframework.geArsetouttoachieveincreasedeconomicgrowthinordertocreatejobs,expandservicesandreduceinequality,albeitwithinastrongframeworkof“fiscaldiscipline”(Powell,2012:16).thismeantthatintheoryatleast,“localgovernmentreformswouldbedisciplinedbyfiscalreformgoals,budgetcontractionandtightertreasurycontrols”(Powell,2012:13).inaddition,italsomeantthatlocalgovernmentswouldbemuchmoreopentoforcesofglobalisationwithattendanteconomictransformations;productionprocessesoffirmswouldchange,somebusinesseswouldclose,newoneswouldemerge.suchprocesseswouldaffecttherevenuebaseoflocalgovernmentbutitwasultimatelyuptomunicipalinstitutionstomanagesuchdynamics(MinistryofProvincialAffairsandConstitutionalDevelopment,1998:19).

inaddition,theequitableshare,whichprovidedforredistributionoffundsfromthenationalfiscustolocalgovernment,wasintroducedinthisperiod.throughtheequitableshare,atleastaccordingtotheoriginaldesign,itwasintended“thatlocalgovernmentraised90percentofitsownrevenueandonly10percentwouldbesubsidised”(Powell,2012:15).furthermoreitwastobean“unconditional”allocationmeaningthatlocalgovernmentcouldallocateitastheysawfit.itwasbasedonthe“costtothemunicipalityofprovidingapackageofbasicservicesandthenumberofindigenthouseholdsinthemunicipality”(DWAf,2006:16).Aportionwastobeallocatedforwaterservices.Howeverthiswassetagainstanoverallfiscalframeworkwhereservicesweresupposedtobeself-financing.nationaltransferstolocalauthoritieswerenotsupposedtosupportongoingoperationsandmaintenancebutonlywherenecessarysubsidisecostsofprovidingservices(DWAf,1994:18).in2011thereweremovestoreformtheequitableshareformula,givenconcernsaboutunderfunding(Powell,2012:25).effortsinitiatedinthepreviousperiodtoaccelerateaccessbypreviouslyunder-servicedcommunitiestowaterservicescontinued.DWAfsoughttoincorporateadditionalparticipantsininfrastructuredevelopment,launchingaprogrammewhereprivatesectoractorswouldbepaidto“build,operate,trainandtransfer”waterandsanitationservicestomunicipalities.in1997thefirstprojectswerelaunchedinruralareasintheeasternCape,Limpopo,MpumalangaandKwaZulu-natal(DWAf,2006:16).

2.3.3finALPHAsethefinalphasewassupposedtocommencein2000afterthesecondroundofmunicipalelectionssincedemocraticemancipation(vanDonkandPieterse,2006:113).thisphasewasfurthersegmentedintothree,thefirstfrom2000-2002entailingestablishmentofthenewformoflocalgovernment,thesecondfrom2002-2005consolidatingit,andfinally,from2005onwards,itwasimaginedthatlocalgovernmentwouldenterafutureofsustainability(Powell,2012:16).

Animportanttransformationinthisphasewasthefurtherreductioninthenumberofmunicipalitiesfrommorethan1000to284(Powell2012:15).thisprocessinvolvedmergersofpreviouslyseparatecouncils(DWAf,


2006:16).Apolicyoffreebasicserviceswasalsointroduced.theservicesconsidered‘basic’werewater,electricity,sanitationandwastecollection.Withregardtowaterandsanitation,thiswasdefinedas“potablewatersupplyof25l/person/daywithin200mcartagedistance,andaventilatedimprovedpitlatrine”(DWAf,1994:25).Accompanyingthispolicywouldbeincreasesinthelevelsoffiscaltransferstolocalgovernment(Powell,2012:16).

AnotherkeydevelopmentwasthatinthisperiodDWAfbegantransferringwaterserviceprojectsinruralareasthatithadbeenrunningtolocalgovernments.HenceforththeDepartmentwouldnolongerbeinvolvedindirectprovisionofwaterservicestoendusers.itwasenvisagedthatthisprocesswouldbecompleteby2008(DWAf,2006:16).

2.4. ToWARDS CRISIS “oneoftheproblemsis,systemsherearesofragileand yousee...theamalgamationofmunicipalities,theamalgamation ofvariousformsoflocalgovernmentinthiscountrywashuge, huge:don’tunderestimateit”(respondentV13september2013)

thisorderly,sequentialvisionofchangefailedtomaterialize.Asearlyas2001variouscommentatorswereworryingthatthingsweregoingwrong(Powell,2012:16).theprocessofchangeenvisagedintheLocalgovernmenttransitionActof1993(Act209of1993)introducedvariablesthatcomplicatedtheabilityofmunicipalitiesnotonlytoprovidewaterandsanitationservicesevenlyacrossthecountry,butalsotheirbroaderdevelopmentalmandate.Wehavenotedthatconsolidationwasamajorexercise,meaningthatpreviouslyindependentcouncilswouldoperateasoneingovernanceandservicedelivery.inpracticethismeantthatatthebureaucraticlevel,previouslydisparatesystemsoffinancialmanagement,rulemaking,tariffsetting,personnelmanagement,servicedeliveryandotheraspectswouldhavetobebroughttogether.itisworthquotingoneofourresearchrespondentsatlengthtoappreciatethediversityofsystems:

youwillfindthatinmanagingtheirservices,somelocalauthoritieswillhaveinhousepeople,whowilldotheconstruction,allthemaintenanceetc.inanotherarea,theywouldhavemovedawayfromthatandoutsourcedsomeofit,soyouhadtobalanceallofthis...eachlocalauthorityhadtheirownadministration,theirownbylaws,theirowntariffsettings,policiesetcetera,nowallofasuddentheyhadtoprepare,say,onebylaw,forinstanceforwater,thatwillgovernhowwewillprovidewater...thetariffswerequiteachallengebecauseyouwillfindthatsomeareasweremuchmoreexpensivethanothers.totakeanexample,inBenoniyouwillpay,say,r4perkilolitreofwater,inAlbertonyouwillpayr2.80perkilolitreandingermistonr3perkilolitre.sonow,allofasudden,youneedtobalancethisandyoumustphaseitinoveraperiod(respondentP,12november2013).

theprocessesofconsolidationbroughttogethertowncouncilsthatnotonlyhaddifferentadministrativesystemsbutalsovaryingcapabilities.forexample,


inthegovanMbekiMunicipality,twotowncouncils,secundaandevander,werereportedly“fairlyfunctionalintermsof...revenueand…operations”whileontheotherhandin“Leandrayouwouldn’treallysaythemunicipalitywasfunctionalbecauseitwasnotgeneratingincome”(respondentC,20november2013).thisalsomeantthatnewadministrationswereinheritingdebtsorsurplusesasthecasemightbe(respondentL,28november2013).

integratingsuchsystemswasanextremelydifficultundertaking.someofthedifficultieswerethechangesinpersonnel.Peoplemovedgeographically,assumingnewresponsibilities,workingwithnewcolleaguesfromdifferentorganisationalcultures,withnewsalarystructuresbeingintroduced,encounteringtheseandotherformsofuncertainty.Asonerespondentobserved“youmustalsounderstandthattosome,theamalgamationprocessin2000wasnotsmoothintermsofhandover.itwasnotasmoothprocess:youknow,peoplewereintimidated”(respondentC,20november2013).Anotherrespondenthelpsenableustoappreciatetheimpactofthetransitionprocess:

Peopleweremovingallovertheshow...idon’tknowwhetheritwasapoliticaldecisionforcedontopmanagementorwhetheritwasjustatopmanagementdecision[tomovepeople]...tosay...ok,wewillkeepasmallcore:saythereweretwentypeopleworkinginasection,nowwewillleavethreepeoplehere,andwewillsendtherestelsewhere...inmyopinionitwasadisasterbecauseallthatinstitutionalcapacitythatyouhaveinacertainarea,youtakethesepeopleandamalgamatethem,ratherthanleavethemwheretheyare.overtime,thisthingwillsortitselfoutbutdon’tdeliberatelymovepeoplefromtheretotheretothere.Bydoingthattheylostalotofinstitutionalcapacityandtheyalsolostalotofinformation...anditalsomadepeoplenegativebecauseapersonlivingthere,itwashischoicetostay,sayinareaA,withhisfamilythereandhiswifeworkingthereandhischildrenatschoolthere:nowallofasuddenheismoved,withnochoice...allthathadaverynegativeinfluenceonpeople’sattitudes(respondentP,12november2013).

Asnotedpreviouslytheprocessitselfledtoservicefailures.onerespondentgaveastarkillustrationofhowthishappenedinoneregion:

Welltheyhadtakenthefunctionawayfromthelocalmunicipality,youhavethesesituationswherethedistricthadtakenawaythefunctionfromthelocalauthority,younowhadsomeonelikeageneralworkerinchargeofaplant...therewasthispictureofthisflowdiagram,thattrackstheflowratio[ofeffluentintoawastewatertreatmentplant],withtheflowratecomingin.ithadjustsortofstoppedatonepointandalltheinkhaddrainedout,itwaslikethismomentwhentheyleft,youknowtheinkhadjuststoppedandhadjustrunoutintothisthing.itwaslikethisincrediblesymbolofsomething.itwaslikeabandonment(respondentn,22october2013).

otherexamplesofdamagerelatetolossesofinformation.somemunicipalitieslostoperationaldatasuchasmapsofexistingwaterinfrastructure.forwhateverreasonssuchrecordswerenotcentrallyarchivedinthenew


municipaladministrativeheadquarters.thismeantthatadditionaleffortandresourceshadtobeallocatedforsearchingouttherecordswherevertheymightbeand/orphysicallyexploringforwaterpipes(respondentsQande).timewaslost.inotherinstanceswheremunicipalitiesmayhavehadongoinginteractionsinvolvingsharingofoperationalinformation,amalgamationdidnotcomplicateordelayoperations:

Luckily,westartedwithaprocessinthenineties,whenitwasstillthelocalauthorities,withtheregionalservicesCouncilwhereiworked.Wedidthisbecausealthoughtherewereindependentlocalauthorities,theywereborderingeachother,sowhatwesaidatthatstagewasthatweneededtoworktogetherandwesetupaforuminabout1992/93whereweworkedtogetherwiththelocalauthorities...insteadof,say,Boksburgbuildingareservoirhereinacertainareamaybeitcanalsosupplyedenvaleorwhatever.itmakessense:let’sratherputourresourcestogetheranddothat.so,wehadalreadystartedabouteightyearsbeforethemetrobegan.Westartedtoworklikethatandthenwerealisedthatweshouldalsohaveaninformationsystemaboutallourpipesandsoon,sizesandwhatever,andwestartedtoputthatalltogetherandwealsodidsomemodelling.so,whenthemetrocamewewereactuallyfaradvanced(respondentP,12november2013).

Perhapsmostchallengingofallwasthatbureaucracieswhichhadbeeninstrumentsofexclusionunderapartheid,servingrelativelysmallwhitepopulations,werenowexpectedtoexpandtheirservicestomanymorepeople,includingextremelypoorblackpopulations.overnightthegapbetweensupplyanddemandincreaseddramatically.Withcommensurateincreasesoffinancialresources,personnel,infrastructureandother‘inputs’therewouldhavenochallenges.Howeverallocationwasvariableandadhoc(MinistryofProvincialAffairsandConstitutionalDevelopment,1998:17).

oneilluminatingillustrationweencounteredinvolvedamergerofahomelandandwhitecouncil.Awatertreatmentplantadjacenttoahomelandareahadbeenerectedtoservicethewhitearea.Duringthetransitionperioditwasdecidedtoextendwaterservicestothehomelandarea.Howeverthewatertreatmentplantwasnotdesignedtosupplythenewvolumesofwaterrequired.Whilesomecreativityintechnicaloperationoftheplantenabledittomeetthedemand,thiswasattheexpenseofmaintenance.inotherwords,theplantcouldnotstoprunningsomeofitspumpsforroutinemaintenance,sincedoingsoeffectivelymeantinterruptingthewatersupply(respondente,21november2013).

Duetothesechallenges,thevisionofreformedmunicipalitiesenteringaperiodofsustainabilityafter2005becameincreasinglyelusive.instead,adiscourseofcrisisandfailurebegantofeature,atleastinpopulardiscourse.Policy-makersandotheractorshaveovertimerespondedbylaunchingrepeatedinitiativestoaddressthemalaiseinlocalgovernment.rakabe(2009:152)identifiesatleast15separateinitiativeslaunchedbyallspheresofgovernment,internationaldonoragencies,andotheragenciesfrom1996


to2010.thefinancialcostsoftheseeffortsarelikelytohavebeenhigh.Consolidatedfiguresarenotavailable,butthescaleoftheexpenditureisindicatedbythemorethanr2billionallocatedunderthefinancialManagementgrantintheperiod2001-2012(PetersandVannieuwenhuyzen,2012:287).Whatisalsoparticularlystrikingisthatinspiteoftheseeffortsatcapacitybuilding,thehistoricpatternsofaccesspresentjustpriortothetransitiontodemocracypersisttothisday,withunevenaccessstillcoincidingwithhistoricapartheid-erapatterns.Considerthemapsbelow:

Figure 11: Map of former Bantustan territories

Source: encyclopaedia Britannica, 2009.

Bantustan territories

Bophuthatswana

BOTSWANAGaborone

Ciskei

Gazankulu

KaNgwane

KwaNdebele

KwaZulu

Lebowa

Qwaqwa

Transkei

Venda

Historical province boundaries

PretoriaMaputo

Durban

East London

Maseru

MbabaneJohannesburg

Bloemfonteon

Cape Town

Kimberley

TRANSVAAL ZWAZILAND

NATAL

LESOTHO

CAPE

ORANGE FREE STATE

SOUTH AFRICA

ZIMBABWE

MO

ZAM

BIQ

UE


thefigurebelowshowsthecurrentprovincialboundaries.

Figure 12: Current provincial boundaries

Limpopo

Mpumalanga

kwazulu natal

eastern Cape

north West Province

northern Cape

Free State

gauteng

Western Cape


Figure 12: Current provincial boundaries

thetablebelowpresentsaperformancehistoryofwaterdeliverybetween2010and2012accordingtotheBlueDropsystem.BlueDropisanationalsystemwhere“allelementsinthewatersupplysystemincludingsamplingofwaterattheintakeandtheoutflowofthewatertreatmentworks,indistributionpipelinesandreservoirsandatthepointofuse”areassessed(DWAf,2013:43).thetableliststhetoptenperformersindescendingorderfromthetop,showingthatingeneralwellperformingmunicipalitiescontinuetobethosewhichdonotoriginateinhomelandsorblacklocalauthorities,whichwereweakened,asdiscussedpreviously,byapartheidpolicies.

Source: Department of Water Affairs Blue Drop Reports, http://

www.dwaf.gov.za/dir_ws/dwqr/

table 2: top ten Blue Drop performers, 2011-2012


Patternsinwastewatermanagementrevealsimilardynamics.thetablebelowrepresentsgreenDropscoreslistedindescendingorderfromthetop.LiketheBlueDropsystem,greenDropisacompositeindexmeasuringhowmunicipalitiestreatanddisposeoftheirwastewater.inthisexercisethe“criticalperformanceindicatorsincludethedesignandoperatingcapacityofthewastewatertreatmentworks,complianceoftheeffluenttoagreedstandards,thetechnicalskillsofthemanagementauthorityandtheconditionofinfrastructure”(DWAf,2013:43).therankingsarebasedonwhattheprocessreferstoasCumulativeriskrating(Crr).theCrrassessesratesofeffluentflowingintotheplantinrelationtodesigncapacity,qualityoftreatedwaterbeingdischargedfromtheplants,andtechnicalskillsavailable.Here,weonlyshowtwoyearssincethe2009reportdidnotpresentCrrpermunicipality.

Source: Department of Water Affairs green Drop Reports, http://www.dwaf.gov.za/dir_ws/gDS/Docs/DocsDefault.aspx

table 3: top ten Green Drop performers, 2011-2012

Municipality

Bitou LM Bitou LM Local Western Cape

Western Cape

Gauteng

GautengGauteng

Gauteng

Gauteng

Gauteng

NorthWest

NorthWest

KZN

Western Cape

Western Cape

Western Cape

Western Cape

Western Cape

Western Cape

Local

Local

Local

Metro

Local

Local

Metro

Local

Local

Local

Metro

Metro

Local

District

Metro

Metro

Local

Metro

Local

George LM

Tlokwe LM

Tlokwe LM

Witzenberg LM



Ethekwini Metro

City of Cape Town

West Coast District

Municipality

Randfontein LM

Witzenberg LM

Ekurhuleni

Mogale City

Category Province Municipality Category Province

2011 Ranking2012 Ranking

George LM

Emfuleni LM

City of Cape Town

Ekurhuleni

Mogale City

Western Cape

Gauteng

Gauteng


Howdoweunderstandthespatialpersistenceofthesepatterns?Mostanalysesattributelocalgovernmentfailurestolackofcapacity.Asnotedintheintroduction,avarietyofotherexplanations,includingcorruption,urbanisation,andtheeffectofintergovernmentalrelationsarefrequentlycitedasthecauses.nodoubtallofthesehavesomeinfluenceasweconfirmedinourempiricalwork.Wehavealsoshownherehowlongerinstitutionallegaciesofadministrativecapacity–allowed,evendesigned,todevelopunevenlyinsouthAfricaunderapartheid–stillshapeservicedeliverytoday.serviceswereexpandedatanimpressiveratepost-1994.thisexpansionoftentookplaceinthecontextofandrelieduponinstitutionsoflocalgovernmentthatwereundergoingmassivetransformation.Areaswhichbroughttogetherwhitecouncilsandformerhomelandareasfacedaparticularlycomplextaskintheamalgamationprocess,asshown.thisgoesalongwaytounderstandingtheextentofunevennessofwaterserviceprovisionacrossthecountry.Butitisnotthewholestory.Asnoted,thedominantexplanationinpolicyreformdiscourseandpopulardebatesisthatofaskillsdeficit.Andindeedwewillshowthistobethecase,yetthenatureoftheskillscrisisandtheconditionswhichhavecreateditarenotthosecommonlyreferredtoinpopulardiscourse.Weturntothisfulleranalysisinthefollowingchapter.


≤ Understanding capacity: All about officials’ skills?

3Chapter


“ifishowedyouthevulnerabilityindexinthiscountry,11itishorrificintermsof...thecolourcodingsystem.therearethreeorfourmunicipalitiesthatareinthegreenzone,therestareintheyellow,amberandredzones.thatmeansthattheyareextremelyvulnerablegoingforward,sotherearealotofvulnerabilityflagscomingup.it...allrevolvesaroundskillsandcapacity,theabilitytorunaproperbusiness,twentyfourseven,365daysayear”(respondentf,7october2013)

3.1. introDuCtionAsthequotationaboveillustrates,lackofskillsisthemostcommonlygivenexplanationforpoorperformance.12thishastwomeanings.onereferstoanabsenceofpeopletofillparticularpositions.forexamplethesignificanceofpersonnelshortageswasunderlinedinasurveywhereamajorityofmunicipalitiesdirectlyprovidingwaterandsanitationservicescomplainedaboutstaffshortages(Mjoliandschoeman,2007:44).13theotherdimensionreferstoalackofrelevantknowledge.Withtheformer,mostpolicydiscussionspointtovacancyrates.Withthelatterpeoplemaybeappointedtopositionswithouttheabilitytocarryouttheirresponsibilities(sAiCe,2011:11).

thischapterexploresthenatureandimpactoftheskillschallenge.itattemptsaquantitativepicture,andfinallyexploresfactorsthatgeneratethechallenge.itarguesthatwhilemunicipalitiesareconfronted,quantitativelyandqualitatively,byinsufficiencyorabsenceofawiderangeofskills,thepictureisunevenacrossthecountry.Largemetropolitanmunicipalitiesmayattractandretainthepeopleandskillsthattheyneedwhileothersstruggle.inaddition,inwaterservices,themostcriticalshortagesoccurinarangeofbasictechnicaloperationalfunctions.itshowsthattheseshortages,intermsofnumbersofpeopleavailable,andvacancies,havealonghistoryandareintimatelytiedtowidernationalpoliticalandeconomicdynamics.

3.2. iMPACtoftHesKiLLsMALAisetheroleofskillsininfluencingperformanceisoftenemphasised.Anationalreviewoflocalgovernmentperceivedcorrelationsbetweenpoorlyperformingmunicipalitiesandlowlevelsofstaffskills(CogtA,2009:9).Morerecently,thesouthAfricanHumanrightsCommissionarguedthat“whilewaterandsanitationservicedeliveryisthecompetencyoflocalgovernment,manymunicipalities,particularlyinpoororruralareas,donothavetheskillsandcapacitytoimplementtheirmandate”(sAHrC,2014:16).similarly,itwasarguedinasurveyofthestateofwastewatertreatmentplantsinsouthAfricathatthemostsignificantproblemtheyfacedwasnotfundingoreventheneedtoupgradetheinfrastructurebuta“criticalshortageoftrained,skilledandexperiencedprocesscontrollersandmechanical/electricalmaintenancestaff”(synmanandvanniekerk,2008:10).

11 The Municipal Vulnerability Index. Refer to the introduction for this index.

12 The discourse around skills often uses the word interchangeably with ‘capacity’.

Much policy discourse for instance bemoans the lack of capacity, meaning

a shortage of people and knowledge.

13 This excluded those that outsourced the function or had set up semi-

autonomous entities such as Municipal owned entities to provide the services.


Declineisarecurrenttropeinthenarrativeaboutgovernment,localgovernmentinparticular(Muller,2009:2;nationaltreasury,2011:116).effectively,thestorygoesthatthestateofgovernance,inthiscaseofwatermanagement,wasoncegoodandthatsince1994therehasbeenasystematicdeterioration.evengovernmentdepartmentshavebecomeaccustomedtotellingthisstory.thenationaltreasury,forexample,reportsthat,“whereasin1994,therewere20engineersper100000people,thishasnowdroppedto3per100000people”(nationaltreasury,2011:140).

theskillscrisisisalsounderstoodtoaffectsmallandruralmunicipalitiesmost(sAiCe,2011:12;PetersandVannieuwenhuyzen,2012:283).spatialunevennessofskillsiscertainlyanobservablefact.forexampleregisteredprofessionalengineersaremainlyfoundinmetropolitanmunicipalities(MunicipalDemarcationBoard,2012:51).onereasonisthatlargermunicipalities,whichtendtobeinmajorurbancentres,areseenbymanyprofessionalsasmoreattractiveplacesinwhichtolive(respondenty,16september2013).Asaresultitisreasonabletoexpectacorrespondingvariabilityinmunicipalperformance.

Whataretheconsequencesofthisskillsmalaise?theabsenceofsuchskillsleadstofailuresinoperationsandinthemaintenanceofexistingassets(nationaltreasury,2011:140;Lawless,2007:323).Concretelythismeansthatusersexperienceinterruptionsinwatersupplyorwastewaterisnottreated,leadingtorawsewagespillingintowatercourses(WaterresearchCommission,2013).sometimes,asweobservedinourresearch,itmeansthatbasicandsimpleinfrastructuralproblems,thatcanseverelyunderminetheoperationsofwastewatertreatmentplantsasawhole,cannotbesolved.forexample,staffatawastewatertreatmentplantwevisitedhadbeenunabletocorrectabalancingmechanismallowingwastewatertocirculate.twotankshadthereforestoppedrunning.oneofourinterviewrespondentsdescribedacutelyhowstaffshortagesimpactondailyoperations:

youknow,weareworkingadhoc.Wedon’tevenhaveamaintenancedepartmenttodomaintenance.Wearedoingthingsadhocbecauseifwesaywearegoingtomaintain,itwilltakeforeverbecauseeachandeverydaywhenyoucomein,thereareservicerequests,youunderstand?Weneedtoaddressthoseservicerequestsbecausewecan’tsayiambusywithmymaintenanceprogrammewhilethereisasewerblockageorpeopledon’thavewater.youhavetogoandrepairthepipe,youhavetogoandunblockthatsewer,soitisdifficultifyouareoperatingatafortysevenpercentstaffcomplement(respondenti,27november2013).

inotherwordsdaytodayoperationsofthiswaterandsanitationunitarecharacterisedbyasenseofcrisis.staffappearedtobeconstantlystrugglingtocatchupwiththechallenges.


3.3. tHesCALeoftHeCHALLengeisitpossibletoquantifytheskillschallenge?Asmanyhaveobserved,therearenumerousproblemswiththedataontheextentoftheskillsproblem(DWAf,2009).Mostofthedataavailableisthereforeonlysuggestiveandshouldnotbetakenasacompletelyaccuraterepresentationoftheextentoftheproblem.

Whatskillsarewetalkingabout?someliteraturereferstoskillsdeficitsintheentiremunicipalenvironment.thisbroadcategoryoftenincludesmanagement,projectmanagement,supplychainmanagement,leadershipandfinancialmanagement(PetersandVannieuwenhuyzen,2012:280;HoskingandJacoby,2013;DWAf,2009:55;Mjoliandschoeman,2007:47).italsoincludes“healthandhygienepractitioners,environmentalhealthofficers,community/healthdevelopmentworkers,home-basedcaregivers,trainers,economicandlegalexperts”(DWAf,2009:88).someoftheseskillsaregenericandnotsectorspecific.

However,itisoftenstatedthatthelackoftechnicalskillsisgreaterinwaterservicesthaninotherbranchesofgovernment.inthiscategoryofworkersareoftenincludedengineers,technologists,waterscientists,technicians,artisans,processcontrollers,healthandhygienepractitioners(nationalPlanningCommission,2011:22;nationaltreasury,2011:140;synmanandvanniekerk,2008;Mjoliandschoeman,2007).inwaterservicesmostresearchseemstoagreethatthegreatestnumberofvacanciesoccurinwastewatermanagement(nationaltreasury,2011:116).inasampleofmunicipalitiesinsouthAfrica,onesurveyfoundthatdepartmentsresponsibleforwaterserviceshadanaveragevacancyrateof34%(WaterresearchCommission,2013:2).otherresearchfoundthatin2007about3,000civilengineerswereneededinthewatersector.thisrepresented57%ofwhatwasrequired(DWAf,2009:68).Atthetimeofourresearch,thegovanMbekiMunicipalityreportedlyhada47%vacancyrateforwaterandwastewaterfunctions(respondenti,27november2013).thesevacanciesoccurunevenlyevenwithinonemunicipality.forexampleduringourfieldworkwediscoveredthatinuthukelaDistrictMunicipalityonewastewatertreatmentplantwasstaffedby28peoplewhileanotherinthesamemunicipalityonlyhadtwo(respondente,21november2013).

thereisdebateonwhicharethemostvitalskillswithintherangeofrelevantoccupationsforthedaytodayoperationofwaterservices.somehaveproposedthat“civilengineeringisthecriticalprofessionforservicedelivery”(Lawless,2007:23).othershaveemphasisedthatwhilecivilengineeringskillsareimportant,itisoftenmoremundaneskillsthatare,daytoday,mostcriticalinthissector:

[Municipalities]don’tfilltheirlowlevelvacancieswhichisactuallytheoperationallevel.thatistheleveloftheguysthatareworkinginthewaterplant,theguywhohastothrowthechemicalsintothepondeverythreehoursorwhateverheneedstodo.Heisactuallythereallyimportantperson(respondentV,13september2013).

Anotherrespondentwassimilarlyunequivocal,sayingthat“thepeoplewhoneedtogetwaterservicesgoingaretheartisans”,astheyareinvolvedindailymaintenanceofinfrastructure(respondento).Anothersupportedthisview,


holdingthat“asmuchasyouneedskilledmanagement,thecrisisinthewatersectorsitsthereatthebottomwithartisans”(respondentH,31January2014).

ifthereisashortageofskillsineveryarea,thenwhichskillsareespeciallyimportant?intheseterms,theskillsquestionistransformedintoaninstitutionalone.Whichfunctionsorrolesaremorevitaltoinstitutionalperformancethanothers?inthecaseofwater,inwhichareasistheskillsshortageespeciallydetrimental?

isitnecessary,forexample,foreverymunicipalitytohaveitsownengineer?onerespondentansweredthatitdependsonthesizeofthemunicipalityoroncollectiveagreementsamongstvariousmunicipalitiestoshareanengineer.(respondentK,29July2013).

seniorengineeringskillsarenotrequiredcontinuouslyforthesmoothoperationof,forexample,wasteorwatertreatmentplants.Availabledatasuggeststhatshortagesaremostacuteinthemoreelementaryskillsthatourtworespondentsdiscuss.forinstanceareportbyDWAfstatesthatthe“watersectorurgentlyneeds4,000artisans/technicians”.theseincludeboilermakers,welders,bricklayers,carpenters,electricians,fencemakers,fittersandturners,instrumentmechanics,machineoperators,masons,mechanics,millwrights,painters,plumbers,treatmentworksoperators,processcontrollers,sewerageworksoperators,waterworksoperators(DWAf,2009:118).thiswasalsoemphasizedbytheLocalgovernmentsetA(LgsetA)whicharguedthateventhough“staffinglevelswithinlocalgovernmenthaveremainedrelativelystablesince2002”thehighestvacancyratesoccurred“inelementaryoccupations,clericalandplantandmachineoperators”.itisalsonoteworthythattherearemoreemployeesinlocalgovernmentinsuchpositionsthaninanyother(LgsetA,2010:13,15).

Atthesametimethereisahighdemandinmunicipalitiesforthesepositions.44%ofrespondentsagreedinasurveyconductedbytheenergyandWatersetA(eWsetA)thatthehighestdemandforskillsoccurredwithinthebroadcategoryoftechniciansandtradeWorkers.thisgroupincludesartisans,boilermakers,chemistrytechnicians,electricians,plumbers,pipelinemaintenancetechniciansandwatertreatmentoperators(eWsetA,2011:87–90).thecriticaldemandforsuchskillswasdemonstratedaptlyinourresearchinthegovanMbekiMunicipality:

Currentlyionlyhavetwomillwrightsandthosearethepeoplethatareresponsibleforthemaintenanceofthepumps,maintenanceofyourmotorsandsoforth.sowehaveeleventowns,sixwaterwastetreatmentworks,elevenwaterandwaterpumpstations,alsothirty-sixsewerpumpstations.forthoseactivities,forthepumpsandthetoolsthatneedtobemaintained,withtwomillwrightsitishighlyimpossible.itistoomuchontheirplate,youunderstand?(respondenti,27november2013).

Anotherrespondentobservedthattherehadbeenashortageofmillwrightsforsometime:“fromthebeginningweusedtotalkaboutit,wewerecomplainingthatweneedextrapeoplebecausewemustdopreventativemaintenanceonthepumps.Buttherearenopeopletodoit”(respondentH,31January2014).


Whiletherehasbeenhighdemandforsuchskills,thereappeartobefewerpeoplegoingintotheeducationsystemtoacquirethem.Consistentwiththenarrativeofdeclinereferredtoearlier,whileinthe1980stherewereover12,500registeredartisans,thenumberhaddeclinedtoabout2,500intheearly2000s(LgsetA,2010:30).thegraphbelowrepresentshistoricaldataonenrolmentsforapprenticeshipexams.thisisdatacollectedbytheinstitutefornationalDevelopmentofLearnershipsemploymentskillsandLabourAssessments(inDLeLA).inDLeLA,previouslyknownastheCentrefortradetests,is,asthenamesuggests,anationalcentrewhere,aftertraining,artisansaretestedtocheckiftheyarefitforpurpose.

num

ber

of e

nrol

men

ts

25000

30000

1971

1973

1975

1977

1979

1981

1983

1985

1987

1989

1991

1993

1995

1997

1999

2001

2003

20000

15000

10000

5000

0

Figure 13: enrolments for apprenticeship exams

Source: Mukora 2009:28Howarewetounderstandthissituationofabsoluteshortageinthenumberofpeopleinlocalgovernmentrequiredtoperformbasictechnicaloperationalfunctionsinwaterservices?thenextsectionturnstothisquestion.

3.4. WHytHesHortAge inBAsiCsKiLLs?ithasalreadybeenmentionedthattheskillsorcapacitycrisisisseenbymanyasthemaincausalvariableinlocalgovernmentperformance.therehave,asmightbeexpected,beenmanystudiesofthisquestion.therearethreebroadexplanations.theysuggestthattheproblemisproducedby(i)issuesinthesystemsofeducationandtraining,(ii)changesintheeconomy,and(iii)issueswithinmunicipalbureaucracy.


3.4.1eDuCAtionAnDtrAininginthefirstcasetheproblemisunderstoodtoliewiththeprocessesofeducationandtrainingthataredesignedtoproducetherequiredpersonnel:

skillsdevelopmentshouldformpartandparcelofalife-longlearningapproach.Assuch,itinvolvesa‘deliverypipeline’thatstartsatpre-schoollevel,continuesthroughprimary,secondaryandtertiarylevelsandisfurtherdevelopedandrefinedtowardsfullcapabilitywithintheworkplace...WithinsouthAfricasevereproblemshavebeenidentifiedinrespectofeachofthesecomponentsofthedeliverypipeline(Mjoliandschoeman,2007:53).

theargumentherepointstotheapartheideducationsystemwhichprovidedpoortrainingtostudents,especiallyblackstudents.thoughthereareeffortstochangethis,legacyfactorsprevail.Asaresultthereisalimitedpoolofcandidatesespeciallyinthemoretechnicaldisciplines;scienceandaccountingforexample(erasmusandBreier,2009:1).

otherspointtoproblemsinsystemsofworkplacetraininganddevelopmentandvocationaltraining,fromwhichlowerlevelskillswouldemanate.trainingsystemsdevelopedorusedbylocalgovernmentareaccusedofbeingshort-termandunsystematic(Mjoliandschoeman2007:v,50).somemunicipalitiesareseennottoprioritizestafftraininganddevelopment.Whentheydo,theselectedtrainingprogrammesarepoorlydesignedintermsofcontentanddonotnecessarilymeetmunicipalrequirements(PetersandVannieuwenhuyzen,2012:295;CogtA,2009:83).

3.4.2 DynAMiCsWitHin MuniCiPALBureAuCrACysome(e.g.Lawless2007:329-332)havearguedthatpersonnelproblemsarecompoundedbyinternaldynamics.someactaspushfactorsleadingtooutflows.otherspreventpossiblecandidatesfromenteringtheprofession.finally,othersleadtoinappropriateappointmentsofstaff.theseproblemsinclude;

• anageingworkforce,• affirmativeactionpoliciesandrelated encouragementforearlyretirementinorder tochangethecompositionoftheworkforce,• processesofinstitutionalrestructuringaslocal governmentswereconsolidated,triggeringanexodus,• frustrationsoverlowpayandthechanging natureofworkwithinadministrations,eliciting feelingsofbeingundervaluedandleadingsometo exitlocalgovernmentfortheprivatesectororoverseas,• introductionofshorttermcontractappointments forseniormanagementpositions,givinghiringofficials theabilitytoletstaffgomoreeasilyandregularly,


• Appointmentsthroughpatronagenetworks. (Lawless,2007:329–332;DWAf,2009:1119; Muller,2009:2andrespondentsP,s,JandZ).

3.4.3DeMAnDforsKiLLsinotHer seCtorsoftHeeConoMyothershavepointedtodynamicsexternaltotheprofessions.thedemandforskills,especiallyengineering,inothersectorsoftheeconomyisseenasacentralcauseofoutflows,particularlytotheprivatesector(DWAf,2009:68).Asarespondentputit,“whatwehavenoticedhere,isthat...themoretherestoftheeconomyisinagrowthphase,themoredifficultitisformunicipalitiestoattractstaff”(respondentV,13september2013).‘Poaching’ofskillsisoccurringnotonlyfromwithintheworkforce,butpriortojobplacement.someemployersinindustriessuchasminingandcivilengineeringrecruitactivelyinthetertiarysystem,employingpeoplewhomightotherwiseworkforlocalgovernment(DWAf,2009:69).forexampleitisreportedthatthe2010fifaWorldCupledtoaheighteneddemandforartisans(erasmusandBreier,2009:228).shortagesofqualifiedpeopleinseniormanagementpositionsareexacerbatedbycompetitionfromtheprivatesectorwheresalariesarebetter(LgsetA,2010:22).thiswasalsoobservedtoaffectelementaryskills:

Amillwrightthatweneededtokeepon...wastheonlyone,therewasonlyoneleft.Hewasresponsibleforallthetelemetricreadingsatthereservoirs.Hegotajobofferfromaminingcompanythatwasgoingtopayhimfiftythousandrand.Hewantedsixtythousandrandfromus:thereisnowaywecouldaffordtopayhimthat(respondentH,31January2014).

AtthetimeofourinterviewthegovanMbekiMunicipalitywasseekingtoattractmoreartisansbutenvisagedthattheywouldfacecompetitionfromsurroundingindustries:

ithinkwiththemillwrights,wemightstruggletofillthosepositions.formillwrightsandartisans,giventhatweareinanindustrialarea,youknow,youhavecompetitionlikesasolandthesurroundingmines.theseareskilledpositionsthatweneedandtheprivatesectorpaysbetterthanlocalgovernment,soyoumightbefacedwiththatchallenge(respondentQ,3December2013).

theseaccountsofferadegreeofunderstanding.However,firstly,theyarelimitedbecausetheycompriseaverybroadanalysisoftheforcesunderminingskillsdevelopmentinlocalgovernment.theydonotspecificallyexplaintheshortagesinelementaryskillsaswellasallocationdifficulties.secondly,theyofferexplanationslocatedinparticularmomentsfromwhichitisdifficulttogeneralise.


3.5. HoW Do We UnDeRSTAnD THe SHoRTAge In eLeMenTARy SkILLS?thereareotheraccounts,partlybuiltonthosealreadymentioned,thatbegintoshedlightspecificallyonwhyitisthatoccupationsassociatedwithbasicoperationsarelinkedtoperformancecrisesinwaterservicesinlocalgovernment.

3.5.1 ALongPersistentHistoryof DeVALuingeLeMentArysKiLLsfirstly,southAfricahasalonghistoryofdevaluingelementaryskills.Wesuggestthatthisdevaluationexplainsinpartwhyithasovertimeprovendifficulttoattractandretainpeopleintothesector.

thelonghistoryofdevaluingbasicoperationalskillsisshowningreatdetailbyBadroodien(2004)inahistoricalaccountoftheevolutionoftechnicalandvocationaleducationprovisioninsouthAfrica.Heobserveshowasystemdesignedtoproduceworkerssuchascarpenters,iron-workers,cobblersandothertradessuitableforgrowingsectorsoftheeconomyhashistoricallysufferedanimageproblem.uptothe1960s,technicalandvocationaleducationwasseenasasolutionformarginalpeopleinsociety:the“poorwhites”,“thementallybackward”,“indigentchildren”,“theaimless”,“thesociallydeviant”,“thekaffirs”.

sucheducationandtrainingwasdesignednotonlytoprovideemploymentbutalsotocultivatemorerespectablecitizenswhocouldcontributepositivelytosociety.thisthemeofcorrection-ofcultivatingthegoodcitizen-continuedevenwhenjobreservationpoliciesbegantofallaway,withmoretraining,atleastformally,beingmadeavailablefornon-whitegroups.forexampleitwasarguedinthe1950sthatthepurposeoftechnicaleducationwasto“builduphappy,usefulandproductiveAfrican,colouredandindiancommunitiesthatwereabletorealisethepotentialofindividualmemberstothefullestextent”.thisfocusontechnicalandvocationaleducationasameansof“correcting”individuals,thatis,ofproducingdisciplined“goodworkersandgoodcitizens”meantthatinsufficientfocuswasgiventothe“learning”dimension(Badroodien,2004:41).

theseconceptionsandpracticeswherebyelementaryskillswereseenasbeingforsocially‘marginal’peoplearguablypersisttothisday.AsAllaisnotes,inthedemocraticdispensation,“thefirstproblemwith‘skillsdevelopment’...isthat‘skill’isseenassalvationforpoorpeople,positedasa‘bridge’intoaworldofformalemploymentoranenablingfactorforself-employment”(2013:209).Morebroadly,asonerespondentremarked,“wewanttosendstudentstouniversitiesratherandthinkwecanteachthemskillsasartisans,toworkwiththeirhands”(respondent0,31January2014).

thegeneralprejudiceagainsttechnicaltradeshasjoinedupwithlonghistoricalandculturalperceptionsaboutwhatitmeanstodisposeofwastematter.inthecourseofthisstudyresearchersheardhowsegregationistracial/ethnicpoliticsledtoaparticularclanoftheXhosacommunitybeingallocatedthetaskofcollectingbucketsofsewage.thesepeoplewereperceivedinasimilarlighttountouchablesinindia.Asaresult,theirclan


namehasevolvedtogenerallyrefertosomeonewhoworksatasewerageplant.inmorerecenttimes,thesamerespondenttoldushowafamilyfriendwasperceivedasworkingina“shameful”professionasaworkerinasewerageplant(respondentn,22october2013).Anotherrespondentnotedhowinsomemunicipalitiespoorworkmanshipwaspunishedbysendingtheemployeeconcernedtoworkinawastewatertreatmentplant:

ispoketoonegentlemanwhotoldmethatwhenthereisadisciplinaryactiontakenagainstageneralworker,withtheguyworkingperhapsinthegraveyardsorinthestreet,andheisnotdoingwell,oneofthedisciplinaryactionsthattheytakeagainstsuchapersonistoplacehimatthewastewatertreatmentplant.itwasapenaltytobeplacedatthewastewatertreatmentworksbecauseitisahorribleplacetowork.Whatmoraledoesthatpersonhavewhenhegoestoworkinthemorning?(respondentK,29July2013).

Wewerealsotoldduringourfieldworkhowtheallocationofworkersforwastewatertreatmentseemsinsomeplacestobegivenasubordinateplaceevenforveryunskilledjobs.inthecontextoflimitedbudgets,municipalstaff“insteadofprioritising...treatmentworks...willprefertocomeandcutthegrassintown,obviously”(respondenti,27november2013).

thislonghistoryofprejudiceagainstartisanalandtechnicalskillsandagainstsanitationrelatedprofessionsinparticular,whichhasbeensustainedbypolitico-economicstructuresandtraditions,partlyexplainswhyithasprovendifficulttoattractworkersintotheprofession.14forexampleinthelate1930sdespitesustainedinterventions,thegovernmentofthetimewasunabletoattractthelargenumbersofrecruitsintoitsprogrammesitrequiredinordertosupportthegrowingeconomy.thiswasinpartbecausethesystemoftrainingwasstillperceivedasforthoseof‘lowerintelligence’(Badroodien,2004:32).sowearguethatsouthAfricahasalonghistoryofseeingtechnicaltrades,especiallythoseassociatedwithwastewatermanagement,asinferioranddegrading.thiswayofseeinghasbeenreinforcedbynationalpoliticalandeconomicdecisions.Weillustratethisinthenextsection.

3.5.2LArgernAtionALPoLitiCAL- eConoMiCDynAMiCsthesecondpointtomakeisthatebbsandflowsintheabsolutenumbersofpeopleintheprofessionshavebeenintimatelytiedtowidernationalpoliticalandeconomicdevelopments.thisrelatestochangesovertimeinthestructureoftheeconomy,thenatureofworkinvariousindustriesandthecountry’sraceandethnicrelations.thesedynamicshavehadandcontinuetohavefundamentalimpactsontheavailabilityofpotentialcandidatestofillelementarypositions,haveshapedthedevelopmentanddestructionoftraining

14 The conditions of service associated with these ‘elementary occupations’

including salaries and associated benefits are a major disincentive.

Historically this is known to be the case. The 1948 De Villiers Commission, in its

inquiry into the artisan system, found that in spite of extensive state support

to young white poor people to train and find work in relevant occupations, many

were not seeking employment. one of the reasons for this was precisely linked

to wage grievances (Mukora, 2008: 44).


institutions,haveledtochangesinapproachestotraining,andfinallyhavemadeemployee-employerrelationsprecariousandconfrontational.Wepresenttheseargumentsthroughacompressedhistoricalaccountoftheevolutionofelementarytechnicalprofessionsfromtheearly17thcenturytothepresentday.

gamble(2004)trackstheoriginsofartisanship-welders,masons,printers,carpentersandothers-andtheassociatedapprenticeshiptrainingsystem,toDutch,french,germanandBritishimmigrants.initsearliestmanifestationsattheCapeinthemid1800s,artisantrainingforcraftssuchasmasonry,carpentry,shoemakingandtailoringwasintroducedforso-calledcolouredmen(gamble,2004;Badroodien,2004:23).Astheeconomyindustrialisedwiththedevelopmentofminingandrailways,technicaltradeswererequired.giventheabsenceofsuchskillsinsouthAfrica,workerswereinitiallyimportedfromtheunitedstates,europeandAustralia(Mukora,2008:41).

intheearly1900sincreasingurbanisationdrivenbydroughtandthedevastationofBoerfarmsduringtheAnglo-BoerwarsawahugeinfluxoflargelyAfrikaans-speaking‘bywoners’intothecities.inthecontextofastillemergenturbanindustrialeconomytherewerelimitedemploymentopportunities.Competitionthereforearoseforavailablejobsincludinginvocationalandtechnicalareas(gamble,2004).Poorwhitesovertimesuccessfullylobbiedforthesepositionstobeoccupiedonlybywhiteworkers.Priortothis,artisanalandotherbasictechnicaljobshadbeendonebyblackpeopleorimmigrants(Badroodien,2004:23;Mukora,2008:41).themovetowardsreservingthesetradessolelyforwhitepeoplewascementedovertimethroughavarietyoflegislation.forexampletheApprenticeshipActof1922,whichregulatedtheapprenticeshipsystem,introducedhigheducationalrequirementsforentry.giventheunequalstructureofeducation,theActeffectivelyreservedthesepositionsforwhitesouthAfricans(erasmusandBreier,2009:232).thisActwasalsoawatershednotonlybecauseitintroducedstateregulationbutalsobecauseitprescribedtheformationofstateledtraininginstitutions.technicalcollegesweretobeestablishedbythestateforthefirsttime,severingthedirectrelationshipbetweentraineeandworkplace(gamble,2004).nonethelessatthetimethereweregenerallyinsufficientskilledartisansavailableforallsectors,includinglocalgovernment.Betweenthe1930sand1960sthenumbersofartisansaswellasenablinginstitutionsgrewrapidly.thiswasdrivenbyanumberoffactors.firstly,thegovernmentsoughttorespondtoincreasedpovertyinthewhitecommunity.secondly,theeconomyexperiencedsteadygrowth,requiringskilledartisansinsomesectorssuchasmining.Atthesametime,newstateownedenterprisessuchasthesteelmanufacturingfirm,isCor,werecreated.thesestateownedenterprisesopenedtheirowntechnicaltrainingcollegesandbecamesignificantsuppliersofartisans(Mukora,2008:43).forexample,almostallofthemillwrightsweencounteredorweretoldofinourresearchhadbeentrainedatisCorinthe1980s(respondentsoandD,31January2014).

Anotherkeyinstitutioncreatedinthisperiod,in1940,wastheCentralorganizationoftechnicaltraining(Cott).Cottbecameakeysupplierofskilledblackartisanssuchas“fitters,machinetooloperators,welders,blacksmiths,toolrepairers,electriciansandsheetmetalworkers”.theorganisationhadtrainingcentresalloverthecountry.Asaresult


ofitsefforts“bytheendof1943nearly22,000blackworkershadbeentrainedatthevariousCottcentres”(Badroodien,2004:37).

subsequently,however,asevermoreracistpoliciesgrippedthecountry,non-whitesouthAfricanswereincreasinglyformallymarginalisedfromskilledtrades.forexampleCott,whichhadbeenprovidingtrainingtoblackworkers,shifteditsapproachtoofferingtrainingtomostlywhitemenreturningfromWorldWarii(Badroodien,2004:37).theconstrictionofthesupplyofpossibleworkerswasencodedthroughlegislationsuchastheApprenticeshipActof1944andthetrainingofArtisansActof1951whichreservedthesetradesforwhitesonly(erasmusandBreier,2009:232).Later,asaresult,inthe1960sandearly’70s,inthecontextofagrowingeconomytherewereshortagesofskilledartisans.Manyindustriesresortedtorecruitingworkersfromoverseas(Mukora,2008:44).

inthelate1970ssocialprotestsfromthedisenfranchisedblackcommunityincreaseddramatically.theseprotestsweredrivenbyexclusionfromthebenefitsofathrivingeconomy,includingexclusionfromskilledworkinindustry.onestateresponsewastograntsomeconcessionstonon-whitecommunitiesincludingde-racialisingtheartisansystemthroughtheManpowertrainingActof1981(Mukora,2008:45).Amongstotherthings,inresponsetotheeconomy’sskilledlabourcrisisthisActdismantledtheraciallybasedsystemoftraining.inpracticehowever,thoughblacksouthAfricanscouldnowformallyjointhetrainingsystem,fewstatetraininginstitutionsorcompaniesenrolledblackcandidates(erasmusandBreier,2009:233).

theActdid,however,leadtooverallincreasesinthenumbersofartisanspassingthroughthesystem(erasmusandBreier,2009:233).Also,asaresultoftheAct,“13trainingcentresand/ortheirsatellites”wereestablishedwith“eachcentreha[ving]atrainingcentremanager,fulltimestaff,atrainingcentrecommitteeandaprovincialtrainingcommittee”(LgsetA,2010:39).theracialcompositionofthestudentbodyalsochangedsignificantly.in1990,sixtypercentofthestudentsenrolledintechnicalcollegeswerewhite,withonlysixteenpercentbeingblack.By2000,seventyfivepercentofthestudentswereblackandtwelvepercentwerewhite(Allais,2013:203).

fromthemid1980s,changesintheeconomyledtoadownwardspiralintheapprenticeshipsystem.thiswaspromptedbystructuralshiftsintheeconomyfrommanufacturingtowardsservices.AtthesametimethesouthAfricaneconomywentintorecession.Largescalestateownedcompanies,whichweremajorinstitutionalsupportersoftheapprenticeshipsystem,wereeithersoldoffortransformedintomorecommerciallyorientedentities.theprivatisationoftheseenterprisesfollowedglobaltrendstowardsrecalibrationofstate-marketrelations.Priortothistransformation,theseentitieswereabletotrainartisansbeyondtheirownneeds.thetraditionalapprenticeshipsystemwasalsoseenincreasinglyasracistandthereforeillegitimate(erasmusandBreier,2009:242).Afterthe1989privatisationofisCor,“thetrainingofartisansreducedratherdramaticallyfrom250ayearto70by2000injustoneplant”(Mukora,2008:46).thiswasbecausesuchstateownedenterprisesstoppedtraininginexcessoftheirneedsandevensoldofftrainingcentresastheysoughttocutcostsinthenewprofitorienteddispensation(ibid.:51).


theothersignificanttransformationtooccurunderlateapartheid,cementedinthetransitionperiod,relatedtoapproachestotrainingintechnicaltrades.thiswasashifttocompetencybasedtrainingandwhatwaslaterknownastheoutcomesbasedsystem.someofthecriticismoftheprevailingsystemwascontainedinareportproducedbytheHumansciencesresearchCouncilandthenationaltrainingBoard(gamble,2004).itwasseenasinadequatesince(i)itwasproducingpoorqualityartisans,(ii)ittooktoolongtoproducegraduates,and(iii)theone-sizefitsallnatureofthelearningprocesswasnotcateringtothedifferentiatedlearningneedsofcandidates(Mukora,2008:45–46).Anewsystemwasneededthatwouldmeetsomeofthesedeficiencies.theadvantagesofsuchacompetencybasedsystemweredescribedasfollows:

[Competency-basedmodulartraining]consistsofadetailedanalysisoftheoccupationintoitsbasiccompetenciesorskills,eachofwhichthenformsamoduleinatrainingprogramme.Modulesarearrangedinalogicaltrainingsequenceandperformancestandardsaresetforeachmodule.thecompetenceofeachtraineeistestedattheendofeachmoduleandheisonlyabletoproceedtothenextmodulewhenhehasreachedmeasurablecompetenceinallsubordinatemodules.itispossiblebymeansofmodulartrainingcoursemapstoarrangetrainingsothatallmodulesleadfromtheunskilledworker,throughjobsrequiringlimitedskills,tomorehighlyskilledoccupations.theemployeecanseeaclearcareerpathwithintheindustryandadvancebymeansofmodulartrainingtolevelscompatiblewithhisaptitudesandabilities(HumansciencesresearchCouncil/nationaltrainingBoard,1989:183,ingamble,2004).

insuchasystem,therelationshipbetweenstudentandteacherchanges.theseeminglyhierarchicalarrangementwheretheinstructor,teacherormaster(tousethetermsintheoriginalapprenticeshipmodel)impartsknowledgetothestudentistransformed.thestudentsarenowinchargeofsettingtheirlearningpace,withtheinstructor,nowseenasafacilitator,beingconsultedfornecessarylearningmaterialsaswellasauthorisations,conductedthroughtests,toproceedtothenextstageofthelearningmodule(ibid.).

thesereformspavedthewayforasystemoftraininginwhichknowledgeandskillscouldbeincreasinglygroupedintoseparate‘unitsofcompetence’,or‘unitstandards’(Allais,2013:213).thiswasrealisedthroughthenationalQualificationsframework,anewpolicyreforminstrumentthatwould“replaceallexistingqualificationswithasetofnewoutcomes-basedqualificationsandpartqualifications”in“alllearningprogrammesandcurricula,atalllevels,inallsectors”(ibid.:204).theoldapprenticeshipsystemwhereastudentlearnedallrelatedaspectsforatradesuchascarpentrywouldbereplacedbywhatareknownaslearnerships.institutionssuchastechnicalcollegesprovidingeducationforartisandevelopmentneededtoconformtothenewregulations.

thesereformshaveweakenedartisandevelopment.oneperverseeffectwastointroducefurtherprecariousnessinemployment.thisisbecauseintheoldsystem,thecontractsignedbetweenemployerandemployeeobligedtheemployertokeeponthestudentfortheentiredurationoftheapprenticeship,usuallyatleastthreeyears.inthenew


model,thecontractualperiodwaslimitedtothedurationoftheparticularmodulethatthetraineewasundertaking,whichcouldbeoverseveralmonthsbutwouldcertainlybelessthanthreeyears(Mukora,2008:49).thissystemwasunlikelytoattractnewentrants.itisperhapswhy,asrepresentedinthegraphbelow,thenumbersofstudentsenrollingforapprenticeshipexaminationsdeclinedsharplyfromthemid-1990s.

num

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Figure 13: enrolments for apprenticeship exams

Source: Mukora 2009:28theotherconsequenceofthesereformswas,asothershaveargued,toweakentheknowledgeandskillsimpartedtostudents.insteadofgainingknowledgesuitabletoawholeprofessionoroccupation,studentsinsteadlearnindividuatedbitsofknowledgerelatedtoparticulartasks(Allais,2013:213).insteadofgaining“all-roundexpertise”inaparticularindustry,a“learner…[is]trainedononlyoneortwomachines,oronrestrictedbutspecialisedworkroutines”(gamble2004).Perhapsthisiswhy“mostcompaniesarescepticalaboutlearnershipsandhavequestionedthequalityfromlearnershipprogrammes”(Mukora,2008:58).otherseveninthepublicsectorhaveagreed,arguingthatthe“competenciesofthestudentscompletingmanyofthecoursesinfetcollegesisconsideredverylowbysomestateemployers”andasaresult“somestateemployersfeeltheyneedtoundertakeafurtherthreeyearsofinternaltraininginordertohavenewartisansworkready”(PsetA,2014:81-2).

recentpolicyattentiontoincreasingthenumbersofartisansdoeshoweverseemtohavebornfruit.inthe2011/2012financialyearalone,6,000studentsenrolledforartisantrainingexaminationsatindlela(DHet,2013:34).

3.5.3introDuCtionofnPMreforMsifthefactorsabovehelpexplainthelong-termevolutionofsouthAfrica’swatermanagementcrisis,reformsinthestructureofgovernmentinthelate1990sbroughtthesituationtoahead.thepreviousaccountshowedhowchangesinthepoliticaleconomyhaveovertimeshapedtheflowofpossiblecandidates


intotheprofession,affectedthenatureanddevelopmentoftraininginstitutions,andledtochangesinemployee-employerrelations.Hereweshowbrieflyhowshiftsinorganisationalmanagement,ornewpublicmanagement(nPM)theories,associatedwithneoliberalism,explainthehighratesofvacancyinbasicoperationalpositionsincludingtechnicaltradesinlocalgovernment.

nPMisassociatedwitharangeofreformsthatunlikethe“traditionalbureaucraticmodesofoperationbasedonrulefollowing,specialism,hierarchyandline-management”areseentoproducebetterorganisationalresultssincetheyintroduce“operatingprinciplesbasedonefficiency,quality,flexibility,competitionandmanagementbycontract”.thisistobeachievedby“greateruseofcompetitionandcontracting,transferofbusinessmethods,suchasqualityassuranceandperformancemanagement,managerialautonomyandindividualresponsibility,withanemphasisondevolvingoperationalresponsibilities,andservicesthatareuser-focusedanduserresponsive”(Lowndes,1997:44).

inthepreviouschapterwedescribedhowtheseideasweresystematicallyintroducedintolocalgovernmentthroughtheWhitePaperonLocalgovernment.Acentralelementofthesemoveswastoelevatetheroleofthemanagerinthebureaucracy.thenewmanager,whowouldreplacetheoldfigureassociatedwiththeapartheidstate,wasenvisagedasdynamicandinnovative.thisnewpersonwouldbeunshackledfromtheoldrulesofthesystem.theywouldbegiven“greaterdiscretionarypower,reducing,inparticular,proceduralconstraintsonthehandlingofcontracts,cashandstaff”(Chipkin:46).further,thismovetowardsforegroundingtheroleofthemanagerwasofteninterpretedasmeaningthatseniorofficialsshouldbefocusedonquestionsofleadership,policy,strategyandvision.thiscameattheexpenseofoperationaland/oradministrativequestionsandissues(tAu,2012).

therefore,overtime,intheimaginationofpolicy-makersandinthemakingofhumanresourcepolicydecisionsatlocallevel,itwasthismanagerialfigurewhoappearstohavereceivedmostattention.Asonerespondentnoted,“technicalcapacityinsomemunicipalitiesisnotseenasimportant...technicalexpertsarenotnecessarilyseenasaddingvalueandthetechnicalskillsthattheyhavearenotvalued,notseenasimportant.thentheywillgetridofthatpersonandbringinsomebodywhodoesn’thavetheexperienceorwhodoesn’thavetheknow-howeven”(respondentZ,24october2013).

thisdynamiciswellcapturedbyoneofourrespondentswhodescribeswhat(s)heobservedovertimeastypicalstaffingdecisionsprioritisingseniormanagementpositions.giventhehighsalariesthesepositionscommandandthelimitationsontheproportionoftheoveralloperationalbudgetthatcanbespentonsalaries,thenitisthelowerlevelpositionsthataresacrificed:

thisiswhatactuallyhappens,anditisnotonlyinthetechnicalfield,butthisiswhymunicipalitieshavesuchahighlevelofvacanciesatelementarylevelandthenatclericallevel.Whattheydoistheyappointseniorlevelpeople,yourmunicipalmanageratthetopandthenyoursection56and57swhoareallyourseniorlevelmanagersinmunicipalities.thosepeoplefalloutsideofbargainingcouncilagreements,sotheynegotiatetheirownsalariesdirectlywithcouncil...sowhatishappeningisthatthewholesalarybill


getspusheduptothetop.Andthenyouarelefttosay,oK...ineedafewengineersandothersuchpeoplearound,wheredoicull,wheredoimakemysavings?oK,wehavegotfourthousandelementaryworkers,surelyweonlyneedhalf,wehavegoteightthousandclericalstaff,surelyweonlyneedathousand.nevermindthatyourbillsmightnotbesentout-elementaryworkers,clericalandadminaretheengineofthemunicipality(respondentV,13september2013).

Whilewedonothaveaccesstofiguresontypesofvacancies,wecanconfirmhowmanagementpositionsinlocalgovernmenthavegainedfavourinpersonnelmanagementdecisions.thegraphbelowrepresents

Wes

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0

2006 Ratio 2009 Ratio 2012 Ratio

Figure 14: ratio of managers to all positions in local government

Source: Stats SA non-Financial Census of Municipalities

managersasapercentageofallpositionsbetween2006and2012.itshowsthatinallprovincesexceptLimpopo,freestateandthenorthernCapetherewassignificantgrowthintheratioofmanagerstootherpositionsinlocalgovernmentbetween2006and2012.onasmallerscale,weseesimilartrendsinthegovanMbekiMunicipalitywheretherehasbeenconstantgrowthinthenumberofmanagementpositionsasashareofallstaffingpositionsasshownintheonthenextpage.thedatacontainsinformationbasedonofficialorganogramsandincludesvacantandparttimepositions.

incontrastwhenweexaminetrendsforallotherpositionswithinthesameperiodweseeconstantdeclines,asthegraphonthenextpageshows.


Figure 15: trends in staffing of management positions in Govan Mbeki Municipality

Againwhenweexaminetimeseriesdataonmunicipalsalariesandbenefitstoemployeesweseegreaterallocationsatthetopend.thegraphonthenextpagerepresentsaconstantdeclineintherateofgrowthofsalariesandwages,pensions,overtimepay,bonuses,allowancessuchashousingandvehicle,medicalaidcontributionsandotherbenefitsandallowancesforpositionslowerthanseniormanagement.

ontheotherhand,themovementsforseniormanagementpositionshavebeencharacterizedbyconsiderablevariationsintherateofgrowthofsalaries,rangingfromveryhighpercentageincreasestocomparativelymodestones,withverylargerecentincreases.Weobtainedamicrolevelillustrationofhowfinancialallocationsfavourmanagementpositionsover

Figure 16: trends in staffing of non-managerial positions

Total staff including vacancies

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Source: Stats SA non-Financial Municipal Census


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Figure17: trends in salaries and benefits in local government

Source: Stats SA non-Financial Municipal Census

thoseofartisans.Weweretoldofaparticularwaterservicesinstitutionthatwishedtoretainanartisanwhohadbeenofferedanattractivesalarybyaminingcompany.Howevertheauthoritywasunabletomatchtherateofferedbytheminingcompanybecauseitfacedlegalconstraintswhichstipulatedwhatthesalarybandneededtobe.ontheotherhand,thepayscaleforseniormanagementpositionswasoutsidetheselegalconstraintsandasaresulttheywerereceivingveryhandsomepackages(respondentsoandH).

3.6. SUMMARythischapterhasexploredtheroleofskillsintheperformanceoflocalgovernmentinwaterservices.itfoundthatwhilemunicipalitiesarefacedwithawiderangeofpersonnelneeds,inwaterservicesthemostcriticalbarriersareassociatedwithroutineoperations,withtheneedfortheskillsofplumbers,millwrights,electriciansandothers.ithasarguedthattheproblem-ofshortages,ofthehollowingoutofknowledgeintheprofessionandoftheallocationofavailableworkers-isdrivenbyhistoricalfactorsonascalebeyondthepossibilityofcontrolbylocalgovernmentalone.

Historicalevidencesuggeststhatthecountryhasheldtechnicaltradesinlowregard.thislowvaluationlinkswithlongstandingaversionstowastewatermanagement.Lowvaluationoftechnicaltradeshasbeenreinforcedorperpetuatedbydevelopmentsinthepoliticaleconomyrelatingtochangesovertimeineconomicstructures,thenatureofworkinvariousindustries,thecounty’sraceandethnicrelations,andtheintroductionofnPMideasintolocalgovernment.takentogether,thesefactorshavehadandcontinuetohavefundamentalimpactsontheavailabilityofcandidatesforelementarypositions.theyhaveshapedthedevelopmentanddestructionoftraininginstitutions,ledtochangesinapproachestotraining,madeemployee-employerrelationsprecarious,andindecisionsaboutpersonnelhaveledtoaneglectofoccupationsservingtechnicalandoperationalneeds.


≤ Conclusions4Chapter


twentyyearsintosouthAfrica’sdemocracy,therehavebeengreatimprovementsinthematerialconditionsofthepopulation.Accordingtothelastcensus,over90%nowhaveaccesstosometypeofsanitationsystemandpipedwater.Howeverinspiteofthisimpressiverecord,thereareproblemswithservicequality.Pitlatrinesmaybeavailablebuttheymaynotbeserviced.Pipesmaybeinplacebuttheremaybenowaterflowingthroughthem.Moreover,aswedemonstratedearlier,therearelargespatialvariationsinratesandqualityofaccess.thisreporthassoughttoanswerwhythereisunevennessinwaterservicesprovisionacrossthecountryandthefactorsimpactingonservicedeliveryinthisarea.thereareamultitudeofinterlockingfactorsthatexplainspatialvariation.thesefactorsincludeapartheidpolicieswhoseeffectsstillechotoday,therelationshipbetweenpoliticsandadministration,ratesofurbanisation,thesizeofmunicipalities,theextentoflocaltaxbases,thenatureofskillsandorganisationalcapacity.Wefoundthatalloftheseaffecttheperformanceofmunicipalities.ourresearchhasemphasisedtheimpactoflongerapartheideralegaciesonadministrativecapacity,theripplesofwhicharestillfelttoday,asexplaining‘unevenness’andhowtheprocessofforginglocalgovernmentinthedemocraticperiodhasbeenandisstillataskofimmensecomplexity.

Wealsofoundthatwithrespecttowaterservices,alackofskilledworkersinmunicipalitiesintermsofvacantpositionsanddiminishedknowledgeisasignificantbarriertoeffectivedelivery.Whilethisproblemoccursacrossarangeofrelevantoccupations,inwaterservicesthechallengeismostacuteinbasicoperationalpositions.thesepositions,suchasthoseofmillwrights,plumbers,electriciansandpipelinemaintenancetechnicians,arevitaltothedaytodayoperationsofwaterpipelines,wastewatertreatmentworks,pumpingstationsandotherrelatedwaterservicesinfrastructure.Heretootheconditionsfortheemergenceofthisproblemhavealonghistory.

Wehavealsoshownhowtechnicaltrades,specificallythoseassociatedwithwastewatermanagement,havebeenheldinlowregardovertime.AsBadroodien(2004)shows,intheperiodofformalapartheidandearlier,technicalandvocationaleducationwasseenasanaturalhomeforpeopleregardedasmarginal.evenduringandafterthedemocratictransitionthereisadegreeofcontinuitywheretechnicaleducationisseenasasolutiontotheproblemofpoverty(Allais,2013).

thedriversofandconstraintstoskillsdevelopmentoftenoccurbeyondthedirectsphereofinfluenceoflocalgovernment.ourresearchhassuggestedthatinordertounderstandtheformation,utilisationandretentionoftheseskills,andarguablyotherstoo,inlocalgovernment,itisalsoimportanttolookmorebroadlythanlocalgovernmentitself.thisisinlinewithrecentstudiesofskillsformationwhichholdthatskillsdevelopmentshouldbeexaminedinthecontextoftheorganisationoftheeconomiesandsocietiesinwhichitislocated.further“itisthestructureofthelabourmarket,thenatureofindustrialisation,andtheextentofsocialwelfarethatwillcreatetheconditionsforanextensiveandlong-termskillformationsystem”(Allais,2013:214).or,asMarockhasargued,“anyfocusonskillsdevelopmentmusttakethenatureoftheeconomyintoaccount”(Marock,2010:4).educationandtrainingsystemsareinotherwordsinextricablyenmeshedinthesocietiesinwhichtheyexist.


ifpolicysolutionsareconceivedofaslyingsolelyintheeducationsystem(includingthevocationalsystemwhetherbasedattheworkplaceorelsewhere),thentheyareunlikelytomakeasubstantialdentintheproblem,becauseskillsformationisalsotheproductoflabourmarketrelations,thenatureofindustrialisation,andthenatureofthesocialwelfaresystem.inourstudywesawsignificantmovementsintotheprofessionwheneverinterventionsweremadeinanyofthesedomains.forinstancerecallthatwhentheprofessionwasderacialisedthroughtheManpowertrainingActof1981,manymoreapprenticesenrolledintotraininginstitutions;alsorecallthatthe1948DeVilliersCommission,initsinquiryintotheartisansystem,foundthatinspiteofextensivestatesupporttoyoung,poorwhitepeopletotrainandfindworkinrelevantoccupations,manydidnotseekemployment.onereasonforthiswaslinkedtowagegrievances(Mukora,2008:44).thesetwoexamplesandothersinthisreportsuggestthatmoreattentionshouldbepaidtofactorsoutsideeducationandtraining.inotherwords,theskillschallengeoutlinedhereisnotnecessarilysolelyaneducationandtrainingone.

thisanalysisalsoprovidecluesastowhytheskillscrisis,atleastthatpertainingtoartisanalskills,seemsintractable.ourresearchinthisregardisaninitialexploration.However,thereisaclearneedforfurtherstudy.suchastudycouldtakeabroaderapproachandselecttwoperiodsassociatedrespectivelywithhighandlowsuppliesofartisansandanalysethenatureofthelabourmarket,socialwelfaredistributionandthestructureoftheeconomyandinvestigatetheirinteractionswiththeeducationandtrainingsystem.Alternativelyitmighttakeanarrowerfocusandattempttoreviewshiftingwagerelationsovertimeincludingconditionsofservice,salarylevelsandbenefitsystems.

ourresearchsuggeststhatmoreattentionshouldbegiventothenexusbetweentheeducationinstitutions,andskillandeducationpolicyontheonehand,andpublicmanagementmodelsontheother.Morerecentpublicsectorreformchoicesinthepost-1994periodhavealsoimpactedontheskillsdeficitinareaskeytowaterservicedelivery.

Wehaveshownthatmajorpolicyreforms‘de-skilled’municipalitiesandledtoaneglectofbasicoperationalpositions.the1998WhitePaperonLocalgovernment,echoingchangesadoptedinotherpartsofthestate,introducedasweepingrangeofreforms,someinspiredbythenPMideascurrentatthetime.theseideastendtoprivilegethemanagerinaparticularguise.Wehaveseenhowbecauseofthis,overtimefinancialandpersonneldecisionshavebeentakeninlocalgovernmentthathavecumulativelydenudedwastewaterandwatertreatmentworksoftheeverydaytechnicaloperativestheyneed.

Wedonotaimtosuggestthatlocalgovernmenthasnoagency,andthatitisahelplessvictimofwhateverwindsmayblowinandaroundit.infact,asnotedearlier,akeyreformofthetransitionerawastograntthissphereofgovernmentfullautonomy.thismightsuggestwhyinspiteoftheonesizefitsallreformagendaintheseminal1998WhitePaperonLocalgovernment,changehasbeenuneven.forinstance,whiletheCityofJohannesburgembracednPMreformsrapidlyandintheearly2000s“hivedoffseveralofitsmainfunctions(electricity,water,roadsandparks,urbanrenewal)into


stand-alonebusinessunits”,nowcalledMoes,theCityofCapetownonlyhasone.Water,sanitationandelectricityservicesforexampleareprovidedbycitydepartments(Chipkin,2013:7;CityofCapetown,2014).Localgovernmentpoliticiansandcivilservantshaveadegreeofautonomythattheycanexercise.

thisreporthasattemptedtomovebeyondbroaddiscussionsofcapacityand“skillscrises”tounderstandingquestionsoflocalgovernmentcapacity,inparticularasthisplaysoutinwaterandsanitationprovision,withmorenuance.Wesuggestthatthefindingsofthisreportintheareaofwaterandsanitationservicesdeliveryraiseimportantquestionsforimprovementsinpublicsectorservicedeliverymorebroadly.inconclusion,wesuggestthatthisconceptualframeworkofexploringskillsformationandutilisationmightbeofsignificantvalueinunderstandingcapacityconstraintsinotherpartsofthesouthAfricanstate.


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