1ST MARINE AIR WING - SAR 3 - 7 SEPTEMBER 1950 - 8 … · on CG lstMAW conf ltr ser 037 of 20 Feb...

1ST MARINE AIR WING - SPECIAL ACTION REPORT 3 - 7 SEPTEMBER 1950 - 8 OCTOBER 1950

Korean War

Korean War Project Record: USMC-110

CD: 01

United States Marine Corps History Division

Quantico, Virginia

Records: United States Marine Corps

Unit Name: 1st Marine Division

Records Group: RG 127

Depository: National Archives and Records Administration

Location: College Park, Maryland

Editor: Hal Barker

Korean War Project

P.O. Box 180190

Dallas, TX 75218-0190

http://www.koreanwar.org

Korean War Project USMC-00304095DECLASSIFIED

I

Division SEP 1951

From To· Subject 1.Se 90a7s-t) • -.I'\'<\~· \:1~

: ' o~

I

t File No: .· ,, ·~~~~:- Ser. No. tJ/:2'? ~i~

Urgent: OUT ::'': ~ :::: Routine: IN OUT f-U'f.;)b5 IN

, Rout-In it Date I nate In it

I R~:- ·Rout-I In it Date •••• Date !rnit

IP.~::_! , 1na 1ng !Sees

Asst CMC Admin Mil Secy

:: Legal Aide "'~•1n1na

Admin: .strative AAA aiM

' N- /O•f" ' . (!/_ Radiol & Cml

I !Hi•t~~'""' ..

: I Tnor..>et,ion Na?al Gunfire :"

lrers Dept ~ Aids

' IPlans & Policies Aviation II'ublic Info ls

·.ina """' 1<>oHnn

Reserve Trng .

i SUPPlY Dept ArtillerY

' lwornen Mo•1no Mobilization

: : ; OF PU~S AND i ~ : "" '"' -: Praotio<

lo-4 i I Exec q' ~ './- Exec

Spl A'i(st /ll Dir T. • 1 '+.iOS . . -

1"-~xec v I

Oen

Pl• ,, :.

I women

· M<;tor Trans • - _:::: ... ,. - _: . A&R Admin & Stat !srs .:

I Pers Pl.

I l~&c :net-t r. Plan :

~ Ofi fers Han I B~ineer ~ ~ --

Enl Pers Plan l Pers Allow Shore ••~tv ·: ·•·-"'

i Big & Elec • FMF T;i;'s · ITk & LVT "' v~ .. /OIR

r: Mobil - .-----.-

r 0_-2

Exec {En!r!.. to be and dat.dl Admin

Studies Plonn1na

G-3 J)lm·AISUID . i Exec

I AC1'ION non n,. ._,. .~ 104555 .._ .,._ _.._. -NVV'•6W

I A!Jpt·oval Information

.\j'~·''?.t: -- -- Cl ) J Com:vlianoe Recommendation -i --- , 'I .... , It::> Return Preparation letter /, -- --

' Retain for signatur~ of memo .. -.... ., -I!J To be seen prior to signature X indicates origlnatorcL!

# To be seen r•rior to mailing -u· ~- f!!/ Use I~ 2, etc,.

0 Copy to be seen after mailing order of ~· n«; ,.. ... M

~~(;~:lu · ·-·· DECLASSIFIED

Korean War Project USMC-00304096

Ref:

• DECLASSIFIED

0662/942 A9 SerO 8 b 'l - ~. l

SLP r, 1951

conf ltr ser 0129 of 8 Apr 1951

Commanding General, Fleet Marine Force, Pacific Commandant of the Marine Corps

lstMAW Special Action Report for period 7 September 1950 to 9 October 1950, add1t1ono to

{b) CG n~F.Pao ltr- aer- 0601-51 of 10 Jul 1951 (lstEnd on CG lstMAW conf ltr ser 037 of 20 Feb 1951)

Enol: (3) Comments on additions to lstMAW Special Action Report for period 7 September 1950 to 9 October 1950

1. Submi ttec.i. herewi t,h, as enclosur-e ( 3), a.r-e comments whioh were not included in enclosure (2) of reference (b).

Copy to: CG lstMAW

BRIGADI · . T. W. MillER, ER GU~Eiv\L, U. S M/,Ril~l

DEPU! Y C:Ol.',AV-..i..JDEFo.

10455.5

DECLASSIFIED


• COHMBNTS ON THE 1ST MARINE AIRCRAFT WING SPECIAL AC'l'ION REPORT ____ FOE~.JHE PERIOD 7 SEPTEMBEH 1950 THROUGH 9 OCTOBER 1950

Section III. Annex SugP.r-.

l, Paragraph 4. Concur,

Comment. The recommendation that the allowance for fork-

;~~t~n:f'{iyn~~r 0~a~~ic;~ 8 :q:~~o~1 ~~c1 ( ~~a~6~p~~~v~;~t~q~~~r~em be carried in tl'1e Section M Allowance is considered t.o be essential, Forklifts are extremely useful and a labor saving device in normal airfield operations, as well as during amphibious operation c.

2. Paragr·e.ph 5. Concur in part.

Corument. This Hee.d.quarters concurs in the recomrnendatl.on that equad.rons should be kept intact, wherever posoible, when oper-ating fr·om forward land bases. However·, when squadrons are operating from carr-iere it is usually impossible or -impracticable to embark the full complement of squadron personnel due primarily to a lack of accommodations. It 1s however, considered esr•ential that sufficient administrative personnel be embarked ln orde:t~ "'.,;o accomplish normal administration 4 In acldi tion the records of all personnel embarked should be carried in order to cope with any c!_iec1pl1mrry, medical, disbursing, etc. , matters that migl1t arise while aboard.

3. Pe.r-ag1··aph 6, Concur,

Comruent. :rne difficulties which occur:r·ecl 1n airborne and VHF crystallizs.tion probabl.y resul tecl, in part, from the fact that .J.~N .. A.P l95(B) "t!as not followed. for frequenoy planning in the Far East. Since the normal procurement and issue or crystals iB baaed on JANAP 195(B), any significant cleviation therefrom poses a crystallization problem unless exteneive crystal gr·inding facilities are available and there ie sufficient time to grind and install crystals for non JANAP 195(B) assignments.

The installing of tranemi tters at or nee.r the fr·ont lines is concurred in, However, the placing of a low frequency beacon in the vicinity of the fr·&~nt linea is open to question since ouch a transmitter could .. svve ae a beacon to enemy air-

~~aft B.!ld wou~~ pr~vi~_e ~ _ ~Cl,e,~~-:~~_t?~t _ r:::_~~e~L D~.._?.P~:~~ions. i::jl.nce line prooJ.eru J.s unaLt o~ ,..~,;-~y.Lu.LufS t:e. w~euu:li wu~~;~rc;uJ ... .~..- .... ..,ndly

. ·,";> ,._,~' .-._ ~'<' . ->~;__.

ENCLOSURE (3)

10455-5


o~ ""'"v..ni"<i· ,..,.,..., nl"'o4 oY"I+ 1·l-.omtJo1 uao "t.r4. +:'h. ~oon~.:~~ni~ +.n J:l lrr'lnl..tr"' Y'\tY1n+. ""'_..~, "'"' u.~- u '""~'" "" ............... u ....................... ..., ...... vu , ............ • ..,..,.I:'.......... ..,.., - -··- •••• r--·· ... within a ground force zone of action, it ie considered that some other type of electronic device might prove n1ore sui table and lese vulnerable to enemy ECM, In any event, it ie believed that the type beacon, whether it be low frequency or VHF which emits an essentially continuous. signal should be located at a semi remote place within a friendly area so that in the event .,_uh,c:i- -4i- Av.nt.tn of"iv.o l'lnnl-1 -f"'o\,...,o "Lri11 Y"'nt' .COYl~nna1v \Qt"t.Y\itt'f'lri1.9A

..... ..,... u ..t. u \A.., Qng .&. ... .., ""'I UI.4V.I..a. .1. ..... v n ... ..._ ... ,.,..., v -v• ,.. ....... ~-~~ "'...,._J:' __ ...,._....;;.,..

nearby installations.

Tile recommendation that all aircraft have RDF equipment installed is strongly concurred in. Although it is possible ttmt the newer type aircraft with which Marine squadrons will eventually be equipped may have RDF' as standard equipment, the aircraft presently employed should 'be equipped with every device available which will assist and improve present close a.lr support technique,

4, Paragraph 7, Concur in part.

Comment. It is felt that a more suitable allocation of frequencies pluu adequate circuit discipline should reduce the need for more than ten (10) channels as now provided by AN/ARC-1 equipment~

5, Paragraph 8, Concur.

r ~ur,JAJ:LtS!!l..& t '"'""'"'T1U'LII'I, I~L

DECLASSIFIED DOD DIR /;ZQO,lo

2 ENCLOSURE (3)

DECLASSIFIED


l \

'

DECLASSIFIED

Headquarters l st Marine A:tr W:i.nr~, Fl:Ji'

c/o }'leet Post Offj ce, San Francisco

\-:;;-:·, I

irorn: Cominanding General

K¥1.0/WH.L :beb A9 Ser: 01?9

8 APR 1951

To: CoHunandant of the M<='.rine Corr;s VJa: CcJjrJmandinF"; Generctl, Fleet Jt..Iarine ll'orce, }'actfio

ciubj: lE-tl>~.AW S·r,eo.Lal Act,ion HetJort f'or nerlod 7 t.iE~lJtember l9SO to 9 (;ctobe:r 1'::150, additions to

Her: (a) GG, f'MJ<'!'ac ltr ser ??60 of 6 Feb 1951

:t:;r1cl: (l) Annex Sup-_ar to O~·ction III, of lstl•'JlW S'{)ecial Action keport fol' 110riod 7 be·ntember 1950 to 9 October 1950

(2) CommentB of Commandinr: Genoral on recommendations containc ,1 :ln 1 stU.AW ST,eo:i.al Actlor. Report fo:r 1)eriod 7 8eotember 1950 to 9 vctober 1950

1. In accordance wi t.tl tllo instruction!': oontain,··d in reference (a), encl_osures (1} and(?) a:re forwardQd he:rewith.

?. :r;nclo.o=;ure (l) contains the comw-:nts of the Commandinr, l 1fficer, Mal'j ne Al:rcraft Groun 1? on tiJ_e rc·.c0mmendations contained in t5ection III of tbe sl1bject. spucial ttction report and is to be appended as Annex SUgar thereto.

3. :B.;nclor;ure (~} contains t~1e comments of the Comme.ndinp, General on t.ue recommenda-tions made by the Tactical Air Commander, X CorlH'3, by tl1C Conunanding Officer, Marine id.rcraft Group 33, and by tf1e Gommandinr~ CJffi cer, r.~arine Ai.rcraft Grou-p J. 2. flln 1 fl er. cl asure is to be added after page three ( 3) nnd preced:i.nr: Annex Able in t.>ection I of tlle subject epccj_al action report,

4. Upon removal of enc~~orcureo (1) and ( 2), tllis letter of tran.s,nittal ma:v be declassified.

lHST.t0:13WfiOh:

CNO (2) BIIA}:H ( l ) C:MC (llirector of Aviation) (l) FUe'Lant (1) AirJ<'i;J'Pao (l) AirYMJ<'I.ant (1) C:omAirPac ( l) C: omNa vl!'E ( l ) Coni!<' a irJ ap ( 1 ) C:omC:arDiv 15 (1) CinCl'acFl t (2) C:inCLe.ntF1 t ( 1)

~-re \4-GVlfl--" J!'IJ<:J"D HA.HlUS

CG 2dMAVI ( J ) UAG-ll. ( 1 ) l.!AG-12 (1) MAG-14 (1) l.!AG-15 (1) N.AG-24 (1)

'-·

MA!FJJ !11 MGCIS-1 (1') ~AOS-2 (1) Vlill!'-21 t:.• (iJ..) ' '" VMF-214· Ia.) Vlill!'-,311 :.:· t.J . '' . ,, .. ·. ' . 'lifb13

n~·~~ll ... ~ DIJl eaoo.l_lr'rll~lli!llili'illioillo1hllill'iil!ilii!Tii?J.J

• ·', •!It-t!

·- _--,--- -- I--- __ , ____ ;...__-,:.;;,:"'~. ~~--7-~----~-----...

DECLASSIFIED

....


lStl.iJIW f>pecial Action He port (Cant 'd) KVlO/WRL: beb

CinCJ(!l (1) J;;UGAK (1) CG 5th AF (J ) C:G l<'I:AY ( l. ) CG lstlilarDiv (1) CG ?.ndMurDiv (l) Comdt, lWS, Q,uantico, Va. (5) Comdt, l~aval War College (l)

VMJ<'-312 (1) VMB'-3?3 (l) VMF(N)-513 Ill VJ.tF(I:)-51,2 (1) VM0-6 (1) VMH-152 (l)

President, Naval War College (l) COJmnandant, Armed Forces Staff' Colle,r._-:a (1) C0 Naval School (Goneral Line) Newuort, H.I. (l) Gu Naval School (General Line) Monterey, Calif (1) CG i>ir University, Maxwell Air l''orce Base, Alabama. (1) Commandant, National \Vur ColleR:e, Ft. Me Ncar (1) l)acific }:J'lcet Combat l:valuation Board, Pearl Harbor (20) Landine: J<'orce l!;gul.pment Board (l) Coml'nibiil•ouJ?-1 11) GomPlli bPac {l) MAH'rCuM (Nas Glenview, Ill) ( 2)

2

ll.tCL.\SiU'liiD Dol> lltR 0200, 10

DECLASSIFIED

•" ~ }\~\

. \\"-w.


.. . UNITED SThTES MARINE C.S • •

'jll!!\:lQUiiRTERS 1 MARINE ;,IRCR;.F ROUP 12

·lst Mo.rl..no Air Wing, Fli.F, c/o Fleet Post Office

Sun Fro.ncisco, California ('"" 1"''1

~i)lilN~O.ioo itNNEX SUG,.R COMMANDING OFFICER'S COMMENTS

1, Marino Aircraft Group 12, during the period 7 September to

9 October 1950, was initially onrcute to Japan and later wo.s

called upon to support logistically from Itami, Jap~n, tho squad

rons on tho carriers and Marine Aircro.ft Group 33 in Korea•

Durinr; this time the squ~d!'ons which ho.d originally bclongqd to

lb.rino J,ircraft Group 12 were assigned to Marine l>ircrnft Group

33 ~nd t)1:Jso of Marine ~ircro.ft Group 33 wore assigned to M2rl ne

idrornft Group 12, Since this Group was not in actunl combat

nt this timo co~runonts and rocommondations concerning tn.ctics

will have to be clelayed until n lator date whon actual combat

exporionco has been gained,

2 • ;,lthough some of tho sections and departments woro at times

hard pressed and frequently were cnll~d upon to perform functions

wr.ich tl1o~r hadn't oxpoctod, tho ovo:t'-nll operations of the Group

in tho rapidly changing tactical sl.tu.1tion were generally sntis• ·

factory, .

3. Soma of tho difficulties montionod in tho enclosed report

wore brought about bec<1uso of tho necossi ty for using obsolescent

cqui?"'ont loft over from World War II, Other difficulties wore

b0ought about by tho shifting of tactical squadrons from group

to group, upon short notioo, in order to bettor follow tho

rapidly changing tactical s~tuation, It is boliovod that diffi•.

cultios duo to the soconO causo wore tho most nurno·rous sinco the

immediate avoilability of supplios and equipment to tho squad•

rons v1cro affoctod by it. Thoro wore a few shortages in equip

mont and material upon doparting the United States, but such

problems referred to herein were of u local nature in that

equipment and material was not readily available at all times

to the squadrons.

4. This operation pointed up tho necessity for addinr, other

ltoms to tho allow,>nce list when operating indopondontly in

tho fiolcl, One such itom is the number of fork lifts ullowad

for moving tho hugo quantity of go:>r !lnd spare p~rts to maintain

o. MQrino ,\ircraft Group away from nn organized supply activity.

It is rccom~·;wndod that nll posstblo matorlnl bo pallotizod for

oxpedi tious handling and th:>t tho allowance of fork lifts as

siGned bo not less than fivo (5) por Service Squadron and ono

(J~) pur tactiolll squadron and that sparoparts for them bo car

ried in tho Section M Hllowance. Buoauso of the sho:r-to.ga, and

h0nce over-working of tho assigned forklifts, breakdowns wore

frequent, Which nocessl tiatod tho bro.o.king of the pt>llets and

tho slow arduous tusk of man handling the muter ia.l ~~board ships,

on the docks, and agnin at its dostinativn,

5.. Mn.r1no Fighter SqutHlron 323 rocommendo·d that 1 ts adm1n1s

trlltivo section accompany it ,,board ship while carrier basad,

This is oonourred in, Not only should thoy ho.vo tho complete

squ,dron ab0:1rd ships, but tho comploto squadron should bo kept

intact when ope:rnting from forward lnnd buses, since u aquo.d~

ron is too small and too compact a unit to split into two

ocholons. Any material which is in tho possession of the squad•

ron and which is not needed ~board ship ie, t&ntage nnd cnmp

oqui~ment, and any that is not needecl at a forward land base

should be turned over to the p~rant group for storage and care,

- 1 •

DECLASSIFIED


•

l

;. •f ·.' \ ..

CONFIDENTIAL ANNEX SUGAR

•• DECLASSIFIED

I - ~

\

COMMAlm!NG OFFICE;R •s OOMMENTS (CON'l'INUED)

6. 'l'he .oommunioati.ons equipment ·avaHable · in ·the ai%'OX'!lft · proved_, Qn the whole, very reliable. i"he shortage of neoee ... sary O%'ystals h ono of the exigencies which might well bo expected at the very out!! at of ho·$t1l1 Hes before prooedurea cun settle down o.nd supply ohan~els· can -b~ filled when going from peaoo~time to wa%'*,t1me ope%'ations, $Jepor1or>oe in the Japnn*Koroa area, whore only nol'i•direotional boam stations are operative, pointed out tho absolute nooossity for-having radio. direction finding sots .iflstallod in fill aircraft, In addition' a low power, non*directionul, beam station transmitter in tho vicinity of the front lines would be of inestimable aid .in getting tho aircraft equipped with.RPF into the,target area oxpoditiously undor conditions pf low visibility o.nd darkness.

? • Althou~~ tho ARC"'l radios !'unctionod very \'Jell there wore novor enough channels available for tho communications load. Since effectivenoss of air support is dopqndent uvon good and fast communications H is recommended that two (2 J :,RC•l radiQB bo installed in all tactical qiroraft to alleviate this bottleneck until UHF equipment boco1:ws s tandurd through<>ut tho sel:'vicos,.

8. Annex 11 6 11 of the onclosod report points out some of tho diffioultios oxporionced in night operations, In general the F4U=5(N) is not conei,dorcd a satisfnct'or_y o.:Lrc:rr~!'t for .night operations because its configunution and luck of visibility mako it distinctly h"z"rdous in nhht tako~offs v.nd landings.

9, Billeting and messing was no problem during this poriod as this Group was located Qt an estab11shod Air B~se in Japan.

10. Tho he!llth and morale of the co:nmund was splendid, Jupan offered nuny opportuni tios for recreation f;tnd many of tho cultural canters in tho urea wore visited on bus trips e>l'l'anged by Group Sp0cial Sorvicea Soction, Tho hc~lth of t~c comn~nd was oxcollont and the voner~l restricted list averaged less than throo (3) poroont of tht. oommahd,

11, During the latter part of this period this Group vias alerted for commi tmont into actio11' in North Korea, Because of tho rapidly changing tnctic:.~l situation in Koreo. and tho spoctccculur advo.noos of tho l'iOK troops along tho c:.>storn flunk, ch~nges in our.scllodulo were> mado to ;:qoet tho changing situation. For this reason written phms wore obsolete bofora distributed and voii[i.neo w;;.s pL.:.ced upon vur-brll di'rect:tves and sto.ff conforuncos. It is a trl.buto tot he tr~in!ng o.nd ind9c"-·· trino.tion of Marines in stuff pr1nc1plcs th!it they could capo · with thoso many chnngos nnd ~-:lGot e'lC.h new r•Dqui!'emont us it nroso.

b~~~Lt4-.L B, C , 'BA TT)l;R'l'ON

I

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DECLASSIFIED

Korean War Project USMC-00304103DICCLASSIFIED

• Hoadouartors lst Marino Air Wing, FMF

o/o Fleot Post Office; San Francisco

CllJJF IDbHTIIH ..

1. Comments of Commanding Goneral to comments Air Command, X Corps. (Ann0x Ablo, Suction I) arc corrospondine,ly nu..~.bored ..

of Tactical C o:nm<J n t s

(1) Concur in tho case: whoro u g<·ncral officer in a~sip;nod to the coT!llllD.nd of a ro inforcod n:roup. I:r honuvor, n •:onoral officer is nssiR:ncd as "Tactical Air Coll1!ll1lndor" Hitil but ono aircraft o:roup end <•stablish his hoadcuurtcrs with tllo noccss~ry comrnunio.~tions to12cthor vdth his· tactical air command cqnt0.r (TACO)· :ti1 closo proximity to tho hoadonurtors of tho ~r.round command.or. By so doing tho ~\Cticol Air 6onmmndor and his staff will e:stablish the tKccsP.ury closo coo:rdinCltion with tho "round commander and his staff. Tho conditions of suporimnosinn: onu nvi<:ction staff unon another would thon 1\ot exist.

( 2 )(a) This condition and simil,u· situations Will be lar~ol y proven ted if tho hoo.dnunrtors of tho Tactical Air Connr¥l.ndcl" is ostnblishod as notod 1n (1) o.bovo, (b) \lith rd'<,r<Jnco to pnotoo:ru phi c c;:,pa bi 11 tics, tho InchonfSoou..l c.~.mpo.ir;n indicates i,fi;-lt tho pr·csont Win~ Photop;ro.phio establishment is adonuatc to moot normal roquirom~nts. Howovor, photoRraphinR or large· nrcns in forwn:rd zones· is beyond the. oo.pnb:!.litics and not oonsidorod n normAl function of the Winq, photoRraphic orp;cnization.

()) "A group ~···ith u. rc~imcnt o.nd o win~ with a divisionu is o. p,ood yardstick for dotorminino: tho rolotivo strcr~th of Marin<' Corps Aviation, It is not u o:oorl operational yardstick .since in wnr no t•..:o situ;:;.tions aro uliko. 'I'hc. nu.;n;round team must bo oro:.~niwd on a task orto:nntzation batds to moot the roouircmonts of tho partionl.u sit\Dtion at hand.

(4) No comments,

(5}.Concur. Tho thr~e addttion"11 iiR:ht obsorvutioit nil'• craft nssigned to ro~>:imcnts wo1.ll d ···o in offoot airborne TACPs. .

(6), (7) & (B) No comments.

(9) VMH aircraft 'lre now orrtnnic to a ~brine Air Wing,· T+ t.r1s boon provod thnt trnnsport aircraft nro roo.ndatory for the suoccissfu,l prosecution of nodorn wurfnrc. (10) T!lo E-ntire orr-;.1nization uf tho Morino Air Control Group etnd its componunt pnrts must bo l'<'Viowod in lill'.ht of oxporioncc Rninod in tho Koronn Wor.. In bri"f, J.t is rolt th:~tt tho '1\.lcticnl Air Control Contor {TACC} ns no1t~ conBti tutod sllould bo nn orR~nio JY'"t of n ~ln:rino Tr1ctical Air Control Snuadron. It is nlso felt tho.t thuro should bo one tacticQl nir diN>otion center ( TADO • per division and thnt possibly this oontor should bo an OTfl--cnic pa:,t or tllc division. Fu'rthor OOMI'l(Onte on this subject will be !11.'1dc by soparn to correspondcnoc, (ll) Concur.

DECLASSIFIED


Heudauurtors l st Marino Air \Hng, FMF

c/o Fleet Post Offioo, f'Jt1n Frnnoisoo

CONFID:cNT LtL

1. Connvnts of CormnndiM GonorQl to oormonts of. Conna.nding Officer, Morine ''ircruft Group 33. (Annex Potcr to Section II). Coru'l\lnts -:1ro correspond in:11;l y nunborcJd, Addi tiono.l cor.u··tents by Coml!lnding Gvnoral added ns shown,

(l) Concur,

( 2) Concur. Photo nquircnonts fron ~round on~anizC>tions Q.S woll ·:..s ~ling Photor-;r~phio nouds ::tro sufflciont to war-r,ont thu cort"lissioninrr of ono (1) Photoc;ruphic Scu:1.dron por Vling, Do not concur in the rooon.'~"Rnd':'l.tion of nloc.so of oporntioml control of tho Photc>f\rOnhic Svotion to tho supportod ground corlft.'i.ndor, (Annux l'hn - pa(lo 4, pam 1. )

2, Oth(;r cornonts nnd rccortrlfJfldQtions throurdwut '"!.rc oithor ooncurrc.d in or considered locnl problons oxoc:pt ns follows:

•

(n) Annex Love, Pnge 2: Concur in tho principh nf ad our. to baso defense but consider sizo, nunbor and oouipnont of such unit and oporntional co:-ntrol should bo vested in nroo. connnndor.

(b) ·Annox Quo on, p2o;o 17, sub para ( 6): In addition to roquirononts for a ciosc air supnort aircraft the following factors should be included:

1. R~dio facilities:

(n) Two ( 2) VHF trr,msouivors (b) Low frcononcy honer,

( o) Annox Uncle, pogo 19, sub para. ( 1i): It is considorcd essential for the TACO or TACP to llavo sono norms 0f providing honinr; fncili tics into tho tnrgot aroa during pc.riods of low cuil:l.ngs o.na for [<.11 Wcathc:r conditto!1s. \lith prosont c 0uipnent and in proper plnco(low frooucncy horJor in nirc:rnft ~tnd low froquoncy. non-dtrnct.ion.nl be~·") nt TACP or TACC) in ocm~i.do:rc·d. ft1nsblo •

CONFIDUIT·J1t

DECLASSIFIED


Tfc':"! d t:lUn rt.ors lst M.:'.·~·:i 'lV 11 i :r \'HJ•g, FMF

c/o Fluet l~cat. Of:fiov,. ::..:on Frnncisoo

l, Conr.1cnts of Com.l:nndin~ n.cncrnl to cot1.''l'lCntn of _Com~ndin~ Officer, !.!orl.no Aircr<lft Group 12. (Annex Sugn.r to Section III). Comncnts nro nunborod correspondingly.

( l ) No conncnts,

(?.) No co:mnn-;;s.

() ) j ·O COT~Ilf.3lltS •

( 4) Concut·.

( 5) Concur with H:r.~rks of r,rnup Cot-tr11.ndcr.

(6) Concur,

(?) Conour in prir.cl.plc, It is felt th''t tlw o.ir-c:round problcr·l of con::.mnic·1tion could be ·-._).} ovintod Y'ith u bettor olloc~.tion of frvouonoies.

( 8) Concur,

(9) No connonts,

(10) No connonts.

( ll) Concur.

CUNFI!J' :J·J'2IAT_

DECLASSIFIED


CONFIDENTIAL

0882/SIU AD Sel' t< I; ~

t>l r ': 1g:.,;

F"ll·lll'I t•;·o~J:.~l~T on CG letMAW oont ltr eezo 0129 ot 9 Apr 1061 " .. l':l._ 1\1\'L-

- ' \.\ ~~ i ;:.I< I • 'f0.~ ll~-itl,o !C'~~dlng Genera11_ Flee1: Mulne Foroe, J>aolrlo _,,~~~ NiJ ln4ant or the I'IU1ne Oo:rpa

UubJI lotMAW Bpeo1al Aotlon Re,port tor per1od 7 September 1900 to 0 Ootobel' 19&01 1111441t1one to

net 1 (b) 00 FMF.Pao l tr ur 0001•&1 ot 10 Jul 1$1&1 (laUn4 on CG l1tKAW oonr ltr 1er 037 or to Feb 1911)

Enoll (3) Ooamente on addltlone to latHAM 8p1o1a1 Aotlon 1\eport ror per1o4 7 &epteawzo 19DO w 9 Oo1:ober 19&0

l, SUbmitted herevlth, aa'-nolo~N (1), al'e o.,nh vbloh were not 1noluded 1n enolo1ure (B) ot reterenee (b),

Oopy 1:<1 I CO leVIA\1

·.\'.' . : -.~ -""']

' I :-.... ~.; ;; \t.!i.R'O

r~ ,~~~-~-l :}~--:; __ -~--: -: .. ~.;~\~:~ J~\U. CON FIDENtlAL \" , ... -

DECLASSIFIED


00/IJ.Mll:N'l'b ON 'l'll&; lB'f HAIUNE AIRCRAFT WING SPECIAL ACTION REPORT t'OH 'l'H!:; l'E;.kiOD 7 S!k?Tp;.NBtR l9W TI:!ROYOH 9 QQ'l'QBEH litO_

l. Pnragr~<ph 4, Oonour.

ColiUlum\. 1'be reoollllliendat1on tha.t the allowanoo for forlll1fts aee1~ned be not leao U1an five (0) per &ervloe Squadron anCl one 0 1 l'er· taot1oal squadron and tha\ apare par to for the:~. be oarrled ln U11 Seot1on M Allovanoe h oonu1dered to be a~aent1al. f'orkl1fte are extremely useful and a labor u.Y1ng 4ev1oe 1n normal airfield operat1one, ae vell as during amph1b1oua opera t1on r;.

2. raragraph 5. Oonou.r 1n part.

Con.n.(>nt. 'lh11 Headquarters aonoura 1n the reoouullendat1on that oquadrone ahould be kept 1ntaot, wherever pOI61ble, when opera\ing from forward land baeea. However, when aquadrone are opltrat1ng from oarr1ers it 18 usuallJ 1apoaaiblt or 1111praot1oable to erubark the full oomple .. nt ot aquadron personnel due pr1mar1ly to a laok ot aooommodat1one. It 1a boveYer, oonelderad eaeent1al tba1. autf1o1enl a4a1n11trat1Ye pereonnel be eabu·k.e<.i 1n orJu to aooomplhlo normal adm1n1draUon. In adcl1Uon the reoor<lll of all personnel embarked should be oarrled 1n order· to oope with ~U~Y 41ea1pl1narJ, aed1oal, d1ebura1ng, ato., matt.era that a.lght ar·he vh1le aboard.

~. Paragr·aph 6, Conou.r.

co~~ent, The 41tt1oult1aa whloh ooourred in airborne and VHF oryatall1u.t1on probat>l)' resulted, 1n part, troll the faot that JANAl' 19tH B) wu not tollovtd tor trequen07 planning 1n the far l!;aat. Slnoe the nor•al prooureaant and 1aaue of oryatalo 1c based on JANAP l9&(B), &nJ a1gnitioant 4niatlon therefrom pose~ a orJatalllaatlon proble• unleea extenolve orJatal gr1nd1ng tac1l1tiee are available and there 1a autt1olant time to grind and 1natall orJatala for non JANAP l9&(B) aaelgnmente.

The 1netall1ng or trans•lttere at or near the front llnau 1a oonourre(l 1n. However, the 'plaolnf of a low trequenoJ beacon 1n the vlo1n1tr or the front 1 nea la open \a queat1on alnoe auoh a tranam1tter oould aerve aa a beaoon to ena~ alroratt ana would prov14e an 14aal target tor enea, vr operations. S1noa the problem is that ot providing a aaana VherebJ tr1en4l7

ENCLOSURE (&)

DECLASSIFIED


CON Fl DE:~TIAl airoraft oan orient thaaaalvea wlth ra1paot to a known point within a ground foroe zone of aot1on, 1t 1e oonaiderad that some other type of eleotronio dev1oe a1gbt prove aora suitable and las~ vulnerable to enem, 10M. In an7 event, 1t 11 believed that the type beaoon, Whether it.be low trequenoy or VHF wnioh emits an essentially continuous signal ehould be looated at a aem1 remote plaoe within a friendly area ao that in the event that it draws fire, suoh tire will not 1sriouel7 Jeopardize nearby installation&.

Tbe recommendation that all airoratt have RDF equipment installed 1a strongly oonourred ln. Although it is poaaible that the newer type airoratt with vhiob Marine squadrons will eventually be equipped mar have RDF as standard equipment, the aircraft presently ~ployed should be aqulpped with every devioe available whioh v1ll assist and improve preaent olose air support technique.

f, Paragraph 7, Conour in part.

Comment, It is telt that a more suitable allocation ot trequenoieo plus adequate o1rouit discipline should reduoe the need for more than ten (10) ohannela aa now provided by AN/ARC-1 equipaent.

5. Paragraph 8, Oonour.

CON FIDENTIA\. 2 EHOLOSUR& (3)

DECLASSIFIED


I I

DECLASSIFIED

Headquarters let Marine Air Win~, I'J'I.l'

o/o FJ.r:f!t Poflt Uf'fioe 1 San l:l'ranoi sco

h'l'l 0 /WRT,: 1mb A9 Her: 0129

8 APR 1951

!'~rom: Cum.ItJantl i ng General To: Comman~ant of the M~rine Corps Via 1 C·Hcummding General, l'l eet Marine Foroe, J'aoirio

8ubj: letli.AW s,.,o\al Action Report for period 7 Bn,temoor 1950 to 9 ~otober 1950, additions to

Hef: (a) 00, Fill' Pao 1 tr aer 2260 of 6 Feb 1951

l.nol: ( l) Annex Sugar to Bt,otion III, c,'f lstMAW Specie! Aot1on Heport. tor period 7 Sent.ember 1950 to 9 October 1950 Comment~ or Commandinr, General on reoommendatione contain, d ir1 1 st!.IAW Special. Aotion llapc>rt for r•erlod 7 [>e,,tember 1950 to 9 C>otober 1950

1. In ncoordance wltt1 the instructions contain' d in re:rerenoe (a), ~nolosuree (l) and (?.1 are forwarded herewith.

?, Enolo•ure (1) contains the comment•' ot the Commandln~ "t'fioer, Marine Aircraft Group 12 on tr1e rfloommendatians contai.ned in L~E~otion III of the subjeot spooia1 &otion report snd :S R to be appentiE~d. as Annex 8ugar thereto.

), lcliC•OnJre (:?) contain• tne comlltflnt. of tl•e Oollllllllndinp General on t:.c :r<,cwrnmend&.tionn made by the Tact1oal Air Comm.'l.nder·, X Cor1m, by t te Ool111D•md1ng Officer, Marine Aircraft Grou)J 33, end by the Commanding Otfloer, Marine Airo:rat't Oroup 1?.. TH1.1< enolosure is to be added after pep;e three ()I and preo<·dl nr, Annex Able in ~E~otion I of the subject ~pf:cde.l action report.

4• Upun removal of enolosurer (1) and (2), thin letter of trausro1tta1 may be deo1ase1t1ed,

Ill STillU 'TJOI<I

ON~ (?I B\IAER (1) CMC (llir~ctor of Avlatton) (1 I l'"MFLant (l) AirtKfPan (l) Airl•'h:f,'L,or>t (l) OomAirPac ( l )

l'IEr.D HARRIS

CG 'dMAW (l I IWJ-ll (1) IIA0-12 (1 I llAG-11, (1) IIAG-15 (l) MAG-24 (l) MAG-)) (l) ,, \ ..... ~~

OomNaW"l' (l) I!GCJB-l ( 1) \i/ , MTACB-2 (1! "-.Wc''\,

.. ~~ ComFuirJtip (1 I ComCarD!v 15 (11 CinC ,, oYl t ( 2) OinCLantn t (11

VMF-212 (l -VMl'-<u. (1 · Vloil'- 311 ( 1 )

l4UJS

OONFIIEN'l' TAt,

DECLASSIFIED

•


- - - - - --- . ------ - - - . --. -- - -- -. -1stNAW Speoial Action Report (Oont'd) KVl OfWRL I be b - - - - ... - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - .. - - •1- - - - -COli!!' IllENTIAL:

GinC.Fll (1) EUHAK (1) 00 5th AY 11) GG FJJ:Al!' (l GO lstMarDiV (1) OG %ndlot<i rDl v ( 1 ) Oomdt, li.CS, Quantico, Va. (5) Gomdt, Naval War College (1)

Vlll'-312 (l) VMI'-)2) (l) VliF IN j-513 (1) VI4P' N -542 (l) Vld0·6 ( 1) VllR-152 (1 )

Pre&1dont 1 Navul War College (l) ComroondMt, Armed ~·uroes Staff Oolle~e (1) cu Navul School (General Linel Newport, H,I, (1/ Cu J<avo.l School (General Line lbnterey, Calif 1) CO Air University, Maxwell Air P'oroe Bane, Alabama (1) Colllllltiudant, National War College, !1t. 14o Near 11) Puo1fio }' lo<>t Gom'b!l t l>valuation Board, Pearl Harbor ( 20) Landing Force hquipment lloard (l) OomPni bGrou~l (1) OomPhl. bPao (l ) MAHTC"M (NaR Glenvi~w, Ill) (2)

' ,· ..•• ;:,;·;.~-.,

2 OONJI'mli:N'l'W.

DECLASSIFIED


\

DECLASSIFIED

UNITE!l"STATES MARINE C' PS

lst I!~ADQUARTERS, MARINE ;,IRCRIJ'• GROUP 12 j Marine Air Wing, FMF, c/o Fleet Post Offi~~ 0000"'

CONFIDENTIAL ANNEX SUG~R

Sun Francisco, Cnliforhia - , 1

t:..

COMMII!IDING OFFICE~S COM:~i!:JlTS

1. Murine Aircraft Group 12, during the period 7 September to 9 October 1950, was initially onroute to \Tapan and later wo.s

(called upon to support logistically from Itami, Japan,· tho aq=drons on the Cnrriors nnd Ma:rine A.ircro.ft Group 33 in Korea. 1

During this time tho squadrons which had originally bolcngod to . Mo.rino h.irornft Group 12 "·ere assigned to Marine Aircraft Group 1 •

33 and those of Marine t.ircraft Group 33 were aasignod to Mo.rl. ne Aircraft Group 12, Sinoe this Group was not in actual coMbat at this time comments and rooommondations concerning tactics will heve to be dclayad until n lo.ter date whon actunl combot

exporionco has boen gained.

2, J,lthough some of tho sections and departments were at times hard prossed and fr&quontly were called upon to perform functions

which thoy hadh't expoctod, tho over-all operations uf the Group in the .~ap1dly changing taotie~l situ~tion wore gener~llY en tis~.

fuctory.

5. Somo of the diffieultios mentioned in the enclosed report waro brought about because of thQ necessity for using obsolescent

equipment loft ovor from Wo.rld '/lor II, Other d1ff1culttes wore brought about by the shifting of·tactical Squadrons from group

to group, upon short notioo, in order to batter follow the rapidly changing tactical situ~tion. It is believed that diffi-. culties duo to the second causo were the most numorous sincO the immcdiuto availability of supplies and equipment to tho squadrons wcro o.ffocted by it •. There were e few shortages in equipmont and m~terial upon departing the United States, but. such

problems referred to herein were of a ·local nature in that equipment and .material was not readily available at all times

to the squadrons,

4. , This operation point.od up the necessity for o.dding other items .to tho a.llowunco list when operating indepondontly in tho field. One such itom is the number of fork lifts allo'Ned for moving the hU(\o quantity of go~r ond spare purts to maintain

. a U . .s.rino .d.ircro.ft Group awo.y froLn an organized supply 'lctivit-y. It is recommondod that all possible material bo palletizod for expeditious handling and thut tho nllowance of fork lifts assigned bo not less than five (5) per Service Squadron and ono (1) per tnot1cal squadron and tho.t spareparts for them bo car

ried in tho Section M i~llowo.ncc, Bocauae of.· the short!l.ga 1 o.nd hGnce over-working of the assigned forklifts, breakdowns were

frequent, which nocessitietod the breaking of tho pallets and tho slow arduous t~sk of man handling the material aboard ships,

on the docks, and again at its destination.

5. Marino Fighter Squa<.lron 323 reoomm<>nded that its adminiatrntive soction accompany it aboard ship while carrier based.

This is concurred in. !lot only should thoy havo tho complete . squudron aboard ships, but tho complote squadron should bo kept

intact when operating from forward lend bases, s1noe a squ~d~ ron 1s too small and too compact n unit to split into two

echelons. Any material which is in the possession of the squadron ond which is not. needed aboard ship·i~~ tentage and onmp

equipment, and any that is not needed at n forward land base should be turned over to the parent group for storage nnd care.

OONFIDENTIJ.I,

- 1 -

f.l" ., ' [ '. "" ,,, ' ,. '.

DECLASSIFIED


. \

CONFIDENTIAL ANNEX SUGAR

DECLASSIFIED

COMMANDING OFF'ICER 'S CO!.lME/lTS (CONTINUliD)

6, Tho communi<~ations equipment ·available in the· aircraft ·proved, on the whole, vory reliable. ihe. shortage of necessary crystals is. ono ot tho oxigenoies Which might well bo expected at the very outset of hosfi~li t~es before prooe<lul'eF oo.n settle down and supply <lhttnnele can be !'illod when going from peaoe-t1me to -war~ time operation.B.o · Experience ll\ the ,: · Jo.pt;!n-Kor,oa are~, __ who~o only non .. _dir_et;l_1;_1_on,a~. boam _$tat1ons ~-r,.o·· oporativo, pointed out tho absolute necessity tor having radio direction finding sots inst~llod in all aircraft, In addition a low power, non-directional, beam station·transmittcr in tho vicinity of the front lines would be ot inesti~able aid in getting tho aircraft equipped with RDF into the target urea expeditiously undor oondiHona of low visibility and darkness.

7, Although tho ARC•l radios functioned very well ·thoro wore nevor enough channels avuilablo tor tho oom:nunioations· load, Since effectiveness of air support is dependent upon good nl1d fast communications it is voo01.unonded that two (2) /,RC-1 rudioe bo installed in all tactical aircraft to ulloviate this bo~tloneck until UHF equipment becomes standurd through<•ut tho servicos.

B. .Annox 11 6" of the onclosod :report po'ints out sor.te of the difficulties exporioncod in night operations. In genet'o.l the F4U-5(N) 1a not considered u satisfuctory aircraft tor night operations booauao its ocnfigunation and 1ack of visibility mako it distinctly hazardous in nioht't~ko-offs and landings,

9, Billeting and messing w~s no problem durinf, this period as this Group Wi!S located "t an estublishod Ait' Ease in Japan.

10) Tho ho::dth ~nd morale of tho command wns splendid. Jupnn offered no.ny opportunities for recreation ond muny of tho cu.lturo.l canters in the uv-ea wcro Vi~ited on bua -Fr.1ps :::~.:rroanged by Grou;> Special Sot'vicos Section, Tho health of the comnund wo.e cxoollont o.nd the ·vonor'),l roatrieted list uvo:r>'n.god_ l$ss than throe (3) percent of tho command,,

ll. During the luttor part of this period this Group was nlertod 'for commitment ·into o.ction in .North -~area. Bec::iuse of the rapidly ch~nging tuctic2l situation in Korea rm'd tho spoctncu.lc.r advance~.; of tl:l<; HOI\ troops along the O'l.Stevn flunk, ch~ngos in our schedule woro mado to :noet tho chahging situution. For this rerraon W!litton plans wore obs.::;~lote bofore distributed and reliance was pl~ced upon verbal directives and sto.ff conferences. !t ia a tribute to tho trJ.lning s.nd !ndoo'""·· trinc,tion of Marinos in staff principles that they could cope · with the so many changes and ;;1oct each now rcqutrorr.ont !.lB. it, \\ o.:r.oso ~

E. 0. B:,'l''l'ERTON

. CONFlPENTlAL

DECLASSIFIED


\

DECLASSIFIED

·-··

Headauarters lst Murine Air \"ling, FMF.

c/o Floot Post Offico, San Francisco

()&fQ! lbtlf!!Jt:.

l. Air arc

Comments of Commanding Ocncral to comments Command, X Corps, (Annex Ablo, Section I) correspondingly numbered,

of Tactical Comments

(l) Concur in ttw on so whcro a p;Pneral officer in assigned to the cormnund of' a reinforood ~roup. If however, n ,v;onoral officor is nssi~<nod ns "Tactical Air Commander" with but ono aircraft group and ostablish his hoadcuartcrs with tho nocossurv communiclltions together with hO.s tactical air command center (TACO) in close proximity to tho headouortors of tho ~round COlliJilElndor. By so doing thr~ Tactiov.l Air 6oJ'l11W1ndor o.nd his sta:ff will establish tho ncccseary close coordinc.tion with tho (!;:"Ound commander a.nd his staff. The conditions of sUpc.r-imnosin~ onu n.viation staff unon another ymuld then not e:xist.

(2)(a) This condition and simil2n situations will be lnr~oly provcntod if tho hondounrtors of tho Tactical Air Commander is ostnblishod ns noted in (1) above,

{b) \>Vi th rc furenco to p.i:lotoR:ranhio c..l}Xlbi ti tics, tho Inchon/Seoul m:mpair,n indicates tlnt tho present Win~~: Photographic establishment is adonuatE; to moot normnl rcquircmE.>nts. However, photoRrnphinp; of largo orcas in forwurd zones is beyond thu ccpnbilitics und not considered n normal function of th0 Win~ photop,:rnphic organization.

(3) "A group with a ro~~;imcnt and u wine; with " division" is n good yardstick for dctcrnlnin~~: the relative stron~th of Marine Corps Aviation, It is not a ~~:ood opc.rCttional yardstick since in wnr no two situatiOns o.ro O.liko. Tho air-ground team must bo org~nizod on a task or~nnizotion basis to moot the rcouircments of the particul.tr situntion at hand.

( 4) No connnonts,

(5) Concur,. The three oddition~l li&~ht observation aircraft ussignod to rop;irncnts would .,o in effect airborne TACPs,

(6), (7) & (8) No comments.

( 9) VMH aircraft ~re now orl',anic to a n~1rine Air Wing, It hrlB bcjon pr-oved thnt trunsport ui~crc.ft uro mo.ndo.tory f'or the succossful·prosocutiqn of Jllodern ~:.trfo.rc..

(10) Tho entire org~nizntion of tho Mnrino Air Control Group und its compontmt pn.rts must be roviewod in light of exporioncc mined in the Koronn Wnr. In brief, it is folt th~t the ~totionl Air Control Cantor (TACO) as now constituted should be nn or~<ani'c Inrt ot n Mnrinc T!lctical Air Control Sduadron. It is-o.lso f'clt tha\t there should bo one tactical nir direction cantor ( TA;JQ' per division and thnt possibly this center should be '"' orn;.ccnic part of the division, Further conmcnts on thi" subject will be rnndo by sopar(lto oorr'espondonco •.'

( l1 ) Concur,

DECLASSIFIED

~l'lOLASSIII'IED

llo'D DIR 1200.1G

1ST MARINE AIR WING - SAR 3 - 7 SEPTEMBER 1950 - 8 … · on CG lstMAW conf ltr ser 037 of 20 Feb...

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Transcript of 1ST MARINE AIR WING - SAR 3 - 7 SEPTEMBER 1950 - 8 … · on CG lstMAW conf ltr ser 037 of 20 Feb...