1999 Southeast Asia's Democratic Moment

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Southeast Asia's Democratic MomentAuthor(s): Amitav AcharyaReviewed work(s):Source: Asian Survey, Vol. 39, No. 3 (May - Jun., 1999), pp. 418-432Published by: University of California PressStable URL: http://www.jstor.org/stable/3021206 .

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SOUTHEASTASIA'SDEMOCRATICMOMENT

Amitav Acharya

Among the multiple effects of the current Asian eco-

nomic crisis is the challenge it has posed to authoritarianule. While govern-

ments of the region emphasizethe social dislocation and potentialfor polit-

ical instabilitycaused by the economic downturn,Musa Hitam, a formerMa-

laysian deputy prime minister, has pointed out that "in the present social,

economic scenario, the humanrightscause seems to be [the] winner here."1

Contrasting he political chaos andcollapse of the Suhartoregime in authori-

tarian Indonesia with the smooth leadershiptransitions n democratic South

Korea, the Philippines, and Thailand, some advocates of democracy argue

thatdemocraticregimes are more capableof effective governanceand crisis

management han authoritarian nes. Furthermore,he notion of "Asianval-

ues," once credited with the region's economic success, andfor some time apowerful conceptualjustificationfor authoritarianule, is now being blamed

for the economic crisis.

The economic crisis necessitates a rethinkingand reorientation f the liter-

atureon democratization n SoutheastAsia.2 This literature,at least during

Amitav Acharyais Associate Professorin the Departmentof Political

Science, York University, Toronto, Canada. The author would like to acknowledge the Asia

ResearchCentreat MurdochUniversity, Australia, or financialsupportand thankGarryRodan,

Brad Roberts,M. Ramesh,and an anonymousreviewerfor Asian Surveyfor valuable comments

on an earlierdraftof this article.

? 1999 by The Regents of the University of California

1. "Musa [Hitam]: Asia's Dynamic Growth Lulled People into Complacency,"New Straits

Times (Kuala Lumpur),June 1, 1998, p. 4.

2. Recent studies of democratization n Southeast Asia include the importantvolume by Ke-

vin Hewison, RichardRobison, and GarryRodan, eds., SoutheastAsia in the 1990s: Authoritari-

anism, Democracyand Capitalism (Sydney:Allen and Unwin, 1993); Don Emmerson,"Region

and Recalcitrance:RethinkingDemocracyThroughSoutheast Asia," Pacific Review 8:2 (1995),

pp. 223-48; Clark D. Neher and Ross Marlay, Democracy and Development in SoutheastAsia:

The Winds of Change (Boulder, Colo.: Westview Press, 1995); and Michael R. J. Vatikiotis,

Political Change in Southeast Asia: Trimmingthe Banyan Tree (London: Routledge, 1996).

Severalother studies of democratizationn the Asia Pacific region include SoutheastAsian case

418



AMITAV ACHARYA 419

the earlier part of the 1990s, had been concerned essentially with domestic

factors. These included the effect of rapideconomic growth on regime legiti-

macy and cohesion, the size and attitude of the middle class, and the pros-

pects for civil society. The currenteconomic and political turmoil in South-east Asia shows that the domestic forces that affect democratizationoften

derive their strengthfrom internationalones, including the effects of global-

ization and the spread of democratic values. Moreover, in the early 1990s,

amid much talk about the Asian economic "miracle," cholarshad focused on

the relationshipbetween economic growth and political change. The Asian

economic crisis necessitates further nvestigation nto the impact of economic

downturns n facilitatingor inhibiting the democratizationprocess.

This article argues that a combinationof domestic, intraregional, ndexter-

nal pressures nducedby the economic crisis has put authoritarianismn the

defensive and empowered pro-democratic orces in SoutheastAsia. While it

may be too early to judge whetherSoutheastAsia's democraticmomentwill

turn out to be irreversibleor even durable,the crisis has already helped the

cause of democratizationn several ways. First, it has debunkedthe notion,

promotedby some SoutheastAsian leaders during the growth years, that de-

mocracy may be inimical to development. That the democraticgovernments

of Thailand and South Korea were more successful at adjusting to the eco-

nomic downturn han the authoritarian uhartoregime in Indonesia has sug-

gested a positive linkage between democracy and development (in the sense

of the former's ability to deal with threatsto the latter). Secondly, the crisis

has increased internationalpressure on governmentsto undertakepolitical

reform. These have included the pressures accompanyingrescue packages

from international inancial institutions-even as the InternationalMonetary

Fund's (IMF)role has been criticizedfor creating greater nstabilityin Indo-

nesia rather than promoting democratizationper se-and Western donors,

who had toleratedauthoritarian ule during the years of cold war geopoliticsandthe so-calledAsian economic miracle. Moreover,the impactof the crisis

has generated what I call a democratic contagion effect across the region.

Thoughlimitedin scope, this has given pro-democracy orces throughout he

regionnew hope andencouragement.Last but not least, the crisis has under-

studies. See Harold Crouchand James Morley, eds., Driven by Growth:Political Change in the

Asia-Pacific Region (Armonk, N.Y.: M. E. Sharpe, 1993); Daniel A. Bell, David Brown, Ka-

nishka Jaayasuriya, and David Martin Jones, Towards Illiberal Democracy in Pacific Asia

(London: Macmillan, 1995); Anek Laothamatas,ed., Democratization in Southeast and East

Asia (Singapore: Institute of Southeast Asian Studies, 1997); and Garry Rodan, ed., Political

Oppositions in IndustrialisingAsia (London:Routledge, 1996).

3. See in particular,Crouch and Morley, eds., Driven by Growth, and Don Emmerson,"A

Virtuous Spiral? Southeast Asian Economic Growth and Its Political Implication," n Asia's

New WorldOrder,ed. George T. Yu (WashingtonSquare, N.Y.: New York University Press,

1997).



420 ASIANSURVEY,VOL.XXXIX,NO. 3, MAY/JUNE 999

mined regional norms shielding authoritarian ule from foreign, especially

neighborly, criticism. The retreat of the doctrine of noninterference n the

Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN) has created space for a

more open form of regionalism in SoutheastAsia, which could aid the causeof human rights and democracy. The following sections explore these

themes.

Rethinking the Democracy andDevelopment Nexus

Scholarsof democracyhave long debatedthe relationshipbetween economic

development and democratization.4 Some of the early modernization heo-

rists acknowledgedthat economic developmentcould createpolitical instabil-ity leading to democratic breakdownsand imposition of authoritarian ule.5

But more recent writings, especially the so-called "ThirdWave" literature,

view economic growthin general,and a relatively high per capitaincome in

particular,as being generallyconducive to democratization.6As Huntington

argued, "Democratizationoccurs most frequently and also most easily in

countriesthat have reached the upper-middle ncome levels of economic de-

velopment."7

In Southeast Asia, however, economic growth and risingincomes duringthe 1980s did not produce a momentum owarddemocratization. Growthdid

not reduce elite cohesion in countriessuch as Singapore,Malaysia, Indonesia,

and Thailandas theorywould have predicted.8 Nor did it produce, except to

a limited degree in Thailand,the emergence of a liberalizingmiddle class

population actively seeking democratictransformation. Instead, it allowed

4. Some recentcontributions o this debate includeLarryDiamond,"EconomicDevelopment

and Democracy Reconsidered,"American Behavioral Scientist 35 (May-June 1992), pp. 450-

99; John Heliwell, "EmpiricalLinkages Between Democracy and Economic Growth,"British

Journal of Political Science 24 (April 1994), pp. 225-48; and Seymour MartinLipset, "The

Social Requisitesof Democracy Revisited,"AmericanSociological Review 59 (February1994),

pp. 1-22.

5. Samuel P. Huntington, Political Order in Changing Societies (New Haven, Conn.: Yale

University Press, 1968).

6. For a review of ThirdWave literature, ee Doh Chull Shin, "On the ThirdWave of Democ-

ratization:A Synthesis of Recent Theory and Research,"WorldPolitics 47 (October 1994), pp.

135-70. For a strong argumentas to why economic growth can promote democratization, ee

Tun-jen Cheng, "Taiwan in Democratic Transition" n Driven by Growth, ed. Morley, pp.

193-218.

7. Samuel P. Huntington,"Cart Before the Horse," Financial Mail (Johannesburg),129:5

(July 30, 1993), p. 39, cited in Larry Swatukand Timothy Shaw, eds., The South at the End of

the TwentiethCentury(London: Macmillan, 1994), p. 236.

8. Larry.Diamond, "The Globalizationof Democracy," in Global Transformationand the

Third World,eds. Robert 0. Slatter, Barry M. Schultz, and Steven R. Dorr (Boulder, Colo.:

Lynne Rienner, 1993), pp. 31-69.



AMITAV ACHARYA 421

governments o deflect criticism of authoritarian ule, while giving them ade-

quate resources and opportunitiesto co-opt the middle class. Rather than

engender greater political openness and participatory nstitutions, economic

growth became the principal ustification for authoritarianism.In addition,thanksto rapideconomic growth, elite perspectives on democ-

ratization in Southeast Asia could privilege democracy over discipline and

society over self. Lee Kuan Yew, Singapore's senior minister, once com-

mented that "the exuberance of democracy leads to undisciplinedand disor-

derly conditions which are inimical to development."9 To be sure, not all

leaders in the region agreed with this view. President Ramos of the Philip-

pines, for example, remindedMr.Lee that the authoritarianism f the Marcos

era contributed n no small way to the country's economic ruin. But the

argument hatWestern-style iberaldemocracywould not supportEast Asia's

economic development also received endorsement from the proponentsof

Asian values, who argued that East Asian economic success came from a

respect for authority hey saw as common to their societies.

The economic crisis struck at the very roots of both the "disciplineover

democracy"and "society over self' arguments. In Indonesia, the Suharto

regime's initial swift response to the economic crisis (by floating the Indone-

sian rupiah)seemed to reinforce the view thatauthoritarian olitical systems

mightbe better able to deal with nationaleconomic problems. But the subse-

quent collapse of the Indonesianeconomy was due largely to the failings of

the political system, including authoritarianism, ronyism, and nepotism.

Pro-democracy orces in the region andelsewhere could contrastIndonesia's

predicamentwith that of South Korea and Thailand in turning the "democ-

racy is bad for development" ogic on its head. They pointed to the relative

ease with which SouthKorea and Thailandwere able to findpolitical alterna-

tives to the existing regimes, regimes which then moved to distance them-

selves from the mistakes of their predecessors. Madeleine Albright, the U.S.secretaryof state,lost no time andopportunity n stressingthe lesson. In her

view, democraticgovernments n Korea,the Philippines,and Thailandmade

progress in overcoming the economic crisis "in part because their people

were able to elect new governments,which startedwork in a climate of open-

ness and trust,and with the moral legitimacy to call for shared sacrifice."'0

Indonesiacould not do so because of Suharto's authoritarian ule. Albright's

view is by no means a solely Westernperspective. OutgoingPresident Ra-

mos of the Philippines was even more blunt. Blaming the "agony"of theAsian economies on lack of "transparency nd democraticcontrols,"Ramos

9. China News (Taipei), November 21, 1992.

10. Secretaryof State Madeleine K. Albright,OpeningRemarksBefore the Senate Appropria-

tions Committee, Subcommittee on Foreign Operations,Washington, D.C., June 16, 1998, as

released by the Office of the Spokesman, U.S. Departmentof State.



422 ASIAN SURVEY, VOL. XXXIX, NO. 3, MAY/JUNE 1999

claimed that "the present economic crisis proves that in choosing democracy

over authoritarianism,we Filipinos were on the side of history, rather than

outside of it, as earlier believed."1 Kim Dae Jung, the South Korean presi-

dent, lent furthercredence to this view. "Democracy,"he argued, "has to gohand in hand with economic growth."2

The economic crisis has also led to a rethinkon the notion of Asian values

on the defensive. Lee Kuan Yew stated that nepotism is a Confucian weak-

ness. Also on retreatare claims about an Asian way of doing business and

managing politics. For example, guanxi-roughly, the use of personal con-

nections to one's advantageoutside the legal framework-is now said not to

be a good Asian value. Moreover, such values are detrimental o develop-

ment since they were not "compatiblewith the competitivefree market."3Certainly, he claim that democracieswould outperformauthoritarian ov-

ernments in ensuring economic development has not gone unchallenged.

Some have questioned attemptsto blame the so-called Asian values for the

economic disaster. Lee Kuan Yew insists thathaving Asian values does not

necessarily translate nto having a general lack of transparency. Singapore,

despite having both Asian values and transparency,could not avoid being

hurt by the crisis because of the regional contagioneffect of the slump in the

neighboringcountries. Lee does not see democracy as being the real issue inthe crisis. The demonstratorsn Indonesia,in his view, were not demanding

democracybut an end to corruption,cronyism,andnepotism,and the rule of

Suharto. Fromthis perspective,the solutionto Asia' s economicproblemsdid

not lie in greater democracy, but in "good governance," including "sound

banking laws, rigorous supervisionin the financialsector, andproper corpo-

rate governance."4 But as the discussionin the following section shows, the

attemptto separate democracyfrom good governanceis unlikely to attract

much support n the internationalpolitical climate of the economic crisis.

The Limitsof "DemocraticAssistance"Scholars of democratizationhave identified several international actors that

are thoughtto promote democracy, including the role of international anc-

tions, aid conditionalitiesused by Westerngovernmentsto promotedemoc-

racy,thepolicies of andpressure rom international rganizations,and demon-

strationeffects.

11. "An Open GovernmentSaved US: Ramos," Straits Times,June 16, 1988, p. 18.

12. Amitav Acharya, "Is Democracy Best?" Asiaweek, October 23, 1998, p. 80.

13. Sunanda K. Dutta-Ray, "Only Clear Laws Can Stem the Tide," Straits Times, March 1,

1998, p. 4.

14. "Riots Not a Call for Democracy," nterview with Lee Kuan Yew, StraitsTimes, June 16,

1998, p. 33.



AMITAV ACHARYA 423

Historically, international actors have had a mixed impact in promoting

democracy in Southeast Asia. For much of the cold war period, Western

supportfor democracy in Southeast Asia was temperedby geopolitical con-

siderations. Democracy was ignoredin order to sustain the West's authorita-rian but anti-communistallies in power, as indicated by the U.S. support or

the Diem regime in South Vietnam, Lon Nol in Cambodia,and Suharto in

Indonesia. Moreover, strategic developmentsin the wake of the U.S. with-

drawal from Indochinain 1975 undermineddemocracy in Southeast Asia.

Fearful of renewed communist subversion, Southeast Asia's pro-Westernre-

gimes strengthened heir internalsecurity measures, which limited the scope

of political debate and underminedthe development of civil society. The

Vietnamese invasion of Cambodia n 1978 also had a debilitatingeffect. Em-

broiled in the Cambodia conflict, ASEAN countries emphasized regime se-

curity and performance egitimacy, often at the expense of political openness.

ASEAN's high profile diplomacyin the Cambodiaconflict and its anti-com-

munist and free marketposture appealedto the West, divertinginternational

attentionfrom domestic authoritarianism. ndeed, the domestic stability and

economic growth achieved underauthoritarian ule (the Philippineshaving

been a major exception among the ASEAN members) not only earned

ASEAN some immunity from international riticism but also enabled the or-

ganizationto project itself as a model for the developing world.

In the Philippines, U.S. pressuredid help transition romauthoritarianule

in 1986. However, its abandonmentof the Marcos regime came quite late,

after the regime's corruptionandeconomic mismanagementhad alienatedthe

middle class, fueled the communistinsurgency, and threatened he future of

the U.S. military presence. Here, a case of geopolitical self-interest served

the cause of democracy. U.S. supportwas crucialin keeping the democratic

governmentunder CorazonAquino in power despite repeatedcoup attempts.

At the end of the cold war, the U.S. and otherWestern countriesembraced

the enlargementof democracyas a sequel to the containmentof communism.

It involved greater emphasis by the West on policy instruments o promote

democratization,amongthem aid conditionality (linking aid to humanrights

and democracy) and humanitarian ntervention. But Southeast Asia was

sparedthe kind of vigorous democratizationcampaigndirectedby Western

countriesand international inancial institutions at the economically less vi-

brantAfrican and LatinAmericanstates. Westernoppositionto authoritarian

rule in SoutheastAsia was balancedby a pragmaticrecognitionof trade and

investmentopportunitiesavailablein the region. This had been truenot only

of the pro-Westernregimes as in Singapore, Malaysia,or Indonesia but also

regimes such as that in Vietnam, where market-oriented conomic reform

earnedthe regimea reprievefrom Westernpressure o bringabout democrati-

zation. The West has been farmorewilling to use sanctionsagainstthe mili-




tary regime in Burma and has opposed ASEAN's policy of constructive

engagement;there are limited economic opportunitiesavailable in Burma to

Western investors. Only in major instances of democratic breakdownsor

near-breakdownsdid the Western governments respond with conspicuouspressure,as in the case of the 1991 Dili massacre in Indonesia and the sanc-

tions briefly imposed on Thailand in response to the Bloody May (1992)

episode. But the fact that only two countries,Denmark and Canada,halted

aid to Indonesiaafter the Dili massacre suggests the limitednatureof interna-

tional sanctions. A popularargumentagainst the use of sanctionsremainsthe

view that economic growth and liberalization,partlyfostered throughWest-

ern trade and investment,will ultimately promotedemocratization.

The internationalcommunity in general and the West in particularwere

interested and involved in bringing democracy to Cambodia in the early

1990s. But the outcome of this effort might serve to strengthenskepticism

about the limits of externally imposed democraticrule. The attempt by the

United Nations TransitionalAuthority n Cambodia(UNTAC) to implement

a comprehensivepolitical settlement n Cambodiacould not resolve the issue

of democraticpower sharing. The subsequent nstabilityin Cambodia ead-

ing to the unravelingof the Paris Agreement n 1997 provided ammunition o

those who have arguedthat the externalimposition of democracyfails in a

country with no traditionof democracy.15

International ressure,despite its mixed recordto date, may now be assum-

ing a more importantrole in fostering democratization n Southeast Asia.

Part of the reason has to do with the impact of economic globalization. In

theirstudyof democratization,O'Donnell andSchmitterpointedout thatone

of the key legitimation strategiesfor authoritarian egimes has been to "act as

agents of transnationalization, pening the economy to foreign trade and in-

vestment, [thereby] increasing its vulnerability to externally generatedim-

pacts."16Economic globalization, including the internationalization f pro-

duction and finance, had rendered authoritarian egimes in Southeast Asia

more vulnerableto externaleconomic and political pressures. This fact has

made democraticbreakdowns ess likely. In Thailand, a country with a his-

tory of democraticbreakdowns(largely due to military coups), globalization

provided a crucial support to democracy. As one analyst observed in the

aftermathof the May 1992 violence, a successful futurecoup in Thailand, n

order to have public support,would require"a strategyof hitherto untried

15. Amitav Acharya, "Cambodia, he U.N., and the Problems of Peace: An Assessment of the

United Nations TransitionalAuthorityin Cambodia:Lessons of UNTAC," Pacific Review 7:3

(1994), pp. 297-308.

16. "Negotiating Pacts," in Transitions rom AuthoritarianRule, eds. Guillermo A. O'Don-

nell, Philippe C. Schimtter,and LaurenceWhitehead(Baltimore,Md.: Johns Hopkins University

Press, 1986), p. 46.



AMI1TAVACHARYA 425

approaches hat combine seizure of power with methods to sustainbusiness

confidence."17But from the late 1980s, fears that political instabilitycaused

by a coup or an attemptedcoup might drive away foreign investors and un-

dermineeconomic growthled the middle class and business groupsin Thai-land to oppose military intervention n politics. It is significantin the wake

of the recent economic crisis that the failure of Chavalit Yongchaiyudh's

elected governmentto deal effectively with the economic problemsdid not

renewdomestic support or militaryrule,despite initialrumorsof an impend-

ing coup. Instead,an alternativegovernmentwas found throughdemocratic

means.

The economic crisis has furtherunderscored he role of international ac-

tors supportingdemocratizationn SoutheastAsia. To be sure,Westernsup-

portfor political changeinitiallywas slow in coming, especially in Indonesia,

despite an earliercall for more openness thereby the formerU.S. Ambassa-

dor PaulWolfowitz.18 Moreover,duringthe last days of the Suhartoregime,

Americanofficials did call for "restorationof orderwithout violence and a

genuine opening of a dialogue on political reform."19But the U.S. was also

accused, in a WashingtonPost editorial,for "stickingwith Suhartoalmost to

the end"and not playing "muchrole in his downfall."20The U.S. did move

quickly to advocate openly the cause of democratizationn Indonesia. Post-

SuhartoU.S. policy towardIndonesiahas called for progress towardopen,

accountablegovernment; ree elections underrules acceptableto the Indone-

sian people; space for political partiesand laborunions; press freedoms;and

the release of political prisoners.

One should not, however, exaggerate the extent of the Western govern-

ments' pushfor democratizationn crisis-riddenSoutheastAsia. Westerndo-

nors have been cautiousabout linking aid with democraticreforms. During

the last days of the Suhartorule, the U.S. did not demand linking IMF loans

to political reform. Rather, Washington demanded Suharto's compliance

with the IMF's economic andfinancialprescriptions.The Australiangovern-

ment more explicitly rejected any linkage between economic and political

reform in Indonesia.21 Following the departureof Suharto, the U.S. has

promisedhumanitarian nd developmentassistance,aid to civil society, and

assistanceto electoralprocess on a bilateralbasis. In general,Westernsup-

portfor democratizationhas been mutedby a concern with political instabil-

17. Tan Lian Choo, "PersonalityPolitics in Thailand," n SoutheastAsian Affairs 1991 (Sin-

gapore:Instituteof SoutheastAsian Studies, 1992), p. 289.

18. I am grateful to the anonymousrefereeof Asian Survey for bringingthis to my attention.

19. RobertGarran,"U.S. Insists on Reform-AidLink,"Australian,May 21, 1998, p. 6.

20. Reproduced n the Nation (Bangkok),June 11, 1998, p. A4.

21. RobertGarranand MatthewAbraham,"IMF Could Delay Loans,"Australian,May 21,

1998, p. 6.




ity even as Westerngovernments see democracy as the best way of ensuring

the long-term political health of the country.

International orces supportingdemocratization n Southeast Asia go be-

yond the role of individual Western governments. Domestic opposition toauthoritarianrule in Southeast Asian countries has derived considerable

moral strengthfrom the general internationalawarenessabout and criticism

of authoritarianismn the region. Moreover, international inancial institu-

tions may now be in a strongerposition to support political reform in the

region. But the commitmentof the IMF and World Bank to foster the pro-

cess of democratization n Southeast Asia remainsunclear. Visiting Jakarta

in early February1998, WorldBank PresidentJamesWolfensohn denied that

democratizationwas part of his mission. Corruption, n his view, was an"economic problem." Brushing aside requests by the InternationalNGO

(nongovernmental rganization)Forum on IndonesianDevelopment to make

human rights, democracy, and rule of law part of the criteria for assisting

Indonesia,he stated thathe was not thereto makeany politicaljudgements.22

There is little question that the policies and actions of the IMF were an

important, f somewhat unintended, actor in the Suhartoregime's failure to

survive Indonesia's economic crisis. For example, criticismby the IMF offi-

cials of the Suhartoregime's apparentunwillingness to implement the fullrange of IMF-imposedmeasuresled to a significantfall in the value of the

Indonesiancurrency,which in turnproducedprogressivelymore vocal calls

for Suharto'sreplacement. At the onset of the crisis, the IMF's managing

director,Michel Camdessus,definedits taskin the region to include "disman-

tling an economic system based on conglomerates; he collusion between the

state, banks, and business; and the restrictivemarkets."23What was left un-

stated, however, was that achieving these objectives would also requirere-

forming the political system. Allowing for greater transparencymeant

greateraccess to informationabout the state of inequity. The breakdownof

the monopolies, which had provided the economic lifeline to authoritarian

rule, and the removal of the cozy government-businessrelationshipopened

up more political space for the pro-democracy orces.

The Asian economic crisis is also making authoritarianismn Southeast

Asia more vulnerable o democracy's snowballingor contagioneffect. In the

1980s, successful democratic transitionsin Korea and Taiwan begged the

question as to whether Southeast Asia would undergoa similarprocess. If

SoutheastAsian countries could follow the pathwaysto prosperity aid down

by the first generation NICs (newly industrializing countries), then why

22. Kafil Yamin, "Indonesia:World Bank BringsAid for Jobs, Gets FlakInstead," nterPress

Service, February5, 1998.

23. "The Right Stuff," Far Eastern EconomicReview, December 18, 1997, p. 64.



AMITAV ACHARYA 427

should they be resistant o their politicalpredicament?Yet, no such snowbal-

ling was in evidence, a fact partlyexplained by the differences in the domes-

tic and historical conditions between South Korea and Taiwan on the one

hand andthe SoutheastAsian states on the other. The communistsystems inVietnam and Laos improved their chances of survival compared to their

counterparts n EasternEurope by beginning their economic reformprocess

well before the collapse of communism in the latter region. Along with

China and later Burma, they constitutedexamples of economic perestroika

without political glasnost. Whether Southeast Asian authoritarianismwas

more soft than its Northeast Asia counterpart,and hence less susceptible to

populardemands for liberalization, could be debated. But there was little

question that the multiethnic characterofSoutheast Asian polities imposedspecial constraintson democratization,as in the case of Malaysia where the

delicate ethnic balance was used to justify authoritarianismo ensureMalay

dominanceof the polity and eventually the economy. Moreover, authorita-

rianregimes in Korea and Taiwan were far moredependenton foreignstrate-

gic support than Singapore, Malaysia, and Indonesia. To that extent, the

latter trio remained somewhatless vulnerableto global strategicchange and

externalpressure favoring democratization.

The downfall of the Suhartoregime may not be a classic case of democ-

racy's snowballingeffect. But there are indications thatthe Indonesianmili-

tary was unnervedby democratization lsewhere in the region. As a senior

adviser to PresidentHabibienoted, "The [Indonesian]militarysaw the com-

ing of democracyto Asia and Indonesia,and are preparing or that."24The

chief of sociopolitical affairs of the IndonesianArmed Forces (ABRI) has

likened events in Indonesia to past developments in the Soviet Union and

Eastern Europe. He acknowledged that ABRI for some time has studied

other recent cases of transition rom militaryto civilian rule so as to prepare

itself for such an eventuality. In his view, ABRI was following a pattern

familiar across East Asia in South Korea,Taiwan,the Philippines,and Thai-

land.25 Furthermore, uharto'sforced departure mboldenedthe pro-democ-

racy forces in Malaysia. The reformasimovement in Malaysia,active since

the ouster of Anwar Ibrahim as deputy prime minister,has even borrowed

concepts such as kolusi, korupsi, and nepotism (corruption,collusion, and

nepotism,respectively)from theirIndonesiancounterparts. (Some would ar-

gue thatMahathir'scrackdownon the reformasimovement and thejailing of

Anwar for six yearsmeant that the economic crisis has led to greaterauthori-

tarianism n Malaysia. But it is far from certain that the crackdownwill be

effective, or that the Mahathirregime will survive.)

24. "Abri Looking to Ease Out of Political Role," Straits Times, June 22, 1998, p. 14.

25. Ibid.



428 ASIANSURVEY,VOL.XXXIX,NO. 3, MAY/JUNE 999

Democracyand Regional NormsA final areain which the crisis may be helping democratization oncerns the

role of regional organizationand its norms of inter-staterelations. The theory

and practice of democratic assistance accord an importantrole to interna-tional and regional organizations n promoting democracy.26 For example,

the EuropeanCommunity(EC, now EuropeanUnion or EU) played a major

role in encouragingdemocratic ransitions n Spain, Portugal,Greece, and the

new states in EasternEurope. The Organizationof American States's Santi-

ago Declaration expressed an explicit commitment to democracy as a key

principleof regionalism. The Organisation or Securityand Co-operation n

Europe' Office of DemocraticInstitutionsand HumanRights monitors rends

in democratizationand helps member countries to establish and consolidatedemocratic institutions. The Organizationof African Unity has endorsed

democraticgovernanceas a way of dealing with Africa's political conflicts

and economic ills. Several regional organizationshave insisted on demo-

cratic political systems in theirprospectivemembersas necessarycriteria or

gaining membershipandmaintainingmembershipstatus. Forexample,dem-

ocratictransitions n Spain, Portugal,Greece,andTurkeywere influencedby

a considerationof theirmembership n the EuropeanUnion, which requires

all members to follow democraticpractices and observe respect for human

rights.

But the main regional groupingin Southeast Asia, ASEAN, has no such

criteria. ASEAN's primaryconcern has been with regime survival. Its role

in regional peace andsecurity,includingthe absenceof waramongthe mem-

bers since 1967, has been fulfilled without the glue of liberal democracy.

The more conservative governments in ASEAN responded to the West's

post-cold waremphasison humanrightsanddemocracy by forging common

regional positions and responses to human rights issues. Economic success

emboldened SoutheastAsian leaders to mount a frontal attack on the West's

policies with respect to democracy. Westernpolicies of humanitarian nter-

vention, "democraticpeace" (i.e., the belief that democracies do not fight

each other),and aid conditionalitywere seen by many amongthe rulingelite

in ASEAN states as instruments or Western dominationof the developing

countries. Malaysia's primeminister,MahathirMohamad,attackedwhat he

saw as a Western effort to impose a particularstandardof democracy on

ASEAN countries.27

26. "InternationalOrganizationsand Democracy," editorial, Journal of Democracy 4:3 (July

1993), p. 3. The issue contains several articles dealing with the role of internationalorganiza-

tions in promotingdemocracy.

27. Cited in New Straits Times (KualaLumpur),July 20, 1991, p. 1.



AMITAV ACHARYA 429

Moreover, before the economic crisis, the ASEAN governments n Malay-

sia, Singapore, and Indonesia dismissed the suitability of Western-stylede-

mocracy for the region. They also argued that external pressures,including

economic sanctions, would not be effective in bringing about democraticchange. The West's democratic zeal, they warned, risks undermining the

foundationsof regionalorder based on the inviolability of state sovereignty.

The very notion of democratic assistance militated against one of the most

vauntedASEAN norms:the doctrineof noninterference n the internalaffairs

of members. The association did not see Vietnam's communistpolitical sys-

tem as a barrier o its membership n the group. ASEAN was also instrumen-

tal in resisting Western calls for sanctions against the Burmese military

regime and pushing for a policy of constructiveengagement. Buoyed by theassociation's backing, neither Vietnamnor Burma saw democratizationas a

way of ending international solation in the mannerof the South Korean elite

in the 1980s. The admission of Burma nto ASEAN in 1997 despite a chorus

of internationalprotestand condemnation llustratesASEAN's policy that a

country's domestic political system could not be used as a criterionof mem-

bershipin the regional organization.

But the economic crisis has dealt a blow to ASEAN's noninterferencedoc-

trine. It has been blamed by some for the reluctanceof fellow members topersuadeThailand to attendto its domestic troublesmore urgently. In this

view, had ASEAN not been so committed to noninterference, riendly criti-

cism of Thailandmight have resulted in more timely Thai action on the eco-

nomic crisis. But, as the Economist magazine put it, "Any persuasionfrom

fellow ASEAN membersto set a new course was so discreet thatit was easy

to ignore."28

In the wake of the economic crisis, the Thai foreign minister, Surin Pit-

suan, openly called for the associationto review its noninterferencedoctrine.As he put it, "It is time thatASEAN's cherishedprincipleof nonintervention

is modified to allow it to play a constructiverole in preventingor resolving

domestic issues with regional implications."29But his call for membersto be

more willing to pressuretheir fellows met with opposition from the other,

more traditionalelements in ASEAN, forcing the Thai governmentto dilute

its call for a review of the doctrine. At the July 1998 ASEAN ForeignMinis-

tersMeeting in Manila,Thailand's idea of flexible engagementreceived sup-

port from just one other member, the Philippines.30 Subsequently, thesacking of Malaysia's Anwar Ibrahim,a strong proponentof a more open

28. "TheLimits of Politeness," Economist, February28, 1998, p. 43.

29. "SurinPushes 'Peer Pressure',"Bangkok Post, June 13, 1998, p. 5.

30. "Thais Retract Call for ASEAN Intervention,"Straits TimesInteractive, June 27, 1998.




ASEAN with greater involvement from civil society, further weakened the

forces advocating more openness in the association.

Yet, the erosion of the noninterferencedoctrine in Southeast Asia contin-

ues. The ASEAN economic ministersare developing a regional frameworkthat will allow members to engage in mutual surveillance of each other's

economic policies. In the political sphere,the crisis saw the first direct criti-

cism of the Indonesianpresidentby the leader of anotherASEAN state when

Singapore's Lee Kuan Yew criticized Suharto's announcement that Jusuf

Habibie was his choice for vice-president. To be sure, ASEAN governments

refrained from any expression of support for regime change in Indonesia.

The Malaysian government was concerned only about political instabilityin

Indonesia due to its "close proximity,"while Prime Minister Goh Chok Tongof Singaporemaintainedthat the Indonesiansituation was an internal affair

that was up to the governmentof the countryto handle.31 But Anwar's sack-

ing (and the uproarover his beatinginjail) dealt a furtherblow to the nonin-

terferencepolicy when the leaders of Indonesia and the Philippines openly

criticized the Mahathirgovernmentfor its treatmentof the former deputy

primeminister. Then, both Habibie and Estradamet with Anwar's daughter.

They initially were reluctant o attendthe Asia Pacific Economic Cooperation

(APEC)summit in KualaLumpur n November 1998, though eventuallythey

went. Estrada'scomplaintthatAnwarwas "notbeing given due process and

that's a humanrightsviolation"32may have been the firsttime that the head

of an ASEAN state had complaineddirectlyabout humanrightsviolations in

a fellow member state. Such criticisms provoked an angry response from

Mahathir,who accused his neighbors of interferingin Malaysian domestic

affairs. Mahathir etaliatedby issuing his own criticism of the internalsitua-

tion in Indonesia and the Philippines,contendingthat the Malaysianjustice

system was better than mob rule in those countries.33

The departureof Suharto,ASEAN's longest serving andperhapsmost in-

fluential eader,fromthe regionalscene has led to a morepositive Indonesian

attitude toward humanrights and democracyissues in the region. This al-

readyhas been evident in the shift in Indonesianpolicy on East Timor. Intra-

ASEAN differences over humanrightsanddemocracyalso have grownin the

wake of the economic downturn. Dewi FortunaAnwar,a foreign policy ad-

viser to PresidentHabibie, contends that the regional criticism of Anwar's

arrestshows that"ASEAN is in dangerof being split between countriesthat

regardhumanrights as universal values whose promotionbecomes a com-

31. "NeighboursExpress Growing Alarm," ibid., May 15, 1998; and "Let JakartaResolve

Crisis," ibid.

32. Straits Times, October 7, 1998, p. 22.

33. Ibid., October 16, 1998, p. 35.



AMITAV ACHARYA 431

mon responsibility,and those that are still proponentsof 'Asian values'.

Such differences may be lamentedas a sign of regionaldisorder,but will be

cheered by pro-democracy orces exasperatedby ASEAN's hitherto olerance

of authoritarian ule.Last but not least, the economic crisis in the region also challenges

ASEAN's constructiveengagementpolicy toward Burma. Before the down-

fall of the Suhartoregime, Burma,with backing from its association partners,

could claim thatIndonesia'spolitical system was a model of militarypartici-

pation in politics, which it could emulate. Now, the Indonesian model has

itself unraveled. With its diminished standing, ASEAN may no longer be

able to shield Burma from internationalpressure. Members already are wor-

rying whether the cost of standingby the military regime in Burma has out-

weighed its benefits. This recalculation has been reinforced by the EU's

refusal to enhance economic cooperationwith anyASEAN delegationthatin-

cludes Burmaas a full-fledged member.

ConclusionNot long ago, SoutheastAsia was held by some to be an importantexample

of the positive relationshipbetween authoritarianule and economic growth.

Now, it is being seen in a reverse light. Neither claim may be completely

valid. Yet, by challengingthe widespreadbelief amongthe region's elite and

middle class segmentsthat authoritarianismmay be more conduciveto devel-

opmentand stability, the Asian economic crisis has presentedSoutheastAsia

with a democratic moment. Whether this moment will produce a durable

legacy will dependon not only domesticforces withinkey regionalstates and

the rate of economic recoverybut also the role of the internationalcommu-

nity and the transformation f regionalnorms.

Democracy and democratizationhave become an increasingly important

factoraffectingthe relationshipbetween SoutheastAsian states andthe wider

international ommunity. The issue of democratization s also shapingintra-

regionalrelations, including regionalmultilateralcooperation,within South-

east Asia. In particular,democratizationmay-gradually if not suddenly-

undermineASEAN's norms concerningnoninterference.Unable to cope with

the effects of economic crisis at home, ASEAN governmentsmay not be able

to offer crediblealternatives o democratization ndthwart nternationalpres-

sures for political change.

In the rapidly changing political climate in Southeast Asia, the strengthofforces andtrendsfavoringdemocratizationmay be overestimated. The crisis

might have done more to open up the regime's marketsthan its political sys-

tems. The interestof the international ommunityin democratization espe-

34. Sunday Times (Singapore),October 4, 1998, p. 19.




cially in Indonesia) is temperedby concernsfor political instability. Any lib-

eralizing political role international inancial institutionsmay play is con-

strainedby their continuingdeferenceto state sovereignty. National political

controlsstill exist in most states,and the ASEAN noninterferenceprinciple ninter-staterelations limits the effect of pro-democracymovements in the re-

gion. Despite all this, the international ommunitynow has an unprecedented

opportunity o help in the process of democratization n SoutheastAsia. The

impact of external forces in promotingdemocracyin the region goes beyond

the traditionalnotion of "democraticassistance," or the use of negative and

positive sanctionsto promotedemocratization.It may be the less tangiblebut

ultimatelymore powerful forces associatedwith economic globalization.

The Asian economic crisis has shown how economic downturnscan

pre-cipitate the breakdownof authoritarian ule. It remainsto be seen whether

democratizationdrivenby economic downturn s more successful and dura-

ble than democratizationdrivenby growth. Analysis of the political situation

in SoutheastAsia during the crisis and post-crisis period will offer important

clues to this question. Authoritarianismn SoutheastAsia has survivedmany

Asian "miracle"years. The economic downturnof the late 1990s does offer

democratization orces a new opportunity.

1999 Southeast Asia's Democratic Moment

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