1994 Assessing the Dispute in the South China Sea a Model of China's Security Decision Making

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Assessing the Dispute in the South China Sea: A Model of China's Security Decision MakingAuthor(s): Samuel S. G. Wu and Bruce Bueno de MesquitaSource: International Studies Quarterly, Vol. 38, No. 3 (Sep., 1994), pp. 379-403Published by: Blackwell Publishing on behalf of The International Studies AssociationStable URL: http://www.jstor.org/stable/2600738 .

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InternationaltudiesQuarterly1994) 38, 379-403

AssessingtheDispute in the SouthChina

Sea: A Model ofChina's SecurityDecision Making

SAMUEL S. G. Wu

TexasA&M University

AND

BRUCE BUENO DE MESQUITA

Hoover nstitution,tanford niversityand

UniversityfRochester

Chinese foreign olicy s represented s a function f nternal, omesticpolitical considerations.Through the analysis of Chinese policy,weillustrate methodfor predicting heoutcomeof policydecision mak-ing inside China. The substantive ssue is China's expected approachtowardterritorialisputes n theSouthChina Sea, especially urround-ing the Spratly slands. We address the extent to whichChina can beexpected toreallocateresourcesfrom conomicreform o foreign olicyundertakings n thatarea and how likelyChina is to utilize forcetoimpose its will on weakerneighbors.

The approachrepresents markeddeparturefrom he predominantneorealistparadigmin international olitics.We assume thatdecisionmakersseek an optimalcompromisebetweenenhancing their ecurityand pursuingtheirspecificpolicyor ideological goals. Using thisper-spective,we conclude that,despite a dramatic ncreasein militaryx-penditures nd a significanttrengtheningfChina'snaval force n theSouth China Sea, China is unlikely o engage in anysignificantses offorce to pursue itsagenda in theSouth China Sea.

Two objectives motivate the analysis here. We suggest a model for examiningChinese foreign policy decision making and we apply that model to the SpratlyIslands dispute. The model is intended to provide tools for predicting reliablythe outcome of decision making in China or in any other political setting. Thesubstantive issue provides a laboratory in which to test the model. We providedetailed predictions about strategies and a policy resolution that will shape

Authors' ote:We are grateful o the Chiang Ching-Kuo Foundation for nternational cholarlyExchange forthe support they have provided to this project. We also wish to thank Dr. Cheng-chi Chang, Alexander Tan,Yu-guo Chen, and Guoqing Zhang for heir ssistance n developing the data forthisresearch.We have benefitedas well from he insights f the anonymous referees nd so take thisopportunityo thankthem.

C 1994 InternationaltudiesAssociation.Published y Blackwell ublishers, 38 Main Street, ambridge,MA 02142,USA, and 108 CowleyRoad,OxfordOX41JF,UK.



380 Assessinghe isputen the outh hina ea

China's struggle o resolvethe tensionsbetween securing their erritorialnter-ests in the Spratly slands and the desire to promote economicgrowth.Thesepredictions re expected to remain viable so long as no major exogenous shock

occurs that fundamentallylters the structure fthe data we use to analyze theproblem.The dispute over the Spratly slands in the South China Sea is particularly

interesting ecause it capturesthe possible tension betweenthe domestic, co-nomic objectives f the People's Republic of China and their xternal, erritorialclaims and ambitions.Specificallywe address the extentto which China can beexpected to transferresources away from economic reformand toward thepursuitof foreignpolicyobjectives n the South China Sea. We want to knowhow likely China is to utilize force to impose its will on its weaker Asianneighbors.

The approach we takerepresents markeddeparturefrom he predominant

neorealist paradigm in international olitics Waltz, 1979). We do not assumethat the nation is a holisticunitary actor seeking to maximize security ndunwilling otrade any amountof security orbenefits n some otherdimension,such as might be representedby policypreferences.Rather we assume thatnations consist of competinginternal and external) interestsvying to shapepolicy outcomes and making implicitcompromisesbetween policy goals andsecurity nhancement throughmultiple tages of gamelike coalition formation.Like neorealist states,our actors are rational,but unlike neorealist tates, heymay seek tomaximize on a dimensionotherthan security. ndeed, our decisionmakers seek an optimal compromise between enhancing their security ndpursuing their specific policy or ideological goals. In that sense, the model

suggested here views foreignpolicy as the foundationof international oliticsand not as a separate area of inquiry.We begin by summarizingthe substantive ircumstances hatmotivateour

interest n evaluating Chinese policy n the South China Sea. Then we explainthemodel we use to predict nd explain Chinese policy making.Following thatdiscussion,we specify he relevant data and apply themodel discussedhere toChina's policybehavior.

SubstantiveBackground

China's (PRC) influence n Asia and, indeed, globally, s growing.The disinte-grationof the Soviet Union and the successof China's economicreformshavecontributed o China's power.With the wealth generatedbyeconomicliberali-zation,China has embarkedon a programto modernize tsmilitary. he PRCis generating significant evenue from arms sales to the Third World and isusingsome ofthisrevenueto acquire advanced weapons and technologiesfromothercountries, most notablyfrom the independentrepublicsof the formerSoviet Union, therebyenhancing its own military apabilities WorldJournal,June 12, 1992).

During this period of economic expansion,the Chinese leadershipseems tobe facing growingdilemma.On the one hand,Chinese leadershaverepeatedlyannounced that

the continuationf thePRC's economic reform rogram s their

top priority. his suggests pacificforeignpolicy n thateconomicreforms ndgrowth re not well-served y politico-militarynstabilityn the region.1 n this

1 i Peng was quoted as saying hatChina needs a peaceful nternational nvironment o embarkon itsvigorouseconomic reformprogram and that t is not the intention f China to be a hegemonic power in Southeast Asia(World ournal, /18/92:8).Qian Qichen, China's foreignminister, tated thatall territorial isputeswithneigh-boringcountries hould be settled n an amicable and peacefulmanner World ournal, /19/92:4).



SAMUEL S. G. WU AND BRUCE BUENO DE MESQUITA 381

sense, China currently as an interestn avoiding nstabilityaused by territorialdisputes n East Asia. On the other hand, some in East Asia are concernedthatChina's improved power may encourage its leaders to seek the resolution of

several territorial isputes with ts neighbors hroughmore aggressivebehavior.Such a perspective s certainly onsistentwith the observed buildup of Chinesemilitary apabilities and with recent statements y the PRC's leaders. For ex-ample, China recentlypledged to use its naval forcesto back up an oil explo-ration project contracted to an American company. In this instance, theexploration s situated n the Spratly slands where sovereignty s claimed byVietnam,Malaysia, ndonesia,the Philippines, nd theRepublic of China (ROC)in Taiwan as well as by the PRC (Lo, 1989; WorldJournal,une 18, 1992).

Located in the South China Sea, theseforty r so small slandswere historicallyclaimed by China as part of its territory, ut were not inhabited until quiterecently.They are just specks of atolls which were relatively nsignificant o

countries n the area untilabout the 1950s. However,three factors hanged thepreviouslydisinterested ehavior of countriesborderingthe South China Sea.These factors nclude: (1) the islands' strategic alue,which was demonstratedby theJapanese duringWorld War II; (2) the vastwealthof oil in the surround-ing territorialwaters; and (3) considerationof the Convention on the Law oftheSea (Lo, 1989).2

Since the 1960s, the Spratly slands have become one of the more dangerousflashpoints orSoutheastAsian security. he Philippines,Vietnam, China, Tai-wan, and Malaysia have all become involved n this territorial ispute.Therehave been numerous small clashes and at least two recorded major clashes onthese islands over the past twentyyears. The first,n 1974, resulted in the

expulsion of South Vietnam from he slands.The second conflict ame in 1988.This saw a small naval battle between Chinese forcesand Vietnamese forcesthat eft seventy-four ead and three Vietnamese naval vessels sunk. Disputesoverthe islands also contributed o China's war against Vietnam n 1979 (Chen,1987). Today the islandsremain hotly ontested.Amongthe forty nits makingup the group, six are occupied by China, twenty-one y Vietnam, nine by thePhilippines, hree by Malaysia,and one by Taiwan (Central aily News,April 7,1993).

There have been two conferences n Indonesia within he past fewyearstoattempt oresolvethe competing laimsto theSpratlyslands. On both occasionsChina reiterated ts desire to see a peaceful resolution of the problem and

welcomedpeaceful, cooperativedevelopmentof the area. Yet at the same timeChina has expanded itsclaims tothe slands.After ccupying ix slandsbetween1988 and 1992, China formally nnounced thatit claims sovereignty ver alltheSpratly slands. This announcement,made inMarch1992,hasbeen followedby a somewhat proactiveChinese policyin the area. For instance,China hassold oil exploration rights n the South China Sea to an Americancompany-CrestoneEnergyCorporation-thereby mplying hatChina has property ightsover the area. It has been reportedthata Chinese highofficialmentionedthatifnecessaryChina will use its "wholenaval force" to protect he company'soilexploration activitiesn the South China Sea (NewYorkTimes, une 17, 1992;WorldJournal,June 18, 1992). More recently here have been unconfirmed

reports that China dispatched three submarines to the area to back up itsinterests Central aily News,April 7, 1993).China's declared willingness o use force n the South China Sea contradicts

thePRC's policyaimed at promoting peacefulinternationalnvironments a

2This conventionhas defined the maritime ights f coastal and islandstates. By claiming itle o the islands,the claimantwill redefine ts maritime nd property ights o resources n surroundingwaters.



382 Assessing heDispute n theSouthChina Sea

prerequisiteto accomplish its economic goals. China's true intentions eemdifficult o discern. After ll, the prospect of warfareover the Spratly slandsmust be daunting to China's leaders, but so musttheprospect of a diminution

in China's territorialntegrity,ssumingthatChina's claim to property ightsnthe area is sincere.China's ability o carryout a successfulnaval war againstseveralprospective

opponents in the South China Sea is farfrom lear.WhileChina can probablyoverwhelm ts neighbors in a land war, the PRC does not have an obviousadvantage in a war foughtfar from ts border and especiallya war foughtfarout to sea. And the nstabilityhatwould be createdbysucha conflict-regardlessof who might nitiate t-would certainlyeopardize China's economicmodern-izationefforts. ecause a war has greatpotentialcostsassociated with t, thereis good reason to believe that China's declaration n favorof an amicable reso-lution of the Spratly slands dispute is sincere. But, because surrendering ts

claimsmightbe taken as a signofweakness,China must also worry bout howtheTaiwanese, theTibetans, and otherswould interpret hePRC's willingnessto cede territoryt had previously laimed as its own. This concernlends cre-dence to China's declaration that t willdefend its claim to the Spratly slandswithforce f necessary.

The contradiction etweenChina's apparenteconomic nterestnstabilityndChina's declared intent o use naval force fnecessary o secure its claimsovertheSpratly slands createsa troubling mbiguitynChina's foreignpolicywhichcalls out for n evaluation. Does China's declarationmean that hePRC iswillingto use forceto discouragewould-bechallengers o itsalleged property ightsnthe South China Sea? Is China willingto shift ome domesticresources away

from tseconomic reform rogram to support militaryngagements?These arequestionswe hope to answer.

Previous Assessments of China's Prospects ofUsing Force

Over thepast severalyears herehavebeen a numberofsignificantnvestigationsof issuesgermane to our focus George, 1967; Gurtov nd Hwang, 1980; Segal,1985; Stolper, 1985; Chen, 1987; Lo, 1989). Unfortunately,he assessmentbyBobrow,Chan, and Kringen 1979) regarding tudiesofChinese security olicymaking is still valid today. After a carefuldiscussion of the difficultiesnd

limitations f the five main approaches used to investigateChinese foreignpolicy, heyconcluded in 1979, "The studyofChinese foreignrelations argelylackssystematic nalysesthat map policysituations, dentify ehaviorpatterns,or estimate the parameters of international interaction"(Bobrow et al.,1979:27).3 Up to this point, scholars have achieved only limitedsuccess in

3The five pproaches used in the field re (1) theteleological pproach, whichpositsChinese decision makingas a process of carefulcalculation of alternatives o achieve clear and immutablegoals; (2) reductiveanalysis,whichholds that Chinese traditionmakes itself elt hroughthe personalities f individualChinese; (3) juxtapo-sitional inkages, which relyon the post hoc reconstruction f particular pisodes in Chinese foreign relationshistory y uxtaposing current events; (4) environmental eterminism,whichuses biographical nformation oidentify ossible conflicts mong the Chinese leadership and explains policymakings s results f theseconflicts;

and (5) kremlinology, hich reliesheavilyon the expertiseof the individual nalyst nd the intensive crutiny fparticulardocuments to figure ut thescramble forpower among the "interest roups."

Alternatively, obrow,Chan, and Kringen propose a "systematic" pproach to the studyof China's securitypolicymaking.They call itsystematic ecause it considersnotonlyparticular ases and generalizedpatterns, utalso the logic that determines he calculation of probabilities nd utilities.Because thisapproach pointsout thelogic that a rational decision makershould follow, tstheoretical ower is greatly nhanced. Through qualitativecontent nalysis,historical ase studies, and quasi-experimental xercises, heyhave made considerableprogressin understanding heChinese decision-making rocess.




explaining nd especially n predicting hina's security olicymaking s itrelatesto eitherthedomesticpopulation or the rest of the international ommunity.

Gurtovand Hwang (1980) and Stolper (1985) emphasize the importanceof

domesticconsiderations n China's securitydecisionmaking.They claim thatChina is adamantin its opposition toany attempt o infringe pon its territorialintegrity,maintaining hatChina is especially ikely o resort to arms to solvedisputes thatthreatenterritorial ntegrity.ndeed, because of China's experi-ences withEuropean imperial expansion in the late nineteenth/earlywentiethcentury nd more recentexperienceswith separatistmovements n Tibet andTaiwan, territorialntegritys a verysensitive ssue to the Chinese generalpopulation and to the leadership (Stolper, 1985; TheEconomist,ol. 329, no.7836, 1993). Afraidof sendingout wrong signalsto secessionists nd of beingaccused of being unpatriotic,China's leaders maybe preparedto sacrifice co-nomic nterests o promoteterritorialntegrityo that heywillnotbe challenged

bytheirdomestic politicalopponents.4Robinson 1970) echoes a related themeby claiming that China's international olicy s mostly he externalization f itsdomesticpoliticalvalues.

Yet, in some cases, including the Tiao-yu T'ai dispute (Senkaku Islands)against Japan, the dispute over the futureof Hong Kong with the UnitedKingdom,and disputeswiththePhilippinesover theSpratly slands,thefact sthatChina did not nitiate iolence. The Senkaku slandsdisputedid notprompta conflictual hinese response,and in thecase ofHong Kong,China waitedformore than fortyyears to retake Hong Kong through peaceful negotiations.What is more, in disputeswith the Philippines n particular,China has over-looked theoccupationof several slandsof the Spratlygroup despitethatcoun-

try's elativeweaknesscompared to China (Lo, 1989).Steven Chan contends in Hsiung (1985) that China's foreignpolicycannotbe understood n isolation. nstead, he maintains hat"anyseriousattempts treconceptualizingnybilateralrelationsmustdeal with heanalytic pparatusesthat are used to investigate he motivationsnd behavior of bothgovernments"(Hsiung, 1985:152). An analysisof China's decisionprocessalone is only partof the story.Taking intoaccount ust such dyadicrelations,Huang, Kim, andWu (1992) derived theoreticalpropositionsconcerningChina's and Taiwan'sconflict nd cooperationdecisionmakingby usingBueno de Mesquita's expectedutility heory Bueno de Mesquita, Newman, and Rabushka, 1985; Bueno deMesquita and Stokman,1994). The theory pproximatesdecisionmakercalcu-

lations of probabilities nd utilitieswith n explicit, ormally erivedargument.The propositions re thentestedsystematicallynd demonstrated o be useful.Huang et al. pointout thatdomesticconsiderations, lliance politics, xtendeddeterrence, nd interactions etween sides are important actors hatcontributeto choicesbetween conflict nd cooperation.

A relatedview, suggestedbyChen (1987), focuseson a combinationof ex-ternaland internal considerationsto evaluate China's policy.Chen bases hisassessmenton his investigation f China's warwith Vietnam n 1979. He indi-cates that t is the combinationof such externalfactors s the involvement fthe two superpowersand the psychology nd personality f Deng Xiaoping

4Gurtovand Hwang (1980) providedsix interesting ropositions.They argue that 1) the chiefpurpose offoreignpolicy n China is to protect and promote the radical socialist revolution t home; (2) Chinese leadersbelieve thata quiescent nonthreatening)nternational nvironment s theoptimumconditionfor radical-socialistdevelopment; 3) economic performance s consideredbyChinese leaders to be the key to national security ndinternational egitimacy; 4) Chinese sensitivityo external hreat s highest t timesof domesticpoliticalweaknessor conflict;5) foreign olicybecomesa domesticpolitical ssue n Chinaby ddressing conomicor political hoicesthat are underdebate; and (6) China's domestic tability romotesconditions hat are favorable o foreignpolicyinitiativesGurtov nd Hwang, 1980:249).



384 Assessing heDispute n theSouth China Sea

(especiallyhis pragmatism, onfidence, nd daring) and such internalfactors sChina's interests, alues, and war fightingapability nd Deng's leadership thatshaped China's policy n the 1979 war with Vietnam. In other words, China's

securitypolicy is determined by the relative power among international nddomestic groups, each with different ositions, saliency for the issues, andcalculations bout coalitionformation.5 his is broadly onsistentwith he recentliterature n two-level ames that ees foreignpolicy s partially ndogenous todomesticpolitical onsiderations Bueno de Mesquita, Newman, and Rabushka,1985; Bueno de Mesquita and Lalman, 1992; Putnam, 1993; Bueno de Mesquitaand Organski,forthcoming).

Although we believe Chen and Huang et al. are on the right rack, heyfailtomake explicit he bargainingprocess ndomesticpolitics nd the ogicbehindinteractionsnconflict ecision making mong relevant arties.Therefore, nthisinvestigation, e plan to use a dynamic nterest roup bargainingmodel devel-

oped by Bueno de Mesquita (Bueno de Mesquita and Stokman,1994) to addressthe expected resultof domesticpoliticalbargaining nside China on the SpratlyIslands issue.

Bueno de Mesquita's model is chosen because it has proven to be usefulinanalyzing nd anticipating he results fpolicydebatesamong competing nter-ests n other settings Bueno de Mesquita, 1981, 1990; Bueno de Mesquita andBeck, 1985; Bueno de Mesquita, Newman, and Rabushka, 1985; Bueno deMesquitaand Stokman,1994; SaltLake CityTribune,March1, 1989; Kim, 1991,1992; Petersen, 1983; Wu, 1990). According to the United States governmentthe model has made accurate and detailed policy predictions n 90 percentofthesituations n which t has been utilized Feder, 1987; Salt Lake CityTribune,

March 1, 1989; Ray, 1992).6 By using this model, we hope to address the twofactors hat possiblyaccount for the limitation f previous studies of Chinesesecurity olicy: the lack of a general theoretical ramework nd the paucityofsystematic nvestigations.n turn,this study,which makes predictions boutevents and policieswhose actualizationhas notyet occurred, erves as an addi-tional testof the usefulnessof the theoreticalmodel.

The Method and Model

We describebriefly model,morefully iscussedelsewhere Bueno de Mesquita,

Newman,and Rabushka, 1985; Bueno de Mesquita and Stokman, 1994), thatfocuseson theapplicationof Black's 1958) median voter heorem nd a theoremabout the monotonicity etweencertainexpectations nd the escalationof po-

5For example, with nformation rovidedby the United States,Deng calculated the possibleSoviet responseto the Vietnam war and was prepared for t. Deng also had realized thatthewar would bring China neitheragreat victory or a disasterbefore he initiated t. He argued thatChina might chieve about 70 percentof its warobjectives.The 30 percent of failed objectiveswould serve as a stimulusfor economic reformbecause the PLAwould then realize the importance f militarymodernization Chen, 1987:87-88).

6JamesRay (1992) notes of Bueno de Mesquita's model that, It has been used with considerablesuccess toforecastpolitical decisions and political nteractionsn more than 60 countrieswith respect to more than 2,000political ssues. Accurate forecasts ave focused,for xample, on the rise to power of Yuri Andropovas a successor

to Leonid Brezhnev in the Soviet Union, the rise to power of Hashemi Rafsanjani n Iran, the decision by theChinese government o crack down on pro-democracydvocates in Tiananmen Square in China, and thedefeatof Daniel Ortega and the Sandinista government y the coalition ed by Violeta Chamorro in the 1990 electionin Nicaragua" (1992:160-161).

Of course, there have been criticisms f Bueno de Mesquita's expected utility heory Simowitzand Price,1990; Wagner, 1984; Nicholson, 1987; Majeskiand Sylvan,1984). However, even critics fthe theoryhavewrittenthat, In general, though, the most ubiquitousdefenseofhis theorys thatdespite tsconceptual problems, tstillsolves moreempirical problemsthananyknown theory n thefield" Simowitz nd Price, 1990:449).




litical disputes (Banks, 1990). The conjunctionof these theoremsalong withconcepts frombargainingtheory foster the development of a quasi-dynamicpolitical model that includes detailed expectationsabout the agreementsor

compromisesthat various "players" are willingto make over time and theimplications f those compromises for the ultimateresolution of the issues inquestion.

Two constraints re assumed to facilitateprediction and explanation: thatissues are unidimensional,so that preferencescan be representedon a linesegment, nd that preferences and associatedutilities) orpotentialoutcomesdiminish teadily he farther n Euclidean distancea possiblesettlement s fromone's preferred utcome. These two constraintsre requirements f the medianvoter theorem. Black's theoremdemonstrates hatthe outcome desired bythemedian voter s the winningpositionunder the constraintsust assumed pro-vided a simple majority s required forvictory.Of course,we do not assume

thatall interesting oliticalproblems involvevoting.Rather,we assume thatpower is thenonvoting nalog ofvotesin mostpolitical nteractions.The monotonicity heoremprovides basisforpredictingwhenpolicydebates

are expected to produce negotiatedsettlements r are expected to lead to anescalationof friction etweencompeting nterests.Banks's monotonicityheo-rem highlights n important eatureof all politics. t tells us that the moreoneexpectsto gain from challenginga rivalperspective, he more likelyone is toundertake the challenge. This simple statement urns out to have interestingand sometimes urprisingmplications orpolitical ntercourse.

Let N = {1, 2, 3, . . , n} be the set of actors or stakeholders tryingto influencea multilateraldecision. An actor mightbe a governmentrepresentative, nofficial rom factionwithin politicalparty r a bureaucracy, leader of someinterest roup, an influential rivatecitizen, nd so forth.

Let M = {a, b, c, ... , m} be the set of issues in a multilateral negotiation andlet Ra be the line segment,bounded for conveniencebetween0 and 100, thatdescribes the unidimensionalpolicy continuumforany individualissue a se-lectedfrom mong the largersetof issuesM. Let each actor , iEN have itsownpreferredesolutionof issue a, withthatpreferred esolutiondenoted as x, suchthat on the issue continuum RaX0 c xr c 100.7

For anyfeasible proposed outcome on issue a, say, k's proposal,Xk,i's utility

forxk, uixk, is a decreasingfunction f thedistance betweenthe proposal andi's preferred esolution, o thatuixk= flXk-xrl. Of the infinitely any possibleproposals to resolve some issue a, how arewe to predictwhichwill be chosen?To answer thisquestion, etus first earn a littlemore about each actor . In thisanalysis, ach decisionmaker s endowed withthreecharacteristics.ach playerattaches omeutilityo each possible outcomeon issue a, as alreadynoted. Eachparticipant n the bargaining process is also endowed with the power o exertsome influenceon decisions.Let ciabe the capabilities or power) actor couldbringtobear on issue a, such thatthe sum ofthe capabilities f the participantsin a multilateral ecision-making etting s 1.8 c, is, then, actor 's share of thetotalpotentialnfluence thatcould be broughtto bear in the negotiationsover

7xta s the outcome actor has revealed to be preferred n issue a. It may or may not be i's true deal point.We generallydo not knowfor sure what anotheractor's true deal point s as there are strategicncentives or nactor to misrepresent is or her ideal point. Because the model as applied here assesses policydecisionson oneissue at a time,we drop the issue-denoting ubscript a, b, etc.) from he notation so thathenceforth l is thepreferred ositionof actor on theissue beingevaluated at themoment.

8Again,we drop the "a" subscript rom henotation hroughout, ut the reader s alertedthat themodel doesnot assume an actor's capabilitiesor potentialpower is the same on all issues.




some issue a. Each participanthas its own agenda of priorities r salience hat tattachesto the issues thatmustbe confronted. hus, i mayattach considerableimportanceto issue a and considerably ess importanceto issue b. Denote the

salienceof issue a for actor assia'

with0 c sia c 1. Each actor s describedbythe values of uixkforall i, kEN, ci, and si on each issue. A group, player, oractor s any aggregationof individualswith denticalvalues on all three ofthesevariables.

When alternative oursesofaction are pitted gainst each other, he arrayofforceson either ide oftendetermines ictory. f course,thisarraydepends onmore than therelativepower ofthe competing nterests.t depends also on thewillingness o spend influence n the ssue in question[si]and the ntensity ithwhich each actor prefersone proposed settlement, ay, 's proposal (uix.), toanother proposal, say, k's (uixk).Each group has a total number of potential"votes."The "votes" presumedto be castby actor in a comparisonof alterna-

tivesxj and Xkare said to equalvk

where:

Vika I Xj Xk) = (Ci) (si) (UWXy - UXk) (1)

Equation (1) statesthat the "vote" or power mobilized by actori in a com-parisonof two alternativesx. and Xk) is equal to the potentialcapabilitiesof idiscountedbyhow important he issue is to i (i.e., si)and byhowmuch prefersone proposal to the other uix. uixk).The "voting" chemereflects,fyoulike,what takesplace "inside the smoke-filled oom" beforeany formal,visible de-cision-making rocess occurs. It assumes that any formalprocess echoes theagreementsreached beforehand.

The prospectthat proposalwillsucceed is assumedto depend on how muchsupportcan be mustered n favorof the proposal as compared to the feasiblealternatives.n themodel this s calculatedas the sum of"votes" crossall actorsin a comparisonbetweenxj and Xk.This sum equals vikwith

V0k = z dk (2)

Ifvjkis greater han zero that mpliesthatx. defeatsXkbecause thetacit oalition

in favor of 's proposal is more motivated and powerfulthan the coalitionsupportingk's proposal. If vikis less than zero,xj is expected to be defeatedbyXk,and if vik equals zero the competinginterests re collectivelyndifferentbetween the two alternatives.

In any negotiation,there are likelyto be many more than two proposedsettlements. y pitting ll alternatives gainst one anothertwo at a time,theoutcome preferredby the median voter (weighted by power, salience, andintensityf preference) s found. Barring perceptionsor beliefsthat ead deci-sion makers to switch heir position, hemedian voterposition s thepredictedoutcome (Black, 1958). In practice,of course, perceptionsor beliefsoften eaddecision makers to grantconcessionsor to give in to a rival'spoint of view,

sometimes even needlessly. Such concessionsor capitulationscan change thelocationofthe medianvoter.Consequently,t s crucialtoprovidean accountingofwhen such switches n positionare expected to takeplace.

If an interest roup is dissatisfiedwiththeexpectedutcomeof a negotiation,it can alter its own level of effort i.e., change si); shift ts revealed position,selectingxi such thatuix* =# ixi;or influencethose who are willingto makeconcessions to the focal group so that those othergroups altertheir evel of



SAMUEL . G. WU ANDBRUCE BUENODE MESQUITA 387

effort i.e., Sk); or it can influence those who are willing o makeconcessionstothe focal group so thatthose other groups alter their revealed positionXk sothatukxt# ukxk, eading to switches n positions. Although in the model we

examineall possibilities, ere we focusonly on the latterone.Decisionmakers nterestedn ascertainingwhat everage they an exertcouldbenefit rom stimating hebeliefsheld by each other actor.To do so requiresa focuson the three characteristics-ux. forall i, EN, si, ci-used to estimateeach player's expected utilityfrom chalienging or not challenging the policyproposal backed by each potentialrival and for approximatingthe expectedutility ach actor i believes its rival expects to derive fromchallenging or notchallengingthe policy goals of actor i. In the model envisionedhere, decisionmakers re assumed to calculatethe expectedconsequences of challenging ndof not challenging alternativeproposals. The expected utility ori from notchallenging ivalj's position s denoted as EiuiAxj d, withd denoting he failure

tochallengeor make a proposal.This expected utilitys estimated y projectingwhat the relevant decisionmaker believesis likely o happen in the absence ofthe exertion f pressureon a rival o persuadethe opponent toalter tsbehavior.One of three contingenciesmay arise: actor i may anticipatethat with someprobabilityQi) rival will not alter ts currentpolicies over the time period ofconcernto i, givinggroupi the ability o derive whateverutilityt receivesfromthepreservation fthe status uo between tself ndj (uiAxjI ); i may anticipatethat 's positionon the issues willchange, in which case thereis some chance(Ti) that,from 's perspective, he policiesofj are anticipated o get better withuiAxt Id being the associated utility)or to get worse (uiAxj- Id), so thatuiAxJ+a> uiLAx. > uiL\xf . i's expected utilityf t eavesj's proposalunchallenged

is described as:EiuiAx 1 = QiuiAx? d + (1- Qi) [Tiuilx+ Id+ (1-Ti)uiAxfld (3)

i can challenge 's positionon issue a by proposinga change in 's position.In doing so, actor i presumablytakes into account the probability hat doesnot care enough about the issue to resist he proposed settlement y (1 - sj).i also considers the possibility hat will resist 's proposal (sj), in which casethere s some likelihoodthat willsucceed in its efforts o enforce ts wishesonj (Pi) and some probability hat it will fail (1 - Pi). Should i succeed, then iwill derive the utility ssociated withconvincing to switchfrom ts current

policystance to thatsupported by . This is denotedbyuiAxj I d, whichequalsu (xi-xj). Should i fail,then t confronts heprospectofhavingto abandon itsobjectives n favor of those pursued by , denoted by uiAxj-Id = ui(x. - xi).The expected utility orchallengingj's proposed resolutionof themultilateraldispute (EiuiAxj d) is:

EiuiAxj d = sj{Pi[uiAxj+d] + (1 - Pi) [ui/x7 I ]} + [1 - sj] [uiALx+ d] (4)

so that the overallexpected utility fi withrespectto 's outlookon issue a is:

Eiuixi\= EiuiAx. d-EiuiAxj Id (5)

Ifequation (5) is greater hanzero,then believes that hallengingj's positionis superior to not challenging it and so i is assumed to make a proposal of itsown. If equation (5) is less thanzero,then notchallenging s preferred nd i issaid to be deterred. f (5) equals zero, then is indifferent etweenchallengingand not challenging 's proposed settlement. ach actor evaluatesequation (5)vis-'a-visach otheractor.In doing so, actorstake the expected actionsof third




parties nto account. The estimatesof Pi include calculations of how i expectsall other parties to respond to a dispute over policy settlements etween andj. In particular,Pi places each other actor in i's coalition, 's coalition, or in a

neutral position as indicated by each third party'spreference for i's policyproposal or 's. j makes a comparable calculation as does each kEN). Becauseequation (5) includes such subjectiveelements as utilities nd subjectiveprob-abilities, t is possible to estimate a complete matrixof expected utilities hatcaptures all possible confrontations, ompromises, nd capitulations mong allthe participants n the relevantpolitical rena.

The various components of equation (5) must each be measured if the modelproposed here has practicalvalue. The measurementprocedures for each termare explained in considerabledetail elsewhere Bueno de Mesquita, 1985; Buenode Mesquita, Newman, and Rabushka, 1985; Bueno de Mesquita and Lalman,1986; Bueno de Mesquita, 1990; Bueno de Mesquita and Stokman, 1994).

Equation (5) is estimated from four perspectives,with relevantsuperscriptson equation (5) indicatingfrom whose perspectivethe calculation is beingviewed:

(1) i's expected utility is-'a-visach rivalj's proposal;(2) i's perceptionof each 's expected utility is-a-vis's proposal;(3) j's expected utility is-a-vis ach i's proposal; and(4) j's perceptionof each i's expected utility is-a-vis's proposal.

The expected utilityvalues summarizedin (1) and (2) and in (3) and (4)respectively escribe each actor's perception of its relationshipvis-'a-visach

other actor. With Banks's monotonicity f escalationtheorem n mind,theserelationships an be described in continuous form.According to Banks's the-orem,the probabilitywithwhich an actor anticipates onfronting givenrivalincreaseswith ts expected utility orchallenging herival'sproposal, so thatthehigher some actor i's expected utility s with regard to persuading some otheractorj to accept i's position, he higher the likelihoodthat willconfrontj.

The likelihood with which confrontation r concessions occur can be easilydisplayed n a polar coordinate space. For ease of presentation,we divide sucha space intosix sectors,with he boundarybetween achreflecting fundamentalturningpoint in the probability unctions. igure 1 displayssuch a coordinatespace, along withrelevant abels for ach of the sixsectors, eflectinghegeneral

likelihood of alternative outcomes in accordance with Banks's monotonicitytheorem.By examining the distribution f informationn graphs like Figure 1, we

attempt o approximate the private nformationvailable to each participantna disputeornegotiation.From that nformation e estimatehow each partywillbehave and what consequences are likely o ensue.

The perceptionsof each actor as illustrated y Figure 1 imply ctions. Thoseactions, n the form of the extraction r granting f concessions over supportfor this or thatspecificposition, ead to a reevaluationof the situationbyeachdecision maker. As stakeholdersrespond to revised proposals,with theirre-sponses supportedbytheir eliefs nd expectations,heprospects or favorable

or unfavorable settlement hange formany participants.Beliefsand expecta-tionsprovide the foundationfor a quasi-dynamic ssessmentof the evolutionof issue positionsand forrecalculations fthe location ofthe median voter.

When actors are persuaded or coerced into acceptinga proposal differentfrom heir nitial or current)positionon an issue the decisionprocessentersanew phase. Coalitionschange and thesupportor risks ssociatedwith lternativeproposals vary. New proposals are broughtforward s revisedbeliefs and ex-




ExpectedLiains

FOCAL GROUP

\ OFFERS CONFRONTATIONCompromise EXPECTED BY

BOTH SIDESFOCAL GFOP

GIVES IN\EU(Focal Group)

Expected RIVALOFFERSExpectedLosses Compromise Gains

BOTHSIDESBLUFF/POSTURE RIVAL

GIVES INStatus Quo

ExpectedLosses

EU(Rivals)FIG. 1.

pectationsopen new possibilities r forecloseold ones. Each such sequence ofrevisedstanceson an issue is called an iteration.The model computesas manyiterations s it takes forthe policy ssue to resolve itselfby reachinga stableoutcome;an outcome fromwhich here s not a meaningful ossibilityfchangegiventheestimated xpectations f theactors.

The model portrays processof decisionmakingduringeach iteration.Togain an intuitive ense of whathappens within he logic of the model duringeach iteration,hink fthe decisionmakers s beingengaged in a game of cards.

Attheoutset, ach player s dealt a hand. The qualityofthe hand dealt to eachplayerdepends on thecommonlyknowncharacteristicsf each player.Strongerplayers or thosewithstrongbacking fromothers)generallydrawbettercardsthanweakerplayers. Because of variations n salience,some playerspay closerattention o their ards thando others and so formdifferenterceptionsofthesituation.Based on the cards theyhold and the knowncharacteristicsf otherplayers, ach decisionmaker formsperceptions bout how good thehand is ofeach rival relative to the hand dealt the particulardecision maker.Withthatinformation, ach player decides on proposals or bids to make to the otherdecisionmakers.

If a player believeshis or her hand is veryweak comparedto a specific ival,

then no proposal is made to that actor. If i expectsto lose to , forinstance,then does not make a proposal to . If,however, thinks tholds a good handrelative to then i makes a proposal in the form of a suggestedchange inpositionbyj on the issue at hand.9 If i thinksj stands to lose quite a lot,theni

9imakes a proposal if, n Figure 1, theconjunctionof 's expectedutility nd i's estimate f 's expected utilityfallsbetween zero degrees from hehorizontal xis and 45 degrees, or fallsbetween270 degrees and 360 degrees




will propose thatj accept i's currentposition.'O f i thinks t has a good enoughhand to shiftj's position,but notso good thatj will give n to what wants, heni proposes a compromise somewherebetween 's position andj's.ll

After ll the players have submitted heir secret proposals to one another,each playernow reviews he newcards-the proposals-that itholds. Of course,some proposalsare betterforthe recipient han others. ndeed, some proposalsturn out to be frivolous n that the proposer cannot enforce the proposal,something that the proposer might only learn at the end of the round ofproposal making. Other proposalsreceived by a decision makerare potentiallyenforceable,but fall by the waysidebecause a superior,enforceableproposalwas made by a different layer. Each playerwould like to choose the best offermade to it, and each proposerenforces ts bids to the extent hat t can. Thosebetter ble to enforcetheir wishes than others can make theirproposals stick.Givenequally enforceableproposals,playersmove the leastthatthey an. Each

actor selectsfrom mong the bids it made and thebids itreceives.The bid thatis chosen is the proposal that is the optimal choice for the playergiven theconstraints nder which t operates.These constraints nclude its own percep-tions and the reality f whichproposals turn out to be enforceableand whichturnout to be beaten back byrivals or rejected outright s unenforceablebythe recipient.

At the end of a round of proposal making, players earn new informationabout their opponents. If, forinstance,a playerfinds thatsome proposals itthoughtof as enforceableare successfully ejectedthen it learns the proposalwas unenforceable i.e., the playerhas less supportthan it thought).By moni-toringresponses to its proposals a player earnshow much leverage t has with

otherdecision makers. If a proposal is accepted, then a player learns that itmade the best offer mong all the proposals made to the recipient f tsacceptedbid.

When theplayersfinish orting uttheir hoicesamong proposals,each shiftsto the position contained in the proposal it accepted (if any). The game endswhen no playerbelieves it has a remainingcredibleproposal or the value ofremainingproposals is sufficientlymall that the cost of continuing o bargainoutweighsthe value foreach playerof the expected improvementn the out-come. The median voterof the finalstageof the game is the predictedpolicyoutcome. For a fullerdescriptionof the sequential process in this game wesuggest seeingBueno de Mesquita and Stokman 1994).

Estimatingthe Model's Results: Developing the Data

Political outcomes,whetherthey nvolve ntra-or intergovernmentalelationsornegotiations etweenpublicand private rganizations r evenwithin singleorganization, an be and have been predictedusingthe modeldelineated above.To do so, however, requiresconverting heoretical oncepts into practical ap-

from he horizontal xis. That is the domain withinwhich believes t has a comparative dvantage over and iexpects more gainsthan losses from hallengingj's position.

10A proposed capitulation by to i's wishes is made if i locates the conjunctionof the respectiveexpectedutilities n the wedge that falls between 270 degrees and 315 degrees below the horizontal xis in Figure 1 or inthe wedge betweenzero degrees and 45 degrees. In the latter nstance, expects resistance rom, buti believesit can enforce ts demand. In the former ase, i expects no resistancefromj.

"1A compromise s proposed if believes the conjunctionof the relevant xpectedutilities alls between315degrees and 360 degreesfrom he horizontal xis in Figure 1.




plication.Althoughthis can be an extremely ifficultask, here s, fortunately,a body of knowledge that can be called upon to estimate he criticalvariables.By combiningthe perspectiveof this rational-actormodel withthe knowledge

and expertiseof area or issue expertst is possible to estimatethe variables ofinterest nd to solve the perceptual and "voting"componentsof the modeldiscussed here.

The forecasting nd perceptual models require the identification f thegroups or actors nterested n trying o influence policyoutcomeon the issuesin question. For each actor,data mustthen be estimated n three nd only threevariables:capabilities,preferred utcome, and salience. Sometimes, n institu-tionally tructured ettings, t is also important o take into account structuralconstraints hat operate to help shape outcomes. With ust thisminimal nfor-mation n hand, and withoutny other nformation,egarding,for instance, thehistory f the situation, he history f relationsbetween particular ctors within

thesituation, ther sunk costs,or without ven interviewing heactors nvolvedto assess theirown udgment about theirbeliefs nd expectations, t is possibleto predictwhat the likely utcome will be.

ForecastingChinese ForeignPolicy: The Data

The data forour analyseswereobtained from everal sources duringthe periodbetween earlyJune and earlyAugust of 1992. The first ata collectionreliesontheexpertiseof Dr. Cheng-chiChang and hisassociates at theNational Chang-Chi University. he issue forwhich we soughtdata is:

What evelofresourcesdoes each group supportreallocating rom he economicreformprogram to military apabilities n orderto respond to challengesfromsmaller ountries nd to secureChina's interestsnthe SouthChina Sea, assum-ing that any such challengesare expected to be on a small scale withno super-power involvement?

Dr. Cheng-chiChang and his associates have investigated his issue in greatdetail.12Nevertheless,when Dr. Cheng-chiChang was interviewed y SamuelS. G. Wu he was not asked to providean answer to theabove question. Rather,he was asked to identify he stakeholders r actors with an interestn shapingChinesepolicyregarding he ssueathand. Dr. Cheng-chiChangwas also askedto use his expertise to estimate he relative apabilitiesor power,position, ndsaliencethateach actor attachesto the ssue,thereby reating he firsttandard-ized data set.13

A second estimationof the same data was done as a reliabilityheck. Thesecond data set is based on researchdone byWu and two ofhis assistants,Mr.Alexander Tan and Mr. Yu-guo Chen. The team searched throughseveralrecentpublications nd documentson politicalfactionswithin heChinese lead-ershipand their ssociated nterest roups Lee, 1992a, 1992b; Ellis, 1987; World

12Dr. Chang is the Chair of the Graduate Programon Labor Relations,NationalChang-Chi University. e isan experton the mpact of nterest roups on China's policymaking especially n laborpolicy). He has conductedseveralfield tudies n southernChina and is therefore articularly amiliarwith he interest roups in that rea.

131t should be noted that the United States governmenthas found that there is substantial onsistencynmodel predictions ven as the expertsproviding he data inputsvary.This is not toosurprising iventhatexpertsare asked verybasic information nly (who are the interestedparties,what do theywant,what is their relativepotential o influence he process, and howmuch do they are about the ssues n question). Surely omeone whodoes not knowthis nformation s not an experton the ssue.




Journal, 991-1992).14 Wu also went to China for one month of fieldresearchto fosterdevelopmentof the second data set.'5

The few differences n estimationsbetween the two data sets were then

resolvedthroughdiscussionsbetween thetwo groups of experts.Therefore, hefinaldata set represents he consensus ofthe two groups. Again,neithergroupwas asked to provide an answer to the questionwe are studying, ut ratherwasasked to provide thebasic data needed by the model to evaluate the issue. Thedata are reportedin Table 1. The scale of policy preferencesfor the data inTable 1 is interpreted s follows:

0 = All resourcesshould be reallocatedfrom conomic reform o militarypurposes even though thiswillmean a delay in economicreform.

25 = Prepared to use army,navy, nd air forces o protect erritorialnter-

estsin the South China Sea.47 = Prepared to use navy and air forces, ut no groundtroops.

70 = Prepared to use a naval blockadeonly to advance territorialnterestsin the South China Sea.

76 = The statusquo, indicating hatthe challenge should onlybe dealt withthrough imitedmilitary perations.

81 = Enhanced military eadiness,but no actual military perations n thearea.

100 = No resources hould be allocatedto militaryonflictnsteadof economicreform o that there will be no military perations n the South ChinaSea.

TABLE 1. Data Assumptions

Capabilities Position Salience

GENPOP3 40 81 30DENG 100 76 75

GUANGDONG 30 70 70PLA2 80 66 70USOIL 3 62 80PLA3 25 59 50SWMILIND 5 56 85GENPOP4 60 54 20GENPOP2 10 47 80CHEN YUN 35 43 75PLAI 10 25 85GENPOPI 3 17 90

'4World ournal s the biggest and most prominentU.S.-based Chinese newspaper. It actuallyprovidesmoreaccurate information han do the newspapers n mainland China since the latter re operated and censoredbythe state.

15Chinese ecurity olicyformation as been one of Wu's research nterests or ome time. Both Mr. Tan andMr.Chen are Ph.D. students.Mr. Tan workedon issues concerningChinese economicreform t a notedeconomicresearch institution n Taiwan for several years before he came to the U.S. Mr. Chen was a lecturer at theDepartment of InternationalRelations, Peking University, efore he came to the U.S. Wu's field studyvisittoChina tookplace in October 1992.




Before turningto our analysisof China's anticipatedpolicy affecting heallocation ofresources for military urposesin theSouth China Sea, we shouldcommentbrieflyn the data presented n Table 1. The identity fthe groups is

explained in the Appendix. It is evident that there s considerablevariation nthe power, position, nd salienceof the groups.One might egitimately onderat how reliable the data are giventhatthey re based on the personal udgmentsof a few specialists.Four points are worthnoting n thisregard.

First, he model's success rateof 90 percent n predicting olicy hoicesamongcontending nterests uggests hatexpertsprovidereliabledata mostof the time.Second,an assessment f the reliabilityfexpertshas found that he predictionsmade with the model are robustacross experts even ifthe assumptionsof theexperts about how to identify elevant actors are divergent.Third,when pre-dictions fromthe model differfrom predictions made by the experts whoprovided the inputdata, the model proves to be significantly ore precise and

accuratethando the very xpertswhose inputswere used (Feder, 1987). Finally,sensitivitynalysiscan be-and has been-conducted to determinewhether heresults re robustor are altered by small changes in the data assumptions.

As part of our data evaluation procedure we have tested the robustnessofour analyticresults. The sensitivityesting enteredon the mostcontroversialaspect of our data set. Some China specialists, or nstance,have suggestedthatthefactiondescribed as the South-Westmilitary-industrialomplex in our datasetmay be stronger han our expertevaluators ndicated.As this conjecture splausible,we have testedthe impacton our results hatwould arise f the South-Westmilitary-industrialomplexactuallyhas capabilities nywheren therangeof 5 units as indicated n our data set) to 50 units on our scale. Fifty nits,of

course, represents tenfold ncrease relative o our data set.The sensitivitynalysis demonstrates hat our analyticresults hange mean-ingfully nly if the capabilities of the South-Westmilitary-industrialomplexare as large as 50. In other words,only when the udgment of a collectivebodyofChina experts urns ut to bewrongby about tentimes,which sveryunlikely,are the resultsof our analysis altered significantly.everal similarsensitivitytestswere conducted and all pointed to the conclusionthatthe results of theanalysis re robust against plausible measurement rrors.

Forecasting China's Policy: An Illustrationof theMethod

As is evident from Table 1, thereis a wide diversity f opinion on this ssue.Less evident,perhaps, is the great differencebetween the concentrationofpotentialpolitical nfluence nd therealized utilization fpolitical nfluence nthisquestion.Figure 2 highlightshatdifference.

Stakeholderswithan interest n transferringubstantial mountsof moneyaway fromthe economic reformprogramand towardthemilitary ollectivelypossesssubstantial olitical nfluence.However,they re much esswilling o usetheir nfluence n this ssue than are those who are moredisposed to maintainthe status quo or even increase support for the economic reform program.Figure 3 displaysthe cumulativepolitical power and utilizedpoliticalpower

(i.e., capabilitiesdiscounted bysalience) as a function fpolicy preference.Themedian "voter" line crosses the power or capabilitiesvariable at position 66,indicating support for a somewhat more aggressiveforeign policy,but theutilizedpower configuration oes not achieve the statusof themedian "voter"until position 76, a posture that is equivalent to the maintenance of thestatusquo.

The expected utility nalysisprovidesdetailsconcerning he resolution fthe




.25 -

UsePow

L .2-CD

3 15-

? 17 43 54 59 66 7625 47 56 62 70 81

Policy PreferenceFIG. 2. Will thePRC Use Force?

1I UsePow

L *75 Power l l

CD

CD)

.25 | l l l l i

?~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~. .........Il-i E l

17 43 54 59 66 7625 47 56 62 70 81

Policy PreferencesFIG. 3. Supportfor ResourceTransfers




issue that cannot be gleaned from these two figures.We find, onsistentwithFigures 2 and 3, that China is expected to become somewhat more militarilyactive n theshortterm n promoting ts claimsto the Spratly slands than has

been true up until now. However, afterconsiderable nternaldebate, China'spolicywill settledown to an equilibrium bout equivalent to the current tatusquo. On a scale from ero to 100,with ll-outwar being equal to zero, and withthe current tatusquo equal to 76, the expectedutility orecast s that nternalChinese debate will first nclineChina toward policy nvolving t least a navalblockade and perhaps air or naval harassment position 66 on the scale). Thismore activisttance,however,willquicklygiveway to a moremoderate position.We expect that the internalbargaining process will lead to a compromise be-tweenhard-linersnd more moderateelements, esulting n supportfor policythatmovesfrom ctivist o an endorsement f some action ike a naval blockade,butwithout dditional military arassment r interventionposition 70 on the

scale). That is, the intermediate xpected utility ssessment ndicates a policythat s slightlymore activist han the current tatus uo.16We find, urther, hateven the ntermediate, nly lightlymoreactivist rofile

willprove difficult orChina to sustain.Gradually, coalitionpolicywill emergeto reassert the current status quo. Althoughthat policywill not be withoutsignificant etractors,t will prove to be fairly table.

It is of some interest o note how the competing nterests re expected toevolve over time.With that n mind, Table 2 provides foursnapshotsbased onpredictions sing the dynamicversionof the expected utilitymodel. In the firstpicture, ach group hypothesized o be relevant o the issue-as defined n theAppendix-is located at what China expertshave identified s their current

position.The second snapshot ndicates he shiftsnpositions, nd theformationofcoalitions, redictedby the nitialphase ofthe dynamic xpectedutilitymodel.The third and fourth napshotsshow the equilibriumpositionsat which eachgroup is expected to settlefor the time being. Each snapshot,then, denotes aphase in thesequence of nternal argaining hatwilltake China from tscurrent

TABLE 2. The ProspectsofMilitary ngagementover the Spratly slands

Group Ti T2 T3 T4

GENPOP3 81 70 69 72DENG 76 75 73 73GUANGDONG 70 71 73 73PLA2 66 75 73 73USOIL 62 70 71 73PLA3 59 64 70 73SWMILIND 56 66 67 67GENPOP4 54 61 63 72GENPOP2 47 43 66 66CHEN YUN 43 49 52 56PLAI 25 66 67 67GENPOPI 17 62 62 69

FORECAST 66 70 73 73

16As noted earlier, there are recent reports hatChina has sentthree submarines o oin itsnaval fleet n thearea. China has denied the action. Submarines, of course, are a major instrument orChina if China hopes toinstigate successfulnaval blockade. If the report s correct, hen, t demonstrates hat the policy predictionwemade inAugust 1992 when thispaper was originally resented t the meetings f the AmericanPoliticalScienceAssociation s consistentwith ubsequentdevelopments.




policytowardthe Spratly slands to a more aggressiveposture and then back tothe statusquo ante.

The dynamicsunderlying he emergence of the predictedequilibriumhigh-

light nteresting eaturesrelated to actor perceptions.Recall that the interpre-tationof the figures hatdepict these highlights s done in accordance with thesample guide provided n Figure 1.

Most notable among the perceptual highlights s the unrealized potentialamong Deng Xiaoping's supportersfor promoting still ess aggressive policythan that which will be implemented. n particular, ccording to the logic ofthe expected utility ssessment, t appears that Chen Yun believes that he cando no better han to givein to Deng if he is pressed to do so. Figure 4 clearlyindicates that Chen Yun perceives himself o be in a politicallyweak positionvis-ai-viseng as well as other reform-orientedctors. While the conservativeChen Yun believes thathe has real influence ver those segmentsof thepopu-

lation that are extremenationalists GENPOPI) or thathave already benefitedsubstantially romcurrenteconomic reformprogramsand are afraid to rockthe political boat (GENPOP3), he otherwise sees himself as embattled. Hissituation,n actuality, s betterwithrespectto Deng thanhe thinks nd is morecomplex withregard to thegeneral population than Chen Yin recognizes.

Figure 5 reveals how each group views ts own situationvis-'a-vis hen Yun.Most intriguing rom policyperspective s the difference etweenChen Yun'sviewof the expected interactionwithDeng and Deng's viewof the same antic-ipated interaction. nsofaras Deng's position s somewhatmore moderate thanthe status quo and Chen Yun is a keycenter of power among the hard-liners,pressing him to accept Deng's policies would foster an even broader based

Chen Yun's Perception: Outset

GENPOP2AMOILSWILIN GENPOP4

DENG PLA II PLA3 PLAiGUANGDO

GENPOP3 GENPOPI

EU(ChenYun)

EU(Rivals)FIG. 4.




coalition of supportfor economic reform nd militarymoderation. Accordingto the model,however,Deng believes his relationship is-'a-vishen Yun is onethatwill ead to a stalemate n which t s best not topress forfurtheroncessions

(Figure 5). Thismisperceptionesultsn a foregonepportunityo consolidatereatersupport ehind eng's objectives.s we saw in Figure4, Chen Yun would give inand accept Deng's policy f he were pressed to do so. That Deng will not pressmeans that he will forego theopportunity o furtherweaken the anti-economicreform hard-liners, hereby possibly eopardizing the future viability f hisprogramsonce he has leftthe scene. While themodel proposed here could beused to simulate the impact on thispolicy questionthat Deng's death (or ChenYun's) would have, such an assessment s beyondthe current cope and objec-tivesof this nvestigation.

We also find hatthe Spratly slands policy s fraughtwith nternal onflict. tthe outsetof our assessment we find that 37 percentof the bilateralgroup

relationships nvolve the prospectof veryhigh tension.This is mitigated ignif-icantly y thefirst argaininground, n whichthecompromise greement t 70leaves about 29 percent of the relationships n a confrontationalmode. Thepress to withdraw ven the small concessions to activists eflectedn this nter-mediate forecast s expected to result in 45 percentof the internal bilateralrelationships eing tense and conflictual.Once the statusquo is reestablished,however, empers eem to calmdown,with return o approximatelyhe currentlevel of tension. In the final iteration of the model, 35 percent of bilateralrelations re conflictual.

It appears thatthebigwinners mong Chinese elitesare Deng Xiaoping andtheleaders ofGuangdong. They are at the core of thewinning oalition,while

Rival's Perceptions About Chen Yun: Outset

GENPOP2

SWMLIN GENPOLAPLA3 GENPOPI

AM01t ~~~~EU(Chenun)OENG ~ PLA2

DENG GUANGDO

GENP 3

EU(Rivals)FIG. 5.




Chen Yun and his followers re the biggest osers. Our assessment uggests hatfears of expanded Chinese militarism n the South China Sea are misplaced.Although the prospect of such behavior s enhanced in the shortterm, t is not

sustainablegiven nternalChinesepressures.This means thatneither he UnitedStatesnor regionalpowersneed worry hemselves erymuchaboutconstructinga policy oriented toward deterringChina's territorialmbitions oncerning heSpratly slands or related disputes in the near future.What the more distantfuturewillbring say, more than fiveyearsfromnow), of course, will'requireupdatingof the analysisfrom ime to time.

Conclusions

The approach to analyzingChinese politicstaken here represents method-

ological departurefrommorecommonly sed perspectives. he technicalnatureofthe analysiswillnaturallynd appropriatelymake China specialists nd otherssomewhat keptical.Yet our conclusionsabout the low prospectsof a waroverthe Spratly slands are ratherconsistentwithprevious Chinese foreignpolicyand withmuch scholarshipon the subject.

Shih and Adelman (1993) look at the history f China's foreignpolicyfrom1840 through1980. They argue thatChina tends to dramatize ts foreignpolicydetermination y participatingn many disputeswhilecarefully ontrolling helevel of conflict. heir assessment f historic atterns s quiteconsistentwith hepredictionswe make regarding he current ngoing dispute n the South ChinaSea. A similarperspective s found n Gurtov nd Hwang's (1980) evaluationof

China's participationn the Korean War and in Segal's (1985) observation hatChina has alwaysbeen flexible n determiningtsmilitary oals.In contrastto our model-basedpredictions,which are also consistentwith

several analysesof past Chinese involvementn disputes,there s considerablediversity f opinion about China's future ntentions, diversityhathighlightsthe controversialnature of our predictions. n the contextof a prospectiveconflictwith Taiwan, for instance,Chang and Lasater (1993) believe China'sapproach is to threatenTaiwan withforce n ordertoobtaingreaterbargainingleverage in the future. Godwin (1993) contendsthat China is likelyto use ablockade ofTaiwan to compel reunification, hile former hairmanof theJointChiefs of StaffAdmiral Thomas H. Moorer believesthata blockadeof Taiwan

would immediately scalate intoa full-fledged ar withthepotentialto spreadthroughout he region. Based on our analysis,we are sanguine thatChina isnotprepared to risk uch a level of military ngagementat this time.

It is reassuringthat our findings re echoed in a substantial ody of earlierresearchon China's foreign olicy.We havemade quite explicit ur assumptionsaboutrationalitynChinese policyformation. thers,thoughusing essexplicitmodels,share this conviction hat China's policiesare shaped by rational, tra-tegic alculations ythe eadership.Certainlyuch a view sreflected, or nstance,in Chan (1978) and Whiting 1975). Specialistson China should be somewhatreassured thatthe formalmodels approach we have taken s capable ofyieldinginsights nto China's future hat are generally onsistentwith significantody

ofmoreconventional nalysis.At the same time, uch specialists,we hope, willbe intrigued ythe differences etweenour predictionsnd otherpointsof viewand by the practical possibilities ur approach holds out forpredicting utureeventsand for explainingthose events n the context of strategic alculationsand motivations o gain political dvantage.

Some limitationsfthe model discussedhere shouldbe mentionedbeforeweconclude thisstudy.The accuracyof the predictions, f course, relies on the



SAMUEL . G. WU ANDBRUCE BUENODE MESQUITA 399

accuracy of the input data. We believe there s room for mprovement n thisregard. This report, therefore, an be seen as an invitationfor experts onChinese security olicy to oin in the effort o analyze Chinese affairs hrough

the use of such models. At the same time,we hasten to add that the reliabilityof predictionsmade with this model over the past decade gives us reason toexpresssome confidence n themodel, the methodused for cquiringdata, andtheexpertise f area specialistsn recognizing he underlyingtructure f power,position, nd salience on specified ssues. What is more,th-emodel providesabasis for ntegratinghe expertiseof thosewho specialize in particularregionsor problemsand those who specialize in the analysisof decisionmaking.Suchan integration olds out promiseof more comprehensivepolitical nalysisthanhas generally een possible byeitherdecisionanalysts r area specialists n theirownin the past.

To the extentthat one might doubt the validity f the data, the approach

takenhere providesa usefultool for ssessing lternative ata assumptions.Themodel can, of course, be resolvedwith different ata assumptionsto testtherobustness f the currentresultsor to evaluate the impactof alternative iewson the fundamental tructure f policy making n China (or elsewhere).Sometestsof ust thesequestionsof robustnesshave been reported n our analysis.

One of the more encouragingaspects of this typeof modeling s thatall ofthe assumptionsbehind the analysisare explicitand fixed,so that differentscholars willnot unwittinglyntroducealternative ssumptionsabout the fun-damental structure fdecision makingwhile usingan approach suchas theonesuggestedhere.This ensures comparabilitycrossanalysts nd allows us tofocusspecifically n the impact, fany,of alternativenput assumptions. nterestingly,

thismodel turnsout to be quiterobust n itsresults n the face of quite differentspecificationsf stakeholders, heirpower,preferences, nd salience.The Spratly slands disputeappears to be unlikely o flareup into a significant

source of violent conflictn the South China Sea over the next few years.Theanalysis ndicatesthat, f challenged, China's response will be a littlebitmoreaggressive n the near future han t has been recently, ut theresponsewill notbe so much more aggressivethat we should expect a significant iversionofresourcesawayfrom conomicgrowth nd towardmilitaryapabilitiesrelevantto disputes n the South China Sea. We see no reason to believe that China willundertake a big policyshift nd become more aggressive.Since reformersnChina will have a muchbetter hance to implement heir genda, policiesthat

emphasizea stable nternational nvironmentre expectedtoprevail nthe nearfuture.That is certainly ood news,not onlyforthose in the region,but alsoforAmerican foreignpolicymakers.

In the event thatchangingcircumstances r a changed leadershipin Chinashould produce an alteration n the situation, he United States would almostcertainly e called upon toactas theprincipal ource ofdeterrence.n the eventof such exogenous eventualities s thedeath ofDeng Xiaoping,we would hopeto revisit his ssue and reanalyze the prospectsfor stable Chinese policyusingtheframeworkuggested here.

Appendix: Description of Positions and Groups

Issue Definition:

What level of resources (therefore, efiningwhat level of military peration)should be reallocatedfrom economic reform o militarydventureto respondto challenge(s) fromsmallercountries and to secure China's interests n the




SouthChina Sea? (The assumption s that thechallenge(s)will be mostly mall-scale one(s) and there will be no superpower nvolvement.)

Groups and Positions:Deng and Reformers n theParty:This groupincludesDeng Xiaoping,GeneralSecretary iangTse-min,Prime Minister i Peng,ForeignMinisterQian Qichen,and others. This group advocates the peaceful resolution of any territorialdisputewith neighboring ountries.Li Peng and Qian (World ournal,August18 and 19, 1992:4) were quoted as sayingthatChina needs a peaceful inter-national environment o embark on vigorous economic reformprograms. LiPengwas also quoted as saying hat t s not China's intention o be a hegemonicpowerin Southeast Asia (World ournal,August 18, 1992:4).

Chen Yun and Supportersin the Party:Led by Chen Yun, thisgroup is the

conservativewingof the Communistparty. t is believed that there is quite afollowingbehind this faction.Chen Yun was quoted as sayingthat economicreform s important ut itneeds to follow he Chinese modelofsocialism WorldJournal,May 13, 1992:4). This groupdoes notoppose expanded militaryonflictin thearea, for t least tworeasons. First, seriousmilitary onflictwouldchangethe policy priority nd emphasize collectivismnstead of individualism. econd,the uncertainty reated by a war mightchange theirdisadvantaged power po-sitionvis-'a-vishe reformers.

PLAI: This group includes the People's Liberation Army's PLA) professionalofficersn the middle and lower ranks, ged from round 50 or older. They are

the losersin the process of economic reform.Manyof these officers re underthe threatof losing their obs with ittle hance to transfer o other obs (WorldJournal, uly 1, 1992:4). Their level of respect has declinedprimarily ecauseof social changes brought about by the success of economic reform WorldJournal, une 25, 1992:4). In addition, theyhave voiced concernsabout the illeffects f economic reform n the PLA's fighting apability nd on themoraleof their roops. They believethattheywouldbenefit rom onflictgainstothercountries.

PLA2: This group includes those high-level eaders in the PLA who supportDeng's economic reforms. or instance,PLA2 includes the NationalChairman,Yang Shangkun, and the PLA reform roup led byYang's youngerbrother nd

Chief of the General Staff,General Chih Haotien (WorldJournal,June 12,1992:4). In a news report World ournal, ctober 10, 1991:1) Yang was quotedas sayingthat economic reforms the singlemost mportant riority orChina,but he cautions thatChina willrespond with force f threatenedmilitarily.fchallenged in the South China Sea, a combinationof a naval blockade andeconomicsanctionmightbe,according oYang,thebestresponse WorldJournal,August 15, 1992:1).

PLA3: This group includes most of the naval forces.The Navyhas been a bigwinner n China's recent increases in military xpendituresfortechnologicalimprovement.As long as a military onflictdoes not escalate out of control,

sizableconflictnthe South China Sea would further oost theperception f theimportanceof the Navy. In turn, t would help the Navyto obtain even moreresources.

Guangdong ProvincialGovernment nd theGuangdong MilitaryRegion: Thisgroup includes the population in the Guangdong area, represented by theleadership of the provincialgovernment nd themilitary egion. They are big




winners because of the economic reform program (WorldJournal,June 13,1992:4). Recently, hey have become less and less controlledby the politicalcenter in Beijing. They oppose a major military peration as the vehicle by

whichBeijing regainscontrolover the South China Sea region. However, theydo not adamantly oppose a controlled, imited military ction in which themilitary ivisions from the Guangdong MilitaryRegion would be responsiblefortheoperation. There are two reasons theywould find uch a limitedmilitaryengagement cceptable: 1) to secure the economic benefits rom he explorationof the South China Sea; and (2) to increase theirpowerthroughthe resourcesgained frommilitary reparations nd operations.

GeneralPopulation 1: This group includes fanaticnationalistsn China (about1% of the population) who are extremely ensitive o any foreign hallenge toChina's territorialntegrity. oreign challengesserveas vividreminders f thehumiliating istory f mperial nvasionsof China by foreign owers.Therefore,

wheneverChina's territorialntegrityschallenged, heypreferChina torespondin a forcefulway. However, even this group would not wantan all-out war.

General Population 2: This group includes those who have a strong sense ofnationalism but are not as fanatic as those in the GP1 (about 3-5% of thepopulation). They preferChina to respondin a limitedbut forcefulway, say, alimitedconventional war involvingno more than twobranches of the armedforces.

General Population 3: This group includes those who have benefitedfromeconomic reforms about 40% of the population,excluding Guangdong). The

territorial isputes in the South China Sea are not theirprimeconcern.Theydo not want to see the currentpath of reform nterruptedby internationalconflict, or do theywant to see conservatives egain power.They could accepta military howdownthat fellshortof actual fighting.

GeneralPopulation4: This group includesthosewhosepositionon the issue isbetweenGP2 (General Population 2) and GP3 (about 50-55% of thepopulation).Included in this group are those who have not yetbenefitedmuch from eco-nomic reforms nd who thereforeput heavier weight on territorial ntegritythan on stability or the sake of economic reform nd development.Neitherstability orthe sake of economic reformsnor military perationsfor the sakeof territorialntegritys a high priority orthem.They can, however,be mobi-lized by an appeal to nationalism.Without uch a mobilization, hey probablypreferto "teach" smaller countriesa lesson witha limited, ow-intensityrmsoperation.

American Oil Company(ies): This group includes the oil companies that areinterested n cooperating with China to explore oil in the area. Of course, thecompany(ies) would prefer peaceful,stable environment or theiroperation.However, ftheir ontract(s)withChina werechallenged byothernations n theregion, they would prefer that China "teach" those nationsa lesson. The warshould be serious enough to deter othercountries rompossibly hallenging hecantract(s) gain, but should not be so out of controlthat the oil exploration s

jeopardized.South-WestMilitary-Industrialomplex: The military-industrialomplex n theSouth-Westof China is one of the most important oncentrations f militaryindustries n China. Many importantmilitarymodernization rojectshave beencontracted o institutionsn thisregion. Military onflictwould probablybringthemmorecontracts.




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1994 Assessing the Dispute in the South China Sea a Model of China's Security Decision Making

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