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2 Human morality
2.1 The nature and functions of morality
Many people react badly to the very idea of morality. It seems too closely asso
ciated with religion, and guilt seems to be the god that it is most interested
in serving. Morality seems to be mostly about obeying the rules promulgated
by parents or other authorities, no matter how pointless or stupid they may
be. The very language of morality seems absolutist and dogmatic. At best it
has the mustiness of an old attic: at worst, it is dangerous.
Having grown up in a Lutheran boarding school, I have a great deal of
sympathy for this reaction. Indeed, the dangers posed by the language of
morality are becoming more apparent every day. Too many political leaders
see the world in terms of absolute good and evil, and identify these with
their own religious beliefs. They exploit people's fears and prejudices with
categorical assertions of "our" virtue and simplistic denunciations of "their"
venality. Shabby moralizers seek power and domination through fiery con
demnations of those whose sexual practices are different from theirs. or
have different views about when life begins. or what it means to die with
dignity.
In my opinion. the best way to remedy this appropriation of morality is
not to give the language away to its abusers, but to go back to the source
and examine the concepts and institutions of morality from the ground
up. Such a thoroughgoing investigation will not only shed light on why
it is sensible to think about the environment from an ethical point of
view. but also help to liberate us from stereotypes about morality that pre
vent us from thinking ethically about many of the distinctive problems of
our age.
What. then, is morality? Of course different accounts can be given, but
let us begin with this one. As a first approximation, morality is a behavioral
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27 Human morality
system, with an attendant psychology, that has evolved among some social
animals for the purposes of regulating their interactions. Such systems are
characteristic of social animals living under certain conditions, such as
scarcity, because in these circumstances relentless self-seeking behavior on
the part of each individual can lead to disaster for everyone.
This was compellingly demonstrated by the seventeenth<entury philoso
pher, Thomas Hobbes, in his description of what he called "the state of
nature." In this state no one engages in productive work, for they cannot be
sure that they will capture the benefits of their labor. As a result,
there is no place for industry, because the fruit thereof is uncertain: and
consequently no culture of the earth; no navigation, nor use of the
commodities that may be imported by sea; no commodious building; no
instruments of moving and removing such things as require much force; no
knowledge of the face of the earth; no account of time; no arts; no letters; no society.
When faced with such a "war ofall against all," it is in each person's interest
to strike first, before they themselves are struck. Even those who prefer peace
have reason to attack preemptively, since they can be sure that less peaceable
people than themselves will attack first if they have the chance. Thus life in
the state of nature, according to Hobbes, is "solitary, poor, nasty, brutish,
and short."1
Hobbes believed that the only solution is to form a state ruled by an
absolute monarch. Whatever we may think of this proposed solution, it
seems clear that establishing a moral system can at least help in solving
the problems posed by the state of nature.2 Since moral systems regulate
and coordinate behavior by systematically rewarding some and informally
sanctioning other behavior, they can complement (or serve as alternatives)
to social control by the direct exercise of power or authority. It is thus
not surprising that moral systems exist among all known human societies.
Whether such systems exist among other animals is controversial, but it is
1 Quotations are from Thomas Hobbes. Leviathan, chapter 13, available in many edi
tions, and on line at <http://oregonstate.edu/instruct/phI302/textsfhobbes/leviathan<.
html#CHAPTERXIll> . 2 Hobbes himself denied this for reasons having to do with his conception of morality.
but this detail cannot be pursued here.
28 Ethics and the Environment
clear that precursors of such systems exist among many species of social
mammals, including the other Great Apes and canids.3
There are various building blocks that figure in the construction of exist
ing moralities, including sYmpathy, empathy, generosity, and the ability to
appreciate the situations ofothers. The ability to control one's own behavior
by suppressing impulses and desires is important as well. The disposition
to reciprocate behavior, a trait that is very deep in our nature, is especially
important. Taken together, such abilities and dispositions have the potential
to bring us from Hobbes's state of nature into cooperative societies that can
accomplish great things.
Imagine a population of organisms in which each individual, when con
fronted by strangers, either randomly cooperates or not. If strangers meet
and initially cooperate. then it is up, up, and away towards establishing a
pattern of behavior in which cooperation becomes increasingly likely. My
cooperating with you makes it more likely that you will cooperate with
me. which makes it more likely that I will cooperate with you, and so on.
This is the behavioral infrastructure that makes social institutions possible.
Compare this with organisms that do not have the tendency to recipro
cate. They may experience random incidents of cooperation. but since these
will not increase the probability of cooperation, these organisms will not
reap the benefits of sustained, mutually reinforcing cooperation. Those who
behave only in immediately self-interested ways will do even worse. They
will be stuck in the state of nature in which life is "nasty, brutish, and
short."
We can see why Mother Nature would favor children who have tendencies
to cooperate and reciprocate, as well as a tendency to pursue their own
interests. Under many sets of conditions, including those that are most
characteristic of human life, these children will do better than those who
do not have these tendencies.
Much more needs to be said about how this story of the construction
of morality goes, but we can already see its basic outline. Kindness begets
kindness, which begets kindness, which begets kindness. and so on. From
here. it is onwards and upwards towards full-blown morality."
3 See De Waal 2006 for discussion. 4 For more on the evolution of morality see Jamieson 2002: ch. 1, and the references cited
therein.
29 Human morality
Once moralities are off and running, like many other institutions they
have a tendency to become autonomous. Sympathetic identification and the
disposition to reciprocate make moralities possible, but once they come into
existence moralities have the power to strengthen their own hands. Our sym
pathy becomes increasingly vivid. and as our expectations grow, reciprocity
becomes nonnative. Reason also gets into the game, perhaps initially as an
instrument for working out the details of implementing reciprocity, but
later as a device for imposing order and consistency. These developments
make it possible, and in some cases almost irresistible, for us to care about
others who are in no position to reciprocate our behavior. Since reason, nor
mative reciprocity, and vivid sympathetic identification make demands on
us as well as on others, morality ~comes aspirational and critical in a way
that other systems of social control are not. It gives rise to the following
sorts of questions: What kind of person should I be? In what sort of soci
ety do I want to live? Am I doing as well as I can? How can my society be
better? These are also the resources that allow us to make trans-historical
and trans-eultural judgments, to project ourselves out of our present situa
tion, and to make claims about how we should act. were we in another set
of circumstances. We ask children how they would feel if they were treated
as they have treated others. To an acquaintance we point out that it would
not cost much to visit a sick parent, and that it would do the parent a world
of good. We condemn a friend for not acting as a friend.
Once we have reached this point, we are in the domain of full-blown
moralities like our own. We have a particular system of social control that
embodies the resources for creating personal standards. It also encompasses
the possibility of its own critique. and contains the materials for projecting
our judgments outward across space and time. Unlike other systems of social
control, such as custom. when it comes to morality the demand for reasons
is always in order. Thus we can say that morality always involves doing what
we have good reason to do.s
At this point we are tottering on the edge of what can be said gen
erally about morality, and there is a warning here that we should heed.
5 Does it always involve doing what we have most reason to do? Some philosophers
such as the eighteenth<entury Gennan philosopher. Immanuel Kant. would declare
affirmatively. Other philosophers, such as the eighteenth<entury Scottish philosopher. David Hume. would say that I radically exaggerate the importance of reason to
morality.
30 Ethics and the Environment
Philosophers have a tendency to import their own views of a controver
sial matter into the very definition of the subject under investigation. For
example, those who theorize about justice often define the very concept
in terms of their favored theory rather than arguing for its normative or
factual superiority over alternative theories. They define justice as some ver
sion of reciprocity, equality, or mutual advantage, rather than arguing on
substantive grounds that one of these theories of justice is superior to the
others. I have no wish to gain by definition what should be obtained only
through hard work and honest argument, though some might say that I
have already attempted to do this in characterizing morality in the way that
I have. At any rate, it is important to leave open a wide range of questions
that can be debated by proponents of various moral theories. For example:
What counts as a reason? Must reasons be impartial? Is there a class of dis
tinctively moral reasons? Are moral reasons decisive? Different responses to
these questions will follow from various moral theories, and they should
be evaluated generally on the basis of how plausible these various theo
ries are. These are the sorts of questions that we will investigate in the
next two chapters. First, however, we need to respond to some challenges to
morality.
2.2 Challenges to morality
In the previous section I outlined a plausible view about the nature and
functions of morality. This, in itself, will not be enough to put at ease those
who find morality distasteful. Indeed, we are now in a better position to
sharpen the vague, inchoate challenges to morality evoked at the beginning
of this chapter. I will refer to these new improved versions as the challenges
from amoralism, theism, and relativism.
It is important to recognize at the outset that I attach specific meanings
to these terms. While I have my doubts about amoralists, it is clear that
many theists and some relativists would not challenge morality in the ways
that I suggest. What I mean by 'theist' in this chapter is not just a religious
person who believes in God, but someone who has a quite specific view about
the relations between her religious commitments and morality. Clearly, not
all theists share this view. Similarly, there are many relativists who do not
fall into the traps that I discuss. These caveats should be borne in mind in
considering my responses to these challenges.
31 Human morality
2.3 Amoralism
An amoralist is someone who listens to what I have said about the nature
and functions of morality and says that what this story really shows is that
there is no such thing as right and wrong. He accepts my account of why
moralities have emerged in human societies. but he sees no reason why he
should be bound by any of them. He can understand morality just as he can
understand the religion of the Atztecs or the science of the Babylonians. but
thinks there is no more reason to feel bound by morality than to worship
the Aztec gods or believe that the laws of Babylonian science are true. The
amoralist chooses to opt out of morality altogether. He refuses to have any
part of it. It has nothing to do with how he is going to live his life. He is
going to do exactly as he pleases. and not worry about the state of nature.
moral rules. or any of that stuff. As far as he is concerned. nothing that
I have said gives him any reason to pay attention to morality. much less
shows him why he must.
Initially. amoralism seems romantic. It conjures up the image of an exis
tential hero living his own life. according to his own lights. paying no atten
tion to what "square" society might think. He is James Dean rejecting his
parents in Rebel without a Cause; Bonnie and Clyde robbing banks in the Amer
ican south, then making love on the side of the road; or the misunderstood
Mafia don. Joey Gallo. as portrayed by Bob Dylan in his album. Desire. Yes.
these are romantic images. and in some moods. especially after a particu
larly tedious faculty meeting. I'm tempted to go for them myself. However.
rather than being amoralists. these characters are all really moralists. An
amoralist is someone who rejects the idea that there is any such thing as
right or wrong. All of these figures have a morality. though it may be one
that is at odds with the morality of those around them.
James Dean is a frustrated romantic. His beefwith his parents and square
society is that they are hypocrites who do not live up to their own stan
dards. He has integrity; they do not. He stands up for his friends; they aban
don their children. Bonnie and Clyde are basically hedonistically motivated
Robin Hood figures. They rob banks because it is exciting. pays for the good
times. and lets them give money away to those who need it. Killing people is
part of the fun, but generally they are willing to let the little guy get away.
unless he is a cop who takes his job too seriously. or someone who really
needs killing. They have a loyalty to each other that goes all the way to the
32 Ethics and the Environment
grave. Bob Dylan's Joey may do a "hit" on a member of another crime family
or rough up a gambler who owes him money, but that is just business. You
can be sure that he is a loving son, kind to his children, and loyal to his
family. The church also probably benefits from his largesse.
These characters all have moralities. They think that certain things are
right, others are wrong, and still others are of no real importance. They
believe that it matters what kind of people they are. They want to exemplify
a certain set of virtues. Far from being amoralists, they are more like exis
tentialist heroes who place a high value on authenticity. Bonnie and Clyde,
and Joey. all have their own codes of conduct. They rob the rich and help
the poor, but what really matters to them is their own integrity as they
understand it. They want to be true to themselves. It is with such people in
mind that Bob Dylan wrote in another song that "to live outside the law you
must be honest." It is this concern for honesty that most vividly separates
these characters from parents, cops, and other authority figures.
Who, then, is an amoralist? Since it is difficult to name a famous amoral
ist, let us invent one called "Dirk," and describe what he would have to be
like in order to be a real amoralist. Dirk is someone who does not think that
any facts about other people's interests or even their suffering provide rea
sons for him to act one way rather than another. When Dirk sees a man on
the side of a road who has just been run over, it is a matter of indifference
to him whether he helps him, kicks him in the head, or just walks away. At
any particular moment he may feel like doing one thing or another, but he
does not feel that one is the right response, or that he should be consistent
in what he does. Indeed, he might initially feel like helping the man, and
then decide to kick him instead: or the other way around. It doesn't really
matter which. Even if the man is Dirk's father or his best friend, he stiIl
does not see that he has a reason for acting one way or another. If he were
to think or feel that he really ought to help his father, then Dirk would
have a morality. It would, perhaps, be a clannish morality of "filial piety"
that is not very attractive or plausible, but if Dirk is really an amoralist
he does not even have that. Indeed, it is not even clear in what sense Dirk
could have a friend as opposed to someone he has hooked up with for some
particular purpose. Suppose that it is Dirk who is lying on the side of the
road having been beaten and robbed. Between episodes of excruciating pain
he can regret that he is in this condition, that he took this road rather than
another, that he did not shoot first, and so on. But what he cannot feel is
that he was treated unjustly or that his assailants did something wrong in
33 Human morality
beating and robbing him. Indeed, even if they tortured him for their own
amusement, Dirk cannot consistently resent them, fault them, or hate them
for it, for these are moral emotions that are unavailable to Dirk if he is truly
an amoralist.6 If Dirk has these emotions, then he has a morality. He may
be deeply immoral in that he has these feelings only about himself and not
others, or that he does not act on these feelings. But if Dirk is a consistent
amoralist, then he has no place for such feelings at all.
As we fill in the picture of Dirk, amoralism becomes increasingly less
attractive. Rather than being the portrait of an existential hero, it begins
to look like the sketch of a sociopath. We also begin to see how difficult it
is to choose amor<rlism and opt out of morality. The very ties that bind us
to a society entangle us in a morality. Morality is ubiquitous; amoralists are
rare. Indeed, one wonders whether they exist outside of the classroom.
2.4 Theism
Like the amoralists, some theists understand my story about the nature and
functions of morality but say that it has nothing to do with them. Unlike
the amoralists, they say this, not because they reject morality, but because
they reject my conception of morality. Morality comes only from God, they
say, and God has no place in my story. As I have explained it, morality is a
human construction that emerges in a world controlled by natural selection.
Whatever this human construction is, it cannot be a morality. For God alone
is the author of morality.
This view is extremely common in America, from the current President
on down. In fact, outside of a few pockets in which Enlightenment ideals
continue to thrive, it is probably the dominant view in the world. The
twentieth-eentury philosopher Jean-Paul Sartre stated the challenge posed
by this view when he wrote that "if God is dead, then everything is
permitted."7
6 But isn't there some notion of "blind" or "animal" hatred in which individuals can hate
the cause of their suffering. without this in any way implying that their suffering is
unjustified? If so, then in this sense Dirk can consistently hate his torturers.
7 These words are from Sartre's 1946 lecture "Existentialism is a Humanism." available
on the web at <www2.cddc.vt.edu/marxists/cd/cd2/Iibrary/reference/archive/sartre/works/
exist/sartre.htm>. Interestingly. Sartre falsely attributes these words to the nineteenth
century Russian novelist, Fyodor Dostoyevski. though it is true that the thought is
Dostoyevski's. ~
34 Ethics and the Environment
There are two distinct reasons why someone might think that without
God, everything is permitted. The first reason is that without God, morality
would have no content. The second reason is that without God, we would
not be motivated to act morally.
Consider the second reason first. Why might someone believe that if we
are not motivated to act morally then everything is permitted? The argu
ment might go like this. Suppose for the sake of argument that
(1) The content of morality is a set of requirements R; everything else is
permitted.
Now suppose that
(2) We are not motivated to do R,
where "doing R" is shorthand for something like "obeying the requirements
included in R." If
(3) It is a necessary condition for doing R that we are motivated to do R,
then, given (2),
(4) We cannot do R.
If
(5) It is a necessary condition for being required to do R that we can do R,
then, given (4),
(6) We are not required to do R.
But if (6), then
(7) R is an empty set.
But if (7), then, given (1),
(8) Everything is permitted.
The reasoning in this argument is valid: if we are not motivated to act
morally, then everything is permitted. However, for the theist's challenge to
morality to succeed, a further assumption, reflected in step (2), must also
35 Human morality
be true: that without God, we are not motivated to act morally. It is this
premise that I wish to deny.8
Notice first, that this claim is ambiguous. It may mean:
(9) If God does not exist, then we are not motivated to act morally;
or
(10) If we do not believe in God, then we are not motivated to act morally.
If (9) were true, then an atheist would certainly be committed to the view
that everything is permitted. However, there is little reason to believe that
(9) is true because it is difficult to see how the sheer fact of God's existence
can affect people's motivations.
Imagine the following cases. In the first case, what I will call "the base
line,"
(11) God does not exist and no one believes that he does.
In the second case,
(12) God exists, but no one believes that he does.
In the third case,
(13) God does not exist, but everyone believes that he does.
It is difficult to see why there would be greater prevalence of moral moti
vation in (12) than in the baseline, (11). People's beliefs are the same in
both cases, though the facts about the universe are different. It is diffi
cult to see how facts about the universe engage people's motivation, except
through psychological states such as their beliefs. Indeed, the power of peo
ple's beliefs to affect motivation is highlighted by (13). It seems reasonable
to suppose that there would be a greater incidence of moral motivation
in (13) than in (12), precisely because there is greater prevalence of belief
in God in (13) than in (12), even though God exists in (12) but not in (13).
For it does seem plausible to believe that there is some positive correla
tion between belief in God and the existence of moral motivation. Indeed,
if Russian novelists and American presidents are reporting their own cases
8 Some might also challenge premise (3). How successful this challenge would be depends
exactly on what one means by 'doing' and 'motivated'. Even if this challenge were to
succeed, the argument could be revised in such as way as to meet it.
36 Ethics and the Environment
accurately and not just speculating about other people. then we have some
testimonial evidence for the existence of this correlation.
So, let us grant that the incidence of moral motivation may be higher
in societies like ours when people believe in God than when they do not.
Does this show that if we did not believe in God. then (2) would be true? No.
In a society in which people did not believe in God. some of us still would
be motivated to act morally while some of us would not be so motivated.
As I will explain in detail in the next chapter. moral beliefs are distinct
from moral motivations. Indeed, this helps explain why there are so few
real amoralists among us, despite the apparent popularity of the view. For
present purposes what matters is that this "mixed" case. in which some
people would be motivated to act morally in the absence of belief in God
while some would not be so motivated, is not strong enough to support the
truth of(2). The fact that some of us would be motivated to act morally even
if we believed that God did not exist shows that (2) cannot be true in the
sense needed to support (4).
Why should we believe that many of us would be motivated to be moral
even if we believed that God did not exist? Because it is a simple fact that ..
many people today do not believe that God exists. yet are motivated to be
moral. Indeed. many moral philosophers fall into this category. For this
reason (and others). there is reason to believe that the moral motivation of
at least some of those who believe in God would not flag, even if they lost
their faith. Perhaps they could be brought to see the connections between
moral motivation and other things that they care about. such as their own
long-term interests, their families. and their societies. as well as other goods
that they value. Morever, as we saw in our discussion of Dirk, the amoralist.
it is quite difficult for someone who lives in a society to escape the tendrils of
morality, however much he might claim to do so. Immorality is ubiquitous.
but amoralism is rare.
It is the other version of the theistic challenge that has historically been
influential.9 On this version. it is God who gives content to morality through
his divine commandments. What is right is obeying his commands and what
is wrong is disobeying them. Thus, without God, there can be nothing that
is right or wrong.
9 The locus classicus of this discussion is Plato's Euthyphro.
37 Human morality
This view, too, is ambiguous. Obeying God's commandments may be right
because
(14) Actions are right in virtue of being commanded by God,
or because
(15) God commands us to do only those actions that are right independently
of his commands.
On the view that is expressed in (14), that obeying God's commandments
is right because the actions that he commands are right in virtue of his
commanding them, rightness is constrained by nothing but God's will. Mur
der, rape, torture, or whatever, is right so long as God commands it. This is
not the view of nice religious people but of Jihadists, Crusaders, terrorists,
and cultists who engage in horrifying acts in the name of following God's
commandments.
The natural response is to say that these awful people are wrong about
what God commands. But how do we know? Religious people disagree about
what God commands, and almost every imaginable atrocity has been com
mitted somewhere, sometime, in his name. We are finite creatures who have
little grasp of the mind of God. How can anyone of us claim more insight
into his commandments than anyone else?
This leads to a second response, which is not any better. Since God is good,
the nice religious person says, he cannot command us to do evil. Thus we
do not have to worry about God commanding us to do horrific things. True
enough, we do not have to worry about God commanding us to do evil, but
this does not rule out his commanding us to do things that we regard as
horrific. On the view under consideration, the goodness of God's commands
is secured by definition. Since whatever God commands us to do is right in
virtue of his commanding it, ifhe commands us to commit acts of genocide
it would follow that such acts are just as right as most of us now think
that it is to feed the hungry. Indeed, if God commanded us not to feed the
hungry, then it would be wrong to do so. The appeal to God's goodness has
no independent force, since goodness is defined by whatever he commands.
Rather than consulting any independent conception of goodness, we are
thrown back on our ignorance of the mind of God to find out what is good.
One casualty of this view is the traditional idea that it is an important,
substantive truth about God that he is good. Yes, God is good, but this is
38 Ethics and the Environment
true by definition. not in virtue of God's substantive behavior conforming
to any normal understanding of goodness. Finding out that God is good.
on this view. is like discovering that the standard meter bar is a meter in
length. or that an ounce of gold weighs an ounce. This is hardly a relief for
those of us who might wonder about God's nature.
There are other unwelcome consequences of this view. but the worst is
this. Suppose that God commands us to carry out the most horrific acts
imaginable. That we would be compelled to carry them out is bad enough.
But worse still is the idea that. in virtue of his command. these horrific acts
would somehow be transformed from evil deeds into acts of goodness. If
we were certain that our universe were ruled by such a creature. the right
thing to say would be not that God is good. but that we are in the hands of
an omnipotent genocidal maniac. or even. perhaps. an evil demon.
Consider the alternative view. (15). that God commands us to do what is
right according to a standard that is independent of his commanding it. On
this view. it is the independent standard of rightness. not God's commands.
that gives morality its content. God conforms his commands to morality: he
does not shape morality through his commands. What is right is indepen
dent ofGod. just as it is independent of us. Even ifGod exists and commands
us to do what is right. it is still up to us to find out what that is. God. on this
view. rather than providing a challenge to the conception of morality that I
have sketched. is himself bound by it. His most important role is to provide
a little extra motivation to be moral for those who believe in him. Thus. the
second version of the theistic challenge goes down to defeat. whichever way
we understand it.
2.5 Relativism
The third challenge to morality is different in kind. The two previous chal
lenges have amounted to saying that while they agree that there is a ubiqui
tous institution of social control of the sort that I have described. they reject
the idea that this institution has authority over them. The theist denies that
the social institution that I have described is in fact morality. though she
accepts the authority of morality. The amoralist grants that the institution
that I have described is morality. but rejects its authority.
The relativist is different from either of them. She accepts both the claim
that what I have described is morality. and that morality has authority over
39 Human morality
her. What she rejects is one important aspect of my conception of morality:
the idea that morality embodies resources for critically assessing the views
of ourselves and others. and indeed, on some occasions. can project its judg
ments across times and societies. What the relativist denies is the possibility
of moral claims transcending the moral system of the speaker's own society.
Relativism is a challenge to morality as I understand it because it threat
ens to deprive morality of its critical edge. thus assimilating it to other
social practices whose ambitions are much more modest, such as "folkways."
"customs." or "standards of etiquette." By making cultures the locus of
morality. relativism not only threatens our ability to make moral judgments
that range across communities and times. but also diminishes the auton
omy and responsibility of individuals. features that are also important to
morality.
Relativism grows from the simple recognition that different societies and
historical epochs judge different actions as right or wrong. Examples of
this are legion. and can be found in such diverse areas as sexual morality.
judgments about killing. and the treatment of animals and nature. Food
preferences. which are often highly moralized, will do as an example.
Most Americans think that it is strange to eat goats. disturbing to eat
horses. wrong to eat dogs and whales. and downright ghastly to eat gorillas
and chimpanzees. On the other hand they see nothing strange. disturbing.
wrong, or ghastly about eating cows, pigs. chickens, sheep. fish, shrimps.
and various other sea creatures. Europeans would largely share these views.
though their category of the animals that can be eaten without comment
might be somewhat more expansive, including, for example, horses and
snails. Religious Jews and Muslims are horrified at the idea of eating pigs,
but have little trouble with most of the other animals on the list. Hin
dus and Jains would object to eating any of these animals. especially cows.
Most East Asians see little difference between eating any of these animals,
and many Africans consider the flesh of gorillas and chimpanzees to be a
delicacy.
When faced with such diversity, enlightened people are often inclined
to think that this shows that moral rules have sway only over particular
societies at particular times. This view is bolstered, it might be thought. by
the picture of morality that I have presented. Since, on my view, morality is
mainly directed towards regulating a community's behavior, there is little
reason to think that the same set of prescriptions and proscriptions would
40 Ethics and the Environment
be appropriate for all communities in all circumstances. According to the
relativist, someone who claims that his morality is right and the morality of
other communities is wrong fails to grasp the essential relativity of moral
judgments. It is one thing for a speaker to report the moral standards of his
own society: it is quite another for him to condemn the moral standards
of other societies. Worse still is any attempt to impose his own morality on
others.
What do we say of people who try to impose their moralities on others?
One natural thing to say is that they are immoral, but this is tricky terrain
for a relativist. For the tendency to export one's morality may be intrinsic to
the morality of those who are doing the exporting, as certainly was the case
with the Victorian morality of nineteenth-century England and arguably is
the case with the prevailing, Christian-inflected morality of contemporary
America. Indeed, it is obvious that many Americans think that that they have
a moral obligation to "share" their morality with others. But if the tendencY
towards exporting one's morality is part of one's culture, then denouncing
such attempts as immoral seems to require the same sort of trans-cultural
moral judgment that the relativist enjoins us not to make. But what is
the alternative? If we cannot denounce attempts to impose one's morality
on others in moral terms, what can we say about them? Criticizing such
attempts in non-moral language - as rude, insensitive, or tasteless - seems
grossly inappropriate to the offence. Saying that a missionary who tries to
get a tribal people to worship Jesus, adopt western standards of marriage,
and behave like proper Englishmen is "insensitive" is like saying that Hitler
had a problem with his aggressive impulses.
The relativist seems trapped by her own theory. The point of her challenge
is to prevent us from trying to impose our morality on others. But insofar
as this attempt is an expression of one's own culture, it would appear that
the relativist is stopped by her own theory from morally denouncing it.
She could try the following maneuver. Just as imposing Christian morality
on the natives was an expression of the morality of Victorian England, so
the relativist's denunciation of this is an expression of the tolerant, secular
morality of her culture. In other words, when it comes to trans-cultural
judgments, everyone, including the relativist, is allowed "to do their own
thing," so long as it is an authentic expression of their own culture and
does not claim any universal privilege, except, of course, from within their
own point of view.
41 Human morality
This gambit amounts to a sophisticated surrender on the part of the
relativist, for it puts her objection to imposing morality on others on the
same level as the attempt itself. Each is an equally authentic expression of
the morality of the culture in which the impulse originates. What started
as a noble, if misguided, attempt to use moral language to prevent domi
nant cultures from imposing their moralities on others has, under pressure,
degenerated into the view that when it comes to moralizing we should let a
thousand flowers bloom, acknowledging that insofar as they are all authen
tic expressions of a culture, no view has any special claim to acceptance
beyond the culture in which it originates. What has been lost is any princi
ple, method, insight, or approach for deciding when culturally transcendent
claims are appropriate, insightful, true, or right. Instead, we are left with a
clash of competing cultures, with no guidance about how to resolve it. This
kind of relativism ceases to be a serious challenge to anything. It has trans
formed its own critique into just another provincial voice, with no claim to
anything more than local interest.
In addition to this theoretical objection, there are serious difficulties in
implementing the relativist view in the highly globalized world in which we
live. Relativism takes cultures as the primary locus of moral authority, but
it is not easy to determine people's cultural membership and thus identify
the standards by which their behavior should be assessed. The following
case brings this out clearly.
In 1996 a seventeen-year-old girl, Fauziya Kassindja, arrived in the United
States from Togo and asked for political asylum. tO She had fled in order to
escape an elaborate ritual which marks the onset of adulthood in young
females in her tribe. Part of this ritual involves a procedure that is vari
ously called "excision," "female circumcision," "female genital cutting," or
"female genital mutilation." There is much to say about such cases, but the
question I wish to raise here is quite limited. Which is the society whose
moral standards are supposed to take precedence in this case? Is it the
standards of Kassindja's tribe, those of urban Togo, those of West Africa,
those of Africa generally, or those of the United States, where she came to
seek asylum? It is clear that each of these societies has different attitudes
towards this procedure and would produce different moral judgments about
this case. My point here is not to argue any particular view, but rather to
10 I borrow this example from Rachels 2003.
42 Ethics and the Environment
point out how difficult it is in the contemporary world to assign people to
the cultures that are supposed to have moral authority over them. ll
Indeed. putting the matter in this way brings out how relativism points
in the wrong direction when it comes to locating the grounds for moral
judgments. What is central to moral judgments are reasons for action that
reflect a host of concerns involving the interests that are at stake. the harms
that would be caused, the precedents that would be set. and so on. Cultural
membership may bear indirectly on how we assess these considerations, but
in itself it is not of central moral importance. By making cultures the locus
of morality. relativism turns us away from the reasons that ground and
justify moral judgments.
There are other problems with relativism. With its emphasis on cultures
as the locus of moralities. it seems to have little place for moral disagree
ment within cultures. This risks putting horrendous acts of racism and bru
tality beyond criticism. so long as they occur within a society rather than
across societies. For example. what do we say about people who oppose theoc
racy. slavery. or patriarchy in societies in which these practices are widely
accepted? If the content of morality is determined by the moral standards of
the society. then these people are just wrong. On the other hand. someone
who simply conforms to his society's prevailing morality would be doing
the right thing. however horrendous the morality he would be upholding.
On this view. an abolitionist in a slave society would be wrong about the
morality of slavery while a slave-owner would be right. But surely it is not
the abolitionist who is wrong. but the relativist. Every society has cranks.
deviants, and rebels. and they are often the revolutionaries who make moral
progress possible. Yet relativism seems committed to their moral condemna
tion. One wonders whether moral progress is possible on such a view. and
if so. what its engine might be.
Still there is something to relativism. and before moving on we should
make sure that we understand what it is. Certainly one of the gifts of rela
tivism is that it attunes us to the fact that there is a great deal more diversity
in moral practices than people were once in a position to recognize. and a
great deal more than many people today are willing to accept. Even so. it is
easy to exaggerate the extent and depth of moral diversity.
11 Sen (2006) argues strongly that it is immoral to assign people such identities, even when
it is possible to do so.
Human morality 43
Consider, for example, traditional Eskimo society, in which female infan
ticide was widely practiced and accepted. Perfectly healthy female infants
were sometimes killed at birth. Before jumping to conclusions about the pr~
foundly different moralities of traditional Eskimo and contemporary Amer
ican societies, consider the circumstances of traditional Eskimo life. The
environment was harsh, food was in short supply, and the margin of safety
was small. In this society, mothers nursed for many years, thus limiting the
number of children who could be supported at a given time. Traditional
Eskimos were nomadic, and infants were carried while the mother did her
work. Food was primarily obtained by hunting, and this was extremely dan
gerous under Arctic conditions. Men were the primary food-providers, and
they were often in short supply because of premature death. In traditional
Eskimo society, female infanticide was not a first but a last resort, often
carried out only after attempts at adoption failed. However, it has been esti
mated that without the practice of female infanticide, an average Eskimo
group would have had 50% more females than food-producing males.12
What should we say about the moral differences regarding infanticide
between traditional Eskimos and contemporary Americans? Surely there
are such differences, for one can say, however superficially, that contem
porary Americans believe that female infanticide is wrong while traditional
Eskimos did not. But if one tries to say anything deeper or more precise,
things become quite murky. Neither society approves of murder; neither
society approves of the gratuitous killing of innocent people; neither society If
believes that children are disposable; neither society believes that, every r thing else being equal. males should be preferred to females. While con I temporary Americans and traditional Eskimos would disagree about what I general rules they would assent to with respect to infanticide, it is not clear
that they disagree about any deep moral principles or even that they would
disagree about particular cases. People and communities find themselves in
different situations, and achieving common purposes sometimes requires
different strategies.
It should not be surprising that in the most general way there would
be widespread agreement about morality across societies. Humans form a
single species and they face common problems of survival; morality is an
12 My account of Eskimo infanticide is based on Rachels 2003, who in tum relies on
Freuchen 1961 and Hoebel 1954.
44 Ethics and the Environment
institution whose role it is to help solve those problems. However, humans
are extremely adaptable and live in a broad range of environmental condi
tions, and in societies characterized by very different forms of social organi
zation. It is thus not surprising that there is diversity in their moral expres
sions, especially with respect to "middle-level" principles.
Even though the extent of relativity is often exaggerated, there is no
denying both the fact and the importance of diverse moralities. Despite the
fact that awareness of diversity and difference is supposed to be part of
the common knowledge of our epoch, there continue to be ignorant and
arrogant attempts to remake the moral fabric of ancient societies. States
whose weaponry far outruns their respect for others behave in ways that
are almost as crude as their imperial predecessors. It is difficult to fully
appreciate the moralities of others, and there is generally enough work to
be done in reforming one's own society for even the most committed of
moral crusaders. The facts of relativity should make us humble about our
ability to understand, much less improve, the morality of others.
Moral relativism is a doctrine that can be educative, but as a challenge to
morality it fails. Relativism errs when it goes beyond a set of observations
about the diversity of cultural practices and begins to promulgate an ethic
of its own. This failure is located precisely at the point at which it moves
from a description of how morality is exemplified in the world to the norma
tive view that a society's morality cannot be morally criticized. It commits
the fallacy of deriving an "ought" from an "is" - of drawing a normative
conclusion from a set of descriptive premises. In its crudest form, it borders
on inconsistency. In its more sophisticated versions, it remains implausible,
while its claim to be a challenge to morality recedes.
2.6 What these challenges teach us
There is a lot to learn from these challenges to morality. They include the
following. Morality is ubiquitous and difficult to escape for even the most
hard-bitten of men (e.g. Dirk). Morality does not need the support of God in
order to have content or to be motivating. Morality is not culture-bound.
At the same time nothing has been said to suggest that there is a single,
true morality, and the facts of moral disagreement should make us sensitive
to the difficulty of interpreting and assessing the views of others. Moreover,
there is no requirement in morality or any other domain that requires us to
45 Human morality
have a judgment about everything. Nothing has been said that suggests that
belief in God is inconsistent with morality, or that rules out the idea that
belief in God may even be supportive of morality. Finally, the amoralist's
challenge highlights the fact that the conflict between morality and indi
vidual desire is ongoing, though it is generally a conflict within morality
rather than a challenge to morality.
Having thus characterized human morality and responded to some chal
lenges, we can turn our attention to some substantive questions in ethical
theory.