Eliminate unnecessary detention of •juveniles. Studies show that youths placed in detention facilities are 4.5 times more likely to recidivate than those placed in alternate programs—even after controlling for offense.6 To reduce unnecessary detention, re-quire all detention centers to inform arrested juveniles of their roles dur-ing detention hearings and establish stricter guidelines for determining which juveniles should be held in de-tention centers.

Restrict the practice of transferring •juveniles to adult criminal courts. Research shows that juveniles con-victed in adult courts are 50 percent more likely to recidivate than those convicted in juvenile courts.7 The transfer of juveniles to the adult sys-tem should be an option for only the most serious offenders. To restrict the number of juveniles waived on to adult court, develop a specific list of offenses and circumstances warrant-ing transfer.

Ensure the continuation of delinquents’ •Medicaid benefits upon release. A de-lay in receiving healthcare benefits is linked to a significant increase in recidivism. To avoid such a delay, forbid Medicaid from terminating contracts with delinquents entering jail. Temporarily suspend all con-tracts while delinquents are in jail and immediately reinstate Medicaid benefits to juveniles upon release.

executIve SuMMary

The American juvenile justice system desperately needs reform. Some 2.4 mil-lion juveniles are charged with offenses annually.1 An appalling 55 percent of juveniles released from incarceration na-tionwide are rearrested within one year.2 In urban centers, that percentage—referred to as the rate of recidivism—reaches up to 76 percent.3 High recidi-vism is associated with increases in crime, victimization, homelessness, family de-stabilization, and public health risks.4 Government-sponsored correctional pro-grams cost sixty billion dollars annually.5 Most tragically, high recidivism indicates a failure to provide meaningful rehabili-tation for offenders. Reducing recidivism specifically among juveniles should be of primary importance to the U.S. Depart-ment of Justice and the Office of Juvenile Justice and Delinquency Prevention. Our government’s current approach to lower-ing recidivism emphasizes the creation and funding of rehabilitative programs. While these initiatives have made mar-ginal gains, efforts have been insufficient. Substantial progress will only come by eliminating recidivism-fostering features of the juvenile justice system itself.

ProPoSed SolutIon

I propose three policy reforms to re-duce juvenile recidivism. First, eliminate unnecessary detention of juveniles. Sec-ond, restrict the practice of transferring juveniles to adult criminal courts. Third, ensure the continuation of delinquents’ Medicaid benefits upon release.

Reducing Juvenile Recidivism in the United States

Jane Wilson, Stanford University

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I. the ProBleM

RecidivismIn the United States, roughly 60 to

70 percent of all adult inmates reenter-ing the community are rearrested within one year of release.9 Precise recidivism rates for juveniles, however, are difficult to obtain at the national level; recidivism is typically measured at the county and state levels, and few states measure re-cidivism by the same metric. Estimates indicate that approximately 50 to 65 percent of juvenile offenders (hereafter delinquents) are re-arrested within one year of release.10 In the state of Califor-nia, 74 percent of all delinquents are re-arrested within one year of release.11 Re-cidivism rates in urban centers tend to be even higher. In Manhattan, 80 percent of delinquents are rearrested within four years of release.12

These numbers should be treated with some degree of caution. Recidivism itself results in part from actions taken by the juvenile justice system, such as arrest, incarceration, and release; without these, recidivism figures would be much lower. Furthermore, a high reincarceration rate may merely demonstrate that police are aware of released offenders and are more likely to incarcerate juveniles they have seen before. While these considerations are valid, they do not entirely negate the usefulness of recidivism as an indica-tor of the degree to which ex-offenders commit additional crime. Research con-ducted using self reported incidence of crime (as opposed to officially reported crime) confirms that juveniles released from incarceration still tend to commit further crime.13

Effects of RecidivismThe effects of recidivism in the Unit-

ed States fall into four general categories. First, recidivism imposes tremendous

public safety costs on American com-munities; high recidivism rates indicate additional victimizations (assuming that the crime for which the juvenile was ar-rested was in fact committed). Second, increased recidivism results in extremely destructive social costs; increases in vio-lence, crime, homelessness, family desta-bilization, and public health risks are all associated with high recidivism rates.14 Third, recidivism imposes a consider-able financial burden on the U.S. De-partment of Justice and, more generally, on American society; our government spends an annual sixty billion dollars on correctional programs.15 Fourth, high recidivism indicates a failure to provide meaningful rehabilitation for inmates re-entering the community; recidivist juve-niles lose out on crucial educational, so-cial, and personal developments that can rarely be regained. Additionally, studies show that recurrent offenses during teen-age years can provide a dangerous incul-cation leading to adult criminality.16 The tragedy of this cycle of criminality can-not be understated.

Benefits of Reducing RecidivismLowering the rate of recidivism

will generate several positive outcomes. First, the aforementioned public safety, social, economic, and personal costs will decrease. Second, young people who otherwise would have been recidivists will become economic assets. Instead of draining resources, individuals who would have been recidivists could im-prove their communities. Third, a lower recidivism rate will allow our govern-ment to reallocate saved dollars from correctional programs to other financial-ly depressed sectors, such as education. Finally, reducing juvenile recidivism will send an important message that our gov-ernment deeply cares about the welfare of its adolescents and prisoners.

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II. current SolutIonS

Government-Sponsored ProgramsThe government’s current attempts

at reducing juvenile recidivism include a variety of strategies, including general programs, multisystemic therapy (MST), residential programs, and community supervision. Taken together, these efforts have produced mixed success.

Examples of programs include Scared Straight (a deterrence-based program), Life Skills classes, interpersonal skills courses, counseling, the Family Home Program, targeted interventions for seri-ous offenders, and therapeutic wilderness and challenge programs. Programs found to be most effective at reducing recidivism include individualized counseling, person-al skills training, and behavior programs. Other programs, such as deterrence-based challenge and vocational programs, have been shown to be ineffective at reducing recidivism.17

Multisystemic therapy (MST) is a rigorous treatment program designed to provide a family-based approach to pre-venting crime and recidivism. It encour-ages youth to change in their natural environment, strengthen their peer rela-tionships and improve their school perfor-mance, and it also empowers parents with the skills necessary to raise a delinquent adolescent. Though MST has successfully reduced crime, there is little evidence that it has reduced recidivism. (Although pre-ventive policies may succeed in keeping juveniles out of custody, they do little about the way in which delinquents are treated once incarcerated and once re-leased from incarceration.)18

Residential programs are overnight programs in which juveniles frequently engage in structured rehabilitation-ori-ented activities (including outdoor wil-derness programs). The effectiveness of residential programs at reducing recidi-

vism is ambiguous: while some studies show a clear link between residential pro-grams and lower recidivism, others reject the correlations entirely.19

Community supervision provides intense professional and governmental supervision of delinquents reentering the community. Probation is one of the ma-jor types of community supervision used. Studies have found no statistically signifi-cant relationship between community su-pervision and decreased recidivism.20

Nonprofit ProgramsIn addition to these government-

sponsored efforts, several nongovernmen-tal organizations address the issue of juve-nile recidivism. Dozens of nonprofits have implemented various successful preven-tive programs (such as the Children’s De-fense Fund’s “Cradle to Prison Pipeline” initiative). Others provide useful reentry resources, courses, and support groups for released delinquents (like the Street Law Reentry Program). Several nonprofit or-ganizations run their own incarceration alternatives (such as the Andrew Glover Youth Foundation). Many of these non-profit alternatives to incarceration have been successful at reducing recidivism.21 Research also supports the effectiveness of nonprofit preventive and reentry pro-grams in lowering recidivism rates.22

Failures of the Current Model Effective governmental and non-prof-

it programs are invaluable instruments needed to reduce recidivism. Though this paper does not intend to provide guidelines for creating better programs, it should be noted that the programs most effective at reducing recidivism have been those respectful of youth; family-like in size and setting; connected to the com-munity during and following treatment; empathy-developing; accountability-oriented; and marked by efforts to teach

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juveniles cognitive skills (such as anger management, decision-making, etc.).23 Effective programs are certainly worth-while and should be continued.

Yet programs alone are insufficient. Although the aforementioned initiatives are effective in some cases and have made improvements, they have done little to af-fect recidivism on a national level. Even with government-sponsored rehabilita-tion programs and the emergence of an army of nonprofits, the national recidi-vism rate has hardly changed over the past 20 years.24

Suggestions for ImprovementTo make significant advances in

reducing juvenile recidivism, our gov-ernment must reform its structural and procedural policies. Before external pro-grams can make a considerable difference, the juvenile justice system must undergo rigorous internal reform. Substantial progress will only come by eliminating features of the system itself that foster recidivism. Currently, three specific ele-ments of the justice system—detention centers, juvenile waivers, and health insur-ance reapplication procedures—undercut efforts at reducing recidivism by actually increasing the likelihood that delinquents will recidivate. Because of their negative effects, these three practices must be al-tered. Government officials should adopt the following three policies:

Avoi1. d holding juvenile delinquents in detention unless absolutely neces-sary.Restrict the practice of transferring 2. juveniles to the adult justice system.Forbid Medicaid from requiring all 3. reentering delinquents to reapply for services.

Taking these steps will significantly re-duce recidivism without disregarding the other goals of these three practices.

It should be noted that these three policies would be implemented most logically and most feasibly at the state level. They could also be recommended to state governors by the Office of Juve-nile Justice and Delinquency Prevention and, if appropriate, made into federal law (as an amendment to the Juvenile Justice and Delinquency Prevention Act, for ex-ample).

1. avoId unneceSSary detentIon

The first proposed policy advises the juvenile justice system to avoid holding delinquents in detention unless absolute-ly necessary. Because individuals placed in detention are significantly more likely to recidivate than their counterparts placed elsewhere, detention must be reserved for only those justifiably requiring it. Avoid-ing unnecessary detention can be accom-plished by educating juveniles about their role in detention hearings and establish-ing stricter guidelines detailing which de-linquents should be detained.

Detention HearingsAfter being accused of committing a

crime, delinquents can pass through up to nine stages of case processing. First, they are arrested and make initial con-tact with law enforcement officers. After taking the juveniles into custody, police juvenile officers evaluate the delinquents and decide whether or not they should be sent to detention, probation intake, home, or alternate educational and rec-reational programs. Roughly 20 to 33 percent of all delinquents are sent into detention, where their capacity to harm themselves and others is supposedly de-bilitated. Within 24 to 72 hours of being held at the detention center, delinquents participate in a detention hearing. Led by a juvenile probation officer, these deten-tion hearings determine whether or not

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the juvenile should remain in detention until adjudication. After briefly reviewing the case, a judge decides if the juvenile requires additional detention. If so, the delinquent will remain in detention un-til adjudicated, after which he or she may be released, relocated to another facility, or sentenced to additional time in deten-tion. On any given day, some 27,000 adolescents are held in detention facilities across the United States. Annually, some 600,000 delinquents will spend time in detention.26

Detention Centers and RecidivismEven though detention may be short

and used for less than half of delinquents, its influence on juveniles can persist for months and even years into their future. Research shows that being held in deten-tion is the number one predictor of recid-ivism—beating out other likely predic-tive variables such as gang membership, gun ownership, and dysfunctional fam-ily background.27, 28 This finding holds true even after controlling for nature of offense (and other potentially confound-ing variables). A study conducted in New York City found that the rate of recidi-vism for juveniles sent to alternate pro-grams ranged between 17 and 36 percent, while their counterparts held in detention facilities averaged 76 percent (again, even after controlling for offense).29 As Lubow explains, “Detention is the gateway to the system’s deep end.”30. 31

Why is this so? Behavioral scientists have found that grouping delinquent ju-veniles together in a detention-like setting can result in deleterious outcomes because detained juveniles receive informal “peer deviancy training.”32 Detention often ex-poses first-time offenders to new criminal friends, gangs, tricks, and “games.” As a result of this exposure and learning, de-

tained juveniles are more likely than their equivalents placed in alternate facilities to commit future crimes, use violence, become involved with drugs, struggle in school, and have difficulty adjusting to adulthood.33

Yet detention centers do serve a valu-able purpose: they incapacitate juveniles who otherwise would be a threat to them-selves and those around them. Because they serve this needed function, deten-tion centers should not be eradicated en-tirely. Rather, detention must be reserved for only those delinquents who, if not detained, present a real threat to society. To reduce recidivism, detention must be reserved only for those truly deserving detention.

Inform Delinquents First, ensure that all delinquents are

aware of their rights and role during the detention hearing. As stated earlier, the detention hearing is a preadjudication as-sessment in which a judge decides where to place a delinquent between arrest and trial. In making their decisions, judges review the facts of the case and act based on their own personal judgment. Near the end of the hearing, judges ask delin-quents if there is any additional informa-tion they would like to share. Unaware of what information would be appropriate to mention, delinquents almost always decline to speak. Judges therefore base their decisions solely on the facts of the case, which rarely speak highly of delin-quents.

Delinquents will be more apt to pro-vide the judge with relevant information if they are aware of what sort of informa-tion they can and should provide during their hearing. In this case, relevant infor-mation might include: Do you have a

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their situation. Their chances of receiv-ing alternate placement will increase, and ultimately the probability that they will recidivate will decrease.

Establish Guidelines for Detaining Delinquents

Second, establish stricter guidelines for determining which juveniles should be held in detention centers. Launch a committee with the mandate of creating a series of directives or rules delineating which offenses require detainment and which do not. A specific list of admis-sible exceptions should be developed. Committee members must be fully aware of the negative effects detention has on delinquents, and should formulate these standards with a rehabilitative approach in mind. Setting a clear standard of who should be detained will eliminate the in-dividual variance and prejudices that of-ten result in unnecessary detention.

2. reStrIct the uSe of WaIverS

The second policy proposal recom-mends restricting the transfer of delin-quents from the juvenile justice system to the adult one. Though initially intended only for the most serious offenders, the waiver system is currently being used to divert ten percent of all delinquents. Be-cause delinquents held in adult facilities are 50 percent more likely to recidivate than those in juvenile facilities, only the most severe cases should receive waivers.

The Waiver SystemOne of the founding tenets of the

juvenile justice system promises its occu-pants a restraint from overly destructive punishments. Unlike the adult court, the juvenile court was established based on rehabilitation-oriented principles. In sen-tencing offenders, juvenile court judges leave “room for reform.” The juvenile

job? Are you using your job to support your family? Are you going to school? Are you planning to graduate from high school? What is your family situation like? A judge understands that placing a delinquent in detention will pull him or her out of school for a month.

Answers to these questions could have a marked effect on judges’ decisions. For example, if the judge hears a delin-quent say that he is trying to graduate, the judge will be more likely to place him in a non-residential program. Similarly, a judge will likely avoid placing someone in detention if the judge hears that delin-quent’s job pays for 50 percent of his fam-ily’s monthly rent.

In order to make delinquents aware of the types of information worth shar-ing in their detention hearing, require detention facilities to inform all juveniles what information is relevant. This can be done in a simple way: distribute a single sheet of paper to delinquents prior to their detention hearing. This sheet should contain an explanation of the detention hearing; the order in which information is presented during the hearing; possible placement options; and various types of information delinquents can share with the judge. Delinquents should read the information sheet carefully, and should be able to receive answers to any additional questions they might have from facility officers. This information could also be provided in video format.

After reading through such an infor-mation sheet, delinquents will have a bet-ter idea of the sorts of information that might help judges make preadjudication placement decisions. As juveniles under-stand their rights and role in the deten-tion hearing process, they will be more likely to speak up when asked for addi-tional information. By sharing pertinent information with the judge, delinquents will provide a more complete picture of

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of delinquents receiving waivers, restrict the granting of waivers to only the most severe cases. According to the procedure’s original design, only the most serious offenses (such as intentional homicide) merit transfer. Significant effort must be spent to restrict unnecessary waivers. Clarifying amendments should be adopt-ed to establish firmer guidelines describ-ing which crimes warrant transfer. Doing so will vastly reduce the number of juve-niles sent to the adult criminal system. Ultimately, the likelihood of recidivism will decrease significantly for delinquents who otherwise would have been unneces-sarily tried in adult courts.

3. change MedIcaId reaPPlIcatIon requIreMentS

The third recommended policy pro-poses forbidding the U.S. Department of Health and Human Services from re-quiring that all juveniles released from jail reapply for Medicaid. Because a delay in receiving healthcare benefits is associ-ated with a significant increase in recidi-vism, all Medicaid services to delinquents should be reinstated immediately upon release.

Health Insurance & RecidivismUpon entering jail, delinquents fre-

quently lose their health benefits. By federal law, the responsibility for an in-carcerated delinquent’s health lies with the detention facility in which he or she is situated. Health insurance providers therefore serve no purpose while their cli-ent is in jail. Typically, health insurance companies terminate their contracts with individuals as soon their incarceration be-gins (or as soon as their clients have been in jail for a set period of time, such as 12 months). Once released, delinquents must reapply for healthcare. This practice holds true for Medicaid, the government-sponsored healthcare plan for low-income

system recognizes the biological and de-velopmental differences between adoles-cents and adults and, as a result, allegedly adjudicates much less punitively than the adult system. Juvenile judges are limited in the extent to which they can incapaci-tate defendants, with sentences rarely top-ping 20 years.

With the crime surge of the 1980s and early 1990s, however, rehabilitation became less of a priority for communi-ties and policymakers. The focus instead shifted to keeping “dangerous” criminals off the streets. In the name of public safe-ty, legislators initiated the waiver system, a method through which severe offenders could be transferred from the juvenile sys-tem to the adult one. Once in the adult system, delinquents received longer and harsher sentences—deserved punishment according to victims.

Failures of the Waiver SystemSince its inception, the waiver sys-

tem has been abused and has encouraged recidivism; the use of the waiver has not been restricted to the most severe cases. Once the conduit between these two sys-tems was opened, juvenile courts have ea-gerly pushed disobedient, recidivist, and older delinquents out of their own system and into the adult one—regardless of the crime they committed. Roughly ten per-cent of all delinquents are now diverted out of the juvenile system into the adult one.35 The consequences for delinquents unnecessarily placed in the adult system have been tremendously unfortunate. Due to their exposure with more sophisti-cated and experienced adult criminals, de-linquents spending time in adult facilities are 50 percent more likely to recidivate than those held in juvenile centers—even after controlling for nature of offense.36

Restricting WaiversTo minimize the superfluous number

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individuals that serves a large portion of delinquents. The reapplication process for Medicaid often takes several months, leaving reentering delinquents without needed healthcare services.

Delinquents with mental health problems are especially hard-hit by the reapplication procedures, and often expe-rience illness flare-ups as a result of the delay.37 Because 70 percent of the juve-nile delinquent population has a mental disorder, receiving timely health services is vital to their long-term health.38 Ad-ditionally, orphaned delinquents some-times wait up to a year before receiving placement in a foster care home (a service provided by Medicaid). In the meantime, they must single-handedly find housing. Confronted with these difficulties, delin-quents often reoffend for the sole purpose of reentering jail and receiving the health-care services provided by incarceration facilities. A delay in obtaining healthcare benefits is linked to a significant increase in recidivism.39

RecommendationTo avoid such a delay, immediately

reinstate all Medicaid benefits to juveniles reentering the community. Medicaid should not terminate its contracts with incarcerated juveniles. Rather, it should temporarily suspend benefits until the de-linquent reenters the community. Abid-ing by this policy will considerably lower the probability of recidivism for portions of the 70 percent of all delinquents with a mental disorder.

ObstaclesOpponents of these three policy rec-

ommendations may argue that high re-cidivism rates require longer and harsher sentences, not rehabilitation-oriented re-form. This argument could be based on the fact that despite its being founded on rehabilitative principles, the U.S. juvenile

justice system has an extremely high re-cidivism rate. The rate of recidivism in the adult justice system—an institution not founded on rehabilitation—is also around 65 percent. Rehabilitation has not worked, the argument goes, and therefore it should be abandoned in favor of a more punitive approach, under the assumption that longer and harsher sentences would deter delinquents from recidivating.

This argument suffers from two main flaws. First, it assumes that the U.S. ju-venile justice system has been entirely rehabilitative. As shown earlier, our gov-ernment’s own internal procedures often counteract its rehabilitative principles. It is incorrect to assume that the juve-nile justice system has been an exercise in rehabilitation. Second, this argument ignores the mounting evidence indicating that punitive approaches increase recidi-vism while rehabilitative ones decrease it. The waiver system, for example, is entirely punitive in nature, and has only increased recidivism. Other deterrence- and pun-ishment-based programs, such as Scared Straight, have at best failed to affect re-cidivism and at worst have increased re-cidivism rates. Rehabilitative programs, on the other hand, have often proven ca-pable of reducing recidivism.40

Others may argue that decreasing the number of delinquents held in detention will fail to maximize full use of facilities, thereby creating a gross economic ineffi-ciency. The United States spends billions of dollars erecting incarceration centers; discouraging their filling would waste valuable already-spent tax dollars. Reduc-ing the number of occupants in a deten-tion facility certainly would be a failure to use the building to its full potential. However, unfilled detention facilities can easily be put to alternate use (for example, detention wings can be turned into class-rooms). In any event, the real economic inefficiency in this case is recidivism, not

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underutilized buildings. The purpose of detention facilities is not to reach maxi-mum capacity, but to provide a location for the juvenile justice system to carry out its mission.

A third counterargument points out that restricting waivers will increase the caseload of an already overburdened ju-venile justice system. Confronted with more cases than it can handle, the system risks making administrative mistakes as a result of the overload. This concern is valid: juvenile courts can expect to see an increase in the number of cases pro-cessed once transfers to the adult system are limited. In the long run, however, the juvenile court caseload will decrease sig-nificantly as recidivism decreases.

concluSIon

The statistics and policies presented in this paper only narrowly describe the issues facing America’s recidivist juveniles. An unacceptable depth of heartache and suffering plagues our delinquents, and without significant effort these youth are more likely to enter a pattern of criminal-ity that hurts society as a whole. Vigorous reformative efforts—including the rec-ommendations herein outlined—must be taken immediately before another genera-tion of youth deteriorates beyond repair. The awful realities of juvenile recidivism demand those efforts.

Endnotes

Synder, Howard, Juvenile Arrests 1. 2000 (Washington D.C.: Office of Juvenile Justice and Delinquency Programs, 2002). Synder, Howard, and Melissa 2. Sickmund, Juvenile Offenders and Victims: 2006 National Report (Washington D.C.: Office of Juvenile Justice and Delinquency Programs, 2006).Calvin, Elizabeth, Legal Strategies to 3. Reduce the Unnecessary Detention of Children (Washington D.C.:

National Juvenile Defender Center, 2004).Travis, J. and A. L. Solomon, From 4. Prison to Home: The Dimensions and Consequences of Prisoner Reentry (Washington D.C.: The Urban Institute, 2001). Schuetz, Pam, “Employment for 5. Former Prisoners: Community, Family and Individual Salvation?” CELCEE Digest, (2005): http://www.celcee.edu/publications/digest/Dig05-07.html.Calvin, Sims, Barbara, and Pamela 6. Preston, eds., Handbook of Juvenile Justice Theory and Practice (Boca Raton: Taylor & Francis Group, 2006).“Appropriations Approves Bill 7. to Reduce Juvenile Recidivism and Homelessness,” News from the Twelfth Assembly District, May 24, 2006, http://democrats.assembly.ca.gov/members/a12/press/p122006062.htm. Various.8. Various.9. Bailey, Brandon, and Griff Palmer, 10. “High Rearrest Rate,” The Mercury News, October 17, 2004.Gerwitz, Marian, “Recidivism 11. Among Juvenile Offenders in New York City,” New York City Criminal Justice Agency, Inc., (2007): http://www.cjareports.org/reports/jorecid0407.pdf. Hewitt, John D. and Robert M. 12. Regoli, Delinquency in Society (New York: McGraw Hill, 2006). Travis and Solomon.13. Schuetz.14. Dunham, Warren, and Chaitin 15. Mildred, “The Juvenile Court in Its Relationship to Adult Criminality,” Social Forces (1966): 114-119.MacKenzie, Doris Layton, What 16. Works in Corrections: Reducing the Criminal Activities of Offenders and Delinquents (New York: Cambridge University press, 2006). Ibid.17. Ibid.18. Ibid. 19. Pozen, David, “The Private, 20. Nonprofit Prison,” Boston Globe, February 21, 2006. See the websites of NGOs mentioned 21. (such as AGYF and CDF). Various. Special thanks to Professor 22. Richard Johnson for compiling this list.U.S. Department of Justice, Office of 23.

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Justice Programs, Bureau of Justice Statistics, Reentry Trends in the U.S., October 25, 2002, http://www.ojp.usdoj.gov/bjs/reentry/recidivism.htm. Roberts.24. Lubow, Bart, “Reducing 25. Inappropriate Detention: A Focus on the Role of Defense Attorneys,” Juvenile Justice Update 11, no. 4 (2005): 1-2, 14-16.Ibid.26. Hollman, Barry, and Jason 27. Ziedenberg, “The Dangers of Detention: The Impact of Incarcerating Youth in Detention and Other Secure Facilities,” Justice Policy Institute (2006).Calvin.28. Lubow29. Dominguez, David, Personal 30. Interview, October 23, 2006.Hollman and Ziedenberg.31. Dominguez.32. Zimring, Franklin E, American 33. Juvenile Justice, (New York: Oxford University Press, 2005).Coalition for Juvenile Justice, 34. Trying and Sentencing Youth in Adult Criminal Court, http://www.juvjustice.org/resources/fs008.html.Sims and Preston.35. Cuellar, Alison, Kelly Kelleher, 36. Jennifer Rolls, and Kathleen Pajer, “Medicaid Insurance Policy for Youths Involved in the Criminal Justice System,” Public Health Consequences of Imprisonment 95, no. 10 (2005): 1707-1711.“News from the Twelfth Assembly 37. District.”Ibid.38. Calvin.39.

About the Author

Jane Wilson is a senior at Stanford University and majors in Political Sci-ence. Over the past several years, Jane has worked with inmates as a GED tutor, lit-eracy coach, and Life Skills instructor. She has also worked with underprivileged ju-veniles as a truancy counselor, ESL tutor, mediator, and music teacher. As Stanford’s Strauss Scholar, she is currently develop-ing educational programs for inmates in New York City, Chicago, San Diego, Salt Lake City, and St. Louis. Jane intends to pursue a law degree and eventually work in correctional legislation.

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