Curry 1

Gunmen armed with Kalashnikov rifles rolled through the streets of Managua, Nicaragua

on July 19, 1979. The following day the National Sandinista Liberation Front established a

provisional government. With the establishment of the provisional government the Sandinistas

ended forty three years of family rule by the Somoza clan. Historian, David Ryan, contends that

the Nicaraguan Revolution resulted from decades of socio-economic inequality.1 Accordingly,

the Sandinistas reforms must be seen in this context. Their goals were to provide vast economic

redistribution through land and social reform. Their methods in pursuing these goals were

consistent with those of communism, and thus the Sandinistas received support from regional

and international communist allies.

The extent of support by communist governments is actually irrelevant in this case. It is

the fact that United States government perceived Nicaragua as being supported by communist

governments that is significant. In fact, communism in the western hemisphere was not as

prominent as many people believed. This perception resulted from cultural animosity with the

Soviet Union that had become institutionalized in Washington D.C.2 Regardless, the U.S.

response to these perceptions was unswerving and intervention always followed. The

intervention varied depending on the Administration in charge at the executive level. At a

minimum, economic sanctions and diplomacy were guaranteed. At the extreme, covert military

operations and support for anti-communist guerilla forces were not uncommon intervention

techniques in Central America.

The Reagan Administration especially pursued the latter method. In fact, the U.S.

Republican Party platform which helped elect Reagan reflected an anti-communist sentiment that

1 Ryan, David. 1995. US Sandinista Diplomatic Relations. London: MacMillan Press Ltd. Pg. 62 Ryan, David. 1995. US Sandinista Diplomatic Relations. London: MacMillan Press Ltd. Pg. 7

Curry 2

was ultimately shown in his foreign policy. That platform specified that the Marxist Sandinista

takeover of Nicaragua would not be supported by the United States nor would any other Marxist

government in the western hemisphere.3 The platform echoes the Monroe and Truman doctrines,

as the Monroe doctrine disallows outside influence to interfere with U.S. interests in the western

hemisphere, and the Truman doctrine contends that the U.S. will support people who want

democratic government. The party platform ends by emphasizing the fact that Republicans will

support a free and democratic government in Nicaragua.

Bipartisan politics influenced the course of events in Nicaragua during the late 1970’s

and early 1980’s. Initially, the Nicaraguan 79’ revolution coincided with the end of President

Jimmy Carters’ term in office. The Democrats stance towards Nicaragua, as reflected by Carter’s

foreign policy decisions, was contrary to later Reagan policies and much less aggressive.

Carter’s directives were threefold; support the private sector, continue political pluralism, and

create a democratic electoral system.4 His initiatives reflect the fact that he wanted the U.S. to

appear non-aggressive against the new regime. In other words, he wanted the Sandinista

government to operate with majority rule and minority rights. He did not intend to force

democracy upon the Nicaraguans to the degree of Reagan, but rather he tried to lead them

towards it. By taking a less aggressive stance Carter’s Director for Latin American and

Caribbean Affairs, Robert Pastor, believed it would “deny the Sandinistas an enemy, precluding

them from obtaining Soviet and Cuban military aid.5” In fact, the United States contributed 75

million dollars of emergency economic aid to the private sector during Carter’s term. This act

3Ryan, David. 1995. US Sandinista Diplomatic Relations. London: MacMillan Press Ltd. Pg. 14 Ryan, David. 1995. US Sandinista Diplomatic Relations. London: MacMillan Press Ltd. Pg. 35 Ryan, David. 1995. US Sandinista Diplomatic Relations. London: MacMillan Press Ltd. Pg. 3

Curry 3

contrasts to the later actions of Reagan and shows that Nicaragua received significant attention

from political actors in Washington. This attention was not lost on U.S. tax payers.

The public became concerned with the significant support Nicaragua received. After all,

it was only a decade prior that the U.S. quit its significant military and economic support of

Vietnam; a country most Americans couldn’t find on a map, let alone care about its politics. As a

result, the public was wary of any potential follow-ups to that war, regardless of institutionalized

policy such as Monroe and Truman’s doctrines which stressed intervention in this case. In fact, a

study of the early 80’s suggested that the public disagreed with Reagan’s policy on Nicaragua

despite efforts by the administration to convince them otherwise. Americans believed that the

Administration misjudged the degree to which U.S. interests were at stake in central America

and “were fearful that U.S. involvement would lead to another Vietnam.”6 It was the Public’s

hesitation to support Reagan’s foreign policy in Nicaragua which ultimately led Congress to

enact funding restraints on Reagan’s initiatives.

However, this did not initially restrict the Reagan Administration’s ability to operate in

Nicaragua. In fact, the Administration began conducting covert options in November of 1981.

The NSDD or National Security Decision directive 17 allowed the CIA to organize a 500 person

force in Nicaragua to irritate the Cuban presence in the area and undermine Sandinista authority.7

It did just that and more. Within the next six months CIA operatives blew up two vital

transportation bridges in North Nicaragua. Covert ops to undermine the Sandinistas were

underway. These operations reflect the willingness of the Reagan Administration to carry out

policy contrary to the public wishes.

6 Ryan, David. 1995. US Sandinista Diplomatic Relations. London: MacMillan Press Ltd. Pg. 117 Ryan, David. 1995. US Sandinista Diplomatic Relations. London: MacMillan Press Ltd. Pg. 21

Curry 4

On November 8th 1982 Newsweek broke a story relaying the covert extent of military

operations in Nicaragua. This prompted Congress to enact more aggressive legislation that

expressed the public will and attempted to limit executive authority. Specifically, the Boland

amendments provided this legislation. Curiously, the Boland Amendments were continuously

amended. This was because the Executive Branch always found a way to operate through a legal

loophole not covered by the amendments. Regardless, the intent of the amendments was clear,

that U.S. intervention in Nicaragua be kept at a minimum.

However, the Reagan Administration could not comply with Congressional or public

sentiment. It maintained that interference in Nicaragua was necessary to the national security

interests of the United States and it would not compromise on its goals. Primary documents

reveal the extent to which funding constraints plagued foreign policy directives. However,

operators within the Administration ultimately solved budget constraints. Lt. Colonel Oliver

North used profits from arms sales with Iran to fund the Contra rebels. The arms deals were

originally not undertaken for profit but rather to secure the lives of American hostages in

Lebanon. In any case, these deals violated the Arms Export Control Act and connected the two

affairs. To make matters worse, after the public learned of the administrations covert presence in

Nicaragua and violation of the Arms Export Control Act, a document shredding party or cover-

up quickly followed. North destroyed countless documents which would have provided a much

fuller picture of the operation and the knowledge of top level officials in the Administration of

maneuvers of lower level NSC staff. The extent of North’s actions demonstrate that undermining

the Sandinista regime was a top priority. Therefore, the foreign policy of the Administration

reflected the sentiments of the Monroe and Truman Doctrines.

Curry 5

“The occasion has been judged proper for asserting, as a principle in which the rights and interests of the United States are involved, that the American continent, by the free and independent condition which they assumed and maintain, are henceforth not to be considered as subjects for future colonization by any European power.”-

President James Monroe to Congress December 2, 1823

“I believe that it must be the policy of the United States to support free peoples who are resisting attempted subjugation by armed minorities or by outside pressures. I believe that we must assist free peoples to work out their own destinies in their own way. I believe that our help should be primarily through economic and financial aid which is essential to economic stability and orderly political processes.” President Harry S. Truman to Congress March 12, 1947

The above passages are known, respectively, as the Monroe and Truman doctrines. The Monroe

doctrine directly shaped the foreign policy of the United States well into the twentieth century.

Likewise, the Truman doctrine was equally significant in matters of foreign policy. Each

doctrine stresses the interest of the United States, and its willingness to support the sovereignty

of democratic governments worldwide. Truman’s policy is directed specifically towards

communist governments, and institutionalized an ideology of containment as foreign policy

throughout the twentieth century. Institutional in the sense that deviation from such policy was

rare and unorthodox from the time of its enactment. The Iran/Contra affair involving the Reagan

Administration and countless clandestine individuals must be analyzed within these parameters.

The Reagan Administration’s unfaltering belief in the Monroe and Truman doctrines ultimately

resulted in the Iran/Contra scandal.

An explanation of the origin of containment policy is necessary to understand the broader

actions of the Reagan Administration in Nicaragua. In political historian John W. Coffey’s, The

Statesmanship of Harry S. Truman, he examines and explains the origins of containment. He

relays, “From the beginning the cardinal feature of Soviet policy has been the militant,

universalist doctrine of Marxism-Leninism, which posits a fundamental, unremitting, global

Curry 6

class war where truce is impossible until capitalism is destroyed and communism dominates the

world.” The spread of communism during Truman’s presidency likely caused him to believe

Marxist theory was coming to fruition. Therefore, to protect American interests, “NSC-68 [was

enacted and] crystallized containment policy, uniting power with principle in a strategy that

matched military means to political ends.” 8 In other words, Truman established the precedent

that any and all means of combating communist world dominance was acceptable, and thus helps

explain the Reagan Administration’s actions.

The conspiracy aspect of the Iran Contra affair arises from the intentional violation of

statutory law and attempts to cover-up violations by the Administration. Specifically, the Boland

Amendments of the 1980’s, the Arms Export Control Act, and Congressional notification

requirements in covert action laws, were all allegedly violated.9 However, some question arises

to the validity of the violations on constitutional grounds. This uncertainty is due to the fact that

the executive branch of the United States was doing the violating. As such, a host of complex

precedents on constitutional law dictate the interplay of power between the executive, legislative,

and judicial branches of government which ultimately decided opinion on the Reagan

Administration’s acts. It is the interaction of these forces which yielded the term conspiracy.

Though the complexity of the entire situation is beyond the scope of this paper, a sufficient

examination will reflect the traditional policy and distinguishing aspects of the Reagan

Administration which resulted in the Iran/Contra Conspiracy.

8 Coffey, John W. The Review of Politics, Vol. 47, No. 2 (Apr., 1985), pp. 231-252. Pg. 231

9 Walsh, Lawrence. 1993. FINAL REPORT OF THE INDEPENDENT COUNSEL FOR IRAN/CONTRA

MATTERS

Curry 7

In declassified documents President Reagan stressed the importance of containment in

Central America. Reagan expressed his purpose and justification for interfering in Nicaragua. He

relays that,

“In cooperation with other governments, provide support, equipment and training assistance to Nicaraguan paramilitary resistance groups as a means to induce the Sandinistas and Cubans and their allies to cease support for insurgencies in the region; to hamper Cuban/Nicaraguan arms trafficking; to divert Nicaragua’s resources and energies from support to central American guerilla movements; and to bring the Sandinistas into meaningful negotiations and constructive, verifiable agreement with neighbors on peace in the region.”10 -President Reagan

The Nicaraguan paramilitary resistance groups Reagan refers to are the Contras or anti-

Sandinistas. His statement contends that the U.S. will provide support to the Contras to

combat the Sandinista government. Reagan then explains why support for the Contras is

necessary, or that supporting the Contras will hamper Sandinista initiatives in the region. He

also makes reference to the Sandinistas “allies.” An understanding of the context of the

situation is crucial to the significance of the reference. The Sandinistas unnamed ally is the

Soviet Union. By hampering the Sandinistas, Reagan is also hampering the Soviet Union's

projects in Central America. Therefore, Reagan exhibits his belief in Truman’s concept of

containment and Monroe’s concept that the western hemisphere is no longer available for

European hegemony.

Further expressions of the Administration’s adherence to containment policy occur

in the minutes of NSC meetings. At approximately 2:30 on the afternoon of June 25, 1984

the National Security Council (NSC) convened the National Security Planning Group

Meeting. In attendance at this meeting were: the President, the Vice President, CIA director

William J. Casey, and future Attorney General Edwin Meese III. At the meeting the

10 Document 1: White House, Presidential Finding on Covert Operations in Nicaragua (with attached Scope Note), SECRET, September 19, 1983. National Security Archives

Curry 8

gentleman discussed the current state of affairs in Washington and in Central America.

Congress was concerned that support for the Contras would lead to another Vietnam or

unpopular war in Central America. Therefore, Congress began limiting funds and aid to the

Contras. Secretary of Defense Caspar W. Weinberger relayed his concerns on funding limits

to the group, “On the anti-Sandinista issue, I think we need to take the offensive against the

Democrats in Congress. We need to hold them accountable for not providing the resources

needed to defend democracy”.11 The Secretary relays that funding is becoming problematic

because of Congressional spending constraints and that this constraint is impeding the

administration’s policy of containing communism in Latin America. The Secretary’s

concern reflects the principles of both the Monroe and Truman doctrines. It would be this

lack of funding that led the Reagan Administration to seek less than legal means to raise

money.

The most explicit reference to the Administration’s policy transpires in a

memorandum from Deputy Director of CIA, Robert Gates. In the document Deputy Director

Gates informs Director of CIA William Casey that “the fact is that the western hemisphere is

the sphere of influence of the United States. If we have decided totally to abandon the

Monroe Doctrine, if in the 1980’s taking strong actions to protect our interests despite the

hail of criticism is too difficult, then we ought to save political capital in Washington,

acknowledge our helplessness and stop wasting everybody’s time”.12 Deputy Director Gate’s

statement makes explicit references to the Monroe doctrine. He makes clear that the

Administration’s policy is based on a 150 year precedent. He provides unquestionable

11 Document 2 NSC, National Security Planning Group Minutes, "Subject: Central America," SECRET, June 25, 1984. National Security Archives12 Document 3: CIA, Memorandum from DDI Robert M. Gates to DCI William J. Casey, "Nicaragua," SECRET, December 14, 1984. National Security Archives

Curry 9

inferences that the acts currently underway in Central America are a result of that policy.

Gate’s dissatisfaction with the way the policy is being carried out is also visible. He clearly

believes that more needs to be done in Nicaragua, or otherwise “[we] should acknowledge

our helplessness and quit wasting everybody’s time.” The statement reflects the inability of

covert ops to operate adequately in Nicaragua due to congressional budget restraints. In

addition, the hail of criticism Gates refers to is the public and congressional reaction to

covert programs in Nicaragua. The statement reflects that top level officials knew executive

policy was unpopular and that if the full extent of that policy could not be realized then it

should be abandoned. Political resources are being wasted at their current usage levels and

should only be continued if more can be done. Therefore, the inability to carry out this

policy is again connected to public unpopularity for foreign policy in Nicaragua and thus

congressional budget constraints. However, the Administration would not allow funding

constraints to disallow a 150 year policy precedent.

Congress passed the Boland Amendments to demonstrate the public’s declining support

for the Contra operations. Provisions of the Boland Amendments depleted funding for the Contra

rebels and caused the Administration to seek alternative methods of finance. Though these

alternatives were ultimately illegal they do reflect the Administration’s refusal to allow funding

to interfere with foreign policy initiatives. However, the Administration does make arguments

justifying their actions in attempts to invalidate allegations of illegality.

The Boland Amendments were fairly clear in intent but were not specific enough in

terminology. The Administration discovered a loop hole through which it operated legally in its

view. Andrew Hayes in The Colombia Law Review states that there was a “covert change in the

Curry 10

status of the NSC”. This change was not accounted for in the Boland amendments. Therefore, the

National Security Council began to carry out clandestine operations previously done by the CIA.

Despite the Administration’s discovery of an apparent loophole, Hayes argues that the intent of

the amendments and the apparent change in NSC status are relevant and that “a court should find

the redistribution of funds though the NSC was prohibited by the amendments”. The first

Boland Amendment “restricts funds from being used for the overthrow of the government of

Nicaragua. Boland II extended this policy to limit all aid regardless of purpose. And Boland IV,

as a response to CIA mining of Nicaraguan Harbors further tightened prohibitions on executive

actions”. 13 It is clear from the Boland amendments that funding and aid for the Contra rebels was

becoming more difficult to obtain. Furthermore, Congress’ intent to limit presidential action in

Nicaragua regardless of venue is demonstrated by the number and breadth of the provisions.

Accordingly, Congress intended the executive branch to limit its activities in Nicaragua; not to

become more covert in carrying out those activities.

Regardless, funding the Contra’s became so problematic that it strongly affected the

concerns of leaders involved. For example, Ambassador to the United Nations Jeane Kirkpatrick

expressed her frustration by demanding funds, “If we can’t get the money for the anti-Sandinista,

then we should make the maximum effort to find the money elsewhere”.14 It is clear from the

Ambassador’s statement that a lack funding will not be tolerated by the administration. In other

words, insufficient funds will not prevent the Reagan Administration from carrying out

traditional foreign policy. Moreover, Ambassador Kirkpatrick is credited with her own doctrine,

the Kirkpatrick doctrine. This doctrine mimics the Truman doctrine and attempts to justify the

13Hayes, Andrew W. Columbia Law Review, Vol. 88, No. 7 (Nov., 1988), pp. 1534-1574. Pg. 1572, 1573

14 Document 2 NSC, National Security Planning Group Minutes, "Subject: Central America," SECRET, June 25, 1984. National Security Archives

Curry 11

support of Authoritarian regimes over Totalitarian regimes in order to undermine communism. In

other words, the Kirkpatrick doctrine allowed the U.S. to support dictatorial governments that

were not communist in order to help contain the potential for a communist outbreak. The

influences of the Truman doctrine are reflected in her views and further suggest the degree to

which members in the Administration were influenced by traditional policy.

The Monroe and Truman doctrines influence even remained strong in the face of

potential illegality. Secretary of State George P. Schultz pointed out the possibility of

repercussions if the administration pursued certain alternative methods of funding. He states that

“[a] lawyer, Jim Baker (Chief of Staff to Reagan), said that if we go out and try to get money

from third countries, it is an impeachable offense”. The Administration was aware of the

potential for repercussions.

As a result, the Administration concocted a complex web of funding schemes to continue

aiding the anti-Sandinistas in a way it believed was legal. The complex nature of the funding

web is a direct result of the Administration’s attempt to maintain legality in the face of mounting

congressional opposition. Several venues of funding were pursued. The administration

eventually determined that third party funding was possible. Attorney General Edwin Meese III

relayed this sentiment, “it's important we tell the Department of Justice that we want them to find

the proper and legal basis which will permit the United States to assist in obtaining third party

resources for the anti-Sandinistas.” 15 Meese’s suggestion implies that the Administration

intended to perpetuate aid to the Contras and thus its adherence to the Monroe and Truman

15 Document 2 NSC, National Security Planning Group Minutes, "Subject: Central America," SECRET, June 25, 1984. National Security Archives

Curry 12

doctrines in legal fashion. However, when third party donations no longer sufficed, the

Administration sought illegal alternatives of finance.

Accordingly, Lt. Colonel Oliver North offered proposals to obtain funding which would

allow the continuace of operations in Nicargau. The National Security Archives provides

documentation of these proposals and also relays that they were altered for Congressinal

hearings. The alteration of the document suggests that North viewed the content as potentially

incriminating. Regardless, North tells National Security Advisor Robert McFarlane that “The

plan attached at tab 1 has been developed, pursuant to our discussion Friday regarding fallback

options. It is premised on the assumption of a major congressional budget battle and an

assessment that the congress will not rescind the restrictions in section 8066 of the FY-85”.16

North explicitly states that the premise of his funding schemes is based on a lack of

congressional monetary support. Therefore, his construction of such schemes and the

Administrations acceptance of his schemes is related to their fear that insufficient funds will

cripple institutionalized American foreign policy. It is difficult to make sense out of the

following diagram by North, but his funding diagram is useful to visualize the extent to which a

lack of funding caused the administration to develop different techniques in order to support

institutionalized policy.

16 NSC, Memorandum from Oliver L. North to Robert C. McFarlane, "Fallback Plan for the Nicaraguan Resistance," TOP SECRET, March 16, 1985 National Security Archives

Curry 13

Figure 1. North’s funding web courtesy, of National Security Archives.

Allegations regarding the support of drug lords also occur in the affair. Particularly Such

allegations arise because of North’s meetings and arrangements with Panamanian Dictator

Manuel Noriega. Noriega used his position as Dictator of Panama to export vast quantities of

cocaine to America. In return for ending U.S. pressure on Panama for Noriega's drug smuggling

operations and helping to "clean up" his image, Noriega proposed to engage in efforts to

assassinate the Sandinista leadership. North’s personal diaries partially reflect this agreement.

North recounts, “tell Abrams that Noriega asked for [help] in cleaning up image”.17 The

compliance of the Administration in helping a known drug exporter should not necessarily be

viewed as acceptance. Therefore, conclusions cannot be drawn which infer that the aid given to

Noriega reflects any pro-narcotic aspect of the Administration. Rather, it is the fact that Noriega

agreed to assist in the fulfillment of policy or doctrine of the Administration which attracts

attention. In other words, the administration was so stringently tied to the Monroe and Truman

17 Document 9: NSC, Diaries, North Notebook Entries on Manuel Noriega, August 24 & September 22, 1986). National Security Archives

Curry 14

doctrines that it overlooked Noriega’s negative activities. Unfortunately, these aspects

contributed to the scandal.

To further complicate the situation world events compelled the President to direct policy

in the Middle East as well as Latin America. The Lebanonese taking of American hostages in the

1980’s also played into the Iran/Contra Affair. It is the Administration’s actions in this aspect of

the affair which led to an alleged violation of the Arms Export Control Act. In document 13 of

the National Security Archives, president Reagan begins “[Description], The provision of

assistance by the central intelligence agency to private parties in their attempts to obtain the

release of Americans held hostage in the middle east. As part of these efforts certain foreign

material and munitions may be provided to the government of Iran which is taking steps to

facilitate the release of the American hostages”.18 It is the phrase certain munitions and materials

which became problematic to the Administration. Reagan’s directives are clear. The

administration provided the Iranians “certain foreign materials and munitions,” in return for their

help in retrieving American hostages. At first glance it appears as if the president’s directive and

the thesis of this paper are unrelated. However, the alleged violation of the Arms Export Control

Act of 1976 is one of several charges against the administration which lead to the Iranian aspect

of the affair. In other words, the Monroe and Truman doctrines were not responsible for the

president’s decision to exchange guns for hostages. However, the two events became connected

when profits from the arms sales were used for aiding the contra rebels. In this sense a brief

analysis was relevant.

18 Document 13: CIA, Draft Presidential Finding, "Scope: Hostage Rescue - Middle East," November 26, 1985. National Security Archives

Curry 15

Further evidence supporting the idea that the two affairs were originally separate is

provided by President Reagan himself. In Caspar Weinberger’s diary, dated December 7th 1985,

he relays Reagan’s comments, “President sd. He could answer charges of illegality but that he

couldn’t answer charge that ‘Big Strong President Reagan passed up chance to free hostages.”19

The President’s statement as recorded by Weinberger reflects the degree to which the president

did not intend to use funding from the sales of arms to fund the Contras. Rather it suggests that

the president really believed his directive was integral to securing American lives.

Despite the Presidents intentions, North connected the events in Iran and Nicaragua.

North prepared a memorandum stating that profits from the Iranian arms sales would be used to

aid the Contra rebels in Nicaragua. He stated,

“The residual funds from [the Iranian Arms] transaction are allocated as follows: 12 million dollars will be used to purchase critically needed supplies for the Nicaraguan Democratic Resistance Forces. This material is essential to cover shortage in resistance inventories resulting from their current offensives and Sandinista counter attacks and to “bridge” the period between now and when Congressionally approved lethal assistance (beyond the $25 million in defensive arms) can be delivered” (North doc16).

Colonel North explicitly states that the residual profits from the arms sales will be used to fund

the contra rebels. This is contrary to the Presidents intentions and suggests that Reagan’s staff

operated independently in many cases. Furthermore, the passage reflects the fact that congress is

not providing enough funding. Congresses intentions are an expression of the public’s discontent

with the Administration’s policy in Nicaragua. Or more importantly, that the Administration

refused to compromise its loyalty to Monroe and Truman’s doctrine for the public, Congress, or

budgets. North clearly expressed his support for the doctrines by allocating money to the

democratic forces to be used for containment against the Sandinista or communist backed forces.

19 Document 14: Diary, Caspar W. Weinberger, December 7, 1985. National Security Archives

Curry 16

If Monroe did not advocate intervention in the western hemisphere to protect the interests

of the U.S. or if Truman had not encouraged support of democratic governments and

containment of communism, the Iran/Contra Affair would not have occurred. No precedent

would have existed to guide Reagan’s’ Administration in the direction that it actually took. In

other words, the Administration might have heeded the Public’s and Congressional demands. It

would not have overlooked the dismay of its government counterparts or its employers by

ignoring the intentions of the restrictions placed on executive action through the Boland

Amendments. However, this was not the case. Monroe and Truman developed doctrines which

last to this day and are still highly influential. The influence of these doctrines on Reagan’s

Administration was no exception. As a result of these strong influences, the Administration

refused to compromise its initiatives in Nicaragua. The result was the Iran/Contra Affair.

Curry 17

Appendix

Section 901 of the National Security Act of 1947 states, “the President may stay the impositionof an economic, cultural, diplomatic, or other sanction or related action by the United States Government concerning a foreign country, organization, or person when the President determines and reports to Congress in accordance with section 903 that to proceed without delay would seriously risk the compromise of an ongoing criminal investigation directly related to the activities giving rise to the sanction or an intelligence source or method directly related to the activities giving rise to the sanction” (TITLE IX—APPLICATION OF SANCTIONS LAWS TO INTELLIGENCE ACTIVITIES, STAY OF SANCTIONS).

EXTENSION OF STAY

SEC. 902. ø50 U.S.C. 441a Whenever the President determines and reports to Congress in accordance with section 903 that a stay of sanctions or related actions pursuant to section 901 has not afforded sufficient time to obviate the risk to an ongoing criminal investigation or to an intelligence source or method that gave rise to the stay, he may extend such stay for a period of time specified by the President, which period may not exceed 120 days. The authority of this section may be used to extend the period of a stay pursuant to section 901 for successive periods of not more than 120days each. (TITLE IX—APPLICATION OF SANCTIONS LAWS TO INTELLIGENCE ACTIVITIES, STAY OF SANCTIONS).

Curry 18

Bibliography

Coffey, John W. The Review of Politics, Vol. 47, No. 2 (Apr., 1985), pp. 231-252 Published by: Cambridge University Press for the University of Notre Dame du lac on behalf of Review of Politics The Statesmanship of Harry S Truman

http:Avalon.law.yale.edu/20th_century/trudoc.asp

Hayes, Andrew W. Columbia Law Review, Vol. 88, No. 7 (Nov., 1988), pp. 1534-1574 Published by: Columbia Law Review Association, Inc. The Boland Amendments and Foreign Affairs Deference

Walsh, Lawrence E. Final Report of the Independent Counsel for Iran/Contra Matters. Vol. 1. n.d. United States Court of Appeals for the district of Colombia Circuit.

Wroe, Ann. Lives, Lies, and the Iran Contra Affair. London: I.B. Tauris and Co Ltd, 1992.

National Security Act of 1947

Arms Export Control Act of 1976http://www.knowledgerush.com/kr/encyclopedia/Kirkpatrick_Doctrine/

Ryan, David. 1995. US Sandinista Diplomatic Relations. London: MacMillan Press Ltd

Document 1: White House, Presidential Finding on Covert Operations in Nicaragua (with attached Scope Note), SECRET, September 19, 1983. National Security Archives

Document 2 NSC, National Security Planning Group Minutes, "Subject: Central America," SECRET, June 25, 1984. National Security Archives

Document 3: CIA, Memorandum from DDI Robert M. Gates to DCI William J. Casey, "Nicaragua," SECRET, December 14, 1984. National Security Archives

NSC, Memorandum from Oliver L. North to Robert C. McFarlane, "Fallback Plan for the Nicaraguan Resistance," TOP SECRET, March 16, 1985 National Security Archives

Document 9: NSC, Diaries, North Notebook Entries on Manuel Noriega, August 24 & September 22, 1986). National Security Archives

Document 13: CIA, Draft Presidential Finding, "Scope: Hostage Rescue - Middle East," November 26, 1985. National Security Archives

Document 14: Diary, Caspar W. Weinberger, December 7, 1985. National Security Archives