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    Civil Defense and HomelandSecurity: A Short History of

    National Preparedness Efforts

    September 2006

    Homeland Security

    National Preparedness Task Force

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    Civil Defense and Homeland Security:

    A Short History of National PreparednessEfforts

    September 2006

    Homeland Security

    National Preparedness Task Force

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    ABOUT THIS REPORT

    This report is the result of a requirement by the Director of the Department of Homeland SecuritysNational Preparedness Task Force to examine the history of national preparedness efforts in theUnited States. The report provides a concise and accessible historical overview of U.S. nationalpreparedness efforts since World War I, identifying and analyzing key policy efforts, drivers ofchange, and lessons learned. While the report provides much critical information, it is not meant to

    be a substitute for more comprehensive historical and analytical treatments. It is hoped that thereport will be an informative and useful resource for policymakers, those individuals interested inthe history of what is today known as homeland security, and homeland security stakeholdersresponsible for the development and implementation of effective national preparedness policies andprograms.

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    Introduction

    From the air raid warning and plane spottingactivities of the Office of Civil Defense in the

    1940s, to the Duck and Coverfilm strips andbackyard shelters of the 1950s, to todays all-hazards preparedness programs led by theDepartment of Homeland Security, Federalstrategies to enhance the nationspreparedness for disaster and attack haveevolved over the course of the 20th centuryand into the 21st.

    Presidential administrations can have apowerful impact on both national and citizen

    preparedness. By recommending fundinglevels, creating new policies, andimplementing new programs; successiveadministrations have adapted preparednessefforts to align with changing domesticpriorities and foreign policy goals. They havealso instituted administrative reorganizationsthat reflected their preference forconsolidated or dispersed civil defense andhomeland security responsibilities within theFederal government.

    Programs were seldom able to get ahead ofworld events, and were ultimately challengedin their ability to answer the publics need forprotection from threats due to bureaucraticturbulence created by frequent reorganization,shifting funding priorities, and varying levelsof support by senior policymakers. This inturn has had an effect on the publicsperception of national preparedness. Publicawareness and support have waxed and wanedover the years, as the governments emphasis

    on national preparedness has shifted.

    An analysis of the history of civil defense andhomeland security programs in the UnitedStates clearly indicates that to be consideredsuccessful, national preparedness programsmust be long in their reach yet cost effective.They must also be appropriately tailored to

    the Nations diverse communities, be carefullyplanned, capable of quickly providingpertinent information to the populace aboutimminent threats, and able to convey risk

    without creating unnecessary alarm.

    The following narrative identifies some of thekey trends, drivers of change, and lessonslearned in the history of U.S. nationalpreparedness programs. A review of thehistory of these programs will assist theFederal government in its efforts to developand implement effective homeland securitypolicy and better understand previous nationalpreparedness initiatives.

    Pre-Cold War Period (1917-1945)

    World War I introduced a new type of attack:the use of strategic aerial strikes against anenemys population to degrade its ability andwill to wage war. German aerialbombardment of towns in countries such asFrance, Belgium, and Poland began in August1914, and in the following year KaiserWilhelm authorized sustained bombingcampaigns against military and civilian targets,particularly against England.1 From Maythrough October of 1915, Germany launchedseven air strikes against London alone.2England, like most other nations at the time,did not have an organized civil defenseprogram to aid citizens during such attacks.Individuals were forced to find their own wayto safety, often taking refuge in the citysunderground subway stations.3 By allassessments, the damage and casualty figures

    that resulted from these early bombingoperations were comparatively insignificant,but they exerted a psychological toll on theBritish public.4 It became clear that civiliandefense, involving a range of actions toprotect the general public in the event ofattack, would become a major fixture in futurewarfare.

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    Though the Axis and Allied powers continuedto employ strategic bombing throughoutWorld War I, leaders in the United States didnot feel that the country was vulnerable to

    attack. They concentrated their publicoutreach on rallying support for the wareffort.5 Much of this task was coordinated bythe Council of National Defense,established on August 29, 1916 with thepassage of an Army appropriations bill.6 TheCouncil was a presidential advisory board thatincluded the Secretaries of War, Navy,Interior, Agriculture, Commerce, and Labor;assisted by an Advisory Committee appointedby the President.7 Its responsibilities includedcoordinating resources and industries for

    national defense and stimulating civilianmorale.8

    The work of the Council escalated when theUnited States entered the war in 1917. In thesame year, the Federal government askedState governors to create their own localcouncils of defense to support the Nationaleffort.9 However, the Councils activitiescontinued to focus more on facilitatingmobilization for the war than on protecting

    civilian resources. When hostilities ended, theCouncil shifted its efforts towarddemobilization. Its operations weresuspended in June, 1921.10

    For the remainder of the 1920s, the Federalgovernment undertook little public outreachrelated to defense and security. However, the1930s saw a revival of civil defense efforts,when aggressive actions and arms stockpilingin Europe fueled international concern.11 In

    1933, President Franklin Roosevelt created byexecutive order the National EmergencyCouncil (NEC) which consisted of thePresident, his Cabinet members, and the headof nearly every major Federal agency,commission, and board.12 The mission of theNEC included a variety of programs unrelatedto civil defense; however, its duties alsoincluded coordination of emergency programs

    among all agencies involved in nationalpreparedness.13

    As World War II ignited in Europe, Rooseveltreestablished the Council of National Defense

    in 1940.

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    Once again States were asked toestablish local counterpart councils. Tensionsamong Federal, State and local governmentsbegan to rise about authority and resources.

    The states claimed they were not givenenough power to manage civil defense tasks intheir own jurisdictions, and local governmentsasserted that State governments did not giveurban areas proper consideration andresources.15 Non-attack disaster preparednessremained almost entirely the responsibility of

    States, while federal funding was reservedprimarily for attack preparedness.

    Because of extensive civilian bombingcampaigns in Europe, concerns aboutpossible attacks against the U.S. homelandincreased. Mayor Fiorello La Guardia of NewYork City wrote a letter to PresidentRoosevelt stating:

    There is a need for a strong Federal

    Department to coordinate activities,and not only to coordinate but toinitiate and get things going. Pleasebear in mind that up to this war andnever in our history, has the civilianpopulation been exposed to attack.

    The new technique of war has createdthe necessity for developing newtechniques of civilian defense.16

    President Roosevelt responded to theincreasing concern of the public and local

    officials by creating the Office of CivilianDefense (OCD) in 1941.17 The Presidentdelegated a number of responsibilities to theOCD by broadly interpreting civilianprotection to include morale maintenance,promotion of volunteer involvement, andnutrition and physical education.18 The OCDoversaw unprecedented federal involvement

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    in attack preparedness. As with the Councilof National Defense, the OCD createdcorresponding defense councils at the locallevel.19

    The issue of whether the OCD shouldemphasize protective services, typically doneat that time by men, or social welfare services,typically undertaken at that time by women,created tension from the offices inception.20Director Fiorello LaGuardia referred tononprotective activities as sissy stuff andsaw opportunities to build neighborhoodmilitias. Pressured to focus on othernonprotective areas such as neighborhoodsupport, he appointed Eleanor Roosevelt toexpand volunteer activities.21 The two leaders,

    with their radically divergent points of view,exemplified a conflict over the meaning andpurpose of civil defense that would continuewell into the cold war era.

    OCD received criticism from Congress andthe public on several fronts. It was calledpink by influential politicians who dislikedthe programs broad reach and socialdevelopment programs. Some believed theorganizations tasks were better undertaken by

    the Department of War.22

    One of OCDsearly leaders, James Landis, recommendedthat the organization be abolished, since thethreat of an attack on U.S. civilians hadreceded.23

    With the end of World War II, most U.S.officials agreed that the risk of an attack onthe U.S. homeland was minimal. Rooseveltdid not take Landis suggestion, and the OCDcontinued to operate.24 While the OCD did

    not fulfill all of its ambitious goals, it didbegin the development of concrete civildefense plans, including air raid drills, blackouts, and sand bag stockpiling.25

    Truman Administration (1945-1953)

    Soon after taking office, Harry Truman didfollow Landis advice and abolished the OCD,reflecting the widely held belief that the

    immediate threat of war had receded.26

    Initially, civil defense was not a high priorityin the Truman Administration, as troopsbegan to return home and other war timeoffices were diminished in scale or disbandedaltogether. The development of the atomicbomb, however, had opened up previouslyunthinkable risks. Increasing hostilities withthe Soviet Union and their pursuit of anuclear bomb threatened the United States.

    In this context, Truman began to reexaminethe national defense structure, reviewing theresults of a set of commissions.27 In 1946, theU.S. Strategic Bombing Survey published itsreport evaluating the results of strategicbombing campaigns by imperial Germany andJapan against enemy civilian populations. Thereport indicated that civil defense plans couldsignificantly mitigate the effects of strategicbombing.28 Specifically, mass evacuationplans for urban areas and shelters for thoseunable to leave the area could form

    components of a viable civil defense plan.29In 1947, the War Departments Civil DefenseBoard, led by Major General Harold Bull,released a second report.30 The so-called BullReportstated that civil defense is theresponsibility of civilians, and the militaryshould not be expected to get involved insuch matters.31 According to the report, civildefense was best implemented locally, aconcept referred to as self-help. Still, thedocument did concede that the Federal

    government could provide the majority ofnecessary resources.32 Additionally, Congresspassed the National Security Act of 1947.Best known for the creation of the CentralIntelligence Agency, the Act also created theNational Security Resources Board(NSRB), which was initially responsible formobilizing civilian and military support, as

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    well as maintaining adequate reserves andeffective resource use in the event of war.33

    Neither report resulted in substantial reformsto the Truman Administrations policies

    because civil defense continued to remain alow priority. 34 However, as U.S.-Sovietrelations became increasingly strained,President Truman began to implement civildefense policy reforms. These changesresulted, in part, from the strongrecommendation of Colonel Burnet Beers,who was responsible for directing a study onfuture civil defense planning and operationsto establish a civil defense unit in the Officeof the Secretary of Defense (OSD).35 Trumanacted promptly on this advice, establishing the

    Office of Civil Defense Planning (OCDP),whose purpose was to recommend a coursefor the creation of a permanent civil defenseagency.36 After six months, the OCDPreleased its 300-page Hopley Report,37 whichcalled for the creation of a Federal office ofcivil defense directly under the President orSecretary of Defense. The report additionallyrecommended that the Federal governmentprovide civil defense guidance and assistance,but that State and local governments handle

    most of the operational responsibilities.38

    Reactions to the Hopley Reportinside andoutside government were generally negative.There were concerns about the cost and scopeof civil defense. Many people feared itsrecommendations were too far-reaching andmade unrealistic demands on the public andgovernment.39 And there were concernsabout military control. Some civilian groupsthought the report called for transferring what

    should be a civilian responsibility to themilitary, which could lead to a garrisonstate.40

    Truman ultimately chose to address the latterconcern by assigning civil defense planning tothe NSRB, a civilian agency.41 However, theNSRB did not receive the necessary resourcesor authority to carry out its mandate.42 As a

    result, the Board was moved to theDepartment of Defense (DOD), then shiftedto the Executive Office of the President, andfinally had its responsibilities transferred tothe Office of Defense Mobilization in

    December of 1950.

    The climate of civil defense changeddramatically with the successful Soviet test ofa nuclear weapon in August of 1949. TheUnited States lost its monopoly on nuclearweapons and the corresponding negotiatingpower that this entailed. Local officials beganto demand from the Federal government aclear outline of what they were to do in crisissituations.43 The Truman Administrationreceived criticism from local officials, a

    worried American public, and Congress fornot taking firm action.44 In response, in 1950,the NSRB generated a new proposal called theBlue Book, which outlined a set of civil defensefunctions and how they should beimplemented at each level of government.45The Blue Book also recommended the creationof an independent Federal civil defenseorganization.46

    Truman agreed with many of the Blue Book

    recommendations, but held firm to his beliefthat civil defense responsibilities should fallmostly on the shoulders of the State and localgovernments.47 In response, Congressenacted the Federal Civil Defense Act of1950, which placed most of the civil defenseburden on the States and created the FederalCivil Defense Administration (FCDA) toformulate national policy to guide the Statesefforts.48

    As planning began, policymakers struggled todefine what was meant by national security. Akey question was the appropriate level ofreadiness to be attained. At what readinesslevel would people have to surrender personalfreedoms to state control? At what level ofsecurity would civil defense metamorphoseinto a garrison state, undermining theunderlying purpose of protecting individual

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    Duck and Coverpromotional material

    rights?49 The decision to assign civil defenseresponsibility to States and localities wasintended partly as a safeguard against thegarrison state.

    Planners also struggled with a difficultpolitical question: just how much supportshould government provide? Congressionalresistance to paying for a comprehensiveprogram, and concerns about establishingpublic dependency on government, led toadoption of a doctrine of self help:individual responsibility for preparedness tominimize (not eliminate) risk.50 The idea ofdecentralized, locally controlled, volunteer-based civil defense was not new; in fact it wasthe foundation of the successful British civil

    defense effort in World War II. However, thedecision to make self-help the basis of civildefense was also a political compromise, away to balance conflicting views over the size,power, and priorities of the emerging postwarnation.51

    The FCDA led shelter building programs,sought to improve Federal and Statecoordination, established an attack warningsystem, stockpiled supplies, and started a well

    known national civic education campaign. In1952, the FCDA joined with the Ad Councilto release Korean War advertising to boostnational morale.52 The FCDA specificallyaimed to teach schoolchildren aboutpreparedness, primarily through civil defensedrills.53 In order to effectively educate theentire youth population, the FCDAcommissioned a movie studio to produce ninecivil defense movies that would be shown inclassrooms across the nation among them

    Duck and Cover.

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    The movie, through its maincharacter Bert the Turtle, showed childrenwhat to do when they saw the flash of anatomic bomb.55 Newspapers and expertsgenerally heralded the film as a positive andoptimistic step toward preparedness.56 TheNew York Herald Tribune, for example, calledthe film very instructive and not toofrightening for children.57 Ultimately, the

    film was seen by millions of schoolchildrenduring the 1950s.58 The public educationcampaign throughout the decade promotedthe idea that with preparation, a nuclear attackcould be survivable.59

    An examination of the FCDA-led shelter-building initiative underscores some of thecivil defense programs internalinconsistencies. The Federal Civil DefenseAct of 1950 allocated significant funding to ashelter initiative. The law allowed the FCDA

    to develop shelter designs and make financialcontributions to shelter programs. However,Congress stipulated that the Federalgovernment could not finance theconstruction of new shelters.60 Incommunities across the country there wasgreat debate over the necessity of the shelters,and Truman himself was not eager to spendgovernment money on the program.61Moreover, FCDA Administrator MillardCaldwell initiated a public relations fiasco

    when he misconstrued the shelter program asa means to protect every person in thecountry. A program that expansive wasdeemed to be too costly to receive sufficientpolitical support; as a result, it never left theplanning stages during the TrumanAdministration.62

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    Contrary to the outlook offered byDuck andCoverand the other educational campaigns,early media reports about the possibility ofnuclear war offered grim predictionsconcerning the aftermath of an attack. The

    scenarios were horrific, and the association ofcivil defense with death and destruction madenot only home preparedness and sheltering,but the whole self-help preparedness concept,a tough sell.63

    The political, fiscal, and emotional cross-currents were reflected in civil defensefunding. Despite ambitious funding requests,actual appropriations to civil defenseremained low throughout the TrumanAdministration, and throughout the 1950s.

    For example, from 1951 to 1953 Trumanrequested $1.5 billion for civil defense, butappropriations totaled only $153 million 90percent less than requested64.

    Despite these practical setbacks, the conceptof civil defense as a purposeful approach tothe protection of citizens from threats outsidethe Nations borders began to take shapeduring Trumans presidency.65 Though eachleader who followed would focus on different

    programs and approaches, civil defenseremained an important initiative during thecoming decades.

    Eisenhower Administration (1953-1961)

    President Dwight Eisenhowers approach tocivil defense was quite different from hispredecessors. Eisenhower identified the

    enormous economic commitment requiredfor military development as one reason not toundertake expensive civil defense programs.66Additionally, Republicans in Congress wereeager to curtail spending, as the party hadpublicly promised to balance the budget whenEisenhower took office.67 ThoughEisenhower requested less funding than

    Truman, actual appropriations were virtuallyidentical to appropriations under Truman.68

    In addition to economic concerns, worldevents contributed to Eisenhowers decision

    to support a mass evacuation policy, insteadof the shelter program initiated underTruman. In 1953, the Soviets detonated ahydrogen nuclear bomb; and shortlythereafter, the effects of the initial U.S.hydrogen explosion were released to theAmerican public.69 The blast and thermaleffects of these new fusion nuclear weaponswere so destructive that many experts arguedthat American cities would be doomed in theevent of a nuclear attack, regardless ofsheltering efforts.70 As a result, new FCDA

    Administrator Frederick Peterson urgedCongress to scale back or completelyeliminate the shelter program.71

    In strongly supporting mass evacuation,Peterson noted that successful executionwould depend on sufficient warning time,proper training for civil defense officials, andregular public drills.72 Many of theresponsibilities for evacuation would be borneat the State and local level, which appealed to

    Eisenhowers belief that the Federalgovernment should not shoulder the entireburden for civil defense programs.73 Congressalso was in favor of the shift in attention fromshelters to evacuation.74 Yet some members,especially Congressman Chet Holifield ofCalifornia, were adamantly opposed toreducing the shelter system.75 Holifield wasthe ranking member of the Joint Committeeon Atomic Energy and later the chairman ofthe Military Operations Subcommittee.76 In

    support of a federally funded shelter system,he likened the idea of family built shelters tocreating an army or a navy or an air force byadvising each one to buy himself a jetplane.77 As a well publicized champion forshelter building, Congressman Holifieldconsistently and persuasively articulated thebenefits of shelter building to the Americanpublic.

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    The 1954 Bravo test

    Long Island shelter, circa 1955

    In March of 1954,the United Statesdetonated anotherthermonuclear

    bomb, called Bravo,on Bikini Atoll inthe MarshallIslands.78 Due to amajor wind shift, alarge amount ofradioactive fallout was unexpectedly releasedover a 7000 square mile area, ultimatelypoisoning the crew of a Japanese fishing boatin the area and even injuring personnelinvolved in the test.79 It did not take long forCongress and the public to turn their

    attention to the need for shelters to protectthe citizenry from such lethal effects.80 TheFCDA was in a tough position. They had justfought for evacuation policies, at the expenseof the shelter option, and the EisenhowerAdministration continued to supportevacuation as the chief civil defenseobjective.81 Faced with this dilemma, FCDAAdministrator Peterson redirected his policytoward an evacuation to shelter approach,whereby individuals would be evacuated from

    affected areas to shelters.82

    He even proposeddigging ditches along roadsides for those whocould not get to shelters in time.83

    The Eisenhower Administration had justbegun work on its massive federal highwayprogram, connecting major cities and in theprocess providing a means for evacuation.84Peterson clashed with the President on theprogram, arguing that Congress should divertsome of the highway funding to support civil

    defense programs. He believed that thehighways should be designed to lead only 30to 40 miles outside of major cities to ruralreception areas.85 However, Petersonsclout did not match the Presidents, and thusno money was diverted from the highwayprogram.86

    The FCDA received extensive criticism overthe next few years for not developing afeasible plan for evacuating major cities.87Congressman Holifield called FCDA efforts

    only a faade of civil defense programs.

    88

    Healso chastised the President for not takingmore responsibility.89 At Holifields request, in1956 the House Committee on GovernmentOperations held a series of hearings to discussthe viability of the FCDA.90 The HolifieldHearings constituted the largest examinationof the civil defense program in U.S. history.91

    Holifield and his Committee concluded that

    the FCDA had been myopically focused onevacuation, which they termed a cheapsubstitute for atomic shelter.92 The FCDAresponded by presenting a National ShelterPolicy, which proposed a $32 billion programfor federally subsidized self-help (e.g. taxincentives or special mortgage rates to shelter-owning families).93 Taken aback by the costof the proposal, Eisenhower convened theGaither Committee (named for its firstchairman, H. Rowan Gaither) composed of

    leading scientific, military, and businessexperts. The committee evaluated militaryreadiness and concluded that the UnitedStates could not defend itself from a Sovietsurprise attack on the homeland. 94 While itsreport, released in 1957, emphasized fundinganti-ballistic missile (ABM) defense systems, italso acknowledged that a fallout sheltersystem occupied a secondary position in

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    deterrence, and to that end recommendedadopting the FCDA shelter proposal.95Two subsequent reports advanced similarideas.96 In 1958, the Rockefeller Report,compiled by a board of experts and

    practitioners directed by Henry Kissinger,stated that civil defense was one aspect of arobust deterrent that should also include moreinvestment in offensive military capabilities.97That same year, a report published by theRAND Corporation emphasized theimportance of civil defense as a powerfulcomponent of deterrence.98

    Despite these supporting reports, the FCDAshelter proposal continued to run counter tothe views of top officials in the Eisenhower

    Administration. Secretary of State JohnFoster Dulles argued that the nation shouldfocus resources on retaliation capabilities andcurtail the shelter program.99 Military leadersalso opposed the shelter program, fearing itwould cut into defense spending.100Eisenhower himself remained opposed to themassive shelter program.101 Instead ofpursuing the National Shelter Policy, heinstructed the FCDA to initiate much morelimited actions, including research on fallout

    shelters, a survey of existing structures, andinforming the public about shelters.102

    Holifield and other legislators were outragedthat the President would disregard thefindings of three separate committees.103Supporters of the shelter system publiclyexpressed disappointment with theEisenhower administration, and Holifieldcommented that civil defense was in adeplorable state during this period.104

    Finally, in the face of strong criticism,Eisenhower largely dissolved the FCDA tomake way for the short-lived Office of Civiland Defense Mobilization (OCDM), whichbegan the bulk of its work during theKennedy presidency.105

    It bears noting that for all of his publicopposition to massive sheltering programs, in

    the middle of his tenure Eisenhower secretlycommissioned the building of an undergroundbunker in West Virginia that would serve as asafe haven for top members of Congress, inthe event of a catastrophe.106 The project was

    similar in scope and intent to one initiated byPresident Truman in 1951. Called Site R,that effort involved construction of anAlternate Joint Communications Center inRaven Rock Mountain, Pennsylvania, to beused in case existing centers in Washington,DC were destroyed by an attack.107 Like hispredecessor, Eisenhower believed it was vitalfor the government to ensure continuity ofoperations following an attack on thehomeland. The West Virginia bunker wasbuilt under the five-star Greenbrier resort and

    was only placed on full alert once, during theCuban Missile Crisis in 1962.108 The publicremained completely unaware of theoperation until 1992 when the Washington Postbroke the story.109

    Kennedy Administration (1961-1963)

    During the first year of his presidency, JohnF. Kennedy made civil defense more of a

    priority than at any previous time in U.S.history.110 He was also the first President todiscuss civil defense publicly, issuing anappeal in the September 7, 1961 issue ofLIFE magazine to all Americans to protectthemselves and in doing so strengthen [the]nation.111 Kennedy continued the approachof his predecessors of including civil defensein deterrence calculations, and he believedthat the only effective deterrent was a strongretaliatory capability. 112 However, he also

    believed that deterrence could fail in the eventone faced an irrational enemy, and thus astrong and coordinated approach to civildefense was required. As he stated toCongress on May 25, 1961:

    [Civil defense] can be readilyjustifiableas insurance for the civilianpopulation in case of an enemy

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    The October 7, 1961 issue ofLIFE Magazine

    miscalculation. It is insurance we trustwill never be needed but insurancewhich we could never forgive ourselvesfor foregoing in the event ofcatastrophe.113

    He concluded by proposing a nationwidelong-range program of identifying presentfallout shelter capacity and providing shelterin new and existing structures.114

    To accomplish these goals, Kennedy issuedExecutive Order 10952 on July 20, 1961,

    which divided the Office of Civil Defenseand Mobilization into two neworganizations: the Office of EmergencyPlanning (OEP) and the Office of CivilDefense. OEP was part of the PresidentsExecutive Office and tasked with advisingand assisting the President in determiningpolicy for all nonmilitaryemergencypreparedness, including civil defense.OCD was part of the Office of theSecretary of Defense, and was tasked withoverseeing the nations civil defenseprogram. The responsibility for carryingout the fallout shelter program was amongthe program operations assigned toSecretary of Defense Robert McNamara.115

    The 1961 Berlin crisis gave Kennedy renewedurgency to improve US civil defense.116 The

    President emphasized the importance offallout shelters as a means to save lives.

    He stressed that identifying and stockingexisting shelters with food and medicine

    should be made a priority.

    117

    McNamaraexplained that this approach was not a majordeparture from the Eisenhower shelterprogram; however, the scope was larger andthus required more money.118 The goal was toprovide maximum protection through costeffective means by utilizing existing buildings.Some members of Congress, notably theranking Republican of the HouseAppropriations Committee, John Taber,worked hard to limit funding to the shelterproject. However, most underscored the

    importance of the shelter program as arational response to the growing threat of anuclear attack.119 Congress ultimatelyapproved more than $200 million thatKennedy asked for the project, which wastwice as much as Eisenhower had everrequested for civil defense.120

    With the appropriated funds, OCD began anationwide survey of all existing shelters.121 Inorder to be designated a public shelter, a

    facility had to have enough space for at least50 people, include one cubic foot of storagespace per person, and have a radiationprotection factor of at least 100.122 Thematerials division of DOD, called the DefenseSupply Agency, furnished shelter supplies tolocal governments, which were thenresponsible for stocking all shelters in theirregions.123 By 1963, 104 million individualshelter spaces had been identified;124 and ofthose 47 million had been licensed, 46 million

    marked, and 9 million individual spaces hadbeen stocked with supplies.125

    The President also decided to distributebooklets to the populace that would outlinethe purpose of the shelter program and thesteps that every American should take duringan attack. The booklet, created by a team ofMadison Avenue writers, was to be sent to

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    The fallout shelter sign wasintroduced by DOD inDecember 1961 to indicateFederally-approved shelterspace

    every household in the nation.126 In anunintended twist, the booklets themselvescreated new controversy. Some presidentialaides felt that the pictures used were toographic, while others felt that they indicated

    the booklet was meant only for the upperclass.127 Ultimately the KennedyAdministration decided to tone down thecontent, so as not to cause unnecessaryalarm.128 The booklets were then sent to postoffices throughout the nation, so people couldpick up copies.

    The means ofcommunicating theAdministrations civildefense message to

    the public was not theonly target ofcontroversy duringthis time. Reviving along-standing debate,

    some prominentmembers of Congress,including AlbertThomas, theChairman of the

    House Appropriations Subcommittee incharge of civil defense, felt that the Federalgovernment should not be undertaking such amassive sheltering project when civil defenseresponsibility belonged to State and localgovernments.129 Kennedy convened ameeting with eighteen of his top advisors atHyannis Port, Massachusetts, on the day afterThanksgiving in 1961 to discuss theappropriate next steps for civil defense.130There, consensus evolved that the Federalgovernments primary role was to provide

    community shelters.131

    Johnson Administration (1963-1969)

    Kennedys assassination in November 1963marked the beginning of a drastic cutback infunding of the Nations civil defense program.

    The topic began to fall slowly off the publicradar, and President Lyndon B. Johnsonallowed it to slip further by not pressuringCongress to pass the Shelter IncentiveProgram bill,132 which proposed to give every

    non-profit institution financial compensationfor each shelter it built.133

    Earlier in the decade, Secretary McNamarahad begun to describe the concept of mutualassured destruction (MAD), which essentiallymeant that the Soviet Union and the UnitedStates had the capacity to effectively annihilateone another with the weapons in theirarsenals, such that this constituted an effectivedeterrent to offensive action.134 Congress andthe public began to accept the doctrine of

    MAD. As a result, a growing percentage ofthe population began to wonder if civildefense programs could adequately protectcitizens from a large scale nuclear attack.135However, when the U.S. military beganexpanding its ABM defense system,McNamara re-emphasized the importance ofa shelter system because he questioned thewisdom of relying solely on an ABMdefense.136 He argued that the effectivenessof an ABM defense system in saving lives

    depends in large part upon the availability ofadequate fallout shelters for thepopulation.137 The belief was that the ABMdefense system could be beaten by detonatingnuclear weapons upwind of largemetropolitan areas and outside the range ofthe defensive missiles. The result would beradioactive fallout spreading across Americascities.138 Large numbers of people would diefrom the exposure to the fallout, unless therewere a sufficient number of shelters.

    Congress opposed financing a shelter system,and McNamara continued to be pessimisticabout an ABM defense system saying,Whether we will ever be able to advance theart of defense as rapidly as the art of offensivedevelopmentsI dont know. At themoment it doesnt look at all likely.139

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    In an ironic twist, attention to civil defensewas also undermined by a series of majornatural disasters that rattled the Nation.Hurricanes Hilda and Betsy devastated theSoutheast, an Alaskan earthquake caused a

    damaging tidal wave in California, and a lethaltornado swept through Indiana on PalmSunday in 1965.140 Senator Birch Bayh ofIndiana sponsored legislation that grantedemergency Federal loan assistance to disastervictims.141 The bill passed in 1966, and Bayhurged Congress over the next few years toprovide even more disaster assistance tocitizens. The concept of all-hazards assistancewas gaining adherents, at the expense of civilpreparedness for attack.142

    The Vietnam War struck a further blow tocivil defense during the Johnson years. As thewar progressed, it required increasingamounts of time, money, and resources.143Although civil defense efforts continued toreceive modest funding, and would for thenext twelve years, no major steps were takento enhance overall capabilities.144 Atransformation in the way the Federalgovernment viewed the task of protecting thepublic had begun.

    Nixon Administration (1969-1974)

    By the time President Nixon entered office,public and government interest in civildefense had fallen precipitously from its peak

    in the early 1960s. According to theNew YorkTimesIndex, in 1968, only four articles on civildefense appeared in that publicationcompared to 72 in 1963.145 However, the newadministration did make a major contributionto civil defense by redefining civil defensepolicy to include preparedness for naturaldisasters. In no small measure, the Presidentsthinking resulted from the Federalgovernments lack of preparedness to handlethe horrific damage wrought by HurricaneCamille (see discussion below). Uponentering office, Nixon immediately tasked theOEP to complete a broad review of theNations civil defense programs.146

    In June 1970, the OEP released the results ofits comprehensive assessment in NationalSecurity Study Memorandum 57. 147 Thestudy concluded that the Nationspreparedness for natural disasters wasminimal to nonexistent.148 TheAdministration responded by introducing two

    of its most significant domestic policy changesin National Security Decision Memorandum(NSDM) 184. NSDM 184 recommended theestablishment of a dual-use approach toFederal citizen preparedness programs andthe replacement of the Office of CivilDefense with the Defense CivilPreparedness Agency (DCPA).149 PresidentNixon would later implement theserecommendations, placing the new DCPAunder the umbrella of the Department of

    Defense.

    For the first time in the history of civildefense, Federal funds previously allocatedfor the exclusive purpose of preparing formilitary attacks could be shared with State andlocal governments for natural disasterpreparedness. This dual-use initiative

    In Time of Emergencywas quietly releasedin March of 1968, when the Vietnam

    War and domestic unrest effectivelyovershadowed civil defense planning.

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    subscribed to the philosophy thatpreparations for evacuation, communications,and survival are common to both naturaldisasters and enemy military strikes on thehomeland. From a practical perspective, the

    dual-use approach allowed more efficientutilization of limited resources, so plannerscould address a larger number of scenarios. 150Given that civil defense funding duringNixons first term barely exceeded the low$80 million per year level of the EisenhowerAdministration (when adjusted for inflation),scarce resources likely played a part in thedecision to adopt the new approach.151

    A series of natural disasters during Nixonstenure also increased the pressure to expand

    civil defense to include preparation andresponse to natural disasters. Several majorhurricanes and earthquakes exposedsignificant flaws in natural disasterpreparedness at a time when no centralizedsystem for disaster relief existed.152 Perhapsmost significantly, in August 1969 HurricaneCamille wreaked havoc in the greater GulfCoast region, highlighting major problemswith disaster response.153 In response,Congress passed the Disaster Relief Act of

    1969, which created the concept of a FederalCoordinating Officer (FCO). The FCO wasan individual appointed by the President, whowould manage federal disaster assistance on-the-spot at a given disaster area.154

    The Presidents decision to increase focus onnatural disaster preparedness also aligned with

    U.S. foreign policy considerations. In orderto reinforce the doctrine of MAD, Nixon wasdeeply involved in negotiations with theSoviet Union to limit defensive weaponcapabilities. 155 The first Strategic Arms

    Limitation Talks treaty (SALT I), signed onMay 26, 1972, froze the number of strategicballistic missile launchers and allowed theaddition of new submarine ballistic missilelaunchers only as replacements for dismantledolder launchers. 156 Perhaps most significantly,SALT I limited the superpowers to only twoABM defense deployment sites. 157 Advocatesof SALT argued that such agreements werenecessary because any increase in defensecapabilities would spur another arms race forimproved offensive capabilities. 158 The Nixon

    Administration felt that the SALT I advanceswould be jeopardized if either side continuedto build up nuclear attack-related civil defenseprograms. This concern helped justify thedecision to turn more attention toward civilpreparedness for natural disasters.159

    The dual use approach was attractive to Stateand local authorities. While in the past Stateand local officials had been reluctant toparticipate in nuclear attack planning, the

    ability to deal with attack preparedness in thecontext of a particular hazard in a specific area(e.g. floods in coastal or riverine areas,hurricanes in coastal areas, tornadoes in theMidwest and Plains States, and civil unrest inurban areas) encouraged new coordinationand participation.160

    The change of focus also garnered publicsupport. The interest of the American publicin attack planning had waned considerably.

    There was little enthusiasm for ambitiousshelter building projects or evacuation drills.161A number of historians attribute this lack ofinterest to a diminished perception of risk,psychological numbing to the destruction ofnuclear weapons, and a growing belief thatcivil defense measures would not ultimately beeffective in the event of nuclear war.162Planning for natural disasters was perceived to

    In 1972, the United States and the SovietUnion signed the SALT I treaty, animportant arms control measure.

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    be more effective, less resource intensive, andable to deliver tangible benefits at the Stateand local level.

    Nixons broad policy changes were

    accompanied by equally sweepingorganizational changes. Following thereplacement of the OCD with the DCPA,another major reorganization took place. In1970 and 1973, Reorganization Plans 1 and 2abolished the Office of Emergency Planningand delegated its functions to variousagencies.163 Executive Order 11725 of 1973solidified the new organizational structure bydistributing preparedness tasks to a widevariety of new agencies including theDepartment of Housing and Urban

    Development (HUD), the General ServicesAdministration, and the Departments of theTreasury and Commerce.164 In total, the newbureaucratic structure placed responsibility fordisaster relief with more than 100 federalagencies.165 Not surprisingly, thisreorganization is perhaps best known for itsineffectiveness.166

    Despite the suggestion of great activity, realprogress on civil defense, both in the

    traditional sense and its new dual-usedirection, was limited during the NixonAdministration. One illustrative example isthe signing into law of the Disaster Relief Actof 1974 (Public Law 93-288). While theDisaster Relief Act sought to remedybureaucratic inefficiencies and provide directassistance to individuals and familiesfollowing a disaster,167 funding remained low,with levels comparable to spending in the pre-Kennedy years. The Act did succeed in

    involving State and local governments in allhazards preparedness activities168 andprovided matching funds for theirprograms.169 However, soon the federalgovernments emphasis on all-hazardspreparedness would lessen.

    Ford Administration (1974-1977)

    At first, the Ford Administration supportedits predecessors approach to dual-usepreparedness. In March 1975 President Ford

    strongly endorsed the policy, stating: I amparticularly pleased that civil defense planningtoday emphasizes the dual use ofresourceswe are improving our ability torespondto national disasters170However, less than a year later, the Office ofManagement and Budget (OMB) rescindedDODs use of civil defense funding fornatural disaster mitigation andpreparedness.171 Civil defense was returned tothe original orientation of nuclear attackpreparedness, as seen during the Truman andEisenhower years.

    There were several motivations for this policychange. Perhaps most importantly, theUnited States had just resumed its intelligenceobservations of Soviet civil defense after afive year break.172 Reports from theseoperations detailed significant Soviet progressin civil defense, compared to relatively smallU.S. efforts. Massive Soviet expenditures(estimated at $1 billion per year in 1977) on

    preparedness initiatives, such as evacuationplans, contributed to a growing concern thatthe United States was falling behind.173Whereas in the United States, civil defensewas considered an insurance policy, theSoviets considered it a factor of greatstrategic significance.174 The most alarmistAmerican commentators concluded that theentire U.S. nuclear arsenal could not inflictsignificant damage on the Soviet Union, duein large part to its increased civil

    preparedness.175

    Developments in Cold War diplomacy likelyalso contributed to the temporary end of all-hazards planning. Gradually the doctrine ofMAD was replaced with new ideas, such aslimited nuclear strikes against strategicallyimportant military and industrial targets,

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    rather than population centers. As early asJanuary 10, 1974 Secretary of Defense JamesSchlesinger stated during a press conferencethat the old policy [of MAD]was nolonger adequate for deterrence and should be

    replaced by a set of selective options againstdifferent sets of targets.176 Over the nextdecade, these ideas of flexible targeting andlimited retaliation developed into the policy offlexible response.177 Flexible response wasbased on the idea that both the Soviet Unionand the United States had the capability forsmall-scale nuclear attacks that could beanswered by similarly-sized acts of retaliationby the other side.178 Theoretically, instead ofmassive retaliation against population centers,targets would be specific, highly-strategic

    sites.179 Since some of these sites could becivilian in nature, some level of civil defenseand nuclear attack preparedness was deemednecessary. Thus, U.S. policy makers renewedtheir attention on civil defense, as a means ofprotecting against targeted highly-strategicattacks.180

    One result was a new initiative called theCrisis Relocation Plan (CRP). Begun in1974 by Secretary of Defense JamesSchlesinger, the CRP favored a strategy ofevacuation rather than sheltering. Directed bythe DCPA, CRP evacuation planning wasconducted at the State level with Federalfunds and encompassed all of the necessary

    support for relocation, food distribution, andmedical care.181 Under the CRP, urbanresidents would be relocated to rural hostcounties, with a target ratio of 5 immigrantsfor every native.182 The focus on

    preparedness through the CRP was continuedthroughout the Ford Administration byincoming Secretary of Defense DonaldRumsfeld, who strongly opposed the dual-useapproach. Rumsfeld believed that the Federalgovernment should address only attackpreparedness, while peacetime disasters were aState and local responsibility.183

    Though Administration officials andpolicymakers defended the CRP as a set ofsimple and highly effective procedures, the

    program suffered widespread criticism.184 ThePlans reliance on a relatively long warningtime (1 to 2 days), compared to the shorternotice necessary for sheltering, meant it couldonly be effective in a situation of risingtensions in which the launch of missilesagainst the country could be predicted.Additionally, vocal critics from Congress andthe public doubted the feasibility of suchlarge-scale evacuations through bottleneckedtransportation routes.

    Organizationally, the fragmentation of civildefense responsibilities begun under Nixonbecame increasingly apparent. Nixonsreorganization plans prescribed that the bulkof the responsibility for civil defense fall tothree different agencies: the OEP wouldadvise the President, HUDs FederalDisaster Assistance Agency would managedisaster relief, and the DCPA wouldcoordinate State and local preparedness

    efforts.

    185

    Though these bureaucratic changeswere not complete until the CarterAdministration, some Congressionalcommittees were already beginning toinvestigate the problem of disjointed civildefense. In 1976, the House Armed ServicesCommittee recommended that an officewithin the Executive Office of the President(EOP) be tasked to manage civil defense,

    Public relations officerpresenting a crisisrelocation plan.

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    while the Joint Committee on DefenseProduction recommended combining thethree agencies into one body.186 Theserecommendations, coming during the finalmonths of the Ford Administration, were

    evaluated in the subsequent CarterAdministration.

    Overall civil defense funding during Fordstenure did not change significantly from theNixon years. With the implementation of theCRP, Secretary of Defense Schlesinger mademodest increases in the 1975 budget todevelop city evacuation plans and implementpopulation defenses.187 However, as inprevious Administrations, civil defense stillcompeted for funding against more traditional

    military expenditures, and the 1975 increaseswere nullified the following year in favor ofspending on offensive military capabilities.188

    In sum, despite ambitious claims of progressby the Ford Administration, civil defenseprograms within the United States remainedless than effective. U.S. nuclear deterrenceplans still emphasized offensive capabilities.In its evaluation of the state of civil defense in1976, the Congressional Research Service

    unconditionally labeled the efforts acharade.189 It would be another five yearsbefore significant progress was made.

    Carter Administration (1977-1981)

    Upon taking office, President Carterimmediately began a review of the disjointedsystem of bureaucracies that managed civildefense. An interagency study led to

    Presidential Review Memorandum 32 inSeptember of 1977.190 The study concurredwith the 1976 recommendations of the HouseArmed Services Committee and JointCommittee on Defense Production that thevarious civil defense agencies must be

    combined into one coherent agency in directcontact with the White House.191 In response,Carter issued Presidential Directive (PD) 41 inSeptember of 1978, which sought to clarifythe Administrations view of civil defense.

    However, it did not offer any particular planfor implementation.192 According to PD 41,civil defense was an element in the strategy toenhance deterrence and stability. Civildefense still did not become a priority for theAdministration, which concluded that it wasnot necessary to pursue equivalentsurvivability with the Soviet Union.193

    Meanwhile, in the midst of a lengthy debateregarding the creation of a single disasterpreparedness agency, an unprecedented

    civilian nuclear accident unfolded on March28, 1979 at the nuclear energy plant on ThreeMile Island, near Harrisburg, Pennsylvania.194By highlighting the slow response, poor local-Federal coordination, and miscommunicationsthat occurred; the accident dramaticallydemonstrated the need for more effectivedisaster coordination and planning.195Partially in response to the near nucleardisaster, on July 20, 1979 the Administrationissued Executive Order 12148, which

    established the Federal EmergencyManagement Agency (FEMA) as the leadagency for coordinating Federal disaster reliefefforts. FEMA absorbed the FederalInsurance Administration, the National FirePrevention and Control Administration, theNational Weather Service CommunityPreparedness Program, the FederalPreparedness Agency of the General ServicesAdministration, and the Federal DisasterAssistance Administration activities from

    HUD, and combined them into a singleindependent agency. At the time, the creationof FEMA represented the single largestconsolidation of civil defense efforts in U.S.history.

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    Conflicting official statements, skepticismabout the nuclear industry, and evenunfamiliar terminology fed thesensationalist media frenzy surrounding

    the Three Mile Island accident.

    Despite the reorganization and move towardgreater mission clarity, civil defense planningon the ground did not change dramatically.Practical plans continued to reflect traditionalcivil defense programs and did not adopt thedual-use approach, though Carter did urgeFEMA to direct more of its efforts to copingwith peacetime disasters.196 Evacuationcontinued to be the focus of Federal planners,

    and Secretary of Defense Harold Brownreaffirmed his predecessors crisis relocationstrategies.197 When FEMA assumedresponsibility for citizen preparedness, theagency called on civil defense plannersnationwide to create area-specific CRPs. 198

    The decision to continue to pursue evacuationas the primary civil defense policy wasinfluenced by several factors. Well-fundedand extensive Soviet evacuation programs

    continued to worry key U.S. decision makers,including Brown.199 Evacuation also madesense in the context of continued resourcelimitations. According to a 1979 FEMAreport, since effective and cost-efficientsheltering in large cities had proven difficult,the U.S. nuclear civil defense programdeveloped into an evacuation programas alow-cost survival alternative.200

    It is likely that the Carter Administrationsfocus on evacuation was also affected by ColdWar diplomacy. The continuing SALTnegotiations created a conflict between the

    desire to advance U.S. civil defense, and thedesire to avoid upsetting the delicate strategicbalance required for successful threatreduction negotiations. With this balance inmind, maintaining the status quo bycontinuing to support evacuation policies mayhave been deemed the best option.201

    Though the creation of FEMA and the goalsof PD 41 signaled renewed interest in civildefense, funding throughout the CarterAdministration remained historically low.

    The 1980 request for $108 million was lessthan adequate for implementing the newplans.202 In the following year, Congress didnot meet a higher request for funding, insteadchoosing to allocate funds to otherpriorities.203 As had been the case many timesbefore, funding levels did not match theambitious plans for program improvement.

    In keeping civil defense funding low,Congressional leaders had little public

    opposition to fear. In contrast to generallywidespread public participation andacceptance in the peak years of civil defenseduring the early stages of the Cold War, mostpeople by this time had little faith that anygovernment civil defense planning couldlessen the impact of nuclear war.204 Somelocal communities refused outright tocooperate with Federal civil defense mandatesbecause they did not believe the CRPs wouldbe effective if a nuclear attack were to

    occur.

    205

    This public attitude would continuethroughout the remainder of the Cold Warperiod.

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    Reagan Administration (1981-1989)

    It would appear that Ronald Reagan enteredoffice with the intention of building upon thecivil defense foundations set by his

    predecessors. In December 1981, Congressacted dramatically in favor of the dual-useapproach by amending the 1950 Civil DefenseAct. In this milestone decision, all future civildefense funds would be allotted for naturaldisasters, as well as attacks on thehomeland.206 The amendment did stipulatethat funding and planning for peacetimedisasters could not overtly detract from attackpreparedness programs. Nevertheless, dual-use preparedness was promoted with much ofthe same language and reasoning as it wasduring the Nixon Administration. 207

    Though Reagan was in favor of the dual-useapproach, his civil defense strategy was largelya continuation of Carters. In the midst ofdeliberations regarding the 1982 budget, theNational Security Council (NSC) compiledNational Security Division Directive (NSDD)26, which spelled out the objectives ofCarters Presidential Directive 41 and wasdesigned to promote deterrence, improve

    natural disaster preparedness, and reduce thepossibility of coercion by enemy forces.208The unclassified version of NSDD 26 states:it is a matter of national priority that theUnited States have a Civil Defense programwhich provides for the survival of the U.S.population.209 However, NSDD 26 wentfurther than PD 41 by stipulating a concretedeadline in 1989 for plans to protect thepopulation, and it mandated that civil defenseleaders investigate and enhance protection

    measures for critical industries in case ofattack.210 Furthermore, NSDD 26 for the firsttime supported research into the developmentof strategies to ensure economic survival inthe event of a nuclear attack.211 However,drawing upon the CRPs of his predecessors,Reagan continued to promote evacuation as

    the primary strategy for civil defense. Duringthis period nuclear preparedness became a toppriority for FEMA.212

    Congress and the Administration came into

    conflict in February 1982, when the Presidentrequested $4.2 billion for a seven-year plan tomassively boost civil defense programs.213Congress did not react positively to thisrequest, particularly because it seemed to bepart of Reagans hawkish stance on Cold Wardiplomacy.214 For example, the HouseCommittee on Appropriations criticizedFEMAs dependence on evacuation planningat the expense of other preparednessprograms and suggested that more attentionbe paid to peacetime disaster preparation.

    Expressing their disagreement with FEMAsplans, Congress allocated only $147.9 millionto cover FEMAs 1983 budget, about 58% ofwhat the agency had requested.215 In 1984and 1985, Congress again blocked requests forfunding increases.216

    In 1983, FEMA responded to theCongressional push for more peacetimedisaster preparation with plans for anIntegrated Emergency Management System

    (IEMS) to develop full all-hazardpreparedness plans at the Federal level.217Under the IEMS, State civil defense plannerswould facilitate the development of multi-hazard preparedness plans based on threatsfaced by specific localities.218 According tothe IEMS, this all-hazards approach includeddirection, control and warning systems whichare common to the full range of emergenciesfrom small isolated events to the ultimateemergency war.219 Despite this innovative

    attempt to integrate civil defense and disasterpreparedness concerns, Congress was notsufficiently convinced that the IEMS wouldeffectively address the management of all-hazard preparedness, and therefore never metrequested FEMA funding levels.

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    1983 Time Magazine coverstory reports on SDI.Labeled Star Wars bycritics, the initiative was afirm departure fromprevious policies.

    Cold War diplomacy continued to play a rolein civil defense decisions under Reagan.President Reagansupported neither thedoctrine of mutual

    assured destruction northe dtente that hadbeen a centerpiece ofthe CarterAdministration.220 OnMarch 23, 1983 Reaganopenly rejected mutualassured destructionwith his speechproposing theStrategic DefenseInitiative (SDI). SDI

    focused on using ground-based and space-based systems to protect the United Statesfrom attack by strategic nuclear ballisticmissiles.221 SDI flew in theface of the 1972 SALT I agreement banningstrategic defenses, and itdemonstrated a shift towards more proactiveand aggressive defensive measures.

    The final years of the Reagan Administrationsaw a number of actions intended to allay

    concerns regarding non-attack preparedness.TheMeese Memorandum(Executive Order12656), signed in 1986, delegated leadresponse roles to certain Federal agencies,depending on the type of disaster.222 OnNovember 23, 1988 the Disaster Relief Act of1974 was amended to become what is nowknown as the Stafford Act, resulting in aclearer definition of FEMAs role inemergency management. The Act defined thedisaster declaration process and provided the

    statutory authority for Federal assistanceduring a disaster. The agencys role in disasterresponse would be tested and debated in theyears to come.

    Bush Administration (1989-1993)

    In the year after George H.W. Bush tookoffice, several natural disasters challenged theNations nascent approach to all-hazards

    preparedness. On March 24, 1989, 11 milliongallons of crude oil spilled into Prince WilliamSound in the Gulf of Alaska from theExxonValdezoil tanker.223 It was the largest oil spillin U.S. history, and the Administration was ill-prepared to manage an environmental crisis ofsuch large scale. Instead of using FEMAthrough the Stafford Act to coordinate theresponse, Bush invoked the Federal WaterPollution Control Act, under which theEnvironmental Protection Agency and CoastGuard managed the event. TheAdministration drew much criticism for thepoor response.224

    On September 13, 1989, Hurricane Hugostruck the Virgin Islands, Puerto Rico, andSouth Carolina, inflicting significant damage.This time Bush chose to send Manuel Lujan,Secretary of the Interior, to assess the damageand provide additional executive oversight.225FEMAs participation in the response wasplagued by shortages of properly trained

    personnel, communication problems, and alack of coordination.226 Within a month ofHurricane Hugo, the Loma Prieta earthquakestruck northern California causing anestimated $6 billion in damage. Alreadystretched thin from dealing with theHurricane Hugo recovery, FEMAs responsecontinued to be hindered by coordination andstaffing problems. Again, President Bushappointed a Cabinet-level representative,Secretary of Transportation Samuel Skinner,

    to oversee recovery operations, and againFEMAs contribution to response andrecovery was judged inadequate.227

    The dissatisfaction with FEMAs response totheExxon ValdezOil Spill, Hurricane Hugo,and the Loma Prieta Earthquake led FEMAto begin developing the Federal Response

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    Plan (FRP) in November 1990.228 Drawingfrom the Incident Command System andIncident Management System framework, theFRP defined how 27 Federal agencies and theAmerican Red Cross would respond to the

    needs of State and local governments whenthey were overwhelmed by a disaster. Theplan used a functional approach to define thetypes of assistance (such as food,communications, and transportation) thatwould be provided by the Federal governmentto address the consequences of disaster.229

    By the second year of the Bushadministration, significant political changeswere occurring. The Berlin Wall fell in 1989,followed shortly by the collapse of the Soviet

    Union and the fall of communistgovernments across Eastern Europe. TheCold War had come to a rapid andunanticipated end, and the threat of a strategicnuclear attack on the United States diminishedsignificantly almost overnight. As a result,civil defense in the traditional sense was nolonger a major priority for emergencyplanners or Congress. With the recentonslaught of natural and man-made disasterstop-of-mind, FEMA planners began to adopt

    the idea of a true all-hazards approach todisaster preparedness. In March of 1992,President Bush signed National SecurityDirective 66 instructing FEMA to develop amulti-hazard approach to emergencymanagement, combining civil defensepreparedness with natural and man-madedisaster preparedness.230

    Testifying before the Armed ServicesSubcommittee Hearing on Civil Defense on

    May 6, 1992, Grant Peterson, AssociateDirector for State and Local Programs atFEMA, reported that:

    [T]he President has approved anew civil defense policyThenew policy acknowledgessignificant changes in the rangeof threats, and eliminates the

    heavy emphasis on nuclearattack. The policy recognizes theneed for civil defense to addressall forms of catastrophicemergencies, all hazards, and theconsequences of those hazards.

    The new policy increases theemphasis on preparedness torespond to the consequences ofall emergencies regardless of theircause. All-hazards consequencemanagement recognizes thatregardless of the cause of anemergency situation, certain verybasic capabilities are necessary torespond and that planning effortsand resources should be focusedon developing the capabilities

    necessary to respond to all thecommon effects of all hazards.231

    In August 1992, Hurricane Andrew hit southFlorida and the central Louisiana coast.President Bush once again appointed aCabinet-level representative, Secretary ofTransportation Andrew Card, to coordinateFederal relief efforts.232 Unfortunately, thisadditional oversight did not result inimproved performance as government at alllevels was slow to comprehend the scope of

    the disaster.233 And despite the presence ofthe FRP, FEMA and the other agenciesinvolved in the response and recovery facedthe same kinds of coordination and logisticalproblems they had three years prior. FEMAwas strongly criticized by Congress for itspoor performance.

    As a result of this criticism, FEMA wasinstructed by Congress to contract with theNational Academy of Public Administration

    (NAPA) to conduct a study of the Federal,State, and local level capacity to respond tomajor natural disasters.234 Issued in February1993, NAPAs assessment, Coping WithCatastrophe, detailed the obstacles facingemergency management at all levels ofgovernment and made recommendations toimprove FEMAs ability to prepare and

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    respond to disasters. NAPA concluded that,a small independent agency could coordinatethe federal response to major naturaldisastersbut only if the White House andCongress take significant steps to make it a

    viable institution.

    235

    Because of the timing ofthe report, it was left to the ClintonAdministration to evaluate the findings andimplement changes to make FEMA moreeffective.

    Clinton Administration (1993-2001)

    Upon taking office, President Bill Clintonappointed James Lee Witt director of FEMA.Witt, the former Director of EmergencyManagement for the State of Arkansas,immediately reorganized FEMA.236 Hecreated three functional directoratescorresponding to the major phases ofemergency management: Mitigation;Preparedness; Training and Exercise; andResponse and Recovery.237 In February of1996, Clinton elevated the FEMA directorshipto Cabinet-level status, improving the line ofcommunication between the Director and thePresident.238

    The shift in emergency preparedness towardsan all-hazards approach allowed FEMA tofocus on addressing natural disasters withouthaving to fear negative political reactionsfrom advocates of civil defense.239 TheAgencys Mitigation Directorate, for example,focused many of its early programs onhazards such as flooding and earthquakes.240At the same time, however, recognition of thethreat of terrorist attacks inside the United

    States was beginning to emerge. In 1993,Congress included a joint resolution in theNational Defense Authorization Act (NDAA)that called for FEMA to develop a capabilityfor early detection and warning of andresponse to: potential terrorist use of chemicalor biological agents or weapons; andemergencies or natural disasters involving

    industrial chemicals or the widespreadoutbreak of disease.241

    As evidenced by this resolution, Congress wasbecoming increasingly concerned about the

    threat posed by terrorist organizations andtechnological disasters. Much of this concernresulted from the World Trade Centerbombing earlier that year, in which 6 peoplewere killed and 1,042 were wounded. Theblast left a five story deep crater and caused$500 million in damages.

    In November 1994, the Federal Civil DefenseAct of 1950 was repealed and all remnants ofcivil defense authority were transferred toTitle VI of the Stafford Act.242 This

    completed the evolution of civil defense intoan all-hazards approach to preparedness.FEMA now had the statutory responsibilityfor coordinating a comprehensive emergencypreparedness system to deal with all types ofdisasters. Title VI also ended all ArmedServices Committee oversight over FEMAand significantly reduced the priority ofnational security programs within FEMA.Money authorized by the Civil Defense Actwas reallocated to natural disaster and all-

    hazards programs, and more than 100 defenseand security staff members were reassigned.243

    The period between 1995 and 1996 saw aseries of major terrorist attacks launcheddomestically and abroad, which furtherinfluenced U.S. preparedness policies. InMarch 1995, the Japanese religious cult AumShinrikyo released sarin nerve gas on fiveseparate cars of three different subway lines inTokyo. Twelve people were killed and

    thousands were injured. One month later,Timothy McVeigh and Terry Nicholsdetonated a truck bomb at the Alfred P.Murrah Federal Building in Oklahoma City,killing 169 people. On June 25, 1996 theKhobar Towers, a U.S. military facility inDhahran, Saudi Arabia was bombed, killing 19Americans.244

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    These events had a profound effect on U.S.lawmakers and the Administration.245 Twodays after the bombing of the KhobarTowers, the Senate adopted an amendmentaimed at preventing terrorists from using

    nuclear, chemical, or biological weapons inthe United States.246 In September Congresspassed the NDAA for fiscal year 1997, whichincluded the Defense Against Weapons ofMass Destruction Act commonly known asthe Nunn-Lugar-Domenici Act.247 This Actrequired DOD to provide civilian agencies atall levels of government training and expertadvice on appropriate responses to the use ofa weapon of mass destruction (WMD) againstthe American public. Lawmakers originallyplanned to have FEMA lead the training and

    provide equipment; however, FEMA officialshad testified that only DOD had the necessaryknowledge and assets .248

    As a result of the Nunn-Lugar-Domenicilegislation, Metropolitan Medical Strike ForceTeams were created, as well as a domesticterrorism rapid response team, whose purposewas to aid State and local officials in WMDresponse.249 Three years later, WMDpreparedness was transferred from DOD to

    the Office of Domestic Preparedness(ODP) within the Department of Justice(DOJ).250 In 1999, DOD also established 10National Guard Rapid Assessment and InitialDetection (RAID) teams, which served toprovide technical expertise and equipment todeal with a WMD attack.251 The unanticipatedresult of these actions was a newfragmentation of responsibility for civilianpreparedness programs. Despite its overturestoward all-hazards preparedness, many of

    FEMAs efforts remained focused on naturaldisasters. Meanwhile, DOD through itsRAID teams, and DOJ through ODP,became increasingly involved in preparationsfor and responses to WMD threats.

    Apart from these efforts, as the century cameto a close, a new concept of homelandsecurity began to emerge. Presidential

    Decision Directive (PDD) 62, signed in May1998, created the Office of the NationalCoordinator for Security, InfrastructureProtection, and Counter-Terrorism withinthe Executive Office of the President. This

    office was designed to coordinate counter-terrorism policy, preparedness, andconsequence management.252Later that same year, President Clinton issuedPDD 63 on Critical Infrastructure Protection.PDD 63 established principles for protectingthe nation by minimizing the threat ofsmaller-scale terrorist attacks againstinformation technology and geographically-distributed supply chains that could cascadeand disrupt entire sectors of the economy.253In the absence of a centralized authority for

    homeland security, Federal agencies weredesignated as lead agencies in their sector ofexpertise. The lead agencies were directed todevelop sector-specific Information Sharingand Analysis Centers to coordinate effortswith the private sector. PDD 63 also requiredthe creation of a National InfrastructureAssurance Plan.

    At the same time, the U.S. Commission onNational Security in the 21st Century,

    chartered by DOD, and known as the Hart-Rudman Commission, began to reexamineU.S. national security policies.254 One of theCommissions recommendations was thecreation of a Cabinet-level NationalHomeland Security Agency responsible forplanning, coordinating, and integratingvarious U.S. government activities involved inhomeland security. The commissiondefined homeland security as the protectionof the territory, critical infrastructures, and

    citizens of the United States by Federal, State,and local government entities from the threator use of chemical, biological, radiological,nuclear, cyber, or conventional weapons bymilitary or other means. Legislation towardthis end was introduced on March 29, 2001,but hearings continued through April of 2001without passage of the legislation.255

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    Another influential commission formedduring the latter stages of the ClintonAdministration was the Gilmore Commission,chaired by Virginia Governor Jim Gilmore.The Commission, officially known as theAdvisory Panel to Assess DomesticResponse Capabilities for TerrorismInvolving Weapons of Mass Destruction,developed and delivered a series of fivereports to the President and Congressbetween 1999 and 2003.256 Of the GilmoreCommission's 164 recommendations, 146were adopted in whole or in part257, includingcreation of a fusion center to integrate andanalyze all intelligence pertaining to terrorismand counterterrorism and the creation of acivil liberties oversight board.258 However, the

    impetus to implement many of theserecommendations only occurred following theseries of devastating attacks on the U.S.homeland that occurred during the initialmonths of the next administration.

    Bush Administration (2001-Present)

    The initial months of George W. Bushspresidency saw a general continuation of

    existing homeland security policies. Prior tothe terrorist attacks of September 11, 2001,OMB summarized homeland security asfocused on three objectives: counterterrorism,defense against WMD, and the protection of

    critical infrastructure.

    259

    The new Administration did implementchanges that affected how national securityand homeland security policies would begenerated. The Administration abolished thesystem ofad hocinteragency working groupsused by Clinton to address homeland securityissues and replaced them with PolicyCoordination Committees within the NationalSecurity Council. A Counterterrorism andNational Preparedness Policy

    Coordinating Committee was establishedthat was composed of four working groups:Continuity of Federal Operations,Counterterrorism and Security, Preparednessand WMD, and Information InfrastructureProtection and Assurance.260 The goal of thisreorganization was to create a moreformalized structure to deal with threats tothe homeland.

    Then came the September 11, 2001 terrorist

    attacks. In their wake, there was near-universal agreement within the Federalgovernment that homeland security required amajor reassessment, increased funding, andadministrative reorganization. In October2001, the White House Office of HomelandSecurity was established via executive orderto work with Executive departments andagencies to develop and coordinate theimplementation of a comprehensive nationalstrategy to secure the United States from

    terrorist threats or attacks.

    261

    President Bushchose Pennsylvania Governor Tom Ridge tolead the new Office. In March 2002 anotherexecutive order created the HomelandSecurity Advisory Council to advise thePresident on homeland security matters. TheCouncil, located within the Executive Officeof the President, is comprised of leaders fromState and local government, first responder

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    Homeland Security Advisory System

    communities, the private sector, andacademia.

    In his 2002 State of the Union address, thePresident announced the establishment of theUSA Freedom Corps

    to promote a cultureof service, citizenship, and responsibility inAmerica. Under the Freedom Corpsinitiative, the White House establishedCitizen Corps within FEMA to engageindividual citizens through education, training,and volunteer service to make communitiesbetter prepared to prevent, protect, respond,and recover from all-hazards. Citizen Corpsinvolved Americans in programs such asCommunity Emergency Response Teams,Fire Corps, Neighborhood Watch, Medical

    Reserve Corps, and Volunteers in PoliceService.

    Then on March 12, 2002, the HomelandSecurity Advisory System (HSAS) wascreated to communicate with the Americanpublic and safety officials using a threat-based,color-coded system, so protective measurescan be implemented to reduce the likelihoodor impact of an attack on the homeland.262Because raising the threat condition can have

    detrimental economic, physical, andpsychological effects on the nation, theFederal government can place specificgeographic regions or industry sectors on ahigher alert status, as the specificity of threat-based intelligence permits.263.

    The Bush Administration also began todevelop a number of strategic documents andstatements that outlined the Presidents visionfor protecting the nation. These included theNational Security Strategy, the NationalStrategy for Homeland Security

    (NSHS),and the National Strategy to CombatWeapons of Mass Destruction.

    The NSHS was released by the Office ofHomeland Security, and its purpose was toprovide a framework to align the resources ofthe federal budget directly to the task ofsecuring the homeland against terroristattack.264 The NSHS was a comprehensivestrategic document that advanced six criticalmission areas: intelligence and warning,

    border and transportation security, domesticcounterterrorism, protecting criticalinfrastructure, defending against catastrophicterrorism, and emergency preparedness andresponse. Importantly, the NSHS gave theproposed Department of HomelandSecurity (DHS) a central role inimplementing the NSHS and directed the newdepartment to serve as the primary federalpoint of contact for state and localgovernments, the private sector, and the

    American people.265

    As these strategic plans were being developed,Congress continued to push for moresubstantial reorganization of the Federalagencies involved in homeland security. Abipartisan group of Senate and Housemembers proposed an ambitious newDepartment of Homeland Security. ThePresident submitted his own plan for thecreation of a homeland security department

    on June 6, 2002. The Homeland Security Actof 2002 established the new Department onNovember 25, 2002, and the President namedRidge its first Secretary in January 2003.

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    The official seal of DHS wasunveiled on June 19, 2003

    As the head of a Cabinet-level department,Ridge obtained increased budgetary authorityand control over many of the agenciesinvolved in homeland security. In the largestgovernment reorganization since the creationof DOD in the late 1940s, DHS inheritedapproximately 200,000 people from 22Federal agencies, and an initial budget of $37

    billion.266

    One of the first major initiatives of the newlycreated DHS was the release of its citizenpreparedness website, Ready.gov, in February2003. The Ready Campaign began a nationalpublic service advertising campaign producedby The Ad Council in partnership with DHSdesigned to educate and empower Americansto prepare for and respond to natural disastersand potential terrorist attacks.267

    DHS also began addressing priority issues oftransportation, border, and port security.Steps to bolster aviation security includeddeploying newly trained federal screeners atairports and placing thousands of federal airmarshals on flights to protect passengers andcrew.268 Also, Ridge oversaw a significantexpansion of the Container Security Initiative.In less than a year, the United States wasworking with allies in 17 international ports to

    inspect and secure the thousands ofcontainers of cargo that arrive daily at U.S.shores.269

    Understandably, much of the Departmentsinitial work focused on addressing the threatof domestic terrorism. However, the DHSmandate encompassed the full range ofdisasters and attacks, and all-hazards

    preparedness soon became a top priority aswell. Homeland Security PresidentialDirective-8: National Preparedness (HSPD-8),issued in December 2003, definedpreparedness as encompassing threatened or

    actual domestic terrorist attacks, majordisasters, and other emergencies. 270 HSPD-8 also spelled out the need for DHS to take aleading role in creating a NationalPreparedness Goal; coordinating Federal,State, local, and private sector efforts toencourage active citizen participation inpreparedness; and developing acomprehensive plan to provide accurate andtimely preparedness information to citizens.271

    The National Preparedness Goal was first

    released in interim form on March 31, 2005.It presented preparedness as a coordinated,national effort involving every level ofgovernment, the private sector, non-governmental organizations, and individualcitizens, and called for the development andstrengthening of capabilities that wouldaddress the full range of homeland securitymissions (prevention, protection, responseand recovery).

    Under Ridge, DHS took a fresh look at theway Federal, State, local, tribal and privatesector resources work together to deal withemergencies. A newNational Response Plan(NRP) was developed to replace the earlierFederal Response Plan, and the NationalIncident Management System (NIMS) wasintroduced to provide a common frameworkfor incident management. A NationalStrategy for Physical Protection of CriticalInfrastructures and Key Assets was also

    developed, officially recognizing the role ofthe private sector and the need forpartnerships between government and theprivate sector in protecting the nation. Thestructure for such partnerships was furtherdetailed in the National InfrastructureProtection Plan, issued in June 2006.

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    Preparedness took on even greaterprominence within the Department underRidges successor, Michael Chertoff. Shortlyafter taking office in February 2005, Chertoffinitiated a Second Stage Review of the

    Departments organization, operations, andpolicies. The following six-point agendaresulted from the review: increasepreparedness with a focus on catastrophicevents; strengthen border security and interiorenforcement and reform immigrationprocesses; harden transportation securitywithout sacrificing mobility; enhanceinformation sharing with our U.S.government and private sector partners;improve DHS financial, human resource,procurement and information technology

    management; and realign the DHSorganization to maximize missionperformance.272 The review also resulted inthe creation of a newDirectorate ofPreparedness and further integration ofpreparedness activities.

    The Nations preparedness received anotherserious test when on August 29, 2005,Hurricane Katrina made landfall along theMississippi and Louisiana coasts. The storm

    was followed by levee failures in NewOrleans, and caused unprecedenteddevastation. With virtually the entireMississippi coast leveled by storm surge, andmuch of the city of New Orleans under water,the Federal, State, and local response provedinadequate to the unprecedented catastrophicchallenge. The National Response Plan,aimed at coordinating the response to majordisasters, was less than one year old when thehurricane hit. It had not been fully trained

    across all agencies and levels of government,and had never been tested in a major event.The White House, Senate, and House ofRepresentatives investigative reports writtenin the months following the hurricaneslandfall cited numerous shortcomings inresponse efforts.

    State and local level preparedness for thedisaster also proved to be flawed. PresidentBush, recognizing the importance of havingadequate plans in place, demanded anationwide review of the status of

    catastrophic planning. DHS and theDepartment of Transportation were tasked toconduct the review in major urban areasacross the country.

    The results were released on June 16, 2006.The Review determined that disaster planningfor catastrophic events in the United Statessuffers from failure to account for the fullscope of catastrophic events; outmodedplanning processes, products, and tools; andinadequate attention to coordination.

    While recognizing the importance of Federalleadership and coordination, DHS and theBush Administration continue to stress thatState and local governments must be the firstline of defense against disaster and attack.DHS administers grant programs that since2003 have provided over $2.1 billion to Statesfor interoperable communications equipment,planning, training, and exercises.273 In total,DHS has awarded $18 billion in grants to

    State and local governments to improvepreparedness levels.274 DHS has alsoprovided counterterrorism training to morethan 1.2 million emergency responsepersonnel from across the country on a rangeof incident response issues such as incidentmanagement, unified command, and publicworks protection and response.275 Finally, theDepartment has conducted more than 400exercises at the Federal, State, and local levelto improve preparedness for and response to

    terrorist attacks and natural disasters.

    276

    Conclusion

    The history of civil defense and homelandsecurity in the United States has been one offrequent policy and organizational change.

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    The changes have been driven by manyfactors including an evolving threatenvironment, major natural disasters that haveresulted in immense destruction, and thespecific preferences of presidential

    administrations. One of the most importantrecent drivers, the terrorist attacks ofSeptember 11, 2001, led directly to increasedfunding and focus on homeland security, andspecifically the creation of DHS. However,just a few years later, the scale of thedevastation caused by Hurricane Katrinashowed that the country remains vulnerable tonatural disasters, as well as to manmadeaccidents.

    Civil defense began with the desire to involve

    Americans in the protection of their fellowcitizens and