8/11/2019 2012 Bargero - Things to be considered in an epistemological ethnography of institutions.pdf

1/4

hings to be considered in an epistemological ethnography of institutions

Mariano BARGERO, Universidad Nacional Arturo Jauretche; Universidad Nacional de Lomas de Zamora;

Universidad de Buenos Aires (Argentina).

Abstract text

This paper describes certain basic elements to be observed in an ethnographic research that follows an

ethnomethodological orientation. By saying that it follows an ethnomethodological orientation means,

among other things, that is based upon the idea that human activities are held by an active participation of

the members and because of the bulk of practical knowledge shared by them. That practical knowledge letmembers understand and communicate each other, coordinate activities and achieve their objectives, and

it becomes observable, for the ethnographer, through the procedures and methods the members use.

Although this knowledge is employed daily, it is not easily noticed by the members because it is usually

taken for granted. Only if we are able to think plausible alternatives to this assumed knowledge, we will beable to detect it. This presentation also reflects on possible strategies to grasp those shared (public but not

seen) assumptions. In this sense, some keys are to look at what members consider a well-done activity,

what are the reasons for the misunderstandings and complaints, which are the basis for the mutualunderstandings, etc.

I am going to present an approach for the study of institutional practices located in specific settings. Most

of the points I am going to make here have been inspired by ideas taken from ethnomethodology and the

late Wittgenstein, some of whose insights, in turn, have been borrowed from the works of an

ethnomethodologist, Jeff Coulter.

I believe that Jeff Coulter does not belong to the hard core of ethnomethodology, but he is aligned

with its ideas in many respects. Here, I am trying to follow his proposal to practice an epistemic sociology

(Coulter 1989). That is, a kind of research that seeks to analyze the practical reasoning of agents through

an elucidation of the rule-ordered (or grammatical) links among ideas, utterances and practices.

The approach aims to describe the practical reasoning of the members. But, in order to understand

how member reasons, it is necessary to grasp the shared assumptions of these practical reasonings.

These assumptions are akin to the sort of knowledge that Wittgenstein analyzes in On certainty

(Wittgenstein 1969). There he makes many insights about the function that truisms play in our lives. He

says that truisms like the Earth planet existed before my birth are not the kind of claims that need to be

8/11/2019 2012 Bargero - Things to be considered in an epistemological ethnography of institutions.pdf

2/4

proved. We just assume them. Rather than a knowledge claim, these assumptions, for Wittgenstein,

consist of a given or inherited background that let us distinguish between true and false (ibid, 92-95).

The problem with this assumed background (of truisms) is that it is not easy to be detected. We act

in coherence with its rules, tacitly, but we do not think of them; that is why they cannot be acknowledged

easily.

So the question is: how can we grasp those assumptions that let us make intelligible the situations

we face? Again, Wittgenstein gives us a clue to answer this question. (Of course, this is not the only way to

answer the question). Several times in On certainty(ibid, 110) and Philosophical investigations

(Wittgenstein 2009, 1), Wittgenstein states that explanations come to an end somewhere.Indeed, in

everyday practices many things (events or utterances, for example) may require or provoke an

explanation, but now the question is: why the explanation comes to an end at a certain moment and not

before or after? And which is the instance when the explanation is enough? It can be said that the

explanation ends once the agent asserts something that is obvious to her/him and her/his interlocutors.

That thing shared by the agent and her/his interlocutors, according to Wittgenstein, is not an idea, but a

form of life (Wittgenstein 1969, 110 and 204). And forms of life are informed, in my view, by, among

other things, the before mentioned assumptions.

These explanations can be compared with the members accounts that Garfinkel mentions in his

Studies in ethnomethodology(Garfinkel 1984). According to Garfinkel, members of institutions, through

accounts, explanations and even by pointing at things that belong to the settings, make intelligible, for

them and their colleagues, what is going on, keeping thus the sense of the situation stable. These

explanations constitute a significant part of what he calls reflexivity(ibid, 8-9). In Garfinkels words,

reflexivity is an essential condition for members to produce () rational-adequacy-for-all-practical-

purposes of their procedures (ibid, 8).The point is that these explanations are part of the practical

reasoning that members enact to coordinate their practices and reach their purposes at hand.

8/11/2019 2012 Bargero - Things to be considered in an epistemological ethnography of institutions.pdf

3/4

For instance, take the liberal individualistic assumption that considers that each person has to be

responsible for her/his own life. At least in Argentina, when people who think in this way are asked to give

an opinion about social inequality, they may explain: the poor have what they deserve because they dont

want to work. Or they are losers. Perhaps, he could give an example that fits her/his explanation and,if

all the present people share the same assumptions, there will not be necessary more words. Of course,

further explanations would be necessary if she or he makes that claim in front of people who do not share

those assumptions.

Or take other example: I know some left wing people in Argentina who, when they face the

situation of giving an opinion about the action or statement of right wing politicians, they say: He/she is a

son of a bitch.And that is enough to account for the politicians action or statement.

These examples can be considered instances of practical reasoning. Note that the connection

between the event (being that social inequality, poverty or the action of a politician) and the explanation is

logically mediated by the rules entailed in the assumptions (that everyone is responsible for

himself/herself, and that people who sustain certain ideas and act accordingly are sons of bitches).

Of course, it is not easy to come to grasp the assumed or tacit ideas (or directly rules) through the

explanations given by the members. Being able to do so requires an in depth immersion in the field. But

sometimes it is necessary something more than a lasting immersion in the field, for as I mentioned

beforepeople do not make explicit these assumptions and the ethnographer may find very difficult to

see them. In this regard, Garfinkel says something that I consider to be an important clue for the

ethnographer. He invokes a notion that shares some resemblances with Wittgensteins before mentioned

notion of background. He refers to background features of everyday scenes (ibid, 36). The members of

the society use these background features as a scheme of interpretation that let them recognize and make

intelligible things and events as familiar ones. And he makes the same point I have already made: albeit

members of society are responsive to this background, they cannot say what this background consist of.

8/11/2019 2012 Bargero - Things to be considered in an epistemological ethnography of institutions.pdf

4/4

Then he adds: For these background expectancies to come into view one must either be a stranger to the

life as usual character of everyday scenes, or become estranged from them (ibid, 37).

Only if we are able to see these background expectancies, background truisms or assumptions as

contingent ideas, we will be able to detect them. So, being a foreigner helps a lot. But, as I mentioned

before, it is also necessary a deep immersion in members activities to come to grasp the notions that give

a sense to their actions and utterances.

Works cited

COULTER, Jeff. Mind in action.Atlantic Highlands: Humanities Press, 1989.

GARFINKEL, Harold. Studies in ethnomethodology.Cambridge: Polity Press, 1984.

WITTGENSTEIN, Ludwig. On certainty.Translated by Denis Paul and G. E. M. Anscombe. Oxford: Basil

Blackwell, 1969.

. Philosophical investigations.4th edition. Translated by G. E. M. Anscombe, Peter M. S. Hacker and

Joachim Schulte. Chichester (West Sussex): Wiley-Blackwell, 2009.