i

QUESTIONS PRESENTED

I. Whether Petitioner’s action for corrective

relief from The Florida Bar’s unconstitutional

orders of suspension and disbarment should be

treated like a habeas action which is not subject

to time bars where Petitioner only seeks relief

from the collateral consequences which flow

directly from said unconstitutional orders,

Petitioner’s injuries can only be redressed by a

favorable judgment for corrective relief from this

court, and Petitioner’s actual ongoing injuries

from the unconstitutional orders meet the case-or-

controversy requirement under Article III, §2 of

the United States Constitution?

II. When Petitioner has no adequate remedy

from The Florida Bar’s unconstitutional

suspension and disbarment orders except through

a judgment from this court by this petition, is this

court’s acceptance of Petitioner’s action for

corrective relief in accord with the mandate of the

United States Constitution and this court’s

fundamental tradition that no citizen should be

left remediless and defenseless against

substantial civil disabilities and collateral

ii consequences which flow from unconstitutional

judgments?

III. Whether The Florida Bar’s actions of not

giving Petitioner notice or opportunity to defend

prior to disbarment and its deliberate

misrepresentation and concealment of material

facts to secure the suspension and disbarment

orders against Petitioner deprive Petitioner of

procedural due process and violate the equal

protection clause of the fourteenth amendment of

the United States Constitution?

IV. Whether The Florida Bar’s actions of

intercepting all material documents Petitioner

filed with the court in case number SC01-1198,

manipulating the dating and filing of documents,

creating five frivolous, sham cases against

Petitioner, publishing and placing in the public

records the sham cases and unconstitutional

orders to Petitioner’s detriment violate

Petitioner’s rights under the fifth and fourteenth

amendment of the United States Constitution?

V. Whether the Florida Bar violated

Petitioner’s rights under the fifth and fourteenth

iii amendment of the United States Constitution and

acted out of the bounds of legal authority when it

ignored all well established substantive and

procedural constitutional safeguards as it

arbitrarily and without cause investigated

Petitioner for over 28 months, permanently

disbarred Petitioner from the legal profession by

misrepresenting and concealing material facts

and not giving Petitioner notice of the sham cases

it brought against?

VI. Whether The Referee, Justice Robert N.

Scola, Jr.’s actions of deliberately misrepresenting

and concealing material facts in his report, aiding

The Bar intercept, backdate and manipulate the

filing of material documents Petitioner filed with

the court in case number SC01-1198, entering

orders and submitting reports that are grounded

in partisan interests and contravene well

established rules of procedure to Petitioner’s

detriment, violated his duty as the minister of

justice and severely compromise the integrity of

the judiciary and our legal system?

VII. Whether The Florida Bar, by and through

its attorneys and the Referee, Justice Robert N.

iv Scola Jr., were deviant in their responsibilities of

promoting and preserving the integrity of the

legal profession, protecting rights and pursuing

justice when they allowed Jonathan D. Wald, The

Bar’s favored member, to use The Bar, the courts

and the judicial system to disparage, humiliate

and cause serious injuries to Petitioner?

v

PARTIES TO THE PROCEEDING

Pursuant to Rule 14.1(b), the

following list identifies all of the parties.

The Petitioner appearing pro se is

Anne Georges Telasco.

The Respondent is the Florida Bar.

There are no corporate parties.

vi

TABLE OF CONTENTS

Page

QUESTIONS PRESENTED ………………………...i

PARTIES TO THE PROCEEDING ………........... v

TABLES OF CONTENTS ………………………….vi

TABLE OF AUTHORITIES …………………….... ix

OPINIONS BELOW ………………………………....1

JURISDICTION ……………………………………...2

CONSTITUTION, STATUTES AND

RULES INVOLVED ………………………....4

STATEMENT OF THE CASE …………………..…4

REASON FOR GRANTING THE PETITION…..28

I. PETITIONER’S ONLY AVENUE FOR

CORRECTIVE RELIEF FROM THE

UNCONSTITUTIONAL ORDERS IS BY

vii THIS PETITION FOR A WRIT OF

CERTIORARI TO THIS COURT. ………......28

II. COURTS HAVE TREATED

CORRECTIVE ACTIONS LIKE HABEAS

PETITION BECAUSE A PETITIONER

WHO SEEKS CORRECTIVE RELIEF,

ONLY SEEKS EQUITABLE RELIEF

FROM COLLATERAL CONSEQUENCES,

AND INVOKES THE AID OF THE

COURT TO PROTECT AGAINST

FURTHER INFRINGEMENT UPON

HER LIBERTY………………………………..30

III. THE FLORIDA BAR’S DEPRIVATION

OF PETITIONER’S CONSTITUTIONAL

RIGHTS OCCURRED AT ZERO LEVEL

OF VISIBILITY BECAUSE THE BAR IS

ENTRUSTED WITH PROTECTING

RIGHTS, PURSUING JUSTICE AND

PROMOTING PROFESSIONALISM IN

THE LEGAL PROFESSION...………..….....32

IV. DISBARMENT CARRIES SERIOUS

ADVERSE COLLATERAL

CONSEQUENCES THAT ARE

viii DETRIMENTAL TO AN ATTORNEY’S

PROFESSIONAL REPUTATION,

CAREER, WELL-BEING, AND

SUCCESS; THUS, NOTICE AND

OPPORTUNITY TO DEFEND MUST

BE ACCORDED PRIOR TO

DISBARMENT………………………………...34

V. WHILE IT RESTS EXCLUSIVELY

WITH THE COURT TO DETERMINE

WHO IS QUALIFIED TO BECOME

AN ATTORNEY AND THE REASON

SHE MAY BE DISBARRED, “THE

POWER IS NOT ARBITRARY AND

DESPOTIC TO BE EXERCISED AT

THE PLEASURE OF THE COURT,

OR FROM PASSION, PREJUDICE,

OR PERSONAL HOSTILITY.”………………36

CONCLUSION ……………………………………...36

APPENDIX (separate booklet attached)

ix

TABLE OF AUTHORITIES

CASES Page

Armstrong v. Manzo,

380 U.S. 545 (1965)……………….……...…35

Baxter v. Claytor, No. 77-1984,

Slip Op., (D.C.Cir., December

19, 1978) vacated on other

grounds by 652 F.2d 181

(D.C. Cir. 1981)………………………………31

Bejar v. Garcia,

354 So.2d 964 (Fla. 3d DCA 1978)…….….35

Bland v. Connally,

293 F. 2d 852 (D.C. Cir. 1962)…………….31

Borden v. Guardianship

of Elsa Borden-Moore,

818 So.2d 604 (Fla. 5th DCA 2002)………..34

Burkett v. Chandler,

505 F.2d 217 (10th Cir. 1974),

cert denied, 423 U.S. 876 (1975)………….35

x Carafas v. LaVallee,

391 U.S. 234 (1968)………………………….2

Chapman v. Sheffield,

750 So.2d 140 (Fla. 1st DCA 2000)………..35

Cleveland Board of Education v.

Loudermill, 470 U.S. 532 (1985)…………35

Crepage v. City of Lauderhill,

774 So.2d 61 (Fla. 4th DCA 2001)…………34

Dailey v. Vought Aircraft Company,

141 F.3d 224 (5th Cir. 1998)………...2, 30, 35

Dent v. West Virginia,

129 U.S. 114 (1889)………………………2, 29

Ex parte Garland,

71 U.S. 333 (1866) ………………………….36

Fiswick v. United States,

329 U.S. 211 (1946)………………………….2

Homcy v. Resor,

455 F.2d 1345 (C.A.D.C. 1971……………..31

xi

In re Jacobs,

44 F.3d 84 (2d Cir. 1994)…………………..29

Kaiser v. The Secretary of Navy,

525 F.Supp. 1226 (D. Colo. 1981)….3, 31, 32

Kauffman v. Secretary of the Air Force,

415 F.2d 991 (D.C. Cir. 1969)…………..2, 30

Kelley v. Johnson,

425 U.S. 238 (1976)…………………..…. 2, 29

Kirkland v. National Mortgage

Network, Inc., 884 F.2d 1367

(11th Cir. 1989)…………………..…………….2

Leviten v. Gaunt,

347 So.2d 452 (Fla. 3d DCA 1977)………. 35

Lewis v. Continental Bank Corp.,

494 U.S. 472 (1990)………………………….2

Monaco v. Nealon,

810 So.2d 1084 (Fla. 4th DCA 2002) …………….35

xii In re: Ruffalo,

390 U.S. 544 (1968)………………….……...35

Schware v. Board of Bar Examiners,

353 U.S. 232 (1957)………………………...36

Selling v. Radford,

243 U.S. 46 (1917)…………………………..29

Sibron v. New York,

392 U.S. 40 (1968)………………………..2, 34

Smith v. Leaman,

826 So.2d 1077 (Fla.2d DCA 2002)……….35

Stapp v. Resor,

314 F. Supp. 475 (S.D.N. Y 1970)…….31, 32

Valliappan v. Cruz,

871 So.2d 1035 (Fla. 4th DCA 2004)………..…...35

Walker v. Segro,

848 So.2d 464 (Fla 4th DCA 2003)……..….34

Wyatt v. Haese,

649 So.2d 905 (Fla. 4th DCA 1995)………………35

xiii

Zarcone v. Lesser,

190 So.2d 805 (Fla. 3d DCA 1966)………..35

xiv RULES REGULATING THE FLORIDA BAR

(February 8, 2001)

Page

1. Rules 3-5.1(j)………………………………... 12

2. Rule 3-7.4(a)…………………………………...8

3. Rule 3-7.4(l)……………………………………9

4. Rule 3-5.1(f)…………………………………..21

5. Rule 3-7.1(b)………………………………….25

6. Rule 4-8.4……………………………………..34

CODE OF JUDICIAL CONDUCT

OF THE STATE OF FLORIDA

Canon 1……………………………………………….18

Canon 2……………………………………………… 18

Canon 3……………………………………………….18

xv

CONSTITUTION, STATUTES AND RULES

Page

Article III, §2 of

The United States Constitution………………..2, 3

The Fifth Amendment of

The United States Constitution………………..2, 3

The Fourteenth Amendment of

The United States Constitution…………....1, 3, 29

28 U.S.C. §1361…………………………………..…...3

§48.161 of the Florida Statute………….….3, 16, 35

Rule 1.070 of The Florida Rules……..……3, 16, 36

of Civil Procedure

Rule 1.090 of The Florida Rules

of Civil Procedure……………………..…………3, 34

1 OPINION BELOW

1. On November 13, 2001, The Florida

Bar obtained a suspension order from The Florida

Supreme Court against Petitioner (Pet. App. 1-2)

after Petitioner refused to sign the boilerplate

resignation (Pet. App. 3-7) and affidavit it

prepared for her. Pet. App. 8-9.

2. On July 11, 2002, The Florida Bar

obtained a permanent disbarment order for

misappropriation of funds from The Supreme

Court of Florida against Petitioner (Pet. App. 10)

pursuant to the amended report of The Referee

(Pet. App. 11-20).

JURISDICTION

This petition is for corrective relief from the

invalid orders that violate the due process and

equal protection clause of the fourteenth

amendment of the United States Constitution

that “No State…shall deprive any person of life,

liberty, or property, without due process of law.”

Kelley v. Johnson, 425 U.S. 238, 244 (1976); and

the Fifth Amendment “liberty” and “property”

concepts which guarantees the right to follow a

chosen profession free from unreasonable

government interference. Dent v. West Virginia,

129 U.S. 114, 121-122 (1889).

The lifelong social and psychological

stigma, limited employment possibilities, and

other civil disabilities that flow in consequence of

the invalid orders have severely impaired

Petitioner’s life and the lives of her dependent

children. The substantial civil disabilities and

penalties are sufficient to ensure that Petitioner

2 has a substantial stake in a judgment for

corrective relief from this court. Carafas v.

LaVallee, 391 U.S. 234, 237-238 (1968) (quoting

Fiswick v. United States, 329 U.S. 211, 222

(1946). Petitioner’s injuries can only be redressed

by a favorable judicial decision from this court

thus representing a case and controversy under

Article III, §2 of the United States Constitution.

Lewis v. Continental Bank Corp., 494 U.S. 472,

477-478 (1990).

In Dailey v. Vought Aircraft Company, 141

F.3d 224, 228-229 (5th Cir. 1998), the court held

that the collateral consequences of disbarment are

not “abstract, feigned, or hypothetical” and thus

justify jurisdiction by the court because the court

is capable of preventing such harm. Citing Sibron

v. New York, , 392 U.S. 40, 52-55 (1968).

There is no mechanism for Petitioner to

seek corrective relief from the orders in the state

court. The court’s acceptance of this Petition is

consistent with its underlying policies to zealously

protect individual rights and to make good the

wrong caused to individual rights by

unconstitutional judgments. Kauffman v.

Secretary of the Air Force, 415 F.2d 991, 995 (D.C.

Cir. 1969).

Petitioner was disbarred for

misappropriation of clients’ funds. The brand of

dishonesty did not vanish after the Bar secured its

orders and closed the cases. The continuous

serious injuries which flow from the orders to

Petitioner and her children constitute collateral

consequences which have kept the controversy

3 between the Florida Bar and Petitioner alive

making the controversy not subject to time bars.

Dailey, 141 F.3d at 228; Kirkland v. National

Mortgage Network, Inc., 884 F.2d 1367, 1370 (11th

Cir. 1989); Kaiser v. The Secretary of Navy, 525

F.Supp. 1226, 1228 (D. Colo. 1981),

28 U.S.C. §1361, the mandamus statute,

gives jurisdiction to this court to “correct”

unconstitutional orders of government officials

which cause grievous injuries and imposes lifelong

disability upon individuals like Petitioner.

CONSTITUTION, STATUTES AND RULES

INVOLVED

Article III, Section 2, The Fifth

Amendment, and The Fourteenth Amendment,

Section 1 of The United States Constitution. Pet.

App. 523.

2. 28 U.S.C. §1361. Pet. App. 508.

3. §48.161 of the Florida Statute. Pet.

App. 508.

4. Florida Rules of Civil Procedure

1.090 and 1.070. Pet. App. 522-523.

RULES REGULATING THE FLORIDA BAR

(February 8, 2001)

1. Rule 3-5.1(j). Pet. App. 508.

2. Rule 3-7.4(a). Pet. App. 508.

3. Rule 3-7.4(l). Pet. App. 508

4. Rule 3-5.1(f). Pet. App. 509.

5. Rule 3-7.1(b). Pet. App. 509.

6. Rule 4-8.4. Pet. App. 509.

CODE OF JUDICIAL CONDUCT

OF THE STATE OF FLORIDA

Canon 1. Pet. App. 510.

4 Canon 2. Pet. App. 510.

Canon 3. Pet. App. 511.

STATEMENT OF THE CASE

1. Preliminary Facts: Petitioner, ANNE

GEORGES TELASCO, is 46 years old. She was

born in Port-au-Prince, Haiti on July 27, 1962.

She moved to the United States at age 13 and

became a naturalized American citizen on

February 11, 1987. She received her Bachelor’s

degree from Barry University in 1988 and her

Juris Doctor’s degree from the University of

Miami School of Law in 1991. She became a

member of The Florida Bar in 1992. On January

23, 1993 she started her private practice. She

was a member of the American Bar, and The

Academy of Florida Trial Lawyers. She was

admitted to practice in The Southern District

Court and The Southern District Court of Appeal.

She also worked as an Adjunct Law Professor at

The University of Miami School of Law. Pet. App.

514-518.

A) On June 5, 1998, Petitioner received a

certificate of appreciation from the Southern

District Court in recognition of the outstanding

service and dedication to the Court’s Volunteer

Lawyers’ Project Pro Bono Program. Pet. App. 36.

In 2001, she was one of forty attorneys worldwide

invited to participate in the Oxford University

Round Table Forum on civil rights. Pet. App. 37-

39.

B) During Petitioner’s years of practicing law,

she never had any problems with her clients, was

never reprimanded or disciplined by the Florida

5 Bar or the Federal Bar and had never been the

subject of a criminal investigation or proceedings.

2. Undisputed Material Facts: In 1993,

Petitioner was retained by eight Haitian clients to

represent them in a racial discrimination case

against ITT Sheraton who was represented by

Holland and Knight. In 1998 and 1999, four of

the cases went to trials. The jury returned two

verdicts for Plaintiff and two verdict for

Defendant. The dissolved ITT Sheraton settled

with the eight clients for $300,000.00 to be paid

in 6 monthly installments of $50,000.00. Pet. App.

40-51.

A) Petitioner paid all costs and expenses

in the cases that were well over $130,000.00. The

clients, with the exception of client Fontaine

Baptiste, contributed a total of $700.00 towards

the costs. Pet. App. 40-51, 93. They agreed to

share all settlement funds equally because the

case was one case which the court severed into

eight cases. Pet. App. 106-107.

B) Petitioner gave a credit of $31,552.30

from her costs to the clients so that each client

may receive $10,000.00. Pet. App. 44, 52-57. The

Bar’s auditor confirmed this credit. Pet. App. 286.

Between 1996 to 1999, Petitioner had given over

$15,480.79 in credits to her clients. Pet. App. 59-

79. Parts of the credits were given to a) help an

inmate client who was about to be release from

jail start a new life; and b) help an elderly client

in need of funeral funds to bury her adult

daughter. This was a common practice of

Petitioner’s firm to forego some or all of her fees

6 and costs based on the circumstances and clients’

need. Pet. App. 58-79.

C) Before full payment was received,

Mr. Baptiste called Petitioner and informed her

that the people who lost should not be paid (Pet.

App. 80-84) and he is entitled to a referral fee for

bringing the cases to her. Pet. App. 87, 89, 105.

Petitioner refused.

D) On July 1, 1999, after Petitioner

received the last payment, she called and sent a

letter to the clients scheduling July 19, 1999 as

the date of distribution. Pet. App. 119-120. On

the advice of Jonathan D. Wald, Esq., a personal

injury attorney (Pet. App. 124-126), they did not

come. Pet. App. 287. Instead, Mr. Wald called

Petitioner and informed her that he was retained

by Mr. Baptiste to review the expenses itemized

in the settlement statement (Pet. App. 135-138),

he advised the clients that Petitioner’s itemized

expenses were not real (Pet. App. 139-143, 148-

150), the credit Petitioner gave them was suspect

(Pet. App. 153) and he will assist the clients in

getting monetary compensation from the State of

Florida Compensation Fund because they were

Petitioner’s victims. Pet. App. 129-130. Mr. Wald

also memorialized the above statements by letter

dated November 24, 1999. Pet. App. 165-167.

E) Mr. Wald demanded that Petitioner

releases all original invoices and cancelled checks

since 1993 to validate the expenses. Pet. App.

135-139. Petitioner refused and he threatened to

take her to The Bar. Pet. App. 209. Petitioner was

not concerned because she believed in the

7 integrity of The Bar. Please Note: Mr. Baptiste

attempted to retain Mr. Wald in 1993 and he

declined. Pet. App. 127-128.

3. Mr. Wald’s complaint letter: Mr. Wald

prepared an undated complaint letter for Mr.

Baptiste. Pet. App. 157-159. The Bar adopted the

unsigned letter as Mr. Baptiste’s complaint

against Petitioner. Within a few weeks, Mr. Wald

had six of the clients sign the letter. Pet. App.

162-164. The Bar had the seven clients sign its

blank complaint form, attached the forms to the

letter (Pet. App. 160-161) and used the letter as

the complaint of the eight clients to launched an

over 28 months investigation against Petitioner.

A) On November 24, 1999, Mr. Wald

wrote another letter demanding that The Bar

begin formal investigation against Petitioner. Pet.

App. 165-167.

B) On December 9, 1999, The Bar sent

the letter to Petitioner requesting a response.

Pet. App. 168-169. Before Petitioner filed her

response that was due on December 28, 1999 (Pet.

App. 58-79), on December 13, 1999, The Bar sent

all eight cases to the grievance committee (Pet.

App. 170-173) and assigned Joseph Ganguzza,

Esq., as the investigator on the cases. Pet. App.

172-173. Mr. Ganguzza was also the chairman of

the grievance committee who found probable cause

in the cases against Petitioner. Pet. App. 201, 218-

219.

C) On December 28, 1999, Petitioner

filed her response. Pet. App. 58-79.

8 D) On April 13, 2000 Petitioner sent a

letter to The Bar objecting to her treatment.

Pet. App. 174-183.

E) On August 14, 2000 Mr. Wald sent a

letter to Petitioner requesting the name of her

malpractice insurance carrier. Pet. App. 309-310.

4. The investigation: The Bar assigned

auditor, Carlos Ruga, issued a report on July 14,

2000 confirming all of Petitioner’s expenditures.

Pet. App. 186-189. He testified that he stands

behind his report. Pet. App. 257-279.

A) Petitioner struggled with The Bar to

obtain a copy of the report. On September 27,

2000 (Pet. App. 184-185), 75 days after the report

had been completed, The Bar mailed a copy to

Petitioner after it received Petitioner’s September

26, 2000 letter. Pet. App. 204-211.

Mr. Ganguzza issued a report on February

7, 2000 negating all of the allegations in Mr.

Wald’s complaint letter. Pet. App. 191-197, 230-

242.

5. Petitioner was not given notice of the

grievance committee hearing (Pet. App. 199)

contrary to Bar Rule 3-7.4(a). Pet. App. 508.

A) The auditor’s report was not included

in the committee’s package (Pet. App. 203)

contrary to Bar Rule 3-7.4(l) (Pet. App. 508-509)

and norm. Pet. App. 229-230.

B) The Bar requested that the clients be

deposed simultaneously. Petitioner refused. Pet.

App. 374-381. On August 24, 2001, Petitioner

attempted to understand The Bar’s inappropriate

9 behavior through her request for documents. Pet.

App. 212-214.

C) Realizing that The Referee was an

extension of The Bar, Petitioner began to

communicate with The Referee and The Bar by

registered mail in order to have proof of delivery

and hopefully deter the destruction of her

documents. Pet. App. 174, 204, 300, 397, 403,

482, 484.

6. On May 29, 2001 The Bar filed its first

case (number SC01-1198) against Petitioner

for failure to keep clients informed and

engaging in conduct involving dishonesty,

fraud, deceit or misrepresentation. Pet. App.

302-308).

A) On July 26, 2001 Petitioner filed her

answer and affirmative defenses. Pet. App. 40-

51).

B) Petitioner conducted discovery to

include but not limited to the taking of depositions

of the clients (Pet. App. 80-118), Mr. Wald (Pet.

App. 121-156), Mr. Ganguzza (Pet. App. 215-256),

and Mr. Ruga (Pet. App. 257-279) via subpoenas.

Pet. App. 358-373, 477-485.

7. Client, Exanise Marcellus testified that

she signed Mr. Wald’s complaint letter

without knowing its content. She did not read

the complaint letter and no one read or explained

it to her. She was just told to sign it and if all

eight clients sign it then… [they would make

more money]. Pet. App. 112-116.

10 8. Ms. Marcellus and client Marie

Darcelin testified that Petitioner always

scheduled regular meetings with all eight

clients simultaneously to discuss the case, the

proceedings, the trial and hiring of outside

counsel. Petitioner communicated with them in

Creole and they understood her. They were aware

of the expenses. Petitioner wrote the expenses in

a paper when she met with them after each trial.

Pet. App. 88-92, 94, 102-105, 109.

A) As a result of Mr. Wald’s poisonous

influence, the clients did not believe Petitioner’s

itemized expenses were real. Pet. App. 91, 97.

9. Petitioner hired Hodelin Rene, a

professional Creole interpreter to assist her

in keeping the clients abreast of the trial

proceedings and settlement negotiations.

Pet. App. 337-340.

10. Mr. Wald testified that his opinion as

to the validity of Petitioner’s expenditures

were irrelevant because he is not an expert

witness (Pet. App. 146) and he never tried a

discrimination case. Pet. App. 152.

A) Mr. Wald did not inform the clients

of the results of Mr. Ruga (Pet. App. 145-147) or

Mr. Ganguzza’s report. Pet. App. 143-147, 150-

152.

11. Mr. Ganguzza testified that he never

spoke to any of the clients during his

investigation. He only spoke to Mr. Wald and he

did not send a copy of his report to the clients. Pet.

App. 224-228.

11 A) He further testified that Petitioner’s

expenses were customary charges that his firm

collects. Pet. App. 228-255.

12. Petitioner consulted with Attorney Bill

Ullman during the week of October 15, 2001

to represent her in the trial phase of the

disciplinary proceeding. On October 23, 2001,

she paid Mr. Ullman’s retainer and he filed his

notice of appearance in the matter. Pet. App. 311.

A) On October 29, 2001 Mr. Ullman

presented Petitioner with a boilerplate petition for

disciplinary resignation and an affidavit prepared

by the Bar on October 26, 2001 for her signature.

The Bar’s ID, fax and date are affixed on the

documents. Pet. App. 3-9. Mr. Ullman informed

Petitioner that signing the documents will make

her troubles disappear and The Bar will give her a

paralegal certificate so she may work. If she does

not sign the documents, The Bar will begin a new

investigation into her trust account and it will get

the state attorney to file criminal charges against

her. “Think of your daughter.”

B) Petitioner refused to sign the

documents. Paragraph 4 of the resignation

petition classifies Mr. Wald’s complaint letter

against Petitioner to be of a criminal nature. Pet.

App. 3-4. Paragraph 5 reflects The Bar’s intent to

permanently exclude Petitioner from the practice

of law. Pet. App. 4-5. The resignation petition is

also contrary to the oral proposal the committee

tendered to Petitioner through Mr. Ruga during

the week of August 8, 2000 (Pet. App. 206-207),

i.e., Petitioner should pay an extra $3,000.00 to

12 each client and write a letter admitting to minor

misconduct. Pet. App. 3-7.

C) That same day (October 29, 2001),

Mr. Ullman prepared a notice of resignation (Pet.

App. 312-314) for Petitioner. The Bar refused to

accept it and gave Petitioner the night to think

about its so called “resignation offer.”

D) Petitioner worked all night preparing

her letter of permanent and immediate resignation

(Pet. App. 317-334), attached the original

deposition transcripts, (Pet. App. 335-336), the

interpreter’s affidavit (Pet. App. 337-340) and on

the morning of October 30, 2001, she hand-

delivered them to The Referee with copy to The

Bar. Pet. App. 341. Mr. Ullman prepared a motion

to dismiss to accompany the package and faxed it

to The Bar. Pet. App. 315-316. Rule 3-5.1(j). Pet.

App. 508.

E) Petitioner had hoped that the

package would alert The Florida Supreme Court

and remove her out of harm’s way.

F) On November 6, 2008 the day

Petitioner shut down her office and all operating

and trust accounts, she hand-delivered (Pet. App.

28) the settlement funds due and owing to the

clients via a cashier’s check (Pet. App. 24) with a

notice of filing (Pet. App. 22-23) and a cover letter

to Judge Scola (Pet. App. 25-27). The Bar and

The Referee did not file the disbursement of funds

package.

G) On November 9, 2001, Petitioner

edited her letter of resignation, placed it on her

website (www.allpeopleslaw.com) and mailed a

13 copy to the Bar and The Florida Supreme Court.

The website is still active. Pet. App. 342-357.

13. On or after November 6, 2001, The Bar

filed a motion to abate, backdate it to

October 31, 2001 (Pet. App. 290-292) and

attached an undated copy of a Petition for

Emergency Suspension to said motion as exhibit

“A.” Pet. App. 293-298.

A) The records of The Florida Supreme

Court reveal that the Petition that is attached to

the motion to abate was filed on November 6, 2001

(Pet. App. 280-285) and docketed on November 7,

2001 under new case number SC01-2423 (Pet.

App. 299) when Petitioner was no longer

practicing law and had submitted all funds due

and owing to The Referee. Pet. App. 22-28, 317-

334.

14. On July 16, 2002, The Bar filed its

notice of voluntarily dismissal of the over 38

month case (SC01-1198) (Pet. App. 387-389)

without filing any of the pertinent and material

documents Petitioner filed, to include but not

limited to Petitioner’s answer and affirmative

defenses, affidavit, letter of resignation,

depositions, reports, and the notice of filing

settlement funds package. Pet. App. 390-394. The

docket of case SC01-1198 reflects just two letters

that Petitioner carbon copied to the court (Pet.

App. 391, 524-527) after she received the

acknowledgement of new case SC01-1198 from the

Florida Supreme Court. The letters reflect that

The Bar never served Petitioner with this new

14 case even though it claimed to have served her

via certified mail.

15. On or after November 6, 2001, The Bar

created a second case, number SC01-2423,

against Petitioner by filing the Petition for

Emergency Suspension (Pet. App. 280-285) with a

back dated affidavit from its auditor (Pet. App.

286-289) alleging that Petitioner was practicing

law and had misappropriated and failed to

distribute clients’ funds she hand delivered to The

Referee on November 6, 2001. Pet. App. 22-28.

On November 13, 2001, four working days after

The Florida Supreme Court received and grant

The Bar’s Petition (Pet. App. 1), The Bar closed

the case. Pet. App. 299.

16) The Bar with the aid of The Referee,

intercepted Petitioner’s resignation package

filed on October 30, 2001 in case SC01-1198,

separated all material documents attached

thereto and held it hostage. Pet. App. 390-394.

A) On November 13, 2001, The Bar filed

a motion opposing Bill Ullman’s motion to dismiss

disciplinary action with The Referee (Pet. App.

382-384) without filing Mr. Ullman’s motion or

Petitioner’s resignation package with the Florida

Supreme Court. One day later, November 14,

2001, The Referee entered an ex parte order

granting The Bar’s motion (Pet. App. 385)

contrary to well established law and Florida Rules

of Civil Procedure 1.090. Pet. App. 522.

B) On December 6, 2001, thirty seven

(37) days after Petitioner filed her resignation

package, without Petitioner’s knowledge or consent

15 (Pet. App. 386), The Bar filed the distorted

resignation package with The Florida Supreme

Court under new case number SC01-2893, thereby

creating a third case against Petitioner.

C) On February 14, 2002, The Florida

Supreme Court, sent a letter to Mr. Ullman (Pet.

App. 399-400) to inform him that the format of the

resignation filed was improper. Mr. Ullman did

not respond. On April 26, 2002, the court sent a

second notice. Pet. App. 401. On June 18, 2002,

The Court dismissed the case. Pet. App. 402.

17. Petitioner asked Mr. Ullman to

withdraw as her counsel on or about

November 7, 2001. On November 8, 2001 Mr.

Ullman filed his motion to withdraw as

Petitioner’s counsel. Pet. 395-396. That same

day, Petitioner sent a letter to Mr. Ullman (Pet.

App. 397-398) and The Referee (Pet. App. 300-

301) voicing her concerns about actions that were

being taken in her case without her knowledge or

approval.

18. Mr. Ganguzza testified that The Bar

has no procedural safeguards against bias or

abuse by its agents toward its members.

Pet. App. 219-223.

A) Alone, desperate, ill and frightened,

on Monday, November 12, 2001 Petitioner sent a

letter to The Florida Supreme Court begging for

help to no avail. Pet. App. 403-406.

19. On January 7, 2002, The Bar filed a

complaint, request for admissions and a

backdated auditor’s affidavit to create its

16 fourth case number SC02-44 (Pet. App. 407-

418, 286-289) against Petitioner for

misappropriation of clients’ funds. Funds which

The Bar knew were in the possession and control

of The Referee (Pet. App. 22-28) for more than 61

days before it filed its case.

A) The Bar did not serve Petitioner with

the documents it filed with the court.

B) On February 28, 2002, The Bar

filed a motion for order deeming matters in its

request for admissions admitted. Pet. App. 419-

424. Attached to said motion is an alleged copy

of a return receipt card with a signature that is

similar to Petitioner’s and a postal seal stamp

reflecting the date of January 14, 2002 affixed

upon it. Pet. App. 424. The original card was not

filed with the court contrary to well-established

law, Florida Statute §48.161 and Florida Rules of

Civil Procedure 1.070. On March 4, 2002, two

working days from the date of the motion, The

Referee grants The Bar’s order ex parte via a

default. Pet. App. 425.

C) It is customary in the state of Florida

that postal seals are placed on the certified mail

receipt to show proof of mailing. It is not the

norm to place it on the green return receipt card to

show date of delivery. The handwritten signature

of the receiver is usually accompanied by a

handwritten date on the return receipt card to

prove receipt of notice and date of receipt.

D) Petitioner, an experienced and

trained advocate, always fills in date of delivery

when receiving certified mail because she is well

17 aware that the date of delivery will trigger a time

limitation and/or obligation that usually have

legal ramifications.

E) Petitioner’s address where The Bar

claimed to have served her was vacant since

December 2001. Petitioner moved to New York on

March 19, 2002 and remained there until

February 2003. Thus, Petitioner was out of

Miami, Florida during the proceedings of this case

as evidenced by her paycheck stubs from her

employment as a legal secretary in New York.

Pet. App. 426-427.

20. The Bar’s investigation and the filing

of case number SC01-1198 which lasted over

37 month were frivolous, and a gross abuse

of power.

A) In case number SC02-44, paragraphs

4 and 5 of The Bar’s complaint (Pet. App. 408),

paragraphs G, H, I and L of its request for

admissions dated January 7, 2002 (Pet. App. 413)

and The Referee’s amended report (Pet. App. 13),

The Bar and The Referee adopted Petitioner’s

averments as to the amount of the settlement, the

agreement among the clients, the $10,000.00

distribution in her Answer and Affirmative

defenses, (Pet. App. 40-51), and her settlement

statement dated July 19, 1999 (Pet. App. 52-57) in

case number SC01-1198.

B) Paragraphs 4 and 5 of its auditor’s

affidavit (backdated to October 30, 2001) reflect

that Petitioner gave a credit of $31,552.30 to the

clients so that they would each receive $10,000.00

from the settlement funds. And Petitioner

18 attempted to distribute the funds on July 19,1999,

but the clients refused to accept the $10,000.00

[pursuant to Mr. Wald’s directives]. Pet. App. 286-

287.

C) The auditor’s affidavit further

reflects that The Bar had “outstanding

subpoenas” for the rest of Petitioner’s bank

records to complete its alleged “new/second” audit

after Petitioner had submitted all clients funds to

the court, resigned, and closed her office. Pet. App.

288.

21. The client’s complaint forms

A) Like case SC01-1198 where the

clients made no notation on The Bar’s complaint

forms as to Petitioner’s ethical violation to

require The Bar’s intervention (Pet. App. 160-

161), the complaint forms which supposedly

triggered the filing of case SC02-44 are blank (Pet.

App. 432-447) except one complaint that has the

notation “Anne Telasco Hold Out Settlement

Money.” Pet. App. 434-435. The settlement

money Petitioner delivered to the court on

November 6, 2001. Pet. App. 22-28. The complaint

forms were signed 74 days after The Bar filed case

SC02-44, more specifically, the clients signed the

complaints between March 17 to 21, 2002. Pet.

App. 432-447. The complaints were delivered to

The Bar on March 22 and 27, 2002, 80 days after

The Bar filed case SC02-44. These complaints

were inadvertently mailed to Petitioner pursuant

to her request for certified copies. Pet. App. 429,

449.

19 22. The Referee deliberately concealed

and fraudulently misrepresented facts in his

amended report (Pet. App. 11-20) and violated

Canon 1, 2 and 3 of the Code of Judicial Conduct.

Pet. App. 510-511. On April 19, 2002, the day of

the final hearing (Pet. App. 21) which resulted in

The Referee’s report and amended report, The

Bar noticed its “motion to reissue Washington

Mutual Bank’s official check (Petitioner’s cashier’s

check dated November 6, 2001) to The Clerk of the

County and Circuit Court, Eleventh Circuit.” Pet.

App. 29-33. The Referee heard and granted the

motion that same day. Pet. App. 34-35.

A) The report fraudulently reflects that

all of the documents Petitioner filed in case SC01-

1198 were generated in case SC02-44 by The Bar.

Pet. App. 11-12. The depositions conducted by

Petitioner via subpoenas in case SC01-1198 (Pet.

App. 19, 335-336, 358-373) were conducted by The

Bar in case number SC02-44. Said depositions

only cover the issues of communication and

validation of costs and expenses in case SC01-

1198 (Pet. App. 80-118, 121-156, 215-279) not the

newly created issue of misappropriation of clients’

funds.

B) The report also awarded The Bar

costs it incurred for conducting depositions, court

reporter attendance at a hearing, staff

investigator, interpreters and expert witness fees

(Pet. App. 19) to give the false impression that

The Bar accommodated truth and justice in its ex

parte summary disposition of Petitioner’s life.

20 C) The expert witness fee in the report

is for Susan Eileen Trench, Esq. whom the Bar

named as a witness in case SC01-1198. She was

to ‘testify as to legitimacy/appropriateness of legal

fees and costs in underlying federal litigation.’

Pet. App. 475. Petitioner subpoenaed Ms.

Trench for deposition (Pet. App. 366-367) and the

Bar failed to produce her, attend the deposition

and did not call Petitioner to cancel. Pet. App.

503-506.

D) The fee for the court reporter’s

attendance at the hearing on March 7, 2002 (Pet.

App. 19) was for a status conference in case SC02-

44 (Pet. App. 469-470) it was not a hearing where

actual expert opinion and testimony were given to

The Referee on the merits of case SC02-44.

E) To support The Bar’s claim of non-

responsiveness by Petitioner and the barren

docket of case SC01-1198 (Pet. App. 390-394), the

report deliberately refers to case SC01-1198 and

claims that Petitioner was not responsive in said

case. Pet. App. 15-16.

F) The report recommended permanent

disbarment “Given the Respondent’s failure to

participate in the proceedings or indicate the

slightest interest in continuing to practice law,..”

(Pet. App. 16) and “her uncooperative attitude

toward these proceedings indicated by her failure

to respond and non-appearance at the final

hearing,..” (Pet. App. 18).

G) Case SC02-44 as filed and recorded

gives the false impression that Petitioner never

paid the funds.

21 23. The Bar with the aid of The Referee,

intercepted and kept Petitioner’s documents

from case number SC01-1198 and

deliberately filed them in an obscure

manner in case SC02-44 to mislead the

public, potential employers and colleagues

of Petitioner.

A) The Bar filed the documents Petitioner

filed in case SC01-1198 (Pet. App. 390-394) on

May 3, 2002, over ten (10) months after

Petitioner filed them and after The Bar secured

its permanent disbarment order, in the unrelated

SC02-44 case. Pet. App. 417-418. The Bar filed

the documents in case SC02-44 as a group of

documents without identifying any of them.

B) The strategic notation on the docket

of case number SC02-44 identifies this group of

documents as “RECORD/TRANSCRIPT – 7

VOLUMES.” Pet. App. 418. This notation gives

the false impression that The Bar conducted

extensive discovery and generated seven volumes

of documents/files in case SC02-44 when in

actuality, case SC02-44, only consists of the

documents that are named on docket SC02-44,

more specifically, The Bar’s complaint, notice

of admissions, Motion and order on Matters

deemed admitted and the referee’s report. Pet.

App. 417-418. Rule 3-5.1(f). Pet. App. 509.

24. The Bar fabricated a fifth case,

number 2002-11-CA-01/State, in the Circuit

Court against Petitioner. Pet. App. 493-497.

The docket of this case reflects the following

activities:

22 1) On January 2, 2002 The Bar filed a complaint

and a final judgment against Petitioner.

Petitioner was not served.

2) On April 24, 2002, five days after the final

hearing in case SC02-44, Petitioner deposited the

settlement funds into the court registry instead of

the actual date of November 6, 2001. Pet. App. 22-

28.

3) Numerous Petitions and orders appointing

inventory attorneys and reports of inventory

attorneys are noted.

4) On September 25, 2002, The Referee executed

numerous orders directing the Clerk of Court to

take custody of Petitioner’s files and to transfer

the files.

5) Numerous notices of hearings for the alleged

stolen funds were conducted with Petitioner’s

name written in all capital letters under every

single one giving the impression that Petitioner

participated in the hearings.

6) On April 23, 2003, 170 days after Petitioner

submitted the alleged stolen funds, a petition to

disburse funds was filed with Petitioner’s name

written in all capital letters under said notation.

7) A settlement fund check was issued to Mr.

Wald and his firm on November 19, 2003, over

two years from the date Petitioner submitted the

check for disbursement to the clients. Pet. App. 22-

28.

8) More then 30 people have viewed this

docket. Pet. App. 493.

9) For the past seven years, Petitioner vigorously

looked for work without success because of The

23 Bar’s unconstitutional orders and fabricated

records. Unable to find work in any other

industry, Petitioner had to accept part time work

as a paralegal with the firm of a colleague from

law school while in Miami, Florida.

25. All of Petitioner’s legal and financial

documents were filed in case SC01-1198

where a thorough audit by The Bar’s auditor

was conducted before he issued his report

on July 14, 2000. Pet. App. 186-190. There

were no new files, information, or

documents that needed to be inventoried. On

April 24, 2002, 170 days after Petitioner

submitted the alleged stolen funds, The Bar

released the funds for distribution by Mr. Wald

with a cover letter stating “Ms. Telasco remitted

these funds to the court which were due and

owing to your clients as a result of her

representation against Sheraton.” Pet. App. 488-

489.

Petitioner did not participate and was not

aware of this sham proceeding since she was not

served with the complaint or any of the documents

in said proceeding.

The sham cases created against Petitioner

explicitly show that Petitioner was an attorney

who totally disregarded the rules of professional

conduct, her actions bordered on contempt for the

legal system and she was a parasite upon those

whom she served. In effect, Petitioner’s law

degree and license were institutional errors that

the orders corrected. Thus, Petitioner should be

nothing more than a paralegal.

24 26. Petitioner’s public file with The Bar

supports the April 24, 2002 and the May 23,

2003 notation on the docket of case 2002-11-

CA-01 in that The Bar placed Mr.

Brombacher’s letter dated April 24, 2002 (Pet.

App. 488-489) and Mr. Wald’s renewed

petition to disburse funds dated May 20,

2003 (Pet. App. 490-492) in said file.

A) Mr. Wald’s petition states that there

was a criminal investigation against Petitioner for

misappropriation of funds. This investigation was

conducted in 9 working days since Mr. Wald’s

motion states that Judge Scola instructed him to

contact the state attorney’s office and attempt to

ascertain the origin of the funds on May 6, 2003,

when he appeared before him, and on May 20,

2003, the date of his petition, he reported the

state attorney told him that “the funds Petitioner

submitted to the court were not traceable.”

Petitioner is not named in the certificate of service

of Mr. Wald’s petition. Pet. App. 490-492.

B) On or about late February early

March 2003, while Petitioner was in the

supermarket, she was followed by a Haitian man

who stood next to her and uttered the words

“some people refuse to work instead they rather

steal people’s money.” (paraphrasing). Petitioner

did not respond and continued with her purchase.

It is now that Petitioner realized that Mr. Wald

distributed the funds to the clients over two years

after she submitted the funds. It is reasonable to

conclude that Mr. Wald with the aid of The Bar

and The Referee led the clients to believe that he

25 obtained relief for them from the State of Florida

Compensation Fund. Pet. App. 129-130. This is

further evident by the complaint of client Venicia

Soupart signed on March 18, 2002. Pet. App. 434-

435.

27. The Bar has the power to alter the

Circuit Court’s database to cover its abuse.

A) When Petitioner first viewed the

docket of case 2002-11-CA-0 during the week of

November 20, 2008, it was titled “FLORIDA BAR

(THE) vs. ANNE GEORGES TELASCO.” Pet.

App. 493-497. After Petitioner’s colleague in

Miami requested a copy of the file, this individual

was informed that the file had to be ordered. On

November 28, 2008, this colleague was informed

that the file had been destroyed and no documents

were kept contrary to well established rules. That

same day, Petitioner went to view and print the

docket, the title changed to “FLORIDA BAR

(THE) vs. PETITION FOR INVENTORY

ATTORNEY.” Pet. App. 498-502.

28. In eight months, The Bar fabricated

five damaging cases against Petitioner and

memorialized them in her perfect

disciplinary history and record. Pet. App.

464-466. The Bar also published case SC01-2423

and SC2-44 since January 2001 and September

2002 to the present on its website named Goliath.

The cases are also published in two other

independent websites. Pet. App. 519-520.

29. The Bar through its Executive

Director, John F. Harkness, Jr., continues to

misrepresent facts.

26 A) In preparation of this petition,

Petitioner requested a certified copy of her

disciplinary history and complete records from the

Florida Bar. Pet. App. 429. In response thereto,

she received her disciplinary history (Pet. App.

430-431) and a copy of the “alleged complaint” of

the eight clients that supposedly triggered case

SC02-44 (Pet. App. 432-447) without a cover letter

or certification.

B) On September 9, 2008, Petitioner

renewed her request. Pet. App. 449-450. On

September 22, 2008, Mr. Harkness sent a second

copy of her disciplinary history to her reiterating

that The Bar purged Petitioner’s file after one

year and the documents provided are the only

documents remaining (Pet. App. 464-466) contrary

to rule Rule 3-7.1(b). Pet. App. 509.

C) Please note that in February 2007,

Petitioner’s colleague in Miami went to view

Petitioner’s file and copied some of the documents

in the file. Mr. Brombacker’s letter dated April

24, 2002 (Pet. App. 488-489) and Mr. Wald’s

petition dated November 19, 2003 (Pet. App. 490-

492) were part of those documents copied. This

colleague has agreed to provide the court with an

affidavit if the court requires it.

30. A) Health: During the prolonged

investigation and pendency of case SC01-1198,

Petitioner had to take prescription Xanax to help

calm her nerves, help her sleep and control the

anxiety attacks. Petitioner’s fear that she will

become dependent, the uncertainty of her minor

children’s future, the fact that truth and justice

27 had evaded the proceedings against her

heightened the stress she was engulfed in. She

aged, lost most of her hair and was sickly thin.

B) Finances: Petitioner’s practice was

catered to indigent clients making it necessary for

her to cover all expenses in most of her pending

cases. When she stopped accepting new cases

and returned all those pending, she descended

into financial chaos. She had no income and lost

thousands of dollars in monies she had paid to

cover the expenses in her pending cases.

By August 2001, her finances had dried up.

She survived by continuously applying for and

receiving equity line of credit on her properties.

Petitioner’s home in Miami is scheduled for

foreclosure in February 2, 2009. Pet. App. 512-

513.

31. After Petitioner resigned and on the

verge of a nervous breakdown, she and her

children moved in with her mother in December

2001. On March 19, 2002 she left her minor

children with her mother, went to New York City,

rented a basement apartment and worked as she

tried to figure out what path to take. Pet. App.

426-427. Petitioner’s absence had a terrible

impact on her children. On February 2003 she

returned to Miami and on July 2003 she returned

to New York City with her son and daughter.

While in New York, she enrolled, attended and

completed New York Film Academy’s 8 weeks

screenwriting and 5-week digital filmmaking

programs.

28 A) On July 2004, Petitioner and her

children returned to Miami. On or about August

2004, Petitioner applied for an equity loan and

discovered that The Bar had permanently

disbarred her for misappropriation of funds while

in New York and had obtained a $5,028.55 cost

judgment against her. Pet. App. 10. On October

7, 2004, when the funds from the loan were

released, Petitioner paid the judgment (Pet. App.

486-487) without any objection because 1) if she

did not satisfy the judgment, the lender would not

have given her the loan she badly needed; and 2)

Petitioner’s priorities were to totally regain her

balance and make sure that her unfortunate

situation did not distort her children’s views of life

and people.

B) In an effort to clear her name and

expose The Bar, on March 2005, Petitioner wrote,

produced and directed a dramatic

autobiographical short script, “In God’s Shadow”

about her dilemma with The Bar. The film won

best directorial debut in Los Angeles and Las

Vegas and Best Score in New York in 2005 in the

New York International Film and Video Festival

(www.nyfilmvideo.com). Since 2005, Petitioner

has completed a total of four short films.

Petitioner is presently fine tuning her

filmmaking skills as she waits for the proceeds

from the sale of her office building to launch God

Shadow, her publishing and production company.

32. Petitioner moved to Rochester, New

York on June 19, 2007 because of its

inexpensive real estate and close proximity

29 to New York City. Rochester is conducive to

the success of Petitioner’s company in that

studio space and access to talented artists

are feasible.

A) With dependent children and other

responsibilities, Petitioner has to work until her

filmmaking career takes off. Petitioner attempted

to enroll with several employment agencies in

Rochester. Like the agencies in Miami, she was

advised that the orders made her a liability. Her

best option is to remove the last fifteen years of

her life which include her three years in law

school, her almost 10 years experience and

accomplishment as an advocate so she may find

employment as a paralegal.

B) Petitioner was hired as a paralegal

by a law firm in Rochester where she worked from

January 28 until June 25, 2008. When her

employer discovered The Bar’s orders, in spite of

Petitioner’s explanation, Petitioner was treated

like a common thief, a leper, as she was asked for

the keys to the office, and escorted out. Pet. App.

507.

C) Petitioner wanted to take The Bar

and apply for her license in New York not to

practice law but in hopes of clearing her name.

Petitioner was advised by counsel that based on

her status with The Florida Bar, she will not pass

the Character and Fitness Review. Petitioner has

decided to forgo her application to the New York

Bar and seeks relief from this court, her last hope,

to clear her name, record and the return of her

Florida Bar license.

30 REASONS FOR GRANTING THE PETITION

I. PETITIONER’S ONLY AVENUE

FOR CORRECTIVE RELIEF FROM

THE UNCONSTITUTIONAL ORDERS

IS BY THIS PETITION FOR A WRIT

OF CERTIORARI TO THIS COURT.

The Bar acted outside the bounds of legal

authority and contravene the mandate of the due

process and equal protection clause of the fifth

and fourteenth amendment of the United States

Constitution when it arbitrarily destroyed

Petitioner’s career, reputation, livelihood and

future prospects. Dent, 129 U.S. at 121-122;

Kelley, 425 U.S. at 244.

The unconstitutional orders have

permanently carved the crime of moral turpitude

on Petitioner’s record and are prima facie

evidence of her character. She will never be in

good moral standing or eligible to become a

member of any reputable organization. To allow

the natural consequences of the orders to continue

to have their devastating effect on Petitioner’s life

would result in grave injustice.

In In re Jacobs, 44 F.3d 84, 88 (2d Cir.

1994) the court held that it would be contrary to

fundamental notions of fairness to close off all

avenues of review to an attorney who has been

disciplined on impermissible or arbitrary

standards. Said attorney must be afforded “some

suitable appellate remedy.” Citing Selling v.

Radford, 243 U.S. 46, 51-52, (1917), the Jacobs

court reiterated the conditions enunciated by this

court that may negate the effect of a state court

31 judgment of suspension or disbarment as follow:

1) the attorney was not afforded notice or

opportunity to be heard; 2) there was an infirmity

of proof as to facts which led to the order; and 3)

to allow the natural consequences of the judgment

to have their effect would result in grave injustice.

The Bar’s invalid orders and fabricated

records have been published and are open to

perusal by judges, attorneys, prospective

employers and potential business associates of

Petitioner. The devastating civil disabilities and

collateral consequences the orders have imposed

upon Petitioner have created a continuing actual

controversy between Petitioner and The Florida

Bar. Dailey, 141 F.3d at 228-229. The court’s

acceptance of Petitioner’s request for corrective

relief is consistent with its tradition of keeping

open avenues of judicial review for deprivations of

constitutional rights. United States v. Morgan,

346 U.S. 502 at 512-513 (1954).

The court’s acceptance of this action will

not be prejudicial to The Florida Bar.

II. COURTS HAVE TREATED

CORRECTIVE ACTIONS LIKE

HABEAS PETITIONS BECAUSE A

PETITIONER WHO SEEKS

CORRECTIVE RELIEF, ONLY

SEEKS EQUITABLE RELIEF FROM

COLLATERAL CONSEQUENCES,

AND INVOKES THE AID OF THE

COURT TO PROTECT AGAINST

FURTHER INFRINGEMENT UPON

HER LIBERTY.

32 Kaiser, 525 F.Supp. at 1228-1229.

Petitioner was not aware of the totality of

The Florida Bar’s constitutional violation of her

rights until August 2008. During the course of

eight months, The Bar filed five cases against

Petitioner. Petitioner was not served with the five

cases and was fully aware of only one of the cases

(SC01-1198). Pet. App. 524-527.

Petitioner could not and has not been able to

find an attorney to represent her against The Bar.

She was not mentally, emotionally or spiritually

balanced to represent herself, for the past seven

years, until now.

In Kaiser, the appellant brought an action

challenging the constitutionality of a twenty years

old court-martial conviction and sought to vacate

the conviction and upgrade his dishonorable

discharge. Citing Baxter v. Claytor, No. 77-1984,

Slip Op., (D.C.Cir., December 19, 1978) vacated on

other grounds by 652 F.2d 181 (D.C. Cir. 1981),

the court held that the statute of limitations and

the doctrine of laches were not applicable to

appellant’s claim for equitable relief. The court

treated “corrective actions” like habeas actions,

rather than like monetary relief actions, for the

purposes of applying time bars. The court noted

that while “an invalid court-martial conviction are

grievous injuries,” a dishonorable military

discharge “imposes a lifelong disability of greater

consequences, citing Homcy v. Resor, 455 F.2d

1345,1349 (C.A.D.C. 1971). Among the serious

collateral consequences of a court-martial

conviction are the lifelong social and psychological

33 stigma and greatly limited employment

opportunities.” Citing Bland v. Connally, 293 F.

2d 852, 858 n. 10 (D.C. Cir. 1962), Stapp v. Resor,

314 F. Supp. 475, 478 (S.D.N. Y 1970). Jones, the

Gravity of Administrative Discharges: A Legal

and Empirical Evaluation, 59 Mil.L.Rev. 1 (1973).

The court continues, “it is the desire to permit

parties to avoid the most pernicious deprivations

resulting from the collateral consequences which

most strongly justifies exempting habeas actions

from time bars. Corrective actions share this

rationale with habeas actions and should be

treated in the same manner.” In a corrective

action, “relief is accorded only because the

continuation of the conviction’s collateral

consequences can no longer be justified in

constitutional terms. He [Plaintiff] invokes the

values of our constitutional heritage which accord

greater weight to the individual’s liberty than to

the state’s interest in repeated or continuing

punishment.” Kaiser, 525 F.Supp. at 1228-1229.

In Petitioner’s case, The Florida Bar imposes two

punitive orders and fabricated five cases against

her without cause. Stapp, 314 F. Supp. at 478.

No state interest was or is being served or

protected by The Bar’s unconstitutional acts.

In Kauffman, the court held that an

individual’s right to her liberty, livelihood and

right to practice her chosen profession are

important. To deny a plaintiff the right to seek to

remedy the constitutional violation of these rights

which has caused and continues to cause

pernicious damages to these rights by a writ of

34 habeas corpus, the only means available to her,

“would be to deny the possibility of review by a

constitutional court and ultimately by the

Supreme Court, of the constitutional claims of

servicemen [individuals] like plaintiff.” 415 F.2d

at 995.

III. THE FLORIDA BAR’S DEPRIVATION

OF PETITIONER’S CONSTITUTIONAL

RIGHTS OCCURRED AT ZERO LEVEL

OF VISIBILITY BECAUSE THE BAR IS

ENTRUSTED WITH PROTECTING

RIGHTS, PURSUING JUSTICE AND

PROMOTING PROFESSIONALISM IN

THE LEGAL PROFESSION.

The Florida Supreme Court’s faith in The

Bar’s integrity has totally insulate The Bar from

reproach, review and accountability as it controls

every aspect of disciplinary proceedings.

It is inconceivable to legal and civilized

minds that The Bar through its attorneys,

Randolph Max Brombacher and John Anthony

Boggs, its executive director, John F. Harkness,

Jr., with the aid of The Referee, Justice Robert N.

Scola, Jr., would unduly delay disciplinary

proceedings, knowingly submit false documents,

improperly withholds material information,

concealed evidence, intercept, backdate and

improperly keep documents, file documents

months after Petitioner filed them in order to

block her access to justice, file and bury material

documents in an unrelated case in order to delete

truth, create five frivolously and sham actions

against Petitioner and publish devastating

35 information about Petitioner in order to

accomplish the ill goals of The Bar’s preferred

member(s), Jonathan D. Wald, Esq., his firm,

Goldfarb, Gold, Gonzalez & Wald, P.A., et. al…

Rule 4-8.4. Pet. App. 509-510.

The Florida Bar is a danger to the public

and the integrity of the legal profession because it

is infected with favoritism and indifference.

The Bar’s action of implementing the ill will of its

favored members to the detriment of Petitioner

constitute a perversion of jurisprudence contrary

to the interest of justice. Its indifference to undue

hardships it imposes on Petitioner and her

children as it strips her of her livelihood and

future is a brutal assault on the administration of

justice, The United States Constitution, Petitioner

and her children.

The Bar has devised a system whereby

when its favored members arbitrarily deem an

attorney to be an undesirable member, it will

discard all rules and constitutional safeguards

with ease as it destroys that attorney’s livelihood,

reputation and future. Florida Rule of Civil

Procedure 1.090(d); Crepage v. City of Lauderhill,

774 So.2d 61, 64-65 (Fla. 4th DCA 2001); Walker v.

Segro, 848 So.2d 464 (Fla 4th DCA 2003); Borden

v. Guardianship of Elsa Borden-Moore, 818 So.2d

604 (Fla. 5th DCA 2002). Petitioner used to

believe that attorneys who made the above

statements were paranoid. She is now traveling

on the road of those whom she used to believe

were paranoid.

36 In Sibron this court acknowledged that

many constitutional violations by legal entities

are not noticed because they occur “…at a level of

‘low visibility … We do not believe that the

constitution contemplated that people deprived of

constitutional rights at this level should be left

utterly remediless and defenseless against

repetitions of unconstitutional conduct.” 392 U.S.

at 52-54. In Petitioner’s case, justice was torn

from within at zero visibility. To allow Petitioner

to remain defenseless and remediless from The

Bar’s unconstitutional deprivations would

contravene the clear constitutional mandate that

disciplinary proceedings must be conducted in a

manner that is consistent with fairness, justice

and truth. The five disciplinary proceedings

against Petitioner were conducted like sacrificial

rituals whereby Petitioner was the victim.

IV. DISBARMENT CARRIES SERIOUS

ADVERSE COLLATERAL

CONSEQUENCES THAT ARE

DETRIMENTAL TO AN ATTORNEY’S

PROFESSIONAL REPUTATION,

CAREER, WELL-BEING, AND

SUCCESS; THUS, NOTICE AND

OPPORTUNITY TO DEFEND MUST

BE ACCORDED PRIOR TO

DISBARMENT.

Dailey, 141 F.3d at 228-229.

In Petitioner’s case, The Bar failed to follow

well established rules and the mandate of §48.161

of the Florida Statutes which provides that failure

to file a return receipt of registered or certified

37 mail with the court is fatal to valid service of

process. Bejar v. Garcia, 354 So.2d 964 (Fla. 3d

DCA 1978); Leviten v. Gaunt, 347 So.2d 452 (Fla.

3d DCA 1977); Zarcone v. Lesser, 190 So.2d 805

(Fla. 3d DCA 1966). Due process values require

strict compliance with this statutory requirement.

Smith v. Leaman, 826 So.2d 1077, 1078 (Fla.2d

DCA 2002); Chapman v. Sheffield, 750 So.2d 140,

142 (Fla. 1st DCA 2000). In Petitioner’s case, The

Referee entered an order ending Petitioner’s

career and reputation on a forged, non-

conforming copy of a return receipt card. Florida

Rules of Civil Procedure 1.070. Pet. App. 521-522.

Monaco v. Nealon, 810 So.2d 1084, 1085 (Fla. 4th

DCA 2002); Valliappan v. Cruz, 871 So.2d 1035,

1036 (Fla. 4th DCA 2004); Wyatt v. Haese, 649

So.2d 905, 907 (Fla. 4th DCA 1995).

In Dailey, the court held that since the

attorney was not given notice or the opportunity

to explain and defend prior to disbarment, she

was deprived of procedural process. 141 F.3d at

229-230. The orders must be voided because of the

absence of prior notice or opportunity to be heard.

Burkett v. Chandler, 505 F.2d 217, 222 (10th Cir.

1974), cert denied, 423 U.S. 876 (1975) In re:

Ruffalo, 390 U.S. 544, 546-552 (1968). Notice and

opportunity to be heard “at a meaningful time and

in a meaningful manner” are essential to the

security of all private rights. Armstrong v. Manzo,

380 U.S. 545, 552 (1965); Cleveland Board of

Education v. Loudermill, 470 U.S. 532, 542 (1985).

V. WHILE IT RESTS EXCLUSIVELY

38 WITH THE COURT TO DETERMINE

WHO IS QUALIFIED TO BECOME

AN ATTORNEY AND THE REASON

SHE MAY BE DISBARRED, “THE

POWER IS NOT ARBITRARY AND

DESPOTIC TO BE EXERCISED AT

THE PLEASURE OF THE COURT,

OR FROM PASSION, PREJUDICE,

OR PERSONAL HOSTILITY.”

Ex parte Garland, 71 U.S. 333, 347-348

(1866).

Petitioner’s right as an attorney is vested

and her right to practice law is property. She can

only be deprived of it after a judicial proceeding

that is constitutionally sound. 71 U.S. at 347-348.

The Garland court continued “to wrongfully

deprive him [Garland] of it, or unjustly withhold

it, is an injury which the law can redress in as

ample a manner as any other wrong. Any

conflicting claims to exercise this must be decided

in the same manner as other claims involving any

other right,…” 71 U.S. at 346-347. The practice of

law is not a matter of grace, but of right for one

who is qualified by his learning and his moral

character. Schware v. Board of Bar Examiners,

353 U.S. 232, 238-239 (1957).

CONCLUSION

Petitioner prays that this court enters an

order vacating the invalid orders and direct The

Florida Bar to correct Petitioner’s disciplinary

record, remove the five sham cases it created

against Petitioner from the courts’ data base,

remove all false and detrimental documents it has

39 placed in Petitioner’s record, remove all

information it published in its website, Goliath

and any other website which it has submitted said

information to, return Petitioner’s Florida Bar

license, reimbursement of the payment for costs

which Petitioner made to satisfy the invalid cost

judgment in case SC02-44, the costs incurred in

bringing this action and any other relief which

this court deems just and proper.

Respectfully Submitted,

_____________________________

Anne Georges Telasco, Pro Se

Petitioner

OATH

Under penalties of perjury, I, Anne

Georges Telasco, have prepared the foregoing

Petition truthfully and accurately. The contents

thereof are true of my own knowledge, except if

stated to be made upon information and belief,

and as to such information, I believe them to be

true.

NOTARIZATION

STATE OF NEW YORK

COUNTY OF MONROE

Anne Georges Telasco who produced her

New York drivers’ license as identification

appeared before me on _____________________ and