2007 Review of Surge Capacity

PEOPLEINAIDPromoting good practice

in the management and support of aid personnel

Research

Surge capacityin the humanitarian relief

and development sector

A review of surge capacity andsurge capacity mechanisms

within international NGOs

October 2007

Rachel Houghton& Ben Emmens



AuthorRachel Houghton

Contributor & EditorBen Emmens

LayoutRedesign

Acknowledgement

People In Aid gratefully acknowledges the support of the Inter AgencyWorking Group (IWG) and the Emergency Capacity Building Project(www.ecbproject.org) during this research.

Abstract

This paper is based on research undertaken by People In Aid in 2007. It isintended to contribute to a deeper understanding of surge capacity andsurge capacity mechanisms within humanitarian organisations.

The report offers:

• Definitions

• A conceptual framework for analysing surge capacity

• A review of the way in which surge capacity is resourced

• Detailed consideration of surge capacity mechanisms and the factorswhich enable effective rapid response (or ‘surge’)

• Learning and ways forward for INGOs that seek to strengthen or improvetheir surge capacity

Disclaimer

Considerable care has been taken to ensure this research report is bothaccurate and relevant. However, People In Aid is unable to provide anywarranty concerning the accuracy, completeness or relevance to yourorganisation relating to any information contained herein.

This publication may be quoted, by not for profit organisations, in any form(written, visual, electronic, or audio) without the express permission ofPeople In Aid, provided the content quoted does not amount to a wholechapter or section, and provided that any and all references are fullyattributed to People In Aid and this publication.

All other requests for permission must be directed to and approved in writingby People In Aid. All rights reserved.

© People In Aid 2007



Special Thanks

People In Aid would like to extend a special thanks to those who contributedfrom the following agencies:

• CARE Australia

• CARE International

• CARE USA

• CRS

• IFRC

• IRC

• Medair

• Mercy Corps

• MSF UK

• NRC

• Oxfam

• Save the Children UK

• Save the Children US

• UNDP

• UNICEF

• WFP

• World Vision International

People In Aid October 2007 3 Researching Surge Capacity

Foreword . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .5

Executive Summary . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .6

Chapter 1: Introduction . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .9Chapter Summary . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .9Background to this research . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .9Research objectives . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .9Defining surge capacity and its context . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .10What are the ‘triggers’ for surge? . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .11Where and to whom does an agency surge, and why? . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .12How much surge capacity is required? . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .14

Developing surge capacity . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .15Decision making capacity? . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .15

Key Elements of Surge Capacity . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .15Resourcing surge capacity . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .16Surge capacity mechanisms . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .17Enabling factors . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .17Chapter 1 – Summary Points . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .18

Chapter 2: Resourcing surge capacity . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .19Chapter Summary . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .19People [staff capacity] . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .19Money [funding] . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .24Chapter 2 – Summary Points . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .29

Chapter 3: Surge capacity mechanisms . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .31Chapter Summary . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .31Planning mechanisms . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .31

Strategic workforce planning . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .31Contingency Planning . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .33‘Second Wave’ and Continuity Planning . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .34

Recruitment mechanisms . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .35Internal mobilisation . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .36External Recruitment . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .37

Challenges in external recruitment . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .38Rosters and registers . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .40

Rosters and Registers Defined . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .42Developing and managing rosters . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .44(1) Whole-organisation Buy-in . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .44(2) HR Management . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .47(3) The IT Solution . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .49

Chapter 3 – Summary Points . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .51

Table of Contents

Researching Surge Capacity 4 People In Aid October 2007

Chapter 4: Enabling effective surge . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .53Chapter Summary . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .53Strategic vision and a supportive agency culture . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .53The role of the HR function or department . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .56

Strong HR capacity can increase accountability and quality . . . . . . . . . . . . .57HR Policies and practices . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .58

Rapid Deployment and Duty of Care . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .58Induction and Orientation . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .59Duty of Care . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .60Learning through Training and Staff Development . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .61

The strength of local capacity . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .63Key points . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .63Strengthening in Practice: what does it look like? . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .63

Chapter 4 - Summary Points . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .69

Chapter 5: Conclusion . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .71Summary: What have we learnt about surge capacity? . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .71Strategic vision and strategic planning . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .74Investment . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .75Staff capacity . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .76Advocacy . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .78

References and Bibliography . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .79

Appendices . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .81Appendix 1: ECB Agencies’ Surge Capacity Mechanisms . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .82Appendix 2: A World Vision ‘Lesson Learning Review’: . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .96Appendix 3: Research Methodology . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .99


Humanitarian emergencies, almost by definition, are difficult to predict and plan for. Whilst we can domuch by building capacity to prepare for and respond to crisis at the local level, major emergencies willcontinue to require global organizations such as CARE to rapidly increase their resources – people, moneyand materials – at the disaster site. Surge capacity – the ability to scale-up (and down) smoothly andquickly - is vital to fulfilling our humanitarian mandate, and ensuring we use scarce humanitarianresources effectively and efficiently.

It is also a major challenge. Many different parts of our organizations – HR, logistics, finance – must workswiftly and smoothly together. In acting quickly, we must not lose the focus on quality and the long-termimpact of our work. And we must work consistently and predictably, whether in response to a high profilenatural disaster or a chronic conflict emergency.

Surge capacity is about much more than ‘to rapidly deploy’. To be effective it requires a wholeorganisation approach, in which mandate, structure, culture and leadership are just as crucial asprotocols, processes and systems. The entire organisation must be aligned behind the capacity objectivesit has set for itself, from headquarters all the way to country offices. And we need to invest in our humanresources as a strategic function and not just an administrative one, at all levels of the organisation.

This report is a major contribution to our understanding of the challenge of surge capacity, and animportant step towards developing practical mechanisms to meet that challenge.

Jonathan MitchellEmergency Response DirectorCARE International

Foreword


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BackgroundThis review of surge capacity has been undertaken within the context of the Emergency Capacity Buildingproject (www.ecbproject.org) and has been undertaken at the request of the Emergency Directors of theIWG agencies. The aim of this report is to stimulate debate and reflection primarily, but not exclusively, onhow to resource rapid response.

The research was undertaken between February and May 2007, and draws on the experience andinsights of a wide range of experienced humanitarian professionals working in the humanitarian relief anddevelopment sector.

Understanding surge capacity in the humanitarian relief and development sectorAs the scale and complexity of emergencies grows this will clearly impact on those humanitarian anddevelopment agencies mandated to respond. It implies that, if these agencies are to continue to fulfiltheir mandates they will need to pay greater attention to their capacities to rapidly respond in times ofincreased need. This includes investing in these capacities between emergencies, a`s well asdeveloping shared capacities between themselves – two critical issues highlighted, for example, in theTsunami Evaluation Coalition’s (TEC) recent Synthesis Report (Telford et al, 2006). These capacities arecommonly referred to as surge capacities.

The purpose of this paper is to foster a deeper understanding of ‘surge capacities’ by: offeringdefinitions and identifying the triggers, or drivers for surge (Chapter 1); exploring how surge capacityis resourced (Chapter 2); enacted (through surge capacity mechanisms (Chapter 3); and effectivelyenabled (Chapter 4). The paper concludes by drawing together the key findings and offering agenciesfurther ‘food for thought’.

What is surge capacity? In the humanitarian context, surge capacity relates to the ability of an agency to scale-up quickly andeffectively to meet increased demand to stabilise or alleviate suffering in any given population.

However, it refers to a much broader perspective than ‘to just deploy people quickly’, which is traditionallyhow it has been understood. Surge capacity is ‘as much an attitude of mind as of procedure’ and involvesa ‘changed way of thinking’ and culture across organisations. Development of surge capacity is thereforebest led from the top through the development of an overall strategic vision, as well as consensus on theobjectives of rapid response.

This suggests the need for a whole-organisation approach to developing surge capacity, and reinforces thenecessity for continuous, ongoing investment if agencies are to respond rapidly – and effectively – whenrequired. A whole-organisation approach is also important because enabling surge to take place oftencompromises on existing ways of doing things.

Preparedness (at HQ, regional and national level) and flexibility are also at the heart of an agency’s abilityto rapidly respond. These are equally about agency culture as they are about procedure. At a practicallevel, preparedness needs to be multi-dimensional if it is to respond to complex demands, and involvesthe development of the following:

People: developing a cadre of deployable people, sufficient in numbers and skills

Policies & procedures: to facilitate the rapid deployment of these people, and agreed among all therelevant organisational stakeholders

Resources: money, equipment, and operations management tools such as operations manuals; again tofacilitate rapid deployment and rapid response.

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Summary PointsWhatever an agency’s approach, and whatever resources it has at its disposal, it is clear that thedevelopment of an effective surge capacity rests on an agency’s ability to develop and prepare an entiresystem of policies, people, procedures and resources in a flexible yet comprehensive manner, withattention always focused on those it is intending to support. Framing this system is the agency’s strategicvision. Developing an effective surge capacity therefore requires a whole organisation approach, and is asmuch about mandate, structure, culture and effective leadership as it is about concrete inputs andprocesses.

An agency’s effectiveness in terms of responding to an emergency will be driven by its mandate andstructure. While some surge capacity instruments might suit some agencies, they may not be feasible orappropriate for another. The research suggests that matching capacity to mandate is therefore essential.Emergency classification indicators and comprehensive preparedness plans help to identify the capacitythat will be required – though this capacity must be sufficiently skilled to implement the plan.

While the emergency response units need to be able to work well with all departments in any givenagency, the critical role of human resources (HR) formed a centre-piece of this research. One of thedefining factors in terms of an agency’s ability to effect rapid deployment is the strategic priority given toHR capacity, as well as the development of HR policies and practices to enable rapid deployment andagency buy-in to these policies and practices. Increased investment in HR will have a positive impact onthe quality and accountability aspects of an agency’s programming.

Research ConclusionsThe first conclusion to be drawn by the report is that surge capacity represents an entire system ofpolicies and procedures; it is as much about an organisation’s philosophical approach as it is about anysingle instrument, such as a roster or register. It is therefore about much more than ‘to rapidly deploy’.

The second conclusion is that developing this capacity is about bringing various component capacities ‘toscale’, simultaneously, within agencies. Based on the research, it is possible to define 10 critical lessons,or enabling factors, required to develop surge capacity.

The 10 critical enablers are:

1. Agencies need to adopt a whole-organisation approach to developing surge capacity. If this does nothappen, their capacity to respond will be compromised.

2. Within the context of a wider strategic vision, capacity needs to be matched to mandate and structure.This has significant implications for the quality of an agency’s programming as well as its ability to beaccountable to affected populations.

3. Pre-positioning of funds is critical. Emergency units need to find ways to leverage greater amounts ofunrestricted and other funds so that they can scale-up when required, respond to less visibleemergencies, as well as build, and maintain, capacity between emergencies.

4. There needs to be investment in HR as a strategic function and not just an administrative one. This isnecessary not only at HQ but also at regional and / or country level.

5. Well-trained and experienced staff are critical. In particular, strong and competent leadership is adecisive factor in the success of any response. There needs to be long-term investment in staffdevelopment, including career development. Focusing on behavioural as well as technical competenciesis important.

6. If emergency response is to be sustainable beyond the initial surge, recruitment for second-wave andlonger term deployments needs to start at the beginning of an emergency. Counter-parting betweeninternational and national staff at this stage in a response is difficult, but vital to the longer termsuccess of any response.

7. It is equally important to develop surge capacity at country and regional level as at HQ. Strategicintegration of aspects of emergency and development programming will help, as will the mainstreamingof disaster risk reduction across relief, recovery and development programmes.


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8. Rosters (and registers) need better investment if they are going to remain the preferred model forrapid deployment. Agencies which use this capacity to augment their sizeable standing capacity alsoface challenges. If agencies opt to develop these tools, it is imperative they invest in adequate HRcapacity in order to make these tools effective.

9. Agencies need to develop standard operating procedures that govern all aspects of an immediateresponse. This is especially important, as being able to rapidly deploy will inevitably compromiseordinary agency policies and procedures.

10. Agencies need to adopt more systematised learning practices, otherwise they are doomed to makethe same mistakes year on year. This is not only bad practice but unethical, given agencies’ qualityand accountability commitments. Becoming better learning organisations is especially important in thecurrent era, where agencies need to shift from being reactive to proactive in order to keep up withchanges in their external policy and operating environment.

Given that these 10 critical enablers are all about ‘more of’, the third conclusion is that developing surgecapacity is not just about bringing to scale, but it is also about leverage within organisations andcollaboration, as a form of leverage, between organisations.

In summaryIn summary, there is no one magic bullet for surge. What will make the creation of surge capacity robustis the parallel development of numerous capacities, as well as a shift in agency culture. Unless an agencyis making progress on all fronts, it is it unlikely to build an effective surge capacity.

Background to this researchIn the coming 10 years it is likely that well over amillion people will die and tens of millions will bedisplaced due to the increasing incidence ofemergencies. While wars and conflicts take livesthe real cost is predicted to come from the impactof disasters, in part due to climate change andemerging pandemics including HIV/AIDS whichalso pose a considerable threat. The effects ofthese disasters are often amplified because ofthe inadequately addressed vulnerabilities of thecommunities affected. When disasters occur inconflict-ridden societies, increasingly complexcrises arise. And rapid urbanisation and changingmarket demands as a result of globalisation arehaving a growing impact on urban poverty, wherethe complex association of concentratedpopulations, social exclusion and poverty,compounded by physical vulnerability, manifestlyincreases risk (ISDR, 2005).

As the scale and complexity of emergenciesgrows this will clearly impact on thosehumanitarian and development agenciesmandated to respond. It implies that, if theseagencies are to continue to fulfil their mandatesthey will need to pay greater attention to theircapacities to rapidly respond in times ofincreased need. This includes investing in thesecapacities between emergencies, as well asdeveloping shared capacities between

themselves – two critical issues highlighted, forexample, in the Tsunami Evaluation Coalition’s(TEC) recent Synthesis Report (Telford et al,2006). These capacities are commonly referredto as surge capacities, and the purpose of thispaper is to foster a deeper understanding of‘surge capacities’ by offering definitions andexploring how surge capacity is enacted (surgecapacity mechanisms) and or effectivelyenabled. The paper concludes by drawingtogether the key findings and offering agenciesfurther ‘food for thought’.

The research was undertaken between Februaryand May 2007, and draws on the experience andinsights of a wide range of experiencedhumanitarian professionals working in thehumanitarian relief and development sector.

Research objectivesThis review of surge capacity has beenundertaken within the context of the EmergencyCapacity Building project (www.ecbproject.org )and has been undertaken at the request of theEmergency Directors of the IWG agencies. Theaim of this report is to stimulate debate andreflection primarily, but not exclusively, on how toresource rapid response.

Chapter 1: Introduction


Chapter SummaryThis chapter sets out the background to and objectives of this research. It defines the concept ofsurge capacity, and introduces some key questions related to this concept:

• What are the ‘triggers’ or ‘drivers’ for surge?

• Where and to whom do agencies surge, and why?

• How much surge capacity is required?

It then describes the basic elements of surge capacity that will form the framework for the rest of theanalysis. These include:

• Resources required for surge capacity (chapter 3)

• Mechanisms that allow these resources to be accessed (chapter 4)

• Enablers that permit these mechanisms to function effectively (chapter 5)

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The objectives of the review are fourfold:

1. To consolidate the various approaches, lessonsand good practices in building effective surgecapacity mechanisms by augmenting thelearning that had already taken place duringthe first phase of the ECB initiative with in-depth interviews with ECB participants.

2. To explore other surge capacity mechanisms ofnon-ECB members to broaden this learning.

3. To provide agencies with a framework to informsenior management and programmedepartments about how surge capacity works.

4. To suggest examples of how ECB agenciesmight seek to work together to addresscommon challenges posed by developingsurge capacity.

Defining surge capacity andits contextIn order to more fully understand ‘surgecapacity’, we need a common starting point, ordefinition. So where does one begin? The OxfordEnglish Dictionary definition of the term ‘surge’includes: ‘a sudden large temporary increase’and to ‘increase suddenly and powerfully’. Giventhat ‘capacity’ is generally understood as anorganisation’s ability to do something – in thecase of an aid agency, to work within, anddeliver on, its mandate – then ‘surge capacity’could be defined as

the ability of an organisation to rapidly andeffectively increase [the sum of] its availableresources in a specific geographic location,

in order to meet increased demand to stabilise oralleviate suffering in any given population.

An important point to note is that ‘surge capacity’is a relatively new term for the humanitarian reliefand development sector, albeit one that is gainingcurrency due, in part, to its use in the UN’s(2005) Humanitarian Response Review. However,not all agencies interviewed for this research usethe terms ‘surge’ or ‘surge capacity’; in part bornout of a desire to avoid jargon, and perhaps alsobecause of the term’s militaristic connotations.Some agencies use the terms ‘surge capacity’and ‘rapid deployment’ (or an equivalent)synonymously, for example the IFRC generallyrefers to ‘rapid deployment’; Oxfam-GB uses theterm ‘scale-up’ and MedAir talks about‘recruitment for emergency response’

Whatever word or phrase an agency adopts, thekey implication of the definition presented aboveis that surge capacity refers to a much broaderconcept than ‘to just deploy people quickly’, whichis traditionally how it has been understood. In thewords of one interviewee, surge capacity is ‘asmuch an attitude of mind as of procedure’ and itinvolves a ‘changed way of thinking’ and ‘achanged culture across organisations’.

A whole organisation approachThe emphasis on a broader perspective is animportant one; it suggests the need for a whole-organisation approach when developing surgecapacity, and reinforces the necessity forcontinuous, ongoing investment if agencies are torespond rapidly – and effectively – when required.This research demonstrates that preparednessand flexibility are at the heart of an agency’sability to rapidly respond; flexibility being criticalbecause enabling surge to take place oftencompromises on existing ways of doing things.

Just as an agency’s approach to emergencyresponse is shaped by its mandate, structure andculture, so the different tools, policies,procedures and resource configurations that itadopts when responding to emergencies will beaffected by the way in which an agencyunderstands and defines surge capacity. Fromthis, one could argue that a ‘surge capacitymechanism’, while typically used as a term torefer to a specific tool (for example a roster),actually represents a whole, complex system ofdifferent but inter-related components.

Development of surge capacity and surge capacitymechanisms is therefore best led from the top;success is dependent on a clear overall strategicvision and consensus on the objectives of rapidresponse. Adopting a ‘whole organisation’approach will ensure both mandate andorganisational structure are taken into account,and surge capacity includes what an agency doesbetween emergencies (so that it is ready torespond immediately in times of increased need),as well as what it does afterwards, i.e. how itintegrates emergency, recovery and developmentprogramming so that it can lessen the impact ofany given crisis.

But no matter which lens one chooses to use inorder to analyse surge capacity, it is clear that inpractice it can be a complex matter, as the casestudy opposite from World Vision demonstrates.


Introduction

What are the ‘triggers’ forsurge?Understanding ‘why’ organisations surge, or what‘triggers’ surge, informs our overall understandingof surge capacity.

The ‘trigger’ may be internal or external; internaltriggers could typically include a strong push foran intervention by a particular programme, orinternal advocate, for example a food securityunit might push for a response in the earlystages of famine. However, the reality is that anemergency response is almost always triggeredby something external, and both politics and the

media play a significant role in shaping thenature of any agency’s response. This mightseem incongruous – indeed one of thefundamental principles of humanitarianism is thataid should be allocated according to need – butin practice few would deny aid is subject to bothpolitical influence and media response which,when combined, play a dominant role in shapingpublic sympathies. This has huge implications forwhere and how an agency responds and,implicitly, where it does not.

Interviewees for this study noted the difficulty ofmounting responses to ‘forgotten’ and moremedia-invisible emergencies. This is related to theoverall recognised lack of surge capacity in thehumanitarian system which means that, if there isdisproportionate attention to one emergency it islikely to undermine response elsewhere (ALNAP,2006). This lack of capacity means that themajority of agencies experience difficulty inspreading surge across more than one majoremergency, as evidenced during the Darfur andTsunami responses in 2005.

Linked to this is the issue of proportionality /disproportionality in humanitarian funding.

At a visible level this is evident, for example, indisproportionately high levels of funding that cansometimes result from media spotlight. Thisoften creates pressures to spend fast and‘through an operational style’ (ibid:37), which hasa direct impact on the extent to which an agencyattempts to strengthen local capacities, as wellas on its ability to be accountable to affectedpopulations. New ways of educating the media

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The surge capacity debate has tended to focus on the response phase alone…

Prevention Mitigation Preparedness Response Recovery

…but this research suggests that surge capacity should be considered at every stage of the emergency cycle.

Surge Capacity in Practice

During the tsunami response, World Visionmobilised an additional 2000 staff across theaffected region within a period of 12 weeks,175 of whom were international staff. It alsoraised £350m during this time (to be spent in a3-5 year timeframe). The 175 international staffconsisted of: 30 from its Global RapidResponse Team; secondments from itsRegional Rapid Response Team; associatesfrom its support offices; staff from its feederschool; and some new recruits.

In order to overcome capacity problems withscale-up, the agency made sure to activate thefinance, HR and administrative functions fromits internal rosters – details about which can befound in Chapter 3 and Annex 1.

Case study 1

Figure 1 Analysing surge capacity

Chapter 1

and the public need to be found beyond thesimple mis-understanding, based on images, that‘any aid is needed, and now’. Perhaps a lesserconsidered aspect of surge capacity thereforeinvolves how the media and communicationsdepartments of agencies behave.

At a more invisible level, disproportionality isabout ‘western political systems that linkhumanitarian aid to other political objectives’(ibid:41). Donors therefore have a fundamentalrole to play by adhering to their principles of GoodHumanitarian Donorship (GHD) which theoreticallyplaces the issue of needs-based allocation at theheart of their practice.

The implications some of these factors are speltout in the OSE’s (2006) Propositions for BuildingBack Better. ‘Proposition 9’ is titled:‘Beneficiaries deserve the kind of agencypartnerships that move beyond rivalry andunhealthy competition’, so often characteristic ofemergency response during which agenciesindividually court the media and compete forinstitutional funding. While the current fundingsystem does little to encourage joint working, howwell agencies work together in the immediateresponse phase has been shown to directly relateto the quality and outcomes of both relief andlonger term recovery and development (see, eg,OSE, 2006; Telford et al, 2006).

Where and to whom does anagency surge, and why?An agency’s effectiveness in terms of respondingto an emergency is driven by its mandate,structure and culture. While some surge capacityinstruments might suit some agencies, they maynot be feasible or appropriate for another. Theresearch suggests that matching capacity tomandate is therefore essential. This is becausepoor performance in an emergency is not justabout capacity constraints and, for example, poorunderstanding by relief managers of recoveryneeds, but also due to agencies’ operatingoutside of their areas of expertise, not being fullyaware of the capacity they have, or not using whatcapacity they do have properly.

In recent years, issues concerning quality andaccountability in emergency response have comecentre-stage as agencies have been shown toconsistently fail to learn from their experiences(see, for example, various issues of ALNAP’sannual Review of Humanitarian Action). Thisrelates explicitly to an agency’s ability to build an

effective surge capacity on a number of levels,particularly with regard to ensuring that its surgecapacity matches its mandate and structure. Alltoo often agencies make promises they cannotkeep either because they are not entirely sure ofthe capacity they have, because they don’t usewhat capacity they have properly, or because theydon’t invest in that capacity. This affects both thequality of their programming and their ability to beaccountable to affected populations.

In general, the larger aid agencies haveestablished programmes in most of the vulnerablecountries and work on the default of emergencyresponse constituting a scale-up of existingprogrammes. Most of these larger agencies havea preference not to respond to emergencies incountries where they have no existing presenceunless there is overwhelming need not met byother humanitarian agencies already in country.Conversely, many of the smaller agencies withestablished operations in fewer countries defaultto emergency response involving theestablishment of a new country office.

Larger organisations with broader, dualmandates clearly require more capacity whenresponding to large, sudden-onset naturaldisasters in comparison to more specialistagencies. They will also require a different kindof capacity to more development-orientedorganisations that concentrate on capacitystrengthening at country level and which maymean, for example, that they choose to focus onbuilding national staff capacity and / or increasethe amount of disaster risk reduction work theydo over augmenting their emergency units at HQ.Save the Children US (SC-US), CRS and MercyCorps are more likely to work on this basis.

Agencies with a particular focus might developmore specialist staff pools (eg, Oxfam-GB, the IRCand the Save the Children agencies) as opposedto developing an overarching roster and registersystem that includes many different functions (eg,CARE and World Vision). Some agencies havealso developed their capacity in response todifferent operational imperatives. For example, thesize of Oxfam-GB’s Humanitarian SupportPersonnel (HSP) pool is in direct response to thedifficulty the agency had in deploying people toChad and Darfur, as well as with staff burn-out. Itwas hard to recruit suitable staff into thesecomplex deployments, but with a larger HSP poolit is possible for the agency to spread the load ofdeployments over a wider group of staff thusmaking staffing for programmes such as thesemore sustainable.


Chapter

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There is no rule of thumb when developing surgecapacity, and each agency will need to considerthe requirements of its particular focus and setup. The case study below considers some of theissues around surge capacity encountered byone of the smaller, more specialised ECBagencies, the IRC.

In comparison to the IRC, the CARE family ofagencies faced a very different challenge when

recently restructuring its emergency responsecapacity. Its history as a federated organisationmeant that many of its surge approaches werereflective of a federation, with capacity beingcontained separately and mobilised via thedifferent national members with minimalcoordination. This led to problems on theground and compromised the agency’s ability torespond effectively.

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Case Study 2: Surge Capacity in the IRC

The IRC serves refugees and victims of armedconflict around the world. The agency bothresponds in locations where it has no priorpresence as well as provides ongoing support toits country programmes where new emergenciesoccur. Recently it has increased its internalEmergency Response Team (ERT) from 6members in 2005 to its current level of 17. Thishas been to ensure that the ERT possesses theskill sets covering all primary programmatic andoperational areas that are most often requiredin emergencies.

The Emergency Preparedness and Response Unit(EPRU) sits within the IRC’s InternationalProgrammes Department which oversees all IRCcountry programmes and HQ technical units. TheERT is under the EPRU. The EPRU worksstrategically with other departments, includingHR, on emergency preparedness and responsecapacity, and this has been found to improve itscapacity to respond to real needs. The ERT isdesigned to be partially sustained by the countryprogrammes which utilise the services the unitoffers as, unlike some of the larger dual mandateagencies, the IRC doesn’t have access to largeamounts of unrestricted funding. The IRC aims tocover 75% of the overall operating costs of theERT through field deployments, with the balancecovered though a number of private grants (seeChapter 3). The IRC senior management stronglyand formally supports the EPRU and the ERT atboth strategic and operational levels, and thishas enabled the scale-up of the ERT to 17.

Following the expansion of the ERT, there was aninitial period when deployment requests wereslow. The deployment request rate has, however,increased steadily over time. This is attributed tocountry programmes becoming more familiar withthe services of the expanded ERT, and realisationof the added-value of ERT deployments. This wasachieved through formal and informal EPRU

communications with country programmes andword of mouth.

When the IRC considers responding to a newemergency in an existing country programme itsemphasis is on what added-value it can offer byutilising its knowledge, expertise and resources,and how, where and when. Overall, quality overquantity is key – based on an important agencylesson about not over-capitalising in the initialdeployment. Rather, the IRC’s aim is to bestrategic and efficient when responding to crisesso that it can ultimately be more effective. Whileit doesn’t always ‘go in small’, generally it hasfound that this approach is the most effective inensuring an appropriate response based onquality needs assessments and clear strategyand planning.

The IRC also operates an internal emergencyroster (IER) and an external emergency roster(EER). These additional response mechanismsallow the IRC to deploy up to five multi-sectorteams at any given time in multiple emergencies.In reality this number could fluctuate given the sizeof the teams and the nature of the response. TheIRC has used the IER less in the past year due theexpansion of the ERT and a relatively slow year foremergencies. Regardless, it recognises the needto maintain a functioning ERT otherwise it maybeunable to respond when needed.

Another key consideration is that its in-countryhuman resource capacity varies depending on thesize and scope of the crisis and the local capacity.If the IRC is already operational in a country whereit is responding, then the existing HR supportfunction may require additional capacity buildingand technical support. Recruitment is a frequentchallenge in any emergency, which is why humanresource assessments are always apart of theIRC’s response process. Response planning isintended to correspond with IRC’s mechanisms torapidly deploy, as well as its capacity to externallyrecruit and deploy within an acceptable timeframe.

Case study 2


Chapter 1

How much surge capacity isrequired?Many agencies use classification indicators andpreparedness plans to identify how much surgecapacity is required. Classification of levels ofan emergency is a key indicator of whatcapacities an agency will require to scale-up, as:

[I]t’s only possible to know what is required –at both HQ and country level – if anorganisation has a clear understanding ofwhat it does in any given emergency situation… so it is all about doing a gap analysis andmatching that to what an organisationalmandate is for a particular emergency. Thenthe organisation can define what level ofcapacity is required (Ros McVean, CARE).

To this end, many of the agencies interviewedsupport their regional / country offices todevelop emergency preparedness plans.1

Another approach is the development ofemergency management plans, as shown byOxfam-GB in Case Study 4.

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CARE’s Strategic Restructuring

In the late 1990s and early 2000s, a number ofevaluations, particularly of Kosovo, highlightedthat lack of coordination between nationalmembers meant that there wasn’t efficient useof financial, human and material resourcesleading to a negative impact on CAREprogrammes. As result, and over the past sixyears, CARE has reflected on how it couldcollectively improve the effectiveness of its workin communities affected by disasters. It hassubsequently gone through a process ofstrategic planning and restructuring, and hasrealigned its internal resources, policies andpractices to enable a more coordinatedapproach which now consists of centralcoordination via the Central Emergencies Unit(CEG) in Geneva, collective use of resources(financial, material and human) and the morerecent development of a regional capacity.These Regional Coordinators [at time of writing,two already employed and two more to beemployed] engage in preparedness efforts,developing local and regional response teams,visiting Country Offices to help them work onvarious operational issues, and acting as aresource to be deployed when a disaster arises.

This changed approach to structure hasenabled changes to the surge mechanismsCARE uses so it can better meet its mandateand improve the quality of its work. There isnow one central coordinating mechanism thatchannels funding to Country Offices who nowonly have to deal with one source, thus freeingthem up to concentrate programming.Additionally the CEG heads up the CrisisCoordination Group which classifies theemergency and establishes who will do whatacross the federation. This also increases theamount of time that the agency can focus onthe work in hand at field level.

Case study 3

Oxfam’s Emergency Management Plan / EMP

Oxfam-GB’s experience in major humanitariancrises is that the appointment of a suitablyexperienced leader is critical to success. Forthis reason it has developed an EmergencyManagement Plan that is ‘not a preparednessplan; it’s a plan for who is going to manage anemergency’ (Nick Roseveare). This is becauseOxfam-GB has found that the presence orabsence of a preparedness plan is less criticalto the eventual success of the programmethan the competence of the management inrunning that programme. Its EMP is thereforedesigned to ‘out’ this difficult issue before acrisis hits and alert people in advance aboutwho will run the response. It does thisbecause it has found that its responses aremost effective when it removes the ‘mostdifficult discussions and emotionally loadedissues and decisions before [an emergency]occurs’. Notwithstanding, its intention is togrow the capacity of particular country staff tomanage future emergency responses.

The EMP is updated twice yearly on a regionalbasis. It delineates who the ‘designatedhumanitarian leads’ (DHLs) are for each of itsthree categories of emergency responseacross its different regions as well as, forexample, which national staff have beentargeted for development with the associatedcompetencies they are being supported tostrengthen. It also provides an analysis of thequalities found to be essential for its DHLs toguide in their selection.

Case study 4

1It is worth noting that if a particularly catastrophic disaster occurs, as with the tsunami, then even if a country or region is well-prepared to respond it willbe essential not to ignore the daily requirements of the ongoing programmes, meaning that a large scale-up will still be required.


A new approach taken by World Vision involvesthe agency in identifying six specific contexts foremergency response. These range from highneed, high instability contexts, through high needbut more stable contexts, to low need and stablecontexts. This has enabled the agency to work outwhat role it will need to have in each context, andto identify what capacity is needed to match eachcontext. As a result World Vision has come to anew understanding of emergencies realising, forexample, that major emergencies constitute notonly rapid onset emergencies but also slow onset.It is anticipated that this will lead to a changedrole for the agency’s emergency teams inrecognition of the new way in which the agencycan contribute to different types of emergencies.It has also enabled the agency to elevate the ideaof emergency response ‘from being just about the“r” to including development, transition andrehabilitation’ (Lars Gustavsson). This has allowedthe agency to move to a more holisticunderstanding of what constitutes emergencyresponse to encompass a focus on disaster riskreduction. Linked to this is the agency’s desire tomove from ‘the country paradigm to the clusterparadigm’, which will help it to build capacity bytechnical cluster rather than by region. This isseen as enabling a more flexible response.

Developing surge capacityObviously different federated organisations facedifferent challenges, depending on theirmandate, and the challenges that reach acrossthese horizontal networks are again different tothose agencies that have a more verticalstructure. Agency size, of course, is also animportant determining factor. However, one thingthat unites all ECB agencies is that enabling aneffective surge capacity takes a ‘wholeorganisation approach’ with support from seniormanagement to effect cultural change across theentire organisation.

As noted in an earlier report for the IWG – theReport on Emergency Capacity by Spee Braun(2004) – all IWG agencies now have humanitarianaction as a primary strategic direction and mosthave the accompanying goals and objectives.While having such strategic objectives do not, inthemselves, guarantee that the appropriate surgecapacity will be developed they do at least providethe framework within which efforts to build surgecapacity can take place; efforts that need to beorganisation-wide and supported at the highestlevels. This is partly because, as Nick Roseveare

of Oxfam-GB notes, the policies and proceduresan organisation will need to follow in order toenable surge to take place will:

[A]lmost inevitably be procedures thatcompromise on established ways of doingthings; that may not be very popular withinternal audit; that may result in difficultdecisions about who’s in charge; that maymean certain organisational priorities haveto be dropped; that may mean certainregions have to sacrifice staff. One of thethings that has to precede theestablishment of tools and procedurestherefore – and at a very high level in theorganisation – is a decision that theorganisation will put itself through pain anddo things differently to effect surge.Somebody has to work on cultural change.… It is as much a corporate attitude ofmind as procedure.

Decision making capacity?One point to emerge during the research was theneed for clear and prompt decision making whenit comes to emergency response. Organisationswhich have clearly apportioned decision makingresponsibilities and instigated decision makingprotocols are able to surge more consistently andmore effectively. For others, a lack of clarityaround decision making can mean (though notnecessarily) a slower initial response, and cansometimes lead to confusion and issues withintegration, transition or exit down the line.

Key Elements of SurgeCapacity Having arrived at a definition of surge capacityand discussed the importance of matching surgecapacity to an agency’s philosophy, mandate andstructure, the rest of this chapter sets out amodel for understanding surge capacity that willprovide the framework for further analysis in thechapters that follow. This model is illustrated inFigure 2 below.

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Chapter 1

Chapter

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Resourcing surge capacitySurge capacity requires access to resources:human, financial and other specialised forms ofequipment and material. The latter lie outsidethe scope of this study, but the role of peopleand money are outlined below and discussed inmore detail in Chapter 2.

People [Staff capacity]People available for deployment are the anchorsof any rapid response to a disaster thatoutstrips local coping capacity. Central todeveloping a cadre of deployable people aretools such as rosters and registers, informalnetworks of contacts, as well as, of course, theemergency units of agencies themselves. Butas Save the Children UK (SC-UK) notes, the‘receptiveness of existing programmes forexternal surge’ is also crucial, and an agency’sability to respond quickly and effectively intimes of increased need is therefore aboutmeaningful national capacity building.

Preparing and retaining this cadre of people isof paramount importance, and agencies utilisea number of different staff development tools todo this, such as regular trainings andworkshops for those deployed as well as, forexample, simulation training and performanceappraisal to facilitate career development. All ofthese help to build appropriate staff capacity,as do tools specifically designed to enhanceorganisational learning such as Real TimeEvaluations and post-response reviewworkshops. These efforts need to be properlytargeted and resourced, otherwise they’ll be oflittle value.2

Agencies interviewed also noted that certainbehavioural and attitudinal competencies suchas flexibility – of systems as well as people –are essential when it comes to enabling rapidresponse. This is reflected by the fact that anumber of those interviewed said their bestresponses came when use of their differenttools, procedures and practices workedsmoothly in parallel, with the implicit need forstaff to accept non-linearity in times of crisis.

Figure 2 – Understanding surge capacity

2 One respondent noted the tendency of agencies to under-invest and pay only lip service to staff development. This person commented: ‘In that case it isprobably better not to do anything because the money invested is almost as good as thrown out through the window.

ENABLING FACTORS:Preparedness; flexibility;durability; sustainability

MECHANISMS:Planning and rescourcing

RESOURCES:Human, financial, materials and

equipment

Trigger

Agency philosophy, mandate and structure

Surge Capacity

Money [Funding]Having the financial means with which to initiate aresponse is a critical component of surgecapacity, whether that be ‘money in the bank’ orspecial relationships with key donors orsomething else.

All IWG agencies interviewed now have anemergency response fund of one kind or anotherwhich they use to support, to varying degrees,both their capacity development betweenemergencies as well as their ability to deployrapidly when required. The extent to which theydo this is based on the amounts available andthe level of commitment of the organisation.These funding arrangements work in differentways, some of the details of which areconsidered in Chapter 2.

Surge capacity mechanismsThe second key component of surge capacityinvolves the mechanisms by which the resourcesdescribed above can be mobilized and deployed.These mechanisms typically include systems,procedures and policies, particularly enablingpolicies concerning operating procedures forrapid response. ECB agencies’ experiencesuggests that many of the problems encounteredin their surge response can be addressed byhaving clear policies and procedures. Thesemight include, for example, policies to supportrapid recruitment or to pre-designate lines ofauthority during the immediate response phase –all agencies noted that leadership during rapidresponse is critical – as well as address issuessuch as retention, availability, backfilling, andcontinuity and succession planning. Policies andprocedures are all very well on paper; central totheir implementation is support from formalleadership, as well as a receptive mindset andculture of an organisation.

Policies concerning duty of care and staff wellnessare also vital when staff are deploying to unstableand chaotic environments, as is the importance ofdeveloping trust between all those involved in aresponse. Developing a culture of trust in anorganisation, particularly between national andinternational staff in times of crisis, is consideredsufficiently critical to be studied on its own meritand is the subject of the ECB working group,‘Building Trust in Diverse Teams Working Group’.This is led by Oxfam-GB along with members fromCARE, Mercy Corps, SC-US and World Vision.

Operations management tools are considered dueto their overall place in the HR structures of anorganisation. Preparedness in this area means thedevelopment and provision of, for example,emergency preparedness plans, generic jobdescriptions (JDs) and operations manuals. Suchmanuals may provide tips on quick assessment oron how to set up financial structures in-countrythat are appropriate for a changed level of activity.Standardised procedures across organisations arealso key. For example, if every finance officer in anorganisation uses the same finance package, thismakes it easier to fill finance posts by drawing onexisting staff. If the same procedures are used fornew hires, this again makes it easier to rapidlybuild up a new or expanded office.

Surge capacity mechanisms are discussed indetail in Chapter 3

Enabling factorsAt the heart of surge capacity are severalimportant enabling factors, and these areexplored in detail in Chapter 4. These factors,which include preparedness and flexibility, as wellas durability and sustainability, are central to thedevelopment surge capacity. Preparedness andflexibility are equally about agency culture as theyare about procedure, and are important atregional and national level as well as at HQ. Thisis linked to the need for greater strategic andprogrammatic integration between the traditionallyseparate humanitarian and developmentdepartments, with a more explicit focus on, eg,disaster risk reduction (DRR) and recoveryinterventions.

However, despite acknowledging that surgecapacity is best considered as part of a widercontext and debate, many of the humanitarianprofessionals interviewed considered it to berelated primarily to the organisation’s ability andcapacity to respond

A number of factors could be said to enableeffective surge and these include:

• Strategic vision and supportive agency culture

• The role of the HR function or department

• HR policies and practices

• The strength of local capacity

Overall, each of these emphasise the criticalenabling role that HR plays regarding surgecapacity, and chapter 5 deals with enablingfactors in greater detail.


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Chapter 1

Chapter

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Chapter 1 - Summary Points• Surge capacity is ‘the ability of an organisation to rapidly and effectively increase [the sum of] its

available resources in a specific geographic location’, in order to meet increased demand tostabilise or alleviate suffering in any given population.

• Surge capacity refers to a much broader perspective than ‘to just deploy people quickly’ which istraditionally how it has been understood

• Preparedness and flexibility are at the heart of an agency’s ability to rapidly respond

A ‘surge capacity mechanism’, while typically used as a term to refer to a specific tool (forexample a roster), actually represents a whole, complex system of different but inter-relatedcomponents

• The key elements of surge capacity include agency vision, philosophy and mandate; variousmechanisms (planning or resourcing), policies and procedures; people and money. A number ofenabling factors (for example preparedness and flexibility) dictate how effectively surge capacitycan be deployed.

• The trigger for an emergency response (or ‘surge’) may be internal or external; both politics and themedia play a significant role in shaping the nature of any intervention.

• The development of an effective surge capacity rests on an agency’s ability to develop and preparean entire system of policies, people, procedures and resources in a flexible yet comprehensivemanner; i.e. it requires a ‘whole organisation’ approach, that incorporates mandate, structure,culture and effective leadership as well as concrete inputs and processes.

• An agency’s effectiveness in terms of responding to an emergency will be driven by its mandateand structure.

• The role of HR departments and HR policies and practices play a critical role in developing andmaintaining surge capacity.

People (staff capacity)There are four sources of staff that agencies usefor rapid response:

• Specialist emergency staff: known staffdeployable from the central emergency unit and/ or full-time standing teams, as well as fromthe virtual redeployment teams (ie, internalrosters and registers) as well as through anumber of other approaches (eg, retainerschemes).

• General staff: known staff who areHQ/regional/country-office based and who canbe re-tasked during an emergency; the growingtendency, however, is to provide these staff withat least some emergency training and / or tohire a greater number of staff who haveemergency experience (viewed as particularlyimportant for programme directors).

• External source, staff unknown to the agency,employed on short-term contracts.

• External source, staff known informally to theagency.

This chapter will give greater attention to thededicated resources ie specialist emergency staff,while chapter 3 will address the mechanismsused for sourcing internally or externally.

Emergency response unitsOne of the main facilitating factors in recent yearshas been the development or significantexpansion of the emergency departmentscontaining specialised emergency staff in each ofthe seven IWG agencies in support of thestrategic prioritisation of humanitarian response.

These units mostly have a dual function: to bothserve as part of the organisation’s emergencyresponse team as well as to provide capacitystrengthening support to national offices anddevelop various standard operating procedures toguide emergency response, including surgeresponse. These dualities can create tensions,and a number of agencies have recently beenseeking to reduce these pressures.

For example, CRS has been working on thetensions created by having a dual-functionemergency unit by separating the functions withinthis unit. It has done this as a result ofrecognising that capacity builders who are alsoemergency responders rarely get round to doingcapacity building, since there is almost alwaysanother more urgent operational demand. Incomparison, World Vision’s emergency unitfocuses on developing standards, policies anddeployment procedures, as well being available fordeployment to disaster management roles rangingfrom response management to executive supportto field directors, and functional or technicalleadership in emergency response. The agencyrecognised that staff who are to fulfil this type ofcapacity building function (even ‘real time’ capacitybuilding during an emergency) require a differentcompetency profile from those who are moredirectly operational, and has therefore modified itsrecruitment processes to select people withprofiles more suited to these intended roles.

Another tension, as also found in Braun (ibid) anddespite significant recent investment, is thatmany of these units are still over-stretched tovarying degrees and cannot scale-up to the extentthey both want and need. In 2007, as in 2004,

Chapter 2: Resourcing surge capacity


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Chapter SummaryThis chapter explores the way in which surge capacity is resourced, and focuses on the two mainaspects, namely people, and money. As chapter 1 has shown, there is a lot more to ‘surge capacity’than merely people and money, but staff capacity and the funding context require specific consideration.

This chapter also contains:

• A description of agencies’ staff capacity.

• Details of the financial resources used to support them.


Chapter 2

they still seem to struggle in areas such aspreparedness, accountability, and programmemonitoring and evaluation. Agencies wereparticularly keenly aware of their ongoingproblems with learning.

It seems that often there is no clear sense ofwhat capacity is required, and differentorganisational stakeholders have, at differenttimes, reported sufficient or insufficient capacityin different areas. Another complexity is that,when country programmes can cope emergencyunits struggle to justify their existence, but whenthey can’t cope the emergency units are heldresponsible. Also, as the mandate of anemergency unit shifts so perceptions of itscapacity change. These tensions reinforce theimportance of developing a strategic vision forsurge at the highest level.

The emergency response units need to be able towork well with all departments in their givenagency, as they generally have to galvanise thewhole organisation’s response. An importantlesson here is that leverage is as important asscale, and the emergency units need tocoordinate and communicate better across alldepartments, especially during surge response. Inpractice this is often difficult as many of theemergency units, particularly in the dual mandateagencies, have been created and kept separate toallow for quick response times and faster decisionmodels – all of which mean that they may haveweaker social and structural links with other unitsin the organisation. Thus when a crisis doesstrike, the emergency units are off and runningoften without bringing in skills from other units.

Many agencies seek to off-set this tendency bycreating cross-agency working groups when anemergency is called. Some of their ‘priorityrelationships’ are noted as constituting theirdevelopment colleagues and programme linemanagement at both HQ and in the field, HR,fundraising and communications, the technicalunits and ICT. Braun (2004) notes some of thedefining characteristics and also some of thetensions with regard to these relationships. Whatwas not comprehensively covered in that report isthe crucial relationship with HR – one of the keythemes to emerge in this study on surge capacity.

ECB agencies are, first and foremost, seeking toaugment their specialist internal responsecapacity through the development of emergencyunits and, if they can afford it, through full-timestanding teams. There are two main staffingmodels within the ECB group:

1. Those agencies that employ a large, full time,global / regional deployable capacity (Oxfamand World Vision) which means they canrespond to at least two emergencies at thesame time. Oxfam’s capacity comes largelyfrom its HSP pool; World Vision’s primarily fromits full-time global rapid response team(including the ‘technical associates’) but alsofrom its regional emergency response offices.Oxfam’s stated aim is to increase its capacityby 50% within three years; World Vision’s is tobe able to respond to four emergenciesconcurrently within five years’ time.

2. Those agencies that operate at a smaller scalethrough employing sufficient capacity at HQ toundertake initial assessments, but then relyprimarily on internal redeployments (mainlythrough a roster and / or register system butalso through informal networks) for the actualresponse (SC-US; CARE; CRS).

The IRC sits somewhere between these two withits newly augmented emergency unit of 17 (one ofthe largest in the ECB group), while Mercy Corpsnotably relies on external hires more than theother ECB agencies.

Figure 3 provides an overview of the currentconfigurations of the ECB emergency responseunits.

While an emergency unit or team could beconsidered a ‘surge capacity mechanism’, for thepurpose of this research we will deal with it in thischapter as many organisations consider it to be apart of their standing capacity or operationalinfrastructure.

For example, CARE, CRS, Mercy Corps, SC-US,and World Vision all employ Regional Directors /Coordinators who are deployable in times of anemergency. Most of these staff are now based inthe regions rather than at HQ, and manifestagencies’ efforts to build their country-levelcapacity. CRS has recently developed a newposition of Emergency Focal Point for each of itsregions. These people:

• Report to the Regional Directors.

• Can be mobilised on a temporary basis.

• Assist with identifying people in-country for theinternal roster and also encourage cross-trainingbetween offices.

• Focus on disaster mitigation issues which isseen strategically as part of surge.

The intention is that each focal point will build aresponse team in each region.

Chapter

2


Resourcing surge capacity

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uman

itaria

nem

erge

ncy

resp

onse

s, in

clud

ing

coor

dina

ting

staf

f fo

r em

erge

ncie

s•

Som

e de

ploy

able

pos

ition

s•

Spe

cial

ists

(re

lativ

ely

new

pos

ition

s) t

o be

use

d to

hel

p de

velo

psp

ecia

list

func

tions

in t

he ‘ne

w C

ERT’

Reg

iona

l coo

rdin

ator

s:•

2 in

pos

t; 2

mor

e po

sitio

ns t

o be

cre

ated

•To

rei

nfor

ce C

ERT

and

deve

lop

regi

onal

ros

ters

com

plem

enta

ry t

o CER

T

•S

ince

199

9•

48-h

our

resp

onse

; de

ploy

ed for

4-6

wee

ks•

Sel

f fu

nded

: ge

nera

lly fro

m d

eplo

ymen

ts b

ut c

an a

lso

use

unre

stric

ted

fund

s•

Reg

iona

l and

cou

ntry

dire

ctor

s w

ork

out

depl

oym

ent

need

s du

e to

natu

re o

f th

e di

sast

er

•Fi

rst

form

ed in

200

0•

Full-

time,

IRC

sta

ff; av

aila

ble

with

in 7

2 ho

urs

•S

uppo

rt a

ll IR

C c

ount

ry o

ffic

es w

hen

not

on e

mer

genc

y as

sign

men

ts

•Ar

e ba

sed

from

hom

e an

d ar

e de

ploy

ed t

o th

e fie

ld a

ppro

xim

atel

y 75

%of

the

tim

e•

Are

part

nere

d w

ith a

n H

Q T

echn

ical

Uni

t co

unte

rpar

t fo

r co

llabo

ratio

n,in

form

atio

n sh

arin

g an

d te

chni

cal s

uppo

rt

Figu

re 3

: EC

B A

genc

y Em

erge

ncy

Uni

ts (

as a

t A

pril

2007

)

cont

.


Chapter 2

Chapter

2

Age

ncy

Emer

genc

y U

nit:

Nam

eM

ain

Cha

ract

eris

tics

Mer

cy C

orps

Oxf

am

SC-U

S

Glo

bal E

mer

genc

y O

pera

tions

(G

EO)

7 _

full-

time

empl

oyee

s •

Emer

genc

y di

rect

or (d

oesn

’t de

ploy

)•

Dire

ctor

of e

mer

genc

y pr

epar

edne

ss a

nd D

RR (d

oesn

’t de

ploy

)•

Prog

ram

me

offic

er•

2 te

am le

ader

s•

Logi

stic

s m

ange

r•

Wat

san

(spl

it be

twee

n G

EO a

nd h

ealth

dep

t)

Hum

anita

rian

Dep

artm

ent

72

sta

ff, w

hich

incl

udes

14

spec

ialis

t te

chni

cal s

taff

PLU

S75

(cur

rent

ly r

ecru

iting

to m

ake

90) s

ervi

ng a

s gl

obal

ly r

ovin

g H

uman

itaria

n Sup

port

Per

sonn

el –

HSPs

Hum

anita

rian

Dire

ctor

Prog

ram

me

Man

ager

s (1

5)PA

to

Hum

anita

rian

Dire

ctor

Logi

stic

s Te

am (2

0)D

eput

y D

irect

or (2

)Pu

b H

ealth

Eng

Tea

m

(22)

Sen

ior

Rep

rese

ntat

ive

Pub

Hea

lth T

eam

(1

5)

Strat

egic

Pro

ject

Man

ager

s (3

)Em

erge

ncy

Food

Sec

& L

ivel

ihoo

ds T

eam

(11)

Co-

ordi

nato

r of

HSPs

Prog

ram

me

Fina

nce

Team

(9

)H

uman

itaria

n D

esk

Off

icer

s (5

)H

uman

Res

ourc

es T

eam

(1

5)Pr

ogra

m A

dvis

ory

Team

(15)

Sys

tem

s &

Res

ourc

es T

eam

(3)

Prog

ram

me

Rep

rese

ntat

ives

(5)

Emer

genc

ies

and

Pro

tect

ion

Uni

t in

the

Chi

ldre

n in

Em

erge

ncie

s an

d C

risis

(CEC

) D

epar

tmen

t D

irect

orFi

nanc

e/Ad

min

(2)

Emer

genc

y Ad

viso

rSup

ply

Cha

in (2

)Em

erge

ncy

Prep

ared

ness

Spe

cial

ists

(2)

Man

agem

ent

Sup

port

(2)

Logi

stic

ianE

mer

genc

y H

ealth

Emer

genc

y Ed

ucat

ion

(2)

Emer

genc

y N

utrit

ion

Emer

genc

y Pr

otec

tion

(2)

Live

lihoo

dsEm

erge

ncy

M&

EEm

erge

ncy

Food

Dis

trib

utio

nEm

erge

ncy

Rec

ruite

r (1

)

•Fo

rmed

in 2

000

•Pu

rpos

e of

GEO

is t

o m

obili

se a

nd c

oord

inat

e th

e re

sour

ces

of t

hebr

oade

r or

gani

satio

n be

hind

an

emer

genc

y re

spon

se•

Dep

loya

ble

GEO

tea

m b

udge

ted

for

25%

cos

t re

cove

ry

Full-

time;

HQ

bas

ed. In

pla

ce for

mor

e th

an a

dec

ade.

Rec

ently

exp

ande

dby

add

ing

HS

Ps. P

rovi

de b

ack-

up t

o th

e H

SPs

whi

le a

lso

havi

ng t

heir

own

port

folio

of w

ork.

Abou

t H

SPs

:•

Perm

anen

t co

ntra

cts;

on

‘sta

nd-b

y’•

Rap

id d

eplo

ymen

t fo

r us

ually

up

to 9

0-da

y as

sign

men

ts

•U

nder

writ

ten

by r

eser

ve fun

ds•

Bud

get

for

25%

of th

eir

time;

get

75%

sal

ary

fund

ed b

y of

ficia

l don

ors.

Spe

cial

ist

tech

nica

l sta

ff:

•S

enio

r /

lead

ersh

ip-o

rient

ed p

osts

; im

med

iate

em

erge

ncy

star

t-up

•M

aint

ain

a se

ries

of in

form

al r

egis

ters

of ke

y co

ntac

ts: ‘li

ttle

bla

ckbo

oks

of e

xter

nal “

mos

t fa

vour

ed”

cons

ulta

nts’

•

Wan

t to

dev

elop

the

se in

form

al r

egis

ters

for

pro

ject

man

ager

s

•Th

e C

EC w

as c

reat

ed in

199

2.•

It is

org

anis

ed in

to a

Tec

hnic

al S

uppo

rt D

ivis

ion

[TS

D] an

dM

anag

emen

t S

uppo

rt D

ivis

ion

[MS

D].

•TS

D in

clud

es P

rote

ctio

n, H

unge

r an

d M

alnu

triti

on, Em

erge

ncy

Prep

ared

ness

and

Res

pons

e te

ams.

•

MS

D in

clud

es a

Com

mod

ity O

pera

tions

tea

m, O

pera

tions

tea

m, H

Rre

crui

tmen

t sp

ecia

list, c

omm

unic

atio

ns s

peci

alis

t, A

llian

ce T

ask

Forc

eM

anag

er a

nd D

M&

E sp

ecia

list.

Figu

re 3

: EC

B A

genc

y Em

erge

ncy

Uni

ts (

as a

t A

pril

2007

) co

nt.

cont

.



Cha

pter

2

Age

ncy

Emer

genc

y U

nit:

Nam

eM

ain

Cha

ract

eris

tics

Wor

ldVi

sion

Int

lH

uman

itaria

n an

d Em

erge

ncy

Affai

rs D

epar

tmen

t (c

ore

team

of 1

8)Vi

ce P

resi

dent

Dire

ctor

, Acc

ount

abili

ty &

Tra

nspa

renc

yD

irect

or, H

uman

itaria

n Pl

anni

ngAs

soci

ate

Dire

ctor

, Log

istic

s &

Dire

ctor

, Strat

egic

Ope

ratio

nsPr

e-po

sitio

ning

Dire

ctor

, Hum

an R

esou

rces

Dire

ctor

, Hum

anita

rian

Lear

ning

Dire

ctor

, Bus

ines

s an

d Fi

nanc

eSup

port

sta

ff (6

)D

irect

or, I

nfor

mat

ion

Tech

nolo

gyAs

soci

ate

Dire

ctor

Cap

acity

Bui

ldin

gD

irect

or, R

esou

rce

Dev

elop

men

tAs

soci

ate

Dire

ctor

Res

ourc

es a

ndAc

coun

tabi

lity

Glo

bal R

apid

Res

pons

e Te

am (

GR

RT)

c22

peop

le d

eplo

yabl

e up

to

50%

of t

heir

time;

min

5 y

ears

hum

anita

rian

resp

onse

expe

rienc

e.

In a

dditi

on, t

here

are

thr

ee r

elat

ed c

ompo

nent

s to

Wor

ld V

isio

n’s

‘em

erge

ncy

unit’

:

Glo

bal P

repo

sitio

ning

Net

wor

k.

A co

re t

eam

of 5

who

ove

rsee

the

pre

-pos

ition

ing

of it

ems

for

emer

genc

y re

spon

se.

Hav

e in

tegr

ated

a n

etw

ork

of o

ther

WV

staf

f glo

bally

who

are

invo

lved

in t

heob

tain

ing

of g

oods

and

ser

vice

s

Trai

nee

Feed

Sch

ools

(fo

r G

RR

T).

5 pe

ople

acr

oss:

hea

lth, p

rote

ctio

n, fi

nanc

e, lo

gist

ics,

IT.

Ass

ocia

tes

12 p

eopl

e de

ploy

able

up

to 5

0% o

f tim

e.M

ainl

y te

chni

cal p

eopl

e w

ho w

ork

in n

orth

ern

offic

es.

In o

rder

to

over

com

e te

nsio

n be

twee

n de

ploy

abili

ty a

nd c

oord

inat

ion,

Wor

ld V

isio

n ha

s ex

plic

itly

assi

gned

som

e of

its

cent

ral e

mer

genc

y un

itto

foc

us o

n th

e co

ordi

natio

n of

dep

loym

ent

and

stan

dard

s. T

his

allo

ws

for

cons

iste

nt a

tten

tion

to d

evel

opin

g po

licy

and

stan

dard

s an

d fo

rm

aint

aini

ng a

str

ateg

ic o

verv

iew,

with

out

bein

g re

gula

rly for

ced

to d

rop

ever

ythi

ng t

o de

ploy

to

an e

mer

genc

y.

GR

RT

•48

-72

hour

s de

ploy

able

, fo

r up

to

3 m

onth

s an

d up

to

50%

of th

eir

time.

•

The

GR

RT

and

asso

ciat

es a

re e

noug

h to

res

pond

, si

mul

tane

ousl

y, t

o2

larg

e-sc

ale

emer

genc

ies.

•

Dai

ly r

ate

char

ged

to p

rogr

amm

e is

$30

0/da

y•

Hal

f te

am =

man

agem

ent; o

ther

hal

f =

tech

nica

l •

Esse

ntia

l pos

ition

s: fin

ance

; H

R; pr

ocur

emen

t /

logi

stic

s, h

ealth

, IT

,pr

otec

tion,

Pro

gram

min

g an

d pr

ogra

m m

gt t

hen

base

d on

asse

ssm

ent

with

reg

ard

to w

hat

else

is r

equi

red.

•

Ove

rall

man

agem

ent

by E

mer

genc

y O

pera

tions

Ass

ocia

te D

irect

or

Figu

re 3

: EC

B A

genc

y Em

erge

ncy

Uni

ts (

as a

t A

pril

2007

) co

nt.


Chapter 2

Money [funding]All of the ECB agencies have some form ofemergency fund which provides core capacity andenables rapid response. Yet despite this, allagencies mentioned funding as an ongoing issuethat affects their ability to build appropriatecapacity and, sometimes, to deploy. Throughoutthe sector there is no doubt that the smalleragencies as well as those agencies with accessto less unrestricted funding find it harder to investin the development of different aspects of theirsurge capacity, and to deploy where they wantwhen they want. The research also suggests thatreliance on investment in a few components ofany surge capacity mechanism, such as a roster,doesn’t completely meet the challenge ofmounting an effective response, and cansometimes divert agencies into looking into the‘wrong’ places for the solution.

Clearly every organisation has options withregard to where it focuses its efforts and money.As Cosgrave (2007) notes: ‘One key part ofhumanitarian funding reform is the proportion offunds that agencies devote to developingdisaster response capacity both within their ownagencies and within communities and countriesat high risk of disasters. Such investment hasthe potential to make interventions both moreefficient and effective, and support allemergency needs, not just those of the crisiscurrently topping the news agenda.’

Emergency response fundsThe exact configuration of emergency responsefunds depends on the agency’s overall missionand strategy, resourcing mechanisms andbudgeting processes. Regardless, pre-positioningof financial resources is critical in enabling rapidresponse, because this helps agencies to avoidhaving to write funding proposals prior todeployment. Moreover, agencies that don’t havesignificant available funding for start-up operations(see, for example, Oxfam’s ‘catastrophe fund’ inFigure 4) report significant constraints in thisarea, for example, CARE. This raises seriousaccountability issues: if agencies go into an areaand undertake needs assessments butsubsequently fail to get funding, they are likely toraise the hopes of the affected populations whomthey subsequently fail to assist.

Typically a portion of an agency’s funds will beexpended each year (and usually topped up fromunrestricted funds or surpluses from elsewhere inthe organisation) while another portion is used ona ‘revolving’ basis with expenditure reimbursedthrough subsequent grant funding. The keychallenge for most organisations is how to recovercosts of maintaining capacity betweenemergencies and how to manage the risk thatfunds spent during emergency deployments willnot be reimbursed. Flexible and effective financialmanagement is one of the most fundamentalsurge capacity mechanisms.

Figure 4 shows each ECB agency’s fundingsources for rapid response.C

hapter2



Cha

pter

2

Figure 4: Sources of Funding for Rapid Emergency Response (as at April 2007)

CARE*EmergencyResponse Fund

CERT ContingencyFund

CRSRegionalOperationalReserves

Individual funds likethe Africa Crisis Fund

OverseasOperations Reserve

The IRCWhitehead Fund

Leo Cherne Fund

MERCY CORPSNo formal fundingmechanisms inplace

Oxfam-GBCatastrophe Fund

Halaby-MurphyRevolvingEmergency Fund

Also preparednessfund and individualemergency funds.

World VisionEmergencyPreparedness andResponse Fund

$1 million, of which$500,000 is revolving

$500,000

Varies

Varies

$1 million / yearvaries annually

$2.5 million

$2 million

£5 million in 2004 (variesannually)

$7.5 million, revolving

$6 million, partially revolvingAnnual allocation: $1 millionfor each of 4 Regions, $1million for preparedness, $1million reserve

Response to small emergencies, allocations of up to $50,000(to be reimbursed by user)

Can access up to $250,000 for an emergency response (veryrarely used due to impracticality of decision-making system)

Regional Operational Reserves are available at the discretionof the Regional Director

Has some restrictions on what can fund

Overseas Operations Reserve Funding is utilised at thediscretion of the Vice President of Overseas Operations

Interest is used according to the priorities of the EmergencyResponse Unit; capital is for specific emergency responseswith an effort made to replenish with private or grant funds.

IRC aims to cover 75% of the operating costs of the ERTthrough field deployments of ERT members; the balance iscovered through the grants from Stichting Vluchteling (whichcovers 9 positions), Wellspring Advisors (6 positions), theBureau of Democracy, Rights, and Labor (1 position), and theChildren's Investment Fund Foundation (1 position).

All funding is subject to annual review and is requested throughthe submission of proposals to all but Whitehead and Cherne.

• Global Emergency Operations team and GRT training isfunded through unrestricted core budget.

• Rapid response fund supported by a private donor.• Unrestricted funds are released for start up of rapid onset

response.• GRT team is funded by field offices when not deployed, by

emergency sources when deployed.

For rapid response prior to receipt of other donor income forthe emergency programme; effort made to replenish withprivate or grant funds.

• Initial stage of emergency response only.• Revolving funds have a requirement that funds drawn down

must be fully replaced through back charging orreclassification of costs to grants or contracts and throughprivate fundraising (usually direct mail appeals).

Mostly for initial stage of emergency response; can use up to25% for preparedness. Regional Relief Directors may allocateup to $100,000 without broader consultation. Effort made torepay with private or grant funds (goal is for 50%replenishment coming from grant/contract funds)

* The entire system for CARE’s emergency response is currently under review, including of its funding mechanisms.

** Revolving funds have a requirement that funds drawn down must be fully replaced through back-charging or reclassification of costs to grants orcontracts and through private fundraising (usually direct-mail appeals).


Chapter 2

Standing capacityThe core element of surge capacity is standingcapacity. As noted above, this consists of staffand material supplies that are permanentlyallocated for emergency response where staffare either part of the emergency unit of anagency and / or part of an agency’s full-time,permanent standing team (ie, Oxfam’s HSPs;those on World Vision’s GRRT; and also SC-UK’s 28-strong group of ERPs [emergencyresponse personnel]).

In most cases an agency’s emergency unit(unless, of course, the agency has a full-timestanding team) has a small number of specialistmanagers whose primary role is to deployquickly in an emergency. They will have accessto a stock of essential equipment which cansimilarly be deployed in the first few hours ordays of an emergency response. Often theseresources are financed out of unrestricted funds,but this is not necessarily so. Two models exist:

Reimbursement model: When staff time andmaterials are expended on an emergencyresponse they are normally recharged to theemergency programme, at cost. Sometimesthis will require prior negotiation with the donor,but the practice is now fairly standard. This stillleaves the question of how to budget for thecosts of maintaining stock and staff betweenemergencies. Perhaps this will be agency’scontribution, or that of a private donor.

Apportionment model: Less common is areimbursement model which also incorporatesrecovery of costs associated with maintainingcapacity between emergencies. For example,by including a portion of warehouse rentalwhen recharging for replacement of pre-positioned materials sent to an emergency.For staff, a recharge cost might beestablished which includes the actual costs ofhaving people on standby for the emergency.

If agencies are thinking about doing this it ispossible to arrive at a daily cost by carryingout the following calculation: consider thetotal annual cost including salary, training,office space, administrative support etc, anddivide that by the total number of days theperson is deployed (eg, 100). It is importantto be realistic about utilisation in order toavoid burnout. It will be necessary todemonstrate that the costs are reasonableand do not represent profiteering by theagency. Not all donors will accept this model,

and agencies need to beware of doublecharging for overheads if they also assign agenerous ICR.

Investment in standing capacity can beconsidered an insurance policy: although theremight not be an emergency ‘next year’, most ofthe research indicates that the number ofemergencies is increasing and historically it israre for well-designed emergency capacity to beunderutilised. One way to scope the size ofstanding capacity is to keep records ofemergency deployments and track whatresources are actually used. Typically there is astraightforward business case to fund aproportion of what has been used in the past, onthe grounds that there is confidence it will alsobe needed in the future. Having adequatestanding capacity improves the speed and qualityof emergency response, and can itself increasethe prospects of raising extra funds. In factWillits & Darcy (2005) found that ‘organisationsthat have invested in emergencies have grown insize and quality. Investment in emergencycapacity provides a good rate of return in termsof funding attracted – as much as 20 times, inWorld Vision’s experience’.

It is important to consider contingencies incasethe capacity doesn’t get used. How would youragency react if there were no emergencies in ayear – is this a crisis for the organisation orsomething to be celebrated? Most of theagencies interviewed described the various waysin which staff in their emergency unit and also,where relevant, their standing teams, getinvolved in capacity building work with nationaloffices, including emergency preparedness.They’re also often involved in developingemergency standards and operations manuals.In terms of stock, probably most of that alreadyin warehouses can stay there (though rent stillhas to be paid). Some stock will need to bereplaced – do these items get used for otherpurposes, in which case older stock could berotated from time to time?

Chapter

2


Internal mobility of resourcesThe second tier of emergency capacity is well-rehearsed movement of resources (people andstock) within the organisation – in staff termsthis means redeployment / secondment / TDYs.This requires knowledge of where staff and stockcurrently are, as well as an evaluation of therelative costs and benefits including possiblenegative impacts on the ‘home’ or sendingcountry office. Various tools to facilitate internalmobility of resources, particularly of staff, arediscussed elsewhere in this paper, yet nonecome free of charge. One of the key ‘lessonslearned’ by mature emergency responseorganisations is that databases and other tools

to manage internal staff redeployments requireconstant maintenance to keep them current andapplicable, otherwise investments quicklydepreciate and systems fall into disrepute.

Funding models for agile resources are broadlysimilar to those mentioned above. Whendeployed to an emergency, human and materialresources can normally be recharged. This canbe administratively complicated to process viainter-organisational transfers between countryprogrammes, and some organisations haveagreed standard internal recharge rates tofacilitate budgeting and reimbursements. If theinternal recharge costs are a little higher thanactual costs then this could in some way


Cha

pter

2

Financing Staff Capacity

One of the best resourced agency in terms ofoverall emergency staffing is World Vision,which has 71 full-time emergency staff atregional and headquarters level (and 8 peopleat 50%). This figure comprises 18 staffcentrally, focused on coordination, qualityassurance and UN liaison; a Global RapidResponse Team (GRRT) of 22; 20 staff inregional relief offices, including the regionalrelief coordinators and country relief focalpoints; 6 involved in global pre-positioning; 5from the GRRT ‘trainee feeder school’; and 8part-time people from World Vision’s ‘northern’offices (see Figure 3). The GRRT is mostly paidfor centrally, but can ‘earn’ extra funds if staffare seconded to country offices for longerperiods than their initial deployment - costs canbe retrieved during deployment to offset thefunding gap. World Vision has undertaken ananalysis of the return on investment in itsGRRT, which has established that each dollarinvested gives a return of $10–20 in fundinggenerated by the GRRT’s activities.

In the IRC, the EPRU covers 100% of the costsof ERT staff working on non-field deploymentTORs. When deployed, country programs cover100% of ERT costs (deployment costs, salary,benefits). On some occasions the EPRU hasdeployed ERT staff and not charged countryprograms. The EPRU Director and SeniorCoordinator determine when this is justifiedand appropriate on a case by case basis.Examples include: to complete assessmentsfor potential start-ups; to provide support to

programme start-ups with no or limitedresources; and to support existing programmeswith limited resources. The EPRU is exploringways to provide subsidies to smallerprogrammes that may not have the resourcesfor ERT deployments, but would benefit fromhaving the support and expertise.

Oxfam is among the best-resourced agencies interms of deployable specialists, with funding inplace to support 90 HSPs (75 are currentlycontracted and this is currently beingincreased) under contract full-time in a range ofspecialisations. These personnel are now muchin demand from country offices, who arecharged for the time deployed. The central unitrecovers around 75% of the HSPs’ costs, therest being for periods of leave, training anddowntime. This figure started out at around50%, but the cost to Oxfam centrally has fallenover the last five years as demand for theHSPs has grown.

SC-UK employs 30 full-time emergencyresponse personnel. The scheme currentlycosts about £900,000 in terms of real costs.As a proportion of the agency’s total annualturnover this is about 0.6%, but it's a muchhigher proportion of its emergency budget,coming in at around 20%. SC-UK covers around15% of the costs from its central budget andrecovers 85% from receiving programmes.

Note: the case studies on World Vision andOxfam-GB are taken from Willits-King andDarcy (2005).

Case study 5


Chapter 2

compensate the donating programme for some ofthe inconvenience incurred. It has beensuggested that this would help to ensure betteravailability of staff and the money could be used,for example, to hire in cover or compensateexisting staff who have to take on additionaltasks when the deployable staff member is away.

Again the question remains how to fund the extracosts for administering and maintainingorganisational agility. This is one of the biggestchallenges for most organisations, and one thatrequires some ingenuity. Prerequisite costsinclude staff time to keep databases up to dateas well as pre-deployment training for rosterstaff. There can be economies of scale andsome of these functions are now managedacross global federations rather than withinindividual agencies. Also standardisation reducesoverheads and increases interoperability: if alloffices use the same brand of computer and thesame version of software, then support costs aremuch lower (similarly with specifications forvehicles, and even programming methods).Another approach is to sensitively combineactivities, for example by training staff asemergency responders for their own countrywithin an emergency preparedness plan, andhaving these same people available as surgecapacity for other countries without extra costs.

Rapid acquisition of resourcesRapid recruitment and reactive procurement canappear to be the cheapest option, with associatedcosts delayed until budgets are allocated for theemergency response. This may be a falseeconomy since insufficient preparation certainlyimpacts negatively on speed and quality ofresponse (this is why World Vision has soughtfunding to pre-position stocks across the entireorganisation, and why Oxfam-GB has developedsuch a large HSP pool). No organisation canreasonably maintain all of the staff that it mightneed nor stockpile all supplies, so every agencyplans for some element of rapid acquisition duringan emergency. Costs of preparedness includeadvance specification of supplies andidentification of potential suppliers, together withdevelopment of generic job descriptions andidentification of suitable recruitment pools (seeChapter 3). Normally the staff required to carryout this acquisition (procurement, recruitment)should not themselves be hired during anemergency, and ideally surge recruiters and surgelogisticians should be identified and trained inadvance, perhaps through one of the mechanismsdescribed above.

Funding over the longer termThe research identified a few examples of whereagencies have managed to target both private andinstitutional donors to support different elementsof their long term surge capacity development.Examples include SC-UK’s training scheme(provided as an earlier case study) and WorldVision’s private funding to enable it to pre-positionstocks on a global scale. Another interestingexample is SC-US’ use of USAID food securityfunding, which saw the agency build preparednessprogramming into its development programmes aspart of its overall efforts toward responding moreeffectively to emergencies.

The SC-US case is an important examplebecause it demonstrates how an agency’sunderstanding of a particular phenomenon – inthis case what constitutes the key componentsof emergency response – enables it to usefunding for its development programming ‘alongthe continuum’. The agency was therefore able togrow its emergency response capacity on thesuccess of its grant mechanisms before buildingcapacity for emergency response was agreed atpolicy level within the organisation.

In the recent period donors have begun to morespecifically fund disaster mitigation and riskreduction work, an example of which is the UK’sDepartment for International Development (DFID)policy to use one-tenth of its natural disastersbudget for disaster preparedness and mitigation(though it has also been noted that DFID mightalso be failing to achieve this funding; LordChidgey, 2006). DFID is also currently supportingUNICEF’s development of its surge capacitymechanism.

Funding is available, and perhaps agencies needto dedicate more resources in terms of theirfundraising capacity to better target differentopportunities for restricted funding. But they willequally need to match this with increasedcapacity to manage additional funding andresources, at both HQ and country level and inlight of some of their lessons learnt about scale-up, especially from the tsunami response whereabsorption capacity was shown to be limited.

Another area of action around funding NGO surgecapacity might be joint advocacy work to holddonors accountable to those aspects of the GoodHumanitarian Donorship principles that directlyrelate to building emergency response capacityand to respond to emergencies according toneed.

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Chapter 2 - Summary Points• The core element of surge capacity is staff capacity. In recent years, IWG member agencies have

focused on augmenting their full-time rapid response staff capacity, largely through thedevelopment of emergency units or large, full-time global rapid response capacity.

• Pre-positioning of funds is critical in enabling rapid response, and all IWG member agencies nowoperate some kind of emergency response fund.

• There are two models of paying for staff capacity: central coverage from unrestricted funds orsurpluses from elsewhere in the organisation; and use of funding on a ‘revolving’ basis withexpenditure reimbursed through subsequent grant funding (also referred to as the ‘charging out’model).

• Flexible and effective financial management is one of the most fundamental surge capacitymechanisms and systems to facilitate, for example, economies of scale, scale-up and absorption ofadditional funds, as well as the rapid acquisition of resources are essential.

• Taking a longer term view of emergency funding is also important, as this allows agencies tocontinue to invest in their emergency surge capacity between emergencies. Such a view alsoencourages agencies to focus other critical programming components, such as disaster riskreduction and preparedness planning.


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Chapter 2


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Most of the surge capacity mechanismsidentified are essentially human resourcedeployment tools or mechanisms, or the humanresource-oriented policies and proceduresrequired. The factors which enable effectivesurge are dealt with in chapter 4.

Planning mechanisms• Strategic workforce planning

• Contingency planning

• Second wave / continuity planning

Recruitment mechanisms• Internal mobilisation

• External recruitment (known/unknown staff)

• Rosters and registers- Definitions- Effective management- Buy in- HR aspects- IT systems

Planning mechanisms

Strategic workforce planningCredible surge response is usually preceded bystrategic workforce planning and anticipatingstaffing needs, both of which are best deliveredthrough a productive partnership with the HRfunction. Agencies that have recognised thestrategic importance of HR in emergencies, andconsider HR to be a proactive partner, activelyinvolved in planning and managing surgeresponse, can consistently demonstrate thebenefits of such a partnership.

Planning and Preparing Staff CapacityStaff capacity entails two main components:

• the size of the pool of skilled and experiencedpeople, or levels of staff capacity,

• the quality of staff capacity.

Both of these factors affect programme quality.Having clear policies and procedures thatenhance staffing levels and skills – with thecorresponding systems that allow the requisitestaff capacity to be mobilised and managed inthe required timeframe – is central to thesuccess of surge response. The researchidentified a number of lessons andorganisational enablers in these areas.

Levels of staff capacity

It is the practice of workforce planning thatallows an agency to anticipate, in detail,emergency staffing needs, within the context ofthat agency’s mandate and structure. If anagency’s mandate is focused on rapid responsethen it will seek to significantly augment itsstaff capacity – at both national andinternational level.

At the national level, an important procedureinvolves pre-identifying, and strengthening thecapacity of, national-level partners. This andother issues related to augmenting nationallevel capacity are addressed in the next chapter.

At the international level, emergency units androsters and registers are the most obviousmanifestations of a rapid response strategy,and are viewed as key preparedness tools. Thisis because, once an emergency has been called

Chapter 3: Surge capacity mechanisms

Chapter SummaryThis chapter considers the most important surge capacity mechanisms currently in use by agencies,and to aid understanding, the various mechanisms, (which include systems, policies, procedures andtools), will be grouped in two categories:

• Planning mechanisms

• Recruitment mechanisms


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Chapter 3

that requires an international response, one ofthe most important lessons is to use peopleagencies already know for the first-wave ofdeployments; people who have been pre-screened for quality, who know the agency, andwho are likely to have been trained – all ofwhich means they can become operational withminimum delay. This allows agencies to committo a response commonly within 48-72 hours.

A key component of workforce planning involvesthe development of various operationsmanagement tools, such as emergencypreparedness plans (EPPs; or, for Oxfam, itsemergency management plans). Among otherthings these enable agencies to anticipate andtherefore plan for appropriate levels of staffcapacity. It is also useful to undertake a moreglobal, organisation-wide exercise that mapswhat the agency has done over the past fewyears and, based on some of the emergingtrends – including, for example, which staff theagency might have found it most difficult torecruit for – extrapolate needs forward.

A related practice is that of identifying morethan one person for each position category, asthis increases the likelihood of finding someonewith the appropriate skill set when required.

Should an agency anticipate requiringsubstantial additional capacity, then an effectivetechnique is to write a clause for ‘travel whenrequired’ into the job descriptions of otheragency staff over and above those in theemergency units, on the standing teams, or onrosters and registers.

Many of the agencies interviewed for this studytalked about the importance of flexibility ininternational staff capacity – indicated by thedifferent staff deployment tools they use as wellas by the different policies and procedures theyutilise for maintaining appropriate levels ofcapacity. Flexibility in this capacity can beparticularly important at field level, as shown byOxfam-GB in the case study below (case study 6).

Quality of staff capacity

Preparing staff is paramount to being able tomount an effective rapid response. Each staffperson needs to have the skills required fortheir position and agencies need to makesufficient investment in this area.

Training is viewed as a key component of staffpreparedness, and regular training coursesneed to be included in agency budgets as partof routine process. One of the reasons it isseen as important is due to the seriousproblem with sourcing good managers.Consequently agencies have learnt it isessential to include management training intheir annual or bi-annual training for deployablestaff, in addition to specialist skills training.3 Alltoo often, ‘People are given managerialresponsibilities, but without the trainingnecessary to cope with the additional tasks’(Loquercio et al, 2006).

Oxfam-GB’s ‘Roving Staff’ model

Oxfam-GB has identified that having flexiblecapacity is key to optimising its operationalresponse. This is articulated in the concept of‘roving capacity’ or ‘flow capacity’. Thismeans that if, for example, a needsassessment has identified the need for fivelogisticians or programme coordinators, theagency will employ six (some will be from itsHSP pool). The sixth person then fulfilsvarious functions. For example, in Sri Lankaduring the tsunami response the sixthProgramme Coordinator proved invaluable andwas fully employed in filling vacant roles andcritical ‘gap areas’ that arose unexpectedly.Also, extra finance and HR capacity visitedthe five field offices to conduct a rapidassessment of staff capacity and help toensure the correct systems were in place tocope with the massive increase in funds andprogramming.

It is, however, difficult to provide thisadditional capacity when resources are tight;it’s can also prove not as satisfying for theroving person because that person doesn’thave his/her own project to manage. Thisposition therefore needs particular flexibility.

Case study 6

3 This training should also, of course, include information on any new humanitarian-related policy and practice developments, in addition to any neworganisational policies or practices, etc.


Surge capacity mechanisms

4 The importance of this issue is reflected in the People In Aid study: ‘Behaviours that lead to effective performance in humanitarian response’ (SaraSwords for People In Aid, 2007). The study links to other relevant and current initiatives in the humanitarian sector, so providing an overall picture of recentthinking on these sorts of competency issues.

Notwithstanding, these sorts of large, formaltraining events should form only part of anagency’s overall efforts to develop its staffcapacity; if an agency is strategicallycommitted to staff development then it willalso need to plan for, and develop, otherpolicies and procedures that help to build thequality of its staff.

Another quality issue relates to staffcompetencies. Two types of competencies areimportant: the personal and the technical. Inthe past, humanitarian agencies have focussedon technical skills and previous experience inemergency situations. In fact agencies still tendto be influenced more by specialist skills setsand availability. More recently, a wider range ofbehavioural competencies have begun to beconsidered essential for humanitarian workers.4

These are linked to various characteristics andqualities to do with: pressure tolerance; buildingand maintaining relationships within changingemergency teams; and operational decision-making in emergency situations.

The prospect of better trained and skilled fieldmanagers has enormous implications, not only interms of their own personal welfare but also withregard to having a wider skill set that will allowthem, for example, to properly coach nationalstaff in the field and to provide higher qualityprogrammes that are more accountable toaffected populations. Oxfam-GB and SC-USemphasised the importance of re-classifyingmanagement as a technical discipline in order tofacilitate the development of training in this area.

Contingency Planning

Many of the aforementioned capacities can beanticipated through contingency planning, whichconsists of (Choularton, 2007:25):

1. A response strategy (defines the objectivesof the response, as well as the interventionsdeveloped to meet these objectives).

2. An implementation plan (defines exactly howthe programmes or responses will beimplemented).

3. An operational support plan (definessufficient administration, financial, humanresources, information andtelecommunications, etc, support).

4. A preparedness plan (identifies actions to betaken before a crisis to facilitate an effectiveresponse once the crisis is under way).

5. A budget (this covers both the cost of theplanned response as well as preparednessactions).

As the case study below demonstrates,simulation exercises are an importantcomponent of planning and preparedness, bothfrom a training point of view as well as allowingcontingency plans to be tested. As noted inLoquercio et al (2006:13) simulation exercises‘can be used to test the viability of differentprocesses, so that ways of working develop[before an emergency] without putting the livesof staff or beneficiaries at risk.’

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The contingency planning process is itself helpfulin terms of building staff capacity, as itencourages the formation of effective workingrelationships. Additionally, ongoing contingencyplanning helps emergency managers anticipateand prepare for different possibilities, includingthe need for different staff capacities.

Choularton (ibid:8) suggests that the contingencyplanning cycle is only complete when ‘lessonsfrom the response are incorporated back into thecontingency planning process, and it is triggeredagain when early warning mechanisms indicatethe onset of the next crisis. In this way …contingency planning … can support themanagement of humanitarian action at differentstages of emergency response.’

‘Second Wave’ and Continuity PlanningMost of those interviewed think that they ‘dorapid deployment well’ but struggle with so-calledsecond-wave deployment and / or continuityplanning. Reasons suggested for this include: notadvertising in the right place; not having the rightrecruiters; not having sufficient partnerships; andnot having staff in national offices whounderstand properly emergency needs.

It is generally the larger agencies who conceive ofsurge capacity as relating to the ability of theagency to mount a second-wave response, forexample, World Vision and Oxfam-GB. WorldVision deploys its first-wave responders for up tothree months but still sees its responsibility forbuilding surge-type capacity for the second roundof deployments. Oxfam-GB, on the other hand,typically has enough staff from its full-time HSPpool to deal with this challenging issue. Allagencies, however, admitted to struggling at thisjuncture – whether they specifically recruit forsecond-wave surge or simply struggle moregenerally with issues related to continuityplanning. And although Oxfam-GB perhaps hasmore flexibility due the deployment lengths of itsHSPs (who sometimes deploy for up to ninemonths) it still struggles in this area.

This is one of the reasons why agencies need tobecome more creative about their sourcingstrategies as well as create different strategiesto train promising people in order to increasetheir pool of first-wave responders. On this latterpoint Susan Barber of World Vision notes:

[W]e don’t always need a World Vision personwith World Vision experience [for this secondwave response] but convincing managers ofthis is difficult. But really for second wave it’snot as key if the induction [and orientation]processes are right.

On a related point a number of agencies sharedthe lesson that it is easier to take sometechnical specialists on the basis of theirtechnical skills rather than their experience with

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Preparedness through Simulation

Both SC-US and SC-UK run regular simulationexercises.

SC-UK: One of the main lessons learnt by SC-UKis the need for preparedness – not just ofdeployable staff and country offices but also ofstaff at HQ who need to act swiftly when anemergency is called. As a result thehumanitarian department holds regularsimulation exercises, or ‘dry runs’, to enable allthose involved when an emergency is called topractice the various procedures SC-UK has inplace to determine how to get standing teammembers prepared and to the field at short-notice. The Red Cross and MSF also run thesesimulation exercises at HQ, and all agenciesnote that this leads to much smootherdeployment in real time. These sorts ofexercises are particularly important in the casethat an emergency should occur over a weekendor public holiday.

SC-US: Although SC-US now has an integratedmandate, its historic development focus has ledthe agency to concentrate its efforts onpreparing and managing its country offices as apriority backed up by specialist technicalemergency capacity at HQ. It therefore puts a lotof resources into preparing its regional andcountry offices to respond, some of whichmoney is spent on in-country simulations. Withits regional REDI teams to hand, and usuallywith the involvement of local high-level districtofficials, the agency simulates full-scaledisasters such as a recent cyclone simulation inBangladesh. A full cyclone was simulated in alocal football stadium involving over 15,000people and a whole make-shift village collapsed.This not only allowed the agency to identify thestrengths and weaknesses of its own internallysystems but also how it worked with localofficials. Another important element was anability to educate the wider public about cyclonepreparedness, as the simulation was televised.

Case study 7


the agency, though all those interviewed agreedthat senior managers must always have hadagency experience.

One of the more important lessons concerningcontinuity is to develop staffing plans for theongoing response from the beginning once theinitial assessment has been undertaken. Thismeans having HR people in the field from theoutset. They can then take into account locallabour laws and develop a policy for NGOrecruitment over the longer term. If HRpersonnel from international agencies deploy tothe field at the same time there will be anopportunity for them to work together on theseissues, contributing to overall sector capacity atthe same time as enhancing their own individualagency response through the very act ofcollaboration and sharing of resources. Theymight consider designing HR policies that, forexample, are non-competitive and designed notto outbid each other for staff so that salaryranges and benefits can be agreed upon acrossthe NGO community.

Another important lesson is for emergencyrecruiters to begin to look for replacement staffright away or, depending on the agency’sstructure and approach to succession planning,for colleagues in the development departmentsto be alerted to recruitment needs right away sothey too can begin planning for emergency staffreplacement.

The compilation of ‘hot lists’, noted above, isanother way of dealing with second-waverecruitment.

Some respondents brought up the issue ofturnover in terms of how long staff are initiallydeployed to emergency situations. There appearsto be tension between the view points that initialdeployments cannot be in the field for more than4-6 weeks due to burn out, in comparison tothose who believe that these kind of short initialdeployments don’t make a difference unless thejob descriptions of those being deployed includeresponsibility for shadowing or coaching and forhelping to build, when necessary, institutionalmechanisms appropriate for taking the responseforward. This issue clearly affects programmequality, accountability and sustainability, and wasconsidered so important by one respondent that,unless coaching or shadowing happens, ‘agencieswon’t really learn the lessons they’ve beenlearning; … it should be all about capacity atcountry level’.

The importance of coaching was alsohighlighted, in particular by the ‘regional’interviewees. While coaching and shadowing canbe challenging in emergency response due tothe additional energy and patience required, it isconsidered essential. These, and other,interviewees also highlighted the importance ofdeveloping relationships of trust. There are ‘swifttrust factors and deeper trust factors’ thatenable these relationships, and these have beenidentified in the ECB study on BuildingRelationships between National and InternationalStaff in times of crisis.

In order to address these sorts of problems,and based on lessons that the most effectiveresponse occurs when there is effectivecounter-parting, CRS tries to make sure that,when deployed, all those in its ERT are counter-parted with national staff. Mercy Corpsoperates a similar scheme whereby its GlobalEmergency Operations team at HQ mentorsthose on its Global Response Team, theagency’s internal roster which is primarilycomposed of national staff. This is done duringannual training and deployments.

Another technique for addressing continuityincludes the release of staff from ongoingprogrammes into the emergency programme.This builds the capacity of the emergencyprogramme as the individuals involved know thelocal communities as well as local programmingpriorities. This means they can contribute tomore locally sensitive emergency planning aswell as continue in post beyond the initial phaseof deployment so contributing to overallprogramme sustainability. CARE furthermentioned employing team leaders for the‘transition’ phase for at least six months tofacilitate programme sustainability.

Recruitment mechanismsThe foundation of most emergency responseconsists of pre-existent staff capacity at countrylevel. This is recognised in agencies’ disasterclassification systems that only activateinternational response beyond a pre-designatedcritical level. In fact some agencies, for exampleCRS and SC-US, prefer to focus on building theircountry level capacity as a way of mitigating theneed for large international surge response.Chapter 4 considers the issue of country-levelcapacity in more depth.


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Chapter 3

There are two ways of sourcing international staffcapacity, and as the case study on Darfur belowshows, often agencies will use a combination ofapproaches:

1. Internal mobilisation, through either:• employing people on permanent contract (so-

called ‘standing teams’; World Vision’s GRRTand Oxfam’s HSPs)

• redeploying / seconding staff from HQ to thefield, or from one field location to another (ie,generally those people named on internalrosters and registers)5

2. External recruitment:• pure external recruitment

• ‘keeping people warm’ through informalnetworks of contacts, including registers

The IWG and other agencies interviewed for thisstudy see recruitment as a set of policies andpractices designed primarily to identify and attractquality employees. Mignon Mazique of MercyCorps reflects that: ‘Recruitment is one of themost important – in fact the most important –function in an agency. If you don’t get the rightpeople at the right time then the whole operationis compromised’. Given that an agency can onlydo so much to improve the quality of itspersonnel once in post, having tools andpractices in place to source the ‘right’ internalstaff as well as recruit the ‘right’ external staff isparamount. This section looks at sourcing stafffor primarily internal rosters and registers andalso via external recruitment. Internal mobilisation

Internal mobilisation is typically managedthrough the use of internal rosters or registerswhich are considered in more detail later in thischapter. Agencies employ a range of techniqueswhen sourcing staff for their internal rostersand registers. Generally, HQ identifies ex-pats(including people who have previously workedfor the agency) while regional / national officesnominate local staff.

The selection process commonly involves thefollowing steps: most often a person will self-select / be identified by HQ, regional or nationalstaff; submit their resume and / or application;have at least two years emergency experience(this time period differs depending on the size ofthe agency and therefore the pool of people ithas to choose from); have their technical skillschecked by a technical specialist; have todisplay a good selection of ‘soft skills’ (see the

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A Multi-pronged Approach in Darfur

World Vision’s Director of Strategic Operationsconsiders his agency’s most successfulresponse to have been in 2004 in Darfur. Whilesome glitches in the response wereexperienced, overall it worked well becausevarious components of rapid deploymentworked in tandem. For example, the agency’sGlobal Rapid Response Team (GRRT) wasdeployed as it should have been for 90 days,joined by a number of its Regional RapidResponse Team (RRRT), which has existed inAfrica for seven years. A number of technicalstaff were seconded from within the agency,and the agency also mobilised staff out of otherfood aid programmes in the area that wereending at that time.

The Head of HR at MSF-UK also describes howrapid deployment ‘never works on just onemethod’. When they responded in Sudan theyfound that informal networks played just asimportant a part as their register. When it wasclear that the situation could deteriorate rapidlythey began to: email people on the registerasking if they might be available; email theiroperations offices to alert them to be on thelook out for response staff; were able to usepeople from their own office; received manyphone-calls from interested parties.

Case study 8

5 Agencies use different terminology to describe this technique: redeployment; secondment; and TDYs.


section on competencies below); have to have aface-to-face or telephone interview; have at leasttwo references checked; confirm their availabilityin advance.

Some agencies do an additional ‘qualityassurance’ check by assessing country-nominated candidates in the context of specialtrainings or workshops.

All agencies talked about difficulties in terms ofattracting staff onto their rosters and registersand retaining them. (Retention in this context ismore about maintaining the interest of people onthese lists and databases when they are notoften used, than it is about concerns with highstaff turnover. Turnover in the rapid deploymentcontext is more to do with the time that firstresponders spend in the field.) Chapter 4 dealswith these issues in more detail, and providessome suggested solutions.

A number of agencies operate ‘retention rosters’and fellowship and training schemes, mosttypically to encourage the retention anddevelopment of senior managers but also toattract and train promising new talent. Forexamples, see Case Study 13. The ECB projecton National Staff Development is developing aFoundation Module designed to increase thenumber of agency staff at national level capableof leading and managing emergency programmes.

Efforts to increase the deployable staff pool isalso why some agencies look to deploy lessemergency-experienced staff in their second-waveresponse, and / or to provide such staff withboth training and opportunities for exposure inless acute emergency settings. This builds theirskills so that they can eventually be used in thefive-wave response.

Finally, as noted in Chapter 2, some of thesmaller agencies rely on the development ofexternal rosters and registers to boost their rapiddeployment capacity. The most common methodof sourcing staff for these lists is to ask ex-employees and favoured consultants if theywould like to join the lists.

Rapid Deployment from InternalSourcesA key aspect of enabling rapid deployment frominternal sources is to ensure staff have been pre-screened, trained and inducted. This allows themto become operational with minimum delay.

Another component of preparedness is to carryout simulations. Additional enablers include:

• The operation of a ‘watch system’ (also knownas ‘on call’). UNDP does this for its internalroster; SC-UK for its standing team. Thismeans that people work on a rota and areavailable at certain points during the year.When ‘on watch’ they are noted as being morepsychologically prepared to deploy, which isrecognised as helping to speed up the process.It also means that they know when they willhave the time to concentrate more on familyand other work / life issues, and so becomesan important approach to staff care.

• A technique for those not operating a watchsystem but who do employ full-time rapidresponse teams is to closely manage the workprogrammes of each individual standing teammember between emergencies, so that whenthey’re needed they’re ready to go. Part of thismanagement should concern the need tobalance down-time with deployment. WorldVision, for instance, ‘Have had to learn to say“no” to requests for other deployments’ fortheir GRRT-ers. This has led them toinstitutionalise central management fordeployment from this global tool.

• Some emergency units in HQ actively organisevisas, all travel arrangements and insurance forall their deployable staff rather than leavingthis responsibility to these staff. Agencies whodon’t do this at least send out regularcommunications to their deployable staffreminding them, for example, to keep visasand vaccinations up-to-date.

• Another technique is to have more than oneperson per identified position. This increasesthe likelihood of finding someone with the skillsets required. The IRC has five peopleidentified against each of its positions.

• Another extremely important component ofenabling rapid surge is the pre-identificationand capacity strengthening of national-levelpartners. This is considered in Chapter 4.

External RecruitmentIf agencies need to use external recruitmentduring the first phase of an emergency, it isimportant that this process happens quickly. It istherefore necessary to develop a set of policiesand practices that by-pass or truncate normalrecruitment practices (see Case Study 15). Whilethese processes can be identified individually ineach agency, all noted the importance of never


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cutting corners on core minimum essentialpractices and procedures, mostly related toquality control.

One of the most important lessons concerns theneed to develop generic job descriptions that canbe adapted to a particular country andprogramme context. A large number of agenciesinterviewed now have these for each of theirmain position areas. Development of genericToRs and scopes of work are similarly noted asimportant, and can be adapted to give peoplespecific information about their deployment.

Developing partnerships can also help with rapidrecruitment. For example, Mercy Corps reportsworking with technical staff in local universitieswhich means that, in the event of a large-scaleemergency, it has access to a pool of technicallyskilled people, including through the student body.

Another strategy for meeting surge in demand isfor HR to set up telephone hot-lines for externalpeople who call in to enquire about deployments,such as those operated by the British Red Crossin times of emergency.

Challenges in external recruitmentMuch has been written about the ‘pressingproblem’ of recruitment, including, for example, inthe People In Aid Handbook Enhancing Quality inHR Management in the Humanitarian Sector aswell as in Glazebrook (2006). Recruiting new staffis especially challenging during new emergencies,as most seem to agree that the pool of suitablyqualified and experienced staff is a finite onegiven competition and natural attrition.

All interviewees expressed particular concernabout recruiting experienced senior managers aswell as those with certain sets of specialisttechnical skills, such as people who work withyouth in emergencies, good shelter coordinators,people with operational accountability experience,and positions requiring specific language skills.Notwithstanding, some have observed that the‘lack of qualified staff is countered by othercomments proposing that the labour market iscyclical and therefore predictably unpredictable.This would indicate that the difficultiesorganisations perceive themselves to be facingare not necessarily as a result of external but[also] internal management issues’ (eg,Glazebrook, 2006).

Reflective of this issue, one respondentcommented that ‘we are very conservative as asector and perpetuate the same way of thinkingand of doing things; we need to take somecalculated risks before the loop of quality isnarrowed’. This is perhaps why a number of theagencies interviewed talk about the need to becreative and ‘look in unlikely places’ byintroducing additional techniques and tools toincrease their pool of potentially suitablecandidates. This requires considerable cultivationof relationships across different professionalsectors, and will only be possible throughadequate investment in HR capacity.

Agencies respond in two ways to the challenge ofrecruiting new staff. First, they emphasise theirown ‘brand’ in order to attract staff they think willbe suitable. Second, they try to develop exclusivepools of staff as well as look in ‘new’ places.

For example, Oxfam-GB and Mercy Corps seek toincrease their external recruitment pool byoperating ‘hot-lists’: lists of candidates who’veperformed well but who came in second; throughmutual agreement these agencies keep thesecandidates’ resumes on file and also keep trackof them. The NRC has created an ‘informationnetwork’ of returned employees who are paid

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Truncating procedures in times of crisis

MSF-UK: MSF deploys to some countries thatrequire police checks as well as visas forentry. Generally, MSF sorts these out ahead oftime to enable rapid deployment when needed.The policy is that no-one will go the fieldwithout an acceptable police check. In a hugeemergency this is balanced by sendingsomeone to the field if they have twosatisfactory references – especially as most ofthose involved in emergencies have gonethrough the whole process before.

Mercy Corps: Mercy Corps’ regular recruitmentpractices involve a number of procedures thatcan be truncated in emergencies, such asspeeding up the benefit payments protocoland filling in any missing information on aperson’s ‘action form’, whereas HR wouldnormally send this back so holding uprecruitment. Mercy Corps is planning topublish a ‘recruiting during emergencies’ setof guidelines to help its work in this area.

Case study 9


expenses to give talks about their experiences todifferent audiences, to encourage them to thinkabout a career in the humanitarian sector. Also,Oxfam-GB has developed some agreements forshort-term loans with technical experts fromrelevant technical organisations outside of thehumanitarian sector. Use of external consultantsis, however, expensive. And although thesepeople might know the agency, it is always achallenge to keep them up-to-date with agencypolicy and practice developments.

If agencies are more developmental they oftenfind it important to hire the ‘right kind ofdevelopment staff’ and train them in terms ofemergency response. Mercy Corps does this asthe agency believes it is easier to traindevelopment staff in emergency skills than viceversa. Induction into Mercy Corps as well asmore broadly into emergency standards andethics is therefore essential, and Mercy Corpsensures that all staff ‘go via Portland’ beforethey are deployed. The agency is comfortablewith this even if it means it may take slightlylonger to deploy.

In terms of sourcing new staff, places agenciesmight go to, or think about going to depending ontheir mandate; are: specialist recruitmentnetworks or agencies, both internationally or in-country; countries that don’t have emergenciesbut that do have good programme staff; jobcentres; volunteer agencies; portal websites(such as AlertNet and ReliefWeb); registeragencies (eg, RedR); different national and localpress; local community centres in-country; privatecompanies; the armed forces; regional or localNGO networks; and different interest groups.

CRS and World Vision also operate retainerschemes, and World Vision augments this withits Senior Associate Humanitarian ProgrammesReserve pool. These tools are designed to alloweach agency to have greater and guaranteedaccess to well-qualified programme managers.Annex 1 provides information on a number ofother ‘people tools’ used by the ECB agencies.Notable for their absence are M & E and learningand accountability specialists.


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Increasing the Pool of Potential Staff

The Norwegian Refugee Council (NRC) uses avariety of different mechanisms in order toreach a broad base of potential newcandidates. Although costly and time-consuming, the NRC occasionally pursues large-scale advertising rounds in a particular regionvia national and local press and ReliefWeb.While this is a heavy procedure it is effectivefor attracting new staff that might notnecessarily have extensive emergencyexperience but nevertheless are technicallyqualified and show promise. The agencyundertakes these sorts of more intensiverecruitments in areas where it may have lessroster staff. It uses these new recruits in lowerintensity crises, counter-parted with qualifiedstaff, before deploying them in the first wave.

MSF-UK seeks to fill 30% of each mission with‘fresh eyes’, usually in the second waveresponse. This is because the agency focuseson more than just medical relief, and is alsoinvolved in lobbying and advocacy around widerhealth issues such as better access to newdrugs. It believes that maintaining an intake ofnewer recruits will maintain levels of criticalanalysis and passion and therefore awillingness to get involved in advocacy workaround these wider issues.

The IFRC operates JobNet, an e-recruitment toolthat it bought from outside the agency. This hasbeen used to advertise positions to attractinterest from people outside of the RCMovement. It is a multiple search database sothat, for example, a Spanish-speaking, watsanengineer can be located. It took considerabletime to set up and two HR offices were initiallyrequired to manage it. Now it is just a smallpart of their work.

Case study 10

Rosters and registers

SummaryThe increasing scale and complexity ofemergencies places real demands on aidagencies. Many of these agencies have sought torespond by expanding and improving their staffcapacity. While some agencies can afford toemploy full-time standing teams – a factor theyconsider to be critical to the success of their first-wave response – most don’t have access to thelevels of unrestricted funding that these largeragencies enjoy. Their chosen route forsubstantially increasing staff capacity thereforecontinues to be through the development of what

most people refer to as internal rosters as wellas, sometimes, external rosters and registers.

Despite this, those interviewed for this studyacknowledged the real difficulties their agencyhas had, or is currently having, with thesesystems. Challenges cited are numerous and arerelated not just to their technical functioning, butalso to wider management issues to do with thesupport and availability of a group of rapidlydeployable staff. For an extremely usefuloverview of the advantages, potential pitfalls andbest practice considerations of running aninternal roster, readers are directed to People InAid’s (2004a) Information Note on EmergencyResponse Rosters.

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Examples of Retention Rosters and TrainingSchemes

World Vision International• Senior Associate Humanitarian Programmes

Reserve Pool: This new mechanism isdesigned to augment the agency’s seniormanagement surge capacity. This allows staffin the agency to ‘act’ when they meet a goodsenior manager and bring that person into theagency. Bridging funding from the core budgetis used to support these new staff members,who initially work on short-term assignmentsuntil they are deployed. The intention is thatthese staff will augment the GRRT as one ofthese five or six individuals will go in as thesenior manager of the response so enablingthe GRRT manager to leave when required fora new emergency (previously they were gettinglocked into positions).

• Retention scheme: This is used to maintain theinvolvement of more senior, semi-retired staff.These staff members receive a stipend if theycommit to six months a year deployment,during which time they go on full salary.

• Feeder schools: World Vision also uses thefeeder school model to augment its emergencyresponse. The HEA Feeder School is a practicalprofessional development programme to serveorganisational HEA objectives through therecruitment of staff with exceptional potentialto develop their technical, management andleadership abilities through intensive support of12 months, with the intent of ‘feeding’graduates into employment in an HEA role withan international management focus.

Capacity building is provided through a varietyof significant experiences such as mentoring, formal and informal training, specific actionlearning programme, exposure and practice inthe full range of job tasks and roles, andstrategic deployment. Performance is formallyassessed against agreed sectoral standardsand organisational requirements.

• The Associate programme involves staff in sixsupport offices who have strong technicalexpertise and augmenting their existing skillsas well as filling some of the sector gaps onthe current GRRT.

Save the Children UK• SC-UK is in the process of accrediting, through

the Open University in the UK, a post-graduatecertificate in humanitarian response. This isdesigned for entry level staff who will becomeleaders of the future. The training module willinclude, for example, leadership andmanagement practices; simulation training;advanced field training in hostile environments;and foundation theory covering issues to dowith humanitarian principles, systems andstandards etc.

• The agency has also been running a childprotection scheme since 2005. This isdesigned to train people specifically in the areaof child protection, and is a one-yearprogramme consisting of two six-monthplacements with a mentor in each differentcountry programme. Save the Children UK iscurrently seeking other agencies to take staffon these training placements.

Case study 11


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This section addresses these challenges in somedetail. It starts by clarifying the issue ofterminology with regard to rosters and registers.Following this it addresses the critical elementsof roster management. It finishes by proposing away forward for ECB agencies.

As indicated earlier, ECB agencies’ preference forfirst phase response is to develop a cadre ofpermanently employed, specialist rapid responsestaff. This is due to historic difficultiesexperienced with roster deployment, includingmaintaining up-to-date information and realavailability. This capacity allows HR time toactivate the various roster and register systemsoperated by agencies which are important ‘forproviding the follow-on capacity in terms ofrotating staff in and increasing capacity ifrequired … [despite the] limit to how much

capacity can be provided from within CountryOffices due to problems of availability, skill setsand the knock-on effect on ongoing programmes’(Willits-King & Darcy, 2005).

In contrast the IFRC, one of the comparison casestudy agencies, is able to rely on its internalrosters for its immediate response. This is dueto the IFRC’s primary mandate for emergencypreparedness and response. Smaller agencies,such as MedAir, only have resources to developan external roster system due to their limitedinternal capacity.

The table below provides an overview of theroster and register systems operated by ECBagencies. All of these tools reflect agencies’preferences for deploying known personnel duringthe first-wave response.


Agency Primary Internal Roster / Register Second Internal Roster / External Roster /Registers / Informal Networks

The IRC

MercyCorps

Oxfam-GB

Internal Emergency Roster (IER)Between 45-60 at any one time. • Secondment roster; IER members hold

regular positions in IRC country programmes• Goal is to have five people identified in every

sector.• Commitment to a 72-hour response.• Available for 4-6 weeks.• Use excel spreadsheet to manage.

Global Response Team (GRT) (incl OSTs; seebelow)• Created in 2005; not yet used extensively. • One week of mandatory training / year.• 72-hour commitment; up to 3 months

deployment. • Mostly national staff; cannot be used for

non-emergency purposes • 100% cost-recovery when deployed. • Excel spreadsheet to manage.This initiative is being replicated at regionallevel, (so-far a ‘mini-GRT’ in Indonesia).

Operational Support Team (OST):• Management & technical specialists (8-9

people)• Assigned to GRT by department heads at

HQ; serve in management, representationalor oversight roles

• One week of mandatory training / year• 72-hour commitment; only for 3-6 weeks• Set up systems and train people to take over

External Emergency Roster (EER)• Third available tool after the emergency unit

and the IER. Used less now the emergency unithas been expanded.

• Ready to deploy within one week’s notice• Not current IRC employees, but many have

worked for the IRC in the past.• Goal is to have five people identified in every

sector.

Oxfam-GB operates a number of informalspecialist registers.

Oxfam International is looking to develop oneoverall register for the Oxfam family of agencies.

Figure 5: ECB Agency Rosters and Registers (as at April 2007)

cont.


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Agency Primary Internal Roster / Register Second Internal Roster / External Roster /Registers / Informal Networks

SC-US

WorldVision

CARE Intl

CRS

Regional REDI Teams (Responding toEmergencies and Disasters Internationally)5 teams by region: Asia; Middle East/Eurasia;Africa; Latin America/Caribbean; United States.• Employees, but also from Save the Children

Alliance• Managed by Emergency Department and

Area Directors• Minimum of three people for each REDI

position, across 17 functions • The US REDI team was created after the

agency faced difficulties with visas whentrying to pull in staff from the other REDIteams

• Each REDI member has an approved backfillplan, which is a requirement for participation

• Heavy reliance on this mechanism for firstsurge response; due to issues concerningavailability the agency is consideringdeveloping a roster of a few full-timeresponders based in their home countries

Global Register• Internal; capacity for deployment for up to 6

weeks per year.• Register is managed by the staffing solutions

function of WVI.• Fee sent to sending offices from receiving

offices for local hires to backfill when thestaff member is deployed.

• Release agreements in place (in theory) andpayments go back into the sending office sothey can recruit and backfill (currently case-by-case negotiation; trying to developprotocols for this that will also involve staffperson being released for regular training).

Care Emergency Response Team (CERT) –though this is noted as not working well at themoment, and CARE US has developed anAction Plan to make it operational it again.

Each CARE operational agency (Australia,Canada, the US) is currently developing its ownEmergency Response Team (ERT).

Emergency Corps – also noted as not workingwell at the moment.

Regional Rapid Response Team (RRRT)• Second internal secondment tool. • Started in Africa seven years ago. • See case study 13 for details.

CARE International notes great use of informalnetworks to staff its emergency response – inpart due to the fact that the CERT is notworking well.

Figure 5: ECB Agency Rosters and Registers (as at April 2007) cont.

Rosters and Registers DefinedRosters are, at their most basic, tools such asspreadsheets or databases to manageinformation concerning deployable staff. Peopleoften refer to these tools as ‘mechanisms’ whichimplicitly widens their scope to include some kindof process – in this case, the process to rapidlydeploy. This is in line with dictionary definitions ofthe term mechanism which talk about processesby which something takes place, or is brought

about, and hence why this section addressesmatters concerning the maintenance of thesetools to enable deployment.

The terms roster and register are often usedsynonymously, though interviewees tended towardusing the term ‘roster’ as a catch-all. Also, US-based interviewees were more likely to use theterm roster, whereas European agencies wereinclined to talk about rapid deployment tools and,sometimes, registers. This differentiation was not


consistent, however, and a useful distinction toemerge from the research concerns the issue ofavailability: rosters provide information onavailable dates, in the way that say a ‘rota’ might.Registers don’t, and are rather a tool to collect,store and make people’s details easily availablefor the roster. This reflects dictionary definitionsof the term register which talk about lists orrecords of information (for example skills) which,when used electronically, enable quick access.

For example, World Vision sees its rosters asbeing part of a larger Global Register systemwhich is used for identifying internal skilled people(though it also provides an opportunity forexternal individuals). The Global Relief Registercaptures all the names, skills, competencies andprovides the ‘background’ information for itsroster (referred to as a ‘calendar’). SC-UKoperates its ‘REACT list’ or ‘rapid deploymentmechanism’ (note its use of terms), a virtualmobilisation technique based on a watch systemfor its core deployable staff. This staff constitutesits full-time emergency response personnel (orERPs), its core team, and also its Alliancepartners. As with World Vision, details aboutthese staff are contained on a larger globalregister that sits ‘behind’ the REACT list (which isan availability spreadsheet). In comparison,Oxfam-GB uses a ‘capacity spreadsheet’ to trackthe availability of its HSPs.

It is notable that the three agencies thatdisplayed a more nuanced understanding ofthese different deployment mechanisms allemploy full-time standing teams. This perhapsmakes it easier for them to utilise a ‘rota’-typesystem. Agencies that rely on internalredeployments naturally struggle much more withthe issue of availability.

The difference between rosters and registersnoted above could be a useful conceptualdistinction. It might help agencies reflect on theinformation management processes they will needto manage information about their deployablestaff, and therefore how they might want todesign their databases or spreadsheets.

In line with most of the agencies interviewedfor this study, this report uses the term rosterto refer to agencies’ rapid deployments tools,unless specifically stated otherwise. Implicit inthe use of this term is a tool that containsinformation both about a person (ie, theirqualifications and skills) as well as theiravailability.

Commonly, agencies interviewed for this studyoperate internal rosters that involve currentemployees either at HQ, from the field, and / orthose who have returned from the field andmight be available for further assignments. Theyalso sometimes have external or second-level‘rosters’: these constitute lists of favouredconsultants, ex-employees and, by mutualconsent, strong candidates who have applied tothe agency and been short-listed but notappointed. The issue of recorded availability isnot at the heart of the information providedabout these people, and to address this issuemore than one person is identified for eachposition category (as is also the case with theinternal mechanisms). Other agencies, forexample, Oxfam-GB, use the term register todescribe informal lists of favoured consultants.

It is notable that two of the smaller agenciesinterviewed for this study have had toconcentrate on building their external lists(referred to by these agencies as ‘rosters’;


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Why HSPs rather than Registers?

While Oxfam-GB is fortunate in the level ofunrestricted funding it has to support itsHSPs, the agency used to operate ‘extensiveexternal registers … but realised themanagement cost of maintaining them wastoo high; it was also too difficult to do well’.Oxfam-GB therefore chose to reduce theadministrative and transaction costs ofemploying lots of people on short-termcontracts and instead decided to increasethe number of HSPs it employs. This wasseen as preferable to constantly recruiting,inducting and training people (a cost-intensive activity) particularly because theagency can now more effectively invest inthe longer term capacity of its staff who willtake their ongoing learning and experienceinto new deployments and advance theircareers inside Oxfam if they wish (manyHSPs have gone on to hold more seniorposts in the UK or at regional or countrylevel in wider programme roles in addition topurely humanitarian ones). In addition tothese HSPs, Oxfam-GB also operates aseries of decentralised, specialist registersand Oxfam International is currentlyinvestigating the development of an Oxfam-wide register.

Case study 12


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MedAir and Care Australia) due to their lack ofinternal capacity, while some agencies haveboth an internal as well as an external ‘roster’(eg, the IRC). These external ‘rosters’ or listsare particularly sensitive to smaller, lesspublicised emergencies because members findit harder to get time off work for responding tothese crises - although their availability is notguaranteed, people on MedAir’s and CAREAustralia’s lists do sign pre-release agreementswith their employers. This is an importantdisabler when it comes to mounting a responsein, say, a chronic emergency that becomestemporarily acute.

Depending on their needs and currentconfigurations, different agencies will thereforeface different challenges with regard to theoperation and maintenance of their rosters and/ or registers.

Once a roster is well-populated with suitablecandidates, it offers obvious benefits as arapid deployment tool. These include speed,transparency, and accessibility. Rosters arealso noted to encourage merit-based selectionsince the easiest way of filtering candidates isto search for relevant qualifications andexperience without using names (UNDPKO,2006). However, these benefits will only accrueif agencies are willing to support thedevelopment of roster systems at managementlevel, as well as invest the money needed todevelop a reliable system from an ITperspective, as well as invest the staff requiredto manage such a tool. UNDPKO (2006:15)notes that OCHA’s roster system ultimatelyfailed due to a number of reasons: ‘Seniormanagers often bypass[ed] the rostermechanism, staff [were] reluctant to subscribeto it (often as a result of perceived lack ofcredibility) and there [were] recurrent problemswith staff being released for deploymentdespite prior agreement.’

Notably CARE and CRS brought up many ofthese issues when talking about theirrespective rosters. CARE in particular reflectedthat, as a result, the agency has been forced tomake greater use of informal networks – withall the attendant costs of contractingconsultants and compromising the quality of itsresponse through employing people who knowthe agency less well.

Developing and managing rostersOverall, developing and managing rosterscomprises four key elements:

1. Whole-organisation buy-in, led by the seniorleadership

2. An HR management solution

3. A technical IT solution

4. Money to finance 2 & 3 above

The rest of this section addresses lessons withregard to 1, 2 and 3 above.

(1) Whole-organisation Buy-inWhatever their mandate and structure, the firstand foremost lesson is that a broad range ofagency staff – from senior management, to thoseresponsible for populating the roster and thoseresponsible for recruitment, to field-levelpersonnel – need to buy-in to the roster conceptas an integrated effective emergency responsetool if it is to work. This suggests that any rostersystem must be properly institutionalised.6

Gaining buy-in is not straightforward, andinterviewees highlighted two challengesassociated with this which impact on efforts toidentify good staff in sufficient numbers:

1. Regional and country directors are not alwaysforthcoming when identifying staff for agencyrosters. HR and roster coordinators have oftenfound the need to actively ‘push’ these peopleto nominate their staff (a process referred toas a ‘constant battle’ by some respondents).

2. Staff do not always see their involvement onthese rosters as part of their career development.

Agencies also need to ensure adequate policiesand plans are in place to support the operation ofthese rosters (for example, strategies forbackfilling), the development of which are notalways prioritised and the implementation ofwhich are not always followed. This is why senior-level support is required which, in an idealscenario, will introduce functioning accountabilityinto the operation of the roster.

Many of these challenges are inter-linked: countrydirectors will, for example, be more sympatheticto nominating staff if they can see that backfillingpolicies are in place and actually work or if, forexample, they receive payment for releasing theirstaff member. This has considerable financial

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6 According to UNDP, if there is corporate commitment to enabling swift emergency response then being on the roster ‘means you’re already released’, asthe commitment to surge capacity is corporately driven. However, this is unlikely to be the case in smaller, less resource-rich NGOs.


implications for an agency that has access toless unrestricted funding.

With regard to 2 above, it was mostly the moredevelopment-oriented agencies that mentionedthis challenge. In comparison, the bigger dualmandate agencies with a longer history ofemergency work reported that being associatedwith the humanitarian department is seen asbringing kudos (this might also be because twoof these organisations, Oxfam-GB and WorldVision, employ full-time standing teams). Thevariety of the work portfolio was also reportedas an incentive, both for those on full-time,standing teams as well as those on some of thedeployment rosters – eg, in the IRC.

Agencies most commonly mentioned threelessons with regard to overcoming the issue ofbuy-in and sourcing staff for their internal rosters:

• Make sure staff from the emergency unitsattend regional and national workshops to talkabout emergency work and the role of rostermembers. Mercy Corps found this especiallyuseful: as primarily a developmentorganisation, it provides workshops andtraining at regional events on, for example, theECB-developed ‘Good Enough Guide’ onaccountability and impact assessment as wellas on disaster risk reduction. This increasesthe likelihood that regional and country officeswill feel that they’re ‘getting something fromthe humanitarian sector that is useful to them’.

• Build effective relationships between theemergency unit at HQ and the regional andcountry directors by, for example, giving‘positive PR’ to the regional director / releasingoffice in public intra-agency events and also, forexample, in newsletters. The IRC, Mercy Corpsand CRS stressed this in particular. This can bean incentive in itself, but perhaps morepowerful is when a country director sees her orhis staff member return more motivated andwith increased skills, which can be put to gooduse if an emergency occurs locally.

• Identify people in emergency preparednessplans with the skills that could be utilised intimes of an emergency. This is often done byfull-time staff who deploy to help a countryoffice prepare these plans. Another approach isto have those on the rosters develop their ownpreparedness plans in the context of trainingworkshops, and then to return with these totheir country offices with something concretefor their manager to see. The development anduse of these plans needs to be kept ‘live’ andmonitored on an ongoing basis.

Buy-in for availability: the importanceof trust and accountabilityBuilding trust and accountability is also crucial togaining buy-in and helping to ensure availability.Some lessons drawn here include:

• Honour pre-release agreements – in other words,do not violate the agreed assignment period.This will increase trust in the mechanism by thecountry directors. Similarly, try not to allow thereleased staff member to apply for other jobswhile away (though some agencies noted that ifstaff do this, this can act as an incentive forothers to join as they see the deployed personactively developing their career track).

• Build accountability into the mechanisms foradhering to agreements on release. This will behelped by, for example, ensuring adequatebackfilling arrangements are in place (see theMercy Corps example below). Backfilling plansare particularly helpful when sending officesneed to identify who to either recruit or whichremaining staff will cover the essentialelements of the post being temporarily vacated.Also, programmes find it easier to release staffif they have a strong team, reinforcing theimportance of national level capacity building. (Asuggested backfilling solution, apparently notyet tried, is to cross-train among countryprogrammes as a backfilling strategy.)

• Another way of building trust, but also importantfor helping with availability, is to provide somekind of bridge funding to the sending offices inlieu of project money being made available.

Mitigating lack of availability

• To mitigate lack of availability, the IFRC operatesa ‘call model’ for its roster system. This meansthat the agency puts, for example, five peopleon call for each of the identified requiredpositions. All information about these people iscontained on a website and when an emergencyis called, this site generates full text messagesand emails to these people who then select in.This website is hosted in Finland and sponsoredby the Finnish Red Cross.

• MedAir has found that building in flexibility isthe best way to address availability, particularlyas it operates an external ‘roster’. The agencyhas three deployable categories: people wholeave within 48 hours for 1-2 weeks; those wholeave within 2 weeks for 1-2 months; and thosewho leave within a month for 3 months. (This ismade easier because the agency is lessconcerned with continuity due to thepredominantly medical nature of its rapid


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deployments.) The agency has also found iteffective to ask people if they’d like to be on itsroster before they leave MedAir assignments.

This is because they have found that the besttime to negotiate potential absence with futureemployers is when negotiating the terms of anew job.

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An evaluation of Mercy Corps’ GEO led theagency to conclude that it was not adequatelystructured as a first responder. As a result, in2005 the agency established its GlobalResponse Team (GRT) and, in drawing up theguidelines for the operation of this team,incorporated lessons learned about differentaspects of surge capacity. Some of theserelate to staff availability and backfilling. (MercyCorps has used the GRT on only limitedoccasion since its establishment due to thelower number of responses requiring its input.It has therefore not yet fully ‘tested’ thismechanism.) For example:

Letter of Understanding: Upon completion ofthe selection process, the Country Director, theGRT member and the Director of GEO agree to aLetter of Understanding. The letter reiteratesthe conditions for deployment detailed in theseguidelines. The letter also reinforces GEOcommitment to return GRT staff to their postswithin the maximum period, a commitment thathas been a critical measure of success withother roster systems. Every six months, GRTmembers and Country Directors confirm theircontinued participation by responding to a GEOe-mail/phone call. If the GRT member orCountry Director is not able to recommit, thenthat position is made vacant for the next roundof applications.

Deployment: There is no guarantee that oncea candidate is accepted onto the GRT andgoes through the training that s/he will bedeployed to an emergency. Manyemergencies are handled entirely by theregular Mercy Corps staff in a country wherethe crisis occurs.

If an emergency occurs and Mercy Corps’President invokes the emergency responseprotocol, a decision may be made to send aGEO team to respond. The TeamLeader/Country Director leading the responsewill work with the GEO to decide whichpositions need to be filled and which GRTmembers’ skills are needed. GEO will contactthe GRT members’ Country Directors to confirmtheir availability for deployment. Should theGRT member refuse a deployment without theprior establishment of a “blackout date,” s/herisks being removed for consideration for futuredeployments.

Blackout Dates: GRT candidates and theirCountry Directors can establish “blackout dates”which are dates when the GRT members areabsolutely not available for deployment. Thiscan be done on the application form at the timeof application, during the semi-annual renewalprocess, or at other times during the year.

The Backstopping plan: It is extremelyimportant that all Country Directors realise thatthe GRT members will be out for as long as 12weeks. Country Directors are responsible formaking sure that the GRT members’ regularresponsibilities are covered during the timewhen members are deployed. The CD approvesa "backstopping plan" for the GRT memberoutlining how his/her work will be covered whiles/he is deployed. The plans constitute a one ormore page document outlining how the GRTmember’s regular duties/responsibilities will becovered during a deployment. This shouldinclude names of staff persons who will beassisting during this time, and must be signedby the country director.

Promising practice

Mercy Corps’ Global Response Team Guidelines


(2) HR ManagementThe second most important lesson with regard toroster management is to make sure there isadequate HR capacity to manage the tool – bothin terms of time required to properly screen andclear candidates, as well as manage relationshipswith those on the mechanism. Agencies that relyon rosters for rapid response under-invest in thiscapacity at their peril.

Rodolfo Siles of CARE US reflects:

The critical element is not the tool but thedesign of the processes and the governanceto effectively manage the information. Oncethat is defined, agreed and people givenresponsibilities for it, the technologybecomes an enabler that facilitates theexecution of the process.

As with any other initiative it needs strongsponsorship that will ensure the tool willsupport roster management processeswithin each agency and not the other wayaround. If those processes are not in placeor at least defined, the tool will be useless.The development of any such project shouldbe process driven rather that technologydriven, and that means identifying ownershipfor the tool and staff responsible formanaging it to ensure the data is current,relevant and correct. Finding the technologythen is much easier.

HR management in this context of this chapteralso refers to a series of policies and practices tosupport roster staff, including comprehensiveincentive packages as well as many of the issuesaddressed in Chapter 4, such as duty of care andstaff development.

Some lessons learntMake proper time for information gathering

• Since a key lesson for rapid deployment is todeploy pre-screened personnel, time must bemade to properly check applications andensure minimum quality requirements. This canbe a challenge if those involved in the interviewprocess work remotely, and proper planningand coordination is required. Nevertheless, it isimportant to involve technical experts as wellas those most familiar with national contextsand standards in the screening of candidates.

• It is imperative that rosters are constantlyupdated if the utility of the roster is to bemaintained. Moreover, in order to maintain

their flexibility new members need to becontinually sought.

• In addition, if agencies develop a simple matrixof fields of expertise and levels of professionalcompetence when thinking about how best togather, and use, information, this will helpthem to classify their candidates and sorespond more

• quickly to position requests.

Focus on relationships and maintain engagement

• Know your staff and know them well: rosters(and registers) are considered most successfulwhen their manager/s have personalrelationships with those on their lists, and knowtheir particular skills sets. This is also importantfor full-time standing teams: if not enough effortis put into their support, development and line-management, they too will ‘disappear’.

• It is also important to provide sufficientinformation and clarity with regard to staffassignments: where they’re going; for howlong; the parameters of their engagement.

• The above will help to build trust, which isviewed as particularly important for external‘rosters’ when members will be required to ‘puttheir lives on hold, get time off their regularjob, and get on the plane as soon as possible’.

• Develop an active strategy to maintainengagement with roster members. For example,some agencies put in annual or bi-annual callsto their deployable staff, as well as, forexample, send out quarterly newsletters. CAREAustralia, which operates an external ‘roster’,draws on its ERT members betweenemergencies by taking them on trainingprogrammes or using them to backfill in theCARE Australia office or overseas. As this canbe organised in advance it is easier for thestaff to get time off work. Staff in Oxfam-GB’shumanitarian department speak to theirassigned HSPs once a month.

• Oxfam-GB operates a system of specialistregisters in addition to its HSPs. For the twolargest registers in the Public Health division,they have hired an additional ‘recruitmentexecutive’ whose role is to keep people on theregister ‘warm’; keep their details up to date;and investigate innovative ways to populatethe registers.

Given the importance of managing individualexpectations and availability, some agencies, suchas MSF, are now beginning to consider issues ofquality vs quantity when building their rosters.


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Rosters (and registers) that aren’t updatedregularly and are not sufficiently supported bystaff in terms of regular individual contact, areconsidered ‘useless’.

Build in a strong, professional capacitydevelopment component

• Training is essential, and helps with bothpreparedness and staff retention.

• Training can be augmented by having eachroster member ‘counter-parted’ with someonein HQ, for example, in the technical units. TheIRC encourage team members and technicalunit staff to set aside time to work together onjoint projects and sets money aside in itsannual budget for this, though obviously needsto work within annual targets to cover the %time that people need to be deployed.

• It is also useful to facilitate regular ‘learningforums’. In Oxfam, the HSPs are broughttogether once a year, in addition to theirtechnical and management training, with theobjective of helping them to reflect and improveupon their work.

• Set up, for example sharepoint (CRS) or yahoogroups (the IRC) to encourage communities ofpractice among team members and betweenteam members and technical specialists in thewider organisation.

Ensure clarity of purpose and parameters arounddeployment

• Provide clear information on how involvement inthe roster can lead to career development, andmake sure to provide adequate assignmentfeedback and performance appraisal to thisend. Clear Terms of Reference should beprovided for all deployments.

• Make sure not to disrupt the deployed staffmember’s existing salary structure but ratherincentivise appropriately through, for example,additional hardship allowances; augmentedsalaries to put the deployed staff member on apar with other internationals; adequate R & Rand other ‘duty of care’ responsibilities such ascounselling.

• Agencies have also found it helpful to assign amaximum deployment time for these personneleach year given the issue of burn-out. For thosein full-time positions outside of their rostercommitments, this will be another way ofbuilding trust with their sending offices.

A coordinated response

• Federated agencies in particular should try toensure a coordinated response so that thecountry office is not swamped with offers foradditional personnel from numerous HRsources. A focal point needs to be nominatedfor this communication.

Chapter

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World Vision’s Regional Response Team

World Vision’s Regional Response Team (RRT)was first set up in Africa seven years ago. Itsobjective is to be the first line of response incategory 2 emergencies – ie, emergenciesthat can be contained within the region.

The RRT targets national and regional staffand, since its foundation, has involved over58 people. All those on the team aremembers of regional or national offices. Theinitial group of 20 staff were identifiedthrough a series of visits to all the nationaloffices in Africa as well as through a series ofregional workshops. These visits also focusedon relationship building and helping peoplesee the value of the RRT. Those selectedwere chosen on the basis of ‘right attituderather than right skills’: at the time the reliefgroup in World Vision had developed asomewhat negative image as ‘cowboys’ whichled the agency to the focus on the sorts ofbehavioural competencies already mentioned.

Staff involved in the RRT undergo 10 daystraining every nine months. This includestraining in their technical areas; humanitarianstandards and principles; and physicalsimulations, among other things. Training as ateam was found to encourage cohesiveness,which helped when members of the groupwere either deployed together or in sub-groupsinto emergencies. (SC-UK believes that‘unless you have created teams it doesn’twork’, noting that team cohesiveness makesan ‘unbelievable difference’.)

Many RRT staff have gone on to seniorpositions within World Vision, which viewsthis mechanism as a leadership feederschool and a way of building future reliefmanagers. Staff have to have been deployednumerous times before being promoted. Oldmembers of the team move into an ‘alumni’

Case study 13

cont.


(3) The IT SolutionIT tools to manage rosters and registers don’tneed to be built from scratch and webapplications, such as recruitment systems, canprovide functionality over the web to alloworganisations to ‘rent’ a tool without the need toinstall it in-house. All the tool does is collect datafrom staff and provide the ability to search thedatabase for specific criteria and select staffmembers that best fit need. The success of rostermanagement is not defined by the tool but by therelevance, timelines and accuracy of theinformation held by each agency.

A number of different companies offer this type ofservice. The suggestions provided below are notan endorsement of any one of them, but agenciesmight find it useful to look at what they offer,including functionality, to get an idea of what ispossible and what is available:

• www.taleo.com

• www.icims.com

• www.kenexa.com

• www.silkroadtech.com

• www.virtualedge.com

Of the seven ECB agencies interviewed, onlyWorld Vision currently operates a web-basedregister and roster system, though other agencieshave web-based recruitment databases.Information on the World Vision system can befound in Case Study 14 below.


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and are invited to coach and mentor newmembers. Some alumni therefore alwaysattend the annual training workshops.

To begin with World Vision had variablesuccess ensuring members’ availability.However, once the national directors realisedthat having RRT members in their officesactually built their own capacity to respondand meant they could avoid ‘calling in thecavalry’ this became less of a problem. Infact another challenge was created: RRTmembers were given more and moreresponsibility in their own teams, meaningthat they became more difficult to pull out forreasons of increased seniority. Hence thedecision to keep this particular roster systemflexible by moving people into alumnipositions and recruiting new members on aregular basis.

World Vision regularly synthesises learningabout key aspects of its emergency response,and this includes a set of learnings around theRRT. These lessons, along with theirsuggested solutions, can be found in Annex 2.

Based on an interview with Eleanor Monbiot

The World Vision Register and Roster System

World Vision’s register, of which the roster isa part, is accessible through WVI’s Navigatorsystem, and is made up of a database and aWeb interface which is fully integrated withthe database itself. The objective of theregister is to develop a pool of competentand skilled human resources that could bedeployed to any large-scale humanitariancrisis anywhere in the world for a shortperiod of time in all major sectors (finance,HR, IT, etc). The register, through its roster,then compliments other response teams inWVI (ie, GRRT and RRT, etc).

Technical functionality

The Web interface provides generalinformation about the register, its purposesand how it functions, explaining theprocesses involved, as well as a navigationmenu, with various relevant links, including alink to a quarterly report of available stafffor deployment. The intent of the quarterlyreport is to allow offices to view a calendar(ROSTER) of available candidates with theirtechnical sectors. The advantage with this isthat the requesting manager isknowledgeable of people available at thetime of a crisis so as to engage withrespective stakeholders.

It is within the web interface that allcandidate nominations are done. Once anomination of a candidate is done either byself or management or other nominatingparty within World Vision, the process ofcandidates is fully automated. Thecandidate’s manager, as well as sectorvaluators, must

approve all nominations before the candidateis activated on the register and subsequentlythe ROSTER.

cont.

Case study 14

Case study 14 cont.


Chapter

3

Chapter 3

The DatabaseThe Lotus Notes database is where all dataresides. It is distinctly separate from the Webinterface, yet still fully interfaced with. Forexample, all documents and edits are done inthe database and then are reflected on the webinterface. This is a manual operation as with anyDB management and within the scope of theregister coordinator.

The database itself is accessible only to alimited number of people; such as the GlobalRelief Register (GRR) Coordinator, theInternational Staffing Solutions OperationsManager, the HEA HR director, and the IMGLotus Notes administrator (who of necessity hasto have universal access to all WV systems).However, the GRR Coordinator maintains accessrights to the Web interface of the Register wherethere is absolutely no compromise of private orprofessional candidate information.

Nomination onto the register

The steps of the nomination process are asfollows:

1. A nomination is made through this facility – bymanager of nominee, nominee him/herself, oranyone else within World Vision on the web.

2. The manager of nominee approvesnomination of staff member - the manager’sapproval form is automatically delivered to themanager by the system.

3. The nominee creates his/her profile directly -the form is automatically delivered to nomineeby the system.

4. The GRR Coordinator pre-screens a nominee’sprofile against the core competencies and thegeneral requirements for that sector, beforeallowing the validators to assess the technicalcompetencies.

5. The sector validator is then asked to confirmor assess the suitability of a nominee for aresponse based on information in the profileagainst the technical guidelines for thatsector. A form will be automatically delivered

to the validator by the system to capture theirassessment comments on a nominee.

6. After the validation process, the nominee iseither finally accepted (or disqualified) into theGlobal Relief Register. The GRR Coordinatorwill notify nominees of their status in relationto the registration process.

People management

The GRR has a full-time Coordinator who has abackground in HR and passion in IT. The majorresponsibilities of this position are:

i) Marketing the Register to increase knowledgeand registration of candidates.

ii) Management of the register database in termsof the coordination of all registration processesfrom nominees to validators.

iii) Generating emails to candidates who have /haven’t been accepted.

iv) Sending out orientation materials to acceptedmembers.

v) Periodically making contact with GRR membersincluding those initially rejected but who mighthave upgraded their skills.

vi) In times of emergency, negotiating with GRRmembers their release with their supervisors fordeployment.

vii) Working with the receiving offices, TORs anddeployment agreements for candidates, includingthe coordination of travel logistics, pre-boardingand onsite orientation.

viii) Carrying out, with the GRRT member and theHR person in the field, exit interviews; this is fedback to the sending office.

Areas identified for improvement include:

Enhancing the technical functionality to allowpeople to access the web from any location andalso allowing external candidates to nominatethemselves by capturing their own informationon the web.



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Chapter 3 – Summary Points• Surge capacity mechanisms typically comprise planning mechanisms, and recruitment

mechanisms. Recruitment mechanisms might be internal or external and rosters or registers areused to plan for and ensure adequate staffing levels.

• Quality is ensured by a focus on staff development plans, including training and, for example,mentoring.

• Sourcing staff for internal rosters and registers requires special attention. External recruitment isequally challenging, and the humanitarian sector needs to ensure that it is sufficiently creative inits external recruitment in order not narrow the loop of quality of humanitarian personnel. Agenciesaddress this issue through a number of means, including operating ‘hot lists’; seeking imaginativemethods of attracting new staff; and deploying promising staff into non-acute emergency settingswhere they can gain experience for future deployments as ‘first-wave’ responders. A number ofagencies also operate ‘retention rosters’ and fellowship and training schemes, most typically toencourage the retention and development of senior managers but also to attract and trainpromising new talent

• To facilitate rapid deployment, agencies do well when they focus on developing policies, proceduresand tools that assist with smooth, fast deployment. For example, to do with rapid recruitment, aswell as rapid induction and orientation; by operating a ‘watch system’ for their full-time standingteams; by closely managing the work programmes of all of their deployable staff; and by practicallysupporting their deployable staff, including with appropriate incentives packages

• ‘Second-wave’ and continuity planning have been shown to impact on programme quality,accountability and sustainability. All agencies struggle in this area, and have sought to address thisdifficult issue through a number of practices including the development of staffing plans for theongoing response right from the beginning of a new emergency, and attempting to regularly counter-part international emergency and country-level staff.


Chapter 3

Chapter

3


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To provide some structure for our considerationof what enables effective surge, let us groupthe key enablers into four categories:

• Strategic vision and supportive agency culture

• The role of the HR function or department

• HR policies and practices

• The strength of local capacity

The cross cutting nature of the role of HR is arecurrent theme and we will return to this.Research has shown that agencies oftenstruggle in the area of human resource capacityfor surge response. This is backed up by anumber of commentators including the authorsof the HRR (2005:9) who observe:

The major gap identified is the low level ofpreparedness of humanitarian organizationsin terms of human resources[.] In the area ofhuman resources, major shortcomings inmanagerial capacities are acknowledged.Recruitment policies, in particular duringemergencies, fail to provide, in a timelyfashion, the number and quality of requiredstaff. Training within organizations, ingeneral, is limited in scope and number ofdedicated hours.

Strategic vision and asupportive agency cultureSurge capacity represents a particular way ofthinking and of doing things. Rudy von Bernuthof SC-US notes that developing an effective,sustainable surge capacity involves having a

comprehensive, cross-departmental vision, andis about effecting a changed way of thinkingacross an organisation as much as it is havingthe physical, material and cash resources inplace to enable surge. This means thatagencies will need to move from reacting toemergencies to anticipating them, as well astake into account the preparedness demandsthat this will place on the organisation.

“First and foremost, an agency needs to have acomprehensive strategic vision that frames itsemergency response, including its surgeresponse.”

First and foremost, therefore, an agency needsto have a comprehensive strategic vision thatframes its emergency response, including itssurge response. Developing an associated arrayof aims and objectives will help to ‘set the tonefor discussions of the relative priority ofemergency and development work, and theresponsibilities of programme staff for preparingfor, and responding to, emergencies’ (Willits-King & Darcy, 2005). Equally important is thatan agency reach agreement and support thedevelopment of each of the component parts ofits surge capacity, including understanding howeach of the components relates to, andsupports, each other, as well as how they bestserve the structure and mandate of theorganisation and, ultimately, the affectedpopulations themselves.

Chapter 4:Enabling effective surge

Chapter SummaryThis chapter identifies the ‘enablers’ of surge capacity, i.e. the factors, or practices, or policies orapproaches which determine whether an organisation successfully surges or not.

Key to an effective surge is undoubtedly a high degree of organisational agility and a strategiccontribution from the HR function.

In addition, we have seen highlighted the importance of preparedness, flexibility, durability andsustainability. Strengthening capacity at a local level is one way of achieving this and this chaptergives some attention to current approaches.


Chapter 4

A small number of the agencies interviewed alsointroduced the idea of ‘durability’ and the need torespond not just with first-wave deployments butalso with second-wave deployment, and to startplanning for this right away. This is related toideas about stability – for some achieved byhaving first-wave responders ‘counterpart’ withnational staff so that continuity is built into thesurge process. It is also related to sustainabilityand the extent to which an agency may beinvolved in disaster mitigation and risk reductionwork, as well as the extent to which theemergency units in dual mandate agencies workwith their development colleagues.

Finally, part of building emergency surge capacitylies in an agency’s commitment to learning fromits experience. The arguments for agencies tobecome ‘learning organisations’ are well-knownand include, for example, the need to identify waysto increase quality and accountability of emergencysurge response. Equally important is the need foragencies to shift from being reactive to being moreproactive. This implies a requirement to investheavily in learning to enable this shift to takeplace. Operations units need to be able toexperiment, including in inter- and intra-agencycollaboration, and any new ways of working willonly be useful if the agency is committed tofeedback, knowledge management and learning.C

hapter4

Enabling Factors in SC-US

Half of SC-US’s resources are linked to itsability to mount emergency response.However, given its historic development focusit has decided to focus on preparing andmanaging its country offices as a priority, andis now focusing on regionalising its rostersystem. It has focused on putting resourcesinto preparing its COs to respond, backed upby specialist technical capacity at HQ.Responses are managed at country level in allbut the most extraordinary of circumstances,and even then the agency tries not to ‘step-aside’ the development hierarchy, particularlyas it ‘doesn’t make sense’ to have separateaccounting, logistics and HR systems. Unlessa country office is therefore unwilling torespond or really clearly doesn’t have thecapacity to take the lead, line managementwill stay within the development side andwithin the development department at HQ.

This approach is facilitated by SC-US having an‘integrated mandate’ rather than a ‘dualmandate’. The distinction is that managers areno longer either development or relief, butmust be capable of leading programmedelivery across the spectrum.

Another critical factor for SC-US has been todevelop two major capacities in its emergencyresponse unit: a management support divisionas well as the technical support division. Thishas enabled the agency to clearly define anddevelop management as a critical element inemergency response; an issue that NGOs havenot always perhaps historically recognised.

Case study 15


Clear communication protocols• An overarching requirement is to have clear

lines of communication. Oxfam-GB hasdeveloped a tool to assist in this process. Thisconstitutes a ‘ways of working in anemergency agreement’ that clarifies roles andcommunication lines of all HR personnelinvolved, and thus improves their ability toaffect a coordinated and effective response.

Leadership• Leadership is viewed as critical to the success

of emergency operations, especially forcountries with an existing agency presence. Ofgreat importance, therefore, are polices thatpre-designate lines of authority so that, oncethe level of emergency has been called it isclear who will take responsibility. Oxfam-GBhas adopted a ‘step-aside’ policy that it cancall on if required and which is effectivelyembedded in the emergency management plantool. In comparison, SC-US emergencyprogrammes stay within the management ofthe agency’s country directors.

• Related to this, particularly for alliance orfederated agencies, is the need to pre-designate an agency lead in order to clarifydecision-making and communication pathwaysat field level.

Enabling effective surge

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World Vision’s Strategic Approach

World Vision’s stated objective is to be able torespond to emergencies anywhere in the world,including two major ones simultaneously. Thiswas agreed among all members of the WorldVision partnership as the starting point forbuilding its emergency capacity. Agreement ona shared vision took several months toachieve, and was followed by an ongoingprocess of policy development. Within a familyor partnership structure, having an agreedpolicy is vital to a common and integratedapproach. The following elements have beendeveloped to strengthen World Vision’s capacity(see earlier and Annex 1 for more informationon these elements):

1. An agreed relief policy among thepartnership, with the objective of beingable to respond to all emergencies,including two large emergencies at any onetime, within 24-72 hours.

2. A dedicated 22-strong Global RapidResponse Team.

3. Regional relief directors and responseteams.

4. Development of detailed standards,policies and procedures.

5. Liaison teams in New York, Geneva andBrussels.

6. A central non-operational humanitarian unitfocusing on standards, policies,deployment capacity and interaction withUN agencies.

7. Bi-annual meetings of relief directors.

8. Initial disaster preparedness plans for allprogramme countries.

9. Stockpiled relief supplies in fourwarehouses, to a value of $6 million.

10. A dedicated $6 million emergencypreparedness and response fund.

Taken from Willits-King and Darcy (2005)

Case study 16

‘ ’


Chapter 4

The role of the HR functionor department

Probably the most critical lesson concernsthe need to strategically elevate HR so thatit is recognised as more than just anadministrative function.

All of those interviewed noted that one of thedefining factors in terms of an agency’s ability toeffect rapid deployment is the priority given to,and the location of, HR capacity, as well as thedevelopment of HR policies and practices tobetter enable rapid deployment. Specific HRissues are covered in more detail in this chapter,and information about the placement of the HRdepartment is also addressed here in recognitionof its strategic importance.

The role of HR in emergency and surgerecruitment has had a ‘painful past’, especiallywith regard to the relationship between HR andthe emergency units. As a result, all IWG agenciesnow have at a minimum either a specific HRmanager who sits in HR (and who gives anywherebetween 50-100% to this task), or an HR managerwho sits in the emergency unit – though a coupleof people reflected that these staff members arelikely to be optimally effective if they sit in theemergency unit.

Additionally, some agencies deploy HR specialiststo the field during emergencies from theiremergency teams, while others deploy peoplefrom their HR department. In all these modelsthese individuals are seen as vital bridgesbetween the HR function and the emergency unit;they also sit in the midst of tensions between HRfunctions and emergency programming. As aresult, all agencies noted the importance of clear,regular and transparent communication betweenthe two. (Mercy Corps has a different set up; seethe case study opposite).

Chapter

4

World Vision’s Lesson with DefiningLeadership Roles

Pre-designating lines of authority can proveparticularly challenging in federated agencies,as experienced by World Vision. The nationaldirectors in World Vision have a lot of autonomyand power which often means that the level ofresponsibility of those from the emergency unitor the rapid response teams is not matchedwith similar authority. During the tsunamiresponse the boards and directors from two ofthe affected-countries were reported to feelthreatened by World Vision International’s rapidscale-up and desire to deploy and re-deploymany staff to the affected region. Critical timewas lost in negotiating with these offices aboutwho would lead the response; a situation notuncommon across most of the agenciesinterviewed. (It was noted by a number ofagencies, and legitimately so, that nationaloffices often feel threatened by humanitarian‘cowboys’ – a fear born out by many of the TECstudies which found that international actorshave a tendency to ‘brush aside’ local capacityduring the tsunami response; a finding alsoreflected for a number of years in ALNAP’sannual Review of Humanitarian Action.)

The response of World Vision to this challengehas been to meet with the boards of theirnational offices to talk about emergencyresponse, addressing such issues as whyinternational staff can help in times of large-scale crisis and also introducing ideas aboutquality and accountability in emergencyresponse. A response of the sector as a wholehas been to introduce a clearer set of morebehavioural-oriented competencies to avoid thedeployment of technicians who don’t alwayshave well-developed inter-personal skills.Obviously in times of large-scale crisis thereare still going to be pressures for quantity overquality, but at least the sector is beginning torecognise that ‘soft skills’ are as important as‘hard’, which will hopefully lead to more holisticchange over time.

Case study 17



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Probably the most critical lesson concerns theneed to strategically elevate HR so that it isrecognised as more than just an administrativefunction, as shown in the Mercy Corps casestudy. Interestingly, Nigel Bruce of CARE Australiasuggests that the effectiveness of HR is lessabout where it is placed in an organisation incomparison to the extent to which anorganisation ‘buys-in’ to good HR practice. Thisis, perhaps, of particular importance if the HRemergency person sits in HR rather than theemergencies unit. He reflects:

There needs to be greater recognition that HRcannot be the sole domain of the HRdepartment. For example, if we have a highturnover rate when HR asks managers why thatis the response can sometimes be ‘It’s a heavyworkload, that person just couldn’t hack it.’When we ask the person who’s leaving whythey made that decision, sometimes theresponse is related to bad management skills.There’s a serious disconnect there if managersonly think they are managing a programme andthe programme’s outcomes rather than alsothinking about their staff who are working anddelivering that programme.

This critical issue was recognised in numerousCARE evaluations that suggested HR must not getboxed into an ‘HR vs programming’ situation butrather should work in tandem with the Country andEmergency Directors every step of the way. This islinked to an agency’s responsibility for quality andaccountability: HR needs to be there to tellprogrammes what is achievable with the capacitythe agency has, and what is beyond its capacity;what is needed in core start-up teams and whocould do what based on knowledge of who isavailable. This might have the beneficial effect thatsenior management is then able to advocate forincreased surge capacity if it becomes clear thatprogramme aims and objectives are not possiblefrom an HR capacity point of view.

Strong HR capacity can increaseaccountability and qualityAgencies will also increase their ability to bemore accountable if they invest in a strong HRcapacity at both HQ and regional / country level.Such investment will enable them to betterselect, prepare and brief international personnelas well as handle issues as they arise on theground in times of crisis.

In summary, whatever model an agency adopts itis essential to ‘get HR right’. Overall, interviewssuggest that there are still some ‘pain points’concerning the role of HR and the emergencyunits, irrespective of the model employed. Andwhile there is much that emergency units coulddo to understand better the importance of‘people rather than programmes first’, certainlyHR could be more responsive to changingprogramme staffing needs. As one respondentnoted: ‘HR teams are not business responsiveenough; they often say “that’s outside of HRprocedures”. They need to be more businessfocused and less procedural’.

Mercy Corp’s Leadership and OrganisationalEffectiveness Division

The importance of HR, particularly with regardto the function of recruitment – which, after all,is the basis of the quality of any agency’soperation – is perhaps best captured byMignon Mazique of Mercy Corps: ‘if you don’tget the right people at the right time then thewhole operation is compromised’. Of all thoseagencies interviewed, Mercy Corps has aunique approach to HR because it hasrecognised that separate mechanisms arerequired for surge. Thus responsibility forrecruitment and staff development lies in theLeadership and Organisational EffectivenessDivision in the Executive Office of the agency,while HR functions related to compliance –such as firing, compensation and payroll – sitin the HR department. This division in HRfunctions has come about because of therecognition that:

[R]ecruitment is a future-oriented functionthat needs to be responsive to the demands,and vicissitudes, of the external world. Thismakes it a strategic business function, whilethe HR compliance functions support theagency’s ‘people agenda’ by maintainingbest HR practices in areas that could put theagency at risk. However, Mercy Corps didn’twant recruitment held back by thenecessarily more risk-averse compliance andmaintenance mentality.

Nevertheless, the importance of good inter-departmental and personal relationshipsbetween HR and the Executive Office – asbetween all other departments withresponsibility for surge – is central tocreating a holistic HR and surge capacity.

Case study 18


Chapter 4

HR Policies and practicesHR lessons for sourcing andrecruiting staffThere are a number of cross-cutting lessonsrelated to the role of HR in terms of sourcing andrecruiting staff. These include the following:

• There needs to be sufficient investment in HRsystems to enable effective sourcing andrecruiting. Should insufficient HR systems be inplace, then the seniority and experience of theHR person employed becomes all the moreimportant. On this point, Mercy Corps notes theneed to have the ‘right number of recruiters’ onboard so that, among other things, they can dothe appropriate ‘behaviour checking’ ahead oftime to make sure deployment can happenrapidly in the case of an emergency.

• This is related to the lesson that the choice ofthe actual recruiter is key, and can affect thesuccess of the recruitment process. This iscovered extensively in the literature (asdiscussed, for example, in Glazebrook, 2006,and Loquercio et al, 2006). UNICEF notes thatany emergency recruiter should have anunderstanding of both HR practices as well asemergency issues, including understandingprogramme content so that he/she can provideadvice on which profiles an emergency managermight want. In the IFRC, the emergency recruiteris emergency trained and, among other things,supports all training for deployable staff.

• As noted earlier, hiring people with recognisedbehavioural competencies is becoming moreimportant. Having a competency framework inplace helps an organisation – especially itsrecruiters – to apply a more structuredapproach to selection and to thinking throughthe behaviours that a job entails, with a viewto delivering better programming. Competencyframeworks ‘allow an organisation to recognisevalid transferable skills and to expand the poolof potential candidates’ (Loquercio et al,2006), an important contribution in a sectorthat perceives its pool of potential employeesas shrinking.7 They also increase the likelihoodof ensuring that the staff hired are well-suitedto the post to which they are appointed, sothat both employer and employee are morelikely to enjoy a long and productive

relationship. This is also a critical factor infacilitating staff retention.

• Another critical lesson related to the quality ofthose hired is to ensure that no recruitment ishandled by a single person. Having a thoroughreview of each individual also helps withregard to working against favouritism andreward, something that can happen whennational staff are nominated onto rosters.Minimally, an HR and an emergency responsespecialist should be involved in any sourcingor recruitment process.

Rapid Deployment and Duty of Care8

Evaluations of emergency response often raisethe subject of timeliness of response, and ECBagencies’ efforts to increase the size of theirrapid deployment tools are a direct response tothis issue. This section provides lessons aboutthe rapid deployment of staff from these internalmobilisation tools, as well as how to speed upexternal recruitment in times of an emergency.

Operations management tools used to supportthis process are numerous and include:

• Management toolkits that encourage the use ofstandard procedures that can be reproducedfrom one context to another. For example,Oxfam-GB uses its ‘Minimum Requirements forthe First Phase of an Emergency’, a set ofstandards designed to enable greater speedand effectiveness in the agency’s humanitarianresponse. These cover logistics and supply;human resources; legality and officemanagement; and programme and overallmanagement. They apply to the first 2-3 monthsof all emergencies. Mercy Corps has developedan ‘Office in a Box’, a set of flexible tools toenable rapid response and programme start up(see Case Study below).

• EPPs (within the context of the widercontingency plans).

• Generic job descriptions, lists of core positionsand organograms.

• Rapid induction and orientation procedures,such as those developed by World Vision thatare designed to help the agency hire and deploynew staff in an emergency.

Chapter

4

7 It is interesting to note from elsewhere in the literature (eg, Glazebrook 2006) ‘recruiters believe that the [ongoing] primary reason behind prioritisingtechnical qualifications – the reduction of risk – [is because] organisations do no have enough confidence in their selection procedures to choose staffbased on other criteria.’ Given the importance of behavioural competencies for programme quality and, for instance, greater accountability to affectedpopulations, this becomes another reason for agencies to invest sufficiently in HR staff and in strategically elevating the role of HR more generally.

8 Contingency planning should address all of the procedures in this area.


Induction and OrientationGood induction and orientation are keycomponents of rapid deployment. Oxfam-GB foundin its feedback from deployed staff that the lackof good induction and orientation was detrimentalto their ability to ‘hit the ground running’.

Broadly speaking, induction is the learningprocess by which an organisation receives andfamiliarises new employees with the organisation.9

Orientation, on the other hand, generally tends tobe more country and programme-specific andtakes place at field level.10 During rapiddeployment, agencies sometimes combine theseprocesses and World Vision, for example, hasdeveloped a number of rapid operationsmanagement tools including a Rapid InductionOrientation tool.

Some of the main lessons learnt regardinginduction and orientation include:

• Do both. Induction for those who are internallyredeployed is, of course, less important, but it’sabsolutely essential for any new staff deployedduring emergencies.

• Although guidelines often exist on paper theseare often not followed in the heat of anemergency. It is therefore important foragencies to develop rapid induction andorientation policies and practices, with scope forthem to be customised by HR staff at country-level. This will mean that key, minimuminformation is at least provided to deployedstaff; staff plans should subsequently includeopportunities for ongoing orientation once in thefield. MedAir, which operates an external roster,has reduced its usual 3-day briefing to half-a-dayin emergencies, and will even meet people atairports to do the briefing there.

• Both induction (for new staff) and orientation(for all) gets better each time HR is involvedearlier in the response.

• Particularly in federated agencies, induction andorientation processes can be different,sometimes leading to a lack of coherence onthe ground. This can affect programme qualityand needs to be addressed as a priority.

• As agencies seek to increase their pool ofdeployable staff and build the capacity ofpromising candidates, they may not alwaysdeploy staff that know the agency in a secondwave response. This makes induction all themore important. It was noted that WorldVision’s development of a rapid induction tool isanticipated to help convince programmemanagers that ‘new comers’ are OK to recruitinto the second wave.


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Office in a Box (Mercy Corps)

(Taken from ECB’s Staff Capacity InitiativeReview, February 2006) /www.peopleinaid.org/resources/casestudies.aspx

Mercy Corps’ ‘Office in a Box’ contains a set offield-tested guidelines and manuals, and thefollowing tools:

• New office start-up checklist

• Field asset manual

• Field warehouse manual

• Field administration manual

• Field procurement manual

• Field security manual

• Field fleet manual

• Field finance manual

• Tricks of the trade

Office in a Box combines best practices ofMercy Corps field offices with donor regulationsto create consistent documents and templatesneeded for effective and compliant fieldoperations management. This collection of toolsand manual provides significant benefits:

• Less time spent on re-inventing the wheelwhile setting up an office, freeing up moretime for programming.

• Quicker and better responses in emergenciesthanks to strengthened systems that improvedesign and help prevent mistakes.

• More efficient use of organisational learning.

• More consistent approach in implementingagency’s policies.

• Increased accountability.

Mercy Corps has allocated resources to trainstaff to use Office in a Box, and to keep thematerials up-to-date.

Case study 19

9 This information most often consists of information concerning its structure, function, norms, rules and procedures as well as, these days, informationrelating to humanitarian principles and standards. Inductions normally take place at the site of recruitment or at a regional or central hub.

10 Orientation involves a country-level ‘briefing’ as well as clarifying the scope of work for the individual, which is essential before somebody is deployed. It alsoincludes, for example, briefing on the security situation and sensitive social or political issues. One of those interviewed from the region noted that it isbetter not to provide information on the local context if this information is out-of-date or incomplete in any way, as this could lead to faulty decision-making.


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Duty of CareEnsuring policies and practices are in place toproperly support staff wellness not only during butalso after deployment is another important aspectof developing surge capacity. As previously notedby one respondent: ‘There’s a serious disconnectif managers only think they are managing aprogramme and the programme’s outcomesrather than also thinking about their staff who areworking and delivering that programme’.

Duty of care covers issues to do with security andsafety; health care insurance; and staff wellness.Dan Kelly of World Vision identifies the support ofstaff wellness as one of his agency’s key lessons.The organisation has invested heavily in providingstaff support through contracting an externalteam. Though this is ‘very expensive’, a recentstaff-care survey showed that staff satisfactionlevels were some of the highest in the agency andwellness support has led to increased retention.

Other organisations also provide support. Forexample, the IRC is creating a cadre of stresscounsellors and guidelines on stressmanagement; Mercy Corps provides a ‘lifebalance’ counselling service; World Vision islooking to additionally develop the support itprovides by guaranteeing a minimum level ofmaterial support to affected-country staff, as wellas looking to source local counsellors who knowlocal languages; and CARE Australia operates a24/7 Employee Assistance Programme thatprovides counselling services to all employeesand their families. This service is contracted outand accessed through CARE Canada’scounselling services.

Of course all agencies have policies concerning R& R, sickness pay and leave entitlements whichcontribute toward overall staff care packages, asdo increased salaries for all international staff,further financial increments for particularly difficultdeployments, and one-off, no-questions-askedpayments for, for instance, child careresponsibilities back home (UNDP provides$5,000 for this). Agencies should also havesufficient stocks of, for example, ‘start-up housekits’ crated up and ready to fly, including camp-beds, so that staff have adequate sleepingarrangements in the first few days while housingcan be found. Other approaches an agency mightadopt are included in the ECB’s Staff CapacityInitiative Review done in February 2006.

HR lessons for deploymentThere are a number of cross-cutting lessonsrelated to the role of HR with regard to rapiddeployment:

• Deployment has been shown to be more rapid ifthose involved in HR focus on pre-positioningstaff in times of emergency. CRS reflects: ‘it’sabout lining people up regardless of what’shappening; be anticipatory of emergency needs,don’t always wait for assessments … it soundselementary but it matters’. This is particularlyrelevant if the emergency units don’t housespecial emergency recruiters – though even ifthese positions sit within the emergency unitthey need to work on the basis of anticipatingneed, for example, by alerting staff on stand-bythat they might have to deploy while the agencydecides what category of response to call.

• A pivotal lesson, mentioned by all agencies, isthe need to have an HR person on the groundat the beginning of any rapid response. In MSF-UK, the deployed HR person helps with entryvisits and work permits, issues concerninghealthcare, accommodation, as well asemployment issues in the local context. He/shewill also welcome people and spend time goingto the airport to pick up new staff as well asorganising internal flights.

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UNDP’s Incentives Package for Surge Staff

An incentive package is being developed for allsurge staff deployed by UNDP. It is envisagedthat this package will provide a flexible range ofinitiatives that recognise that surge advisorswill be asked to deploy to difficult and insecurelocations with minimum notice. It is likely thatin these situations that some additionalpersonal expenses will be incurred and thatthere should be time for family reunion uponreturn. The package will not representautomatic entitlements and benefits but amenu of choices to be considered on a case-by-case basis, depending on the specialcircumstances of each assignment and thesurge advisor’s personal situation. It is alsonoted that the challenging experiences gainedas a surge advisor will have positiveimplications for a staff member’s careerprospects and should be appropriatelyacknowledged through UNDP’s Recognitionand Rewards Scheme.

Case study 20


• Additionally, federated agencies have found itimportant to decentralise HR so that any centralcoordinating HR function has an emergency HRfocal point in each of the main memberagencies. It is also important to identify regionalHR focal points.

• Lack of the right number of HR staff at HQ andsimilarly lack of capacity in the HR team in thecountry office has also been found to stronglyinfluence the ability of an agency to respond.This is because it directly correlates to theamount of time that senior management andthe technical specialists have to focus on theprogramme response as opposed to gettingcaught up, for example, in issues concerningaccommodation when first in a country.

• If an agency does need to employ lessexperienced people in times of a large-scaleresponse, then it is important to short-list andinterview as many people as possible awayfrom the field manager so that his or her time isnot distracted from the ongoing emergency.

• An overarching requirement is to have clearlines of communication. If a number ofdifferent people and departments are involvedin identifying and preparing staff fordeployment they should arrange toteleconference to ensure that they are allworking with the same information. Similarly,people working in HQ should be clear who theirHR contacts are in the field, and vice versa. Asnoted earlier, Oxfam-GB has developed twotools to assist in these processes.

Finally, many agencies mentioned the importanceof conducting some form of learning review aftereach emergency deployment; it was also notedthat this is not systematically done. World Vision’shumanitarian learning project represents the onlysubstantial investment in learning across theseven ECB agencies. It conducts lesson learningreviews after each emergency response, includingan assessment of the role of HR. An example ofone of the documents from these reviews can befound in Annex 2.

Learning through Training and StaffDevelopmentEarlier sections in this chapter identified skillsdevelopment as contributing to the maintenanceof staff quality as well as staff retention – twoissues of importance in terms of an agency’sability to both continue to deliver its programming,as well as improve on the quality of its currentpractice. Although training and staff development

activities, including career development, might betime-consuming and expensive, not providing suchlearning opportunities for staff and managers isundoubtedly more expensive. This is because itcan lead to ‘loss of staff, the costs associatedwith recruiting new staff, especially managers,and the costs associated with poor programmeimplementation’ (People In Aid, 2004), all ofwhich will have a detrimental impact on theaffected populations. Providing learningopportunities is therefore also important from anaccountability point of view.

Recently a number of independent studies,including the TEC Synthesis Report (Telford et al,2006) and the Clinton NGO Impact Initiative (OSE,2006) have commented on the lack ofprofessionalism that predominates in thehumanitarian sector, and the negative effect thishas on programme quality. Both reports call forgreater regulation in the aid sector andprofessionalism of aid workers, both national andinternational, to ‘ensure a predictably high qualityof international disaster response’ (Telford et al,2006). This creates a dilemma: how do agenciescontinue to deliver in real time within the contextof increasing demands for professionalism and allthis implies in terms of increased financial inputas well as diverting staff into training and othercareer development activities?

Improving on quality also implies the need to plancomprehensive learning strategies, predicated ona variety of different tools. As noted by Mark Janzof World Vision:

The issue of quality (and impact) takes us intoa whole new area with regard to … evaluationand M&E. Where do NGOs get resources forthis, especially as [the sector] is outputoriented? To do a more professional job andnot just be functional will require [planning] avery comprehensive and strategic modelaround analysis, monitoring, research andevaluation. If we are going to do all this in amore professional manner, different kinds ofresources are going to be needed.

The People In Aid Handbook, Enhancing Quality inHR Management in the Humanitarian Sector,devotes a chapter to the importance of trainingand career development. It notes the need foragencies to have a strategic organisationalcommitment to this, and usefully introduces atraining and development model to manage theseprocesses. Below is a summary of some lessonsand promising practices as shared by theagencies involved in this research.


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Chapter 4

Invest at the organisational level

Gareth Owen of SC-UK reflects that only a real‘step-change’ in agency management and culturewill enable sufficient investment in training andcareer development. Yet both the HRR (2005)and, for instance, UN-DPKO (2006) note thatyearly training is barely sufficient to deliver thekind of increase in quality that is required.

Senior leadership in organisations needs not onlyto understand this so that they assign appropriateresources to training, but also so that they cancollaboratively lobby donors at the highest level.Again, Gareth Owen: ‘It’s the training; thencoaching; then providing continual support; thebiggest lesson is “it’s the people stupid”. Costsare only prohibitive if they haven’t been plannedfor. Senior staff can make money available; theycan bring it in.’

To create this sort of genuine, quality capacity willcost tens of thousands of pounds. As alluded toby a number of agencies, corporations areinterested in assisting NGOs in this way andunderstand the needs of training and coaching. Byopening up and engaging with those towardswhich it has traditionally had antipathy, the sectormight gain the benefit of expertise and,potentially, impact on the practices of theseentities themselves.

Exploring different types of learning

Training must not be the primary focus. TheALNAP Review of Humanitarian Action (2004)explored the preferred learning methods of fieldlevel staff, and these were found to involvelearning by doing in the context of their daily jobsrather than being taken out of their daily contextsfor training at HQ or even regional level.Respondents to this research also drew this asan important lesson. Many agencies approachthis by, for example, pairing staff for the purposesof coaching and mentoring. One respondentsuggested it would be preferable to use trainingmoney to put people into emergency situations sothey have ‘real-life engagement’ withemergencies, making the distinction between‘practice’ and ‘training’.

Some agencies have set up sharepoint or yahoogroups to encourage communities of practiceamong those on their rosters and registers andbetween these members and technical specialistsin the wider organisation. CRS has started a newsharepoint initiative, and the IRC pairs its ERTmembers with technical unit staff and encouragesthem to set aside time to work together on joint

projects, setting money aside in its annual budgetfor this. Oxfam-GB HSPs take part in regular,formalised learning forums in their specialisttechnical areas, and are also involved in threeweb-groups, depending on their discipline: foodsecurity, engineering, or public health.

Providing comprehensive career developmentsupport

Another lesson for many agencies is to have goodcareer development policies and practices inplace. In particular, performance reviews areimportant. These support staff development bylinking to a competency framework. Regularappraisals are part of a well-developedperformance review system. These are used toacknowledge good performance, identifyweaknesses and plan for future training toaugment gaps in the staff person’s skills.

For example, World Vision’s experience is that, ifend-of-deployment appraisals are based on thedeployed person’s ToR then this provides aframework for discussion and has been found tobe very motivational. This is because it not onlybecomes task-specific and so has a usefulquantitative component, but it is also based oncore competencies and so involves discussionabout how the person performed in the job – thustouching upon the ‘softer’ behaviouralcompetencies mentioned earlier.

Adequate de-briefing and in-country feedback alsocontributes an important quality controlmechanism, because otherwise there is no basison which to take remedial action should there onlybe informal feedback on a receiving office’sexperience with the deployed person.

A suggested solution, apparently not yet tried, isto cross-train staff between country programmes.This could also act as a backfilling strategy.

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Strengthening in Practice: whatdoes it look like?Strengthening country capacity for emergencysurge response is manifested in the practice ofemergency classification, whereby all agenciesstipulate that only the largest emergencies willrequire the assistance of international personneland be managed solely from HQ. Otherwise all

emergencies are to be handled first by thecountry office; then with the support of theregional office; and sometimes through acombination of the regional office and emergencyunit at HQ, depending on the severity of the crisisand the particular country office’s capacity. It isthe stated intention of most agencies tostrengthen national and regional capacity with theintention that, over time, these offices will require


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Key pointsCrises happen when communities run out of capacity to adjust. Given the changing, and increasing,nature of humanitarian need; the unpredictability of emergencies; and the overall low, as well asdisproportionate, levels of international funding, strengthening capacities at regional and countrylevel is imperative. In particular, the current funding environment means that maintaining staffcapacity between emergencies cannot be guaranteed, which reinforces the need to strengthencountry capacity.

More important, however, is the recognition that the most appropriate and sustainable responsesoccur when led by local and national-level capacities. Surge and other mechanisms can only ever be'palliative solutions’ (European Commission, 2004).

It is not surprising, therefore, that an ECB Learning Event in Washington DC (12-13 April 2007)identified country capacity strengthening as perhaps the most important component of futureemergency response. This is recognised in a number of different studies which continue to point tothe failure of the humanitarian and wider development communities to strengthen local and nationalcapacities, with the attendant familiar results concerning lack of accountability and sustainability and,in the worst instances, destruction of country capacity (see, eg, Scheper et al, 2006).

A number of commentators have noted that efforts to strengthen these capacities will only happen‘within the context of a longer term perspective, with longer-term funding, partnerships andengagement in processes bridging the divide between humanitarian and development programming’(ALNAP, 2005). The TEC Synthesis Report (Telford et al, 2006), on the other hand, argues stronglythat strengthening local capacity in particular will not happen to any significant degree unless there isa fundamental reorientation of the humanitarian sector, with international aid actors becomingfacilitators of communities’ own response and working in a more demand-led way. This is reflected inPeter Walker’s call for humanitarian organisations to become ‘adaptation facilitators’ (ECB LearningEvent, Washington DC, 2007).

Moreover, development of national and local capacity is integral to poverty reduction and therefore theachievement of the millennium development goals. Capacity constraints mitigate sustainabledevelopment. Agencies interviewed for this study increasingly recognise that developing country-levelcapacity for emergency response involves efforts across whole organisations, including betterintegration of efforts between humanitarian, recovery and development programming – both at anintra- and inter-agency level.

It is beyond the scope of this chapter to provide an analysis of the full range of challenges andtensions associated with building and strengthening country level capacity. For this, readers aredirected to ‘Institutional Capacity Building amid Humanitarian Action’ in ALNAP 2005. Rather, what ispresented here are a number of examples and lessons learnt with regard to ECB, and other,agencies’ efforts to at least attempt to help their regional and national offices respond moreeffectively in emergencies. It has not been easy to obtain a clear picture of the outcomes of theseefforts because of the paucity of evaluations and reviews related to agencies’ investment in capacitystrengthening in this area.

The strength of local capacity


Chapter 4

less and less international human resourceassistance because they will be prepared torespond independently. That said, manycommentators continue to observe, year on year,that there nonetheless seems to be a tendencyfor aid agencies to try to ‘catch up’ throughcapacity building during and after emergencies(Scheper et al, 2006).

At a practical level, ECB agencies are doing anumber of things to strengthen their regionaland national offices to be better prepared andto respond with greater autonomy. They aredoing in three main ways: through preparednessof personnel and of associated rapiddeployment tools; through partnership; andthrough programming.

Preparedness of personnel and rapiddeployment toolsWillits-King & Darcy (2005) note that the IFRCprobably has the strongest commitment toinvesting in preparedness in terms of internationalgood practice. The agency identified disasterpreparedness as one of its four core areas under‘Strategy 2010’ that it adopted in 1999. It has adisaster preparedness policy(www.ifrc.org/who/policy/dppolicy.asp) and hasdeveloped a diagnostic tool to identify risks,national capacities to mitigate and respond, andgaps in national society capacity. It also has acomprehensive training package on disasterpreparedness for country offices.

Emergency preparedness plans: Earlier it wasnoted that emergency preparedness plans arecritical in terms of planning sufficient staffcapacity. Depending on the agency, these plansplay a particular role in preparing country officesfor rapid response. They:

• Designate who will take responsibility foractivating the plan once the emergency hasbeen called (for example, World Vision’s countryoffices are mandated to activate this locallywhen an emergency happens).

• Include an analysis of different emergencythreats and scenarios of what will happen ineach country, and subsequently identify staffwho can take different roles in different types ofresponse.

• Are used to develop career development plansfor country level staff, specifically related toemergency response.

• Have specific HR components in place to assistwith the identification of key issues related to

staffing in times of emergency. This can includeidentification of, eg, recruitment companies in-country, as well as organisations who might beable to identify volunteers. SC-US does this.

• Can also include protocols to assist countryoffices to scale-up systems in order to betterreceive international response.

It is common for emergency unit staff, those onthe full-time standing teams and sometimesthose on agency rosters and registers to workwith regional and country offices to help developtheir emergency preparedness plans. Goodpractice is to review and update these plansevery six months.

Notwithstanding, one respondent commented thatemergency preparedness plans are not worthanything unless the agency has involved all staffin their meaningful development and tested theplan. Interviews also indicated that agencieshaven’t evaluated whether these plans makethem more effective at responding toemergencies. This is probably because agenciesreported that they still struggle with systematicmonitoring, evaluation and learning. It is alsoprobably because it is still less likely formonitoring and evaluation to be process andoutcomes oriented.

An alternative to the model of the emergencypreparedness plan is Oxfam’s EmergencyManagement Plan approach. This was consideredin Chapter 1, and resulted because the agencyfound that ‘it doesn’t matter whether or notthere’s a preparedness plan in place because ifthere isn’t competent management in place forwho will implement the preparedness plan then itwon’t work’. An important component of this planis the identification of national staff who can be‘grown into’ emergency management positions.

SC-US focuses on building leadership capacity bymaking sure that gaining emergency experiencebecomes part of the career development plan ofall their country directors who currently lack thisparticular capacity. To this end, World Visionsends in senior managers to work alongsidenational director who lack experience duringemergencies. Among other things this person alsohelps the national director understandexpectations from the wider federation level.

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Regionalisation of rosters: An importantcomponent of surge capacity strengthening atcountry level is the regionalisation of a number ofsurge capacity instruments, in particular throughthe development of regional rosters. WorldVision’s RRT and SC-US’ regional REDI teams areperhaps the best examples of this (see CaseStudy 18), while CRS’ new Emergency FocalPoints (EFP) represent promising practice. Detailsabout these different instruments is contained inChapter 2, but it is interesting to note that theCRS EFPs remit is to focus on disaster mitigationissues which is seen strategically as part ofsurge. The intention is also for each focal point tobuild a team in each region and therefore toassist with identifying people in-country, as well asencourage cross-training between offices withinthe region. This person can also be deployed, soaugmenting capacity at country level.

Training: Skills development and training is asimportant at country level as it is at internationallevel. Any capacity building training that isprovided to country offices must link with thoseoffices’ own plans for emergency response andhow they are going to staff it; agencies arelearning that training should not be delivered forthe sake of an agency being able to say it hasdone it – an approach all too common in the pastwith the over-riding sector focus on outputs.

Moreover, ALNAP (2005) notes: ‘There is atendency to respond to criticism with calls formore training inputs, rather than through criticalanalysis of what capacities were built throughpast training, how these capacities were utilisedand sustained, and, above all, what impact thesecapacities have had on humanitarian performanceas well as community adaptation to local realities


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Emergency Preparedness Planning Process AndHow it Supports Local Capacity For EmergencyResponse: The Case of CARE

CARE’s EPP process addresses at its heart thechallenge of how to simultaneously increase acountry programme’s ability to respond to smalland medium-sized emergencies, as well asimprove its ability to accommodate extra helpwhen needed.

As part of the EPP exercise, country programmestaff (development programme managers,support functions and emergency specialists)identify some of the emergency scenarios thatthey may be faced with in the future. In eachcase they consider what their response would beand what staffing would be required. They thenconduct a gap analysis, looking at what extraresources might be required and where theycould be obtained. In some cases they will lookfirst to local sources, for example former staff orpartner organisations. In other cases they willlook outside of the country, for example to theCARE Emergency Response Team (CERT).

In some cases the team might realise that otheragencies already in-country probably have bettercapacity to respond to certain types ofemergency. In other cases the team will identifycurrent staff who are willing to become multi-skilled alongside their existing responsibilities.This way a point person is identified for each ofthe core functions: someone who will lead theneeds assessment; someone who will undertake

rapid recruitment; someone who will beresponsible for procurement; and someone whowill process payments, etc. CARE has identified6-10 core roles in an emergency response teamfor a country.

Members of the country programme’s EmergencyResponse Team receive coaching and supportfrom the organisation’s global emergencyresponse specialists. The EPP process (whichnormally lasts seven days) helps the emergencyresponse team to agree on their role andresponsibilities during and between emergencies.Normally each team member makes acommitment to maintain a certain level ofpreparedness. Members of the countryprogramme Emergency Response Team areinvited to regional training events from time totime. This provides them with an opportunity tomeet other emergency responders fromneighboring countries and from the global team.In Central America, members of the emergencyresponse teams in respective countries have metand worked on shared emergency protocols forthe Central America region that define thesystems and processes for emergency response,as well as how the team will work together toshare resources with each other in the event ofan emergency. Some members of the countryoffice emergency response teams also serve inCARE’s global emergency response roster.

CARE has learned that building local emergencypreparedness within its country offices is vital forsuccess in emergency response.

Case study 21


Chapter 4

and sustained preparedness for futureemergencies.’ The message? Training isimportant, but needs to be properly evaluatedand, as noted above, greater efforts are requiredto focus on on-site training, mentoring, shadowingand coaching, as these correspond best to fieldworkers’ preferred ways of learning.

Research for this study identified that UNICEF hasfound the combination of training, simulation andcontingency planning the best way to prepare itscountry offices for emergencies.

Protecting national staff: Finally, an issue notspecifically included in the research but thatneeds to be taken into account when addressingthe strengthening of national capacity is the issueof the well-being and security of national staff.Dan Kelly of World Vision notes that one of thekey challenges going forward is to develop thesame standard of care packages for national staffas for internationally deployed staff. Moreover,while national level staff might themselves beincluded in, for example, security training, partneragencies generally aren’t. One observer hasnoted that ‘local staff are first-tier targets towhom we only give second-class protection’(Barrs, 2004). This is an area where furtherresearch is needed, as most agencies pay verylittle explicit attention to the special situation ofnational staff (People In Aid, 2005; Van Brabant,2001) and even less to their responsibilities tolocal partner organisations.

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Building Staff Capacity at National Level

(Taken from ECB’s Staff Capacity InitiativeReview, February 2006)www.peopleinaid.org/resources/casestudies.aspx

SC-US believes that local staff can respond toemergencies far more quickly than people whoare brought in from other locations. Thesepeople know already know the localorganisation, its culture and way of doingthings; they have relationships withcommunities and local partners; and theyspeak local languages. Recognising this, SC-UShas focused efforts on building the capacity oflocal staff to respond to emergencies, includingthrough the development Regional REDI Teams.

The objectives of its efforts are to: increase thespeed of response; ensure the appropriatenessof response through better use of localknowledge; increase the pool of staff to drawon in the next emergency; increase interest inemergency preparedness planning.

• Regional REDI teams function as SC-US’second line of defence in humanitarianemergency response and support local staffwhen field offices needs additional capacityfor small- to medium-sized emergencies.

• Each field office selects a point person whoundergoes formal emergency responsetraining, and an emergency point person,who is not necessarily the same person whoparticipates in the trainings.

• Regional Preparedness Advisors work withfield offices to develop emergencypreparedness plans and with the areaoffices to launch the regional REDI teams.

• Temporary Duty Assignments allow lessexperienced staff or those in countries whereemergencies occur less frequently to work inan emergency with more experienced staff tobuild their skills.

• Employees attend formal trainingprogrammes outside the organisationspecific to their area of expertise, eg, healthtraining for emergencies.

• Apprenticeships / mentoring opportunitiesare a way to learn alongside someone withmore experience.

• Simulation exercises are also used as aneffective way to learn.

Case study 22


Preparedness comes frompartnershipGood relationships between local andinternational actors are a fundamental componentof surge response. ‘Outside’ organisations withlong-standing, established relationships with localpartners, or even a national sister agency, areinvariably better equipped to make good use oflocal knowledge, skills, and personnel, and thusrespond more quickly and effectively. Establishingsuch partnerships is very difficult during anemergency situation, and should be part of anagency’s effort to develop its surge capacity inbetween emergencies.

Oxfam-GB notes that it launched a relativelysuccessful response in Java and Pakistan due toits prior identification of partners (and also ofsuppliers and laying-in of contingency stocks).Notwithstanding it was noted that the agency stilltends to treat its partner organisations as sub-contractors rather than ‘real partners’. The agencyhas drawn a number of important lessons fromthis, including the need to pre-assess a partner’scapacity, identifying where its strengths lie butalso where its weaknesses are and thereforewhere it will require support.

Good relationships with partner organisations andwith staff in national offices are predicated ontrust. Interviewees for this study highlighted trustas a vital factor in determining the effectivenessof emergency response. As noted in earlier, trustis the subject of the ECB working group, ‘BuildingTrust in Diverse Teams’. A ‘scoping study’ donefor this group identifies ‘swift’ approaches tobuilding trust as well as how to develop ‘deeper’trust over time, and readers are referred to thisstudy for more information.

ProgrammingInterviewees did not discuss programmingapproaches in any depth. This is probablybecause programming is not often considered toconstitute part of surge capacity building. It isalso perhaps because programming in areas thatcould be considered to build surge capacity –disaster risk reduction and emergencypreparedness – is not sufficiently well developedand has not been extensively evaluated (somecommentators note a ‘structural deficit’ in thisarea; Stoddard, 2004). Therefore, the veryidentification of disaster risk reduction andpreparedness programming as contributing tosurge capacity by some respondents is animportant step forward.

It is worth noting that capacity in this context alsoincludes the capacity of communities to reducerisk and / or the effects of a disaster, as well aslocal governmental and non-governmentalorganisations, and the national offices ofinternational agencies.

Disaster risk reduction: Better management ofrisk indicates better preparedness, and perhapsthe most promising approach to building andstrengthening regional, national and localcapacities to respond is to do with themeaningful rolling out of disaster risk reductionpolicies and activities. The Hyogo Framework ForAction provides a framework for policies andactivities in this area.

The ECB workstream on disaster risk reductionhas been running nine pilot projects in disasterrisk reduction in Ethiopia (4), Guatemala (4),and Indonesia (1). It has drawn some usefullessons and promising practices from thesepilots. Nevertheless, a recent ECB ‘semi-annualreport’ identified real difficulties in thisworkstream because:

• DRR is not a high priority for most IWGagencies.

• There is no systematic way to identify andevaluate DRR components within integrated orother sector project reports.

• Staff turnover is high, both in HQs and countryoffices.

• There are no designated staff to gather, analyseand interpret information.


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Recovery programming: In interviews for thisstudy, SC-US in particular introduced thedifficulties encountered with recoveryprogramming. This is supported in the literature(see, eg, Christoplos, 2006; ISDR/World Bank,2005). All too often recovery programming isunder-funded and ‘missed’ by both relief anddevelopment programming, an issue reflected byrespondents’ concerns about continuity andsuccession planning. Moreover, disaster riskreduction also needs to be mainstreamed not onlyinto development programming but also intorecovery programming.

These two programming issues are anotherreminder of the importance of the ‘wholeorganisation approach’ when developing surgecapacity. This is because of the linkages they implybetween relief, recovery and developmentprogramming as well as, for example, thefundraising departments of agencies. More thanthis, though, they are a recognition of theimportance of, first and foremost, buildingcommunities’ and other local capacities to respondto emergencies, as local people and localorganisations will always be first on the ground.


Chapter 4

World Conference on Disaster Reduction: anew form of commitment?

The World Conference on DisasterReduction, held in Kobe, Japan in January2005, exemplifies the challenges andopportunities of galvanising a commitmentto building capacities in preparation for thenext disaster. If the plans for early warningsystems in the Indian Ocean region are tobe effective, enormous efforts will beneeded to ensure that local organisationshave the capacity to alert communities andtake appropriate action. Past experience hasshown that building such capacities is noteasy, and sustaining them is even harder,especially where disasters are infrequent.

The next question will be how to maintainthese commitments. Critics have criticisedthe lack of concrete targets that came outof the Conference. One observer describesthe outcomes as a ‘vague framework and awish-list’ (Ben Wisner, cited in Radford,2005). It may prove to be a challenge jointlyto the development and humanitariancommunities to keep these vaguecommitments alive. The ‘moral imperative’(Jan Egeland, cited in Bisiaux et al, 2005) ininvestment in capacities for disaster riskreduction is in many respects ahumanitarian imperative, though it might notbe the humanitarian community that willultimately provide the cash.

Source: ALNAP (2005).

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Chapter 4 – Summary Points• The key enablers can be grouped into four categories, and HR is a cross cutting theme:

- Strategic vision and supportive agency culture

- The role of the HR function or department

- HR policies and practices

- The strength of local capacity

• Strengthening country capacity is as much a part of building surge capacity as, say, creating aroster and register system, or developing a series of operations management tools to facilitaterapid deployment.

• Agencies pursue a number of activities to strengthen and prepare their national offices andpartner organisations. These include developing emergency preparedness (or management)plans; regionalising their roster systems; and investing in training of national staff that issensitive to their needs. On-site training, mentoring, shadowing and coaching are noted asespecially relevant. Due to the paucity of evaluations of these efforts, however, it is hard toassess the outcomes of these activities.

• Preparedness is also achieved by building effective partnerships, based on trust, as well as,for example, through mainstreaming disaster risk reduction into both development andemergency programming, and by ensuring adequate funding of recovery programming.


Chapter 4

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The primary objective of this research was toconsolidate the various approaches, lessons andgood practices with regard to building effectivesurge capacity from across the IWG and otheragencies. Using the lessons scattered throughoutthis report as a starting point, this final chaptermakes a number of suggestions as to how theIWG and other agencies might strengthen theirsurge capacity, at both intra- and inter-agencylevel. These suggestions are necessarily broad asthey address different agencies with differentmandates and structures, as well as at differentstages of development of their surge capacity.

Summary: What have welearnt about surge capacity?The first conclusion to be drawn, as evidencedthroughout this report, is that surge capacityrepresents an entire system of policies andprocedures; it is as much about anorganisation’s philosophical approach as it isabout any single instrument, such as a roster orregister. It is therefore about much more than ‘torapidly deploy’.

Building a flexible and sustainable surge capacityinvolves many things. What will make this capacityrobust is a comprehensive, strategic vision –including how to strategically elevate HR – of whatsurge capacity entails, along with a whole-organisation commitment to operationalising thatvision and to learning from experience. This willbe the case whether an agency chooses to focusits primary efforts on augmenting its standingcapacity, its redeployment capacity, orstrengthening its national capacity – all of whichreinforces the need to match capacity to mandateand structure. Harmonising the mandate,structure and capacity of an agency also hassignificant implications for the quality andaccountability of its humanitarian response.

Framed by its larger strategic vision, developmentof an effective surge capacity rests on anagency’s ability to make progress, and beprepared, on many fronts. For example, building

an effective surge capacity is not just aboutaugmenting staff numbers, but it’s about staffquality and the utilisation of competencyframeworks and staff development plans. It’salso about the strategic, flexible, pre-positioningof funds and equipment, as well as thedevelopment of operations management tools.And it is about strengthening capacity incountries and regions as well as identifying whowill be the most useful partner organisations andtargeting them for real development.

More than this, however, development of aneffective surge capacity is about changing agencyculture. A radical change in attitude andunderstanding is required for two reasons. First,to enable the development and implementation ofchanged policies and procedures that maycompromise on existing ways of doing things, aswell as increase the likelihood that some of themore difficult, surge-specific procedures, suchpre-release agreements, are adhered to. Second,to lubricate paradigm shifts within agenciestoward, for example, viewing disaster riskreduction as contributing to the development ofsurge capacity at country level, and as needing tobe mainstreamed within relief, recovery anddevelopment programming.

Ten critical lessons for surge capacityBased on the research, it is possible to define 10critical lessons, or enabling factors, required todevelop surge capacity. The second conclusion isthat developing this capacity is about bringingthese various component capacities ‘to scale’,simultaneously, within agencies. The 10 criticalenablers are:

1. Agencies need to adopt a whole-organisationapproach to developing surge capacity. If thisdoes not happen, their capacity to respond willbe compromised.

2. Within the context of a wider strategic vision,capacity needs to be matched to mandate andstructure. This has significant implications for

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the quality of an agency’s programming as wellas its ability to be accountable to affectedpopulations.

3. Pre-positioning of funds is critical. Emergencyunits need to find ways to leverage greateramounts of unrestricted and other funds sothat they can scale-up when required, respondto less visible emergencies, as well as build,and maintain, capacity between emergencies.

4. There needs to be investment in HR as astrategic function and not just an administrativeone. This is necessary not only at HQ but alsoat regional and / or country level.

5. Well-trained and experienced staff are critical. Inparticular, strong and competent leadership is adecisive factor in the success of any response.There needs to be long-term investment in staffdevelopment, including in career development.Focusing on behavioural as well as technicalcompetencies is important.

6. If emergency response is to be sustainablebeyond the initial surge, recruitment forsecond-wave and longer term deploymentsneeds to start at the beginning of anemergency. Counter-parting betweeninternational and national staff at this stage ina response is difficult but vital to the longerterm success of any response.

7. It is equally important to develop surgecapacity at country and regional level as atHQ. Strategic integration of aspects ofemergency and development programming willhelp, as will the mainstreaming of disaster riskreduction across relief, recovery anddevelopment programmes.

8. Rosters (and registers) need better investmentif they are going to remain the preferred modelfor rapid deployment. Agencies which use thiscapacity to augment their sizeable standingcapacity also face challenges. If agencies optto develop these tools, it is imperative theyinvest in adequate HR capacity in order tomake these tools effective.

9. Agencies need to develop standard operatingprocedures that govern all aspects of animmediate response. This is especiallyimportant as being able to rapidly deploy willinevitably compromise ordinary agencypolicies and procedures.

10. Agencies need to adopt more systematisedlearning practices, otherwise they are doomedto make the same mistakes year on year.This is not only bad practice but unethical,given agencies’ quality and accountabilitycommitments. Becoming better learningorganisations is especially important in thecurrent era, where agencies need to shiftfrom being reactive to proactive in order tokeep up with changes in their external policyand operating environment.

Given that these 10 critical enablers are all about‘more of’, and that single agency, emergency unitscale will, at some point, become finite, the thirdconclusion is that developing surge capacity isnot just about bringing to scale, but it is alsoabout leverage within organisations – eg, of moreeffective partnerships – and collaboration, as aform of leverage, between organisations.

Collaboration is a multiplier. In working together,agencies are likely to achieve their goals morequickly and more effectively as evidenced, forexample, in recent efforts between ECB agenciesin Sumatra in early 2007 (see Case Study 24).There are also increasing external imperatives forcollaboration. For example, donors are movingtoward pooled funding arrangements at countrylevel, and policy makers and practitioners areincreasingly calling for international agencies towork in partnership, as well as through commonmechanisms such as consortia, in recognition ofthe quality and accountability benefits this is likelyto bring. To this end the OSE (2006) notes:

Agencies — local and international — will bemost effective when they are committed toeffective partnerships. This may involvepooling resources, sharing a commonstrategy, looking for ways to divide workefficiently, and providing an integratedresponse to affected communities.

Moreover, it is predicted that the very scale ofindividual agencies’ response capacities will inthe future be dwarfed by the changing nature ofrisk. It is possible, therefore, that collaborationwill not simply be an option but will need tobecome a mandate.

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Collaboration at Country Level: ECB Agenciesin Sumatra

The ECB Learning Event in Washington DC in April2007 provided an opportunity for agencies toshare many of the positive experiences from thisproject. One example told how ECB agencies hadcollaborated following the earthquake in Sumatrain March 2007. This case study was provided byMara Hardjoko, the Disaster Risk ReductionCoordinator for SC-US Indonesia.

One of the biggest benefits of ECB in the fieldhas been the informal network and sense ofteamwork and trust that has formed betweenstaff in ECB agencies. So when an earthquakestruck last month, we were able to respond in aquick and coordinator manner. This is whathappened:

• In March 2007, two earthquakes measuringaround 6 on the Richter scale struck WestSumatra, near Aceh, and displaced around136.000 people. This affected the area of theECB DRR pilot project.

• Within 48 hours of the earthquake, ECBagencies held a coordination meeting in bothJakarta and West Sumatra to discuss thesituation and plan their response.

• Mercy Corps was the only ECB member with anoffice in the affected area and offered to shareits office with other ECB members, as well asvehicles or support needs.

• ECB members shared rapid assessment toolswith one another, and Mercy Corps, CARE andSC-US sent staff to be part of a jointassessment. Other ECB members conductedtheir own assessments but coordinated withthis group. Mercy Corps had general staff onthe ground and SC-US sent education, mediaand health staff while CARE sent an emergencyresponse expert in WatSan.

• Many schools were heavily damaged so it wasdecided that a response should focus onsupport to the schools. Since that is SC-US’sexpertise, we contributed school tents whichwere pre-positioned in our warehouse nearby.Mercy Corps took the lead in the response andreceived funding from OFDA to cover the jointactivities which included school kits, householdand hygiene kits.

• Joint sitreps, case studies, and local pressrelease were all issued from this ECBmember team.

Some people questioned if the ECB agenciescould really and truly cooperate in a time ofcrisis, but senior management in Indonesia wascommitted to making it work for the followingreasons:

• While all ECB members now have experience inemergency response, because of the frequencyof disasters all were stretched in recoveringfrom the disaster the month before; theagencies therefore realised they would be moreeffective if they pooled resources and efforts.

• All ECB agencies had limited relief kits andstaff near the disaster location which; poolingthese created much greater capacity.

Lessons learnt:

• Coordination in emergency preparedness andresponse could and should be strengthened inIndonesia. This will require having moreconfidence to work with other INGOs and torecognise the comparative strength of eachagency. This requires the right personalitiesand relationships on the ground.

• If ECB is the mechanism to support thiskind of coordination, it should have aclearer management structure. Often thecommunication lines, authority lines andareas of assistance were unclear andsometimes confusing.

• There should be more funding allocated tosupporting staff involved in collaboration.Even though the intention is to use existingcountry office resources in order for ECBwork to be sustainable, current staff areoverstretched in responding to emergenciesand this leaves little time to focus onconcrete joint preparedness activities.

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Below are a number of suggestions about howbest to bring the different components of surgecapacity to scale, indicating where greaterleverage and collaboration is needed. The fiveareas considered are:

• Strategic vision and strategic planning;

• Investment;

• Developing staff capacity,

• Including national capacity; and

• Advocacy.

Strategic vision and strategicplanningThis report has introduced a comprehensivevision of what constitutes surge capacity, aboveand beyond the traditional concept of rapiddeployment from agency rosters and / orregisters. If this is considered useful, agenciesmight want to reflect on their approach andcurrent capacities in light of the componentsintroduced in Figure 2 (Chapter 1). The frameworksuggested is that of a ‘whole-organisation’approach that reaches across departments, withthe emergency unit as the driver supported bysenior leadership. Having corporate leadership isessential, as this will help to steer any requiredchange processes. It will also help to buildaccountability into the system which will in turnassist in addressing some of ‘pain points’ aroundsurge, for example, the issue of staff release.

Agencies that haven’t already done so will need toseek political and organisational consensus ontheir strategic vision as it relates to rapidresponse. Defining what constitutes surgecapacity will be helpful, as will the development ofa strategy setting out a consensus definition ofthe agency’s surge capacity objectives. This willhelp when subsequently outlining the requiredcomponents of surge capacity and how thesework to support each other. It might be useful toundertake a SWOT analysis as part of this work.

Some of the issues agencies might want toconsider include:

Configuring human capacityConfiguring human capacity is complex because itdepends to a great extent on how an agency ismandated and structured. In this respect onequestion agencies will need to think aboutconcerns the merits of developing specialisttechnical capacity vs being more generalist,founded on an honest assessment of capability.

Another important consideration is how tomaintain skilled capacity (see below).

If the objectives of an agency’s emergencyresponse are focused on rapidly saving lives, thenperhaps the ‘command and control’ modelmanifested in Oxfam-GB’s step-aside policy is anhonest and appropriate way forward. Certainly thepreferred approach for rapid response by thoseagencies which can afford it is to build standingcapacity – both in terms of staffing up theemergency unit and / or employing large standingteams along the lines of Oxfam-GB’s HSPs, WorldVision’s GRRT, or SC-UK’s ERPs. However, one ofthe strongest messages to emerge from thisresearch is the need to focus greater efforts onbuilding capacity at country level, including ofcommunities’ own capacities to survive andrecover. An approach in line with this would be tofocus a greater proportion of surge capacitybuilding efforts at country level, as SC-US andCRS have done. These agencies have invested,for example, in ensuring that the country directorsof their programmes are sufficiently skilled and /or supported to manage an emergency response.In comparison, World Vision has focussed onstrengthening capacity at both international andcountry level, as evidenced in Chapter 2.

Integrated programming andrelationship buildingAgencies will also need to grapple with how tobetter integrate aspects of their humanitarian anddevelopment programming, for example, aroundcontinuity planning and mainstreaming disasterrisk reduction. This implies that internal leverageand cross-departmental relationship building willbe critical – evidenced by agencies’ numerousreferences to the importance of communicationand building trusting relationships.

Harmonising systemsAnother important aspect of strategic visioningwill require federated agencies in particular tocreate policies and procedures aimed atharmonising systems across all levels withinfamilies of agencies.

Resourcing and investmentFinally, decisions will need to be taken aroundhow to resource this work; developing a strategicvision and plan will be redundant if the moneyisn’t there to operationalise the plan. Focusing onjust a few components of surge capacity isunlikely to deliver real progress towardcomprehensively achieving an agency’s goals.

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InvestmentFinancial resourcesFlexible and effective financial management isone of the most fundamental components of anysurge capacity mechanism. Systems to facilitate,for example, economies of scale, scale-up andabsorption of additional funds, as well as therapid acquisition of resources are essential.These processes will be helped by harmonisingfinancial systems across organisations.

It is not possible for this report to provideagencies with a clear financial business case withregard to how to finance surge. This is becausethe information and analysis required to do thisgo beyond both the information provided byrespondents and the time available for theresearch. Nevertheless, a number of broadstatements can be made.

First, an agency’s vision for surge capacity shouldbe developed as part of a managed programmeof investment and growth. Two points areimportant here. First, funding is more likely to beprohibitive if agencies don’t properly plan;second, the development of such a plan requiresappropriate internal capacity to carry out theplan. An example is Oxfam-GB’s HumanitarianInvestment Plan, initiated in spring 2005 andstructured into separate projects. Thisconstitutes a long term investment programmeaimed at improving Oxfam-GB’s emergencyresponse capacity in terms of effectiveness andresponsiveness over the next five years.

Although it is difficult to determine whether thereis a correlation between size of investment andquality of capacity, this is an important factor toassess when agencies are considering how bestto scale-up. Willitts-King and Darcy (2005:19)compared levels of staff capacity and associatedstaff costs (as a proxy for investment), given thislatter input is usually the largest budget item inan emergency response. Their findings show thatthere is a basic minimum level of investmentrequired to build an effective emergency capacity,relative to an agency’s size. Investing less thanthis, they suggest, is a poor investment andresources will be spread too thinly. Based on acomparative analysis of SC-US and SC-UK, Oxfam-GB, CARE, MSF, the IRC, and WVI, they proposethat around 40 full-time emergency staff is the‘entry-level’ figure for effective emergencyresponse. They also suggest that sectoralexcellence would require 3–4 specialists on staff,amounting to an annual investment per sector ofperhaps $200,000–$250,000 (ibid:39). There are

two models of paying for staff capacity: centralcoverage or ‘charging out’.

A lot depends on what an agency chooses toinvest in and how it determines the quality of itscapacity. There is a strong general sense that thereal missing capacity is humanitarian leadership;investing to scale-up this will be a long termendeavour that will require a concerted focus ondeveloping talent. This has substantial resourceimplications and efforts will need to be sustainedover years, which will have to be planned intocosts. Agencies will need to continually seek newtalent, develop their existing potential, and createopportunities for people to put their skills intopractice – all of which activities will be integral toany change management agenda. The returns,both tangible and intangible, are potentially verystrong, not least in terms of staff recruitment,retention and motivation. SC-UK reflects: ‘If youget this right then it eventually becomes costneutral as programmes factor into budgets andproposals the money needed to sustain theachieved capacity.’ Taking the longer view alsoencourages agencies to focus on other criticalprogramming components, such as disaster riskreduction and preparedness.

Developing a business case for surge capacity willbe an ongoing exercise. In the first instance itmight be useful for agencies to analyse currentcapacity and expenditure and extrapolate thatexpenditure to the desired capacity levels. At thesame time it would be instructive to undertake acomparative analysis of peer agencies’ resourcingstrategies, asking such questions as whetherthere is a correlation between emergency capacityand unrestricted funding, and whether there is acorrelation between the size of the investment andthe quality of the capacity. The ECB might considerundertaking further research in this area.

Finally, a point worth re-emphasising here is thatagencies that don’t have significant fundingavailable for start-up operations report significantconstraints, and this raises serious accountabilityissues. In comparison, those agencies that havescaled up their investment in emergency capacityhave grown in size and quality, and are less likelyto face such constraints.

Leverage through pooled funding The increasing tendency toward pooled fundingmechanisms was mentioned above. This clearlyrepresents an area where ECB agencies couldfurther develop the comparative advantagebrought by their collaboration – particularly assome agencies don’t have the funding available

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for start-up operations and many have problemsresponding to lesser known emergencies.Moreover, pooled funding arrangements havebeen shown to reduce programmaticfragmentation and increase the quality ofhumanitarian response. Pooled funding might alsoenable a more rapid response as it could be usedto facilitate, for example, the early mobilisation ofjoint assessment teams.

Leveraging material investmentInvesting time and resources in buildingpartnerships with a view to sharing materialstockpiles could also be important, including withexternal suppliers. Leveraging relationships in thisway would almost certainly lead to economies ofscale. Agencies could begin by mapping anddefining their deployment kits and developingMOUs to guide use of each other’s supplies.

Staff capacityThis research has been a strong reminder ofmany of the ongoing challenges to do withdeveloping staff capacity. Below are some of thekey issues to consider when going forward.

Overcoming HR constraintsThe research identified ongoing challenges in, forexample, sourcing and recruitment; retention;staff development and so on. In addressing theseissues it is suggested that agencies need to facefundamental contradictions in their HR policies,particularly with regard to sourcing but also interms of the strategic versus complianceagendas. Hiring an emergency HR manager or atthe very least designating a focal point for HR andemergency operations has proved a crucial stepforward for many of the agencies interviewed, ashas the deployment of HR capacity in first-waveresponse. But practice could be further enhancedby separating the strategic and compliancefunctions of HR, as done by Mercy Corps. It couldalso be enhanced by focusing on gaining agency-wide buy-in to HR policies and procedures, whichsuggests the need to focus on enhancing theoverall quality of the HR function within agencies.Among other things, agencies will need to scale-up so as to employ the right number of recruiters;provide emergency training to recruiters; andaugment HR capacity at field level.

In terms of sourcing, implicit in the research arecontradictions to do with internal versus externalsourcing, issues to do with skill reliability versusvariety, and cultural fit versus fresh ideas.Certainly a more proactive approach to sourcing is

required in order to avoid narrowing the ‘qualityloop’ and to reduce the negative impact ofunpredictable global events, as well as the overallchanging nature of humanitarian need.

If they haven’t already done so, agencies couldusefully develop an integrated emergencyrecruitment strategy and associated plan thatgrapples with these issues and has explicit linksto organisational aims and objectives for surge.A central component of the plan would entail thedevelopment of rapid HR procedures to assistwith rapid deployment. Agencies might also thinkabout seeking new talent pools, with a focus ontransferable skills; introducing M&E into sourcingand recruitment procedures to enable theevidence-based development of this function(recruitment needs to be measured againstlonger term organisational objectives as well asshort-term need); decentralising recruitment tofield offices who understand specific localneeds; reviewing the breadth and depth ofinformal networks, including ‘hot lists’, todetermine the extent of their usefulness beforeanother emergency.

Staff preparednessAnother main message to emerge from theresearch is the need to build a sufficiently skilledresponse capacity so that agencies don’t have touse too many external hires at the immediateonset of a new emergency.

Investment in staff development, at both nationaland international level, is an issue that requiresserious attention. Scale is certainly importanthere and there needs to be a step-change in theresources and efforts assigned to theseactivities: too often interviewees mentioned it wasdifficult to afford the annual training for theirdeployable staff, as well as challenging tocounter-part and shadow during rapid response –despite the fact that field staff find much morevalue from processes associated with mentoring,job shadowing and coaching. The quality of anagency’s staff directly impacts on the quality ofprogrammes an agency can deliver; andprogramme continuity, in part achieved throughcounter-parting, not only impacts on quality butwill affect communities’ ability to self-sustain overthe longer term.

Preparing human capacity is also about makingsure internal systems work, including rostersand registers and their associated HR protocolssuch as release protocols and incentivesystems. It is about identifying appropriatepartners to fill any specialist skills gaps, and

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buying in these skills if necessary. It is aboutdeveloping supportive policies and procedures,for example, around staff wellness, and givinggreater credence to behavioural competencies.And it is also about leveraging collaborativecapacity for optimum response.

Agency collaborationBeyond scaling-up at an individual agency level,agencies might seek to collaborate to addressmany of their challenging HR issues. Forexample, they might consider holding jointrecruitment training seminars to share goodpractices between agencies and better explainrecruitment needs to roster managers. Theymight also collaborate to produce minimumstandards for staffing in emergency response,particularly for leadership positions. Another areafor joint work might involve joint training on themany strategic issues that staff need to beaware of, including Sphere, gender, humanitarianlaw etc. This could involve not only developingjoint training activities but also, eventually,training a cadre of trainers that IWG agenciescould then use between themselves.

An obvious area for joint work concerns rostersand registers. The potential for partnership in thisarea was identified by a large number ofrespondents to this research, and Chapter 3identified some concrete suggestions about howto take this work forward. There are two mainoptions: collaboration on the development of acommon staff roster management tool andcollaboration around common staff pools in well-defined areas of activity. Joint assessment is anobvious one; continuing with joint M & E alsoseems sensible given the experience of the ECBworkstream on impact assessment andaccountability, as well as agencies’ ongoingdifficulties with learning.

The most important lesson concerning rostersand registers is the need for broad agency buy-into the roster concept as an integrated effectiveemergency response tool if it is to work. Asnoted earlier, the most significant costsassociated with rosters relate to theirmanagement. If agencies opt to develop thesetools it is imperative they invest in sufficient HRcapacity to make them work.

Implications of preparedness inpracticeThere are two important implications with regardto staff preparedness: how agencies can improve

the quality of their response over and abovegreater investment in traditional staffdevelopment activities (eg, training); and the needfor greater emphasis on national capacity building.

Quality and learning: There are currentlywidespread calls for increasing professionalisationof the humanitarian sector. This issue of quality,which is directly related to an agency’s longerterm impact, takes agencies into a whole newarea with regard to monitoring, evaluation andlearning. To do a more professional job and movebeyond mere functionality will require agencies todevelop a comprehensive and strategic modelaround programme analysis, monitoring,evaluation, research and learning. If this is goingto be done in a more professional manner,different kinds of resources are going to beneeded. Developing an effective surge capacitytherefore must involve adequate investment in M& E and learning, and agencies need to ensuretheir emergency units have a staff position tomanage the learning agenda. World Vision clearlyhas experience to share from its ‘H-Learn’programme. Agencies could also considermainstreaming these skills sets into a wider arrayof their emergency job descriptions.

The issue of quality also requires that agenciestake more seriously their commitments to careerdevelopment as well as methods of trainingassociated with on-the-job learning, especially asthis is the preferred method of learning for field-level staff. Agencies could consider a morestrategic engagement with universities to helpincrease professionalisation. Efforts here mightinclude identifying minimum requirements forhumanitarian personnel. The ECB working groupon national staff development has gained someuseful experience in this area.

Ultimately all agencies will need to work toward asituation where they can make a virtue of peoplemoving between organisations, as this will thebest short cut to collective learning. Having somecommon standards will help in this regard.Moreover, increased learning will ultimately leadto improved surge response. Agencies whostruggle to learn will arguably continue to struggleto surge, as effective rapid development is asmuch about an agency’s ability to learn and notmake the same mistakes as it is anything else.

Preparedness at country level: Preparedness atcountry level will be achieved by focusing muchgreater efforts on the various national levelcapacity strengthening initiatives identified inthis report. These efforts will need to beplanned within agencies’ strategic planning

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cycle and articulated through, for example,greater regionalisation of rosters, contingencyplans, emergency preparedness and / oremergency management plans, and nationalstaff development packages. The cleararticulation of flexible policies and proceduresto be followed in the event of a rapid responseare particularly important.

Responses to this research indicated that muchmore investment is required at country level ifagencies are to break the habit of falling backon external staff. To this end many agenciesnow locate their regional emergency directors inthe relevant region, and some have begun tobuild teams around these people. These staffhelp country directors to develop theirpreparedness plans and also with identifyingstaff for training in emergency response.Reducing the use of staff outside of affectedcountry/region contexts, unless in extremecrises and in some specialist technical areas,clearly needs to form a more central focus ofemergency response. However, unless agenciesdevelop and maintain an understanding of thelinks between preparedness and rapid responsethen this might be difficult to achieve.

National staff development is likely to be bestapproached within a framework of disaster riskreduction, which needs to be properly resourcedand include good emergency preparedness andsuccession planning. Moreover, a DRR approachwill lead to better prepared communities:agencies need to be working toward a scenariowhere, for example, community leaders are as animportant component of developing nationalcapacity as national staff. Communities are thefirst responders. If they are trained to do needsassessments, for example, then they will bebetter able to say what they want as well as morelikely to be able to take ‘ownership’ of anyresponse – both of which will result in moreappropriate and sustainable recovery and longerterm development.

Leverage at community level is crucial. Whenfaced with an emergency people to turn toeverything around them to survive. This hasimplications for wider relationships that will berequired which reinforces the need to developdiverse forms of partnership. Agencies need tolook to develop more concrete relationship with,eg, local authorities, community groups andlocal businesses, all of which would facilitate amore rapid response. Their programming alsoneeds to re-orient toward greater preparedness,risk reduction and more integrated recovery

programming so that communities’ relationshipswith their surrounding environment arestrengthened. People’s needs are rarelyaddressed by single interventions such as assetreplacement initiatives or shelter reconstruction,and agencies need to look to better integrateinterventions to assist in social and economicrecovery.

The IWG agencies might consider undertakingfurther research into how national levelorganisations surge.

AdvocacyFinally, it is worth reflecting on the importance ofadvocacy when developing a way forward forsurge capacity. Agencies are relatively weak inthis area, particularly with regard to advocacyaround funding. Yet this could make aconsiderable difference to their ability to developand maintain not only the obvious staffcomponents of surge capacity, but moreimportantly the kind of comprehensive rapidresponse system as set out in this report. Actingtogether is likely to create the most leverage andhave the strongest impact.

The Introduction to this report set out some of thechallenges associated with humanitarian funding,including those related to lack of proportionalityand political partialities and associated impactson quality and accountability. The IWG and otheragencies need to operate within theseconstraints, which not only impacts on their abilityto mount rapid response in ‘funded emergencies’but particularly in lesser known emergencies.Another discrepancy is that donors haveconsistently pushed agencies to developstandards on which funding is increasingly basedwhen often they do not maintain their ownstandards by, for example, funding according toneed (as set out in the GHD principles).

It is therefore suggested that IWG agencies seekto develop coordinated advocacy strategies withregard to developing and maintaining surgecapacity – and at country level as much asinternational level. Such strategies will need toalign with agencies’ overall advocacy approaches.In adopting such a coordinated approach,agencies could also make a crucial contribution inhelping to re-orient the humanitarian sector fromits traditional service delivery focus to one morein line with a partnership approach which willdirectly impact on the quality and impact not onlyof emergency response but recovery anddevelopment over the longer term.

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ndic

es

AppendicesAppendix 1: ECB Agencies’ Surge Capacity Mechanisms . . . . . . . . .82

CARE (International) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .82CRS . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .84The IRC . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .85Mercy Corps . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .87Save the Children US . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .88Oxfam-GB . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .91World Vision . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .93

Appendix 2: A World Vision ‘Lesson Learning Review’ . . . . . . . . . . .96Consolidated lessons for human resources (March 2006) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .96

Appendix 3: Research Methodology . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .99Research approach . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .99Research process . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .99Limitations and constraints . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .99


Appendices

Appendices CA

RE

(Int

erna

tion

al)

TOO

LB

RIE

F D

ESC

RIP

TIO

NM

AIN

CH

AR

AC

TER

ISTI

CS

CAR

E In

tern

atio

nal:

Car

eEm

erge

ncy

Gro

up (C

EG)

CAR

E In

tern

atio

nal:

Car

eEm

erge

ncy

Res

pons

e Te

am(C

ERT)

CAR

E In

tern

atio

nal:

Glo

bal

Res

pons

e Te

am (G

RT)

CA

RE*

Emer

genc

y R

espo

nse

Fund

CER

T C

ontin

genc

y Fu

nd

9 po

sitio

ns

Emer

genc

y re

spon

se d

irect

orEm

erge

ncy

hum

an r

esou

rces

coo

rdin

ator

Team

lead

er (as

sess

men

t) (G

RT;

see

bel

ow)

Logi

stic

ian

(GR

T; s

ee b

elow

)R

egio

nal e

mer

genc

y co

ordi

nato

rs (x2

)S

enio

r sp

ecia

list

on s

helte

r an

d re

con

Sen

ior

spec

ialis

t on

wat

san

Sen

ior

spec

ialis

t on

logi

stic

s

CER

T

(NB

: C

ARE

staf

f ha

ve n

oted

tha

t th

is t

ool i

sno

t w

orki

ng w

ell a

nd C

ARE

US

hav

e de

velo

ped

an A

ctio

n Pl

an t

o m

ake

it op

erat

iona

l it

agai

n)

Sm

all s

tand

ing

team

FUN

DIN

G R

ESO

UR

CES

$1 m

illio

n, o

f w

hich

$50

0,00

0 is

rev

olvi

ng

$500

,000

•Fo

rmed

in J

uly

2004

•In

clud

es a

n H

R c

oord

inat

or•

Coo

rdin

ates

and

ove

rsee

s C

ARE

Inte

rnat

iona

l’s g

loba

l hum

anita

rian

emer

genc

yre

spon

ses,

incl

udin

g co

ordi

natin

g st

aff fo

r em

erge

ncy

resp

onse

•

Som

e de

ploy

able

pos

ition

s•

Spe

cial

ists

to

be u

sed

to h

elp

deve

lop

spec

ialis

t fu

nctio

ns in

CER

T on

ce t

he C

ERT

is o

pera

tiona

l aga

in

Reg

iona

l coo

rdin

ator

s:•

2 in

pos

t; 2

mor

e po

sitio

ns t

o be

cre

ated

To s

uppo

rt t

he r

einf

orce

men

t of

CER

T an

d de

velo

p re

gion

al r

oste

rs c

ompl

emen

tary

to C

ERT

•Fo

rmed

in 2

002

•In

clud

es C

ARE

staf

f an

d ex

tern

al c

onsu

ltant

s •

For

thos

e se

lect

ed for

ass

essm

ent: d

eplo

ymen

t w

ithin

48-

72 h

ours

; fo

r up

to

4w

eeks

in-c

ount

ry•

For

othe

r po

sitio

ns: de

ploy

with

in 3

-5 d

ays

and

on a

ssig

nmen

t be

twee

n 1-

3 m

onth

s•

Ski

lls a

nd e

xper

tise

acro

ss 2

4 fu

nctio

nal a

reas

•2

full-

time,

tec

hnic

al s

taff

One

: TL

/ a

sses

smen

t /

prep

ared

ness

; th

e ot

her: lo

gist

ics

Res

pons

e to

sm

all e

mer

genc

ies,

allo

catio

ns o

f up

to

$50,0

00 (

to b

e re

imbu

rsed

by u

ser)

Can

acc

ess

up t

o $2

50,0

00 for

an

emer

genc

y re

spon

se (ve

ry r

arel

y us

ed d

ue t

oim

prac

tical

ity o

f de

cisi

on-m

akin

g sy

stem

)

PEO

PLE

FUN

DIN

G R

ESO

UR

CES

Appe

ndix

1:

ECB

Age

ncie

s’ S

urge

Cap

acity

Mec

hani

sms

cont

.


Appendix 1

Appe

ndic

es

TOO

LB

RIE

F D

ESC

RIP

TIO

NM

AIN

CH

AR

AC

TER

ISTI

CS

CA

RE

USA

:Em

erge

ncy

and

Hum

anita

rian

Assi

stan

ce U

nit

CA

RE

Aus

tral

ia

CA

RE

Can

ada

CA

RE

USA

, A

ustr

alia

and

Can

ada

PO

LIC

IES,

PR

OC

EDU

RES

& O

PER

ATIO

NS

MA

NA

GEM

ENT

TOO

LS

9 st

aff,

of w

hich

2 a

re a

t 50

%

Dire

ctor

Dep

uty

Dire

ctor

/Pre

pare

dnes

sS

r. Ad

v. C

omm

odity

Mgm

t &

Log

istic

sS

r. Ad

v. A

sses

smen

t, D

esig

n, M

&E

Sr.

Adv.

Sta

ff D

evel

opm

ent

Prog

ram

me

Off

icer

Iraq

Prog

ram

me

Off

icer

Prog

ram

me

Assi

stan

t/H

OTS

POTS

Exec

utiv

e As

sist

ant

Has

an

exte

rnal

ros

ter

it ca

n ca

ll on

as

wel

las

, eg

, JD

s fo

r ot

her

staf

f in

the

age

ncy

to b

ede

ploy

ed if

nec

essa

ry.

Hum

anita

rian

Assi

stan

ce a

nd A

ssis

tanc

eEm

erge

ncy

Team

(H

AET)

. 4

peop

le ful

l tim

e

•H

as b

een

in p

lace

for

mor

e th

an a

dec

ade;

rec

onfig

ured

in 2

002

•C

ARE

US

A al

so h

as a

ful

l tim

e H

R m

anag

er t

o su

ppor

t su

rge

and

emer

genc

yde

ploy

men

t as

wel

l as

emer

genc

y ca

paci

ty b

uild

ing,

as

wel

l as

one

full

time

HR

assi

stan

t fo

r em

erge

ncie

s (o

nly

until

Jun

e 20

07).

One

ful

l tim

e em

erge

ncy

HR

pos

ition

to

supp

ort

surg

e an

d em

erge

ncy

depl

oym

ent.

Has

out

sour

ced

HR

, on

e of

the

HAE

T st

aff m

embe

rs is

CAR

E’s

poin

t pe

rson

for

emer

genc

y H

R q

uest

ions

; th

is p

erso

n th

en d

eals

with

the

out

sour

ced

serv

ice

prov

ider

.

All h

ave

wel

l-dev

elop

ed c

ouns

ellin

g se

rvic

es. C

ARE

US

A th

roug

h its

ow

n ps

ycho

-soc

ial

serv

ice;

CAR

E C

ANAD

A an

d Au

stra

lia h

ave

a po

oled

ser

vice

(C

anad

a-ba

sed)

for

serio

us c

ases

in t

he fie

ld.

Pers

onne

l req

uisi

tion

form

; ge

neric

JD

s; m

in r

equi

rem

ents

for

diff

eren

t te

chni

cal

area

s; c

ouns

ellin

g su

ppor

t; r

apid

mob

ilisa

tion

prot

ocol

for

CER

T et

c.

CA

RE

OP

ERAT

ION

S O

FFIC

ES

CA

RE

(Int

erna

tion

al)

cont

.

App

endi

x 1:

EC

B A

genc

ies’

Sur

ge C

apac

ity

Mec

hani

sms

cont

.


Appendices

Appendices CR

S

TOO

LB

RIE

F D

ESC

RIP

TIO

NM

AIN

CH

AR

AC

TER

ISTI

CS

Emer

genc

y R

espo

nse

Team

(ER

T)

Emer

genc

y R

ecru

iter

Reg

iona

l Dire

ctor

s an

dEm

erge

ncy

Foca

l Poi

nts

(EFP

s)(tec

hnic

al a

dvis

ors)

Ret

aine

r po

sitio

ns

Emer

genc

y C

orps

Trai

ning

and

sta

ff d

evel

opm

ent

PEO

PLE

11 p

eopl

e: 4

in H

Q a

nd 7

in N

airo

bi

Team

Lea

der

Dep

uty

Team

Lea

der

Sec

urity

& T

elec

omm

unic

atio

nsLo

gist

ics

Hea

lth a

nd

Nut

ritio

nS

helte

r &

Com

mun

ity In

fras

truc

ture

Fina

nce

Man

agem

ent

Prot

ectio

n (2

)S

peci

alis

tW

ATS

AN

Sits

in H

R

Reg

iona

l Dire

ctor

per

def

ined

reg

ion.

O

ne E

FP p

er r

egio

n.

2 (1

vac

ancy

)

Con

ceiv

ed in

200

1 bu

t ne

ver

fully

rea

lised

.Ag

ency

is lo

okin

g to

rei

nvig

orat

e.

• S

ince

199

9•

48-h

our

resp

onse

; de

ploy

ed for

4-6

wee

ks•

Sel

f fu

nded

: ge

nera

lly fro

m d

eplo

ymen

ts b

ut c

an a

lso

use

unre

stric

ted

fund

s•

Reg

iona

l and

cou

ntry

dire

ctor

s w

ork

out

depl

oym

ent

need

s du

e to

nat

ure

of t

hedi

sast

er

Reg

iona

l dire

ctor

s:•

Mak

e cr

itica

l dec

isio

nsFo

r th

e EF

Ps:

• R

epor

t to

the

Reg

iona

l Dire

ctor

s (in

mos

t ca

ses)

• C

an b

e m

obili

sed

on a

tem

pora

ry b

asis

• As

sist

with

iden

tifyi

ng p

eopl

e in

-cou

ntry

and

enc

oura

ge c

ross

-trai

ning

bet

wee

n of

fices

• Fo

cus

on d

isas

ter

miti

gatio

n is

sues

whi

ch is

see

n st

rate

gica

lly a

s pa

rt o

f su

rge

• In

tent

ion

is for

eac

h fo

cal p

oint

to

build

a t

eam

in e

ach

regi

on

• G

ener

al e

mer

genc

y fo

cus

• A

seco

ndm

ent

tool

tha

t, o

nce

oper

atio

nal,

will

be

mai

ntai

ned

by H

R•

The

regi

onal

ros

ters

tha

t th

e ag

ency

is d

evel

opin

g co

uld

be p

oole

d to

giv

e C

RS

agl

obal

ros

ter

to u

tilis

e as

nee

ded

• ER

T an

d EF

P m

embe

rs id

entif

y th

eir

own

trai

ning

nee

ds•

Bas

ic t

rain

ing

in S

PHER

E, s

imul

atio

ns, an

d pr

otec

tion

is r

equi

red

App

endi

x 1:

EC

B A

genc

ies’

Sur

ge C

apac

ity

Mec

hani

sms

cont

.

CR

S c

ont.


Appendix 1

Appe

ndic

es

The

IRC

TOO

LB

RIE

F D

ESC

RIP

TIO

NM

AIN

CH

AR

AC

TER

ISTI

CS

Emer

genc

y Pr

epar

edne

ssR

espo

nse

Uni

t (w

hich

hou

ses

the

Emer

genc

y R

espo

nse

Team

; ER

T)

ERT

of 1

7 m

embe

rs (from

6 in

200

5)

Sen

ior

emer

genc

y co

ordi

nato

rER

T co

ordi

nato

r (x

2)Em

erge

ncy

oper

atio

ns c

oord

inat

orEm

erge

ncy

finan

ce c

ontr

olle

rEm

erge

ncy

secu

rity

coor

dina

tor

Emer

genc

y hu

man

res

ourc

es c

oord

inat

orEm

erge

ncy

com

mun

icat

ions

coo

rdin

ator

Emer

genc

y M

&E

/ gr

ants

coo

rdin

ator

Emer

genc

y he

alth

coo

rdin

ator

(x2

)Em

erge

ncy

envi

ronm

enta

l hea

lth c

oord

inat

or (x2

)Em

erge

ncy

gend

er b

ased

vio

lenc

e co

ordi

nato

rEm

erge

ncy

child

ren

and

youn

g pe

ople

’sde

velo

pmen

t co

ordi

nato

r (x

2)Em

erge

ncy

prot

ectio

n co

ordi

nato

r

•ER

T fir

st for

med

in 2

000

•Fu

ll-tim

e, IR

C s

taff

; av

aila

ble

with

in 7

2 ho

urs

•S

uppo

rt a

ll IR

C c

ount

ry o

ffic

es w

hen

not

on e

mer

genc

y as

sign

men

ts

•Ar

e ba

sed

from

hom

e an

d ar

e de

ploy

ed t

o th

e fie

ld a

ppro

xim

atel

y 75

% o

f th

e tim

e•

Are

part

nere

d w

ith a

n H

Q T

echn

ical

Uni

t co

unte

rpar

t fo

r co

llabo

ratio

n, in

form

atio

nsh

arin

g an

d t

echn

ical

sup

port

PEO

PLE

TOO

LB

RIE

F D

ESC

RIP

TIO

NM

AIN

CH

AR

AC

TER

ISTI

CS

Reg

iona

l Ope

ratio

nal R

eser

ves

Indi

vidu

al fun

ds li

ke t

he A

fric

aC

risis

Fun

dO

vers

eas

Ope

ratio

ns R

eser

ve

FUN

DIN

G R

ESO

UR

CES

Varie

s

Varie

s$1

mill

ion/

year

(va

ries

(ann

ual)

•Reg

iona

l Ope

ratio

nal R

eser

ves

are

avai

labl

e at

the

dis

cret

ion

of t

he R

egio

nal

Dire

ctor

•H

as s

ome

rest

rictio

ns o

n w

hat

can

fund

•O

vers

eas

Ope

ratio

ns R

eser

ve F

undi

ng is

util

ised

at

the

disc

retio

n of

the

Vic

ePr

esid

ent

of O

vers

eas

Ope

ratio

ns

PO

LIC

IES,

PR

OC

EDU

RES

& O

PER

ATIO

NS

MA

NA

GEM

ENT

TOO

LS

Emer

genc

y re

spon

se m

anua

ls c

over

ing:

asse

ssm

ent; s

helte

r; s

ecur

ity (pl

anne

d fo

r op

erat

ions

and

fin

anci

al m

gmt); c

ross

-pla

cem

ent

prot

ocol

s(to

faci

litat

e m

ovem

ent

betw

een

diff

eren

t of

fices

with

in t

he s

ame

regi

on);

sha

re p

oint

site

(be

ing

deve

lope

d; w

ill in

clud

e al

l inf

o ab

out

an e

mer

genc

y as

wel

l as

indu

ctio

n in

form

atio

n; m

aps;

sec

urity

situ

atio

n et

c; w

ill b

e do

ne o

n a

case

-by-

case

bas

is t

o re

tain

fle

xibi

lity)

; ful

l sta

ff p

acka

ge: R

&R

; da

nger

pay

; co

st o

f liv

ing

adju

stm

ents

etc

.

App

endi

x 1:

EC

B A

genc

ies’

Sur

ge C

apac

ity

Mec

hani

sms

cont

.

The

IRC

con

t.


Appendices

Appendices TOO

LB

RIE

F D

ESC

RIP

TIO

NM

AIN

CH

AR

AC

TER

ISTI

CS

Inte

rnal

Em

erge

ncy

Ros

ter

(IER

)

Exte

rnal

Em

erge

ncy

Ros

ter

(EER

)

Con

fere

nces

, tr

aini

ng,

men

torin

g, c

ount

er-p

artin

g.

45 +

is t

he t

arge

t; m

embe

rs r

epre

sent

cor

epr

ogra

mm

e an

d op

erat

ion

com

pete

ncie

s•

Sec

ondm

ent

rost

er•

IER

mem

bers

hol

d re

gula

r po

sitio

ns in

IRC

cou

ntry

pro

gram

s•

Goa

l is

to h

ave

five

peop

le id

entif

ied

in e

very

sec

tor

•C

omm

itmen

t to

a 7

2-ho

ur r

espo

nse

•Av

aila

ble

for

4-6

wee

ks

•U

se e

xcel

spr

eads

heet

to

man

age

rela

ted

data

•R

eady

dep

loy

with

in o

ne w

eek’

s no

tice

•N

ot c

urre

nt IR

C e

mpl

oyee

s, b

ut m

any

have

wor

ked

for

the

IRC

in t

he p

ast

•G

oal i

s to

hav

e fiv

e pe

ople

iden

tifie

d in

eve

ry s

ecto

r

Incl

udes

an

annu

al w

orks

hop

for

ERT

and

IER

mem

bers

FUN

DIN

G R

ESO

UR

CES

ToR

s fo

r de

ploy

men

t; de

velo

ping

a le

arni

ng d

atab

ase

(cur

rent

ly b

eing

dev

elop

ed; w

ill b

e us

ed t

o st

reng

then

man

agem

ent

of s

taff

dev

elop

men

t an

d tr

aini

ng a

ctiv

ities

, an

d w

illin

clud

e em

erge

ncy

resp

onse

lear

ning

opp

ortu

nitie

s); st

affin

g pl

ans

(HQ

HR

dev

elop

s a

staf

fing

plan

in e

ach

new

em

erge

ncy

by w

orki

ng w

ith t

he c

ount

ry d

irect

or);

risk

anal

ysis

(for

all c

ount

ry p

rogr

amm

es),

etc.

FUN

DIN

G R

ESO

UR

CES

The

IRC

Whi

tehe

ad F

und

Leo

Che

rne

Fund

$2.5

mill

ion

$2 m

illio

n

Inte

rest

is u

sed

acco

rdin

g to

the

prio

ritie

s of

the

Em

erge

ncy

Res

pons

e U

nit; c

apita

lis

for

spe

cific

em

erge

ncy

resp

onse

s w

ith a

n ef

fort

mad

e to

rep

leni

sh w

ith p

rivat

e or

gran

t fu

nds.

IRC

aim

s to

cov

er 7

5% o

f th

e op

erat

ing

cost

s of

the

ER

T th

roug

h fie

ld d

eplo

ymen

tsof

ER

T m

embe

rs; th

e ba

lanc

e is

cov

ered

thr

ough

the

gra

nts

from

Stic

htin

gVl

ucht

elin

g (w

hich

cov

ers

9 po

sitio

ns),

Wel

lspr

ing

Advi

sors

(6

posi

tions

), th

e B

urea

uof

Dem

ocra

cy, R

ight

s, a

nd L

abor

(1

posi

tion)

, an

d th

e C

hild

ren'

s In

vest

men

t Fu

ndFo

unda

tion

(1 p

ositi

on).

All f

undi

ng is

sub

ject

to

annu

al r

evie

w a

nd is

req

uest

ed t

hrou

gh t

he s

ubm

issi

on o

fpr

opos

als

to a

ll bu

t W

hite

head

and

Che

rne.

App

endi

x 1:

EC

B A

genc

ies’

Sur

ge C

apac

ity

Mec

hani

sms

cont

.


Appendix 1

Appe

ndic

es

MER

CY C

OR

PS

TOO

LB

RIE

F D

ESC

RIP

TIO

NM

AIN

CH

AR

AC

TER

ISTI

CS

Glo

bal E

mer

genc

y O

pera

tions

(GEO

) (t

he e

mer

genc

ies

unit

atH

Q)

Glo

bal R

espo

nse

Team

(G

RT)

Ope

ratio

nal S

uppo

rt T

eam

OS

T(a

sub

-set

of

the

GR

T)

Reg

iona

l Dire

ctor

s

Min

i-GR

T te

ams

at r

egio

nal l

evel

GR

T Tr

aini

ng P

rogr

amm

e

PEO

PLE

7 1 /

2fu

ll-tim

e em

ploy

ees

• Em

erge

ncy

dire

ctor

(do

esn’

t de

ploy

)•

Dire

ctor

of em

erge

ncy

prep

ared

ness

and

DR

R (do

esn’

t de

ploy

)•

Prog

ram

off

icer

(do

esn’

t de

ploy

)•

2 te

am le

ader

s•

Logi

stic

s m

anag

er•

Wat

san

(spl

it be

twee

n G

EO a

nd h

ealth

dep

t)

Inte

rnal

ros

ter

of c

35 p

eopl

e (in

cl O

STs

; se

ebe

low

)

Man

agem

ent

and

tech

nica

l spe

cial

ists

; 8-

9pe

ople

• Fu

nded

by

core

fun

ds•

Purp

ose

of G

EO is

to

mob

ilize

and

coo

rdin

ate

the

reso

urce

s of

the

bro

ader

orga

niza

tion

behi

nd a

n em

erge

ncy

resp

onse

• D

eplo

yabl

e G

EO t

eam

bud

gete

d fo

r 25

% c

ost

reco

very

• C

reat

ed in

200

5; n

ot y

et u

sed

exte

nsiv

ely

• R

ecei

ve o

ne w

eek

of m

anda

tory

tra

inin

g pe

r ye

ar•

72-h

our

com

mitm

ent; u

p to

3 m

onth

s de

ploy

men

t •

Mos

tly n

atio

nal s

taff

; c

anno

t be

use

d fo

r no

n-em

erge

ncy

purp

oses

•

100%

cos

t-rec

over

y w

hen

depl

oyed

•

Use

exc

el s

prea

dshe

et t

o m

anag

e; d

iffer

ent

sear

ch fie

lds

for

lang

uage

s an

dex

pert

ise

• As

sign

ed t

o G

RT

by t

heir

depa

rtm

ent

head

s at

HQ

; se

rve

in m

anag

emen

t,re

pres

enta

tiona

l or

over

sigh

t ro

les

• R

ecei

ve o

ne w

eek

of m

anda

tory

tra

inin

g pe

r ye

ar•

72-h

our

com

mitm

ent

• O

nly

for

3-6

wee

ks•

Set

up

syst

ems

and

trai

n pe

ople

to

take

ove

r

All r

egio

nal d

irect

ors

are

now

bas

ed in

the

fie

ld a

nd a

re a

n ad

ditio

nal r

esou

rce

for

emer

genc

y de

ploy

men

t

This

initi

ativ

e ha

s on

ly s

tart

ed r

ecen

tly, an

d so

far

has

dev

elop

ed in

Indo

nesi

a on

ly

For

tech

nica

l ski

lls b

uild

ing;

hum

anita

rian

polic

y an

d st

anda

rds

deve

lopm

ent; t

o ge

t to

wor

k to

geth

er a

s a

team

; an

d to

aid

the

GEO

in t

he fin

al s

elec

tion

of c

andi

date

s

App

endi

x 1:

EC

B A

genc

ies’

Sur

ge C

apac

ity

Mec

hani

sms

cont

.

MER

CY C

OR

PS c

ont.

App

endi

x 1:

EC

B A

genc

ies’

Sur

ge C

apac

ity

Mec

hani

sms

cont

.


Appendices

Appendices TOO

LB

RIE

F D

ESC

RIP

TIO

NM

AIN

CH

AR

AC

TER

ISTI

CS

MER

CY

CO

RP

SN

o fo

rmal

fun

ding

mec

hani

sms

in p

lace

Lett

er o

f un

ders

tand

ing

Bac

ksto

ppin

g pl

an

Bla

ckou

t da

tes

Glo

bal E

mer

genc

y O

pera

tions

tea

m a

nd G

RT

trai

ning

is fun

ded

thro

ugh

unre

stric

ted

core

bud

get.

Rap

id r

espo

nse

fund

sup

port

ed b

y a

priv

ate

dono

r.U

nres

tric

ted

fund

s ar

e re

leas

ed for

sta

rt u

p of

rap

id o

nset

res

pons

e.G

RT

team

is fun

ded

by fie

ld o

ffic

es w

hen

not

depl

oyed

, by

em

erge

ncy

sour

ces

whe

nde

ploy

ed.

PO

LIC

IES,

PR

OC

EDU

RES

& O

PER

ATIO

NS

MA

NA

GEM

ENT

TOO

LS

PLU

S: D

igita

l lib

rary

/ o

nlin

e(a

ll tr

aini

ng m

ater

ials

are

mad

e av

aila

ble

in t

his

way

); ‘O

ffic

e in

a B

ox’(

see

Cas

e S

tudy

14

for

deta

ils);

GEO

pro

ject

des

ign

chec

klis

t; ge

neric

JDs

& s

cope

s of

wor

k; a

nd a

var

iety

of ‘le

arni

ng’ to

ols:

revi

ews,

M&

E, p

ost

depl

oym

ent

revi

ew, af

ter

actio

n re

view

, af

ter

actio

n ‘s

urve

y m

onke

y’

FUN

DIN

G R

ESO

UR

CES

Bet

wee

n M

ercy

Cor

ps a

nd c

ount

ry d

irect

or; to

get

agr

eem

ent

that

the

GR

T m

embe

r ha

s th

e op

port

unity

to

dedi

cate

the

maj

ority

of h

er /

his

5% o

rgan

isat

iona

l lea

rnin

g tim

e to

em

erge

ncy

prep

ared

ness

tra

inin

g as

wel

l as

part

icip

ate

in t

rain

ing

for

up t

o 5

days

a y

ear.

The

CD

app

rove

s a

back

stop

ping

pla

n w

ith t

he G

RT

mem

ber

outli

ning

how

her

/ h

is w

ork

will

be

cove

red

durin

g de

ploy

men

t

Ope

rate

‘bl

ack

out

date

s’. If

pers

on n

ot a

vaila

ble

whe

n th

ey s

aid

they

wou

ld b

e th

ey m

ight

be

drop

ped

from

the

GR

T.

Sav

e th

e C

hild

ren

US

TOO

LB

RIE

F D

ESC

RIP

TIO

NM

AIN

CH

AR

AC

TER

ISTI

CS

Emer

genc

y D

epar

tmen

t:C

hild

ren

in E

mer

genc

ies

and

Cris

is (

CEC

)

Chi

ldre

n in

Em

erge

ncie

s an

d C

risis

(C

EC)

Dep

artm

ent: E

mer

genc

y Pr

epar

edne

ss a

ndR

espo

nse

Uni

t (5

), Pr

otec

tion

and

Educ

atio

n U

nit

(6),

Hun

ger

and

Mal

nutr

ition

Uni

t (1

1),

Com

mod

ity O

pera

tions

(3)

, O

pera

tions

(3)

, H

R in

Emer

genc

ies

(1),

Com

mun

icat

ions

Spe

cial

ist

(1),

DM

&E

Spe

cial

ist

(1),

Allia

nce

Task

For

ceM

anag

er (1)

Pro

gram

me

Sup

port

(3)

, S

enio

rM

anag

emen

t (3

)

•Th

e C

EC w

as c

reat

ed in

199

2.•

It is

org

anis

ed in

to a

Tec

hnic

al S

uppo

rt D

ivis

ion

[TS

D] an

d M

anag

emen

t S

uppo

rtD

ivis

ion

[MS

D].

•TS

D in

clud

es P

rote

ctio

n, H

unge

r an

d M

alnu

triti

on, Em

erge

ncy

Prep

ared

ness

and

Res

pons

e te

ams.

•

MS

D in

clud

es a

Com

mod

ity O

pera

tions

tea

m, O

pera

tions

tea

m, H

R r

ecru

itmen

tsp

ecia

list, c

omm

unic

atio

ns s

peci

alis

t, A

llian

ce T

ask

Forc

e M

anag

er a

nd D

M&

Esp

ecia

list.

PEO

PLE

Sav

e th

e C

hild

ren

US c

ont.

App

endi

x 1:

EC

B A

genc

ies’

Sur

ge C

apac

ity

Mec

hani

sms

cont

.


Appendix 1

Appe

ndic

es

TOO

LB

RIE

F D

ESC

RIP

TIO

NM

AIN

CH

AR

AC

TER

ISTI

CS

Reg

iona

l RED

I Tea

ms

(Res

pond

ing

to E

mer

genc

ies

and

Dis

aste

rs In

tern

atio

nally

)

Area

Dire

ctor

s

Wee

k lo

ng t

rain

ing

for

RED

Im

embe

rs +

tec

hnic

al t

rain

ings

insp

ecia

list

sect

ors

5 te

ams

by r

egio

n: A

sia;

Mid

dle

East

/Eur

asia

;Af

rica;

Lat

in A

mer

ica/

Car

ibbe

an; U

nite

d S

tate

s •

Empl

oyee

s, b

ut a

lso

from

Sav

e th

e C

hild

ren

Allia

nce

•M

anag

ed b

y Em

erge

ncy

Dep

artm

ent

and

Area

Dire

ctor

s•

Min

imum

of th

ree

peop

le for

eac

h R

EDI p

ositi

on, ac

ross

17

func

tions

•

The

US

RED

I tea

m w

as c

reat

ed a

fter

the

age

ncy

face

d di

ffic

ultie

s w

ith v

isas

whe

ntr

ying

to

pull

in s

taff

fro

m t

he o

ther

RED

I tea

ms

•Ea

ch R

EDI m

embe

r ha

s an

app

rove

d ba

ckfil

l pla

n, w

hich

is a

req

uire

men

t fo

rpa

rtic

ipat

ion

•H

eavy

rel

ianc

e on

thi

s m

echa

nism

for

firs

t su

rge

resp

onse

; du

e to

issu

esco

ncer

ning

ava

ilabi

lity

the

agen

cy is

con

side

ring

deve

lopi

ng a

ros

ter

of a

few

ful

l-tim

e re

spon

ders

bas

ed in

the

ir ho

me

coun

trie

s

Cou

ntry

Off

ices

and

Pro

ject

Off

ices

are

gro

uped

into

geo

grap

hica

lly c

ateg

oris

ed a

reas

with

an

Area

Dire

ctor

ove

rsee

ing

field

pro

gram

mes

in t

heir

regi

ons

both

prog

ram

mat

ical

ly a

nd o

pera

tiona

lly. In

clo

se c

olla

bora

tion

with

the

ir fie

ld d

irect

ors,

Area

Dire

ctor

s se

t th

e ov

eral

l lon

g-te

rm a

nd s

hort

-term

pro

gram

mat

ic a

nd fun

drai

sing

stra

tegi

es for

the

ir Ar

ea. F

ield

dire

ctor

s, in

tur

n, a

re r

espo

nsib

le for

insu

ring

that

the

irde

sign

ated

pro

gram

s ar

e m

anag

ed s

ound

ly a

nd e

ffec

tivel

y.

They

are

als

o re

spon

sibl

efo

r in

surin

g co

mpl

ianc

e w

ith S

C-U

S’s

sta

ndar

d op

erat

iona

l pol

icie

s an

d pr

oced

ures

.In

clo

se c

olla

bora

tion

with

the

ir su

perv

isor

s, fie

ld d

irect

ors

set

the

long

-term

and

shor

t-ter

m p

rogr

amm

atic

and

fun

drai

sing

str

ateg

y fo

r th

eir

offic

e.

The

RED

I Wee

k lo

ng r

etre

at c

over

s th

e fo

llow

ing

topi

cs:

• Pa

radi

gm S

hift: from

dua

l man

date

to

inte

grat

ed a

ppro

ach;

fro

m G

loba

l RED

I to

Reg

iona

l RED

I•

Allia

nce

appr

oach

to

emer

genc

ies

• W

ellb

eing

and

Str

ess

Man

agem

ent

• Em

erge

ncy

Cas

e S

tudy

• M

edia

and

Sec

urity

tra

inin

g•

Team

Bui

ldin

g•

Less

ons

Forg

otte

n•

Dep

loym

ent

Tim

e•

Non

-Dep

loym

ent

Tim

e

Sav

e th

e C

hild

ren

US c

ont.

App

endi

x 1:

EC

B A

genc

ies’

Sur

ge C

apac

ity

Mec

hani

sms

cont

.


Appendices

Appendices TOO

LB

RIE

F D

ESC

RIP

TIO

NM

AIN

CH

AR

AC

TER

ISTI

CS

Hal

aby-

Mur

phy

Rev

olvi

ngEm

erge

ncy

Fund

Also

pre

pare

dnes

s fu

nd a

ndin

divi

dual

em

erge

ncy

fund

s.

$7.5

mill

ion,

rev

olvi

ng•

Initi

al s

tage

of em

erge

ncy

resp

onse

onl

y.•

Rev

olvi

ng fun

ds h

ave

a re

quire

men

t th

at fun

ds d

raw

n do

wn

mus

t be

ful

ly r

epla

ced

thro

ugh

back

cha

rgin

g or

rec

lass

ifica

tion

of c

osts

to

gran

ts o

r co

ntra

cts

and

thro

ugh

priv

ate

fund

rais

ing

(usu

ally

dire

ct m

ail a

ppea

ls).

PO

LIC

IES,

PR

OC

EDU

RES

& O

PER

ATIO

NS

MA

NA

GEM

ENT

TOO

LS

Emer

genc

y R

espo

nse

Man

ual;

Dom

estic

Em

erge

ncy

Res

pons

e M

anua

l; E

mer

genc

y Fi

nanc

e M

anua

l; G

uide

for

Acc

ount

abili

ty a

nd Im

pact

Mea

sure

men

t in

Em

erge

ncie

s:G

ood

Enou

gh G

uide

; E

mer

genc

y As

sess

men

t To

olki

t;

Min

imum

Ope

ratin

g S

tand

ards

; C

omm

odity

Man

agem

ent

and

Prog

ram

min

g M

anua

l; A

llian

ce G

rant

s H

andb

ook;

H

ome

Off

ice

Dep

artm

ent

Prep

ared

ness

Pla

ns; D

AP/M

YAP

Gui

delin

es; C

ount

ry O

ffic

e Pr

epar

edne

ss P

lans

; A

vian

Flu

Cou

ntry

Off

ice

Prep

ared

ness

Pla

ns; B

usin

ess

Con

tinui

tyPr

oced

ures

; F

ield

Off

ice

Polic

ies

and

Proc

edur

es M

anua

l; C

omm

unity

The

rape

utic

Car

e M

anua

l.

Volu

ntee

r da

taba

seS

ince

Kat

rina,

SC

-US

thr

ough

its

HR

dep

artm

ent

has

wor

ked

to li

ne u

p bo

th in

tern

alan

d ex

tern

al v

olun

teer

s in

the

eve

nt o

f an

em

erge

ncy

of s

uch

scal

e th

at s

urge

capa

city

is r

equi

red.

In

tern

al v

olun

teer

s w

ere

draw

n on

for

the

Kat

rina

resp

onse

itsel

f, an

d pr

oved

ver

y su

cces

sful

.

FUN

DIN

G R

ESO

UR

CES

Ros

ter

in E

xcel

Cur

rent

ly u

se E

xcel

, bu

t m

ovin

gto

war

d sh

arin

g a

soft

war

epa

ckag

e fo

r ro

ster

man

agem

ent

with

SC

-UK

A pr

ojec

t m

anag

er w

orks

ful

l-tim

e on

man

agin

g th

e ro

ster


Appendix 1

Appe

ndic

es

OX

FAM

-GB

TOO

LB

RIE

F D

ESC

RIP

TIO

NM

AIN

CH

AR

AC

TER

ISTI

CS

Hum

anita

rian

Dep

artm

ent

(Incl

udes

spe

cial

ist

tech

nica

lst

aff)

Sta

ff t

rain

ing

prog

ram

mes

Loca

l sta

ff

Cat

astr

ophe

fun

d

72 s

taff

, w

hich

incl

udes

14

spec

ialis

t te

chni

cal

staf

f PL

US

75 (cu

rren

tly r

ecru

iting

to

mak

e 90

)se

rvin

g as

glo

bally

rov

ing

Hum

anita

rian

Sup

port

Pers

onne

l – H

SPs

Hum

anita

rian

Dire

ctor

PA

to H

uman

itaria

n D

irect

orD

eput

y D

irect

or (2)

Sen

ior

Rep

rese

ntat

ive

Str

ateg

ic P

roje

ct M

anag

ers

(3)

Co-

ordi

nato

r of

HS

Ps

Hum

anita

rian

Des

k O

ffic

ers

(5)

Prog

ram

me

Advi

sory

Tea

m (13

)Pr

ogra

mm

e R

epre

sent

ativ

es (5)

Prog

ram

me

Man

ager

s (1

5)Lo

gist

ics

Team

(32

)Pu

blic

Hea

lth E

ngin

eerin

g Te

am

(22)

Publ

ic H

ealth

Tea

m

(13)

Em

erge

ncy

Food

Sec

urity

& L

ivel

ihoo

ds T

eam

(11

)Pr

ogra

mm

e Fi

nanc

e Te

am

(9)

Hum

an R

esou

rces

Tea

m

(18)

Sys

tem

s &

Res

ourc

es T

eam

(3)

Diff

eren

t fo

r ea

ch o

f th

e di

ffer

ent

type

s of

sta

ff

c£5

mill

ion

Full-

time;

HQ

bas

ed. Pr

ovid

e ba

ck-u

p to

the

HS

Ps w

hils

t al

so h

avin

g th

eir

own

port

folio

of w

ork.

Abou

t H

SPs

:•

Perm

anen

t co

ntra

cts;

on

‘sta

nd-b

y’•

Rap

id d

eplo

ymen

t fo

r up

to

90 d

ay a

ssig

nmen

ts

•U

nder

writ

ten

by r

eser

ve fun

ds•

Bud

get

for

25%

of th

eir

time;

get

75%

sal

ary

fund

ed b

y of

ficia

l don

ors.

The

25%

of t

heir

time

they

‘ow

n’: th

eir

leav

e; t

heir

trai

ning

tim

e et

c.

Spe

cial

ist

tech

nica

l sta

ff:

•S

enio

r /

lead

ersh

ip o

rient

ed p

osts

; im

med

iate

em

erge

ncy

star

t-up

•M

aint

ain

a se

ries

of in

form

al r

egis

ters

of ke

y co

ntac

ts: ‘li

ttle

bla

ck b

ooks

of

exte

rnal

s; “

mos

t fa

vour

ed c

onsu

ltant

s”.

•W

ant

to d

evel

op t

hese

for

pro

ject

man

ager

s, t

oo.

The

deve

lopm

ent

of in

tra-

regi

onal

reg

iste

rs o

f st

aff av

aila

ble

for

emer

genc

ies

depl

oym

ent

is c

urre

ntly

bei

ng s

cope

d.

Avai

labl

e fo

r fu

ndin

g re

spon

ses

to u

npre

dict

able

, ra

pid-

onse

t di

sast

ers

and/

or for

unde

rwrit

ing

emer

genc

y re

spon

ses

whi

le e

xter

nal f

undi

ng is

sec

ured

. U

sed

tole

vera

ge p

rogr

amm

es o

f up

to

£25m

n.

PEO

PLE

FUN

DIN

G R

ESO

UR

CES

App

endi

x 1:

EC

B A

genc

ies’

Sur

ge C

apac

ity

Mec

hani

sms

cont

.

OX

FAM

-GB

con

t.


Appendices

Appendices TOO

LB

RIE

F D

ESC

RIP

TIO

NM

AIN

CH

AR

AC

TER

ISTI

CS

Cor

pora

te (ge

nera

l) fu

nds

Hum

anita

rian

Inve

stm

ent

Plan

(HIP

)

Proc

edur

es for

cal

ling

and

man

agin

g O

xfam

’s e

mer

genc

yre

spon

se

Min

imum

Req

uire

men

ts for

‘Fi

rst

Phas

e’ H

uman

itaria

n R

espo

nse

Emer

genc

y M

anag

emen

t Pl

ans

Hum

anita

rian

Han

dboo

k(s

ucce

eded

the

Em

erge

ncy

Res

pons

e M

anua

l)

c£2.

3 m

illio

nM

oney

mad

e av

aila

ble

for

cost

s of

adv

isor

s an

d H

SPs

. Fo

r su

stai

ning

ove

rall

resp

onse

cap

acity

.

DEV

ELO

PIN

G P

RA

CTI

CE

Beg

inni

ng t

o se

cond

nat

iona

l sta

ff fro

m o

ne o

ffic

e to

ano

ther

.B

egin

ning

to

wor

k on

Glo

bal i

nter

natio

nal O

xfam

reg

iste

r.

PO

LIC

IES,

PR

OC

EDU

RES

& O

PER

ATIO

NS

MA

NA

GEM

ENT

TOO

LS

A pl

an (st

ruct

ured

into

sep

arat

e pr

ojec

ts) in

itiat

ed in

spr

ing

2005

and

con

stitu

ting

a lo

ng t

erm

inve

stm

ent

prog

ram

me

aim

ed a

t im

prov

ing

Oxf

am’s

em

erge

ncy

resp

onse

cap

acity

in t

erm

s of

eff

ectiv

enes

s an

d re

spon

sive

ness

.

Con

tain

s a

set

of m

inim

um r

equi

rem

ents

for

the

firs

t ph

ase

of a

n em

erge

ncy

(gen

eral

ly b

etw

een

2-3

mon

ths)

in lo

gist

ics;

hum

anre

sour

ces;

fin

ance

; an

d pr

ogra

mm

e/ov

eral

l man

agem

ent

•W

orki

ng d

ocum

ent

that

ong

oing

ly id

entif

ies

desi

gnat

ed h

uman

itaria

n le

ads

for

each

of O

xfam

’s c

ount

ry o

ffic

es d

epen

ding

on

the

cate

gory

of re

spon

se c

all.

•Al

so u

sed

to id

entif

y po

tent

ial n

atio

nal l

evel

lead

ersh

ip a

nd t

o de

sign

pro

gram

mes

to

build

tha

t ca

paci

ty•

Des

igne

d to

‘ou

t’ d

iffic

ult

issu

e of

who

will

be

in c

harg

e of

the

res

pons

e an

d co

ntai

ns a

pro

toco

l to

affe

ct a

ste

p as

ide

polic

y

•M

anua

l / s

yste

ms

over

view

; al

l tem

plat

es n

eces

sary

to

run

an e

mer

genc

y.•

This

is a

lso

on t

he in

tran

et a

nd o

n C

D, an

d al

so a

ppea

rs in

‘po

cket

for

m’.

•C

onta

ins

the

min

imum

req

uire

men

ts

Plus

, fo

r ex

ampl

e, g

ener

ic J

Ds;

cap

acity

pla

nnin

g sp

read

shee

ts (w

hich

tra

ck a

vaila

bilit

y); w

ays

of w

orki

ng t

hat

delin

eate

intr

a an

d in

ter

depa

rtm

enta

l rel

atio

nshi

ps; ch

eckl

ists

for

depl

oym

ents

etc

.

App

endi

x 1:

EC

B A

genc

ies’

Sur

ge C

apac

ity

Mec

hani

sms

cont

.


Appendix 1

Appe

ndic

es

Wor

ld V

isio

n

TOO

LB

RIE

F D

ESC

RIP

TIO

NM

AIN

CH

AR

AC

TER

ISTI

CS

Hum

anita

rian

and

Emer

genc

yAf

fairs

Dep

artm

ent

Glo

bal R

apid

Res

pons

e Te

am(G

RR

T)

Asso

ciat

es(F

or e

xam

ple:

wat

er a

ndsa

nita

tion,

pro

tect

ion,

DM

E,he

alth

) ar

e de

ploy

able

with

GR

RT

staf

f)

Cor

e te

am o

f 18

Vice

Pre

side

ntD

irect

or, Ac

coun

tabi

lity

& T

rans

pare

ncy

Dire

ctor

, H

uman

itaria

n Pl

anni

ngD

irect

or, S

trat

egic

Ope

ratio

nsD

irect

or, H

uman

itaria

n Le

arni

ngD

irect

or, H

uman

Res

ourc

esD

irect

or, In

form

atio

n Te

chno

logy

D

irect

or, R

esou

rce

Dev

elop

men

t D

irect

or, B

usin

ess

and

Fina

nce

Asso

ciat

e D

irect

or C

apac

ity B

uild

ing

Asso

c D

irect

or, Lo

gist

ics

& P

re-p

ositi

onin

gAs

soci

ate

Dire

ctor

, R

esou

rces

and

Acc

ount

abili

tyS

uppo

rt s

taff

(6)

c22

peop

le.

This

is t

he W

V G

loba

l Sta

ndin

g R

espo

nse

team

.Th

ey w

ork

on t

he D

isas

ter

Mgt

cyc

le w

hen

not

inem

erge

ncy

resp

onse

.

12 p

eopl

e de

ploy

able

up

to 5

0% o

f th

eir

time

In o

rder

to

over

com

e te

nsio

n be

twee

n de

ploy

abili

ty a

nd c

oord

inat

ion,

Wor

ld V

isio

nha

s ex

plic

itly

assi

gned

som

e of

its

cent

ral e

mer

genc

y un

it to

foc

us o

n th

eco

ordi

natio

n of

dep

loym

ent

and

stan

dard

s. T

his

allo

ws

for

cons

iste

nt a

tten

tion

tode

velo

ping

pol

icy

and

stan

dard

s an

d fo

r m

aint

aini

ng a

str

ateg

ic o

verv

iew,

with

out

bein

g re

gula

rly for

ced

to d

rop

ever

ythi

ng t

o de

ploy

to

an e

mer

genc

y.

•48

-72

hour

s de

ploy

able

, fo

r up

to

3 m

onth

s an

d up

to

50%

of th

eir

time.

•

The

GR

RT

and

asso

ciat

es a

re e

noug

h to

res

pond

, si

mul

tane

ousl

y, t

o 2

larg

e-sc

ale

emer

genc

ies

•D

aily

rat

e ch

arge

d to

pro

gram

me

is $

300/

day

•H

alf te

am =

man

agem

ent; o

ther

hal

f =

tech

nica

l •

Esse

ntia

l pos

ition

s: fin

ance

; H

R; pr

ocur

emen

t /

logi

stic

s, h

ealth

, IT

, pr

otec

tion,

Prog

ram

min

g an

d pr

ogra

m m

gt t

hen

base

d on

ass

essm

ent

with

reg

ard

to w

hat

else

is r

equi

red.

•

Ove

rall

man

agem

ent

by E

mer

genc

y O

pera

tions

Ass

ocia

te D

irect

or

Mai

nly

tech

nica

l peo

ple

who

wor

k in

ano

ther

WV

offic

e. M

ay o

r m

ay n

ot h

ave

adi

ffer

ent

repo

rtin

g lin

es (th

an G

RR

T) d

urin

g pe

riods

of no

n-de

ploy

men

t.

PEO

PLE

Five

yea

r go

al:

to b

e ab

le t

o ex

pand

fro

m b

eing

abl

e to

res

pond

to

two

larg

e-sc

ale

emer

genc

ies

at o

nce,

to

four

.

App

endi

x 1:

EC

B A

genc

ies’

Sur

ge C

apac

ity

Mec

hani

sms

cont

.

Wor

ld V

isio

n co

nt.


Appendices

Appendices TOO

LB

RIE

F D

ESC

RIP

TIO

NM

AIN

CH

AR

AC

TER

ISTI

CS

GR

RT

Feed

er S

choo

ls

Reg

iona

l Rap

id R

espo

nse

Team

(RR

RT)

Reg

iona

l Rel

ief

Dire

ctor

s &

thei

r te

ams

Pre-

cris

is s

uppo

rt t

eam

/Ex

ecut

ive

supp

ort

team

Glo

bal r

egis

ter

Glo

bal P

re-p

ositi

onin

g N

etw

ork

5 pe

ople

cov

erin

g he

alth

, IT

, fin

ance

, pr

otec

tion

and

logi

stic

s

Inte

rnal

sec

ondm

ent

tool

Part

of th

eir

job

desc

riptio

n is

for

dep

loym

ent

A re

gist

er t

hat

is c

urre

ntly

bei

ng p

opul

ated

(w

illha

ve b

etw

een

200-

300

peop

le)

A te

am o

f 5

who

ove

rsee

the

pre

-pos

ition

ing

ofite

ms

for

emer

genc

y re

spon

se. H

ave

inte

grat

ed a

netw

ork

of o

ther

WV

staf

f gl

obal

ly w

ho a

rein

volv

ed in

the

obt

aini

ng o

f go

ods

and

serv

ices

.

Dev

elop

ing

man

agem

ent

and

tech

nica

l cap

abili

ties

in o

rder

to

mov

e in

to a

nin

tern

atio

nal o

r a

mor

e se

nior

rol

e w

ithin

the

WV

part

ners

hip.

Firs

t st

arte

d in

Afric

a se

ven

year

s ag

o; s

ee C

hapt

er 5

for

mor

e de

tails

•Ex

istin

g se

nior

hum

anita

rian

staf

f w

ith e

xten

sive

exp

erie

nce

of e

mer

genc

ies

and

WV,

and

who

hav

e a

high

leve

l of re

spec

t in

the

age

ncy.

•Ar

e de

ploy

ed p

rior

to a

res

pons

e (in

slo

w o

nset

em

erge

ncie

s) for

2-4

wee

ks t

o w

ork

alon

g si

de t

he N

atio

nal D

irect

or a

nd n

atio

nal b

oard

to

prov

ide

supp

ort

and

capa

city

build

ing

on s

tand

ards

, po

licie

s, s

yste

ms

and

expe

ctat

ions

aro

und

prep

arin

g fo

r an

dle

adin

g a

resp

onse

.

•In

tern

al; ca

paci

ty for

dep

loym

ent

for

up t

o 6

wee

ks p

er y

ear.

•R

egis

ter

is m

anag

ed b

y th

e st

affin

g so

lutio

ns fun

ctio

n of

WVI

.•

Fee

sent

to

send

ing

offic

es fro

m r

ecei

ving

off

ices

for

loca

l hire

s to

bac

kfill

whe

n th

est

aff m

embe

r is

dep

loye

d.•

Rel

ease

agr

eem

ents

in p

lace

(in

the

ory)

and

pay

men

ts g

o ba

ck in

to t

he s

endi

ngof

fice

so t

hey

can

recr

uit

and

back

fill (

curr

ently

cas

e-by

-cas

e ne

gotia

tion;

try

ing

tode

velo

p pr

otoc

ols

for

this

tha

t w

ill a

lso

invo

lve

staf

f pe

rson

bei

ng r

elea

sed

for

regu

lar

trai

ning

).

Maj

or w

areh

ousi

ng s

ites

in D

enve

r, D

ubai

and

Han

over

. S

tock

ed w

ith N

on foo

d ite

ms,

com

mun

icat

ions

equ

ipm

ent

and

vehi

cles

whi

ch c

an b

eflo

wn

into

a r

espo

nse

at 2

4 ho

urs

notic

e.Fo

ur o

f the

tea

m a

re d

eplo

yabl

e in

a s

uppl

y ch

ain

func

tion

durin

g em

erge

ncy

resp

onse

.

App

endi

x 1:

EC

B A

genc

ies’

Sur

ge C

apac

ity

Mec

hani

sms

cont

.

Wor

ld V

isio

n co

nt.

App

endi

x 1:

EC

B A

genc

ies’

Sur

ge C

apac

ity

Mec

hani

sms

cont

.


Appendix 1

Appe

ndic

es

TOO

LB

RIE

F D

ESC

RIP

TIO

NM

AIN

CH

AR

AC

TER

ISTI

CS

Sen

ior

Asso

ciat

e H

uman

itaria

nPr

ogra

mm

es R

eser

ve p

ool

Ret

entio

n S

chem

e

Emer

genc

y Pr

epar

edne

ss a

ndR

espo

nse

Fund

4/5

key

lead

ers

who

hav

e be

en h

ead

hunt

ed

Cur

rent

ly o

ne p

erso

n in

thi

s sc

hem

e. T

arge

t is

for

2-5.

$6 m

illio

n, p

artia

lly r

evol

ving

Annu

al a

lloca

tion:

$1

mill

ion

for

each

of 4

Reg

ions

, $1

mill

ion

for

prep

ared

ness

, $1

mill

ion

rese

rve

•H

ave

just

sta

rted

allo

catin

g m

oney

fro

m t

he c

ore

budg

et t

o su

ppor

t th

is•

It w

ill a

llow

sta

ff in

Wor

ld V

isio

n to

‘ac

t’ w

hen

they

mee

t a

seni

or m

anag

er;

brid

ging

fun

ding

is u

sed

to b

ring

thes

e pe

ople

in a

nd t

hey

wor

k on

sho

rt-te

rmas

sign

men

ts u

ntil

they

are

dep

loye

d •

Inte

ntio

n is

tha

t th

ese

staf

f w

ill a

ugm

ent

the

GR

RT

as o

ne o

f th

ese

indi

vidu

als

will

go

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CONSOLIDATED LESSONS FOR HUMAN RESOURCES(March 2006)Below is a summary of significant learning related Human Resources. These lessons have been drawnfrom multiple country case studies of current or recently completed large-scale relief responses, and alsoinclude Expert Group feedback and perspectives on learning. In this document are NEW lessons andsuggested solutions that have been captured in 2005, as well as previously captured continuing lessons.

Appendix 2: A World Vision‘Lesson Learning Review’:


Appendices

Appendices

LESSON SUGGESTED SOLUTION

Expectations of HR to be involved in sectors suchas admin diverts attention from their focus fromestablishing HR policies/JD’s/TORs etc.

Burnout is experience in some of the first wavestaff due to high demand of the role and the longhours worked.

An attitude and organizational culture of learningand sharing needs to be more strongly cultivated.New staff in particular should be made aware ofprior and current learning during their orientationand hand over procedures.

HR systems need flexibility to recognize staff whomay not be certified, but are competent in corecapabilities.

Non-HEA Senior staff moving out of national office(NO) and regional offices (RO) at the early warningstage or the beginning of an emergency severelyeffects the response i.e. finance managers,national directors (NDs) etc.

Staff coming into affected areas must haveappropriate equipment to ensure their owncomfort and health.

Admin staff need to be made available/recruitedearly in the response so as to free up the availableHR staff to focus on matters related to humanresource management. Budget allocations shouldconsider this a priority.

Managers need to determine working hours andprovide for adequate R&R. A balance between tasks,staff available and budget allocations need to besought as much as possible throughout the responseand clearly communicated to the executive team.Spiritual support systems are also essential here.

Ensure rapid orientation package is being used andthat learning agreements are signed between all staffdeployed and their national counterpart.

HR staff need to take the lead in encouraging staff totake part in the Humanitarian competency packagesas well as making sure good staff are taken forwardto the global relief register.

The executive support team along with the regionalteam needs to ensure that senior positions are notfalling empty during the early warning on responsestage of an emergency, even if this means staffbeing asked to delay their moves to new positions.

Staff flyaway kits are available from some Global pre-positioning units and must be included in the firstrelief flights to enter the countries. Ensure that thepolicy regarding purchase of appropriate clothing forstaff going into a response area, that may haveclimatic and religious challenges, is clearlycommunicated and used. Money also needs to bemade available to purchase appropriate clothing forlocal staff e.g. winter clothing.

New Lessons


Appendix 2

Appe

ndic

es


Clear Job Descriptions are needed for every positionin the response/JDs are often unclear or never done.

Communications staff and managers who lackappropriate language skills can hinder the programmeand create misunderstandings.Communicators/marketers must have a mix of skills,so as to avoid the need for too many comms staff inthe field.

Local staff lack emotional, physical, financial andspiritual support during responses.

There is a lack of senior staff and leaders to movequickly into response positions.

Staff should not be seconded to a response for lessthan 3 weeks.

Recruitment for full time/second wave staff hasimproved but for some position is still taking too long,resulting in a rapid continuous turn over of responsestaff and a loss of credibility with externalstakeholders

The National Office/emergency response requiresgood technical support personnel from thePartnership to assist in the response.

The standard JDs have helped this, but staff are stillseconded from one job to another without clearexpectations and understanding of the role. At thestart of a response it is imperative all seconded staffhave TORs and then JDs can be developed by themanagers with support from HR.

There is a need for more recruiters who speak French,Spanish and Portuguese and to advertise in theselanguages so more bilingual staff can be recruited.HR needs to work with the funding offices to ensurethat communicators coming to the country areappropriate and can multi task. The new internationalrecruitment model should also help with this.

Ensure staff have access to Non food Items, Foodparcels etc for them and their families.Give an exceptional payment to affected staff andensure they have phone cards etc.Provide trauma counselling to staff within the first 2weeks.Ensure staff understand the evolving organigram andthat new/international staff coming in are not going totake their jobs away.Ensure time for prayer/devotions.

Managers must be prepared to look outside of WV forsenior staff.There needs to be an improved link with the capacitybuilding teams to ensure that leaders are beingdeveloped.Large responses end up poaching leaders from otherregions, which has long-term effects. Recruitmentneeds to be done in a holistic manner with thePartnerships best interest at the forefront.

TORs need to be clear that staff have to remain incountry for at least 3 weeks and complete handoverdocuments before they leave, to prevent unnecessarydisruption to the programme.

Start recruiting permanent staff from day one on 6-month contracts.Relief register needs to be supported and expanded.HR needs to look at creative options to find staff –e.g., outsourcing, and linkages with colleges oruniversities – to expand pool of candidates forresponses.

This has improved, but as WV expands its response,new sectors such as water/sanitation and childprotection now need to be staffed. HR needs toengage more with proposal design to insure that staffare available for projects.

Continuing Lessons


Appendices

Appendices


A visitor liaison officer needs to be put in place fromthe outset, especially in rapid onset emergencies.

The response to slow onset emergencies can takesome time to start and good people are lost in themeantime as recruitment is too slow.

HR needs to be more involved in proposal design toensure appropriate resources are available forstaffing.

A full time HR manager needs to beseconded/recruited immediately in a Cat III.

Field offices are slow in communicating with recruitersover TORs/JDs/CVs so good candidates are lost andare also unaware of HR systems and policies.

There must be a qualified finance manager withextensive grant experience in place, in each NO, fromday one.

The roles and responsibility of the region in theresponse needs to be clearly defined.

Staff are being seconded/recruited from NOs withoutthe NDs approval, which is affecting their programmesand causing tensions.

New staff must have a security and cultural briefingwithin 48 hours of their arrival in country.

Experienced local staff are not considered forpromotion in a response.

HR needs to ensure that this position is staffed andbudgeted for, from the outset.

Emergency Response fund money should be used toaccess good staff early on, if grants have not yetbeen approved.

HR staff need to work closely with programming andfinance staff to ensure salaries and benefits arecorrectly calculated and that sectorial staff areavailable for planned projects.

There is a need for the regions to become moreengaged in providing HR support in Cat IIs and IIIs.

HR standards need to be more detailed about turnaround time and NO/response teams need tounderstand the importance of rapid communications.Transmission of relevant HR policies must take placebefore implementation of the response begins. Thepolicies also need to be translated into the languageappropriate to that context e.g. French & Spanish

Every response has shown that when we just useexisting finance structures in the NOs, we end up withenormous problems. Engage GRRT and RRRT on thisASAP.There is also a need to streamline internationalpay/compensation so that it is easier to follow/workwith the grant matrix.

MOUs need to be clearly define the support roleof the region, especially in areas of HR.

Protocols need to be reviewed regarding who isconsulted when a staff member is offered a position.

HR should ensure that briefing packs are developedwithin the first 72 hours of a response and rapidinduction modules are used.

It is too often presumed that local staff do not havethe response capacity and that international staff arealways required. More effort needs to be taken toassess the capacity of local staff and offer themmanagement roles if appropriate.


Appendix 3

Appe

ndic

es

Research approachThe research approach adopted was qualitative and based on comparative case study analysis.Qualitative approaches are helpful because they allow for the identification of newly emerging themes,which is particularly important in under-researched areas such as that represented by surge capacity. Thecomparative aspect also enabled the researcher to identify commonalities and differences across theagencies studied which helped lead to an interpretation of the most pressing issues with regard todeveloping surge capacity.

The method of appreciative enquiry also influenced the approach of the research. Appreciative enquiry‘[I]nvites people to discuss what is working in a system, to envision a future that builds on that success,to look at all the structures and procedures that would support such a future, and to develop a wayforward’ (http://www.aileadership.com ).

Research processThe research began with a brief review of ECB documents relating to staff capacity. A smaller number of‘think pieces’ on both surge and staff capacity were also consulted. Following this review, a semi-structured interview was developed and shared with a small peer review group. This had to be quitegeneric in order to allow it to be flexible enough to capture differences between agencies.

Following the development of the interview framework, 43 telephone interviews were carried out during a12-day period in March 2007. Those interviewed comprised 33 individuals from the ECB agencies, 9others from across seven additional case study agencies (MedAir; MSF-UK; UNICEF; UNDP; the IFRC; theNRC; and WFP) as well as four independent consultants.11 Where possible, the researcher readdocuments provided by the agencies prior to each interview in order to inform the discussion. Informationgathered during the interviews was supplemented by email exchanges with many of the respondents, whowere extraordinarily generous with their time. It was also supplemented by numerous conversations withagency staff during the ECB Project Learning Event held in Washington DC on 12 and 13 April 2007.

Those interviewed in the ECB agencies ranged from emergency directors and emergency HR managers inHQ, to roster coordinators and a small number of regional personnel. As the review has mostly beeninformed by people at the strategic and corporate level within the humanitarian departments of agencies,further research into other perspectives, including those from development colleagues and also from fieldlevel staff, might also be of interest.

Limitations and constraintsThe report is largely predicated on what information was shared and who was available for interview. Itshould be noted that some agencies were less well represented than others in terms of numbers of staffinterviewed, while some agencies provided much more written information than others. As a result themajority of case study examples are mostly drawn from a smaller core group of agencies.

More specifically, there are two main limitations and constraints to this research:

1. Due to the ongoing nature of the work in this area, many policies and practices discussed wererelatively new and have not yet been ‘tested’. This meant that assessments of their efficacy werescarce. That said, the lessons that form the foundation of many of these different approaches shedimportant light on the current scope of work in this area.

Appendix 3: Research Methodology

11 John Glazebrook, John Cosgrave, Jim Henry, and Sean Lowrie.


Appendices

2. The compressed time in which the research had to be completed has also been a constrainingfactor.

Furthermore, as the researcher was trying to build a picture of whole organisations it wasn’t alwayspossible to ask everyone the same questions. This made some aspects of the comparative analysis moreof a challenge, and also meant it was less easy to quantify some of the qualitative responses.

Appendices

About People In AidPeople In Aid is a global network of development and humanitarian assistanceagencies. We help organisations whose goal is the relief of poverty andsuffering to enhance the impact they make through better management andsupport of staff and volunteers.

The impact and effectiveness of relief and development operations depend onthe quality of staff and volunteers and the support an agency gives them. Ourvery practical output can help agencies enhance that quality.

We respond to the needs of members and the sector by acting as aninformation exchange on good human resources and people managementpractice, by facilitating networking, by providing resources, by undertakingresearch and by answering queries.

Established by agencies in the relief and development sector in 1995, we area not-for-profit membership organisation governed by our members, whoseexperiences and HR practices shape our activities and have informed thecornerstone of our work, the ‘People In Aid Code of Good Practice in themanagement and support of aid personnel’.





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2007 Review of Surge Capacity

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