201203145 Army Air Force Integration Forum (13 1630 Mar 2012) (2)

For Official Use Only

For Official Use Only as of 13 1630 Mar 2012

Army Air Force Integration Forum The Army of 2020

COL Mark Elfendahl 15 March 2012

For Official Use Only (FOUO)

The Army of 2020

The Structural Transition

The Human Transition

Strategy Capabilities Structure Organization Modernization

NATIONAL SECURITY

STRATEGY

Capstone Concept for

Joint Operations

The Army Profession

Doctrine 2015

Army Learning Model

The Squad

Leader

Development

Army Capstone Concept

Tra

inin

g

Ex

pe

rien

ce

Ed

uc

atio

n

Leader Development

ADP 3-0

Unified Land

Operations

ADRP 3-0

Unified Land

Operations

S02291300

http://upload.wikimedia.org/wikipedia/commons/b/b9/Abrams-transparent.png

FOUO

FOUO

Problem Statement

CSA to CG, TRADOC (July 2011):

“How do we transition from today’s force to the Army of 2020 in an era of

fiscal austerity and still accomplish all that the Army must do as part of the

Joint force?”

– What must the Army of 2020 do?

– Can we eliminate entire C2 echelons?

– Can we justify EAB C2 overhead after reducing BCTs?

– What is the role of the Corps and Division?

– Can we create a common structure to reduce affordability issues with the current mix of H-, I-, and SBCTs? Is it a BCT- or Division-based solution?

– Are Brigades assigned to Divisions and Corps?

– How do we tie in an affordable Modernization Strategy to force designs?

– How do we keep the Army expansible?

– How do we resolve the unsustainable officer grade plate?

– How do we link regional alignment to training?

– How do we generate readiness and tie this process to a regional alignment strategy?

– How do we leverage Joint interdependencies to identify and eliminate redundancy?

3 S02291300



Counter Terrorism and Irregular Warfare

Deter and Defeat Aggression

Project Power Despite Anti-Access/Area Denial Challenges

Counter Weapons of Mass Destruction

Operate Effectively in Cyberspace and Space

Maintain a Safe, Secure, and Effective Nuclear Deterrent

Defend the Homeland and Provide Support to Civil Authorities

Provide a Stabilizing Presence

Conduct Stability and Counterinsurgency Operations

Conduct Humanitarian, Disaster Relief, and Other Operations

The Possible Iran Conflict

India - Pak Conflict Korea Conflict

Chem/Bio/Rad Attack in CONUS Failed State with Loose Nukes

Arab - Israeli Conflict Iran-Arab Conflict

Kurdish Nation Hostile Pakistan

China-Taiwan Conflict Genocide

Mass Migrations The Unthinkable

Pandemic Fall of the House of Saud

Nuclear Incident in CONUS Destruction of Panama Canal

Russia-NATO Conflict Central American Narco States

Hostile Turkish Regime

The Probable Episodic Terror Attack

Persistent Cyber Conflict Humanitarian Crisis WMD Proliferation

Communist Cuba Fails

Futures Prevent Shape Win

Army 2020 Operational Environment

Dynamic and rapidly changing security environment

Cyber

Global Trends

Resource Competition

Pacific focus

08 1500 MAR 12 4



Hybrid Threats in 2020

• Anti-access and area denial campaigns … strategic thru tactical

levels

• Engage at small unit level where they perceive a greater chance

to obtain overmatch and achieve success

• Use violence, intimidation and coercion against U.S. supporters

• WMD capable… but still seeking nuclear

• Avoid detection and targeting by operating among the people

• Slow down or halt our momentum using anti-tank missiles, IEDs,

air defense and SOF

• Increased use of robotics and unmanned aerial systems

• Employ electronic warfare to counter US precision

• Conduct sophisticated information campaigns designed to erode

US will over time

Capabilities:

SAMs MANPADS

ATGMs Missiles

JOAC

ASB

GMA

Hybrid

Threats

Threats require effective combined arms fire and maneuver

Three components of Hybrid Threats

Nation States or Proxies with a range of capabilities

Desire to preclude U.S. from executing its “way of war”

Capabilities that affect the strategic calculus, missiles, nuclear

weapons and terror sponsorship … specifically designed to impact

U.S. actions

5 12 1130 MAR 12



What the Army Must Do: Through the Lens of Defense Strategy

Historic Examples:

1920-30s Rainbow Planning

Airmobile

Active Defense

AirLand Battle

Now: Gain and Maintain Access

Narrow Lens

Defeat A2/AD

Wide Lens Hybrid Threats

Army also did

missions

outside this

narrow lens

Gain and Maintain Access Unified Land Operations

Deter Defeat

Project Power

Deter &

Defeat CT/IW

HD/

DSCA

Presence

Counter

WMD

Cyber &

Space

Nuclear Deterrence

Stability/

COIN HADR

Specific Threat

Specific Location

Specific threat, degree of certainty

and location drove: Doctrine

Equipment

Training

Organizational Structure

Force Posture

What the Army Must Do: Prevent, Shape, and Win:

Strategic guidance requires the Army to conduct a wide range of

missions while retaining the ability to focus more narrowly on

projecting power to deter and defeat aggression once a specific

threat emerges.

The combination of a narrow focus within a wide lens allows the Army to adjust more rapidly to potential threats.

The Army must maintain a high level of operational adaptability 6

Insurgents

Criminals

States Terrorists

08 1430 MAR 12



The Dynamics of Change

POM 13-17 POM 14-18

POM 15-19

2011 2012 2013 2014 2015 2016 2017 2018 2019 2020 2021 2022 2023 2024 2025 2026 2027 2028

38th CSA Impacts

out to

POM 16-20

Deep Fight Shaping Opns Main Battle Area - POM Close Fight

Anticipating Change Creating Opportunities

Leading Change Integrating Change

Current Doctrine Concepts Concepts / Big Ideas

Test, Evaluate, Exercise Experiments/Wargames Wargames

Current/Program Force

Projected POM Force

(Army 2020)

Force After Next

POM 16-20

Army concepts timeframe

Acquisition

Procurement / 6.5

Research & Development

6.4 / 6.3

Science & Technology

6.2 / 6.1

Today Current Force

Future Force Army 2020

7 29 1300 FEB 12



Historical Perspective on Army Concepts

Challenge Major Ideas Announced Timeframe Outcome

Nuclear battlefield Pentomic Army 1956 1957-1959 Inadequate technology

Difficult terrain Air Mobility 1960 1965-1972 Employed in Vietnam

WWII / Korea Reorganized Objective 1961 1961-1979 Employed in Vietnam

lessons learned Army Division (ROAD)

Soviet threat Active Defense 1976 1977-1982 Inadequate – revised

Soviet threat AirLand Battle 1982 1982-1992 Employed in ODS

Digital Technology Force XXI 1994 2000-2010 Employed in OIF/OEF

Op. maneuver Army After Next 1996 2010-2025 Led to Objective Force

strategic distance

Deployability Objective Force 2002 2002-2009 Network/Bde-based Army

Increased lethality, Modularity 2004 2005 Employed in OIF/OEF

mobility, dispersion

Hybrid threats Operational Adaptability 2009 2016-2028 Ongoing

Changes in strategy, resources, and the operating environment drive the need for new Army concepts

8 29 1300 FEB 12



Ways Ends Means

Army Operating

Concept

August 2012

Army Capstone

Concept

April 2012

Army

Functional

Concepts

September

2010

Army

Functional

Concepts

September

2010

Army

Functional

Concepts

September

2010

Army

Functional

Concepts

September

2010

Army

Functional

Concepts

September

2010

Mission

Command

Functional

Concept

December

2012

Capability

Development:

Considers gaps in:

• Doctrine

• Organization

• Training

• Material

• Leadership and

Education

• Personnel

• Facilities

Moderated by:

• Cost / Affordability

• Risk • The Army determines its required capabilities starting with concepts

• Current concept work focused on 2016-2028; refreshed every two years

• The Army organizes its concepts through the warfighting functions:

• Mission Command

• Intelligence

• Movement and Maneuver

• Additional concepts address Building Partner Capacity, Learning, Training,

the Human Dimension, and Gaining and Maintaining Access (Army-USMC)

• White papers being developed for Cyber, Special Operations, and Aviation

• Fires

• Protection

• Sustainment

TRADOC CG-

Directed Concepts

Training Concept

Learning Concept

Human

Dimension

Concept

June 2008

Army

Functional

Concepts

September

2010

Army

Functional

Concepts

September

2010

Army

Functional

Concepts

September

2010

Army BPC

Concept

2011

The Army Concept Framework

Concepts drive capabilities development 9 29 1300 FEB 12



The Army Profession

15-18 NOV 2011

Fort Sill, OK

2012 Campaign of Learning Execution

SEP 11

DEC 11

NOV 11

JAN 12

AUG 11

FEB 12

Building Partners

and Capacity

7-10 FEB 2012

Potomac, MD

OCT 11

MAY 12 JUN 12

Alternative Futures

Symposium

24-28 OCT 2011

Chantilly, VA

What the Army Must

Do

5-9 DEC 2011

Washington, DC

MAR 12

Army Future Game

Planning Conference

(STAFFEX)

30 APR-4 MAY 2012

Carlisle, PA

APR 12

Senior Leader

Seminar

13 JUL 2012

Arlington, VA

Army Future Game

3-8 JUN 2012

Carlisle, PA

ACF

Revision

DP

Warfighter

Outcomes

DP

JUL 12

Joint

Warfighting

Challenges

DP

USN

Global 11

14-22 Jul 2011

USMC

Expeditionary Warrior

5 - 9 Mar 2012

Combined Arms Maneuver /

Wide Area Security (CAM /

WAS)

Experiment

8-19 Aug 2011

Ft. Benning, GA

Army Science and Technology

Advisory Group (ASTAG) DEC 11

CCJO

Seminar Wargame

6-11 May 2012

JB Andrews, MD

ACC Published Campaign

of

Learning

DP

How the Army

Fights

9-12 JAN 2012

Potomac, MD

Combined Arms Maneuver /

Wide Area Security (CAM /

WAS)

Experiment

8-19 Aug 2011

Ft. Benning, GA

Army Expeditionary

Warrior Experiment

18 Oct-17Nov 2011

Ft. Benning, GA

Engagement

Experiment

Phase 0/1

Nov 2011

Ft. Leavenworth

Set Conditions

For Phase 2/3

Event

Jan 2012

Ft.

Leavenwort

h

Gain & Maintain

Access

Experiment

Phase 2/3

11-22 Jun 2012

and

23-27 Jul 2012

Distributed

Build & Prepare

Experiment

Phase 4/5

13-17 Aug 2012

Ft. Leavenworth

Army of

2020 CoL

Capstone

Event

21 Sep 2012

Ft. Leavenworth

Human Dimension

Workshop

17-20 April 2012

Fort Bragg, NC

CCJO

Multinational &

Think Tank

9 MAR 2012

JB Andrews, MD

Campaign of

Learning

Conference

26-27 APR 2012

Carlisle, PA

CCJO Wargame

May 2012

Washington, DC

CCJO

Writing

Workshop #2

21-22 MAR 2012

BAH McLean,

VA

10 08 1500 MAR 12



What the Army Must Do as Part of the Joint Force (UQ 2012 Recommendation)

• Prepare for and conduct a wide range of important missions:

‒ Train, equip, and posture forces to deter adversaries and prevent conflict

‒ Provide support to civil authorities as directed

‒ Conduct operations to counter weapons of mass destruction

‒ Provide strategic and theater missile defense

‒ Modernize units to meet the requirements of the future operating environment

• Shape the operational environment:

‒ Provide a sustained, stabilizing presence to gain access, understand the environment, build partner

capacity, and set conditions for operations

‒ Support combatant commander theater security cooperation activities

‒ Conduct integrated SOF and Conventional Force operations and activities

‒ Perform Title 10, executive agent, and Army support to other service responsibilities

‒ Conduct humanitarian assistance, disaster relief, and other operations

• Prevail in war and defend the homeland in support of Joint Force Commanders:

‒ Deter and defeat aggression through unified land operations

‒ Conduct combined arms maneuver to seize and exploit the initiative, and win decisively

‒ Conduct wide area security to retain the initiative and protect populations, forces, activities and

infrastructure

‒ Conduct counter terrorism and irregular warfare

‒ Conduct counterinsurgency and other stability operations

‒ Conduct sustained campaigns to achieve favorable conflict termination

‒ Maintain a reserve and generate forces to mitigate strategic risks

‒ Implement reversibility and expansibility to counter unexpected crises

11 08 1500 MAR 12



What the Army Must Do as Part of the Joint Force (UQ 2012 Recommendation)

• Project military power despite anti-access/area denial (A2AD) challenges:

‒ Maintain a capable and rapidly deployable Global Response Force

‒ Conduct entry operations, including forcible entry, to defeat anti-access/area denial strategies

‒ Open and set theaters of operations to enable joint military action

‒ Provide deployable joint and coalition-capable headquarters

• Operate effectively in cyberspace and space:

‒ Maintain a robust cyber network to enable land force dominance

‒ Operate, Defend and attack within, through, and from cyberspace

‒ Remain able to operate in degraded mode

‒ Defend space-based systems and operate their supporting ground-based infrastructure

• Preserve and enhance the All Volunteer Force:

‒ Recruit and retain quality Soldiers

‒ Promote a positive environment for Soldiers and their families

The Army must be able to Prevent, Shape, and Win as part of a Joint Force

12 13 0925 MAR 12



Ideas for Army 2020 and Beyond

• Shaping to provide a stabilizing forward presence – BPC is an element of shaping that develops and expands

enduring defense relationships to enables access to achieve national interest

• Integration of SOF and conventional force - Develop support relationships across ROMO to include IW

• Overcoming Anti-Access and Area Denial – Army role as part of the Joint Force in defeating enemy capabilities

and enabling action in other domains (sea, air, space, cyber) in both the global commons and foreign territories

• Counter-Proliferation – Role of Army forces in securing WMD weapons, fissile material and sensitive sites in

permissive and hostile scenarios

• Ground-Littoral Maneuver – Mutually reinforcing employment of maritime and land forces in entry and maneuver

operations to defeat enemy forces

• Decentralized Operations – Enabling decentralized operations at Battalion level vice BCT

• Autonomous Brigade – Dominant combat power, strategic mobility, expanded umbrella of force protection; reduced

logistics

• Mounted Vertical Maneuver – Ability to project mounted forces by air across extended distances to strike directly

against critical enemy objectives

• Seabasing – Ability to conduct joint operations without reliance on shore-based infrastructure

• Increased Autonomy for Robots – Artificial intelligence in armored vehicles and elsewhere; realistic approaches –

replacing soldiers instead of just using them

• Power and Energy Enhancements – From personal power generation to new generation systems, directed energy,

EM gun, and other power generation technologies

Selected ideas to be explored during the FY2013 Campaign of Learning

13 08 1700 MAR 12



Major Army of 2020 Ideas

Collapse an Echelon of C2 at Echelons Above Division (EAD)

Assign / Align Brigades to Divisions and Corps

Align Corps / Divisions / Brigades Regionally

Adapt ARFORGEN to a Selective Mission Readiness Model

Establish an Operational Reserve

Redesign Brigade Combat Teams

Implement a New Tactical Wheeled Vehicle Strategy

Create Reconnaissance and Surveillance Brigades

Improve Army Advisory Capability:

― Organic to ASCCs

― Regionally Aligned Forces (apportioned for planning)

Integrate Special Operations and Conventional Forces

Ensure Reversibility and Expansibility

Significant changes to how the Army organizes and does business

14 13 1500 MAR 12



Questions

15



Back up

16



Integration (Continuity of Key Ideas and Required Capabilities)

Informs Key Ideas Informs how the Army

operates, refines

required capabilities

Experiments

Wargames Studies

S&T Warfighter

Outcomes

Evaluations Insights/findings/ recommendations/ interim

solution strategy

AWFCs

Focused detail on how we

fight and further refines

required capabilities

Army

Operating

Concept

Mission Command

Army

Functional

Concepts

Emerging Trends

in the OE

Mission Command

Special

Concepts

Rolling Assessment

Scenarios / Modeling & Simulations Enabled

What the Army Must Do How the Army Fights

6 x Warfighting Functions

2 Year Revision Cycle

Strategic

Guidance

QDR

NMS

GEF

GDF

Capability

Based

Assessments

Experiments, Wargames, Seminars, and Studies

The Campaign of Learning

BPC

HD

etc.

08 1545 MAR 12 17



Collapse an Echelon of C2 at EAD The Idea — Merge Corps/Theater Armies — PACOM/CENTCOM

Six HQs assume JTF and ASCC/Theater Army staff functions • Two Field Army HQs (with organic OCPs) assigned to GCCs (CENTCOM & PACOM)

• One Corps HQs globally available (located in CONUS)

• Four Theater Army HQs have MCP and CCP capability only (NORTHCOM, EUCOM, SOUTHCOM & AFRICOM)

• EUSA HQs exists as a separate ARFOR command in ROK

USARSO

MCP (ASCC)

(535)

CCP-

(96)

XXXX/XXX

HHB

(60)

MCP

(ASCC)

(535)

USARAF

CCP-

(96)

HHB

(60)

XXXX/XXX

EUSA MTOE: 577

XXXX/XXX

USAREUR

MCP (ASCC)

(535)

CCP-

(96)

HHB

(60)

XXXX/XXX XXXX/XXX

CCP

(96)

HHB

(60)

MCP (ASCC)

(535)

ARNORTH

HHB

(173)

XXX Contingency

Corps

TAC CP-

(62)

MCP (523)

MCP (ASCC)

(535)

USARPAC

OCP (523)

TAC CP-

(62)

HHB

(173)

XXXX/XXX

HHB

(49)

MCP (ASCC)

(535)

USARCENT

OCP (523)

TAC CP-

(62)

HHB

(173)

XXXX/XXX

HHB

(49)

Spaces are preliminary estimates of requirements;

requires more detailed analysis

18 08 1500 MAR 12



Assign / Align Brigades to

Divisions and Corps

Division

Theater / Corps HQ

XXXX / XXX

Fires Maneuver Mission Command

AAMDC

+

CA

+ Signal

Command

++ III

IO

X

SIG STRAT

X

CA

X

ADA

X

SIG TAC BCD

X

Sustainment

ESC

+

FMC HRSC

III

TASMG RSG

III

X

AFSB

X

CSB

X

MED

X

SUST

TSC

++

Intel

TAC

I

MIG

III

MIB X

(Exp)

AEB II

(Exp)

TIG

III

Protection

EOD

III

CM

X

X

EN

X

MP

X

MEB

X X X

X X X

XX

DIV

X X

Brigades are assigned (AC) or aligned (RC) to Corps and Divisions

19 08 1500 MAR 12

EN

++ MP

++



Align Corps, Divisions, and

Brigades Regionally (Illustrative Model)

CENTCOM

XX

XXX

XX

III

3

1

1

XX

X

3

SF

III

5

TEG

III

Alignment enhances access, focuses training, and improves wartime responsiveness

XX

29

SF

III

20

GLOBALLY

AVAILABLE

SOUTHCOM

EUCOM

XXX

XVIII

XX

82

7

XX

10 TEG

III SF

III

AFRICOM

101 3 TEG

III XX

SF

III

XX

1 SF

III

10 TEG

III

PACOM

XX

XX

XXX

SF

III

1 I

2

4

XX

25

X

2

40

XX

SF

III

19

TEG

III

X

11

20 08 1500 MAR 12



• Mission Pool. Select AC and RC forces (including critical RC enablers) are assigned to a

mission pool. These forces remain in a constant state of readiness and are maintained using

individual replacements. They never drop into the rotational pool.

• Reserve Force Pool. The reserve force pool is comprised of forces that are not organized,

trained, or equipped to deploy rapidly, such as the generating force units and select RC units.

Adapt ARFORGEN to a

Selective Mission Readiness Model

Mission Pool

Reset Train Ready Available

Time Ready Forces

Rotational Pool

Reserve Pool Str

ate

gic

Req

uir

em

en

ts

21 07 1430 MAR 12

― Readiness phases are progressive over time,

generating a third of the AC force and a fifth of

the RC force at any time. Units in the available

phase are also able to be assigned to the

mission pool as a surge force based on

requirements.

― Rotational pool units train to the level

commensurate with their directed mission or

that of specific mission pool units.

― Units that do not deploy reset on a significantly

shortened timeline depending on their mission

and individual unit requirements.

Key Elements:

•Rotational Pool. The majority of forces move through reset, train/ready, and

available phases of progressive readiness. Taken together, these phases encompass

27 months (nine deployed) and may eventually decrease to 24 total months.



Establish an Operational Reserve

Things we are considering:

• Determining force mix (AC/RC) for each element of the model

• Establishing readiness levels required for AC/RC units in each pool

• Leveraging existing ARNG state partnership programs and adapting as necessary

• Synchronizing with enduring shaping requirements

Mission Pool

Reset Train Ready Available

Time

Ready Forces

Rotational Pool

Reserve Pool

Str

ate

gic

Re

qu

ire

me

nts

Sustains total force readiness for the Army

22 08 1530 MAR 12



Fields… 30 AC BCTs and 90 Maneuver Bns 28 RC BCTs and 84 Maneuver Bns 174 total Maneuver Bns

Army 2020 Base Case at 30 BCTs

for COA Comparison

Base Case derived from TAA 14-18

Alternate Case Excursion (at 490K)

• Adopts 3-Bn Design for ABCT and IBCT

• Fields Brigade Engineer Battalion to BCTs

• Implements other Force Design /Force Mix proposed changes (e.g., Signal FDU, etc)

• Retains 10 active and 8 National Guard Divisions

• Fields Fires Bde, Aiation Bde and MEB for all Divisions

AC RC

ABCT 10 7

CAB 30 21

IBCT 12 20

IN Bn 36 60

SBCT 8 1

Stryker Bn 24 3

The Alternate Case at 490k:

X

12/20/0//32

X

10/7/0//17

X

8/1/0//9

ABCT IBCT SBCT

AC RC

DIV HQ 10 8

Fires 10 8

AV 11 8

MEB 3 15

23 08 1500 MAR 12


For Official Use Only 24

HHC

MI

CBT

CONST

I

I I

I

I

359/43/4288//4691

BEB

I I I I I I I

HHC

I I

X

29/2/363//394

MP

CBRN

TUAV PLT

43/17/113//173

3/0/42//45

6/0/141//147

1/0/41//42

1/0/11//12

13/1/78//92

5/0/85//90

34/8/403//445 28/0/399//427 49/0/582//631

Current Design without Changes address identified gaps:

• Add additional combat capability (3rd Bn)

• Add additional Engineer capability (BEB)

• Add additional Fires (3x6 Composite Fires)

4/0/60//64

16/1/59//76

BEB HHC removals:

- MP Platoon (42)

4/6/61//71

0/2/25//27

0/2/30//32

270

173 427 1893 394 443

FMS 3 Bn w/ BEB E/S: 4869

FSC (x3) CAB FSC: 5/1/174//180

BEB FSC: 5/1/129//135

FIRES FSC: 5/1/144//150

RECON FSC: 5/1/113//119

I I

BSB

71/16/1272//1359

17/2/67//86

5/2/137//144

4/6/92//102

15/0/68//83

HHC

1359

Personnel Removed from BCTs:

• Vertical PLT from Const CO: -24

• SPT SQD from Horizontal PLT: -16

• MP PLT (detainee, police actions): -42

• COLTS (Targeting and Direction): -12 • Fuel Haul: -30

• Distro: -16

• Water Production: -8

• FSC Offsets: -9

• MICO TAA Informed -48

TOTAL: -178

BSB Removals:

•Remove Fuel Haul - 30 • Remove Distro – 16

• Remove Water Production - 8

• BEB FSC Offsets – 9

Total Offsets = 63 HHC removals:

- COLTS HHC (12)

427

Armored Brigade Combat Team Proposed x3 Bn and BEB Design (3X4)

24 08 1500 MAR 12


For Official Use Only 25

34/9/383//423

X

BEB

I I I I I I I

HHC

I I

32/2/376//410 45/16/105//166 44/0/654//698

37/0/367//404

HHC

MI

CBT

CONST

MP

CBRN

I

I

14/1/74//88

3/0/42//45

6/0/123//129

1/0/41//42

1/0/11//12

0/2/30//32

4/0/64//68

16/1/56//73

TUAV PLT

4/6/61//71

0/2/25//27

BEB HHC removals:

- MP Platoon (42)

I

6/0/82//88

I I 105T

155T

6/0/108//114

176

166 404 2094 410 423

345/44/4042//4431 Current Design without Changes address identified gaps:

• Add additional combat capability (3rd Bn)


• Add additional Fires (3x6 Composite Fires)

FMS 3 Bn w/ BEB E/S: 4645

I I

BSB

65/17/851//933

FSC

HHC

(x3) IN FSC: 4/1/86//91

BEB FSC: 4/2/114//120

FIRES FSC: 4/1/97//102

RECON FSC: 4/1/80//85

17/2/64//83

5/2/99//106

5/6/81//91

15/0/58//73

BSB Removals:

• Infantry Transport - 96 • Fuel Haul - 10

• Distro – 20

• Water Production - 7

• BEB FSC Offsets - 9

933





• COLTS (Targeting and Direction): -12

• Infantry Transport: -96 • Fuel Haul: -10

• Distro: -20


• BEB FSC Offsets : -9


TOTAL: -281

HHC removals:

- COLTS HHC (12)

Infantry Brigade Combat Team Proposed x3 Bn and BEB Design (3x4)

25 01 1000 MAR 12



Stryker Brigade Combat Team

Proposed x3 Bns and BEB Design

26

I I I I

HHC

170

31/2/360//393 45/15/110//170 36/0/367//403

403 2088 393

33/10/440//483

BEB

I I 483

HHC

3/0/42//45

MI

5/0/114//119 CBT

CONST

16/0/78//94

I

6/0/47//53

I

I

I I

I

5/0/85//90

0/2/27//29

MP

CBRN

1/0/41//42

1/0/11//12

4/0/60//64

16/1/57//74

TUAV PLT

4/7/78//89

0/2/25//27

BEB HHC removals:

- MP Platoon (42)

317/43/4013//4373 FMS 3Bn w/ BEB E/S: 4438 X

I I I I

Current Design without Changes address identified gaps:






• CBRNE: -12

• COLTS (Targeting and Direction): -12 • FSSP – Equipment Only

• Add Distro/Haul: +52


• BEB FSC Offsets: -9


TOTAL: -100

BSB

I I 839

43/16/780//839

17/2/148//167

5/2/198//205

5/12/363//380

16/0/71//87

BEB Removals:

• Remove FSSP – Equipment Only • Add Distro/Haul - +52

• Remove Water Production - 4

• BEB FSC Offsets - 9 43/0/653//696

HHC removals:

- COLTS HHC (12) HHC

26 08 0800 MAR 12



TRADOC Army 2020

Operational Based TWV Reductions Preliminary Target 63,203

Minus TDA Reductions 2,199

61,004

Minus TAA 14-18 (estimate) 11,000

New Estimated Target 50,004

CSA Goal = 170,000 TWVs

*233,203 – 170,000 = 63,203

(Preliminary Reduction Target)

*Start Point FY17 Oct 11 SACs File = 233,203 (DAMO-FM)

Phase I: TOE Operational

Assessment & Re-baselining

Phase II: Pooling

Army-wide scope of effort working within the 2020 construct to get down to 170K trucks – not just BCT focused

Retain in Unit TWVs that are Minimum Mission

Essential for Training, Low Density, etc…

X

TOEs Designed for

Offensive and

Defensive

Operations

Pool Common User

and Task Truck TWVs

Phase III: Augmentation

Pool for Stability Operations

Mix of MRAP and TWV

Redesign and Pool for

Offensive & Defensive Opns Protected Mobility for

Stability Opns

27

01 1000 MAR 12



Future R&S Brigade Requirements

• Recent operations and future projections indicate need for capable reconnaissance at EAB:

– IED problem: a lack of area security, despite effective collection capability

– Better intelligence via intensive and repetitive ground patrolling to secure wide areas

– Improved route recon and route clearance TTPs and equipment

– More than collection and fusion: Must engage hybrid threats and interact with the population

• Current doctrine and formations are not adequate:

– Doctrinal revisions or modest organizational fixes will not address the gap

– Sensors or lightly-armed troops alone cannot conduct effective recon operations at EAB

• The Army needs a new operational concept for a reconnaissance formation at corps / division:

– Conduct intelligence collection; answer PIR

– Fight for information in close contact with the population and the enemy

– Direct and employ joint fires as required

– Act as a light-to-medium weight “strike force” (e.g., following forcible entry and lodgement seizure)

• An enhanced reconnaissance and security formation could provide:

– Traditional recon functions for a division / corps engaged in combat and stability missions

– A mix of capabilities that support combined arms maneuver and wide area security

– Offensive operations: screen the front or flank of a maneuvering division or corps; early entry force after

forcible entry; act as an advanced guard to protect a corps or division main effort

– Defensive operations: conduct a counter-recon fight; provide area and route security

– Stability operations or DCSA: secure wide areas and operate in an economy of force role in corps and

division unassigned areas to allow the concentration of effort elsewhere

28 05 1245 MAR 12



R&S Brigade Designs

Enables future Army forces to fight for information at echelons above brigade

TUAS

HHC HHT

C&E

Tech Collect

1026 with 1x MI Bn Current

1701 with FDU Applied

281 324 BSC 175 HHC 177 MI 40

CI/ HUMINT

X

*

LRS (Future fielding)

27

SPT 46

73

53

101

54

138

46 X 2

94

• Add Capability to Fix and Finish

- 2nd Mounted Recon SQDN

- Artillery Battalion

- Sustainment enablers

Base Case Design: 1026

FDU Adds Design: 1701 Proposed Design: 2742

• FDU Adds

- 3RD Mounted Recon Troop

- Increase Scouts PLTs from 4 to 6

- 3 – 120mm Mortar Sections

- Sustainment enablers

2742

29



R&S Brigade Employment Options

• The R & S BDE conducts Reconnaissance and Surveillance in the DIV or Corps AO based on METT-TC. It can operate in an area assigned by the supported commander or operate in an unassigned area within the Division or Corps AO.

• The R & S BDE enables the understanding of the networks and operational environment.

Finds key network elements and their vulnerabilities

Fuses intelligence: In conjunction with Div / Corps / BCTs and extended intelligence enterprise; to enable network exploitation / attack.

• The R & S BDE conducts fix and finish missions based on METT-C factors and augmentation (Maneuver BN, Fires, AV)

• The R & S BDE provides Flexibility and Versatility to the DIV & Corps.

• METT-TC considerations will determine the operational reach of the R&S BDE; the Corps or Division Commander may focus the R & S BDE into one or more tactical operating areas to answer PIR and / or identify enemy network elements.

Operates in Area Assigned by Corps Operates in Area Assigned by Div Operates Across the Division Area

30



R&S Brigade

Proposed Design

Proposed Design: 2742

Current Design

Gap Solution (Base Case)

Insufficient reconnaissance

capability

3rd Troop per Squadron

Insufficient intelligence capability Redesigned MI (P&E) BN (DP 142)

Insufficient fires Organic mortars

Limited capability to fix and finish Augment or task with organize elements of Maneuver,

Aviation, or Fires

Base Case Design: 1026

Proposed Changes

Transform the BFSB into the R&S BDE

• Approve the R&S Squadron BDE FDU and MI redesign initiative: enhances analytical capability ,

enhances ability for combat information collection, increases the ability to actively engage the local

population.

Consider adding the capability to fix and finish

• Add mounted reconnaissance squadron and organic artillery

X X

31



Integrate Special Operations and

Conventional Forces Decisive Action

Capture and sustain a high level of SOF-conventional integration

• Shape by integrating SOF and conventional forces in a new construct for Irregular Warfare (includes

CT, UW, FID, COIN, Stability Ops, SFA)

• Determine conventional force support to SOF and SOF support to conventional force

• Synchronize training and leader development

• Gain authorities and policies to employ AC and RC forces in more predictable ways

• Facilitate integration with regionally aligned conventional forces

• Consider a 7th warfighting function to drive operational and institutional integration (will require the

addition of a new functional concept to the AFC revisions in late Summer 2012)

Proposed Construct

Stability / DSCA

Offense Defense

Shaping Operations

Current ADP 3-0

Stability / DSCA

Offense Defense

32 01 1000 MAR 12



Improve Army Advisory Capability

What do we need?

Priorities of 21st Century Defense: “Whenever possible, we will develop innovative, low-cost, and small-

footprint approaches to achieve our security objectives, relying on exercises, rotational presence, and

advisory capabilities.”

38th CSA Marching Orders: “The Army shapes the environment by sustaining strong relationships with

other Armies, building their capacity, and facilitating strategic access.”

ASCC Engagements:

– “Corps has to hunt for a Theater Engagement Group/Theater Engagement Section, (TEG/TES)

capability prior to deployment; it should be provided to them.”

– “Emphasizes the role of regionally-focused engagement to command's success, particularly in

shaping and preventing.”

General Officer Operational Assessment: “Provides a separate subordinate organization to provide

mission command over Army forces engaged in theater security cooperation activities in Host Nations,

and provide Army institutional development advice and expertise to HN land forces.”

33 13 1000 MAR 12

Potential Solutions: ‒ Use regionally aligned forces (through GFM process)

‒ Assign advisory element to ASCC (with organic TTs)

‒ Assign advisory element to ASCC (and use regionally

aligned forces for TTs)

‒ Employ a centralized structure adapted from current

organizations (e.g. 162nd, AEG)



Reversibility and Expansibility

Problem Statement: How does the Army ensure it is able to restore needed

capabilities and capacity to meet future contingencies after beginning force reductions and in

response to the current strategic environment and budget constraints?

Key Definitions:

Reversibility: The ability of the Army to slow and reverse a planned drawdown in

the force through the use of specific strategies, policies, and selected investments.

Reversibility requires the Army to make and sustain selected investments and put policies in

place to mitigate risk and posture the force to respond quickly to unforeseen requirements or

changes in the National Defense Strategy.

Expansibility: The ability of the Army to grow capabilities and capacity not

resident in the existing Total Army. Expansibility employs reorganization and mobilization of

the existing Army, coupled with regeneration and capabilities development to reconstitute or

produce new capabilities and capacity. Expansibility combines intellectual capital, concepts,

and methods to produce increased capabilities and capacity in response to operational

demands.

“Zero Sum Gain” Strategies, Policies, and Investments Enabling Expansibility

34 01 1000 MAR 12



E

n

d

S

t

r

e

n

g

t

h

Drawdown Decision Points

Reorganize /

Mobilize

Make maximum

use of the existing

Total Force

Time

Demand

Increase

Reversibility focuses on preparation – Expansibility focuses on execution

BCT

Enabler

Growth

Capabilities

and

capacities

lost in

Drawdown X# of BCT

Reduction

Growth

Target:

15K per year

New capabilities

for a specific

future conflict

Strategic Risk

Current Force: 569K A/C, 358.2K ARNG, and 206K USAR

Planned Reduction: 490K A/C, 350.2.2K ARNG, and 205K USAR

01 1000 MAR 12

Reversibility and Expansibility

in the Army of 2020

35



Gain and Maintain Access

Operational Access Concept Space

Focus of the

Army/Marine Gain and Maintain

Access Concept

Air Sea Battle Focus Sustained Land Ops

29 1300 Feb 2012 36



14

Army 2020

FD/FM

01 OCT

9 SOF-CF

Interdependence

17 MAY

AOC 2012

12

15 AUG

13 TA/Corps

Design

30 AUG

23 APR

2

Force Gen/

Operational

Reserve

ASCC Sr Cmd

Engagements

04-29 NOV

ARCIC/ARNG

Working Group

10 JAN

USA-USMC Talks

05 APR Winter AUSA

22-24 FEB

An integrated plan to design the Army 2020

Best Practices

Requirements &

Acquisition

27 APR

5 6

17 MAY

Reversibility/

Expansibility

Army 2020 Project Design

KEY

Decision Point

Significant

Event

Event/Process

Key Delivery

ARCIC/ARNG

Working Group

18 APR

ARCIC/ARNG

Working Group

18 JUL

05 JUN

EAD Mission

Command 8 BCT 2020

1

08 FEB

11 Tactical Wheeled

Vehicle Strategy

16 JUL

Operational Analysis LoE (TRADOC ANALYSIS CENTER-TRAC)

USA-USAF Talks

07 FEB

Strategic Engagement and

Communication LoE (TRADOC ARCIC-F)

FORSCOM-USASOC

31 JAN

Campaign of Learning LoE (Force Design/Mix/Concepts)

(TRADOC ARCIC-CDL)

Force Modernization and

Investment LoE (Force Capabilities)

(TRADOC ARCIC-RID)

“An integrated

plan for transition

to Army 2020”

A well-grounded

proposal to guide

Army redesign

for an Army 2020

force that is:

affordable, agile,

capable,

networked,

responsive and

adaptive, able to

address the

complex future

operating

environment

characterized by

complex, hybrid

threats, and

demanding

missions.

27 APR

R&S

Brigade 3

ACC 2012 17 MAY

4

TRAC

FT LEE

17 MAY

Regional

Force Alignment 7

UQ 12 Human Dimension

Excursion

16-20 APR

Transition Actions to the

Army Campaign Plan

16 JUL

SRC and URS REVIEW

SRC and URS REVIEW

SecArmy Decision

2 vs 3 Bn

(27 MAR)

FDU (SRC)

Recc

TAA 15-19

TAA 15-19 POM 14-18 LOCK

JAN FEB MAR APR MAY JUN JUL AUG SEP OCT

TAA 14-18

01 FEB ARSTRUC 14-18 Signed

SRC and URS REVIEW TAA 16-20 FY2013

3-star

GOS

C

FDU (SRC)

Approval FMR 15-19

TAA 14-18

3-star GOSC TAA/POM 14-18

TAA/POM 15-19

POM Mid-year

Review

TAA 14-18

2-star GOSC

OMA Mid-year

Review

2-star

GOSC Cap Demand

CoC

GFMB

(26-27 APR)

CCJO

Seminar

Wargame

CCJO

Wargame

GFMB

Resourcing

CCJO

Seminar

Wargame

FORSCOM Sourcing

(14-18 MAR)

HQDA/FORSCOM W/S

(4-8 JUN)

J33 Sourcing W/S

(15-19 OCT)

JIA&JMD

(18-20 SEP)

CF

(10-14 SEP)

SOF

(28-30 AUG)

GO Cyber Summit

24 MAR

Army Fellows

Engagement

24 MAR

1/2 Star GOSC

(FORGEN)

01 MAR

ASCC & Corps Cdr Eng

28MAR

SASC A-L SC

(28 MAR)

XVIII ABN

Corps

OSD CAPE

Visit

Resourcing

CoC

3-star

GOS

C

2-star

GOSC

27 JUN

10 Assign/Align

Bde/Div/Corps

27 MAR

15 BCT Support

Concept

USA-USAF

Integration Council

14 MAR

USA-USN Talks

MAR

TRAC

FT LEE

F/MF Cdr

Conf GO Opn’l

Assessment 3-4 DEC 25 JAN

BCT Design Alternatives Modeling

Key Enabler

Sufficiency Analysis ARFORGEN Model Dev

Expansibility Analysis

BCT Cdr

Conf

13-15 DEC BCT Mix Analysis

TWV Analysis Support



BCT Design Analysis

13 0830 MAR 12 37 37




Links to Joint Concepts

Joint Operational Access Concept 17 Jan 2012

CONUS

Joint Concept for Entry Operations

Air-Sea Battle Concept

SPOE

APOE

•Terror attack

•Cyber attack

•Propaganda

•Misinformation

•Media manipulation

•Political attack

• Space and cyber

attack against

critical deployment,

C2, and support

networks.

• Theater Ballistic

Missiles

•Submarines

• Anti-Ship Ballistic

Missiles

• Surface

Combatants

• Anti-Ship

Cruise Missiles

• 3rd/4th/5th Gen

Attack Aircraft

• Swarm Boats

• Surface to Air

Missiles

• Rotary Wing

Aircraft

• Unmanned Aerial

Vehicles

• Sea Mines

• Paramilitary/Proxy

Conventional/Forces

• Mines and IED

• Infantry weapons

• Anti-tank Missiles

• G-RAMM

• Cyber/network attack


Concept

The Joint Staff J7 is developing the Joint Concept for Entry Operations.

Gaining and Maintaining Access is Critical to Projecting Power

08 1500 Mar 2012 38




Problem Statement

Adversaries will employ anti-access/area-denial capabilities using

tactics intended to offset U.S. advantages in joint integration, high-

tech sensors, and stand-off, precision weaponry. For example:

Hiding sophisticated weapon systems in complex terrain-

particularly in heavily populated urban areas—in order to counter

the U.S. ability to find and target them via technical means;

Denying use of fixed airfield and ports to U.S. forces by creating

unacceptable risk;

Creating periods of air, cyber, or sea superiority.

How will the Joint Force Commander set conditions and employ Army-Marine forces

to defeat area denial capabilities and maintain access throughout a campaign?

39 08 1500 Mar 2012




Central Idea Army and Marine Corps forces contribute to the Joint Force

Commander’s effort to gain and maintain operational access by

entering hostile territory, without benefit of domain dominance, and

employing combined arms maneuver to locate and defeat area-denial

capabilities.

U.S. Army and Marine Corps forces must be capable of:

• Conducting simultaneous force projection and sustainment to

multiple, unexpected, austere locations.

• Countering the effects of adversary actions against the air, sea,

space and cyberspace domains by locating, seizing, neutralizing,

or destroying land-based capabilities, thereby enabling cross

domain synergy.

• Seizing key terrain to facilitate the entry of follow-on forces.

Army and Marine Forces Contribute to Freedom of Action in all Domains

08 1500 Mar 2012 40




Supporting Ideas

Exploit the Sea as Maneuver Space. Army forces operate through and from the

Seabase. Marine forces conduct Ship to

Objective Maneuver.

Integrate Special Operations Forces

with Conventional Forces Critical to setting conditions prior to entry,

continuing operations at depth, and assisting in

maintaining access during follow on operations.

Operate From Intermediate Staging

Bases Key action required for increased speed of

force flow/build up in the joint operational area.

Conduct Mounted Vertical Maneuver The maneuver by air and vertical insertion of

mobile armor protected combined arms forces.

Access and Operate in Austere

Locations Forces must sustain initial operations

independent of local infrastructure.

Reduce Force Vulnerability Army and Marine force developers must seek

innovative ways to reduce signatures and

logistics demands.

Fight for Information Entry forces seek joint integration of

communication, navigation, intelligence,

reconnaissance, targeting processes, and

command and control.

Key tasks required to project power and conduct entry

operations given an active area denial environment

08 1500 Mar 2012 41



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