(1943) Intelligence Bulletin, Vol. I, No. 7

8/17/2019 (1943) Intelligence Bulletin, Vol. I, No. 7

1/164

FOR USE OFMILITARY PERSONNEL ONLY

N O T

TO BE

REPUBLISHED

V O L U M E 1

NUMBER

7

INTELLIGENCE

BULLETIN

March

1943

* I I

v

^ • >• ?*""*> ^ ••


2/164

• Readers are invited to comment on the usethat

they arem akingof the Intelligence ulletin andto

forwardsuggestionsforfutureissues. Correspondence

may be addressed d irectly to the Dissemination

Branch, In te lligence Group, M i l i ta ry Intelligence

Service, W a r D e pa rtm e n t, W a s hin gto n , D . C.


3/164

M IL IT A R Y I N T E LL I G E N C E IN T E L L IG E N C E

S E R V IC E B U L L E T I N

W A R DEPARTM ENT N O . 7

W ashington,M arch 1943 M IS 461

NOTICE

The Intelligence Bulletin is designed p rim a rily for

the use of ju nio r officers and enlisted m en. I t is a

vehicle for the dissemination to them of the latest in

formation received from M ilitary Intelligence sources.

In order to secure thewidest possible use of this bulle

tin , its contents are not classified. I t is for the exclu

sive use of mi l itary personne l, however, and no par t

of it may bepublished w ithout the consent of the M ili

tary In te lligence Serv ice, excep t in the case of Task

Forces and O verseas T heaters of O peration. Com

manders of these o rgan izations a re authorized to re

produceanyiteminthe Intelligence Bulletin, pro vided

theym aintain the classification of the information and

giveitssource.

I t is recommended that the contents of this bulletin

beutilized whenever practicable as the basis for infor

mal talks and discussions with troops.


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TABLE OF CONTENTS

PA RT O N E : JAPAN

age

SECTION I. JA PA NESE IMPR ESSIO NS OF U. S. W AR FA RE 1

1. Introduction 1

2.

U.S.Battlefield Tactics 1

I I. D ETAILS OF N EW R I FLE U SED B T J A PA NESE 5

1. General 5

2.

Table of Characteristics 7

3. Description of Component Parts 8

a. Barrel Group 8

b.

Receiver Group

9

c.

Front Sight 9

d. Rear Sight 9

e. Operating Mechanism Group 10

f. Trigger Mechanism Group 11

g. Magazine Group 11

h. Stock and Hand-Guard Group 11

IIL^-J^PA N ESE W ARFARE— FROM T H E IR DOCUMENTS 13

1. Introduction 13

2.

Movement inJungle Country 13

a. During the Day 13

b. At Night '_ 15

3.

Assaulting Enemy Positions 16

IV. COMMUNICATIONS 17

1. Introduction 17

2.

Instructions for Land-Air Liaison 17

a. Selecting a Panel Signaling Post 18

b. Dropping Message Tube from Aircraft 18

c. Operating a Panel Signaling Post 19

d.

Pick-up Message Tube Method

20

e. Identifications 20

3.

Miscellaneous Orders 21

v


5/164

VI TABLE

OF

CONTENTS

Page

SECTION

V.

J AP AN ES E W AR FA RE

AS

SEEN

B YU . S.

COMBATANTS

23

1. Introduction 23

2. General Tactics

23

3.

Attack Techniques

25

4. Deception 26

5.

Morale 27

6. Armament

28

a. Artillery 28

b . Powder , 28

7. Defense Tactics

29

a. General 29

b .

In theBuna A rea 30

P A R T T W O : G E R M A N Y

S E C T I O N I .

G A S

W A R F A R E 31

1.

G e n er a l

31

2 . D ef e n s e

32

3 . O ffen se

. 34

a. W eapons

of

Smoke Troops

34

b .

Equ ipmen t ofOther Arms 35

c .

Miscel laneous

Gas

Weapons

35

4 .

T h e o re t i ca l U seofGasi n the F i e l d 36

a.

ForCloud Effect 36

b .

ForContamination

37

I I .

V IS U A L S I G N A L S B E T W E E N

A I R AND

G R O U N D F O R C E S .

. 38

1. I n t r o d u c t i o n 38

2.

C o or d i na ti on

38

3 . D a y S i g na ls U s e d

b y

G r o un d T r oo p s

39

a. Orange Smoke 39

b .

Identification Panels

39

c. Swastika Flags 40

d . Improvised Signals

40

4 . D a y S i g n al s U s e d b y A i r c r a f t 41

5 .

N i g h t S ig na ls U s ed b y G r o u n d T r o o p s 41

6. N i g h t S ig na ls U s e d

b y

A i r c r a f t

41

7. Useof V e ry L i g h t s 42

I I I .

I N F A N T R Y F I E L D W O R K S 43

1. Introduction . 43

2. G e n e ra l P r in c ip l e s

43


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TABLE OF CONTENTS VII

Page

SECTION IV . IN T ER RO G A TIO N O P B R IT IS H P R IS O N E R S O F W AR 47

1.

General 47

2. A Specim en B lank 48

3.

T h e Instruc tions 49

V. A IR FO R C E S 51

1. Henschel 129 B om ber 51

2. D ornier 217E B om ber 54

V I. M ISC E LL A N E O U S 56

1. Light Assault Bridge 56

a. Version 1 , 56

b. Version 2 58

2. Use of Sm oke Against T ank s 58

a.

Experiment 1

_ _

58

b. Experiment 2 59

c. Experimen t 3 59

d. Experiment 4 59

P A R T

T H R E E : U N IT ED N A TIO N S

SECTION

I .

N O T E S ON S E CU R IT Y PR OM T HE M I D D L E E A S T 61

1.

In troduc tion 61

2.

Preserving Enem y Aircraft 62

3. Safeguarding Enem y D ocum ents 62

4.

The Souvenir H ab it 63

I I . B R IT IS H T R A IN IN G FOR SPE C IA L D U T I E S 65

1. In trod uc t ion .^ 65

2.

Scouts and Observers 65

3. Am bushes 67

a. General 67

b . Choosinga Locality 67

c.

P lanning

67

d.

Action

68

4.

S tree t F ighting 70

5.

W oodcraft and B ivouac 71

a. General 72

b .

B ivouac S ite 72

c. Bed 72

d. Campfires 73

e. Important Note. 73


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VIII TABLE

OF

C ONTENTS

S E C T I O N

I I I .

M IS CE LL AN EO US

74

1.

Steel H e l me t s a n d H e a d W o un d s 74

2.

B ri ti sh N i ck na me s of T a n k s 77

a. British Tanks

77

b .

American Tanks 77

LIST OF ILLUSTR TIONS

I G U R

1.

N e w

J a p a n e s e R if le ; (a) R i g h t S id e , (b)L e f t S id e 6

F I G U R E 2 . H e ns ch el 129Bomber 51

I G U R 3 . G e r m a n L i gh t A ss au lt B r i dg e 57

FIGURE 4. SteelHelmets and Head Wounds 75


8/164

PART O N E

:

JAPAN

SectionI. JAPANESE IMPRESSIONS

O F U. S. W A R FA R E

1.

INTRODUCTION

Thissection isbased on several Ja pa ne se documents,

of various types. Some of them were wri t ten pr ior to

our capture of Guadalcanal and o ther is lands nearby.

This fact p robably accounts for con tradic to ry s ta te

ments in some of the documents. Remember tha t th is

information comesfrom enemysources,andtherefo re is

not necessarily tr ue . T he in div id ua l documents a re

separated by dashes. R eference should be m ade to

Intelligence Bulletin No. 5, for Jan ua ry , 1943, Section

I (J ap an ),"J a p Est im ateof U .S.Land Tac tics ,"page

29.

2. U.S.BATTLEFIELD TACTICS

The U . S. A rm y's usual fighting is in accordance w ith the

bulletin, "A m erican A rm y C om bat In fo rm a tio n, G uad alcanal

Is land ," d is tr ibu ted November 24, 1942. (The Aus t ra li an Army

fights according to N os. 1 and 2 of th e "S pecial Intelligen ce

Reports.") However, spme supp lemen ta ry in fo rmation on their

usual methods of fighting is as fol lows:

510834°—43— vol. 1,No.7 2 1


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2 INTELLIGENCE BULLETIN

a.

The enemy (U . S.) fires at a slow rate,but isskillful incov

ing jungle roads and precipices.

b.

He is fond of using hand grenades, and fires and throws

thematcloserange.

o.

Theenemy's fighting spirit isunexpectedly intense. Hedoes

not retreat in single-firing combat. However, when charged,he

willflee.

d.

A t a point about 1kilometer (roughly % mile) tothefront

are scouts who, when attacked, usually flee immediately.

e.

Enemy foot patrols usually operate 200 to 300yards tothe

left and r ight , forward and rear of the ir positions .

ThefollowingisourestimateofAmericanstrengthandcapa

bilities:

a.

T hey stress cooperative firing, and never fight without

artillery.

b.

Whenassaultingtheyfiretheirpistols.

c.

Their tactic s are fo rma l, and they lack in itia tive ability.

Theydonomorethantheyaretold.

d.

In defense, they never countera ttack and never carry out

an offensive.

e.

The ir supply facilities a re extravagant .

/ . T hey know no th ing of assau lt. W e should assault when

ever possible. Fifty yards is often the best distance for assault.

g.

The Americans are untrained for n ight fighting, and they

fire the ir guns all n ight long.

h.

T he ir com mand is untra ined for re tre at com bat. If they

begin re treating, pursue them quickly.

i.

Their tanks fight separate ly. However, they are verygood

atmovement.

I f the Americans a re h i t on the flanks or in the rear, their

command becomes confused and they are unable to fight.


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3APAN IM PRESSIONS OF U . S. WARFARE

The following are no tes on the enemy's (U. S.) methods of

combat:

a.

The Americans choose h igh p laces o r curves in roads for

their positions, and snipe from ashort distance (30to 50yar ds ).

b.

They are skilled in the use of hand grenades.

c.

Their will to resist is comparat ively s trong, and, a lthough

we attack them, they sti ll resist.

d.

T he enem y usually posts an observation pa rty a t a poin t

approximately 1,000 yards in front of his position.

e.

H i s observation to th e flanks and re ar is very good. H e

alwaystries to attack our rear and flank.

/ . The enemy pays considerable attention to fire support.

Theenemy'sweakpoints:

a.T he enem y does not pay m uch atte ntion to hand-to -hand

fighting.

b.

His front- line defense iseasily penetra ted. There are many

gaps in his position.

Things to watch for in combat:

a.

T he enem y lays p ia no w ire (sm all, sm ooth, and m ade of

high-grade steel) in front of his positions.

b.

He has good fire protect ion on his flanks.

c.

He outflanks by using heavy firearms.

d.

H e uses diversion tactics in attack. (Do not pay much

attention to enemy decoy tactics.)

e.

He constructs many false positions.

/ . I t is easy to be deceived by the enemy's decoy tactics in the

forest. Send a sentry forward. Don 't choose a good position.

g.

The enemyalwaysshootsfrom the side of roads or from the

edge of h igh ground.


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INTELLIGENCE B ULLETIN

h.

Th e enemyusually placesobservation posts about1,000yards

infront ofhisposition. W atch closelyfor electricwireand

micro

phones.

i.

The enemy alwaysp repares for closecombat.

Their (U.S.) impressionsof theJapanese A rm y:

a.

TheJapaneseA rmy isvery strong— always winning.

b.

They don 'ttak e aseriousviewoffirepow er.

c. Theyareskillful inm ovement at night.

d.

They have a s trong espri t de corps .

e.

They make minute plans for operat ions.

/ . Theycharge without any thought of sacrifice.

g.

They generally throw their reserves into battle immediately

after i t s tarts .

h.

Their officers are skillful and industrious.

i.

Assaults are skillfully executed.

Art i l lery is ski ll fully used.


12/164

SectionII. DETAILS O F NEW RIFLE

USED BY JAPANESE

1.

GENERAL

The Japanese have pu t in to use a new service rifle

(seefig.1 ),whichisinmany ways similar ino peration,

functioning, and general designtotheir M eiji 38th-year

pat tern (1905) rifle, except for a shorter barrel , larger

caliber, and improvements in the rear s ight. The new

weapon isknown asthe 99th-year pa tte rn (1939) short

rifle.

Thecaliberofthe Ja pa nes ew eaponis7.7mm. (.303),

the same caliber as the Lee-Enfield rifle and the Bre n

light machine gun, both s tandard weapons in the B ri t

ish Army . However, the ammunition is semi-rimless

andnot r imm edliketheB rit ish .303Mk. V I I .

One of the new rifles, captured on Guadalcanal, was

examined by a U . S . Army Ordnance officer. He de

scribed the rifle as a manua lly ope ra ted , air-cooled,

shoulderweapon. I tisloadedbymeansofaclip,which

contains 5rounds of amm unition sim ilar to tha t of our

M1903 rifle. However, IT. S . caliber .30 amm unit ion

willnotfitintothefiringchamberoftheJapanesewea

pon,because the distance from the base to the tapered


13/164

6

INT EL LIGE NCE BULL ET IN

shoulder oftheca rtr idge caseissufficient topreventthe

bolt f rom closing. I n addit ion, our ammunition istoo

longtofit inthemagazine. B ritis h caliber .303ammu

ni tion will fit in the firing chamber, but the boltwill

not close because the base of the cartridge caseis too

b

Figure1.—NewJapanese Rifle; (a) Right Side,(6)Left Side.

large in diameter and has too large a r im tof it in the

recessofthebolt. F ou r roun dsoftheBr itishammuni

tionwill fit intothemagazine.

The Japan ese rifle is equipped with a cleaning rod,

which is carr ied in a hole in the stock, jus t under the

barre l. The rod isheld secure bya catch.


14/164

7APAN—DETAILS OF N EW R IF LE

A sling, made

of

rubberized canvas,

is

a ttached

to

swivelsonthelower bandandstock ontheleft sideof

the rifle.

Therifle

hasa

monopodattached

tothe

lower band.

While

not in use,thepodcanbe

ro ta ted forward

to

catch onthe stock. T his podisabout 12 inches long

from thecenter line of thebore,andit appears tobe

toolongforuseintheprone posi tion.

Theboltmechanism ofthe

rifle,likethat

of

theolder

6.5-mm Japane se rifle,

is

covered

by a

semicircular

cover

of

sheet m etal th at slides with

the

bolt

in

loading

andextractingammunition.

The

purpose

of

thiscover

probablyisto keep d i r t from fou ling themechanism.

Therifleisnotprovidedwith acut-off forfiringsingle

shots.

Although dis tr ibut ion

of the new

rifle

may

have

started asearly asJ uly , 1942,itis reasonably certain

that a large m ajority of J apanese in fan try troopsare

still equipped w ith theold6.5-mm (.256caliber) rifle,

theM eiji 38th-year pa t tern (1905),

or

with

its

carbine

form. Thisoldmodelhas

not

beenchangedsince1905/

2.TABLE

OF

CHARACTERISTICS

Weight of rifle (unloaded) with sling 8.8 lbs.

Magazine capacity 5 rounds

Over-all length 44in.

Length of barrel

25y

2

in.

' F o r d etails

of

M eiji 3 8th -y ear p a t te r n rifle,

see

In te ll igence Bul le tin ,

No.

5,p.53.orTM30-480,p.92.


15/164

8 INTELLIGENCE BULLETIN

Length of barrel and receiver 32% in.

Rifling ( right-hand twis t) one turn in (estimated

same as U . S. M19O3) 10 in.

Grooves in barrel No.4

Depth of grooves Estimated

twice that

of U. S.

M 1 9 0 3

rifle

Caliber of bore (measured) .303in.

T rigger pull 9 lbs.

Range on rear-sight leaf 300 to 1,500

m e t e r s

(328 to1,-

640yds).

Peep-sight opening

y

8

in.

3. DESCRIPTION OF COMPONENT PARTS

In genera l, the new rifle is composed of four main

groups of assemblies and pa rts . They are describedas

follows:

a. BarrelGroup

The barrel, approxim ately 2 5 % inches long, is

threaded in to the receiver in a manner similar to the

methodusedinU . S.rifles. A nalignmentm arkispro

vided for assembling the barrel and receiver together.

The bore has four r ight-hand lands and grooveswith

a twist (approxim ately the same as the M1903rifleof

one t u r n p er 10 inches. T he grooves are cut much

deeperthanthoseofIT.S.rifles.


16/164

9APAN IM PRESSIO NS OF U . S. WARFARE*

b. Receiver Grou p

Withfewexceptions,thereceiverisconstructedmuch

likethat oftheJapa ne se 38th-year pa tte rn rifle. Abolt

stopis provided at the left rear p ar t of the receiver by

merelyutilizingapieceofmetalthatswingsalugclear

of the bolt when it is w i thdrawn from the rifle. The

ejector is hinged in thebolt s top and operates in prin

ciple like tha t of the IT. S. rifle M1917. {See TM

which describes th e U . S. caliber .30 M 1917 rifle.)

Therear of the receiver has a slot cut for a lug in the

safety. The receiver has grooves cut near the firing

chamber for the locking lugs of the bolt, in a manner

nearly iden tical to those in U . S. rifles. The grooves

do not appear to be tapered , p rov id ing fo r " slow ex

t rac tion" of fired car tr idge cases; th is is a point con

sidered impo rtant in the design of U. S. rifles. A gas-

escape vent hole %Q inch in d iamete r is p rov ided in

thetopofthereceiverjus tin rear ofthe firing chamber.

c. Front Sight

The f ront s ight is pract ica lly identica l wi th tha t of

U. S. caliber .30 M1917 rifle (see TM No. 1917, which

describes this U. S . r if le ). An a lignment m ark is pro

videdfor m atching the front sight with the front-sight

carrier.

d.

RearSight

Therea r sight ofthe rifle islocated approxim ately in

the center of the rifle. The s ight is of the folding-leaf

510834°— 43— vol. 1,No 7 -3


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1 0 INTELLIGENCE BULLETIN

type with are gu lar peep-sight and abatt le peep-sight;

each h as an openin g of % - in ch d iame ter. The rear-

s ight leaf has calibrated notches for ranges of 300to

1,500 meters (328 to 1,640 yd s) , inclusive. Thesight

has no means provided for correc ting range or drift.

Theslideonthesightisequippedwithtwoarms(right

and le ft) t hat can be swung out 2% inches from the

centerofth erifle and arep robab lyusedfor antiaircraft

fire. The rem ainder of the p ar ts of this sight aresimi

la r to those of the U . S. caliber .30M1917 rifle, shown

in FM-23-6 .

e. Operating Mechanism Group

The operating mechanism consists essentially of the

bolt, extractor, s t r iker , m ainspring, and safety. These

parts , except for the safety , a re very s imilar to those

ontheU .S.caliber .30M1937rifle. Thesafetyfitsinto

the end of thebolt and locks the bolt p ar ts togetherby

meansofalugonthesafety,whichengagesinaslotin

thestriker,andalugontheboltwhichengagesinaslot

in the safe ty . The safe ty is appl ied when pushed for

ward about %-inch and ro ta ted approximately 15de

grees clockwise, engaging a lug on the safety witha

c ircular groove in the receiver. This action locks the

bolt in the rece iver and also locks the s tr iker to the

safety . The tr igger is not locked when the safety is

applied.


18/164

JAPAN— DETAILS OF NEW RIFLE H

f. Trigger-Mechanism Grou p

The par t s and princip le of opera tion of the t rigger

mechanism are practica lly identical wi th those of the

U . S. caliber .30 M1917 rifle. The tr igger is not de

signed for in itia l slack a t the s ta rt of the pull, but

moves w ith a steady resistan ce. T he mechanism re

quiresaveryh ightrigger pu llof 9poundsbefore firing,

comparedto3%to5%poundspull intheU.S.M1903

rifle.

As the sear is re leased due to a camming action

of the tr igger onthe receiver, asafety stud on the for

wardendofthesearisshovedintoagrooveinthebolt

toactasalockwhenaroundisfired.

g.MagazineGroup

Themagazinegroupconsistsessentiallyofthetrigger

guard, magazine, follower, magazine spring, and floor

p la te ; p a rt s sim ilar to these are shown in F M - 23 -6

for the U. S . caliber .30 M1917 rifle. The floor p la te

differs in design in th a t it is hinged to th e fo rw a rd

p art of the trig ger gu ard and held in position by a

catch located in f ron t of the t rigger . W hen the catch

is released, the magazine spring and follower fly out

with thefloorplate . This feature of the Japanese rifle

isverygood.

h. Stockand H an d-G ua rd Group

ThestockoftheJapaneserifleismadeintwopieces

andfastened together by adove-tailed joint in the butt

of the stock—a method probably adopted to conserve


19/164


m aterial. Noprovision ismade intheb utt ofthestock

for anyaccessories. Thereceiveran dthetriggerguard

are held firmly to the stock by three screws. Thebutt

ofthestockiscoveredbyabuttp late. Thehandguard

is constructed in one piece and held in place by the

upper and lower bands. The wood portion of therifle

a pp ea rs to be made from wood similar to the U.S.

white walnut or a wood sof ter than the black-walnut

stocksusedonU.S.rifles.


20/164

SectionI II . JAPANESE W A R F A R E

FRO M THEIR DOCUMENTS

1. INTRODUCTION

This section is based on various types of Japanese

documents, obtained from several sources. They have

been a rr an g ed acco rd in g to subject ma t te r as fa r as

possible. Somearegivenalmost verbatim ,while others

havebeen edited to elim inate repetition and pa rts con

sideredofl it tle ornovalue. Theindividual documents

areseparated bythe useof dashes.

2. MOVEMENT IN JUNGLE COUNTRY

a. DuringtheDay

Although i t is said tha t the jungle is ideal for the individual

soldier, if he doesnot carry woodcutter 's equipment he will often

findit impossibletoget through. Although the density of jungle

varies, a woodcutting group of 20to 30men under the direction

of an officer isnecessary for a single column (one team under the

man in charge of b lazing the way, and several teams under the

man in charge of cut ting throu gh).

Speed in passing through jungle will depend upon its density,

butingeneral 1kilometer (% mile) will require2hours.

13


21/164


To m aintain direction, a compass should be used; even so,mis

takes in direction are sometimes made because of the tendencyto

keep following theeasiestte rra in . Moreover,themagneticdeclin

ation onG uadalcanal Islan d miist no tbeforgotten; tha tis,toad

vance west by compass, one must advance approximately 7°40'

northwest. Therefore, i t is important to search out the highest

ground possible and orient one's self before proceeding.

F or bivouacking in a jung le, the foot of a slope isbestbecause

it hascover from bombing or strafing. The area around streams

might easily be atarg et for enemy planes, and so isnot suitable.

Use such things as small whistles to keepcontact in thejungle,

but donot shout carelessly, especially at night. On highground

in thejung le,theenemy has installed microphonestolearn ofour

approach and make it possibleto bomb ard us. Often it isimpos

sible to get a rt il le ry pieces through the jungle unless they are

dismantled.

In the jung le the Americans build indiv idua l shelters, sur

rounded by wire entanglements, or concealed; and, when weap

proach, they fire tracer bullets or signaling shots to directbom

bardment.

In grass plots in the jungle , the enemy sometimes preparesa

concentration of fire . I t is especially imp ortant to search inad

vancetheborderareasbetweenjungleandgrassplots.

The enemyis extremely wellequipped with artillery andheavy

infantry weapons, and, on seeing us advance, they freely open

up with heavy fire. Therefore, in advancing through opencoun

t ry by day, it is im p ortan t to cooperate well w ith our own

artillery.

W hen the enemy discovers even an individual soldier, whether

by day or night , they bring concentra ted fire on him. Makeuse

of this by causing the enemy to waste his bullets. That is,place

imi ta tion target s wliere troops are no t disposed, and at night

carry out such clever deceptions aslig htin g lamps.


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1 5APAN—JAPANESE WARFARE

In the jungle there are covered machine-gun emplacements at

unexpected points. If thefirst lineof troops discoversthem, they

musttakemeasures to destroy them imm ediately.

The enemyhas few tank s and they are slow, sothey can easily

bedestroyed by such weapons asour rapid-firing gun and infan

try gun.

Theenemygreatly fears our assaults. Donot forget that final

victory always lies in hand-to-hand battles.

b. A t Night

Movement within the jungle at night, especially the movement

of large units , is extremely difficult. When passing through the

jungleatn ight,evenwhenthecoursehasbeenm arked and plotted

during the day , contact is often lost, especially front to rea r.

Therefore, it is essential to devise means of m aintaining contact,

suchastheuse of punk (made from coconut hu sks ),fireflies,and

phosphorescent substance (from decayed trees) .

As the o rgan iza tion of fire by the enemy is p recise, even a t

n ight, care must be taken to dep loy to such an ex ten t tha t the

controlof command willnotbeimpaired. I t isimpo rtanttokeep

from giving the enemy an opportunity to fire, by making use of

terrain features, camouflage, and crawling, and at the same time

to devote one's efforts to continuing the advance.

Theforemost prerequisite of successistha t each unit reach the

objective of i ts attack, and m aintain the prescribed direction of

advance. I t is extremely important to avoid mixing the units of

a force, and to keep friendly t roops from a ttacking each other .

Therefore, conspicuous landmarks in the jungle area, especially

within and in front of the enemy positions, should be previously

designated, and it isessential to make the utmost effort to main

ta in d irection by use of the compass, by orienta tion from high

ground,andby everyother method.


23/164


3. ASSAULTING ENEMY POSITIONS

The terrain within the enemy positions is generallyflat,with

the exception of the Lu ng a River area, and traffic isunrestricted.

Therefore, w ithin the positions,expect attacks from enemytanks,

covered machine-gun positions, and, at times, concrete pillboxes

inthe second- and third-line positions.

As a counter measure, prepa re hand-to-hand fighting (demoli

tion) squads of infantry and engineer troops, and advancethem

to the foremost l ines. Do the utmost to inflict a surprise attack,

and bring up light and mobile guns (presumably light artillery)

near the first lines . I f conditions permit, have the demolition

squadsprecede the first-line infan try to make the advanceofthe

infantry easier.

I t is importan t to streng then the shock troops, and tomake

sure th at thesetroo ps,by the use of terrain features and camou

flage,reach the flank and rear of the enemy firing point andat

tempt a sudden penetra tion. At such times, the enemy attempts

tofirepistolsand throw han d grenades atth enearest ofourpene

tra tin g troo ps; therefore it is necessary to penetrate by throwing

hand grenadesinordertoholdtheinitiative.

Uponoccupyingenemypositions,itisimperativetopursuethe

fleeingenemyimm ediately. By halting ,onthe other hand,heavy

lossesfromenemyfiremighteasilybeincurred.


24/164

SectionIV. CO M M UNIC AT ION S

1. INTRODUCTION

Like their German allies, the Japanese have empha

sizedclosecoordinationoflandandaircommunications.

Thiswas especially t rue in the M alaya and Phil ippine

campaigns,inwhich the Jap an ese enjoyed considerable

airsuccess. Theinform ation belowhasbeen tran slate d

freely from Japanese documents , and most of i t deals

withair-ground comm unication.

2.

INSTRUCTIONS FOR LAN D-AIR LIAISON

Smooth land and a ir communications can be mainta ined only

by understanding thoroughly the details of both land and a ir

communication facilities.

Anyone working wi th ant ia i rc raf t communica tions should be

able to iden tify both friendly and enemy a irc ra ft, and should

have a knowledge of the pr incipal characterist ics of a ir tactics

and aircraft performance.

Ordinarily one, or a combination, of the following methodsof

communication is us ed :

(a)

T o aircraft from a ground u n i t: rad io sig nalin g p an el,

messagetube (bypi ck -u p) ,heliograph, flare,smoke signaling,etc.

(h )

To the g round from a irc ra f t: radio message tube, helio

graph, flare, smoke signal, carrier pigeon, etc.

510834°—43—vol. 1,No.7 4 1 7


25/164


(


26/164

1 9APAN—COMMUNICATIONS

(2) W hen the panel sig nalin g post is located, fly low and

dropamessagetubeaimedatthepanel.

(3) W hen message "Received message tub e"is shown on panel

signaling post,d epart. If thesignal "Messagetubenot received'"

isshown,repeatprocedure.

c. Operating a PanelSignalingPost

Communication from a panel s ignaling post to an a ircraf t is

carriedoutasfollows:

(1) Givethesignals "requested"and "call."

(2) I f the signal "under sta nd" is received from an a irc ra ft,

givethe panel message immediately. W hen the message is com

pleted,givethesignal "Messagecom pleted."

(3) Sometimes amessagem aybegiven without acall signal.

(4) Removepanelsonreceipt of "understand" signal from air

craft, or when it is believed your message has been received.

Repeatthesignalif"Repeatsignal"isgiven.

Communication from a irc ra ft to the panel s igna ling post is

carriedoutasfollows:

(1) W hen the call signal is given from the panel signaling

post, rep ly with the signal "understand ," and wait for a panel

signal.

(2) Give the signa l "unders tand" if the panel signal is in te r

preted,but,ifnot,give"Repeatthesignal."

(3) The need for communication from an airplane to aground

unit can be determined by giving the "call" s ignal from the a ir

craft, and waiting for a reply from the panel s ignaling post.

In the event that an a ircraft s ignals, the panel s ignaling post

willreply.

The fo llowing precaut ions must be taken in panel s igna ling:

(1) S tudy the position of a irc ra ft and fac ilitate observation

from air.

(2) Makeair observation aslongaspossible.


27/164


(3) If a panel is not seen from the a ir , leave the signaluntil

theobservercanseeit.

The following precautions have to be taken in order tomain

tain satisfactory comm unication:

(1) Lay a panel in the correc t position and remove anybig

wrinkles.

(2) Remove any object which obscures the view of thepanel

from the a ir .

(3) When using smoke to draw the a ttent ion of an aircraft,

do not let smoke obscure the panel.

(4 ) Pane ls not in use will be disposed of in such a manner

as to beinvisible from the air .

(5) Index number panels will be laid from the firstfigure

and down in order, and other panels will be la id or removedat

thesametime.

In order to speed up the finding of a dropped message tube,

more than two persons (pickers) will be posted about every100

yards.

d . Pick-up MessageTube Method

(1)

Panel signaling post.

— Give the signal "pick-up amessage

tube"

and if the prep aration is complete,give the signal "ready."

(2)

Aircraft.

— If the signal "pick-up amessagetub e"isrecog

nized, give the signal "understand."

W ait for a"read y" signal and pick up amessagetubeby flying

low.

e. Identifications

In addition to the Rising Sun on the wings, our planescanbe

identified by a white line, approxim ately 8inchesw ide,nearthe

tail end of the fuselage.

Fr iendly p lanes use the fo llowing signals to identify them

selvesto ground forces:


28/164

JAPAN— COMMUNICATION'S 2 1

(1) W hen a p lane is alone, i t w ill waggle its w ings. I n the

case of a formation, the plane a t the extreme end will give this

signal.

(2) When about to cooperate with land forces, the planes will

usually circle overhead.

(3) At n ight, the navigation l ights a re usually turned on and

off.

(4) When aircraf t other than fighter planes approach friendly

troops at night, our "shooting star" is fired if necessary.

3.MISCELLANEOUS ORDERS

In o rder to p revent leakage of in forma tion, all detachments

will use army telephones as much as possible when communicat

ingwitheachother.

In writing le tte rs home, you will not g ive the following in

formation :Name of place, m ilitary strength, matters concerning

our army, establishments, future movements, or discussion of air

raids.

You will be perm itted to write the fo llowing: Am fighting

south of the equator, need more competition, the enemy is weak,

am fighting fiercely, and am l iving under conditions s imilar to

thoseof the regular residents.

The division signal un it will insta ll the communication net,

and must carry out the communication lia ison with the reserve

unit, with both flank un its , and with the command post.


29/164

SectionV.JAPANESEWARFAREASSEEN

BYU.S. COMBATANTS

1. INTRODUCTION

W hat U nited States officers and enlisted men, under

fire in th e S outhw est P acific, th in k about J ap an es e

methods of war fa re as used aga inst them during the

pas t few months is revealed in ind iv idual in te rv iews

givenbelow. Thenamesandun itsofthemenarew ith

held. F o rtheconvenienceofthereader, thequotations

are arranged roughly according to subject m atter, and

repetition has largely been elim inated.

2. GENERAL TACTICS

The Japanese method of figh ting is comparab le to

ju jitsu.

They count heavily on surpr ise and deception, endeavoring to

strike suddenly where we do not expect i t, and when we are not

ready . . . They avoid, if at all possible, the slugging

m atch where w eight of num bers and fire pow er count. T hey

stress the principles of surprise and mobil ity a t the expense of

the p rincip les of mass. Wi th these tactic s, the Japs have been

able to use surpris ingly small forces throughout the campaigns

of this war to gain their objectives.

23


30/164


. . . The individual Japanese hates the war and fears

dea th as much as the average Occidenta l. Faced by a resolute

man with abayonet, Jap ane se have not stood up aswellastheir

doctrines p reach. Uni ts have broken when involved in situa

t ions where they were outmaneuvered or outfought.

. . . Constan t p ra ctic e has m ost p robab ly m ade it possible

for the Japanese to omit, in their orders for landing operations,

considerable deta ils concerning such th ings as missions to be

carried out immedia tely afte r lan ding ,successiveobjectives,front

ages and boundaries between un its, security measures,communi

cations, and so on . . . The Japanese commanding officer

does not commit his forces to a definite plan of action untilhe

has had an opportunity to est imate the s ituation on the ground

asitconfronts histroops. Also,thisisinkeepingw iththeJapa

nesepolicy of allowing subordinates tousefull initiativeandtake

independent action as the situation requires.

There are definite advantages in this, and great weaknesses,

chiefly those of loss of coordination and breakdown of control,

should th e com mand ing officer become a casua lty or otherwisefail

to exert control. Independent action by subordinates is aptto

lead to piecemeal attacks and comm itment of the wholeunitin

a

manner not advantageous for the unit , but i t does instill in the

subordinate the ha bit of acting w ithou t orders when thesituation

requires. This prevents the breakdown of the entire operation

when higher control is lost.

. . . One gets the im pression th at the perfect Japanese

solution to a tac tical problem is a neatly performed stratagem,

followed by an encirc lement or a flanking a ttack driven home

with the bayonet. This allows the commanders to demonstrate

their abili ty, and the men to show their courage and ferocityin

hand-to -hand fighting. T he Ja pa ne se p la ns are a mixtureof

mi l itary a r ti st ry and vainglorious audac ity.

. . . B ulldog tenacity in carrying out a mission, even to

annihilation, will very frequently give a most erroneousimpres


31/164

JAPAN JAPANESE WARWARE 25

sionoftheJapanesestrengthandwill often resultin small forces

overcominglarger ones,

as

their units

arenot

rendered ineffective

untiltheyarenearly allcasualties . . .

After the recent Milne Bay action, in which my organization

was very actively engaged,

I

reached

the

following conclusions:

(a) Any fear or doubt concerning their own ability whichour

personnel may have developed, as a result of the spectacular

Japanese land conquests during the past 9months, is gone and

forgotten now. Especially in anything like open terrain, where

theJap cannot rely on his many "jungle tricks,"he isno match

for either theUnited States or Australian soldier.

(b) The fact that themenhavenowbeen able to see,in actual

combat, the marked superiority of our weapons as compared to

thoseof the Japanese,hasof coursegiventhem agreat dealmore

confidence, and the feeling that they have a definite advantage

over our enemy.

(c) The 50-caliber machine gun proved itself the outstanding

singleweapon in stopping the Japanese attack. It wasveryde

moralizing tothem, and theyhad nothing with which tomeet its

fireeffectively.

(d) Thecontinuous strafing and bombing attacks towhich the

Japs were subjected during all daylight hours would have been

justified,evenif nocasualtieshad resulted. Asidefrom thedam

ages,thepresence of our planes apparently demoralized and dis

organizedtheenemytoaverygreatextent.

3. ATTACK TECHNIQUES

The Japanese approach march on Guadalcanal wasalmost in

variably made in close formation along terrain features, such as

ridges

. . . .

510834°—43—vol.1,No.7 5


32/164


The enemy usually a ttacks onan arrow front, rarely over300

yards—some units have pene trated

a gapof

only

15

yards

in

width.

The

firstelement

or

wave

ofan

attack

isa

silentgroup

armed with bayonets , hand grenades,

and

wire cutte rs . This

is

followed

byan

echelon which deliberately makes noises

for

the

purpose

of

confusing our troops.

When the Japanese inf il trate through our lines, they expect

and in ten d t ha t

we

w ill then fall back.

The Japanesefire high. O ur experience isth at only 10percent

of

our

wounds are below

the

knee,20percent are below thehips,

and

the

balance

are

b ody w ounds. B ullet sears

on

trees

are

mostly 2i/2 feet above the ground.

4. DECEPTION

When the Japanese met our line of skirmishers (in New

Guinea) theyfired

all

the ir machine guns into the treetopsabove

ourm en. Assoonasthisfirewascountered byourmachineguns,

their mortars opened

uponour

machine-gun positions.

On several occasions, when ourline of skirmishers was met,

largenumbers

of

Japane se ran forward and weremetbyawither

ing machine-gun fire. They immedia te ly turned

and

fled.

Our

men,with

the

usualcry

of

"After the

,"

rushed after them

with fixed bayonets. Immedia te ly , the fleeing Japanese threw

themselves

onthe

ground

andour

fellows

r an

into machine-gun

firefrom the Japanese rear.

In

the

Milne

Bay

area,

the

Japanese plan was

to

advanceand

a ttack dur ing

the

night

and

then

to

w i thdraw dur ing

the

day

time,

leavingdozens

of

theirmen

at

thetop

of

coconutpalms,and

in

the

jungle , wi th machine guns

and

Tom m y guns.

As our

forces advanced thenext day, they were harassed bytheserem

nants.

Often

the

Japanese were tied

inthe

tops

of

palm trees

andremainedthereaftertheywereshot.


33/164

2 7APAN—JAPANESE WARWARE

(Com m ent: T he J apanes e policy of advancing a t n igh t and

h id ing du ring the day m ay have been d ictated on the spot by

the constant s trafing and reconnaissance by our a ircraft .)

5. MOR ALE

. . . A lthough the state of Japanese morale (on Guadal

canal) varied a good dea l wi th different units, as a whole they

had been softened up in mora le and shortened in supply before

their w ithdrawal . . . In the early stages at Guadalcanal

after Ja p rein forcements had landed , they were confident tha t

our forces would su rre nder. Subsequent events shook them a

great deal,and they had a"relapse "as aresult of defeats,losses,

diseases, poor supply, and failure to properly reorganize broken

and defeated units .

. . . The J a p soldier is determined and persistent, and

especiallytough if our forces show anysignsof breaking. W hen

evertheJ a p ism et with courage and suffers losses,helosesm ost

of h is dash, a lthough he will keep t ry ing.

Our Marines do not consider the J a p a par ticula r ly tough op

ponent whenmet on anything approximating even terms. When

cornered and h a rd p ut, th e J a p s very often get in to a p anic,

and show as m uch fear as any other soldiers under sim ilar

circumstances.

There is evidence tha t some uni ts ( Japanese) a re pract ical ly

ostracized if they suffer defeat. Marines have come upon these

units,

found liv in g a pa rt from th e rest of th e tro op s, and ap

parently not having any contact or supply. I t isnot known how

much of th is is due to Ja p psychology, and how much is due to

the inability of broken uni ts to secure a port ion of the limi ted

suppliesof morefortunate units. AgreatmanyJ ap sarewander

ingaround in small bands,which are continually beingkilled off.

both by our own and n ativ e p atro ls. These broken u nits ap

parently do not reorganize well with other units , and within the


34/164


defeated unit itself there appears tobeno organization whatever.

Starvation

is

common among those who

are

separated from the

main forces. They remain deceptiveandcunning,however,and

many

of

them will walk into certain death

in

order

to

get

a

shot

atourtroops.

Japanese p risone rs t alk freely, as a ru le, andare truthful.

They know about heavy Japanese losses (in t hi s a r e a ); ithas

affected theairforce inparticular. Forinstance, they saythat

the "left w ing" manof a fo rma tion rarely returns , andpilots

prefer nottofly in th is position. P ilo ts and crews consider

Henderson Fie ld

abad

place

to

atta ck , expect heavy losses,and

saythat theantiaircraft set-upistough

6. ARMAMENT

a. Artillery

T he J a p s onGuadalcanal didnotmake asgood use oftheir

artillery

as

they m igh t,

and

they seemed

to

w ork upon

the

principle of the s ingle gun r a the r than concen trated battery

support. . . .

Therewereagreatpercentageofduds in theJ a p artilleryam

m unition G un positions wereh ard to locatebecausethey

werewellconcealedinthejungle. . .

There have been several puzz ling examples of theJaps 'ap

parentdisregard

for

theirownartillery.

In

onecase,theMarines

cap tured four newguns anda la rge qua ntity of ammunition

within300yardsofHenderson Field. Thegunswereinposition

to fire upon thefieldbuthadneverbeenfired,andnot aJapwas

inthevicinitywhenthegunsweretaken.

b. Powder

Th e Japanese powder produces lessflash and smokethanours.

(Comment: RecentU.S.Ordnance tes ts proved that the Japa


35/164

JAPAN—JAPANESE WARWARE 2 9

nese powder itself produces

as

much smoke

and

flash

as

ours.

However, the Ja pa ne se rifle has a smaller caliber, a smaller

charge, a longer barre l , and a lower muzzle velocity than ours;

these factors, which make combustion more complete,tend

tore

ducesmoke andflash.)

7. DEFENSE TACT ICS

a. General

TheJapanesesystem ofdefense isbasedonmaneuver,stressing

to

the

limit

the

necessity

of

s t riking back when

the

attackers

are

disorganized, even to the extent of h i tt ing them while they are

deployingfortheattack. I t seemsremarkable tha tthe Japanese

should indicate th at

thewayto

copewith

our

greaterf ire power

is to increase the size of the ir reserves at the expense of their

front-line defenses.

The Japanese counterat tacks are not pr imar i ly aimed merely

a t dr iving

the

enemy

out of

areas

he has

taken,

but

r athe r

at

striking

him in

such

a

m an ner t h at

the

initiative passes

to the

Japanese and decisive results aregained. The Japanese donot

intend to wh ittle down the a ttacks by a s trong defense, un ti l

the attack bogs down. They p lan

on

g iv ing wi th

the

blow

and

hitt ing back suddenly and decisively when thea t tacker hasbe

comedisorganized byhisownpenetration.

To

the

Japanesemilitary,tactics

isanart,

withdecisionsgained

byskill,notby sheer power. The ir policy for theuseofmaneu

ver may appear to lead toward complicated evolu tions. T rain

ing

andthe

delegation

to

subordinates

of the

init iative

for

inde

pendent action are most p robab ly the factors t ha t m ake such

tacticssimple.


36/164


b. IntheBuna Area

The first highly organized Japa nese defense positions encoun

teredbyU.S. troops in thepresentwarwere intheNewGuinea

area. American observers considered

the

positions very strong,

despitethefact th at the areaislowand practically level.

The positions consisted of bunkers andtrenches, which were

never over 3to4 feet deep because thewater level isapproxi

mately

5

feetbelowthesurface oftheground.

Becauseofthesandy soil,the trenches were only about 1foot

wideat thebottomand4%to5feetwideatthetop. Thebunkers

were built

of

logs

and

d irt. Narrow slits were made

for

machine-gun fire.

The trench systems,ordefense areas, were arranged in sections

which permit ted excellent fie lds of fire to the front andboth

flanks. T o fa cilitate th is , the flank trenches were constructed

at anangle ofabout 40° to 45° tothe front. Each defense area,

accommodatingnotmore tha n aplatoon, had four separatedug

outs.

A la rge portion of thetrenches wascovered with amixture

of coconut palm logs andd i r t which was8to10inches thick.

Coconutlogsaretough and donot splinter much. Thisprotective

cover was strong enough to resist direct hits ofallour weapons

oflesstha n88-mmcaliber. (TheBritish 25-pounder gun-howitzer

is88mm)

Thedefensiveareaconsisted

of

jungle,openspacescoveredwith

high grass,andcoconut groves, whichhadah igh grassy under

growth.

Both l ight andheavy machine guns were used extensivelyby

the Japanese, who seemed tohave plenty of ammunition.


37/164

PA R T

TW O:

GERMANY

Section I. GASWARFARE

1. GENERAL

Since W orld War I,w h e n the German Army first

made

useof

poison

gas,

German scientis ts have

con

ductedexhaustiveresearchinthefieldofchemicalwar

fare. TheGermansareknowntobewellpreparedfor

thistype of combat, both offensive anddefensive,and

there is li tt le doubt tha t they wouldusegaswith their

characteristic vigor and thoroughness should theyde

cidethatthesituationseemedtodemandit.

TheagentsthatGermanymayusedo notdiffer m ate

ria lly from those available to the o ther Powers,and

may

be

classifiedasfollows:

American classification German classification

Vesicants (blister gases). YellowCross (Gelbkreuz).

Lungirritants. Green Cross {Grilnkreuz).

Lacrimators (tear gases).

WhiteCross

{~W

eisskreuz).

Irritant smokes. Blue Cross (Blaukreuz).

31


38/164


W hen applied as code m ark ing to ammunition, there

is some alteration of this classification. Rings replace

crosses, and two rings of different colors indicate agas

w ith dua l p rope rt ie s. Fo r example, a green ring and

a yellow ring indicate that the charging is a lungirri

tantgaswithsomevesicantproperties.

I n general, G erm an chem ical w a rfare troops are

organized in re gime nts, b atta lio ns , an d companies.

A lthough they are called "sm oke tro op s" (Nelel

truppen),

i t is to be emphasized tha t they a re aswell

equipped to w ork w ith gas as w ith sm oke. F or de

fense, decontamination companies a re included, and

there are also some specialized decontamination com

paniesamongthemedicaltroops.

2.

DEFENSE

If all troops a re adequa te ly supp lied w ith antigas

devices,gas w ar fa re losesm uch of its effectiveness and

pow er to terrorize. B efore in itia tin g gas warfare,

an a rmy must p ro tect i ts own troops aga inst retalia

tion . I n the G erm an A rm y an tig as tra in in g is very

well o rgan ized ; as a basis fo r thi s work , there area

number of ant igas schools to which officers and non

commissionedofficersofunitsaresent.

Of allthe agentsm entioned in pa ra gr ap h 1,thevesi

cant type , or a lung- i r r itant type possessing vesicant

p ro pe rtie s, seem s to be p re fe rre d by the Germans.

Such gases are really liquids which evaporate quickly,


39/164

33ERMANY GAS W ARFARE

yielding heavier-than-air gases which collect and per

sist in low p ortio ns of th e te rr ain . B o th th e liquid

and the gas will produce severe burns if they come in

contact w ith the skin. G round and m ateriel which

have been con taminated by these agen ts a re dange r

ous over a period of hours or even, in extreme cases,

fordays.

AllGermantroopsareequippedonanadequatescale

w ith s tandard ma te ria ls fo r decontamination of per

sonnelandweapons. Theseincludethegasmask, anti-

gas tablets called " L o s a n t i n " (to be m oistened and

madeintoapaste),anantigassheetinapouch(forpro

tection agains t ves icant sp ray ) , and a pocket flask of

weapondecontaminant. Each soldier is impressed with

the importance of being able to protect

himself,andof

knowinghowto decontaminate hisp ersonal equipment.

In addition, certain uni t equipment is issued, such as

light and heavy protec tive c lo th ing, and gas-detector

sets for gas scout sections or gas sen tries. Special

equipment for decon tamination onalargescaleincludes

decontamination vehicles,whichareh alf-tracked truck s

equipped with rear hoppers for dis tribut ing bleaching

powder; and clothing decontamination vehicles, which

are large, windowless, six-wheeled trucks containing a

boiler for generating s team quickly, a s team chamber,

andadryingchamber. Somesectionsamongtheveteri

nary troops specialize in decontamination of horses.

The Germans lay g rea t s tress on no t allowing con

tamination of te r ra in tohold up an advance. The gas

510834°— 43— Vol. 1,N o.7 6


40/164

3 4 INTELLIGENCE. BULLETIN

scout sections are equipp ed w ith light antigas clothing,

and have the du ty of finding and m ark ing off contami

nated areas. A specialplow isusedtomake safe,nar

row path s which perm it the rap id passage of troopsin

s ingle file. This implement is a di tching plow witha

rubber-tired, single-axle carriage and two plowshares;

i t isdraw nbyadecontaminationtruck. Thetwoplow

shares tu rn the sod over in opposite directions sothat

a shallow trench about 20 inches wide, as well as the

slopes of the overturned earth, are free from contami

nation . Fo r large areas, specia lis t t roops are brought

up for decontamination in accordance with a definite

plan.

3. OFFENSE

a . Weapons of SmokeTroops

I f gas warfare breaks out, the pr im ary role willbe

assigned to the smoke bat tery, as i t is intended to fire

gasaswellassmoke. Th ere are twodifferent versions

ofthismortar;themodel35,whichhasarangeofabout

3,000 yard s, and the model 40, which has a maximum

range of about 6,500yards. Am m unition chargedwith

thevariousagentsmentionedinparagraph1isbelieved

toexist.

I n 1942the G ermanswered istribu ting anewtypeof

weapon, the Nebelwerfer 41, which they classify asa

m ortar , a lthough i t is really a rocket weapon withsix

barrels set in a circle like the chamber of a revolver.


41/164

35ERMANY—GAS WARFARE

Thebarrelshave

no

breech

andare

open

at

bothends.

Thisweapon

canbe

used

for

firing high explosive,

gas,

orsmokeprojectiles.

The decontamination bat ter ies

of the

smoke t roops

mayalsoengage

in

bulkcontamination.

For

this

pur

pose they

are

equipped with con tamination veh icles.

These

are

s tand ard half-tracked vehicles

on

which

con

tain ers have been mo unted.

The

liquid vesicant

is

emitted

by

what appea rs

tobea

s p r a y

arm

extended

wellbeyondtheback

of

thevehicle . Emission,which

is

produced

by

compressed

air, is

contro lled from

the

driver's compartment.

b. Equipment ofOther Arms

Although

the

smoke m or ta rs

are

perh aps more effi

cient

for gas

projection,

it is

believed that extensive

supplies

of

gas-charged shells have been

set

aside

for

the 105-mm

and

150-mm field h ow itzers. A lso,

gas

shells

maybe

firedfrom

the

l ight

and

heavy infantry

guns.

Aircraft

are

imp o r t a n t

in gas

war fa re .

TheGer

mansconsider low-altitude (un der

1,000

feet) vesicant

spray especially effective, both against personnel

and

for g round con tamination . Moreover,

theuseofair

craft bombs with chemical charging

isa

possibility

to

be taken into account,

if gas

war fa re should s ta rt .

c. Miscellaneous GasWeapons

TheGermanspossess

gas

grenades, with which their

parachute t roopsm ightbeequipped. Am munition

for


42/164


an t it ank rifles, models 38 and 39, includes armor-

piercing tracer bullets charged with tear gas.

4. THEORETICAL USE

OF

GAS

IN

THEFIELD

T he G erma ns d istin gu ish betw een

gas

attack

for

cloud effect and gasa ttackforcontamination.

a . For CEoud Effect

Gasattackforcloudeffect bymean sofnonpersistent

gases,

maybe

a tte mpte d

to

achieve

the

following

purposes:

(1) The G erman s m ight choosetopu t theopposition

outofaction before an tigas m easures could beadopted.

(2) TheGermans might employ gasbombardment

for several hours,

or

evendays,

to

neutralize opposing

units,weakentheirgasdiscipline,andinflictcasualties.

(3)

The

G e rma ns mig ht employ in te rmitte nt

gas

bombardment tocompel opposition troops toweargas

masks d urin g a long period, and thus weakengas

discipline.

(4) TheGermans m ight introduce gasammunition

into

a

mixedbombardment

of

highexplosiveandsmoke

bombardment.


43/164

37ERMANY-—GAS WARFARE

b. ForContamination

1

The German theo ry of contamination bymeansof

persis tent gases (such

as

mus ta rd )

is

m ore concerned

withdefenseandwi thdrawal than wi th a ttack . How

ever,

in

a ttack they m ight consider contam ination

useful

for

neutralizingcenters

of

resistancewhichcould

thenbebypassed,

andfor

safeguarding

a

flank. W h en

contaminating with ar t i llery

or

a ir craf t, there

is

also

thepossibility ofhinderingtheopposit ion's withdrawal

or

of

changing

its

direction . H ow ever,

the

scope

of

such tactics is limi ted, inasmuch as they canhamper

theadvance

of

f r iendly troops.

1

It m ust be r em em bered tha t con tam ina tion, in a m i l i ta ry sense , m eans

theprocess

of

spreading

an

in jurious , pe rs i sten t chemica l agent , which wi ll

remain in effective concentra tion at the p oin t of d is pe rs io n fro m a few

minutes

to

s eve ra l days, depend ing

on

local conditions.


44/164

SectionI I . V ISU A L SIGNA LS BETWEEN

AIR A N D GROUND FORCES

1.

INTRODUCTION

TheGermansystemofvisualcommunicationbetween

groundtroops anda ircraft iswelldeveloped. Extracts

from a German document exp la in ing the system are

rep rinte d below. I t m ustberemembered,however,that

the Germans take the precaution of changingtheirsig

nals as often as possib le. Pe rhap s the chief valueof

these extracts is that they i l lustrate basic methodsof

a ir-g ro un d visual sign aling and the im portance at

tached to them by the Germans .

2.

C O O R D IN A TIO N

Coordinat ion between Army and A ir Force is to be arranged

through the respective headquar te rs p r io r to each action. The

appropria te headquar te rs of these two branches of the service

are also responsible for keepingthemselvesm utually and speedily

informed regarding a ll movements in their bat tle area, bothon

the g round a nd in the air.

To speed up recognition, ground troops should possessdetailed

knowledge of our own aircraft types, of the prearranged signals,

and of the a ir s ituat ion. This information should be distributed

38


45/164

GERMANY—SIGNALS BETWEEN

AIR AND

GROUND FORCES

3 9

down

to

companies,whosecommanders

may

giveorders

to

signal.

If air crews are aware of the s ituation on the g round, of the

general conduct

of

ground troops

in

b attle,

and of the pre

arrangedsignals,gunnerswill

be

able

to

distinguishmorequickly

between enemy troops and friendly troops.

Ground troops must give their s ignals ear ly andin a position

easily observed from

the air.

A ircraft must

be

able

to seethe

signals before arrivin g overtheposition.

Aircraft must

not

give th eir sig nals

too

soon, inasmuch

as

coveroften interferes with observation by g round troops. Only

when

the

ground

is

fla t,

and

when

the

a ircraf t

are

flying

low,

may early signals

be

given. Since recognition

by

ground troops

is difficult when planes appear overhead too suddenly, unneces

sarily

low

flying over

our own

troops

is to be

avoided.

3. DAY SIGNALS USED BY GROUND TROOPS

In the daytime, ground t roops must g ive recognition signals

when

air

units call

for

them

by

g iv ing their

own

recognition

signals,

orif

friendly aircraft threaten

to

attack.

Also,

groundtroopsmaygivedaytimerecognitionsignalswith

out being called upon

to do so if

they consider

it

necessary

to

identify themselves to friendly aircraft—especially where terrain

featurestend to obscure ground troops from airobservation.

a. Orange Smoke

Orange-colored smoke

isthe

signal most easily recognized from

the

air. I t

means

"own

troops

are

here."

It isthe

chief recogni

tionsignalforallground troops.

b. Identification Panels

Identification panels will belaid outso tha t they mayberead

from aircraf t flying toward

the

front. They m ust

be

a rranged

in good t ime,

and on a

background aga inst which they

canbe


46/164


picked out c lear ly from the a ir, so that the a ircraf t will notbe

obliged to circle over the battle area.

Th epanels shouldbespread onopen ground,whereverpossible,

since aircraft usually observe while approaching, and not when

direc tly over a pos ition. Trees , bushes, and other objects may

prevent aircraft from seeing the signals obliquely. Every effort

must be made to make the signa ls as large as possible. Panels

may be lifted only when the a ircraf t a re out of sight.

Yellow cloths mean "here is our own front l ine ." They areto

be used only for this message, so tha t the front line will always

be c lear ly indicated. The a ircraf t can draw i ts own conclusions

astothebattlesituation. In general,yellow iseasilyrecognizable

from a moderate he ight; a number of yellow cloths spreadout

sidebysidewillmake identification easier. W hen ourowntroops

advance, the yellow cloths must not be left behind.

..

In add ition,the orange smokes ignal istobeused asextensively

aspossible.

c. Swastika Flags

Swastika flags can scarcely be identified at all from great

heights , and onry wi th difficulty from modera te heights. They

mean "own troops are here." As a ru le , they a re used in rear

positions, but may be used in the front l ine if yellow cloths are

not ava ilable or if no par ticula r value is a ttached to a distinct

recognition of the front l ine as such. Since swastikaflagsalone

are generally not sufficient for identification purposes,it isadvis

able to use the addit ional s ignal of orange smoke.

d. Improvised Signals

If the usual recognition signals are not available, troopsmay

improvise signals, such as the waving of steel helmets, handker

chiefs, and so on. However, these s igna ls afford no guarantee

th at the ground troops Avill be recognized.


47/164

GERMANY— SIGNALS BETW EEN AIR AND GROUND FORCES 4 1

4. DA Y SIGNALS USED BYAIRCRAFT

In the day time , a irc ra ft must g ive recognition signals when

firedonby friendly troops. Daytime s ignals may also be given

by a irc ra ft which suddenly emerge from clouds over friend ly

territory, or which wish to request signals from ground troops.

G round troo ps w ill g en erally id entify frien dly airc raft by

noting the type of plane, the nat ional marking, or specia l paint

ing. When security permits , messages will be dropped in mes

sageboxeswhich emit a yellow smoke while dropp ing and after

reaching the ground. If these boxes are not avai lable, messages

w ill be dropped in message bags, to w hich a red-and-w hite

stream er is attached . A i rc ra ft m ay im provise such signals as

the d ipping up and down of the nose and tai l of a p lane , wing

dipping, or repeated spurts of the motor (" jackrabbit ing").

5. NIGHT SIGNALS USEDBY GR OU ND TROOPS

At n igh t, g round troops must g ive recognition signals when

these are requested by our own aircraf t, and when the s ituation

w arran ts an tic ip atin g a bom bing attack by our own aircraft.

Ground troops uselig ht signals of all types,m aking extensiveuse

ofVerylights. Codesarechanged continually,ofcourse,and are

madeknown down to companies.

6. NIGHT SIGNALS USED BY AIRCRAFT

Aircraft must givenigh t signalswhen there isdanger of attack

by friendly troops. Fur the r , a ircraf t are permitted to signal a t

night if they have lost their bearings and wish to know whether

they are flying over friendly terr i tory ; if they know, or believe,

that they are crossing the front on a r etu rn flight; when they

wishtorequest friendly troopstogivesign als;and whenthey are


48/164


about to land a t an a irdrome. Aircraf t must continuallychange

the meanings of their fixed light signals and flashed searchlight

signals.

7. USE OF VERY LIGHTS

The Germans use white, green, and red Verylights.

Atthetimetheaboveinstructionswerepublished,Ger

m an aircraft used wh ite V ery l ights to request ground

troops to give recognition sign als; green, when aplane

wasabouttodropamessageandwishedgroundtroops

toindicatewheretheyp referred tohaveitdropped;and

red,to conveyth em essage" B ew a re of enemyantitank

w eap on s." Red smokesignalsalsowereusedtoconvey

thislastmessage,whileblueorvioletsmokesignalswere

used to indicate the presence of enemy tanks.


49/164

SectionIII . INFANTR Y FIELDWORKS

1.

INTRODUCTION

The follow ing e xtra cts from G erma n A r my docu

ments illu str ate the genera l p rincip le s that the Ger

mans follow in constructing infantry fieldworks. The

Germans p reface their doc trine on th is subject w ith

a reminder t ha t th e co nstru ction of po sition s " mu s t

conform to factors determ ined by the enemy, the

ground, one's own forces, and the time and supp lie s

available. F i r e p ositio ns and fields of fire must be

established on the fire plan before the work is m arked

out and construction begun. F ire positions m ust

merge with the surrounding country in such a fashion

that themaximumpossibleuseis madeofnatural con

cealment. F u r th e rmo r e , all positions, even those to

the rear, will be kep t camouflaged as much as possible

whiletheyareun de r co ns tructio n."

2. GENERAL PRINCIPLES

The tim e required for the construction of fieldworks m ust

be calculated carefu lly . Periods of tim e given -at the end of

th is section represent the minimum requirements . A few com

43


50/164


plete and well-concealed positions areworth far more thana

la rge number, half-finished. W hen

our

troops

arein the im

mediate neighborhood

of the

enemy, construction must

be

car

ried

outin

such

a

fashion that some form

of

defense

is

possible

atalltimes.

I n order

to

decrease vulnerabili ty

to

high-angle enemy fire,

weapon p its m ust

be

constructed

no

la rger than

is

necessary.

Thewallsofthepitmustatalltimesbekeptatasuitableangle,

varying wi th

the

nature

ofthe

ground,

so

that they cannot fall

in.

In the

case

of

loose ground,

andin

constructingfireposi

tions

in

permanent fronts,

it

may

be

necessary

to

revet thewalls

of

thepit.

Re ve tting w ith resistan t m a te ria l m akes

the

work

of c lear ing

outthepit

after

a

shell-hit more difficult;

the pit

must then be excavated to a larger size than before.

I f

the

situation

and

enemy action permit,

the

surface soil

is

removed from

the

immediate neighborhood

of thepit,to be

used later incamouflaging theposition. Thespoil, orsubsur

face soil, mu st

be

deposited

fa r

enough from

thepitto

forestall

the necessity

of

moving

the

earth

a

second time.

The

parapet

must beextended farenough oneach side toafford theriflemen

a fie ld

of

fire

onall

sides, meanwhile protecting them against

enem y flanking fire. A lso,

the

p ara pe t should

be

kept

low.

The field of fire should notbeaffected byirregularities in the

surface

of

theground.

A firing posit ion that can bereadily assumed remains the first

consideration. Thedep th

of

the excavations for arm sorweapons

depends

onthe

required firing height. Dimensions must also

be adjusted toconform to theheight of theriflemen. In set

t ing

outthe

work, measurements

canbe

taken

bythe

lengthof

aspade.

Length

of

sh ort spade

20

inches.

Length

of

long spade

3

feet

7

inches.

Approximate length

of

b lade

8

inches.


51/164

45ERMANY IN FA NTR Y FIELD WO RK S

The excavated earth should be disposed of in the least obvious

manner, and by a single route leading from one side of the pi t .

The path by which the ea rth is t ransported must be regu lated

carefully.

Each position must have an a lte rnative position. Th is must

be at least 50 to 60 mete rs from the o rig inal position. I t must

fulfill the samerequirement. "Field of fire comesbefore cover."

Asalways, camouflage is of pri m ary importance.

I f time allows, p i ts should be connected by communication

trenches.

Along lengthy communication routes, ant itank pi ts should be

dug at intervals of 50 yard s. The com munication trenches

should follow a z igzag course, and should be constructed wi th

rounded, ra ther than sharp , edges.

Thetype and construction of positions is determined above all

bythetimeavailablefor thework. Ground conditions,drainage,

weather, facilities for concealment, available personnel, entrench

ing tools, o ther tools, and construc tion mater ia ls must also be

considered.

The following will serve as a guide fo r the construction of

positions on average te rra in :

Available time Type of construction

Afew hours Machine gun and rifle p it s, affording pro tec tion

against m ach ine-gun fire and fragm en ts of

shells w ith im pact fuzes. Sim ple w ire ob

stacles should be constructed. In the case of

lig ht m achine guns, an titan k rifles, heavy

m achine g un s, lig ht m o rta rs , and a ntita nk

guns, overhead pro tectio n for riflemen and

the ir weapons m ay be p rovided a t t he sam e

time.

W ith heavy m ortars, light infantry

guns,and heavyinfa ntry guns,overhead cover

for the crew must be constructed before tha t

for the weapon.


52/164


vailable

time

Half day

Type ofconstruction

T ho ro ug h construction of p its andrecessesunder

parapets , providing protect ion against light

high-angle fire and splinters from richochet

ing and time-fuze shells, protection against

weather, and increased comfort for thecrew.

W hole day S tren gth en in g of w ire obstacles, strengthening

of p i ts and firing bays. Connection ofwea-

pon pits within the system by crawl orcom-

munication trenches.

Several days C ontinuous trenches.

Several w ee ks. . System aticconstruction ofdefenseswithcontinu

ous trenches and shelters.


53/164

SectionIV . INTER ROGATIO N OF BRITISH

PRISONERS OF W A R

1. GENERAL

Thematerial in this section consists of two items:a

translation of a German printed form issued in pads

and designed to befilledin after the interrogation of

British prisoners of war, and a translation of a setof

German instructions entitled "Notes onthe Interroga

tionofBritishPrisonersofW ar. " Theseinstructions

werefoundattachedtotheinsidecoverofapadofthe

forms.

This material should give the reader an ex

cellentideaastowhatkindofstandardinformationthe

Germans make every effort to obtain from United

Nationsprisoners.

47


54/164

48

INTELLIGENCE BULLETIN

2.

A SPECIMEN BL NK

No. 01061

FORM FOR P. W. INTERROGATION ENGLAND)

(Interrogating

Unit)

(Place)

(Day)

To

CHIEF OPTHE GENERALSTAFF OFIHE ARMY

Dept.—Foreign

Armies.—West. ,

Tobe transmittedbythe quickestmeans.

Name:

Taken Unit

Christian Name:

Yearof Birth:

Rank:

At

Name

ArmyCorps.

Division.

Brigade.

Battalion.

Number: On

TypeofCompany.

Mobilization and transportoverseas

Regular

Armyor

Territorial

Place Command Table

of or-

Em-

bar-

Disem

kation

Route

taken

Army

Date

gani

zation

ofunit

kation

Place,

Date

Place,

Date and

dates)

Unit

arrived in the line

What units in thesame

Division?

Otherunits

known

At

Name.

From

Division.

To

Place.

Date.

Particulars ofweapons

,

tanks,equipment, antigas equipment

Morale

: (Losses)

Otherimportantitems.

REMARKS:

1.

Important papers (diaries,orders) aretobeattachedtothecopysent

directtotheChiefoftheGeneralStaffintheField.

2. Items of local interest only are to beput ona specialsheetonlyfor

unitsinterested.


55/164

GERMANY—BRITISH PRISONERS OF WAR 4 9

3.

THE

INSTRUCTIONS

NotesonInterrogation ofBritish Prisoners ofWar.

a.

Theblanksaretobefilled in asfully aspossible.

b.

Exact identification of theuni t is part icula rly important .

In theinfantry, "regiment" actually means theparent unit . I t

hasnonumber—only aname. Thetactical formation thatcor

respondstoour"regiment" istheBr i t ish "brigade." The brigade

is identified byanumber, andconsists of three ba ttal ions from

various regiments . Since battal ions from one regiment willbe

found with different brigades, it is especially imp ortant tofind

outthebattalion's number.

Unitsofother armsarenum bered, exceptforcertain tank and

armoredunitswhichwerecavalry,originallyandwhichhavekept

theirnames.

For fu rther remarks onBr it ish Order of Batt le , l is t of regi

mental names, exp lana tion of ranks, badges, and E nglish

abbreviations, seethehandbook, "TheBr it ish Army."

c.

Furtherquestions

to

beput

to

prisoners:

(1) Have there beenanyalterationsintheOrder ofBatt leas

printed

inthe

handbook?

Are

alterations

in

progress, particu

larlywithregard to armored formations

?

(2) How

far

havein fantry and other unitsbeenequipped with

antitank and light an tiaircraft units? W i th which unitsare

there signal units tha t donot belong organical ly to Divis ion

Signals? W h at

is

known about

the

A rm y

Air

Corps

orthe

Air

borne Div ision (pa rachute and airbo rn e troo ps)

?

S trength ,

organization, tra ining , equipment,andarmament of Commandos

andSpecialServiceTroops ?

(3) Effect ofourweaponsandtanks,morally andtechnically?

Lossesinpersonnel,weapons,andequipment ?

(4) W ha t isknown about Amphibious Transport

(Landungs

fahrzeuge)i.

Newweapons (machine pis tol, ant itank, ar ti llery,

explosives,

and

hand grenades) ? New tanks, especially new

in


56/164


fantry tanks, and new armament and armor on known typesof

tanks? Active and passive Chemical W arfare preparations?

(5) W h a t is know n about op eratio ns in conjunction with

AmericansandotherAllies.

(6) W hat rumors arethereaboutfuture operations?

(7) W h a t about th e hom e fro nt? F orm atio n of new units?

Movem ents overseas? S itua tion r ega rd ing supply and food?

Opin ions as to p rospects in the war? General morale?


57/164

SectionV . A IR FORCES

1. HENSCHEL 129 BOMBER

TheHenschel (H s ) 129isasingle-seat attac k bomber

usedfor closesup port of ground forces and for attacks

onarmored ground targets.

I t is a twin-engine, low-wing, s ingle-rudder mono

plane of all-metal, stressed-skin construction, with re

trac table landing gear (see fig. 2 ) . W hen the wheels

Figure 2.— Henschel (Hs) 129 Bom bers.

areup,theyp rotru de slightly from the enginenacelles.

Thecentersectionofthewings,inboardofthenacelles,

isgull-shapedan dthe tai lsectionisof cantilever design

w ith a ta ll fin and rudder . The nose of the fuselage

51


58/164


drops steeply away from the cabin, thus affording the

pilotabetterdownwardfieldofvision.

This airc raf t is powered by two 450-horsepower air-

cooled,in-line,invertedV-12enginesandhastwo-blade,

variable-pitch propellers. One version of the Hs129,

however, m ay be fitted w ith Gnom e-Rhone 14-cylinder

radial engines. The plane has a cruis ing speed of170

miles per hour a t 10,000 feet, and a normal cruising

rangeofapproximately400miles.

The "1 2 9" has an e stima ted w ing span of 50 feet,

a length of 38 feet, and a gross weight of about 9,000

p ou nd s. T he ma ximu m bomb load is believed tobe

about 2,200pounds and to consist bothof antipersonnel

and combined splinter and high-explosive bombs.

The a rmam ent consists of one 30-mm cannon, for

use ag ainst ta nk s an d arm o red vehicles, and four

machine guns—two l ight and two heavy—all rigidly

m ounted inthe nose of the fuselage.

The a ir craf t is heav ily a rmored on the underside.

The cabin is also armored, a lthough the distribution

and thickness of the plat ing has not been determined.

Thenoseofth efuselage ispainted toresembleapike

fish 's head, which seems to be a s tandard markingon

the H s 129. A sim ilar design has been previously

noted on M esserschm itt 110's, an d m ay have been

adopted in the hope of increas ing the demoralizing

effect of low-flying a t tacks on t roops . I t is believed

th a t m achine guns a re m ounted in the eyes of the

"p ike ' s head . "


59/164

GERMANY AIR FORCES 53

In tactical ope rations,th etake-off ismadein echelon

bysections. E n route to the target , planesfly in eche

lon formation, with the sections s tepped up—a closed

formation is flown when there is danger of a t tack by

enemy fighters. A nt ia i rcraft defenses are avoided, as

far as possible , by changing course, by m aking use of

weather conditions, and by approaching from the sun.

Theattackismadebysections,onesectiondivingas

another leaves and as a th ird approaches

(1943) Intelligence Bulletin, Vol. I, No. 7

Documents

Transcript of (1943) Intelligence Bulletin, Vol. I, No. 7