2012 Jezierska - Mouffe s and Habermas s Political Anthropology

8/13/2019 2012 Jezierska - Mouffe s and Habermas s Political Anthropology

1/12

KatarzynaJezierskarebroUniversity

Subject and its Other. Mouffes and Habermass pol iticalanthropology.

TheaimofthispaperistohighlighttheanthropologyunderlyingChantalMouffesagonisticpluralismandJrgenHabermassdeliberativedemocracy.Theseareamongthedominatingvoices inthecontemporarydemocratictheorydebate intheWest.I intendtodescribetheprocessofsubjectivationanditsoutcomethesubjectinpoliticsandtopresentthewaysinwhich theyhavebeen articulated in the respective theoriesofdemocracy.Who is thesubjectforMouffeandHabermas?Who istheirOther1andwhatroledoes itplay?Aftera

presentation

of

Mouffes

and

Habermass

positions,

some

points

of

critique

will

be

raised.

Mouffesposition

Mouffesenvisioningofthesubjectisinfluencedbybroaderdiscoursetheoreticaltraits.Sheidentifiesher intellectualalliesamongadvocatesofpoststructuralismandpsychoanalysis.2Herstartingpoint is theemphasison theultimatecontingencyofallsocial identityat thesame timeas temporary fixationsofmeaning are acknowledged asnotonlypossiblebutevennecessary.Tomakeitclear,eventhoughundecidabilityisconceivedastheunderlyingcondition, it isalwaysaccompanied(or interrupted)byfixations.Thesecouldbeofvarious

sorts,

and

their

temporality

could

be

quite

long

lasting.

Striving

for

hegemony

demands

a

striving for fixity, which basicallymeans that all identities or meanings are inprincipleunstable,butcanbeexperiencedasquitefixed.

Lackofidentityandabundanceofsubjectpositions

Mouffeavailsherselfof two images inherpresentationof the subject subjectpositionsandsubjectasLack.3ThepsychoanalyticalconceptofsubjectasLack4aimstoexplainthat

1InthispaperIusethetermOthertodenotethehumanotherinitsspecificity.Inconsequence,I

occasionallysubstitute

the

Other

with

personal

pronouns

such

as

s/he.

Especially

in

Mouffes

case,

the

Othercanbeunderstoodmorebroadly,asanythingdistinctfrommethathelpsmedefinemyidentity.Itcouldhencebeaninhumanother(suchasaliensoranimals)thathelpusdefineourhumanness,oraspecificdiscourseorpowerstructure(forexamplethediscourseonfeminine/masculine)thathelpsmedefinemyidentity(asfemale/male/queer).TheexampleJennyGunnarsonPaynegivesinherbookSysterskapetslogiker.Enetnologiskstudieavfeministiskafanzines,Umeuniversitet,Ume2006isathandhere.ForthequeerfeministmovementsdescribedbyhertheOtherisconstitutedbyheteropatriarchy,whichdoesnotmeanthatconcretemenorheterosexualsarenecessarilyseenasadversaries,orenemies.2MouffeChantal,TheReturnofthePolitical,Verso,London2005,p.12.3Originally,inLaclauErnesto,MouffeChantal,HegemonyandSocialistStrategy.TowardsaRadicalDemocratic

Politics,Verso,London&NewYork2001,she(andLaclau)referredtosubjectpositionsonly.AfteriekscritiqueiniekSlavoj,BeyondDiscourseAnalysis,[in:]LaclauErnesto,NewRefletionsontheRevolutionofOurTime,Verso,London,NewYork1990,she(andLaclau,howeverdisjointedlyfromnowon)introducedthepsychoanalyticalconceptofsubjectasLack.Inherrecentpublications,thetwoappearsidebyside.IwillreversethischronologicalorderhereandsetoffbyintroducingsubjectasLackasitreferstosomekindof

1


2/12

the subject has no original identity, although it always attempts to establish one. Thisfilling that we engage in is otherwise called identity formation. It entails that theexperienceof lack issomethingthatwesharethroughoutour lives,aswealwaysstriveforbut never succeed in filling the gap. This implies an identity that cannot ever be fullyestablished,andthatalwaysincludesacertaindegreeofopennessandambiguity.

What ismore,according toMouffe,weneed toperceive thesubjectassplit intomultipleandpoliticized (notunitaryandhomogeneous) subjectpositions. In thisvision there isnocentralcoreoressentialnucleusofsubjects identity.[N]ocentreofsubjectivityprecedesthe subjects identifications.5 Every identity is exposed to the influence of its discursivesurroundingandhenceneverfullysutured;instead,subjectsareseenasconstitutedbyasetofsubjectpositions,notnecessarilyaccommodatedtoeachother.

Wecanthusconceivethesocialagentasconstitutedbyanensembleofsubjectpositions that can never be totally fixed in a closed system of differences,

constructedby

adiversity

of

discourses

among

which

there

is

no

necessary

relation, but rather a constant movement of overdetermination anddisplacement. The identity of such a multiple and contradictory subject isthereforealwayscontingentandprecarious,temporarilyfixedattheintersectionofthosesubjectpositionsanddependentonspecificformsofidentification.6

The concept of subject positions aims to capture the positioning of subjectswithin adiscursivestructure.Inotherwords,subjectpositionscorrespondtothemultiplicityofsocialrelationsthatthesubjectisinvolvedin;theycanbeunderstoodasidentifications.Identitycannot, therefore,belong toonepersonalone,andnoonebelongs toasingle identity.7Subjectpositions(suchaswoman,father,employee)aresharedbyanumberofindividuals,

andany

individual

is

split

between

anumber

of

identifications.

An

important

aspect

in

Mouffes conception is the emphasis on conflictuality between these subject positions.According to her, there is no necessary homogeneity or consistency in this composition.Subjectpositionsintersectinginonesubjectmaywellbeconflicting.

Summingup,thevisionofagonisticpluralismisasubjectasLack,onethatconstantlyaspirestofillingthisLackthroughmultipleidentificationswithnewsubjectpositions.Thesubjectishere situated (not universalistic or unencumbered) and fragmented (not unitary). Theprocess of subjectivation is one of permanent hybridization and nomadization8,whichstandforthemultiplicityofidentity(theintersectionofmanysubjectpositions)andlackof

originalpositionthatneverthelesscontinuestofunctionasthemaindriveforthesubjectsthroughouttheirlifehistory.ForaninterestingcommentontheiekLaclau/MouffeexchangeseeZerilliLindaM.G.,(1998)ThisUniveraslismWhichIsNotOne,Diacriticsvol.28,no.2:320.4MouffeChantal,Preface.DemocraticPoliticsToday,[in:]DimensionsofRadicalDemocracy,ed.MouffeChantal,Verso,London1992,p.11;TorfingJacob,NewTheoriesofDiscourse.Laclau,Mouffeandiek,BlackwellPublishers,Oxford1999,p.150.5MouffeChantal,TheReturn,p.76.6Ibidem,p.77;inexactlythesamewordingMouffeChantal,(1992)CitizenshipandPoliticalIdentity,October:

art,theory,criticism,politicsvol.61,p.28;compareMouffeChantal,RadicalDemocracy:ModernorPostmodern?,[in:]RossAndrewed.,UniversalAbandon?ThePoliticsofPostmodernism,EdinburghUniversityPress,

Edinburgh

1989,

p.35.

7MouffeChantal,(1997)Decision,Deliberation,andDemocraticEthos,PhilosophyTodayvol.41,no.1,p.27.8Ibidem,p.27;compareTorfingJacob,p.255.

2


3/12

reference toacertainplaceorpropertyspecific foran identity its formationtakesplacewithintheunclearconfinesofsociety.9

constitutiveoutsideandmeetingtheOther

Mouffesees

identity

as

relational,

although,

as

we

will

see,

her

conception

of

intersubjectivity differs a lot fromHabermass. She insists that identity is always builtondifference. Here Mouffe avails herself of a Derrida inspired concept of constitutiveoutside10.It isbyarelationtoanotherthat isexteriortomethatIcandefinewhoIam.Howeverheretoo,theOtherisneverfullyfixed,andneitherismyidentity.Whatismore,itis impossible to draw an absolute distinction between the interior and the exterior;11betweenmeandtheOther.KieranKeohaneexplainsitwell;

TheproblemofrelationalitywiththeOtheristhattheOtherisalwaysalreadypartoftheOne.This issobecausewithouttheOtherthere isnoOne:theOne isthe

originalLack.

12

This unclear exterior is also constitutive, which means that it is the very condition ofpossibilityofmyexistencewithouttheOtherIwouldhavenoidentity.Atthesametimeitisalso theconditionof the impossibilityofacomplete identity.The Otherpreventsmefrombeingtotallymyself.13Hence,theOther isbothnecessaryanddisruptive; itenablesexistence (self)butprevents from totality (fully itself).Mouffesmeetingwith theOther isnotameetingbetweentwofulltotalities,butunsuturedandblurred(tothemselvesaswell)that can impossibly constitute themselves finally. This questions every essentialistconceptionof the subject.Moreover, it also forecloses the belief in naturalor original

identities,

as

every

identity

is

here

seen

as

a

result

of

a

constituting

process.

Pointsofcritique Mouffe

IwanttodiscusstwopointsofcritiquethathavebeendirectedatMouffesdefinitionofthesubject.The firstconcerns thestatusofantagonismvs.herclaimofcontingency,and thesecondherfocusonthesplitsubjectandscarcecommentsontheroleofaunifiedsubject.

9ThispointshouldbeunderstoodinrelationtoMouffesdiscussionwithMarxistsandfeminists,thatcontrary

toMouffe

privilege

acertain

position,

or

experience

(worker,

woman).

She

obviously

does

not

downplay

the

importofwomensorworkersexperience,butdoesnotposeitasthepositioninhertheory.10

MouffeChantal,OnthePolitical,Routledge,London2005,p.15.ConstitutiveoutsideisatermcoinedbyHenryStaten,nowfrequentlyusedbyDerridaanalysts.ItbuildsonfollowingnotionsfromDerrida:supplement,trace,diffrance.Itsaimistohighlightthefactthatthecreationofanidentityimpliestheestablishmentofadifference.MouffeChantal,(2009)DemocracyinaMultipolarWorld,Millennium.JournalofInternationalStudiesvol.37,no.3,p.550.KieranKeohaneexplainsitbyreferencetoHegel:ThemostgeneralformulationisfromHegelsdiscussionoftherelationshipbetweenthemasterandtheslave,i.e.,thatthemasterdependsupontheslaveforhis/herownfreedomi.e.,fortheconstitutionofhis/herownidentityasmaster.KeohaneKieran,(1993)CentralProblemsinthePhilosophyoftheSocialSciencesafterPostmodernism:ReconcilingConsensusandHegemonicTheoriesofEpistemologyandPoliticalEthics,Philosophy&SocialCriticismvol.19,no.2,p.158.11

Mouffe

Chantal,

(1997)

Decision,

p.27.

12

KeohaneKieran,p.159.13

LaclauErnesto,MouffeChantal,Hegemony,p.125.

3


4/12

Mouffes conceptof antagonism is a bit puzzling.One could argue that her definition ofantagonism as ontological diminishes the dimension of contingency. Even thoughcontingency isalwaysreferredtoasthefundamentofthetheory14,theroleantagonism isascribed goes in theoppositedirection.Ontologizing antagonismmakes it seem as if thenatureofthemeetingbetweenmeandtheOtherwaspredefined.AmongothersAletta

Norvalargues

against

ontologization

of

antagonism.

She

holds

that

such

astance

would

implyaprivilegingoftheequivalentialelements inpolitics(chainsofequivalencerequireaformationof frontiers, two clearcut sides), at the costof thedifferential,whereas theselogicsareclaimedtobeequallyrelevantandthepowergamebetweenthemistheveryfuelofdemocraticpolitics.

There isindiscoursetheoryatendencytoprivilegethemomentofnegativity,offrontier construction and of the development of antagonisms.Nowhere is thisclearerthan inthefactthatthefriend/enemyrelation istreatedasconstitutiveofpoliticsassuch.15

TheprivilegingofantagonisminthiswayisproblematicinMouffestheory;howeverIdonotsee it as the only possible reading of it. In my interpretation, antagonisms are merepossibilities, they are always latently present. Mouffe makes it clear in her recentpublication,whereshearguesthattherelationofdifference

doesnotmeanofcoursethatsucharelationisbynecessityanantagonisticone.Butitmeansthatthereisalwaysthepossibilityofthisrelationus/thembecomingoneoffriend/enemy.16

Mouffe describes antagonism as a dimension that can never be eradicated in politics,

howeverit

can

be

domesticated17,

or

transformed

into

agonism.

In

effect,

she

obviously

accepts other than antagonistic relations, but only states that antagonisms can alwaysemerge anew. In the context of Mouffes theory the only plausible way of picturingsubjectivation(andtherelationtotheOther)isasaprocesscharacterizedbyindeterminacy.ItopensspaceforconsideringavarietyofwaysinwhichtherelationbetweenselfandOthermaybeconceived.Hence,itbecomespossibletothinkofsocialdivisionintermsotherthatthefriend/foerelationship.Mouffesintroductionofthecategoryofadversary(asopposedtoenemy)goesinthisdirection.IagreewithNorvalthat[t]hegenerallogicofindividuation

14

Ifind

Judith

Butlers

ponderings

about

the

nature

of

foundations

in

theory

relevant

here.

She

holds

that

any

theoryisbasedonsomefoundations,thatis,premisesthatfunctionasauthorizinggrounds,andtheseareconstitutedthroughexclusions,whichexposethefoundationalpremiseasacontingentandcontestablepresumption.ButlerJudith,ContingentFoundations:FeminismandtheQuestionofPostmodernism,[in:]BenhabibSeyla,ButlerJudith,CornellDrucilla,FraserNancy,FeministContentions.APhilosophicalExchange.Routledge,NewYork1995,p.40.Andfurther,Thatisnottosaythatthereisnofoundation,butrather,thatwhereverthereisone,therewillalsobeafoundering,acontestation.Ibidem,p.51.Inshort,sheclaims,andItendtoagree,thatfoundationsarecontingentandindispensable,aswellassecuredthroughcertainexclusionarymoves.15

NorvalAlettaJ.,Trajectoriesoffutureresearchindiscoursetheory,[in:]Discoursetheoryandpoliticalanalysis.Identities,hegemoniesandsocialchange,eds.HowarthDavid,NorvalAlettaJ.,StavrakakisYannis,ManchesterUniversityPress,ManchesterandNewYork2000,p.223.16

Mouffe

Chantal,

(2009)

Democracy...,

p.550

(emphasis

mine).

17

Shedefinestheaimofdemocracyastransforming(ordomesticating)antagonismsintoagonisms.Formoreaboutthisdistinctionandtheproblemsconnectedtoitseemyforthcomingthesis.

4


5/12

can and ought to be distinguished from the formation of political frontiers, and theconstitutionofantagonisticformsofidentity.18However,IdonotseethatMouffeisguiltyofthismove.

Inasimilarvein,ArashAbizadehhasdirectedcritiqueatMouffesconceptionofidentityand

theOther.

He

argues

that

she

conflates

the

Schmittian

language

of

alterity

with

the

Derridean language of difference19 and maintains that Mouffe wrongly defines allintergroupconflictsasantagonistic(strongparticularistthesis),while,infact,theydovaryinnature.HeclaimsfurtherthatMouffesideaoftheOtherasexternalisflawed.Accordingtohim, collective identities are not necessarily particularistic; they do not presuppose anexternalOther thathelpsdefine their identity.Rather, thedifference thatdefines identitycanbesituatedontheinsideofthegroup,and,whatfollows,theintragroupOtherdoesnothavetobeantagonistic.

WhileAbizadehisrightinpointingoutthattheOthermightaswellbesituatedontheinside

incollective

identities,

Ido

not

think

it

undermines

Mouffes

theory.20

In

the

first

place,

the

verydelimitationofagrouppresupposessomethingthatisoutsideofit,somenongroup.Inthissense,theidentityofthegroupalwaysneedsan(constitutive)outside.Furthermore,asdiscussed above,Mouffes concept of constitutive outside involves questioning of simplebinaryoppositions.Theoutsideisalreadyonthe inside;theyareinterdependent.Abizadehclaims thatMouffemisses thisnuance,which ismainly visible in her conclusions that henamesSchmittian.21ShereferstotheOtherasconcreteindividuals,thatareexternaltous.AbizadehrecallsMouffesuseofpersonalpronouns(he,she)indiscussionabouttheOtherasproofofhermisinterpretationof thedislocatedexternal/internaldivide. IwouldarguethatAbizadeh fails to recognize the significanceof splitting the subject; he still seems to

thinkof

aunitary

subject

(and

Other).

When

scattered

into

subject

positions,

as

Mouffe

no

doubtargues, theborderlinebetween the internalandexternal iseasier toperceiveofasintrinsictothesubject.Theconstitutiveoutsidemightbealreadyontheinsideofthesubject(collectiveaswellas individual).Forexample, inorder to identifymyselfasheterosexual Imightbeable to identifyahomosexualdrive inme,ormyCatholicself isconstitutednotonlyinoppositiontoothernonCatholicsbutalsoinoppositiontomeasascholar.

Theother lineof critique Iwant to discuss here isMouffes exclusive focus on the split,scattered subject.Sheonlymentions that the subjectconceivedofasLack ispreoccupiedwithfillingofthisLack.Thesubjectisdrivenbyaconstantstruggletoachievesomeunity;a

processthat

has

been

defined

as

subjectivation.

The

subject

seeks

to

establish

for

itself

apositionasaspeakingI,witharecognizable identity.Totalselfunification is impossible;

the subjectwill alwaysdiscover the incompleteness and false stabilityof the constructed

18NorvalAlettaJ.,Trajectories...,p.223.

19AbizadehArash,(2005)DoesCollectiveIdentityPresupposeanOther?OntheAllegedIncoherenceofGlobalSolidarity,AmericanPoliticalScienceReviewvol.99,no.1,p.46.20

IwouldsaythatthesamegoesforAbizadehsargumentthattheOthermightaswellbeconstructedimaginativelyandtemporally.Ofcourseitmay.TemporalityisclearlyinscribedinMouffesvision;theOther(asanyfixationofmeaning)isbydefinitionnotstable,butonlytemporary.WhenitcomestotheimaginarycontraconcreteOther,IguessMouffecouldhaveexplicateditbetter,althoughIseenonecessarychangetoher

theoryin

order

to

include

this

observation.

See

Abizadeh

Arash,

(2005)

Does

Collective

Identity...,

p.46,

p.58.

21

Indeed,MouffeherselfstatesthatsheisarguingwithSchmittagainstSchmitt.WhatAbizadehpossiblymeansisthat,inherconclusions,sheisclosertoSchmittstraditionthantoDerridas.

5


6/12

unity.ThemeetingwiththeOtherisalwayspartlyan illuminationinthisrespectandpartlyan aid in the taskof filling the gap (finding some identitywith itself). Iwould argue thatMouffe pays too little attention towhat role this filling has and the role of unity. SeylaBenhabib makes a similar point: On the contemporary theoretical playground, wherefragmentation and multiplicity prevail, questions about the unity of the self are never

posed22.As

Isee

it,

Mouffes

general

view

of

afragmented,

or

split

subject

is

accompanied

by her notion of hybridization. Subjects are hybrids, which entails that they are(re)composedofpieces,puttogetherintoaconstellationthatisnotfracturefree.ThehybridistheonlyunityMouffeadmitsof.However,Istillthinksheshouldtheorizemoreabouttherole this unity plays. Some clues can be drawn by translating her political logic to theindividuallevelandarguingthatevenwithinasubjectthereisanongoingstrugglebetweenthe logics of difference (the drive towards fragmentation and pluralism) and equivalence(thedrivetowardsunification).Atdifferentmomentstheywintheirway.Inanycase,intheinteractions,subjectspresentthemselveswithahegemonicsubjectposition(thisistheunityaskedfor),whichtemporarilygainstherighttopresenttheinterpretationofthesubjectasa

whole(synecdoche).

Habermassposition

LetusnowtakeacloserlookatHabermassconceptionofthesubject.Herepeatedlymarkshiscessionwiththephilosophyofthesubjectorthephilosophyofconsciousness.Bytheseterms hemeans the exaggerated emphasis on and belief in the individuals capacities.Instead, he resorts to philosophy of language, which underlines intersubjectivity andcommunicativerationality. Inhisconception,theself iscreated in frontoftheeyesoftheothers, in interactionwith them.Hence all the fundamental philosophical concepts shift

fromthe

basis

of

consciousness

to

that

of

language,

amove

originated

by

Georg

Herbert

Mead23.Thisistheproclaimedchangeofparadigm24fromtheindividualisticCartesian,withitsinstrumentalrationalityandatomisticIinthecenter,totheintersubjectiveselfcreatedin interactionwithothers (theMeadian interplaybetweenIand me)with thehelpofcommunicativereason.Inthelatterone,languagegainsprimacyoverconsciousness.Accesstoselforselfknowledgeisguaranteednotbyselfreflectionbutbyparticipationinlinguisticinteraction.25

selfdeterminationandselfrealization

Habermas,inspired

by

Mead,

speaks

of

two

aspects

of

the

subject

(or

ego

identity);

self

determination and selfrealization. The former is connected to the ability to actautonomouslyonthebasisofuniversalisticactionorientations,thelattertotheabilityto

22BenhabibSeyla,DieQuellendesSelbstinderzeitgenssischenfeministischenTheorie,DiePhilosophin:

ForumfrfeministischeTheorieundPhilosophievol.6,no.11,p.22(mytranslation).23

HabermasJrgen,IndividuationthroughSocialization:OnGeorgeHerbertMeadsTheoryofSubjectivity,[in:]PostmetaphysicalThinking:PhilosophicalEssays,PolityPress,Cambridge1992,p.162.24

HabermasJrgen,TheTheoryofCommunicativeAction.Vol.1.ReasonandtheRationalizationofSociety,BeaconPress,Boston1984,p.390.25

Habermas

Jrgen,

Individuation...,

p.162;

Dews

Peter,

Communicative

paradigms

and

the

question

of

subjectivity:Habermas,MeadandLacan,[in:]Habermas:ACriticalReader,ed.DewsPeter,Blackwell,Oxford1999,p.101.

6


7/12

realizeoneselfinalifehistorytowhichonelendscontinuitybyresponsiblytakingitover26.TheseareexpressionsofIasuniversalandIas individual (orparticular).Thesubject isselfdetermined if it is capableof autonomous actions. InHabermass interpretation, thismeans that thesubjectabidesonly those rules that ithasbeenactive increating. It isanexpressionof

theideaofautonomyaccordingtowhichhumanbeingsactasfreesubjectsonlyinsofar as they obeyjust those laws they give themselves in accordancewithinsightstheyhaveacquiredintersubjectively.27

The selfrealization aspect serves to highlight the individual peculiarities, i.e., thatwhichindividualizes the individual. The subject is selfrealized only insofar as s/he has anunmistakable life history and lifeproject attributed to him/her.28 In other words, selfrealizationisabouttakingresponsibilityforonesbiographyandgettingclearaboutwhoonewantstobe.

The two componentsof agencyoregoidentity thatHabermasproposes selfrealizationand selfdetermination couldotherwisebe framedbyhis conceptsofethicalandmoralautonomy.Byselfrealizationtheselfcontextuallydefinesher/hisconceptionofthegood,aswellas integrates it intoacoherentnarrativeofthe identity.S/healsoprovidesargumentsand reasons in defense of this conception, which will be used in interaction with theothers.29Selfdetermination,ormoralautonomygivestheselfauniversaltouch.Agentsactmorally autonomously if they act andjudge in accordancewithmorally valid norms andprinciplesthattheyacceptassuch.30

intersubjectivity

IntersubjectivityisafundamentalconceptinHabermasstheorybuilding,oreventhebasicargumentunderpinningHabermassconsensustheoryofepistemologyandethics31.FromMeadheborrowstheideaofasociallyproducedego.Individualityformsitselfinrelationsof intersubjective acknowledgement and of intersubjectively mediated selfunderstanding.32Hence,subjectivation isforhimaprocessofrecognizingoneselfintheother33. Habermas adds a linguistic dimension toMeads idea andmaintains that self

26

HabermasJrgen,TheTheoryofCommunicativeAction.Vol.2.LifeworldandSystem:ACritiqueofFunctionalistReason,BeaconPress,Boston1987,p.106.27

HabermasJrgen,BetweenFactsandNorms.ContributionstoaDiscourseTheoryofLawandDemocracy,TheMITPress,Cambridge2001,pp.4456.Aswesee,inthisconception,autonomyisconditionaluponsubjectsactiveparticipationindeliberation.Inthisway,autonomyisnotanatural/transcendentalgivenbutratheraproductofrationalcommunicativeexchange.OnthispointseeBorradoriGiovanna,PhilosophyinaTimeofTerror.DialogueswithJrgenHabermasandJacquesDerrida,TheUniversityofChicagoPress,ChicagoandLondon2003,p.59.28

HabermasJrgen,TheTheoryofCommunicativeAction.Vol.2,p.101.29

CookeMaeve,Habermas,feminismandthequestionofautonomy,[in:]Habermas:ACriticalReader,ed.DewsPeter,Blackwell,Oxford1999,p.196.30

Ibidem,p.195.31

KeohaneKieran,p.156.32

Habermas

Jrgen,

Individuation...,

p.153.

Or,

otherwise

put,

one

has

to

be

amember

of

acommunity

to

beaself.HabermasJrgen,TheTheoryofCommunicativeAction.Vol.1,p.24.33

HabermasJrgen,Individuation...,p.175.

7


8/12

consciousnessisnotonlyintersubjectively,butcommunicativelygenerated.Wegettoknowourselvesinthemeetingwithothersandthroughcommunicationwiththemwedefineouridentity.Habermasuses intersubjectivityasanantidote to thepossessive individualismofthephilosophyofconsciousness.

Theego

[]

does

not

belong

to

me.

Rather,

this

ego

always

retains

an

intersubjectivecore,becausetheprocessofindividuationfromwhich itemergesrunsthroughthenetworkoflinguisticallymediatedinteractions.34

Contrary to classicalphilosophys claims,we cannot get to knowourselves throughmereintrospection, the others (also imaginative, but these are secondary) are absolutelynecessary.

It isHabermassversionofthedeathofthesubject35.Forhim,subjectsarenotcentral;hewants to shift the focus to intersubjectivity. He even speaks of subjectless forms of

communication36

.The

focus

is

now

on

the

in

between,

the

process

and

result

of

communication between the subjects and not the subjects as such. Such a perspectivemakes itself visible in the conceptof sharedunderstanding that is supposed to transcendeveryparticipants lifeworldhorizon37or intheconceptofrationalitythat isnot located inthesubject,butintheintersubjectiverelationsofcommunication.

The idea of intersubjectivity has another impact on the way Habermas perceivessubjectivation.Itisnamelyseenasaprocess,andjustasprocessesofcommunicationareanever ending endeavor in his theory, so are identities. They are under constant(re)formulationindeliberation.Identityorsubjectformationisaproject.Ouridentityisnot

only

something

we

have

received:

it

is

at

the

same

time

our

own

project.

Certainly,

we

cannotchoosewhattraditionwehave.38However,aswesee,hereaswellas inMouffestheory,thisprocessisnotseenascompletelyvoluntaristicweareboundbyourtraditions,orlifeworlds,thatcircumscribethepossibleoptions.

Thereisanindissolubleelementofarbitrarinessinthechoiceofalifeproject.Thisis to be explained by the fact that the individual cannot adopt a hypotheticalattitudetowardhisownoriginsandbackground,thathecannotacceptorrejecthisbiographyinthesamewayashecananormwhoseclaimtovalidity isunderdiscussion.39

34Ibidem,p.170.

35Itisawidedebateinphilosophyabouttheroleofthesubject,wherethesubjectwasusuallyunderstoodasatomistic,detachedfromothersubjectsandfullyconstitutedbyanessence.ItisthiskindofexpressivesubjectsthatHabermaswantstoleavebehind.Hisamendmentistheemphasisonthedependenceonothersand,inconsequence,lackofessence.However,hestilloutlinescoherent,transparentandunitarysubjects.36

SeeforexampleHabermasJrgen,BetweenFactsandNorms...,p.486.Hereinthecontextofadiscussionaboutsovereignty,subjectlessformsofcommunicationservestounderlinetheroleofproceduresinitsattainment.37

HabermasJrgen,ReplytoSymposiumParticipants,BenjaminN.CardozoSchoolofLaw,[in:]HabermasonLawandDemocracy.CriticalExchanges,eds.RosenfeldtMichel,AratoAndrew,UniversityofCaliforniaPress,Berkeley

1998,

p.414.

38

Ibidem,p.399.39

HabermasJrgen,TheTheoryofCommunicativeAction.Vol.2...,p.109.

8


9/12

The identity isnotallcontingenteven though it is revised throughout theyearsandnewexperiences,newintersubjectivelinguisticallymediatedencounters.

Oneeffectof intersubjectivityandtherelationalcharacterofthesubject itsdependenceonothers in (trans)forming theegoidentity isHabermass recognitionofunfixityofany

subject.This

explains

the

almost

constitutional

insecurity

and

chronic

fragility

of

personal

identity,aninsecuritythatisantecedenttocruderthreatstotheintegrityoflifeandlimb.40Whatwefindhereisrecognitionofcontingencyasaneffectofintersubjectivity.

Hence,we can conclude that the identities in Habermass theory are seen as fluid andmoldable.

The egoidentity of the adult proves its worth in the ability to build up newidentitiesfromshatteredorsupersededidentities,andtointegratethemwitholdidentitiesinsuchawaythatthefabricofones interactions isorganized intothe

unityof

alife

history

that

is

both

unmistakable

and

accountable.

41

The subject in deliberative democratic theory is not pictured as linked to a stable, fixedidentity,but stillone that is supposed tobe coherentand transparent to the selfand itsOthers.Multipleandchangingidentificationsareadmittedofbuttheyshouldbeorderedinacoherent(henceaccountable)andtransparentwhole.

WhatisthensubjectivationforHabermas?Inoldertexts,hereferstostagesofdevelopment(inspiredmostlybyLawrenceKohlberg)inexplainingegosprogresstowardsmoreuniversalandcriticalmoralorientationas theprocessofbecomingasubject. Inshort,an individual

develops

along

these

stages

and

goes

through

socialization

(adaptation

of

the

ruling

norms

in society) to individuation (distance to those rules andmore autonomous stancewhichleansbackonuniversalprinciples).42 Such anevolutionaryperspective serves tohighlightHabermass ideal (the last postconventional level) of a transparent, selfconscious andautonomousindividual.

transparentandcoherent

Butwhat is theeffectof the intersubjectiveprocessofsubjectformation?What imageofthe subject does Habermas sketch?We can resort to his idealizations in search for thewishedforsubjectinhistheory.

Theanalysisofthenecessaryconditionsformutualunderstanding[idealizations]in general at least allows us to develop the idea of an intact intersubjectivity,whichmakes possibleboth amutual and constraintfree understanding among

40HabermasJrgen,MoralityandEthicalLife:DoesHegelsCritiqueofKantApplytoDiscourseEthics?,[in:]HabermasJrgen,MoralConsciousnessandCommunicativeAction,MITPress,Cambridge1990,p.199.41

HabermasJrgen,TheTheoryofCommunicativeAction.Vol.2...,p.98.42

HabermasJrgen,MoralDevelopmentandEgoIdentity,[in:]CommunicationandtheEvolutionofSociety,Polity

Press,

Cambridge

1991.

The

subject

can

question

the

ruling

norms

of

his/her

society

by

reference

to

awidercommunity(idealcommunicationcommunity)ofthepastandfuture.SeeHabermasJrgen,TheTheory

ofCommunicativeAction.Vol.2...,p.98.

9


10/12

individuals intheirdealingswithoneanotherandthe identityof individualswhocometoacompulsionfreeunderstandingwiththemselves.43

The idealizations serve tomakecleara vision, inwhich individualscome toa transparentunderstandingwitheachotherandofthemselves.Thetransparentunderstanding ishence

tobe

found

both

on

the

intrapersonal

and

interpersonal

level.

Importantly,

Habermass

claim isnot that this is theway subjects are,only that they shouldbe so,and to certainextent,thatweactuallydopresupposesuchaconstructionofourselvesandothers(theasifapproach),whichheclaimsisapreconditionofcommunication.

AnotherqualityHabermasascribestosubjects iscoherence.Hearguesthat incoherenceviolates thenormsofaccountability (or rationality);behaving inconsistently isanextremethingtodoforasubject,asitobscurestheintelligibilityofherutterancesandactions.44Aswesee,communicationistherecurringreference.Thesubjectneedstobetransparentandcoherent inorder tobeareliablecommunicativepartner.Weneedtobeauthentic in the

presentationof

ourselves

45

,which

presupposes

aself

transparent

to

itself,

aself

conscious

ofitsownidentity.Habermaspurportsthat[a]conceptofindividualitythatpointsbeyondmeresingularitycanonlybepossessedbyonewhoknowsbeforehimselfandothers,whoheisandwhohewantstobe46.

Pointsofcritique Habermas

SumminguptheremarksaboutHabermassvisionofthesubject,myfirstobjectionisthatifegoisaneffectoflinguisticallymediatedintersubjectiveinteractions,thenitcanimpossiblybe fully transparent to itself. Or I would argue that this would be the admission of

contingencythat

Habermas

seems

partly

to

abide

to.

As

we

noted

earlier,

the

intersubjective

dimension so forcefully underlined by Habermas in different passages, leads us to theacknowledgementofthecontingent,undecidedand insecure.Then, itcomesasasurprisethatHabermassimultaneouslymaintainsthatthesubjectbetransparenttoitself.

Despite the move away from the philosophy of the subject/consciousness, with itsexaggeratedfocusonthesubjectandits(omnipotent)abilities,intersubjectivitydoesntfullyprovideawayoutofthisperspectiveand itsflaws.Thedemandsof(self)transparencyandcoherenceseemtoberemnantsoftheseoldervisionsofthesubjectwhenitwaspicturedasthemasterofobjectivereality(subjectobjectrelation)andabletobothcontroloneselfand

everything

around

(interactions

with

others

included).

What

Habermas

fails

to

underscore

is

that,evenifnothingshouldinprinciplebeunquestionable,therewillalwaysbesphereswecannot make conscious. Here count the powers of discourses and the unpredictabilityinscribedinthemeetingwiththeOther.

43HabermasJrgen,TheUnityofReasonintheDiversityofitsVoices,[in:]HabermasJrgen,

PostmetaphysicalThinking,p.145;compareHabermasJrgen,TheTheoryofCommunicativeAction.Vol.2...,p.2.44

HabermasJrgen,ReflectionsonCommunicativePathology,[in:]HabermasJrgen,OnthePragmaticsofSocialInteraction.PreliminaryStudiesinthetheoryofCommunicativeAction,MITPress,Cambridge2001.45

HabermasJrgen,Individuation...,p.168.46

Ibidem,p.169.

10


11/12

Following Kieran Keohane, I propose that one first reexamines Habermass theory ofsubjectivity from Hegelian and Lacanian perspectives, paying attention to the dialecticalparadoxofthesimultaneousneedforandfearoftheOther47.WhereasforHabermastheintersubjectivemomentissmooth(markthatitisanidealizationhespeaksof),transparent,andsymmetrical,andtheOtherhasonlybenevolentinfluenceonmyidentity,Isuggestthat

wetake

into

account

Mouffes

Derrida

inspired

insight

that

the

Other

is

both

constitutive

of

our identity and disruptive. The meeting is antagonistic in the respect that the Otherpreventsmefrombeingtotallymyself.Whatismore,thismeetingisnotaclearcutgameofwinning/losingtheencounter.Thetransformativeaspectisimportanthere;theidentitiesofthe discussants are at stake, themeeting transforms their positions, bothmakes themrealize thepositionand forcesthem to transform it inthecourseofthemeeting. Inotherwords,itisavisionofdynamicintersubjectivity,withabitofatreacherousedge.

Conclusions

Aswe

have

seen,

the

deliberative

and

agonistic

democracies

present

sharply

contrasting

notions of the subject and subjectivation.Habermas puts forth an idealof a transparentsubjectthatmakeshim/herpredictableandtrustworthyincommunication(accountability).Maybe that is necessary if we put deliberation and consensus as ideals for politics. Incontrast, toachieve thedynamicsofMouffesagonisticpoliticsadifferentconceptof thesubject is required.To fit to theundecidabilityofpolitics, the subjecthas tobeunsettledtoo,and itsopaquenessto itself isexplainedandjustifiedbythevisionofpoliticsasdrivenbypassionsandnotrationaldeliberation.

Summing up, both Mouffe and Habermas acknowledge multiple identifications as the

conditionof

possibility

for

the

subject;

Mouffe

by

the

concept

of

subject

positions

and

Habermasbyreferringtodifferent identificationsofonesubject.However,theontologicalpresuppositions for their respectivedefinitionof the subjectarequitedivergent.Mouffecannot see subject positions without the necessary element of disruption, whereasHabermaspicturessubjectasaharmoniouswhole,wherethedifferentrolescomposeintoacoherent entity.Mouffe envisages the subject as a nomad, never at home, in constantsearch for(more)permanentsettlement(the fillingoftheLack),althoughthe impossibilityofanyfinalfixitymakesitselfvisibleinthealwaystemporaryandnonnecessarycharacterofany fixations,orsettlements.Mouffessubjectcanalsobearticulatedasahybrid,notoneunderstoodasamixtureofearlierready/fixedpieces,butonewhereeventhecomponents

areunclear

and

blurry

at

the

edges.

48

Hybrid

would

be

the

only

unity

allowed

for,

an

effect

ofsubjectivation,whichherecomestomeanthealwaysincompleteputtingtogetherofthescatteredpieces.

It is interesting to contrastHabermass andMouffes visions of theOther and its role insubjectformation.Aswehaveseen,bothdescribethesubjectasrelational,thepresenceoftheOther isabsolutelynecessary forthe formationofasubject.EgoandalterEgoemergesimultaneously itisnotpossibletothinkaselfwithoutanOther,andanOtherwithoutaself. However,what I have tried to show in this paper are the different possibilities of

47

Keohane

Kieran,

pp.157

8.

48

NorvalAletta,Hybridization:TheIm/PurityofthePolitical[in:]SovereigntyandSubjectivity,eds.EdkinsJenny,PersramNalini,andPinFatVronique,LynneRiennerPublishers,BoulderandLondon1999,p.104.

11


12/12

12

thinking intersubjectivity, the more harmonious and consensusoriented one and thelatentlyantagonisticanddestructiveone.InMouffescase,therelationtotheOtheralwayscomprises both a dependence on him/her (and so forth there is no difference withHabermas),butat the same time, theelementof fearof theOther,expressed inhis/herthreateningmy identity, preventingme from being fullymyself. In thinking relationality

Habermasavails

himself

of

the

concept

of

intersubjectivity

in

asmooth,

rupture

free

vein,

whileMouffeseesitasJanusfaced.SherecallsthenotionofconstitutiveoutsidetohighlightthethreateningbutnecessarycharacteroftheOther.

Habermas perceives of subjectivation as a teleological process. He refers to stages ofdevelopmentandadirectiontowardsthepostmetaphysical level.This laststagestandsforautonomousand reflective individuals thatmanage todistance themselves from societysnormsandhaveanorientationtowardsuniversalnormsandvalues.Mouffessubjectivationisalsoaprocessbutinnowayaprogressiveordirectedone.Thesubjectconstantlystrivesfor filling theLackand recurrently (re)definessomeofhersubjectpositionsand identifies

withnew

ones.

There

is,

however,

no

final

stage

or

telos

of

this

process,

only

asocial

norm

ofaunifiedsubject.

What canwe learn from these twodifferent visions?Mouffe is cogent inher accountofsubjectas lack that fitswell forher ideaofagonisticpolitics.However, I think sheshouldtheorize more the role unity plays in interactions. I also find Habermass focus onintersubjectivityconvincing,howeverIseeaneedtoradicalizeit,tointroduceamomentofnegativity in the formof the threatof theOther.Moreover, thedemandsheputson thesubjectseem too rigid.Transparencyandcoherencecannotbesalient ideals forasubjectconsciousofitslimits.Notonlyontheempiricalgrounds.Amoreproperaccountwouldbe

ofasubject

partly

opaque

to

itself,

not

being

able

to

fully

account

for

its

origin,

or

the

norms

settingthestagefor itsbeing. In linewithJudithButler,Ithinksuchavisionofthesubject(closer to Mouffes) can constitute grounds for an ethical relation to the Other.AcknowledgementofmyownopacitycanbeastartingpointforamoregenerousrelationtotheOther. Itwould be, perhaps, an ethics based on our shared, invariable, and partialblindness about ourselves.49 The same goes for the requirement of consistency. If wesuspend the demand for selfidentity or total coherence,we can adopt amore humblerelation to the Others and ourselves. What the arguments above boil down to is anadmissionoftheverylimitsofknowing.Thiscan[...]constituteadispositionofhumilityandgenerosity alike50.We have to be aware that the account of ourselves will never be

complete,and

when

asking

the

Other

who

he

is,

we

have

to

leave

the

question

open

and

cannotdemandanydefiniteanswer. Inthiswaywe let theOther live.ForcingoneselfandtheOthertopresentacoherentandtransparentaccountoflifehistoryistopromptlevelingoverallthebreakagesandrupturesthatareconstitutiveofthesubject.

49Butler Judith, Giving an Account of Oneself, Fordham University Press, New York 2005, p.41.50Ibidem, p.42.

2012 Jezierska - Mouffe s and Habermas s Political Anthropology

Documents

Transcript of 2012 Jezierska - Mouffe s and Habermas s Political Anthropology