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than the regular army. Qaddaddfa, mem-bers of Qaddafis tribe, are strongly over-represented among these troops. As of lateMarch 2011, Qaddafi forces have regainedcontrol over Tripoli and the western cities

of Zawiya and Zuwara through large-scalerepression and major army offensives, andcontinue to besiege rebels in Misurata andthe Jebel Nafusa in the north-west. Theregime has also managed to coax parts ofthe urban population and some tribal con-stituencies in north-western and centralLibya into obedience through a combina-tion of cash handouts and threats. Inter-national alliance airstrikes authorised un-der UN Security Council Resolution 1973to protect civilians and enforce a no-flyzone mean that Qaddafis forces are on thedefensive and have no realistic prospect ofrecapturing the north-east. The key ques-tion, though, is whether external militarypressure in combination with sanctionsand the rebellion will lead to furtherdefections in Qaddafis entourage, or toefforts by security officials to topple theQaddafi family. Failing the unravelling ofthe regimes core, Qaddafis forces could yetretain control over north-western and cen-

tral Libya for months, possibly longer. Inthe meantime, however, a new politicalorder is emerging in rebel-held areas, spel-ling the end of the Qaddafi era there.

The post-Qaddafi political arenaUnder Qaddafis 42-year rule, there wereneither political parties nor civil societyorganisations. It is only now that they candevelop. The contours of the post-Qaddafipolitical scene, therefore, remain sketchy.

The Interim National CouncilThe Interim National Council that formedin late February in Benghazi quickly gainedthe support of defecting military units,state officials, and tribal leaders, and hassince been seeking international recogni-tion as the sole legitimate representativeof Libya until a new government can be

established. The Council aims at steeringthe transition to a post-Qaddafi govern-ment, and is calling for free elections anddrafting a new constitution to establisha democratic state with a separation of

powers. The Council comprises a loosecoalition of different groups, and is cur-rently dominated by Libyans from thecountrys north-east. However, it shouldnot be dismissed as an instrument of north-eastern elites being used to expand theirinfluence; rather, representatives of areasthat remain under Qaddafis control areunable to join due to the ongoing civil war,or fear that their families will be subjectedto reprisal if their identities becomeknown. As of late March 2011, the namesof 13 of its 31 members have been madepublic, while the others are kept secretdue to security concerns. The chairmanof the Council is Mustafa Abdel Jalil from

Al Bayda, who resigned as Qaddafis JusticeMinister on 21 February. The most prom-inent representative of the oppositiongroups that led the rebellion in the first

weeks is Abdel Hafiz Ghoga, a lawyer fromBenghazi. Another key figure is Mahmoud

Jebril, who is in charge of external relations

and has been tipped to be head of a futuretransitional government. Jebril is a US-educated academic who between 2007 and2009 played a leading role in (unsuccessful)efforts to reform the Libyan economy. Onthe whole, former officials dominate theCouncil, although the revolutionaries lawyers like Ghoga and academics such asFathi Baaja retain significant representa-tion. However, the composition of theCouncil is bound to evolve: the coalitionbetween regime defectors and revolution-aries would likely be affected by Qaddafisdemise, which would require the Councilto accommodate representatives of othertribes and regions.

The tribesTribal loyalties play a key role in Libyanpolitics. Qaddafis regime could be under-stood as essentially an alliance of the small

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Qaddadfa tribe with two of the countryslargest tribes: the Warfalla based mainly inTripolitania, and the Magarha from theFezzan. These three tribes were dispropor-tionately represented in government, the

military, and the security apparatus. Repre-sentatives of other tribes were also accom-modated to ensure stability. The tribes alsofunctioned as networks through which theQaddafi regime distributed patronage. Thecontinuing importance of tribal loyalties

was demonstrated during the first two weeks of the rebellion, when a numberof leading tribes and numerous smallergroups publicly withdrew their supportfrom the regime. Most prominent amongthem were the north-eastern tribes. Numer-ous tribes or sub-groups from other areasalso joined the rebellion, including theBerber tribes of the Jebel Nafusa, the Tou-bou minority in Libyas south, and parts ofthe Warfalla. Senior officials such as JusticeMinister Abdel Jalil, Interior Minister AbdelFattah Younis, or Ambassador to Washing-ton Ali Aujali all members of north-eastern tribes followed their tribes insupporting the rebellion.

After Qaddafis demise, the tribes will

be primarily interested in redistributinginfluence within the state apparatus andaccess to state resources and services. Thereis potential for major shifts in this regard,given that the Qaddadfa tribe and some ofits allies would inevitably lose influence ina successor state. Groups that remainedloyal to the regime during the insurgencycould be politically marginalised or facereprisals. Such groups could form the basisof (potentially armed) opposition to thenew regime, unless they are politicallyaccommodated.

However, the current rebellion and post-Qaddafi politics should not be misunder-stood as simply a power struggle betweentribes. All available evidence suggests thatthe goal to topple the Qaddafi regime com-mands overwhelming support acrossLibyas regions and cities. Moreover, theinfluence of tribal loyalties is limited inthe large cities of Tripoli, Benghazi, and

Misurata, where more than a third of thecountrys six million Libyans live. The

young population that led the uprisingin these and other large cities is unlikelyto feel adequately represented by tribal

leaders. Finally, the tribes are not homo-geneous entities. Each of the larger tribesconsists of numerous smaller sub-groups.Many tribal leaders have been discrediteddue to the role they played under Qaddafi.Consequently, the transition is also likely tosee power struggles within the tribes forexample, rivalries between opponents andloyalists of Qaddafi among the Warfalla,Magarha, and Qaddadfa.

The former regime eliteFollowing a spate of desertions by seniorofficials in the first two weeks of theuprising, the former ruling elite is deeplydivided. Many former officials now play aprominent role in the Interim NationalCouncil and are positioning themselves forthe post-Qaddafi era. This includes former

Justice Minister Abdel Jalil and formerTrade Minister and Ambassador to India,

Ali al-Essawi (now responsible for external

relations, along with Mahmoud Jebril) as well as the former Ambassadors to theUN and the United States, AbderrahmanShalgam and Ali Aujali. Omar al-Hariri(now nominally in charge of the rebelarmy) and Abdel-Monem al-Houni, former

Ambassador to the Arab League, fall into aslightly different category: both partici-pated in Qaddafis 1969 coup but were

jailed or exiled after a failed coup attemptagainst Qaddafi in 1975. Some defectors are

viewed with a high degree of suspicion bythe revolutionaries, such as former InteriorMinister Younis, who is accused of beingresponsible for serious human rights

violations. Within the inner circle surrounding the

Qaddafi family, there have thus far beenfew desertions, and confirmed informationis scarce. Qaddafis cousin Ahmed QaddafEddam, who until recently was Qaddafispersonal envoy to Egypt, on 24 February

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announced his resignation and fled toSyria, though opposition media allege hecontinues to support Qaddafi. Qaddafi inlate February reportedly dismissed hisbrother-in-law, Abdallah Senoussi, head

of the secret service and one of the mostimportant representatives of the Magarhatribe surrounding Qaddafi. The head of thearmy, Abu Bakr Younis Jabr, has apparentlybeen under house arrest since the start ofthe rebellion. Qaddafi himself and his sonshave no real prospect of being offered adignified exit or playing a role in a politicaltransition. However, key players in the secu-rity apparatus and the tribes that continueto support Qaddafi would need guarantees,such as non-prosecution or political accom-modation, in order to change sides.

Opposition groupsPrior to the uprising, opposition to theQaddafi regime consisted primarily ofexiled political parties with a narrowsupport base and armed Islamists who

waged a rebellion in the north-east inthe late 1990s. Reflecting the absence oforganised opposition, the main driving

forces behind the uprising were sponta-neous and unorganised. Unemployed orunderemployed young men without polit-i cal affiliation took the lead in setting fireto police stations and government build-ings in cities across the north-east and inthe Jebel Nafusa in the north-west, therebyescalating the uprising. Particularly inBenghazi, however, representatives of theliberal professions played a prominent rolein the uprising and are now representedin the communal and national interimcouncils.

Among the opposition, the MuslimBrotherhood stands out with organisationalstructures and significant support, primari-ly based in the countrys north-easterncities. Representing a moderate strand ofpolitical Islam, the Muslim Brotherhooddistinguishes itself by an ideologicallydefined programme in a political contextthat is likely to be defined by rivalries over

access to resources and positions. Its social justice platform targets the urban middleclasses and therefore transcends tribal con-stituencies. While the groups leadershiphad long been exiled and lacks prominent

figures, the Muslim Brotherhood played animportant role in initiating the uprising bycalling for protests from early Februaryonwards. The Brotherhood has pledged itssupport to the Interim National Council,provided the Council incorporates all forcesinvolved in the revolution and excludesdeserters from Qaddafis inner circle. Thegroup therefore opposes a mere restorationof the ruling elite without Qaddafi.

Islamist extremists associated with theformer Libyan Islamic Fighting Group(LIFG) represent a marginal phenomenon.They are mainly based in the north-east,

where armed groups were active in the1990s. Even after the dismantling of theLIFG, the vast majority of Libyan jihadistsfighting in Iraq originated from the north-east, suggesting that extremist groupsretain some support in the region. Themajority of former LIFG fighters werereleased from prison in recent years afterrenouncing violence; some have since

integrated the Islamist mainstream andnow support the rebellion. Althoughformer fighters will not necessarily returnto armed struggle, extremist groups couldreorganise during the transition and seekto expand their influence.

The monarchists surrounding Moham-med al-Sanussi, great-nephew of King Idriss,

who was overthrown in 1969, are unlikelyto play any significant role. The fact thatthe monarchys flag has become the symbolof the rebellion does not express a desire tobring back the monarchy, but simply refersto a Libya before and without Qaddafi;its tricolour also symbolises the unity ofLibyas historic three regions. There is nosign of efforts to re-establish the monarchy.

State collapse or state-building?The key challenge after Qaddafis demise

will be to create a new state from the

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ground up. Libya currently does not have aconstitution, and the 1951 constitution ofthe Senoussi monarchy cannot be easilyresurrected. Due to Qaddafis insistence,Libya does not even have a formal head of

state. The institutions of the old regime including the General Peoples Congress(Parliament) and the local Basic PeoplesCongresses play a purely symbolic roleand will not survive Qaddafis fall. As aconsequence, the foundations of the stateand the political system will have to bebuilt entirely from scratch, such as theform of government, the separation ofpowers, the role of the regions, and theelectoral system. There are virtually noinstitutions that will be able to maintaincontinuity. Government institutions andthe military were deliberately weakened byQaddafi and have disintegrated during theuprising. Instead, a new body the InterimNational Council is set to play the leadingrole in the transition.

In addition, the rebels do not appearto be promoting any clear vision of post-Qaddafi Libya, focussing instead onQaddafis demise and voicing generaldemands for democracy, freedom, and an

end to corruption. This is understandable,as debates on the nature of the politicalsystem had, to date, been impossible inLibya, and because the rebels efforts arenecessarily focussed on Qaddafis defeat aslong as he continues to rule. However, thelack of concrete ideas about the futuresystem is also telling, insofar as duringthe transitional phase most players arelikely to be focussed on the redistributionof resources: positions in the state appara-tus and government; sectoral and provin-cial budgets; public services and infrastruc-ture. Virtually the entire Libyan economy isdirectly or indirectly dependent on the dis-tribution of state revenues from the oilsector. Disagreements over the structures ofthe new state will primarily be distributiveconflicts, or are likely to conceal such con-flicts. This will pose additional obstacles tostate-building.

ScenariosCivil war is likely to continue for at leastas long as the Qaddafi family can retaincontrol over its security apparatus, and

would probably result in a drawn-out

stalemate and a temporary partition of thecountry. Violent conflict could persist afterQaddafis demise if key constituencies arenot accommodated in a future government.Two alternative scenarios for the post-Qaddafi era are: a new deal by old regimeelites that would likely fail to producestability, or a protracted, but ultimatelymore sustainable, state-building process.

Civil war and temporary partitionThe ongoing conflict is unlikely to come toa quick end unless Qaddafi loses the loyaltyof key tribal constituencies and securityofficials, who would then topple theQaddafi family or lead another large-scaleuprising in the north-west. If Qaddafissecurity apparatus remains intact in itscurrent state, a military solution to theconflict is highly unlikely. Rebel forces aretoo weak to wrest control of Tripolitaniaaway from loyalist troops. Attempts to that

effect would trigger protracted urban war-fare. On the other hand, Qaddafi forces areunable to lead large-scale offensives onrebel-held areas as long as the internationalcoalition continues to enforce UN SecurityCouncil resolution 1973. As a result, aprotracted stalemate looms that wouldeffectively divide the country into a westernpart controlled by Qaddafi with somepockets of resistance and a rebel-held east.

An internationally mediated ceasefire couldfurther cement such a stalemate. Althoughit has so far shown no interest, the regimecould agree to a ceasefire once Qaddafisforces have sufficiently weakened thepockets of resistance in the north-west toretain control by repression, rather thanlarge-scale military offensives. The ceasefire

would then allow the regime to quietlycement its hold on western Libya through

widespread repression. Before long, such astalemate would necessitate the agreement

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of an oil-for-food deal to alleviate the im-pact of sanctions for civilians, since inter-national sanctions would trigger the econ-omys collapse before drying up Qaddafisfunds. Such a situation would be costly for

international allies, since it would requirea continued military operation to police theceasefire, and effectively sustain a highlyunstable and repressive state in westernLibya.

Alternatively, as Libya slides deeperinto civil war, parties to the conflict couldsplinter and militias could form, raisingthe possibility that violence could continueeven after Qaddafis demise for example,previously privileged tribal constituenciesthat are excluded from a post-Qaddafipolitical deal could continue to wage aninsurgency against a new government.

However, there is little danger of thepower struggles that would followQaddafis demise unleashing centrifugalforces; partition would be unlikely to sur-

vive Qaddafi. Observers correctly point outthat Libyas territorial unity is relativelyrecent. Until colonisation, Libya consistedof three largely separate political structures(Tripolitania, Cyrenaica, Fezzan), and under

the monarchy, these three regions wereautonomous entities with their own parlia-ments until 1963. However, there are noregional identities today. The InterimNational Council understands itself as thebasis for a transitional government for allof Libya, with Tripoli as its capital. Mostimportantly, Libya has become a central-ised state under Qaddafis rule because thecentral government controls oil revenues.

As soon as a transitional government takescontrol of oil revenues or even just partof these revenues, as is conceivable in thenorth-east it will be able to establish it-self as the new centre of power. While theTripoli government is in any case unlikelyto survive Qaddafis fall, the emergence oftwo permanent entities will be prevented aslong as one of these entities is targeted bythe comprehensive international sanctionsin place under resolution 1973.

Old elites, new deal As outlined above, former members of theruling elite under Qaddafi play a promi-nent role in the Interim National Council.If they succeed in toppling Qaddafi and

ending the civil war by accommodatingsenior players from the Warfalla orMagarha, the old elites could form analliance that would dominate the post-Qaddafi political scene. This would effec-tively amount to a restoration of the oldregime without Qaddafi not in terms ofits institutional structure (which would beobsolete in any case) but its social basis.The latter would continue to consist of acoalition of large tribes linked to thecentral government through patronagenetworks. While this scenario would alsoentail considerable power struggles overthe redistribution of wealth, the rulingelite would remain largely identical, asidefrom internal power shifts and the exclu-sion of smaller groups like the Qaddadfa.Ethnic minorities, liberals, and Islamists

would be largely excluded. Fundamentalquestions relating to the form of govern-ment or the electoral system would stillhave to be addressed, but debate on these

issues would be cut short and reformistinterests excluded. As a result, fundamentalchanges to the state and governance struc-ture for example, strengthening thepowers of the regions and provinces orfar-reaching reforms in education, social,or industrial policy would be unlikely. Theseemingly rapid stabilisation would there-fore probably soon give way to renewedinstability in the form of rioting in themajor cities or armed resistance in certaintribal areas.

Protracted state-building While any post-Qaddafi government wouldneed a certain degree of buy-in from formerregime heavyweights to be stable, a coali-tion incorporating a broader spectrumof political forces would provide a morepromising avenue for stabilisation in themedium term. In this scenario, the interest

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