2013 Kenya Elections

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The Allied Command Operations (ACO) Civil-Military Fusion Centre (CFC) is an information and knowledge management

organisation focused on improving civil-military interaction, facilitating information sharing and enhancing situational awareness

through theCimicWebportal and our weekly and monthly publications. CFC products are based upon and link to open-source

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cannot necessarily guarantee the accuracy or objectivity of these sources. CFC publications are independently produced byDesk Officers and do not reflect NATO policies or positions of any other organisation.

This report examines preparations for the March 2013 national elections in Kenya. It summarises the instability

that stemmed from election results in 2007, the ICC indictment of 2013 candidates for president and vice-

president, and efforts that were introduced to mitigate civil strife and possible flashpoints where political tensions

might give way to violence. Related information is available atwww.cimicweb.org. Hyperlinks to source material

are highlighted in blue and underlined in the text.

BackgroundKenyan voters will go to the polls on04 March 2013, five years after adestabilising electionin 2007 led to wide-

spread violence that resulted in the deaths of approximately 1,200 people and the displacement of over 600,000

more. For decades, the political elite in Kenya have manipulated ethnic grievances and tribal affiliations to obtain

political advantages, a factor that is believed to be the primary cause of the 2007-2008post-election violence. A

referendum in 2010 established a new constitution and ushered in sweepingdevolutionary reforms, including the

abolishment of the position of prime minister and the introduction of 47 provincialcounties(an increase from the

previous count of 7provinces and the capital Nairobi Area). For the first time, voters willelecta bicameral legisla-ture of 394 members and 47 county governors. Additionally, outgoing President Mwai Kibakiis ineligible for a

third term, so electors will decide on a new

head of state. Leading candidates include cur-

rent Prime Minister Raila Odinga and current

Finance Minister Uhuru Kenyatta, the son of

Kenyas former president from 1964-1978. Ifneither politician claims a plurality of the vote,

then a runoff is scheduled for April.

International monitors are hopeful the elections

willadvance gainsmade by the ratification of

the 2010 constitution, continuing the coun-trys progress toward becoming a modern

democratic state. However, if the process is

marred by a lack of transparency and contested

results, it could return the country to infightingand violence that marked the 2007 elections.

Furthermore, violent outcomes might destabi-

lise the economic, political and security cli-

mate throughout the region, a possibility that

international governments seek to prevent. In recent months, the Horn of Africa region has experienced politicalturbulence. Case in point, Ethiopia underwent a transition of power when former Prime Minister Meles Zenawi

died suddenly and was replaced by Hailemariam Desalegn; in January 2013 aminor coupwas attempted in Eri-

February 2013Comprehensive Information on Complex Issues

The 2013 Kenya Elections

C I V I L - M I L I T A R Y F U S I O N C E N T R E P R E S E N T S

Foard Copeland

Desk Officer

[email protected]

Source:BBC

Jennifer Gadarowski

Assistant Desk Officer

[email protected]
https://www.cimicweb.org/Pages/cimicwebWelcome.aspxhttps://www.cimicweb.org/Pages/cimicwebWelcome.aspxhttps://www.cimicweb.org/Pages/cimicwebWelcome.aspxhttp://www.cimicweb.org/http://www.cimicweb.org/https://www.cimicweb.org/cmo/medbasin/Pages/Kenya_Election.aspxhttps://www.cimicweb.org/cmo/medbasin/Pages/Kenya_Election.aspxhttps://www.cimicweb.org/cmo/medbasin/Pages/Kenya_Election.aspxhttp://www.irinnews.org/In-depth/76116/68/Kenya-s-post-election-crisishttp://www.irinnews.org/In-depth/76116/68/Kenya-s-post-election-crisishttp://www.irinnews.org/In-depth/76116/68/Kenya-s-post-election-crisishttp://csis.org/files/publication/110706_Barkan_Kenya_Web.pdfhttp://csis.org/files/publication/110706_Barkan_Kenya_Web.pdfhttp://csis.org/files/publication/110706_Barkan_Kenya_Web.pdfhttp://www.strathmore.edu/pdf/mutakha-devolution-kenya.pdfhttp://www.strathmore.edu/pdf/mutakha-devolution-kenya.pdfhttp://www.strathmore.edu/pdf/mutakha-devolution-kenya.pdfhttps://opendata.go.ke/facet/countieshttps://opendata.go.ke/facet/countieshttps://opendata.go.ke/facet/countieshttps://www.cia.gov/library/publications/the-world-factbook/geos/ke.htmlhttps://www.cia.gov/library/publications/the-world-factbook/geos/ke.htmlhttps://www.cia.gov/library/publications/the-world-factbook/geos/ke.htmlhttp://www.dw.de/kenyan-president-signs-himself-hefty-retirement-package/a-16524640http://www.dw.de/kenyan-president-signs-himself-hefty-retirement-package/a-16524640http://www.dw.de/kenyan-president-signs-himself-hefty-retirement-package/a-16524640http://mg.co.za/article/2012-12-26-kenya-fears-of-another-violent-electionhttp://mg.co.za/article/2012-12-26-kenya-fears-of-another-violent-electionhttp://mg.co.za/article/2012-12-26-kenya-fears-of-another-violent-electionhttp://www.cfr.org/kenya/electoral-violence-kenya/p29761http://www.cfr.org/kenya/electoral-violence-kenya/p29761http://www.cfr.org/kenya/electoral-violence-kenya/p29761http://allafrica.com/stories/201302040409.htmlhttp://allafrica.com/stories/201302040409.htmlhttp://allafrica.com/stories/201302040409.htmlhttp://www.bbc.co.uk/news/world-africa-19454253http://www.bbc.co.uk/news/world-africa-19454253http://www.bbc.co.uk/news/world-africa-19454253http://online.wsj.com/article/SB10001424127887323301104578255933208465470.htmlhttp://online.wsj.com/article/SB10001424127887323301104578255933208465470.htmlhttp://online.wsj.com/article/SB10001424127887323301104578255933208465470.htmlmailto:[email protected]:[email protected]://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/africa/7165962.stm#maphttp://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/africa/7165962.stm#maphttp://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/africa/7165962.stm#mapmailto:[email protected]:[email protected]:[email protected]://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/africa/7165962.stm#mapmailto:[email protected]://online.wsj.com/article/SB10001424127887323301104578255933208465470.htmlhttp://www.bbc.co.uk/news/world-africa-19454253http://allafrica.com/stories/201302040409.htmlhttp://allafrica.com/stories/201302040409.htmlhttp://www.cfr.org/kenya/electoral-violence-kenya/p29761http://mg.co.za/article/2012-12-26-kenya-fears-of-another-violent-electionhttp://www.dw.de/kenyan-president-signs-himself-hefty-retirement-package/a-16524640https://www.cia.gov/library/publications/the-world-factbook/geos/ke.htmlhttps://opendata.go.ke/facet/countieshttp://www.strathmore.edu/pdf/mutakha-devolution-kenya.pdfhttp://csis.org/files/publication/110706_Barkan_Kenya_Web.pdfhttp://www.irinnews.org/In-depth/76116/68/Kenya-s-post-election-crisishttps://www.cimicweb.org/cmo/medbasin/Pages/Kenya_Election.aspxhttp://www.cimicweb.org/https://www.cimicweb.org/Pages/cimicwebWelcome.aspx


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February 2013 Page 2

K e n y a E l e c t i o n s 2 0 1 3

trea; and for the fifth consecutive year,Somalia topped the Failed State Index. Kenya is an important regional

powerthat boasts a GDPgrowth ratenear five per cent. The past two decades have seen unprecedentedeconomicexpansionwith trading partners outside of Africa, suggesting that the United States, Europe, and China, among

others, will closely watch the 2013 polls.

The election margins will almost certainly be close, and experts predict a run-off. Towinthe presidency outright,a candidate must claim a majority of ballots cast at the national level and 25 per cent of the vote in half of thecountrys 47 counties. The election commission has until 11 March, one week after polling stations close, to tally

and announce the results. If no candidate receives a majority vote, the top two candidates will face arunoff votein

April, no later than11 April. As of 04 February, Odinga ledthe polls with a forty-six per cent approval rating;

Kenyatta trailed with a forty per cent rating.

2007-2008 Post-Election Violence

Sincemulti-party electionswere introduced in 1992, nearly every Kenyan vote has been accompanied by violence

or scandal. President Kibakis re-election in 2002 was a relative exception. However, by 2007 his multi-ethnic

Rainbow Coalitionhad dissolved and he represented the pro-Kikuyu Party of National Unity (PNU). Odingas

ODM party ran a heated opposition campaign, during which both politicians openly appealed to ethnic divisions.

Elections were held on 27 December 2007. With a quick, fraudulent tabulation of the vote, according to theCenter for Strategic and International Studies, President Kibaki was hastily announced the winner in what was

widely believed to be a rigged election. Odinga protested the results and clashes broke out almost immediately,

continuing for six weeks.

Kibera, an impoverished Nairobi community that is home to one million people, was an early flashpoint of the

post-election violence. Men rushed into the streets with sticks, stones and flaming tires, and were met by police.

Kibera is a microcosmof Kenyas ethnic diversity, consisting largely, but not exclusively, of Kikuyu, Luo andNubiancommunities. Elsewhere, thirty civilians, many of them children, were burned to death when rioters set

fire to the church in Eldoret, a predominately Kalenjin town in the East Rift. This incident was not unique.

Throughout the country stories mounted about members of particular ethnic groups being dragged from their

homes and clubbed to death in public.

Over the course of several weeks,police killedas many as 405 people, the majority of them living in the Kiberashantytown or Kisumu, a port city on Lake Victoria. In Kisumu, Luosdrove outover 20,000 Kikuyus. Although,

they are the largest and most powerful political and economic group in Kenya, their influence in the Rift Valleyhas waned and Kikuyus in the West suffered from revenge attacks committed by smaller ethnic groups for Kiku-

yu-initiated violence that took place in the East. Towns in theRift Valleylike Nyanza, Molo and Nakuru also bore

witness to mob violence that killed hundreds. During the unrest,the media, Kenyas election commission, interna-

tional monitors and nearly every major candidate were blamed for inciting the controversy.

Ethnic fault linesdefine much of Kenyas political culture, and ethnic hostilities are the most widely attributed

cause of the chaos that proceeded from the 2007 election. After Kenyasindependence from Britain, ethnic ten-

sions were reinforced bypolitical elites to calcify their economic, social and political status. In turn, these eco-nomic and social factors provided politicians levers by which they could exacerbate existing ethnic and tribal

cleavages. Therefore, economic disparities, systemic government corruption, weak institutions, access to re-

sources, andland rightsall contributed to thecomplicated tableauthat fomented instability in the early weeks of

2008.

Outcomes

In the wake of the 2007-2008 violence, a process known as the Kenya National Dialogue and Reconciliation

(KNDR) was initiated by government leaders with strong backing from the international community. It was led byformer UN Secretary-General Kofi Annan, former president of Tanzania Benjamin Mkapa and former South Afri-

can first lady Graa Machel. The dialogue sought to immediately stymie the political crisis and establish inde-pendent review commissions that considered long-term causes of the conflict which might recur if not redressed.

Over a span of six weeks, Odingaceded victoryto Kibaki, a National Accord was signed on 28 February 2008,

and a national unity government known as the Grand Coalition was introduced. Under the agreement, the num-
http://www.foreignpolicy.com/failedstates2012http://www.foreignpolicy.com/failedstates2012http://www.foreignpolicy.com/failedstates2012http://www.ifp-ew.eu/pdf/201203IfPEWEWConflictPrevEULearningLessonsKenya.pdfhttp://www.ifp-ew.eu/pdf/201203IfPEWEWConflictPrevEULearningLessonsKenya.pdfhttp://www.ifp-ew.eu/pdf/201203IfPEWEWConflictPrevEULearningLessonsKenya.pdfhttp://www.ifp-ew.eu/pdf/201203IfPEWEWConflictPrevEULearningLessonsKenya.pdfhttp://www.standardmedia.co.ke/?articleID=2000072166&story_title=World-Bank-cuts-Kenya-2012-GDP-growth-forecasthttp://www.standardmedia.co.ke/?articleID=2000072166&story_title=World-Bank-cuts-Kenya-2012-GDP-growth-forecasthttp://www.standardmedia.co.ke/?articleID=2000072166&story_title=World-Bank-cuts-Kenya-2012-GDP-growth-forecasthttps://openknowledge.worldbank.org/handle/10986/7999https://openknowledge.worldbank.org/handle/10986/7999https://openknowledge.worldbank.org/handle/10986/7999https://openknowledge.worldbank.org/handle/10986/7999http://www.theafricareport.com/elections/kenyas-long-walk-to-free-elections.htmlhttp://www.theafricareport.com/elections/kenyas-long-walk-to-free-elections.htmlhttp://www.theafricareport.com/elections/kenyas-long-walk-to-free-elections.htmlhttp://abcnews.go.com/International/wireStory/icc-suspect-listed-kenya-presidential-candidate-18353052http://abcnews.go.com/International/wireStory/icc-suspect-listed-kenya-presidential-candidate-18353052http://abcnews.go.com/International/wireStory/icc-suspect-listed-kenya-presidential-candidate-18353052http://allafrica.com/stories/201210050270.htmlhttp://allafrica.com/stories/201210050270.htmlhttp://allafrica.com/stories/201210050270.htmlhttp://allafrica.com/stories/201301270072.htmlhttp://allafrica.com/stories/201301270072.htmlhttp://allafrica.com/stories/201301270072.htmlhttp://www.iiss.org/publications/strategic-comments/past-issues/volume-19-2013/january/kenyas-election-risk-of-renewed-violence/http://www.iiss.org/publications/strategic-comments/past-issues/volume-19-2013/january/kenyas-election-risk-of-renewed-violence/http://www.iiss.org/publications/strategic-comments/past-issues/volume-19-2013/january/kenyas-election-risk-of-renewed-violence/http://www.standardmedia.co.ke/?articleID=2000074922&story_title=Kenya-The-irony-of-the-Kibaki-leadership-http://www.standardmedia.co.ke/?articleID=2000074922&story_title=Kenya-The-irony-of-the-Kibaki-leadership-http://www.standardmedia.co.ke/?articleID=2000074922&story_title=Kenya-The-irony-of-the-Kibaki-leadership-http://www.standardmedia.co.ke/?articleID=2000074922&story_title=Kenya-The-irony-of-the-Kibaki-leadership-http://csis.org/files/publication/110706_Barkan_Kenya_Web.pdfhttp://csis.org/files/publication/110706_Barkan_Kenya_Web.pdfhttp://csis.org/files/publication/110706_Barkan_Kenya_Web.pdfhttp://www.nytimes.com/2007/12/31/world/africa/31kenya.html?_r=2&scp=7&sq=kenya&st=nyt&http://www.nytimes.com/2007/12/31/world/africa/31kenya.html?_r=2&scp=7&sq=kenya&st=nyt&http://wiredspace.wits.ac.za/bitstream/handle/10539/5776/KIBERA_Thesis.pdf?sequence=3http://wiredspace.wits.ac.za/bitstream/handle/10539/5776/KIBERA_Thesis.pdf?sequence=3http://www.kibera.org.uk/Facts.htmlhttp://www.kibera.org.uk/Facts.htmlhttp://www.kibera.org.uk/Facts.htmlhttp://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/africa/7166932.stmhttp://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/africa/7166932.stmhttp://nairobichronicle.wordpress.com/2009/07/19/kibaki-creates-20-provinces-ethnic-clashes-now-feared/http://nairobichronicle.wordpress.com/2009/07/19/kibaki-creates-20-provinces-ethnic-clashes-now-feared/http://allafrica.com/stories/201112300207.htmlhttp://allafrica.com/stories/201112300207.htmlhttp://allafrica.com/stories/201112300207.htmlhttp://www.economist.com/node/10653938http://www.economist.com/node/10653938http://www.economist.com/node/10653938http://www.npr.org/templates/story/story.php?storyId=18468272http://www.npr.org/templates/story/story.php?storyId=18468272http://www.npr.org/templates/story/story.php?storyId=18468272http://ebookbrowse.com/kenya-policy-briefing-08-pdf-d12630077http://ebookbrowse.com/kenya-policy-briefing-08-pdf-d12630077http://ebookbrowse.com/kenya-policy-briefing-08-pdf-d12630077http://www.nytimes.com/2008/01/27/world/africa/27kenya.html?_r=0http://www.nytimes.com/2008/01/27/world/africa/27kenya.html?_r=0http://www.opendemocracy.net/article/democracy_power/kenya_ethnicity_tribe_statehttp://www.opendemocracy.net/article/democracy_power/kenya_ethnicity_tribe_statehttp://www.iiss.org/publications/strategic-comments/past-issues/volume-19-2013/january/kenyas-election-risk-of-renewed-violence/http://www.iiss.org/publications/strategic-comments/past-issues/volume-19-2013/january/kenyas-election-risk-of-renewed-violence/http://www.iiss.org/publications/strategic-comments/past-issues/volume-19-2013/january/kenyas-election-risk-of-renewed-violence/http://www.kenya-advisor.com/kenya-election-violence.htmlhttp://www.kenya-advisor.com/kenya-election-violence.htmlhttp://www.sabc.co.za/news/a/237b11004c4ee79f95619d3f0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ber ofcabinet ministersand assistant ministers rose from seventeen to ninety and included Odinga as prime minis-

tera temporary arrangement; the position will be eliminated after the upcoming elections.

An additional component of the National Accord established two landmark commissions. The Independent Re-

view Commission (IREC) examined the electoral process and developed the Kriegler Reportwhich outlined a

set of recommendations for improving the electoral process. The Commission of Inquiry on Post Election Vio-lence (CIPEV), also known as the Waki Commission investigated alleged instances of criminality, violence and

security responses to the 2007 election; it consideredpast injustices. Both reports resulted inAgenda Item 4of the

National Accords, which recom-

mended sweeping constitutional re-

forms to improve governance, ensure

transparent elections and prevent

political violence in the future.

Reforms

The introduction of the Grand Coali-

tion largely quelled the disorder. As

the political arena normalised, theKenyan government, steered by the

KNDR process, undertook a series of

reforms. The2010 constitutionis the

most significant of these. A primary

goal of constitutional reform was to

address many of the ethnic rifts that

divided the country in the past bylocalising government responsibili-

ties and replacing corrupt provincial

authorities with smaller, decentral-

ised counties. It includes a bill of

rights that extends protections to

women and all racial groups, up-holds civil liberties, strengthens au-

tonomous institutions, and outlinesmechanisms for more transparent

governance. Kenyans voted over-

whelmingly in favour of the constitu-

tion and Kibakiratifiedit on 27 Au-

gust 2010.

During the KNDR process, leaders also identified the opportunities for cronyism inherent in the now defunct Elec-tions Monitoring Board (EMB). The EMB had been responsible for oversight of elections and its members were

appointed directly by the president in power, hardly an independent arm of the government. The KNDR recom-

mended that it be dismantled and proposed in its place the Independent Electoral and Boundaries Commission

(IEBC), a body that was removed from presidential supervision. Officially mandated underArticle 88of the con-

stitution, the agency was charged with registering candidates and overseeing elections, as well as reconstitutingKenyas former system of provinces into decentralised counties.

Additionally, the National Cohesion and Integration Commission (NCIC) was also established during the KNDRas a permanent body with the purpose of ensuring integrity and equality of opportunity in the political sphere. In

theory, the NCIC functions as a nonpartisan watchdog,prosecutingperpetrators of hate speech and training elec-tion monitors and pollsters.

Source:USAID
http://www.cipe.org/blog/2008/04/23/kenya%E2%80%99s-grand-coalition/#.URJ8K1pxfbAhttp://www.cipe.org/blog/2008/04/23/kenya%E2%80%99s-grand-coalition/#.URJ8K1pxfbAhttp://www.cipe.org/blog/2008/04/23/kenya%E2%80%99s-grand-coalition/#.URJ8K1pxfbAhttp://www.kas.de/wf/doc/kas_16094-1522-2-30.pdf?090428104720http://www.kas.de/wf/doc/kas_16094-1522-2-30.pdf?090428104720http://www.kas.de/wf/doc/kas_16094-1522-2-30.pdf?090428104720http://www.dialoguekenya.org/Monitoring/(January%202009)%201ST%20Review%20Report%20Agenda%204%20Long-standing%20issues%20and%20solutions.pdfhttp://www.dialoguekenya.org/Monitoring/(January%202009)%201ST%20Review%20Report%20Agenda%204%20Long-standing%20issues%20and%20solutions.pdfhttp://www.dialoguekenya.org/Monitoring/(January%202009)%201ST%20Review%20Report%20Agenda%204%20Long-standing%20issues%20and%20solutions.pdfhttp://www.unhcr.org/refworld/type,LEGISLATION,,KEN,4c8508822,0.htmlhttp://www.unhcr.org/refworld/type,LEGISLATION,,KEN,4c8508822,0.htmlhttp://www.unhcr.org/refworld/type,LEGISLATION,,KEN,4c8508822,0.htmlhttp://www.freedomhouse.org/report/countries-crossroads/2012/kenyahttp://www.freedomhouse.org/report/countries-crossroads/2012/kenyahttp://www.amanikenya.com/wp-content/uploads/2011/04/The-Kenya-Bill-of-Rights-_2010_.pdfhttp://www.amanikenya.com/wp-content/uploads/2011/04/The-Kenya-Bill-of-Rights-_2010_.pdfhttp://www.amanikenya.com/wp-content/uploads/2011/04/The-Kenya-Bill-of-Rights-_2010_.pdfhttp://www.bbc.co.uk/news/world-africa-11106558http://www.bbc.co.uk/news/world-africa-11106558http://www.bbc.co.uk/news/world-africa-11106558http://www.bbc.co.uk/news/world-africa-11106558http://www.bbc.co.uk/news/world-africa-11106558http://www.law.northwestern.edu/journals/jihr/v8/n2/1/http://www.law.northwestern.edu/journals/jihr/v8/n2/1/http://www.law.northwestern.edu/journals/jihr/v8/n2/1/http://www.kbc.co.ke/news.asp?nid=78776http://www.kbc.co.ke/news.asp?nid=78776http://www.kbc.co.ke/news.asp?nid=78776http://www.kenyaembassy.com/pdfs/The%20Constitution%20of%20Kenya.pdfhttp://www.kenyaembassy.com/pdfs/The%20Constitution%20of%20Kenya.pdfhttp://www.kenyaembassy.com/pdfs/The%20Constitution%20of%20Kenya.pdfhttp://www.cohesion.or.ke/http://www.cohesion.or.ke/http://www.cohesion.or.ke/http://www.sabc.co.za/news/a/237b11004c4ee79f95619d3f0b660f76/The-need-for-reconciliation-in-Kenya-20121108http://www.sabc.co.za/news/a/237b11004c4ee79f95619d3f0b660f76/The-need-for-reconciliation-in-Kenya-20121108http://www.sabc.co.za/news/a/237b11004c4ee79f95619d3f0b660f76/The-need-for-reconciliation-in-Kenya-20121108http://kenya.usaid.gov/kenya-maphttp://kenya.usaid.gov/kenya-maphttp://kenya.usaid.gov/kenya-maphttp://kenya.usaid.gov/kenya-maphttp://www.sabc.co.za/news/a/237b11004c4ee79f95619d3f0b660f76/The-need-for-reconciliation-in-Kenya-20121108http://www.cohesion.or.ke/http://www.kenyaembassy.com/pdfs/The%20Constitution%20of%20Kenya.pdfhttp://www.kbc.co.ke/news.asp?nid=78776http://www.law.northwestern.edu/journals/jihr/v8/n2/1/http://www.bbc.co.uk/news/world-africa-11106558http://www.bbc.co.uk/news/world-africa-11106558http://www.amanikenya.com/wp-content/uploads/2011/04/The-Kenya-Bill-of-Rights-_2010_.pdfhttp://www.amanikenya.com/wp-content/uploads/2011/04/The-Kenya-Bill-of-Rights-_2010_.pdfhttp://www.freedomhouse.org/report/countries-crossroads/2012/kenyahttp://www.unhcr.org/refworld/type,LEGISLATION,,KEN,4c8508822,0.htmlhttp://www.dialoguekenya.org/Monitoring/(January%202009)%201ST%20Review%20Report%20Agenda%204%20Long-standing%20issues%20and%20solutions.pdfhttp://www.kas.de/wf/doc/kas_16094-1522-2-30.pdf?090428104720http://www.cipe.org/blog/2008/04/23/kenya%E2%80%99s-grand-coalition/#.URJ8K1pxfbA


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2013 Presidential Candidates

Raila Odigna

Current Prime Minister RailaOdingarepresents the Orange Democratic Movement (ODM). A Luo chief, his fa-

ther was the outspoken critic of Jomo Kenyatta, the first president of Kenya and father to Odingas rival , Uhuru

Kenyatta. Odinga identifies as aLuo, the second most populous ethnic group in Kenya. He ran for the presidencyin 2007 and nearly succeeded in unseating Kibaki. In 2012, ODM aligned itself with Vice-President KalonzoMusyokas Wiper party and Trade Minister Moses Wetangulus Ford party. Odinga announced Vice-President

Musyoka as hisrunning mate; Minister Wetangulu will serve as leader of the party. Collectively, their 2013 plat-

form is outlined in theCord Manifesto.

Uhuru Kenyatta

Uhuru Kenyatta, current deputy prime minister and minister of finance, represents the National Alliance Party

(TNA). His running mate is William Ruto. Kenyatta is Kikuyu, the countrys most populous ethnic group, and

Ruto identifies as aKalenjin, an ethnic group associated with agriculture and the Rift Valley that has gained in-

creasing political importance in recent decades. Kenyatta is the countryswealthiest citizen, worth USD 500 mil-

lion, and heir to the political fame of his father, Jomo Kenyatta, the modern states founding president. Ruto was

anOdinga supporterin the 2007 election, which has led to criticism that the ticket is a union of convenience. TheTNA and itssupporting partiesreleased theJubilee Manifestoin 2013 to outline their platform.

ICC ControversyKenyattas campaign has been mired in controversy since he and Ruto were charged by the International Criminal

Court (ICC) for instigating violence and committingcrimes against humanityduring the 2007-2008 election cycle.

According to the charges, Kenyattaorganised and financeda campaign of Kikuyu-led violence, which resulted in

rape, murder, transfer of populations and other inhumane acts, reports The Guardian. Ruto is wanted for com-mitting similar crimes, but in the countrys western Rift Valley. Although both men deny the charges, Kenyatta

has said they willcomplywith the ICC judicial process, regardless of the electoral outcomes. The trial willcom-

mence in April, around the time a runoff would take place should no candidate win the election outright, an out-

come that is exceedingly probable.

Both parties have tried to capitalise on the international case for their own political gains. Kenyatta and Ruto ac-cused Odinga ofconspiring with foreigners while maintaining their own innocence. They assured voters they

will support the ICC verdict while also asserting they expect an acquittal. Odingas camp has responded that theinternational community willshun Kenyaif its leaders are brought before the Court. Other politicians have simply

suggested they will have the men removed from office, should they win. The Africa Policy Institute (API) ex-

plains that the ICC controversy increases the likelihood for the elections to bring instability. According toAPI,The intervention by [the] ICC has deeply polarised the power elite, widening existing ethnic fault lines andheightening the risk of a repeat of electoral violence.

Possible Outcomes

UnderArticle 145of Kenyas constitution, one third of the parliament can vote toimpeach a sitting presidentifthere is reasonable suspicion that s/he has violated national or international law, a prospect that Kenyan lawyers

have not ruled out. Another possible outcome is that, if elected, much of their terms will be served in absentia

while the men sit for the Courts proceedings at The Hague. Chief Prosecutor Fatou Bensouda estimated thepros-

ecutionwill require 826 hours to present evidence against Ruto;Kenyattas casewill require 572 hours.

The International Crisis Group (ICG) warns a Kenyatta presidency while ICC proceedings are on-going could

isolateKenya, or at least render it difficult for many governments to normalise diplomatic and economic relations

with the country. Donors might also be affected, electing to scale back assistance. On 07 February, the top USdiplomat for Africa, Johnnie Carson, urged Kenyans to carefully weigh their decisions before casting a vote. Alt-

hough he did not mention Kenyattas name, Carsonwarned of consequencesdepending on the elections out-come. According to the Washington Post, Carson stated, Individuals have reputationsIndividuals have histo-

ries. Individuals are known for who they are and what they say, what they have said, and how they act.
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c-cpi.int/iccdocs/doc/doc1538712.pdfhttp://www.icc-cpi.int/iccdocs/doc/doc1538712.pdfhttp://www.crisisgroup.org/~/media/Files/africa/horn-of-africa/kenya/197-kenyas-2013-elections.pdfhttp://www.crisisgroup.org/~/media/Files/africa/horn-of-africa/kenya/197-kenyas-2013-elections.pdfhttp://www.washingtonpost.com/world/africa/us-warns-of-possible-consequences-for-kenya-depending-on-presidential-election-outcome/2013/02/07/566fed20-7131-11e2-b3f3-b263d708ca37_story.htmlhttp://www.washingtonpost.com/world/africa/us-warns-of-possible-consequences-for-kenya-depending-on-presidential-election-outcome/2013/02/07/566fed20-7131-11e2-b3f3-b263d708ca37_story.htmlhttp://www.washingtonpost.com/world/africa/us-warns-of-possible-consequences-for-kenya-depending-on-presidential-election-outcome/2013/02/07/566fed20-7131-11e2-b3f3-b263d708ca37_story.htmlhttp://www.washingtonpost.com/world/africa/us-warns-of-possible-consequences-for-kenya-depending-on-presidential-election-outcome/2013/02/07/566fed20-7131-11e2-b3f3-b263d708ca37_story.htmlhttp://www.crisisgroup.org/~/media/Files/africa/horn-of-africa/kenya/197-kenyas-2013-elections.pdfhttp://www.icc-cpi.int/iccdocs/doc/doc1538712.pdfhttp://www.icc-cpi.int/iccdocs/doc/doc1538795.pdfhttp://www.icc-cpi.int/iccdocs/doc/doc1538795.pdfhttp://www.standardmedia.co.ke/index.php/radio-maisha/radio-maisha/?articleID=2000060518&story_title=Why-ICC-suspects-can-still-run-for-presidencyhttp://www.kenyaembassy.com/pdfs/The%20Constitution%20of%20Kenya.pdfhttp://www.africapi.org/papers/Risk%20to%20Stability%20in%20Pre-Election%20Kenya%20Conference%20Working%20Paper.pdfhttp://www.nation.co.ke/News/politics/Mutula-cautions-against-electing-Uhuru-and-Ruto/-/1064/1626278/-/rta90nz/-/index.htmlhttp://www.crisisgroup.org/en/regions/africa/horn-of-africa/kenya/197-kenyas-2013-elections.aspxhttp://www.reuters.com/article/2012/07/09/us-kenya-icc-idUSBRE8681AO20120709http://www.reuters.com/article/2012/07/09/us-kenya-icc-idUSBRE8681AO20120709http://www.aljazeera.com/programmes/talktojazeera/2013/01/20131228450568673.htmlhttp://www.guardian.co.uk/world/2011/mar/08/kenya-international-criminal-court-suspectshttp://www.bbc.co.uk/news/world-africa-16675268http://tna.co.ke/manifestohttp://citizennews.co.ke/news/2012/local/item/7657-understanding-the-jubilee-manifestohttp://endgenocide.org/an-unlikely-alliance/http://www.guardian.co.uk/world/2012/jan/23/court-kenyans-trial-election-violencehttp://www.africa.upenn.edu/NEH/kethnic.htmhttp://softkenya.com/uhurukenyatta/http://www.kenya-today.com/wp-content/uploads/2013/01/CORD-Manifesto-2013.pdfhttp://cordkenya.org/new/index.php/item/125-launch-of-cordhttp://www.africanewspost.com/2013/01/raila-uhuru-parties-top-candidates-count_25.htmlhttp://articles.cnn.com/2008-02-15/world/kenya.election_1_salim-lone-orange-democratic-movement-mediators?_s=PM:WORLDhttp://www.africa.upenn.edu/NEH/kethnic.htmhttp://softkenya.com/railaodinga/


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The ICG also suggests that matters grow increasingly complicated if one or both men do not cooperate with the

court. If a verdict is delivered that does not favour Kenyatta and/or Ruto, then aworst-case scenariomight includethe men rejecting the Courts ruling and refusing to abdicate power, similar to the current scenario played out by

President Omar al-Bashir of Sudan. The United Kingdom, France and Switzerlandreiteratedtheir restricted dip-

lomatic engagements with individuals indicted by the ICC. According to French ambassador Etienne de Poncins,

Our position is that we only have essential contact with somebody who is indicted by the ICC; it is a well-knownposition, same as that of the British.

Economic FactorsAnticipation of insecurity stemming from the election has produced an array of economic consequences. For in-

stance, Christmastime travel decreased throughout the country, and thesale of alcoholhas been banned by Parlia-

ment in the days leading up to 04 March. The fear of violent protests and potential property damage has driven

business owners to suspend operations. In January 2013,businesses closedin Odingashomedistrict of Kisumu.

According to local residents, politicians have a history of stoking violence that causes proprietors to pre-emptively

shut down their enterprises. As employees lose or abandon their jobs, families often return to ancestral homes,

signalling broader displacement patterns. The World Bank forecasts an overalleconomic declinefor the Kenyan

economy from 6.1 per cent to 5 per cent. If violence erupts in the wake of the election, the World Bank indicates

growth could drop to three or four per cent. In the previous election cycle, the countrys growth rate fell from 7.1per cent in 2007 to 1.5 per cent in 2008.

Concerns for 2013

Human Rights Watch (HRW) predicts thelikelihood for instabilityfollowing this years election remains peri-

lously high due to the failure of the government to address many of the root causes of violence in 2007-2008.

Since June 2012, at least 477 people have been killed in inter-communal violence related to the upcoming elec-

tions.Displacementhas also increased; since August 2012, as many as 112,000 people have fled their homes.HRW criticises the limited scope of government reforms. Of particular concern, is the relative impunity and pro-

tection from prosecution that public officials enjoy. The Council on Foreign Relations (CFR) also notes the devo-

lutionary reforms that were enacted could be counterproductive because they have led to the mostcomplex elec-

tion in the countrys history. In creating 47 new counties, the electorate will now vote on 47 county governors,

hundreds of new parliament members and any number of local officials, in addition to the highly fractious presi-

dential race

Inadequate Police Force

Reports of police abuse were prolific during the 2008 post-election turbulence, and fears thatpolice conductwill

result in bloodshed in 2013 have been voiced by internationalhuman rightsgroups like HRW and Amnesty Inter-

national. Despite its past record, the Kenyan police force has undergone significant reforms, including the ap-

pointment of its firstinspector general. However, a major obstacle to security remains the limited size of the force.

The IEBC anticipates opening between 29,000 and 40,000 polls; each must be manned by at least one police of-ficer, with some of the larger polling sites requiring several officers. The size of the police force is only 70,000.

The CFR warns that the insufficient number of officers sets up a scenario whereby the Kenya Defence Forcesmight be deployed for the first time since the countrys independence. Another alternative is the deployment of theGeneral Service Unit (GSU), an elite paramilitary domestic police force. In 2007-2008, members of the GSU were

allegedly responsible forsexual violenceagainst women and girls andextrajudicial executions.

Somali Border

Since 2011, when Kenya deployed troops to Somalia to combat theal-Shabaabpresence along the border,north-easternpockets of the country have become increasingly volatile. Large populations of ethnic Somalis inhabit the

Mandera districts; Dadaab, alone, has been home to over 100,000refugeesfor more than a decade. Kenyansecuri-

ty forceshave reportedly carried out abuses against ethnic Somalis in the past, and the International Crisis Group(ICG) cites Islamic radicalisation in the region as a potential trigger for ethnic clashes, possibly even fuelling

trans-state violence. On 03 February, a suicide bomber suspected of links to al-Shabaabdetonatedhimself in acrowded marketplace in Wajir, wounding several. If these types of attacks grow more common, they could plunge

the state into civil chaos, a possibility that regional and international actors would rather avoid.
http://www.crisisgroup.org/~/media/Files/africa/horn-of-africa/kenya/197-kenyas-2013-elections.pdfhttp://www.crisisgroup.org/~/media/Files/africa/horn-of-africa/kenya/197-kenyas-2013-elections.pdfhttp://www.crisisgroup.org/~/media/Files/africa/horn-of-africa/kenya/197-kenyas-2013-elections.pdfhttp://www.africareview.com/News/Why-the-West-has-interest-in-Kenya-poll-outcome/-/979180/1689980/-/c0vx8q/-/index.htmlhttp://www.africareview.com/News/Why-the-West-has-interest-in-Kenya-poll-outcome/-/979180/1689980/-/c0vx8q/-/index.htmlhttp://www.africareview.com/News/Why-the-West-has-interest-in-Kenya-poll-outcome/-/979180/1689980/-/c0vx8q/-/index.htmlhttp://allafrica.com/stories/201301031110.htmlhttp://allafrica.com/stories/201301031110.htmlhttp://allafrica.com/stories/201301031110.htmlhttp://www.irinnews.org/Report/97192/Kenyan-businesses-close-in-fear-of-electoral-violencehttp://www.irinnews.org/Report/97192/Kenyan-businesses-close-in-fear-of-electoral-violencehttp://www.irinnews.org/Report/97192/Kenyan-businesses-close-in-fear-of-electoral-violencehttp://www.kenyan-post.com/2013/02/raila-odingas-home-turf-of-kisumu-on.htmlhttp://www.kenyan-post.com/2013/02/raila-odingas-home-turf-of-kisumu-on.htmlhttp://www.kenyan-post.com/2013/02/raila-odingas-home-turf-of-kisumu-on.htmlhttp://www.theeastafrican.co.ke/business/Election-jitters-to-slow-down-Kenya-growth-says-World-Bank/-/2560/1639360/-/p9e0ox/-/index.htmlhttp://www.theeastafrican.co.ke/business/Election-jitters-to-slow-down-Kenya-growth-says-World-Bank/-/2560/1639360/-/p9e0ox/-/index.htmlhttp://www.theeastafrican.co.ke/business/Election-jitters-to-slow-down-Kenya-growth-says-World-Bank/-/2560/1639360/-/p9e0ox/-/index.htmlhttp://reliefweb.int/report/kenya/high-stakes-political-violence-and-2013-elections-kenyahttp://reliefweb.int/report/kenya/high-stakes-political-violence-and-2013-elections-kenyahttp://reliefweb.int/report/kenya/high-stakes-political-violence-and-2013-elections-kenyahttp://www.amnesty.org/en/news/kenya-stalled-police-reform-risk-elections-2013-01-30http://www.amnesty.org/en/news/kenya-stalled-police-reform-risk-elections-2013-01-30http://www.amnesty.org/en/news/kenya-stalled-police-reform-risk-elections-2013-01-30http://www.cfr.org/kenya/electoral-violence-kenya/p29761http://www.cfr.org/kenya/electoral-violence-kenya/p29761http://www.cfr.org/kenya/electoral-violence-kenya/p29761http://www.cfr.org/kenya/electoral-violence-kenya/p29761http://www.hrw.org/sites/default/files/reports/kenya0213webwcover.pdfhttp://www.hrw.org/sites/default/files/reports/kenya0213webwcover.pdfhttp://www.hrw.org/sites/default/files/reports/kenya0213webwcover.pdfhttp://www.amnesty.org/en/news/kenya-stalled-police-reform-risk-elections-2013-01-30http://www.amnesty.org/en/news/kenya-stalled-police-reform-risk-elections-2013-01-30http://www.amnesty.org/en/news/kenya-stalled-police-reform-risk-elections-2013-01-30http://sabahionline.com/en_GB/articles/hoa/articles/newsbriefs/2012/12/24/newsbrief-02http://sabahionline.com/en_GB/articles/hoa/articles/newsbriefs/2012/12/24/newsbrief-02http://sabahionline.com/en_GB/articles/hoa/articles/newsbriefs/2012/12/24/newsbrief-02http://www.cfr.org/kenya/electoral-violence-kenya/p29761http://www.cfr.org/kenya/electoral-violence-kenya/p29761http://www.cfr.org/kenya/electoral-violence-kenya/p29761http://www.smartglobalhealth.org/blog/entry/post-election-violence-in-kenya-and-its-aftermath/http://www.smartglobalhealth.org/blog/entry/post-election-violence-in-kenya-and-its-aftermath/http://www.smartglobalhealth.org/blog/entry/post-election-violence-in-kenya-and-its-aftermath/http://www.review.upeace.org/index.cfm?opcion=0&ejemplar=24&entrada=129http://www.review.upeace.org/index.cfm?opcion=0&ejemplar=24&entrada=129http://www.review.upeace.org/index.cfm?opcion=0&ejemplar=24&entrada=129http://reliefweb.int/report/somalia/push-follow-somalias-roadmap-carries-riskshttp://reliefweb.int/report/somalia/push-follow-somalias-roadmap-carries-riskshttp://reliefweb.int/report/somalia/push-follow-somalias-roadmap-carries-riskshttp://reliefweb.int/sites/reliefweb.int/files/resources/OCHA%20HoA%20Situation%20Report%20No.%2020%20-%2028%20October%202011.pdfhttp://reliefweb.int/sites/reliefweb.int/files/resources/OCHA%20HoA%20Situation%20Report%20No.%2020%20-%2028%20October%202011.pdfhttp://reliefweb.int/sites/reliefweb.int/files/resources/OCHA%20HoA%20Situation%20Report%20No.%2020%20-%2028%20October%202011.pdfhttp://reliefweb.int/sites/reliefweb.int/files/resources/OCHA%20HoA%20Situation%20Report%20No.%2020%20-%2028%20October%202011.pdfhttp://pdf.usaid.gov/pdf_docs/PNADT520.pdfhttp://pdf.usaid.gov/pdf_docs/PNADT520.pdfhttp://pdf.usaid.gov/pdf_docs/PNADT520.pdfhttp://www.hrw.org/reports/2012/05/04/criminal-reprisalshttp://www.hrw.org/reports/2012/05/04/criminal-reprisalshttp://www.hrw.org/reports/2012/05/04/criminal-reprisalshttp://www.hrw.org/reports/2012/05/04/criminal-reprisalshttp://www.crisisgroup.org/en/regions/africa/horn-of-africa/kenya/b085-kenyan-somali-islamist-radicalisation.aspxhttp://www.crisisgroup.org/en/regions/africa/horn-of-africa/kenya/b085-kenyan-somali-islamist-radicalisation.aspxhttp://allafrica.com/stories/201302041198.htmlhttp://allafrica.com/stories/201302041198.htmlhttp://allafrica.com/stories/201302041198.htmlhttp://allafrica.com/stories/201302041198.htmlhttp://www.crisisgroup.org/en/regions/africa/horn-of-africa/kenya/b085-kenyan-somali-islamist-radicalisation.aspxhttp://www.hrw.org/reports/2012/05/04/criminal-reprisalshttp://www.hrw.org/reports/2012/05/04/criminal-reprisalshttp://pdf.usaid.gov/pdf_docs/PNADT520.pdfhttp://reliefweb.int/sites/reliefweb.int/files/resources/OCHA%20HoA%20Situation%20Report%20No.%2020%20-%2028%20October%202011.pdfhttp://reliefweb.int/sites/reliefweb.int/files/resources/OCHA%20HoA%20Situation%20Report%20No.%2020%20-%2028%20October%202011.pdfhttp://reliefweb.int/report/somalia/push-follow-somalias-roadmap-carries-riskshttp://www.review.upeace.org/index.cfm?opcion=0&ejemplar=24&entrada=129http://www.smartglobalhealth.org/blog/entry/post-election-violence-in-kenya-and-its-aftermath/http://www.cfr.org/kenya/electoral-violence-kenya/p29761http://sabahionline.com/en_GB/articles/hoa/articles/newsbriefs/2012/12/24/newsbrief-02http://www.amnesty.org/en/news/kenya-stalled-police-reform-risk-elections-2013-01-30http://www.hrw.org/sites/default/files/reports/kenya0213webwcover.pdfhttp://www.cfr.org/kenya/electoral-violence-kenya/p29761http://www.cfr.org/kenya/electoral-violence-kenya/p29761http://www.amnesty.org/en/news/kenya-stalled-police-reform-risk-elections-2013-01-30http://reliefweb.int/report/kenya/high-stakes-political-violence-and-2013-elections-kenyahttp://www.theeastafrican.co.ke/business/Election-jitters-to-slow-down-Kenya-growth-says-World-Bank/-/2560/1639360/-/p9e0ox/-/index.htmlhttp://www.kenyan-post.com/2013/02/raila-odingas-home-turf-of-kisumu-on.htmlhttp://www.irinnews.org/Report/97192/Kenyan-businesses-close-in-fear-of-electoral-violencehttp://allafrica.com/stories/201301031110.htmlhttp://www.africareview.com/News/Why-the-West-has-interest-in-Kenya-poll-outcome/-/979180/1689980/-/c0vx8q/-/index.htmlhttp://www.crisisgroup.org/~/media/Files/africa/horn-of-africa/kenya/197-kenyas-2013-elections.pdf


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Rift Valley

TheRift Valleyis home to Kikuyu andKalenjingroups, which have clashed over land rights long before the 2007election. Nevertheless, the elections triggered some of the most gruesome inter-communal violence as well-

organised gangs of Kalenjin youth attacked Kikuyu shops and homes. TheLuoalso represent a sizable population

of the Rift and were targeted by Kikuyu bands in

2007-2008. HRW found that government re-forms were largely ineffective and the inabilityof police to carry out regular tasks in a non-

discriminatory manner has increased animosi-

ties rather than mitigate them. A final concern is

thatimpunity from crimescommitted in the pre-

vious election could provoke further violence in

2013.

Coast ProvinceMRC and Tana Delta

The impoverished communities surrounding the

capital of Coast Province, Mombasa, such as

Kisauni, Bamburi and Mtwapa are being closelymonitored. The regions economy is severely

depressed and officials predict the overflowing

shantytowns could erupt into violence similar to

the mobs that appeared in Kibera streets in 2007.

An additional concern in the province is the re-

cent resurgence of the Mombasa Republican

Council (MRC), a grassroots separatist move-mentthat is challenging the Kenyan government.

Supposedly organised in the 1990s, the group

has gained notoriety since 2008 when it publi-cised the slogan Pwani si Kenya (the Coast is

not Kenya). MRC members range from 100,000

to 1.5 million and cite coastal land rights as their primary grievance with Nairobi. The group threatened toboycottelectionsin 2013 and bar entry of the IEBC; however, a courtstruck downthe MRC petition. The Kenyan gov-

ernment outlawed the group, a decision that was quicklyreversedby the court system. Contravening the courtsruling, the national police, including GSU battalions, arrested key leaders of the group. The Integrated Regional

Information Networks(IRIN)published reports suggesting thecrackdowncould backfire if violence in the re-

gion continues toescalateprior to 04 March. However, on 02 February, a spokesman for the MRC called for a

peaceful electoral process, indicating the group will encourage its members, especially community youth, to re-frain from violence. MRC Secretary General, Hamza Randu, echoed the spokesman, We are ready to talk to our

youth and allow the government [to] conduct the general elections.

Tensions in theTana Deltaare indicative of the ethnic fault lines that pervade much of Kenyan politics, yet theyalso demonstrate the willingness of national politicians to co-opt localised conflict. Over 200 people have died in

the region since mid-2012 in violence related to inter-communal and inter-ethnic feuds. The Orma is a pastoralist

tribe that often competes for water and grazing rights with the Pokomo, a settled agrarian community. Although

they outnumber the Pokomo, the Orma have not had representation since the new constitution introduced redis-

tricting. Pokomo leaders currently hold all three elected seats. The most recent spate ofattackscan be traced toDecember 2012 when Pokomo slaughtered between 48 and 53 mostly Orma villagers. The Orma carried out re-

prisal attacks against Pokomo several weeks later, and a political mediation is yet to be implemented. The conflict

is made more complicated by the fact that both police and politicians have been accused of complicity in thebloodshed. The Tana Delta police chief admitted local Pokomo and Ormapolice officerswere participants in the

violence. Inaction by the local police could require federal intervention, such as the deployment of GSU, despitethe potential for blowback if abuses similar to those committed by national police in 2007-2008 are repeated.

UNREST STIRS an EXODUS

Since a deeply flawed election in December incited ethnic and political

violence, hundreds of thousands of people have been driven from their

homes. Many are resettling in ethnically homogenous areas. The areas

on the map represent a sample of the movements by some ethnic groups

(red labels). Source:Geographic Travels
http://www.tandfonline.com/doi/pdf/10.1080/17531050802095536http://www.tandfonline.com/doi/pdf/10.1080/17531050802095536http://www.tandfonline.com/doi/pdf/10.1080/17531050802095536http://www.cidcm.umd.edu/mar/assessment.asp?groupId=50109http://www.cidcm.umd.edu/mar/assessment.asp?groupId=50109http://www.cidcm.umd.edu/mar/assessment.asp?groupId=50109http://csis.org/publication/international-criminal-court-and-post-election-violence-kenyahttp://csis.org/publication/international-criminal-court-and-post-election-violence-kenyahttp://www.guardian.co.uk/world/2008/feb/04/kenya.internationalhttp://www.guardian.co.uk/world/2008/feb/04/kenya.internationalhttp://www.guardian.co.uk/world/2008/feb/04/kenya.internationalhttp://www.hrw.org/sites/default/files/reports/kenya1211webwcover_0.pdfhttp://www.hrw.org/sites/default/files/reports/kenya1211webwcover_0.pdfhttp://www.hrw.org/sites/default/files/reports/kenya1211webwcover_0.pdfhttp://www.theafricareport.com/news-analysis/kenya-coastal-politics-threaten-the-white-sands-of-mombasa.htmlhttp://www.theafricareport.com/news-analysis/kenya-coastal-politics-threaten-the-white-sands-of-mombasa.htmlhttp://www.irinnews.org/report/96630/Briefing-Kenya-s-coastal-separatists-menace-or-martyrshttp://www.irinnews.org/report/96630/Briefing-Kenya-s-coastal-separatists-menace-or-martyrshttp://www.irinnews.org/report/96630/Briefing-Kenya-s-coastal-separatists-menace-or-martyrshttp://sabahionline.com/en_GB/articles/hoa/articles/newsbriefs/2012/12/19/newsbrief-09http://sabahionline.com/en_GB/articles/hoa/articles/newsbriefs/2012/12/19/newsbrief-09http://sabahionline.com/en_GB/articles/hoa/articles/newsbriefs/2012/12/19/newsbrief-09http://sabahionline.com/en_GB/articles/hoa/articles/newsbriefs/2012/12/19/newsbrief-09http://sabahionline.com/en_GB/articles/hoa/articles/newsbriefs/2012/12/20/newsbrief-04http://sabahionline.com/en_GB/articles/hoa/articles/newsbriefs/2012/12/20/newsbrief-04http://sabahionline.com/en_GB/articles/hoa/articles/newsbriefs/2012/12/20/newsbrief-04http://allafrica.com/stories/201210210068.htmlhttp://allafrica.com/stories/201210210068.htmlhttp://allafrica.com/stories/201210210068.htmlhttp://www.irinnews.org/report/96630/Briefing-Kenya-s-coastal-separatists-menace-or-martyrshttp://www.irinnews.org/report/96630/Briefing-Kenya-s-coastal-separatists-menace-or-martyrshttp://www.irinnews.org/report/96630/Briefing-Kenya-s-coastal-separatists-menace-or-martyrshttp://www.irinnews.org/Report/96312/Analysis-Kenya-s-deadly-mix-of-frustration-politics-and-impunityhttp://www.irinnews.org/Report/96312/Analysis-Kenya-s-deadly-mix-of-frustration-politics-and-impunityhttp://www.irinnews.org/Report/96312/Analysis-Kenya-s-deadly-mix-of-frustration-politics-and-impunityhttp://allafrica.com/stories/201302040184.htmlhttp://allafrica.com/stories/201302040184.htmlhttp://allafrica.com/stories/201211061398.html?aa_source=useful-columnhttp://allafrica.com/stories/201211061398.html?aa_source=useful-columnhttp://allafrica.com/stories/201211061398.html?aa_source=useful-columnhttp://www.theafricareport.com/news-analysis/kenyas-tana-delta-burning.htmlhttp://www.theafricareport.com/news-analysis/kenyas-tana-delta-burning.htmlhttp://www.theafricareport.com/news-analysis/kenyas-tana-delta-burning.htmlhttp://www.hrw.org/sites/default/files/reports/kenya0213webwcover.pdfhttp://www.hrw.org/sites/default/files/reports/kenya0213webwcover.pdfhttp://www.hrw.org/sites/default/files/reports/kenya0213webwcover.pdfhttp://www.geographictravels.com/2008/03/post-election-violence-in-kenya-maps.htmlhttp://www.geographictravels.com/2008/03/post-election-violence-in-kenya-maps.htmlhttp://www.geographictravels.com/2008/03/post-election-violence-in-kenya-maps.htmlhttp://www.geographictravels.com/2008/03/post-election-violence-in-kenya-maps.htmlhttp://www.hrw.org/sites/default/files/reports/kenya0213webwcover.pdfhttp://www.theafricareport.com/news-analysis/kenyas-tana-delta-burning.htmlhttp://allafrica.com/stories/201211061398.html?aa_source=useful-columnhttp://allafrica.com/stories/201302040184.htmlhttp://www.irinnews.org/Report/96312/Analysis-Kenya-s-deadly-mix-of-frustration-politics-and-impunityhttp://www.irinnews.org/report/96630/Briefing-Kenya-s-coastal-separatists-menace-or-martyrshttp://allafrica.com/stories/201210210068.htmlhttp://sabahionline.com/en_GB/articles/hoa/articles/newsbriefs/2012/12/20/newsbrief-04http://sabahionline.com/en_GB/articles/hoa/articles/newsbriefs/2012/12/19/newsbrief-09http://sabahionline.com/en_GB/articles/hoa/articles/newsbriefs/2012/12/19/newsbrief-09http://www.irinnews.org/report/96630/Briefing-Kenya-s-coastal-separatists-menace-or-martyrshttp://www.irinnews.org/report/96630/Briefing-Kenya-s-coastal-separatists-menace-or-martyrshttp://www.theafricareport.com/news-analysis/kenya-coastal-politics-threaten-the-white-sands-of-mombasa.htmlhttp://www.hrw.org/sites/default/files/reports/kenya1211webwcover_0.pdfhttp://www.guardian.co.uk/world/2008/feb/04/kenya.internationalhttp://csis.org/public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Technology

Theonline communityhas lent unprecedented support to the Kenyan electoral process in 2013. The country hasan estimated 13.5 million internet users, most of whom rely on mobile phones to access content. Civil society or-

ganisations (CSOs), corporations and free-lancers are using technology to arm voters with tools that will encour-

age conflict-free elections and enforce transparency in the polling process.Effortshave primarily focused on three

core functions: sharing information about how and where to vote; monitoring and preventing hate speech that isintended to incite violence; and expanding access to crowdsourcing tools that can report incidents of violence and

voting irregularities as they occur during real-time. DaudiWere, one of Kenyas most prominent bloggers summa-

rised the efforts, We are protecting the vote, protecting the electoral progress.

Conflict Mapping

Ushaidi(witness in Swahili) produced the 2008 post electionviolence mapthat first allowed individuals to send

SMS messages to report hostilities. An early example of crowdsourcing, the platform was later used in post -

earthquakeHaiti, theGazawar in 2009, and the TohokuJapanese tsunamiin 2011. To prepare for the 2013 elec-

tions, Ushaidi hasmobilisedastandby task forceof technologists, researchers, and activists to support a range of

crowd-mapping activities. The group has already designated local language teams and is currently monitoring hate

speech. It has also enlisted dozens of data visualisation experts to code open source maps of events that unfold

throughout the electoral process.

So-called crisis mappers or conflict mappers have established open source platforms that allow anyone with a

mobile device to share and access information about polling irregularities. For example, Uchaguzi seeks to im-

prove election transparency by providing mobile-based tools for individuals to report, intimidation, hate speech,

vote bullying, polling clerk-bias, and voting misinformation. Individuals with a mobile phone can email, text, or

tweet real-time information, which is recorded and then visualised on a map according to the Global Positioning

System (GPS) coordinates provided by a user. Think Spatial Kenya has produced a map of 16,000polling sitesacross the country so that individuals have reliable data about a polling station. Another CSO, Map Kibera, has

organisedelection monitors in one of the largest slums in the capital Nairobi.

Governments and International Organisations

Governments and international organisations have also capitalised on the sophistication of technology users in

Kenya and are relying on digital platforms to provide information about polling sites, candidates, and other elec-tion details.Kenya Open Datais a government-sponsored initiative that aims to improve governance and transpar-

ency by making government records, including voting regulations and election data, accessible online. The UNOrganisation for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs (OCHA) has produced a map ofconflicts by districtas

inter-community violence escalates prior to the election. The Constitution and Reform Education Consortium

(CRECO) represents a broad coalition of Kenyan organisations that conducted a baseline study to identify the

most volatile counties based on a range of social, economic and security factors. CRECO then outlined specific

local-level reforms that might mitigate post-election violence.

Social Media

In 2007-2008hate speechsent via SMS messages was used to rally crowds and inflame ethnic divisions. In 2012,social media outlets have reportedly deployed teams of technologists to undermine groups or individuals that uti-

lise technology to instigate violence.Umatihas gained notoriety for its plans tomonitor new media, identify dan-

gerous speech and then disseminate information about the distributor and the content of the messages. Reports

published by Umati demonstrate how its staff has identified commentators of hate speech and then paired the

commentators with specific instructions. Examples of such calls to action include directions to discriminate,

forcefully evict, beat, and even kill. The organisation enjoys support from well-known institutions like

American University andUshahidi. As the election approaches, Umati can be followed byblogandtwitter.

In apartnershipwithStoryful, Google launched theKenya Election Hub, a YouTube channel that hosted presiden-

tial debates and plans to monitor campaign activities and election results through 04 March. The online space is

an increasingly important tool for outreach, engagement and reflection during the political process, said Mark-

ham Nolan, the managing editor at Storyful, Googles chief partner in the election hub initiative.
http://www.itnewsafrica.com/2013/02/kenya-online-community-galvenised-to-cover-elections/http://www.itnewsafrica.com/2013/02/kenya-online-community-galvenised-to-cover-elections/http://www.itnewsafrica.com/2013/02/kenya-online-community-galvenised-to-cover-elections/http://www.aljazeera.com/indepth/features/2013/01/2013115132332780404.htmlhttp://www.aljazeera.com/indepth/features/2013/01/2013115132332780404.htmlhttp://www.aljazeera.com/indepth/features/2013/01/2013115132332780404.htmlhttp://www.mentalacrobatics.com/about/http://www.mentalacrobatics.com/about/http://www.mentalacrobatics.com/about/http://www.guardian.co.uk/news/blog/2011/apr/07/ushahidi-crowdmap-kenya-violence-haguehttp://www.guardian.co.uk/news/blog/2011/apr/07/ushahidi-crowdmap-kenya-violence-haguehttp://kenya.ushahidi.com/mainhttp://kenya.ushahidi.com/mainhttp://kenya.ushahidi.com/mainhttp://api.ning.com/files/HX-j3*PqLLSgdkf8w5RVQwTyx-8GN*wEGnr3zb-aZoeXYGoOLSBhU5nFC5-qTSj4C7m7StA0yHmGmHWgdDuDtu48CJRnwW8Q/Ushahidi_Haiti_Eval_final.pdfhttp://api.ning.com/files/HX-j3*PqLLSgdkf8w5RVQwTyx-8GN*wEGnr3zb-aZoeXYGoOLSBhU5nFC5-qTSj4C7m7StA0yHmGmHWgdDuDtu48CJRnwW8Q/Ushahidi_Haiti_Eval_final.pdfhttp://api.ning.com/files/HX-j3*PqLLSgdkf8w5RVQwTyx-8GN*wEGnr3zb-aZoeXYGoOLSBhU5nFC5-qTSj4C7m7StA0yHmGmHWgdDuDtu48CJRnwW8Q/Ushahidi_Haiti_Eval_final.pdfhttp://labs.aljazeera.net/warongaza/http://labs.aljazeera.net/warongaza/http://labs.aljazeera.net/warongaza/http://www.sinsai.info/http://www.sinsai.info/http://www.sinsai.info/http://blog.ushahidi.com/2013/01/21/uchaguzi-community-next-steps/http://blog.ushahidi.com/2013/01/21/uchaguzi-community-next-steps/http://blog.ushahidi.com/2013/01/21/uchaguzi-community-next-steps/http://standbytaskforce.ning.com/main/authorization/signIn?target=http%3A%2F%2Fstandbytaskforce.ning.com%2Fpage%2Ftask-force-teamshttp://standbytaskforce.ning.com/main/authorization/signIn?target=http%3A%2F%2Fstandbytaskforce.ning.com%2Fpage%2Ftask-force-teamshttp://standbytaskforce.ning.com/main/authorization/signIn?target=http%3A%2F%2Fstandbytaskforce.ning.com%2Fpage%2Ftask-force-teamshttp://thinkspatial.blogspot.com/2012/07/conflict-potential-map-of-kenyan.htmlhttp://thinkspatial.blogspot.com/2012/07/conflict-potential-map-of-kenyan.htmlhttp://uchaguzi.co.ke/mainhttp://uchaguzi.co.ke/mainhttp://thinkspatial.blogspot.com/http://thinkspatial.blogspot.com/http://thinkspatial.blogspot.com/http://mapkibera.org/http://mapkibera.org/http://mapkibera.org/http://www.mapkibera.org/blog/2012/11/23/opinion-leaders-nominated-to-lead-election-monitoring/http://www.mapkibera.org/blog/2012/11/23/opinion-leaders-nominated-to-lead-election-monitoring/https://opendata.go.ke/visionhttps://opendata.go.ke/visionhttps://opendata.go.ke/visionhttp://reliefweb.int/sites/reliefweb.int/files/resources/map_3176.pdfhttp://reliefweb.int/sites/reliefweb.int/files/resources/map_3176.pdfhttp://reliefweb.int/sites/reliefweb.int/files/resources/map_3176.pdfhttp://www.katibasasa.org/wp-content/uploads/2012/05/CRECO-Peace-bk-May.pdfhttp://www.katibasasa.org/wp-content/uploads/2012/05/CRECO-Peace-bk-May.pdfhttp://www.katibasasa.org/wp-content/uploads/2012/05/CRECO-Peace-bk-May.pdfhttp://sabahionline.com/en_GB/articles/hoa/articles/features/2013/02/05/feature-01http://sabahionline.com/en_GB/articles/hoa/articles/features/2013/02/05/feature-01http://sabahionline.com/en_GB/articles/hoa/articles/features/2013/02/05/feature-01http://mediasourceafrica.com/article/view/1283/kenya-umati-online-media-monitoring-project-releases-october-2012-initial-results#.URQjkVpxfbAhttp://mediasourceafrica.com/article/view/1283/kenya-umati-online-media-monitoring-project-releases-october-2012-initial-results#.URQjkVpxfbAhttp://mediasourceafrica.com/article/view/1283/kenya-umati-online-media-monitoring-project-releases-october-2012-initial-results#.URQjkVpxfbAhttp://research.ihub.co.ke/downloads/Umati%20Report_October.pdfhttp://research.ihub.co.ke/downloads/Umati%20Report_October.pdfhttp://research.ihub.co.ke/downloads/Umati%20Report_October.pdfhttp://blog.ushahidi.com/2012/12/19/umati-monitoring-dangerous-speech-online/http://blog.ushahidi.com/2012/12/19/umati-monitoring-dangerous-speech-online/http://blog.ushahidi.com/2012/12/19/umati-monitoring-dangerous-speech-online/http://umatisocmedia.blogspot.com/http://umatisocmedia.blogspot.com/http://umatisocmedia.blogspot.com/https://twitter.com/umatisocmediahttps://twitter.com/umatisocmediahttps://twitter.com/umatisocmediahttp://www.businessdailyafrica.com/Corporate-News/Google-to-launch-Youtube-channel-for-Kenya-elections/-/539550/1681574/-/vmrxwtz/-/index.htmlhttp://www.businessdailyafrica.com/Corporate-News/Google-to-launch-Youtube-channel-for-Kenya-elections/-/539550/1681574/-/vmrxwtz/-/index.htmlhttp://www.businessdailyafrica.com/Corporate-News/Google-to-launch-Youtube-channel-for-Kenya-elections/-/539550/1681574/-/vmrxwtz/-/index.htmlhttp://blog.storyful.com/2013/01/31/launching-our-kenyan-election-youtube-channel/#.URJnJlpxfbAhttp://blog.storyful.com/2013/01/31/launching-our-kenyan-election-youtube-channel/#.URJnJlpxfbAhttp://blog.storyful.com/2013/01/31/launching-our-kenyan-election-youtube-channel/#.URJnJlpxfbAhttp://www.youtube.com/elections?hl=en-GB&gl=KEhttp://www.youtube.com/elections?hl=en-GB&gl=KEhttp://www.youtube.com/elections?hl=en-GB&gl=KEhttp://www.youtube.com/elections?hl=en-GB&gl=KEhttp://blog.storyful.com/2013/01/31/launching-our-kenyan-election-youtube-channel/#.URJnJlpxfbAhttp://www.businessdailyafrica.com/Corporate-News/Google-to-launch-Youtube-channel-for-Kenya-elections/-/539550/1681574/-/vmrxwtz/-/index.htmlhttps://twitter.com/umatisocmediahttp://umatisocmedia.blogspot.com/http://blog.ushahidi.com/2012/12/19/umati-monitoring-dangerous-speech-online/http://research.ihub.co.ke/downloads/Umati%20Report_October.pdfhttp://mediasourceafrica.com/article/view/1283/kenya-umati-online-media-monitoring-project-releases-october-2012-initial-results#.URQjkVpxfbAhttp://sabahionline.com/en_GB/articles/hoa/articles/features/2013/02/05/feature-01http://www.katibasasa.org/wp-content/uploads/2012/05/CRECO-Peace-bk-May.pdfhttp://reliefweb.int/sites/reliefweb.int/files/resources/map_3176.pdfhttps://opendata.go.ke/visionhttp://www.mapkibera.org/blog/2012/11/23/opinion-leaders-nominated-to-lead-election-monitoring/http://mapkibera.org/http://thinkspatial.blogspot.com/http://uchaguzi.co.ke/mainhttp://thinkspatial.blogspot.com/2012/07/conflict-potential-map-of-kenyan.htmlhttp://standbytaskforce.ning.com/main/authorization/signIn?target=http%3A%2F%2Fstandbytaskforce.ning.com%2Fpage%2Ftask-force-teamshttp://blog.ushahidi.com/2013/01/21/uchaguzi-community-next-steps/http://www.sinsai.info/http://labs.aljazeera.net/warongaza/http://api.ning.com/files/HX-j3*PqLLSgdkf8w5RVQwTyx-8GN*wEGnr3zb-aZoeXYGoOLSBhU5nFC5-qTSj4C7m7StA0yHmGmHWgdDuDtu48CJRnwW8Q/Ushahidi_Haiti_Eval_final.pdfhttp://kenya.ushahidi.com/mainhttp://www.guardian.co.uk/news/blog/2011/apr/07/ushahidi-crowdmap-kenya-violence-haguehttp://www.mentalacrobatics.com/about/http://www.aljazeera.com/indepth/features/2013/01/2013115132332780404.htmlhttp://www.itnewsafrica.com/2013/02/kenya-online-community-galvenised-to-cover-elections/


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Despite the proliferation of digital monitoring mechanisms, Kenyan government minister Muthui Kariuki issued a

cryptic warning to international journalists covering the election on 30 January 2013. Accusing journalists andpollsters of catalysing violence in the past, he asserted that reporters will be summoned if they publish stories

that polarise the electorate. He admonished journalists by stating, We will set you on fire before you set us onfire. The issue of journalism is complicated because local media outlets undeniably contributed tohate speech

that fuelled ethnic tensions and clashes in the weeks after the 2007 elections. Although most local radio stationscalled for calm during the 2007-2008 violence, a BBCinvestigation found that some stations broadcasted blatant

hate speech targeting specific ethnic groups that stoked the unrest. The recent statements by Kariuki hinted at

wide-scale press restrictions and drew international criticism. The Associated Press called the decree a veiled

threat and Tom Rhodes of the Committee to Protect Journalists decried the statement as utterly reprehensibleand unbecoming of a government spokesman.

Conclusion

Since violence first broke out after the 2007 elections, the Kenyan government, with support from regional and

international actors, has implemented a suite ofgovernance reformsmeant to curtail post-electoral clashes in the

future.Foreign governmentshave endorsed the new constitution and voiced their support for a peaceful political

transition. Technology companies and CSOs have also introduced innovative strategies andsocial mediaplatforms

to dissuade politicians from inciting instability through hate speech. Nevertheless, ethnic divisions remain fraughtin the country of forty million, as do a host of economic, political and social cleavages. International monitors will

closely observe results on 04 March realising the high probability of a run-off to follow in early April of 2013.
http://abcnews.go.com/International/wireStory/icc-suspect-listed-kenya-presidential-candidate-18353052http://abcnews.go.com/International/wireStory/icc-suspect-listed-kenya-presidential-candidate-18353052http://downloads.bbc.co.uk/worldservice/trust/pdf/kenya_policy_briefing_08.pdfhttp://downloads.bbc.co.uk/worldservice/trust/pdf/kenya_policy_briefing_08.pdfhttp://downloads.bbc.co.uk/worldservice/trust/pdf/kenya_policy_briefing_08.pdfhttp://www.salon.com/2013/01/30/kenya_govt_issues_stern_warning_to_intl_media/http://www.salon.com/2013/01/30/kenya_govt_issues_stern_warning_to_intl_media/http://www.salon.com/2013/01/30/kenya_govt_issues_stern_warning_to_intl_media/http://www.salon.com/2013/01/30/kenya_govt_issues_stern_warning_to_intl_media/http://www.salon.com/2013/01/30/kenya_govt_issues_stern_warning_to_intl_media/http://www.salon.com/2013/01/30/kenya_govt_issues_stern_warning_to_intl_media/http://www.freedomhouse.org/report/freedom-world/2012/kenyahttp://www.freedomhouse.org/report/freedom-world/2012/kenyahttp://www.freedomhouse.org/report/freedom-world/2012/kenyahttp://www.huffingtonpost.com/2013/02/05/kenya-election-barack-obama_n_2622103.htmlhttp://www.huffingtonpost.com/2013/02/05/kenya-election-barack-obama_n_2622103.htmlhttp://www.huffingtonpost.com/2013/02/05/kenya-election-barack-obama_n_2622103.htmlhttp://allafrica.com/stories/201302111724.htmlhttp://allafrica.com/stories/201302111724.htmlhttp://allafrica.com/stories/201302111724.htmlhttp://allafrica.com/stories/201302111724.htmlhttp://www.huffingtonpost.com/2013/02/05/kenya-election-barack-obama_n_2622103.htmlhttp://www.freedomhouse.org/report/freedom-world/2012/kenyahttp://www.salon.com/2013/01/30/kenya_govt_issues_stern_warning_to_intl_media/http://www.salon.com/2013/01/30/kenya_govt_issues_stern_warning_to_intl_media/http://www.salon.com/2013/01/30/kenya_govt_issues_stern_warning_to_intl_media/http://downloads.bbc.co.uk/worldservice/trust/pdf/kenya_policy_briefing_08.pdfhttp://abcnews.go.com/International/wireStory/icc-suspect-listed-kenya-presidential-candidate-18353052

2013 Kenya Elections

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