1987 the Asia-Pacific Region_Cockpit for Superpower Rivalry

7/30/2019 1987 the Asia-Pacific Region_Cockpit for Superpower Rivalry

http://slidepdf.com/reader/full/1987-the-asia-pacific-regioncockpit-for-superpower-rivalry 1/5



TheAsia-Pacificregion:cockpit forsuperpower rivalry

Amitav charyaIs theAsia-Pacific egion1 itnessinghebeginningsf newphaseofsuperpowerivalry? oth heUnitedStates nd theSovietUnionhave increasinglyurned heir ttentiono the

region.American fficialsrequentlyeferothe Age of thePacific'; resident onaldReaganhas describedhePacific stheocean where hefutureftheworld ies'. In his famous

speech tVladivostoknJuly1986,theSovietPartyeader,MikhailGorbachev, ssertedhe ovietUnion'sclaim o be aPacific owerwithegitimateeasons obe involvednthe f-fairs ftheregion. he implicationsftheGorbachevpeechare still einghotly ebatedbothwithin heregion nd the

United tates,where oncern asgrownhat he ower alancein thePacific,ongregardeds an 'Americanake',might ereversedn thenon-too-distantuture.hisarticle ssesses hecurrentalance nd ts uturerospects,n he ightf he ecent

policies f he uperpowersnthe egion.

A Soviet push?Thegreaterart fMr Gorbachev's ladivostokpeech2 ealtwith omesticmatters,ocusingnthe conomic rospectsortheSovietFar East. In thewest,however,most ttentionas

goneto theSoviet eader'sproposals oncerning hina and

regionalssues.TowardsChina,Gorbachevmadetwomajorconcessions. irst, eofferedowithdrawa substantialart' fthe oviet roop resencenMongolia. econd,heagreed o he

long-standinghinesedemandthattheSino-Soviet order

alongtheAmurriver e demarcated longthemedian ine,ratherhan heChinesebank.On regional ecurity,emadethefollowingroposals: Helsinki-typeonferenceo be at-tended y ll countriesgravitating'owardshePacific cean

(withHiroshima s a possiblevenue) to discusspeace and

securitynthéAsia-Pacific egion; alkswith heUnited tatestoreducenavalforcesn thePacific,ncluding estrictionsnanti-submarinectivityn certainonesof he cean;creationof 'zoneofpeace' inthe ndianOcean; anda conferencefAsia-Pacific tatesoundertakepractical iscussionsn confi-

dence-building easures nd on thenon-use fforcen this

region'.Finally,Gorbachev nnounced plan towithdrawsixregimentsfSoviet roops rom fghanistanndspeedupnegotiationsoreach politicalettlementnAfghanistan.

Theolivebranch oward hinawasclearlyhemost ignifi-cant fGorbachev'segionalnitiatives.heconcessionsntheSino-Sovietorder roblemndthe roposedroopwithdrawalfromAfghanistanid address woofthe ssueswhichChina

regardss impedimentsonormalisationfrelations. utthethirdobstacle',theVietnamese ccupation fKampuchea,wasnot ddressed. he Chinese,nonethe ess,sawtheGor-bachev nitiativesna morefavourableight han heUnited

States,whichuestionedhe ovieteader's incerity.heideaofa Helsinki-typeonference as dismissed y the UnitedStates s a propaganda xercise. he limitedroopwithdrawalfrom fghanistanasviewed s a clever loymeaning othingbutrotationftroops.WhileGorbachev olicited Japaneserole nthedevelopmentfSoviet arEast,he didnotmentionthe riticalssueofJapan'sclaim otheNorthernslands, c-

rnnieH v he ovietUnion ince he econdWorldWar.Japan

itselfemainedooltoGorbachev, efusingo takeuphisofferof meetingtthehighestevelbetweenhe wo ountries.3

UndeterredytheChinese eservationsndAmericancep-ticism, he SovietUnionhas embarked n a large-scale ip-lomatic xercise o selltheGorbachev roposals o theAsia-Pacific ountries.n thepastyear, heSoviet oreignministryhas sentdelegations o South-EastAsia,Australia nd NewZealand to discusspolitical s well as trade ssues. n earlyFebruary987, he oviet oreignMinister, duardShevard-nadze, travelled o Thailand, Indonesia and Australia. nNovember 986,Gorbachev imselfisited ewDelhi,hisfirst

third-orlddestinationincebecoming oviet eader.Aftertalkswiththe PrimeMinister,Rajiv Gandhi, Gorbachev

repeatedhisproposals n confidence-buildingeasures ndreductionn naval ctivitiesnAsia-Pacific.He alsoofferedo

negotiateuaranteesor afe assage nthe traitsnd sea-lanesof he ndianOceanwith ll tsusers.

The SovietUnionhas actedto fulfil orbachev'spledgeson imitedroopwithdrawalsromMongolia ndAfghanistan.In October1986,six Sovietregiments,ncludinghree nti-

aircraft,womotor-riflend onearmoured,werewithdrawnfrom fghanistan.hesewithdrawalsre seenbytheUnitedStates san exercisendeception. ccordingo he epartmentofDefencenWashington,he ank ndanti-aircraftnitswereof limitedmilitary alue in Afghanistan,nd the Sovietauthoritiesad

ustbroughtntoAfghanistanwonfantrynits

from entralAsia 'forthepurpose fbeingable to removethem'4 nJanuaryhis ear,Moscow nnouncednagreementwithMongolia to withdraw ne motor-rifleivisionfrom

Mongolia nd nJune onfirmedhat hewithdrawaladbeencarried ut.Meanwhile, hortlyfterheVladivostokpeech,'normalisation'alkswith hina ontinued ith isitsoBeijingby wo opSoviet fficials,heDeputy rimeMinister, ikolai

Talyzin, ndtheDeputy oreignMinister,gorRagachev, heformereadingthehighest-rankingovietmission o Chinasince 969.5 hemost ecentmove nGorbachev's sia-Pacific

'peace' offensives hisproposal oeliminatellmedium-rangenuclearweapons SS-20s)fromuperpowerrsenals,ncludingthose ased nthe ovietAsianmainland, rovidedheUnitecStates greed oremovetsnuclearweapons romapan,Kores

andthePhilippines.Anotherovietnitiative hich asreceivedonsiderableo-tice nthewest oncernshe outhPacific, hithertoeglectecarea in thegeopoliticalalculations fthesuperpowers. h<SovietUnion igned isherygreements ithwo outh acificisland tates, iribatinAugust1984andVanuatu n Marci

1987,prompting merican omplaints hattheagreement!couldbeusedfor oliticalnd ntelligence-atheringurposesAmerican fficialsear hatSovietfishingrawlersmight <usedtomonitorheAmericanmissile-testingange tKwajalein toll ndthat he ovietUnionmightetupa satelliteartlstationn Kiribati.6 he Soviet uthorities,owever, aveallowedtheir greement ithKiribati o lapseafter he atte:

rejected heir emandfor reductionf$300,000 n licenafees.nanother iplomatic ove,Moscowhas ignedhe roto

colsattached otheSouthPacificNuclear-FreeoneTreaty

155



156 THEWORLD TODAY AUGUST/SEPTEMBER987

Washington, as refusedo support hetreaty, rguing hatendorsement ouldcreate precedentndencourage pro-liferation fnuclear-freeones elsewhere, specially n theBalkans ndScandinavia.7 his, nturn, ouldundermineheAmericantrategyfnuclear eterrence.8

American concerns

In thewest,twodifferentchoolsofthoughteemto haveemerged n the ignificancend implicationsfGorbachev'sAsia-Pacific nitiative. he first iews it as reflectingheKremlin'seconomic concerns nd problems.9 he SovietUnion,accordingo thisview, s desperate o accelerate heeconomic evelopmentf ts iberian egion spart f ts idtorideoutthepresent conomic risis.This requires mprovedeconomicnd, therefore,olitical elations ith apan nd thefast-developingacificBasincountries. he second chool fthoughtees long-termovietgeopoliticalmbitions ehindGorbachev'sAsia-Pacific olicy.Accordingothisview,theSovietUnion,traditionallynderdog o the UnitedStates nterms f tspoliticalnfluencendmilitaryapabilitiesn theregion, ow eeks o upplant mericannfluence ith ts wn.AccordingoRichardArmitage,heReaganAdministration's

AssistantecretaryfDefencefor nternationalecurity f-fairs: What we are seeing s the additionof political ndeconomic lementsothegrowingower rojectionapabilityinEastAsia and the acific, capabilitylearlyimed ttheUSand ts egional riendsndallies.1()

During hepastdecade,Sovietmilitaryorcesn theAsia-Pacific heatre avebeen ignificantlypgraded. heimprove-mentsreboth uantitativendqualitative,nd embrace othnuclear nd conventionalapabilities.One segment f thenuclear componentconsists of SS-20 intermediate-rangeballisticmissiles, 71ofwhichre tationedast f heUrals. Ifthe o-calleddouble-zero'olutionurrentlyeingnegotiatedatGeneva is finallyccepted, hen heSoviet idewouldbeallowed okeep nly 00SS-20s).Also argetinghe ar Easterntheatrere385 nuclearmissiles board32ballistic-missileub-

marines SSBN) and 380 intercontinentalallisticmissiles(ICBM) inseven aunching ases inSovietAsia. The Sovietgeneral urpose orcesnthe ar East heatreTVD) include 7army ivisionsincluding ivenMongolia),1 350 ombat ir-craft, woregimentsf naval infantryroops nd theSovietPacific leet. The atter,he argestf llthe our oviet leets,isregardedy heUnited tates s themost owerfulymbolfthenewSovietmilitary ightn theAsia-Pacific egion. hefleet,which lso hasresponsibilitiesornavaldeploymentsothe ndianOcean,hasgrowny thirduringhe astdecade.Accordingo a recent merican stimate,t now ncludes woaircraftarriers, 4 principalurface ombatants, 21othercombatantsnd120nuclear ndconventionalubmarines.hePacific leethas received omeof the atest enerationovietsurface

hips, ncludingwo Kiev-class ircraft

arriers,Kirov-class uided-missileruiser, nd SoveremennyyndUdaloy-class uided-missileestroyers. ccordingo thePen-tagon, he ovietnavy ould ventuallyssign woKirovs, iveSoveremennyyand four daloys otheir acific leet.12

The fleet s home-based tVladivostok, etropavloskndSovyetskayaavan.But he seof hese ases sconstrainedyclimate ndgeography. etropavlosks ice-bound or everalmonths year,while ccess tobothVladivostok nd Sovyet-skayaGavanrequires assage hrougharrow nd vulnerablestraitsurroundingheSea ofOkhotsk nd theSea ofJapan.This enhances hesignificancefSoviet accessto open andwarmwater utlets f tsfriendsn theWestern acific.Themostmportantf hese sVietnam,which nder 1978 reatyhas allowed heSovietUniontouseair andnaval facilitiest

Danangand Cam RanhBay.

Recently merican nd Soviet fficialsavebeen nvolvednarguments egardinghe xtentndsignificanceftheSovietpresencenCam RanhBay.American fficialsraw ttentionto he acthat amRanhBaynowhosts helargestoncentra-tion f oviet avalunits nd ircrafteployedo navalfacilityoutside heWarsaw act' 13Accordingo estimonyyAdmiralWilliam rowe, he ormerommanderf heAmerican acific

Command CINCPAC), and thepresent hairman f theAmerican oint hiefs f taff, amRanhBay' . . . offers warmwaterportwith ignificantupportfacilitiesome2,200miles outh fVladivostok. naveragepresencef 0-25shipsnthe outh hinaSea indicateshatthe amRanhfacilities ill e used sa forwardtagingasefor ower rojectionnto he outh hinaSeaandthe ndianOcean. Additionally,heSoviets ontinueo ncreaseheiruseof ir facilitiesn Vietnam. heyhave ntroducedpto20 Bears and Badgers.Notonly rethey onductingongrangereconnaissance ithBear D aircraft,ut they recarryingut anti-submarine arfare perations s well.Theirmostrecent nvestmentncludes hedeliveryfap-proximately dozenMiG-23Flogger ll-weatherighters.

Thiss an

mportantpgradenthe irdefencefCam Ranh

Bay. n essence, conclude hat he oviets re thereo tayand planto use thisfacilityn a routine asisfor he n-definiteuture.'14

The Kremlin asdenied uch laims.n March his ear, heSovietAmbassador oAustralia, . Samoteikin,tated hat:

'TheUSSR has no navalbaseatCamRanhBay nthe ensein which t scustomaryo defineuchbases,namely, neswith omplete tructure.Whatexists verthere s onlypointfor he material nd technicalupply f the SovietNavy. Ships allthere oreplenishheir tocksfwater ndfood r to makeminor epairs n their wn.The point tCam Ranh Bay innowaycan be comparedwith heUSSubieBayNavalBase in thePhilippines,rwith nyof he

350US militaryases catteredround he egion.15

Although heAmbassador's omment egardinghemis-match etween he asingnetworksf he uperpowerssvalid,satellite hotographsfCam RanhBay recentlyeleased ytheUnitedStates onfirm Sovietpresencemore ubstantialthanwhathis remark ould uggest.16venAustralia,whoseperceptionsf he ovietmilitaryresencenthePacific rebyno means larmist, as viewed heofficialovietdenialswithscepticism. lsewherentheregion, ecent eports avesug-gested hat theSovietUnionuses facilitiesn Kampuchea.PrinceSihanouk, he eader of theKampucheanresistancecoalition ightingheHeng Samrinregime, laims that heSovietnavyhas beenusing heport fKompong om andtheAmerican-builtavalbaseat Ream.17 heKampuchean aseswould not

onlyfacilitateoviet

deploymentso theGulf of

Thailand,but,moremportant,rovidehe ovietUnionwithavital allbackositionn ase ccess ofacilitiesnVietnamwastobe denied o it nfuture. astyear, he SovietUnion andNorthKoreasigned n agreementermittingverflightightstoSoviet ircraftlyingrom etween ietnam nd the ovietFarEast. The Soviet uthoritiesrereportedlynterestednob-taining ort acilitiesnNorth orea,althoughtremains obeseenwhether orthKoreawould omplyndtherebyllowmajordeteriorationn ts elations ith hina.

Thepower projectionbalanceIn the context fGorbachev'sdiplomaticnitiativesnd theAmerican erceptionsf he ovietmilitaryuild-up, he ssueof hepower rojectionalance n theAsia-Pacific heatres-

sumesgreat ignificance.s the ovietUnionseekingmilitary



ASIA/PACIFIC THEWORLD TODAY 157

superiorityver heUnited tatesn the egion? re he ecentSoviet iplomaticmoves n theregion art f calculated eo-politicalffensive?

In theAsia-Pacific egion, he conomic, olitical nd stra-tegic onnectionsftheUnitedStateswith egional ountriesremainmore xtensivenddeep-rootedhan hose f he ovietUnion.Moscowhasnofriendsntheregion, xcept he ndo-

Chinese tates ndNorthKorea. FortheUnitedStates, iveof tsmost mportantilateral ecurityelationshipsrewith

regionalountriesJapan, outhKorea,thePhilippines,hai-land ndAustralia). he SovietUnion salso ata disadvantageover he inkageshat evelop hroughrade.t s themarketor

only percentof thetotal xports f theAsia-Pacific oun-tries.18heUnited tates,ncontrast,asexperiencedmajorupsurgen tsAsia-Pacific rade. ince1980,Americanradewith siahas urpassedts radewith urope, nd t sexpectedto ccount or 5percent f heAmerican ross ational ro-ductgnp)by heyear 000. 9

Gorbachev's esire oexpand radewith he ovietUnion'sAsia-Pacific eighbourshroughmproved olitical elationsand he ettlementf utstandingegional isputessunlikelyo

yield ignificantesultsn thenearterm.The problemswith

ChinaandJapanhavebeenmentionedarlier. t shouldbenotedherethatNormalisation' f Sino- oviettiesdoes notmeanChina'sacceptance f, rsupportor, oviet ower ro-jection,whichwill onflict ithBeijing's wnregional mbi-tions. hegrowingrotectionistentimentntheUnited tatesand therecent conomicdownturnn thecountrieswhich

belong otheAssociationf outh-East sianNationsAsean)make he oviet fferf mprovedrade inks ttractiveothelatter.However,hereagain, theKampucheanproblem, owhichno end is still n sight, emains significantarrier.

Althoughhe Aseanremains ivided n itsattitude owards

Moscow, he hared ndbasic nti-communismf ll tsmem-berstateswouldprecludenymajor mprovementnpoliticalrelations ith he SovietUnionevenafter hewithdrawalf

Vietnameseroops rom ampuchea.Sovietproposals oncerningHelsinki-typeonferenceortheAsia-Pacific nd itsproposed avalarmsreductionalkswith heUnited tates restill ague.But t shard o be op-timisticbout uch nitiativesiven he ate f imilar ecentt-

tempts elatingothe ndianOcean (theaborted uperpowerNavalArms imitation alksandthe till-to-be-convenedn-

ternationalonferenceodiscuss heproposed ndianOceanZoneofPeace). Theprospectsor settlementnAfghanistan,whichmightnhance oviet oliticalmage ntheAsia-Pacific

region, owappearbetter hanon anyprevious ccasion. n

theso-called roximityalks onducted nderUN auspices,theSovietUnionandPakistan re closeto an agreementn

a timetable or hewithdrawalfSoviettroops. t is beingsuggestedhatPakistan s delaying n agreement ntilthe

American ongress as approved $42bn militaryndeco-nomic idpackage roposed ytheReaganAdministration.20Buttheres ittle rospecthat n agreementeached etween

Pakistan, heSovietUnionand theKabul regimewouldbe

respectedytheAfghan esistance roups. he SovietUnionfaces notherrucial ilemma: f n agreementhouldeadto

theremoval fthepresentAfghan egime, t couldnotbut

undermineoviet redibilityeforetspoliticalnd deological

partnersnEurope ndthe hird orld.

Despite hemprovementsn tsmilitaryosturentheAsia-

Pacific uringhe ast ecade, he ovietUnion sunlikelyobe

able omatch mericanmilitaryapabilitiesnthe egionnthe

foreseeableuture.n thewest,muchhas beenmadeofthe

growingizeandcapabilityf heSoviet acific leet.Butthe

Pentagontself asconceded hat he izeof he ovietFleet s

™rtK, ur n ts p-enoranhicsolation rom ther ovietfleets

andmajor hipbuildingentres.This remoteness',ccordingto thePentagon,would make reinforcementofthe SovietPacificFleet)exceedingly ifficulturingwartime.'21 s re-gards apability, merican acificnavalforcesre substanti-ally uperiorotheir oviet ounterpartsnallmajor reas n-cluding arly-warning,ir-defence,nti-ship,nti-submarinewarfarend amphibious apabilities.22he mismatchs par-

ticularlyignificant ith espect o aircraftarriers,rguablythemostpotentnstrumentfpowerprojection. he SovietPacificFleet,with tstwo33,000ton Kiev-clas arriers ithYak-36 VSTOL (Vertical nd ShortTake-off nd Landing)aircraft,s a poorcompetitoro the60,000-and 90, 00- onAmerican arriers ndtheir rray fhigh-performancettackand interceptorircraft. ew navalstrategistselieve hat, nwartime,heSovietPacific leet ouldposea serious hreatotheAmerican eventh leetwhichwould omprise ive arrierbattlegroups, wobattleshipurface ctiongroups nd fourunderway replenishment roups.23 he new-generation60, 00- on oviet ircraftarrier, hich oesnot fferubstan-tiallymprovedapabilities, illnotbe ready or eploymentuntil he arly 990s.Eventhen, heAmerican avy smoder-nising t a faster ateand grander cale. Its 600-ship ro-gramme,whichwillbe inplace bythe nd of his ecade,willenhance tstechnologicalead over theSovietnavy,which s

currentlyacing reductionnshipbuildingue tobudgetaryconstraints.24

TheAustralian efenceMinister, imBeazieyhasrecentlystatedhat he ignificancef he ovietmilitaryuild-upntheAsia-Pacific nd tspresencenCamRanhBayhavebeenex-

aggeratedn thewest.25Moreover, tcan be argued hat, n

peacetime, he Sovietpresence n Cam Ranh Bay,which s

perceivedby many regional countries s an unwelcome

development, illharm heKremlin's ffortsowinfriendsntheregion.AnyfurtherncreasenSoviet ctivityheremightprompthepro-westernountriesn theneighbourhoodo n-creasetheir trategicooperation ith he UnitedStates.Tosome xtenthis as

lready appened,f netakesnto ccount

anagreementignednJanuary987 etweenheUnited tatesandThailandproviding or repositioningfAmericanmili-

tary quipmentn Thailand.26 oviet cquisition ffacilitiesin NorthKorea is boundto giveadded impetus omilitarylinks etween apan,SouthKoreaandtheUnited tates.

In wartime, am Ranh Bayremains ighly ulnerable oAmericanttacks romhe ea. In addition, heSoviet irandsea lineof communicationsLOCs) between am RanhBayand Vladivostok ouldbe interdicted ithrelative ase byAmerican orcest several oints longthe Sea ofJapan,theFormosa trait, rtheBashichannel etween hePhilippinesandTaiwan.American avaldominance f hese easwould efurthernhancedwith elpfrom apanese orces, hichresetto receive boostfollowingheNakasonegovernment'seci-

sion o raiseJapanese efencependingbovethe

elf-imposedlimit f1per ent f he ountry's np.27Also significantn this ontexts thegrowingooperation

between heAmerican nd Chinesenavieswhich astyearconducted jointexercisen theSouthChinaSea. Accordingtotheformer mericanNavySecretary, ohnLehman,theAmerican oal is to improve heChinesenavy'scapabilitiesagainst externalthreats n its coastal waters,specificallymeasures hat trengthenhina's surfacehip nti-submarinewarfare apability'.28f,as wouldbe likely, hina should edrawnnto superpoweronflictnthe egiontsnavy,whether

operatingndependentlyrwithAmericanupport,ould dd

to thealready ubstantial ulnerabilityfthe SovietPacificFleet nd tspresencet CamRanhBay.

Indeed, there s a basic asymmetryn superpower aval

capabilitiesnthePacificwhichsreflectedn their espective

1987 the Asia-Pacific Region_Cockpit for Superpower Rivalry

Documents

Transcript of 1987 the Asia-Pacific Region_Cockpit for Superpower Rivalry