(1942) Intelligence Bulletin, Vol. I, No. 1

8/17/2019 (1942) Intelligence Bulletin, Vol. I, No. 1

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V O L U M E

«

NUMBER

INTELLIGENCE

BULLETIN

September 942

FILE OPY

CftGSS LIBR RY

MILIT RY INTELLIGENCE SERVICE

W R DEP RTMENT


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RESTRICTED

M ILITA R Y IN T E L L IG E N C E IN T E L L IG E N C E

SER V IC E B U L LE TIN

WAR DEPAR TMENT No 1

W ashington , Septem ber 1942 M IS 461

Distribution

N on div isio na l u n it s a r e b ein g su pp lied w i th copies on a b as is s im ila r

to t he a pp ro ve d d is tr ib u ti on fo r d iv isio na l co mm an ds, a s fo ll ow s :

IN F DIV CAV DIV

ARMD

DIV

Div Hq 15

D iv Hq

Div Hq 12

Ren

Troop

4

Ord Co

Ren Bn 6

Sig Co 4

Sig Troop

Engr Bn 6

Engr

Bn__ 6 Ren Sq Med Bn 6

Med Bn__ 6

Engr Sq

Maint Bn 6

QM Bn__ 6

Med Sq

Supply Bn 6

H q In f Rest, 7 e a — 21

QM Sq

Div Train Hq 6

InfBn, 6 ea 54

Hq C av B rig, 3 ea

6

Armd

Regt,

32 ea___ 64

Hq D iv Arty 10

Cav

Regt,

20 ea

80

FA Bn, 6 ea 18

FA Bn, 6 ea 24

Hq Div Arty Inf Regt 20

PA Bn , 6 ea

18

150

150

150

F or a lim ited tim e ad ditio nal copies of th is bu lle tin m ay be had upon

re qu est. D is trib u ti on to a ir u n it s is b ein g m a de by th e A -2 of A rm y A ir

Forces.


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FOREWORD

W hen Napoleon sa id , "E ve ry sold ier carr ies a mar-

shal's baton in his knap sack," hewasunw itt ingly por

tray ing the actua l conditions of modern warfa re , for

today it is l iterally tru e tha t in the field of combat the

individual soldier orsquadleader mayfindhimself ina

positionwherehemustmakedecisionswhichmayhave

adirectbearingontheultimateoutcomeofaparticular

engagement.

I n order th at the A m erican soldier as well as the

junior officer may be fully informed as to the enemy's

methods and practices sothat in an emergency he may

beable to make as accurate an estimate as possible of

a s ituation, the M il itary Intell igence Service is under

taking the collection and dissemination of inform ation

whichwill beof value to him for this purpose. Owing

tothecharacterofthematerialcontainedinthe

I N T E L

LIGENCEBULLETIN,it hasbeennecessary toclassify it as

" re s tr ic te d ." I t is th e hope, how ever, th at it w ill be

possibletope rm it of itsge neral usebyall enlisted per

sonnel and junio r officers, as i t is designed prima ri ly

to serve as a vehicle for the d issemination, fo r thei r

benefit, of the la test informat ion received from Mili

tary Intelligence sources.

Major General, U. S. Army,

Assistant Chief of Staff G-2.


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TABLE OF CONTENTS

P A R T

O N E : G ER M AN Y

Page

SECTION I . A RM O RED F O R C E S 1

1. T h e 8 8-m m . G u n 1

2. Tanks in the S po tl igh t 4

3.

M echan ized War fa re 7

I I. A I R F O R CE S 12

1. Focke-Wulf— FW 190 12

2.

P a r achu t i s t s 13

a. Introduction 13

b . Training 13

c.

Tactics

14

d.

Organ ization of Division

_... 18

e. The Parachutist's "T en Com mandments" 19

I I I . B OO BY T R A P S 21

1. General 21

2. Ope ra tion 21

3.

P r inc ip les of Use 22

a.

Keeping Normal Appearance

22

b . Small Spaces

22

C. Many Traps In One Place 24

d.

Doub le Bluff

24

e. Curiosity 24

f.

Everyday Operations

24

g.

Firing

24

h. Variety 24

4. De tec t ion 24

a.

General

24

b. Places of Traps 25

c.

Suspicious Signs

26

5.

De ta il s of B ooby Traps 26

a.

General

26

b. Shaving Stick Booby Trap 27

c. Stick Grenades Used as Booby Traps 30

d. Miscellaneous Booby Traps 31

6. Booby T ra ps in R ela tion to Minefields and

D em olitions 32

in


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IV

TABLE OF CO NTEN TS

S E CT I O N IV . LA N D M I N E S

1. I n L ibya

2.

I n R u ss ia

V. T R A IN IN G M E T H O D S

1. G eneral _.

2.

N o t es o n T r a in i ng

V I. N I G H T D R IV IN G E Q UIP M E NT

1. General

a.

Blackout Headlights

. . . . . . . .

.

b. Interval-Judging Rear Lights and Stop

Lights

....... _

c.

Additional Rear Lights

2. Use D u ring C onvoys .

VTT. I N S T R U C T IO N S IN

C AS E

OF C A PT U RE

1. I n t roduc t ion

2.

T h e C a pt ur ed G erm a n M a nu al

VIIT. ' S E C R E T ' W E A P O N A GA IN ?

P AR T T W O : JA PA N

SECTION

I . G R O U N D F O R C E S

1. I n tr o d u c ti o n

2.

T a ct ic s

a. Movements

b . Infiltration

c.

Magnetic Mines

d. Use of Light Machine Guns.

e. Mortars

f.

Landing Operations

g.

Japanese "Graves"

h.

Deceptions

^

i. Fifth Column

3. E q u ip m e n t

a.

Rifles

b . Svjords

c. Helmets

d. Shade

e.

Entrenching Spades

f. Water Purifier

g.

Rope

h. Diaries

Page

34

34

35

36

36

37

40

40

40

41

42

42

43

43

43

48

52

52

53

53

54

58

58

58

59

59

60

62

66

66

67

67

67

67

68

68

68


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TABLE

OF

CONTENTS

V

SECTION I. GKOUND FORCES—-Continued

3. Equ ipment— Continued Page

i.

Wire-Scaling Device 68

New Bomb

: 69

I I . AIR

FORCES

70

1.

General

70

2. Methods

of

Attack

71

a.

Fighter Planes 71

b. Bomber Planes 73

3. Supplies

by Air 74

4. Japanese " 0 " Fighter 74

I I I .

FOOD

77

1. General

77

2. Emergency Five-Day Ration

77

3. Other Types

of

Emergency Rations

78

4. Field Rations

78

a. Special Type 78

b. Normal Type

79

5. Vitamins

79


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1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

LIST OF ILLUSTRATIONS

Page

FIGURE

. T h e 88-m m . A ntiaircraft and A n titan k G un 3

FIGURE

. M ark IV T an k 5

FIGURE

. M ark I I I T an k 6

FIGURE

. Focke-W ulf— FW 190 F igh te r 11

FIGURE

. D oors to Booby T rap s 23

FIGURE

. B ooby T ra p P ush -Ig n i te rs 27

FIGURE

. Booby T ra p P u ll-Ign ite rs 27

FIGURE

. Shaving Stick Booby T ra p : 28

FIGURE

. Im m ed ia te A ction G renade 29

FIGURE

. " 0 " Fighter 75

VI


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P A R T O N E G E R M A N Y

Section I. ARMORED FORCES

1. THE 88-MM. GUN

Fie ld Marshal Erwin Rommel's use of the 88-mm.

antia irc ra ft gun as an offensive an titank weapon in

Libya has caused som uch discussion among Am erican

soldiers everywhere th at this seems a good t ime to de

scribe it . In plain Engl ish, there isnothings t range or

unusual about the 88. To the question " I s it vu lnera

ble?" t he answer i s "Yes!"

Back in the 10-year period before H i t ler came into

power, the German 88-mm. an ti air cr af t gun was de

signed and built in secret. In those days the German

Army was rig id ly limited as to men and mate rie l. I t

is known that the designers of the gun were chiefly in

terested in constructing a double-purpose ant iai rcraf t

andant itank weapon. The news of the gun 's ant itank

capabilities was not allowed to leak out, however, and

not until the Nazis invaded P olan d did the w orld

discover what the German designers had perfected.

1

477851°— 42— vol. 1,N o. 1 2


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2 INTELLIGENCE BULLETIN

B asically, th e 88-mm . is a tra cto r-d ra w n gun for

firing onmovingtarg ets (fig.1 ). I t hasara te offireof

25roundsperminute, orsl ightlybetter, andis capable

not only of a great volume of fire, but of extrem e

accuracy against m oving targ ets of any type. This

app lies to ta rg ets on the ground as well as those in

the air. W h en the 88-mm. is to attack arm ored ve

hicles, it is pro vided w ith a special arm o r-p iercin g

projectile.

Rommel generally sends the gun into posi tion under

cover of m edium tanks. The tanks are then w ith

draw n for offensive operations somewhere else,and the

88-mm.begins its m ission of tryin g to pierce the armor

of approaching hostile tanks .

W h a t are the g un 's w eaknesses? F i rs t, it m akes a

good targe t for dive bombers, even though one of its

du ties is to oppose a ir cra ft. T he 88 has a h ard time

placing i ts fire ondivebombers. They can come down

at a furious speed, blast the 88, and get away success

fully. B u t th e re ally imp o r ta n t w eakness of th is , or

an y other gun, lies n ot in its ma nu fa ctu re bu t in its

crew . T he gun is n ot a liv e; th e men a re . T hey know

th at it m ay not be a ircraft or long-range artillery

which will endthe bigg un 's usefulness to theA xis, but

a detachm ent of p erh ap s 20 A m erican soldiers. To

meet such a threa t , the crew wear their rifles s trapped

to their backs in readiness for close combat.

The na tu ra l question that a rises i s : "D o we have a

comparable w eapon— if so, w h a t ? " F o rtu n ate ly , our

90-mm. is superio r to the 88-mm. in every impor tan t


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Figure 1.—S8 mm. Antiaircraft and antitank gun


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4 INTELLIGENCE BULLET IN

respect, and we are building even bette r models. The

clever tactics of the Germans, rather than the 88

itself

have been responsible for much of the g un s success.

2 TANKS IN THE SPOTLIGHT

Lately the Germans have been working their Mark

I V tan k overtime, especially in Liby a. I t is a medium

tank of 22 tons , ca rrying a crew of five (fig. 2 ) . Armed

with one 75-mm. gun and two light m achine gu ns, it has

been used chiefly as mobile, close-support artillery in

desert w arfa re. The repo rted substitution of a more

powerful 75-mm. gun may send the Mark IV back

to its normal task of serving as the chief element in a

bre ak thro ug h. I t s best possible speed is 31 miles per

hou r. I n study ing the photograp h for identification

purposes, note that the Mark IV has, on each side,

eight small bogie wheels and four track-support

rollers. Testing a captured G erman M ark I V tank,

the British have discovered that it can be blinded by

flame-thrower atta ck . A lthough the flames are not

likely to enter the turret or the driving compartment,

they will coat with thick soot all lookout points, in

cluding the telescopic sigh ts on the gun. As a resu lt,

the men in the tank cannot fire effectively until they

have changed or cleaned their sights.

The Germans also make wide use of the Mark III, a

ligh t medium tan k of 18 to 20 tons (fig. 3 ) . Form er ly

it was armed with one 37-mm. gun and two light


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GERMANY —ARMORED FORCES


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7ERMANY ARMORED FORCES

machine guns, but in most cases the 37-mm. has

been replaced by a 50-mm. I t s best possible speed is

28 miles per hour, bu t it is much easier to maneu ver

on the battlefield than the heavier Mark TV.

The war in Africa has proved, however, that the

Am erican M3, known to the B ritish as the G en era l

G ra n t, has the best tan k arm or in the world. G en

eral Grants' ' stay in the fight after as many as eight to

ten hits by 50-mm. and smaller an tita nk weapons. I n

at least one case, a G en er al G r a n t has continued to

perform well after 27 hi ts. The new A m erican M4,

known as the G en er al L e e , is even more reliable. I t

has greater speed and more power, and is excellent for

reconnaissance and pu rsu it. Am ong other improve

ments, its 75-mm. gun has been placed in the turret

instead of on the side. This change gives it an all-

around field of fire.

3 MECHANIZED WARFARE

The tactics used by the Germans in mechanized

warfare are of interest to every American in the field.

German mechanized tactics are likely to follow certain

set pa tte rn s. Nevertheless, it m ust be remem bered

that German commanders are clever at changing

standard tactics to fit the situation at hand.

Under normal circumstances, the first German move

is to order armored car patrols, supported by anti

tank guns, to do a thorough job of reconnaissance.

Motorcycle riflemen also lend support if the terrain is


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8 INTELLIGENCE BULLE TIN

suitable. These reconnaissance patrols are drawn

from the reconnaissance battalions of the armored di

vision. The size and makeup of each patrol naturally

depends on the mission it has to perform. Sometimes

the Germans even add a number of light tanks.

These reconnaissance detachments not only report our

movements and those of their own units, but are sup

posed to be strong enough to put up a fight, if neces

sary. While the patrols are trying to find out our

strength, German air and ground observers are doing

their best to detect our artillery and antitank-gun posi

tions so that these may be dealt with when the main

attack begins.

Having decided where to strike, the enemy next

brings forward his tanks, supported by motorized in

fantry. He covers this move by a screen of antitank

guns and tries to bring his forward elements, includ

ing a company of Mark IV tanks, to within about

2,000 yards of our own antitank guns and artillery.

At this stage he generally tries to refuel his tanks

under the protection of his forward detachments.

The Mark IV tanks direct their 75-mm. gun fire on

our antitank guns and artillery. Meanwhile, Mark

III tanks assemble for battle, and often challenge our

defended area at different points in strong, close

formations.

The enemy then decides where he wants to begin his

main thrust. Having done his best to weaken the

power of our defense by the fire of his Mark IV tanks


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9ERMANY ARMORED FORCES

and artillery, he opens a strong attack with his Mark

III tanks, followed by motorized infantry and guns,

and advances on his objective.

In addition, he often directs at least one column

(containing tanks, artillery, and motorized infantry)

on some important locality in our area, such as a tank

repair center. There may be more than one of these

thrusts. As a rule, the Germans try to develop them

into a pincer movement, with the advance columns

pushing ahead to meet at the final objective.

If one of the enemy's Mark III tank columns suc

ceeds in penetrating any part of our defenses and es

tablishing a fairly good position, motorized infantry

is then moved forward to within a few hundred yards

of the position. The infantry dismounts and goes into

action, mopping up as rapidly as possible and organ

izing the position. German machine guns and anti

tank guns follow the infantry closely. Every effort

is made to turn the captured position into an area, or

a series of areas, capable of all-around defense against

any form of attack. In this last operation, speed is

emphasized.

In Libya, the Germans often start these attacks late

in the afternoon so as to have the advantage of fight

ing with the sun behind their backs. In this theater

of operations, the action is usually completed by

nightfall. Either side is likely to counterattack soon

after dark. Experience has shown that the Germans

especially dislike this form of combat, and United

Nations counterattacks begun at night have often suc

477851°—42— vol. 1. No. 1 -3


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1 0 INTELLIGENCE BULLETIN

ceeded in recovering', at small expense, ground lost

during the day.

It must be repeated that, although the Germans like

to employ established and familiar tactics, they know

how to change them when necessary. The best ex

ample of this is the new German technique of bringing

up artillery in close support of tanks, so that tanks are

never required to face antitank guns by themselves.


18/183


19/183

SectionI I . AIR FORCES

1.

FOCKE-WULF—FW190

A new addition to the Germ an A ir Force is the

F ocke-W u lf— F W 1 90. The G erm ans claim th at it is

the fastest and most easily maneuvered fighter in the

world. However, in spite of its speed and maneuver

abili ty, the B rit ish have been ableto destroy a number

of these p lanes and recently cap tu red one almost in

tact.

As shown in the accom panying photograph, the

F W 1 90 bears some resem blance to our P 36 p ursu it

plane,which hasbeenin service for severalyea rs. The

wing form seems s imilar to tha t of the Bri t i sh "Spit

fire."

P ow e red by a new air-cooled, tw in-row ra dia l en

gine of h igh horsepower, this p lane is capable of per

formingat anextremelyhighalt i tude.

I t is well protected by armor, is heavily armed, and

carries m ore cannons th an is usual w ith planes of

similar type.

A lthough the FW 190 has not yet been known to

c ar ry bombs, it is possible t ha t bomb ra ck s may be

fitted to the p lane , since the Germans have done th is

with other fighters.

12


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1 3ERMANY—AIR FORCES

2. PARACHUTISTS

a. Introduction

A good many Am erican fighting men have said that

theywould like to get a clearer mental picture of Ger

manparachutists— what they looklike,howthey train ,

what their standard tactics a re , and in general how

theydotheirjob.

A common mistake is to imag ine tha t the German

parachutis t is an ordinary infant rym an who, on land

ing,goesintocombat asague rrilla fighter op era ting by

himself, w ith help from any fellow -parachutists he

mayhave the luck to meet. Actually , a German para

chutist is a thoroughly traine d specialist who fights as

part of a well-organized unit. The G erm an A rm y

teaches him to believe that h is is the most impor tant

ofalljobs—thatheisevenmorevaluablethantheaces

of the G erm an A i r F orc e. A fter he has h ad a long,

tough tra in in g in a p a ra c hu tis ts ' school, he is p re

pared not merely to jum p well, but also to fight well.

Infact, teamwork is the Germanp ara ch utist 's guiding

principle.

b. Training

In choosing men who are to be sent to a parachut

ists'

school, the German Arm y selects candidates who

are young, athletic, quick-w itted, and aggressive.

Many of them are chosen with regard to certa in spe

cial abilities (medical, engineering, and so on) which

are ju st as m uch needed in parachute operations as


21/183


in any other k ind . D u rin g the tra in in g, em phasis is

placed on exact procedures; for instance, a man packs

a p arach ute w ith special care if he knows th at he

himself is going to use it. A fter p roper physical

conditioning, the candidate w orks from a jum ping

tower, practicing landing methods und er different con

d itions , ^h e school also requ ires , and develops, fear

lessn ess; to illu stra te , in a t ra n s p o rt p la ne an y sign

of h esitatio n a t th e command " J u m p ! " ma y cost the

candidate h is membersh ip in a parachute company.

However, parachute jum ping is only a small pa rt of

the candidate 's tra in in g, inasm uch as the Germ an

Army hopes to make h im a useful member of a crack

combat o rgan ization . He must know how to take par t

in w hat is called a " v er ti ca l e nv elo pme nt"— th at is,

the capture of an area by air-borne troops.

1

c. Tactics

A irfields and railw ay and highw ay junctions are

likely to be among the foremost objectives of vert ical

envelopmen ts. Usua lly theybegin a t dawn. Tomake

the parach ut is t 's task less difficult, the Germans send

out bombers, dive bombers, and fighters ahead of time

to place fire on th e d efe nd ers ' gun p osition s an d to

drive gun crew s to cover. Special atte ntio n is paid

to ant ia ircraft ba tter ies .

A fter an hour or m ore of continuous a ir attack,

one of several possible events may take place, since

x

T h e G erm an cap tu re of th e island of C rete w as m ade possible by a

ser ie s of the se ver ti ca l envelopm en ts .


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1 5ERM ANY—AIR FORC ES

German tactics a t th is stage are not s tandard ized . I f

reconnaissance has shownth at the terr ain is favorable,

gliders may descend and t ry to land their troops

(usually ten to a glid er) in a su rprise move u nd er

coverofthe ai r attack.

If the landings are successful, the glider-borne

troops w ill m ake every effort to k ill or c ap tu re the

defending gun crew s, thereby p av in g the w ay still

further for th e a rr iv a l of th e p ara ch ute tro ops. O r,

i t may be that gliders will not beused at all, and that

parachutists will berequired top erform this operation

by themselves. Much will depend on how s trong the

Germansthinkthegrounddefensesare.

Even though the parachut is ts will use tommy guns,

rifles,

or grenades while they are descending, ex

perience has shown th at this is the tim e when the

defending ground forces will get the best possible re

sults with the ir fire power. The Germans cannot aim

effectively w hile they a re descending. A s they a re

nearing the ground, andfor the first few m inutes after

they land, they make idea l ta rge ts . I n Crete, for ex

ample, the Germans suffered enormous losses a t th is

stage. Nevertheless, it m ust be rem em bered tha t if

there is an airfield to be gained , the Germans appar

ently will sacrifice their parachuti st s freely in a con

centrated effort top ut the defende rs ' gun crews out of

action. The German command will be chiefly in te r

estedin gaining enough control of an airfield to perm it

the landing of b ig t ranspor t a ircraf t like the Junke rs


23/183


52's,

which carry twelve men (plus the pilot, observer,

and reserve pi lot) or heavy equipment and fewer men.

If the parac hutists cannot overcome the defenders ' gun

crews, the opera tion is likely to be a fai lure from the

G erm an po int of view. To p ut it briefly, the para

chu tis ts (perhaps supported by g lider-borne troops)

are shock tro ops, and it is upon th eir fighting that

future control of the airfield hinges.

Different Germ an tactics may be expected, however,

when a parachute uni t is dropped on an area which in

itself maynot interest the Germans, but which maybe

reasonably near an airfield, a junction, or a communi

cations center. I n this case, w hatever units are

dropped will quickly t ry to assemble as a coordinated

fighting force and then advance to c arry out their

mission.

The German method of re leasing parachuti st s from

t ra n s po r t p lan es over an y given a rea is so carefully

worked out tha t very l it tl e is l eft to luck . The p lanes

a re likely to a r rive in flights of th ree . Arr iv ing over

th e ir objectives, th ey may circle, an d th en fly a t an

a lt itude of 300 to 500 feet across the a rea where the

p arac hu tis ts are to land. J um p i ng is carried out in

form ation . A n officer in the leading plan e shows a

yellow flag

2

two minu tes before jumping as a sign to

get read y. H a lf a m in ute before th e ju mp , he shows

a red and w hite flag. W h e n the planes are over the

area he pulls in th e red and w hite flag. T his is the

2

S ignals a re subject to change.


24/183

1 7ERM ANY—AIR FORCES

signal to jum p. I f he waves both flags, crossing them

back and forth, he is signalling " D o n 't j u m p ! " A t

night, signals are givenby colored flashlights, in which

case red m ay m ean " G et re ad y," green m ay m ean

"Half aminute togo ," and white maymean " J u m p ! "

A leader in each plane gives the s ignal to jump by

soundingan ins trument like an automobile horn. Be

fore jumping, the parachut ists at tach the r ing of their

parachutes to awire running along the inter ior length

of the a irc ra ft on th e rig ht-h an d side. T he ju m p is

made th rough the righ t-hand door, the ring yank ing

the cord of the parachute, which opens automatically

after a 5-second delay (equal to a d rop of about 80

feet).

Equipm ent containers are dropped through

the door on the left-hand side of the plane. Each

container includes the equipm ent of th ree or four

men, and is th rown out when, or jus t a fte r, the men

jump.

The twelve m en and four containers carried

by each p lane a re supposed to be d ropped w ith in 9

to 10 seconds. W h en th ere is a delay, or when all

the parachut is ts cannot jum p while the plane is over

the desired area, th e p lane w ill sw ing a ro un d in a

circle and make a second run across the area.

Jumping at an a lt itude of 300 to 500 feet, the para

chutists will reach the ground within 20to 30seconds.

The Germans have found it useful to a ttach pa ra

chutes of different colors to different kinds of loads .

For example, a soldier's parachute may be a mixture

of green and brown, to make him less conspicuous on

the ground and to serve la ter as camouflage for cap


25/183


tured motor vehicles. On theother hand,white para

chutes may be used for equipment containers

3

and

pink for medical supplies. The Germans are likely

to change the meaning of these colors from time to

time.

Since parachutists can request extra supplies

by laying strips of white cloth on the ground in cer

tain formations, there is always a possibility that the

opposition willfindout the code, and deceive German

aircraft into dropping such supplies as ammunition,

food,andmedicine.

d.

Organization ofDivision

A brief discussion of how the German Flight Di

vision VII— nicknamed the "Parachute Division"—

wasorganized at the time of the capture of Cretewill

show some of the elements that may be expected in

a German parachute attack. I n May 1941, Flight

DivisionV I I wascomposed of the following un its:

DivisionHeadquarters.

Threeparachuteregiments.

Parachute machine-gun battalion (three compa

nies).

Parachute antitank battalion (three companies).

Parachute antiaircraft and machine-gun battalion

(three companies).

Parachute artillery battery (three troops, four

gunseach).

Parachuteengineerbattalion.

3

( 1 ' x 2 ' to 4 ' x 6 ', or even larg er, w ith the bigger ones fitted w ith

whee ls fo r hau ling. )


26/183

GERMANT AIR FORCES 1 9

Para chu te s ignal uni t .

Parachutemedical unit .

Parachute supply unit.

Captured loading lis ts indicated a s tandard organi

zation of 144 parachu tis ts per com pany, carried in

twelve a ircraf t, ar ranged in four flights of three a ir

craft each.

Before an attack, a parachute regim ent m ay be

reorganized tomake i ts f ire power more even. An ex

change of p la toons may be made between rifle com

panies and machine-gun and bomb-thrower companies

so tha t, a fte r the reorganization , each company may

have, for exam ple, two rifle platoons, a heavy m a-

chine-gun platoon, and a platoon of heavy bomb

throwers.

e. The Parachutist's "Ten Comm andments"

Here is a t rans la tion of a document captured from

a German parachute trooper who was taken prisoner

in Greece. I ts title is " T h e P a ra c h u tis t's Ten Com

mandments ."

1. You are the elite of the Germ an Arm y . Fo r you, com bat

shall be fu lfillment. You sha ll seek i t out and t ra in yourself to

standanytest.

2.

Cultivate true comradeship,for together with your comrades

youwilltriumphordie.

3. Beshyofspeechandincorruptible. Menact,women ch atter;

chatterwillbringyoutothegrave.

4.

Calm and cau tio n, vigor and d eterm in atio n, valor and a

fanatical offensive spirit will make you superior in attack.


27/183


5. In

fac ing

thefoe,

ammunition

is the

most precious thing.

He

who

shoots uselessly, merely

to

reassure himself,

isa man

without guts. Heisaweakling and doesnot deserve the titleof

parachutist.

6. Never sur render . Your honor lies

in

Victory

or

Death.

7. Only withgood weaponscanyouhavesuccess. Solook after

themontheprinciple— First myweapons,then

myself.

8.Youmust grasp the full meaning ofanoperation sothat,

shou ld your leader fa ll

bythe

way,

youcan

carry

it out

with

coolness and caution.

9. F igh t chivalrously agains t

an

honest foe; armed irregulars

deservenoquarter.

10. W ith your eyesopen,keyed uptotoppitch,agileasagrey

hound, tough

as

lea ther, hard

as

K rupp steel,

you

will

be the

embodiment

ofa

German warrior.


28/183

SectionIII. BOOBY TRAPS

1. GENERAL

A booby t rap is any form of concealed explosive

which causes destruct ion of men, equipment, or com

munications. I t is so placed tha t it will be acci

dentally set off by the enemy or will function auto

matically by means of a time mechanism. Although

explosivesa re theno rmal method of destruction, booby

t raps may also be designed to utilize flares or incen

diarybombs.

1

The reason for em ploying such tr aps is to create

an a tmosphere of uncertainty and to make the enemy

very cautious and uneasy, thereby lowering his morale

and slowingu p his actions.

Since booby t raps get the ir success from surprise,

both the charge and the operating m echanism are

either concealed or made to resemble some common,

harmless object.

2. OPERATION

In almost every case booby t raps may be opera ted

byone of the following m ethods:

' S e e also T F 25-394 an d FM 2 1-4 5, C hap . 8.

21


29/183

2 2

INTELLIGENCE BULLETIN

a. Di rect p ressure of a foot, wheel, or t rack on the

hidden explosive:

b. Movement of some harmless-look ing object;

c. Movement of some hidden object, such as a th in

t r ip w i re ;

d. Some form of automatic , delayed-action machine

designed to explode w ith ou t any h um a n touch. The

delaymaybea fewhours or manydays.

I n the first th ree cases, the tr ig ge r m ay fire the

charge a t once, or the explosion may not go off: for

several m inutes.

3.

PRINCIPLES

O F USE

The following genera l methods a re o rd inarily used

by the enemy in sett ing boobyt ra p s ; by s tudying how

the t raps a re set, we can more easily find and safely

destroy them.

a. Keeping Normal Appearance

Every a ttempt is made to d is tu rb the surroundings

as little as possible and to remove or h ide carefully

all signs of p reparat ion a fter lay ing the t rap .

b. Small Spaces

The smaller the space in which the t ra p is la id—for

example, passages, stairw ays, dugout inclines, and de

files— themore chance there will beof the tr a p 's being

sprung.


30/183

23

ERMANY—BOOBY TRAPS

Figure 5.—Doors to Booby trap s.


31/183


c. M a n y Traps in O nePlace

M any tr ap s areusua lly la id in oneplace so that

there will

be

less chance

of

finding them

all

without

s prin gin g som e. D um m ies m ay beused freely.

d. Double Bluff

An easily recognized t rap is often used tomask a

well-concealed tra p nearby.

e. Curiosity

The n a tu ra l desire to handle souven irs, p ic tu res,

food andd r ink con ta iners, musical ins truments ,and

other ar ticles a reconsiderations insett ing the t rap.

f. Everyday Operations

Traps

maybe

fired

bythe

opening

or

closing

of

doorsorwindows (see ig 5),theuse oftelephonesor

electric-light switches,etc.

g. Firing

E ac h t r a p m ay besetoffbytwo orm ore methods.

h. V a r ie ty

A s m any different types as possible are usually

used inany one locality.

4. DETECTION

a . G e ne ra l

Since there

maynotbe

enough engineer troops

to

have complete charge of finding trap s,itisnecessary

that other soldiers beonthelook outfor them.


32/183

GERMANY BOOBY TRAPS

25

A detailed reconnaissance should include, sofaras

time permi ts ,

the

m ark in g

of

known

or

suspec ted

booby-trap areas

aswell as d isarmament of detected

traps. Reports

of the

types

of

t raps found

are

also

extremely im po rtant .

To find and safely d estroy booby tra p s, soldiers

must be t rained to recognize telltale m arks andclues

quickly,

and

must knowwhat

the

enemyuses

for

t r aps

andhowthey arefixed.

Valuable information

can

often

be

obtained from

prisoners, part icu larly soldiers

of the

engineer corps,

aboutthesites where tra ps have been laid andthena

ture

of the

t r ap s . L ocal in ha bita nts

may

g ive valu

able in fo rmation abou t

the

activities

of the

enem y

before hiswithdrawal.

b. Places for Traps

Some

ofthe

m ore common places which

are

utilized

for sett ing booby tra psare:

(1) Roads.— Cuts, embankm ents, blind bends,

bridges, culverts , obstacles, wooded stre tches, junc

tions,crossroads,

and

generaldebris.

(2) Open Country.— Woods, trees, posts, gates,

paths,

hedges, obstacles, s tores, dumps, and genera l

debris.

(3) Buildings and Dugouts.—Steps, floors, doors

(fig.

1),

windows, cupboards, passages, furn iture, fire

places, water taps , closets, supplies , telephones, l ight

switches, floor coverings, p ic tures, documents,

and

debris.

47785 1°— 42— vol. 1,No.1 5


33/183


c. SuspiciousSigns

The following signs m ay indicate the existenceofan

enemy'sboobytrap:

(1) D istu rbed g round, especially a fte r the ra in .

(2 ) Explosive wrappings, sawdust, nose caps from

shells,etc.

(3 ) T ra ces of camouflage, w ithered vegetation, etc.,

showingsomeattempt atconcealment.

(4 ) B re ak s or d istu rb an ce s in vegetation, dust,

paintwork, t imbering,etc.

(5) Thepresence of pegs, na ils , e lec tric leads,or

pieces

of

wire

or

cord

for

which there

isno

apparent

use.

(6) M a rk s ontrees, onpaths, ontheground, or on

wallsofbuildingsfornoobviousreason.

(7) Movable objec ts, such

as

equipment, souvenirs,

musical inst ruments, food and

d r ink conta iners ,

and

kitchenutensils.

(8) Minor obstructions of all k in ds on roads,in

trenchsystems,andinbuildings.

(9 ) I r re g u l a r tr ac k s offoot orwheeled traffic where

thereis noapparentreason

for

suchmarks.

(10) Any indication tha t an area has been carefully

avoided.

5. DETAILS OFBOOBY TRAPS

a. General

The following trap s

are

typical

of

those which have

been setby the Axis ,pr incipally the Germans. Var ia


34/183

GERMANY BOOBY TRAPS

27

tions on them are l imited only by the smartness of the

enemy, but they a re usually a pt to be based on the

push- or pull-ignite r (figs. 6 and 7) and can be dis

armed fa irly easily once they a re detected and their

typeisdetermined.

DANGER SAFE

Figure 6.—Push-igniters.

Noil

DANGER

SAFE

Figure 7.—Pull-igniters.

b. Shaving Stick Booby Trap

The so-called "Shaving S t ick" booby t rap consists

of an aluminum cy linder, pain ted yellow, with walls

0.039 inch thick (fig. 8 ) . I t contains % pound of


35/183

28

INT EL LIGE NCE BULL ET IN

2 in, cord

Aluminum

cylinder

painted

yellow

.04 in .

thick

Figure

8.—German

shaving stick booby trap.


36/183

29

ERMANY BOOBY TRAPS

Explosive

Detonotor

Delay system

Friction igniter

Lead ball

Wooden hondle

. 'rcelain

Screw cap

which is pulled

to operote .

Figure 9.—Immediate-action grenade.


37/183


high explosive as a block filling . In thetopof the

filling are three black powder pellets , C,par tly inside

the m ain filling.

The topof the bomb isrivetedtothe body, and car

riestheignition mechanism. A2-inch length ofcord

isattached atoneendtoadiscinthecap, andatthe

other endto a loop in the f ric tion wire , A. Ifthe

cap is pulled m ore th an 2 inches the fr ic tion wire

causesthefriction composition to ignite thepellet,

B,

which fires the compressed pellets,

G.

When the bombs are found com plete, they are

harmless. If the caphas been left unscrewed, the

cord

maybecutandthecap

replaced

to

protect

the

friction wire.

c. Stick Grenades Used

as

Booby Traps

The G erm an stick grenade,

M24,may

sometimes

bemodified to form abooby tr ap by removing thede

laying device (fig.9 ) . W h e n frien dly tro op s attempt

to usethe cap tured grenades, pu lling of the friction

wire causes thegrenades to explode at once, without

the usual 4%-second delay.

To seewhether ornotthedelaying devicehasbeen

removed from thegrenade, it maybe tested as fol

lows:

(1) Unscrew the explosivecylinder from the wooden

handle.

(2 ) Remove thedetonator and thefuze, which pro

ject from thehandle.


38/183

GERMANY BOOBY TRAPS 3 1

(3) U nscrew th e cap a t th e end of th e handle a nd

let the porcelain r ing hang down.

(4) U nscrew th e delayed-action device in th e to p

of the handle to m ake sure th a t the delayed-action

cylinder actually conta ins the column of compressed

gunpowder.

The grenades can then be p ut together again by

carrying out the above operations in the reverse

order.

I f time is important , i t will be a ll r ight to take one

of each batch of suspected grenades, to unscrew the

handles from them and ope ra te the fuzes by pulling

the cords from a distance. I t will then be obvious

whether the explosion takes p lace a t once or after an

interval of 4% seconds.

d.

Miscellaneous Booby Traps

I t is repo rted that the Germans in L ibya have laid

antilifting devices, using a pull -igni ter, under mines.

Tar barrels have been left on roadsides, with three

large shells of about 6-inch caliber in them, the whole

device to be fired electrically.

At points where the road is cut into a hillside,

stick grenades have been hung by w ire down the

steep bank overlooking the road, with a t r ip wire car

ried from them across the road.

Ononeoccasion, a Germ an whistle, of a dark brown

bone type, was found to have a small charge in the

1

body of the w histle, exploded by a s trik er an d capj


39/183


W h e n thewhistle isblown, thev ibra t ing pea h itsthe

str iker , thus causing theexplosion.

A G erm an plane w hich landed recently at Malta

had anewtypeofrad io . W hen the Br i ti sh attempted

to remove the radio, an explosion resul ted in which

five m en w ere killed. B ecause of theextent ofthe

damage, nodetai ls of the booby t r a p are available.

S imi la r r esults have frequen tly been experienced in

connection wi th the removal of radios from other

German p lanes.

6. BOOBYTRAPSINRELATIONTOMINEFIELDSAND

DEMOLITIONS

Captured German documents from theM iddle East

make itc lear tha t theGerm an comm and considersthe

placing

of

booby t r aps

a

ro utin e p a r t

of the

mining

operations

to be

u nd ertak en before abandoning

a

position. E lab ora te instructions have been issued

for the laying of land m ines and for improvised

mines, w hich co ntain p ra ctic al suggestions forthe

arrangement of booby t ra p s . Howessential a part

of

the

whole m ining defenses

the

booby trap may be

comecanbeshownbytheB ri t ish experience atAge

dabia :

the

ground

was

m ined w ith lan d m ines

ina

circle 3to5m iles from thecenter of thevillage,all

the roads were mined, inmany casestheshouldersas

well as the centers , and the detours m ade bythe

Germans for t he ir ownusewere heavily mined with

both ant i tank and armor-pierc ing mines .

In

fact,

the

w hole B r iti sh account emphasizes the ex treme re


40/183

GERMANY BOOBY TRAPS 33

sourcefulness of theGermans invarying the s tandard

pat terns laid down in thei r t rain ing manuals. In the

midst of these m anifold contrivances were m any

booby tr ap s. W e lls

and

c is terns,

for

example, were

left deliberately undestroyed, but the p r inc ipa l ones

were ar tfu lly prepared wi th charges ;themain c is tern

contained a 40-pound charge and a land m ine, con

nected with a pull -igniter and cord to the manhole

cover.

Many

of the

houses w ere equipped w ith sim ilar

traps, consisting generally of a land mine , connected

with apul l igniter e ither d irec tly onthedoor or toa

t r ip wire across thedoor . In some cases, handgre

nades were fixed inside the door, in such a fashion

as to indicate tha t themanwhohad set the t r a phad

then left

by the

w indow.

In

general,

the

G erm ans

seem tobeusingpull-igniters tokill ordisable soldiers

more frequently than prepa red demolition charges.

477851°—42—vol. 1,No.1


41/183

Section IV . LAND MINES

1. IN LIBYA

In Libya the Germans have been laying rows of

anti-personnel mines in front of their plate-shaped

antitank mines inan effort tomake the cleaningupof

minefieldsmoredangerous.

The anti-personnel mines have push-igniters, and

are usually laid with only an inch of the antennae

visible. Although the disturbed earth is carefully

smoothed back into place, the appearance of the

danger spot is likely to be different from that of the

surrounding ground. A sharp eye can detect the

difference, especially sincethe Germans,after smooth

ing back the earth, don't seem to worry much about

disguising their minefields elaborately.

German antitank mines in Libya are usually laid

sothatthetopsofthepush-ignitersareflushwiththe

ground. As in the case of the anti-personnel mines,

not much concealment is attempted and the disturbed

earth usually gives away the location.

For safety's sake,be on the lookout for trip wires.

No mines with pull-igniters have been captured, but

it is known that the Germans are using them.

34


42/183

GERMANY LAND MINES 35

2. IN

RUSSIA

In Russia , when

the

Germans

are

r e treat ing , they

try

to

ha l t

or

delay

the

Russ ian advance

by

min ing

roads

and

b ridges.

The

Germ ans bury

the

m ines

(small, round m etal cans) under earth

or

snow.

Sometimes,

in the ir haste , they leave a sm all m ound

visible, but not often. A lthough the G erm an m ines

are occasionally laid in rows or in a checkerboard

pattern, asa ru le they arenotplaced in exact order.

Sometimes they are w ired in se ries, so th at if the

Russians donot investigate carefully while disarming

the first mine, they

maybe

killed

or

in jured

byone

oftheothers.

Another Germ an m ethod is to p la nt h un dred s of

empty t incans in the hope tha t theR ussians willbe

comecareless

and

overlook live m ines.

The

Germans

also hang mines from trees , par t icular ly atnight ,let

ting them dangle lowenough so t ha t menand t anks

willrunariskofcollidingwiththem.

I t

is

in te resting

to

note th at

the

Germans' chief

reason

for

u sing land mines

isnotto

cause great

de

struction

but to

spread "m ine fever"

or, in

p lain

words, fear.

The

Germans consider that

if

the ir

op

ponentsstaycoolandlevelheaded, themine-layinghas

been l it tle more than awaste of t imeandmateriel .


43/183

SectionV . TRAINING METHODS

1. GENERAL

Present German military thought centers around

the task force idea. The task force usually consists

of all arms and services working under one com

mander to perform a single specific mission. The

Germans spend a great deal of time developing their

task forces,which may vary in size from a squad toa

group of armies. The elements of the task force are

sodrilled that theywill lose their identity as separate

unitsandmergeintoasmooth-workingtask-forcecom

bat team. As a result of this joining together of

units,

the Germans stress cooperation, with everyman

andunitdoingadefinitejob.

According to the best German military thought,

there has been a change in the nature offighting and

also in the basic objective of battlefield combat

itself.

Formerly, the supporting arms made it easier for the

infantry to surround and destroy the opposition.

Now, even the destruction is done by the supporting

arms—mainly artillery and combat aviation—with the

in fan try operating only in a supporting role. The

mission of the supporting arms, according to the

36


44/183

37ERMANY TRAINING METHODS

German idea,istokeep the infant ry advancing wi th

outengaging incom bat. T histheGermanshavedone,

asarule,inthep resent war. Followingthearmored,

motorized,andair team with forced marches,thefoot

un its have done m op-up work and have seized and

organized strategic areas.

2. NOTES O N TRAINING

When amission isassigned toa commander, heis

given

the

troops

and

equipment with which

to

accom

plish it. Thesearem ade available tohimso thathe

canmoldacombatteam fortheaccomplishment ofhis

assignedmission. Notonlymustthemendothe ir own

jobs,butallmustworktogetherintheaccomplishment

ofthecommontask.

When

the

t roops

are

first made available, they

are

like a football squad report ing toacoach onthefirst

of Septem ber. T heyareasquad,butnotyeta team.

After acourse of combined t raining, andpar t icular ly

after some experience in combat, they maybeconsid

ereda taskforce inthecorrect senseoftheword.

Of course,

allmeninthe

GermanArmy

are

given

a

basic course of ins truc tion . At p rese nt, u nd er war

conditions,thebasic instruction lasts aboutsixweeks.

This isfollowed byat least four weeks of t ra iningin

large units .

If

possible , this inst ruction

is

extended

anadditionalfourweeks.

Theideahereistomoldthe individualunitsintothe

structure of the combat team as a whole, under the


45/183


leadership

of its

commander.

In

this change-over

everyeffort

is

made

to

discourage rivalry betweenthe

components

ofthe

team.

For

example, there

are no

songsabout the infantry beingbetter than the cavalry

and

the

engineers being best

of all.

There

are no

inter-company

or

inter-battery athletics. Onthecon

trary, every opportunity

is

taken

to

develop team

work among

the

par t s

of the

force. Cooperation

between

the

units

is

encouraged. This

is

impressed

upon

all

subordinate commanders—so much

so

that

theygooutoftheirwaytoassisteachother.

One important phase

of the

training

of

combined

arms

is

theuse

of

practice ammunition. This

is

reg

ular ammunition with reduced bursting charges.

The

men tak ing part must

be

careful

in

handling these

munitions, soastoescapeinjury. Use

of

realammu

nition

in

training exercises

is

very valuable. Many

men

are

accidentally killed

in

combat

by

fire

of

friendly troops lacking th is valuable experience.

Umpiresareused

in

alltheseexercises.

During

the

training phase,

the

importance

of sur

prise

in

combat

is

continually emphasized. Accord

ing

to

German teachers, surprise

is

accomplished

by

three general methods: first,

by

secrecy; second,

by

deception;third,byspeed

of

execution.

Surprise

by

secrecy and speed

of

execution

isself-

explanatory. Duringthetrainingperiod,

a

greatdeal

of time

is

spent

inthe

construction

of

dummy posi

tions,

andin the

execution

of

false movements

to

deceivetheopposition.


46/183

39ERMANY TRAINIXG METHODS

With regard to infantry tra in ing, there is much

more emphasis on

volume

of

fire than

on

accuracy.

Riflemarksmanship isnotstressed,andthere isgood

reason

to

believe that German standards

donot com

pare with

our

own.

The

basic fire power

of thein

fantry squadisprovidedbyalightmachinegun,sup

portedbytenrifles. Incombatthemaineffort ofthe

squadmembers

isto

advance their machine gun.

Al

though their marksmanship standards arenothigh,

German infantry soldiers

are

likely

to

center

a

heavy

volumeoffireonvitalpoints.

Since there is very little stress ontheuseofthe

bayonet

in

combat, there

is

little emphasis

onits use

intraining.


47/183

SectionV I . NIGHT DRIVING EQUIPMENT

1. GENERAL

German veh icles have special n igh t-dr iv ing equip

ment which compares favorably wi th tha t used by the

U nited N ations. The equipm ent includes the fol

lowing:

a. Blackout Headlights

The headlight is mounted on the le ft-hand side of

th e vehicle, about 3 to 4 feet from the gro un d. The

headligh t-opening for passage of light is flat-shaped.

A 35-w att bulb gives off lig ht to the r ea r, ag ain st a

m i rro r which is half oval in shape. The m irro r, in

tu rn , reflects the light forward through a glass panel

under the overhanging hood.\ The g lass panel spreads

the light, which extends to the f ront a d is tance of 100

to 130feet. The longest width of the l ight is about80

feet. T he lig ht ra ys a re scattered m ore on th e sides

than in themiddle.

Theheadlight willb urn at three stagesof brightness.

A three-s tage switchwi ll tu rn i t on " d im ," "m edium ,"

or " fu l l . " The Germans claim that a t heights of over

2,000feet the light cannot beseenw hile itison " d im ."

40


48/183

GERMANY N IG H T DRIVING EQUIPM ENT 4 1

I t is fu rther claim ed t hat it cannot be seen on "me

dium" at heights of 3,400 feet or more, and while on

" fu ll " it isno tvisible above6,400 feet.

W hile in m ovem ent, th e h ead lig ht of the leading

vehicle is tu rned on a t the lowest possible stage to

permit t ravel . Asa rule, thed arker thenight , the less

light needed. The danger of observation also is taken

intoaccountindecidingtheamountofl ighttoturnon.

b. Interval-Judging Rear Light and Stop Lights

The panel containing the lights is d ivided into two

parts, the upper half and the lower half. The upper

half includes the interval- judging device itself, while

the lower half conta ins the usua l r ed ta il-ligh t and a

yellow " s t o p " light, which goes on when the b rakes

are put on. The interval-judging device has four

small windows, r ec tangular in shape and grouped in

pairs.

W hen the device is working, a yellowish green

lightshinesthroughthewindows.

The use of the in te rva l- judging device is based on

the way the hum an eye sees lights a t different dis

tances. W hen viewed from a certa in d istance, lights

close to each o ther appea r to be ju st one light. Fo r

instance, a t 325 yards the ligh ts sh in ing through the

four rectangular openings in the in terval- judging de

vicewill seem tobe only onel ight. A t 35to 40yards,

the four lights look like two, and a t about 25 to 30

yards all four m ay be seen. I n a convoy all d rivers

except the first one keep an in te rval so tha t two of


49/183


the lights are alwa}^s visible. In other words, they

mainta ina

distance

of

35

to

40yards.

On the u n d er side of thehousing which contains

the in terval-judging device isa shut ter , which , when

open,allowsadimlight toshine down onthe vehicle's

number p late.

c. Additional Rear Lights

One isontheleft sideofthevehicle andtheother

is

onthe

r ig ht. G erm an reg ulatio ns re qu ire th is

ar

rangement of r ear lights to indicate thewidth of the

vehicle's rea r aswellasitsfront. Each ofthese side

r ea r lights has twowindows, oneabove the other.

T he u p pe r oneshows a dimlight andthelowerone

a norm al light.

A

s hu tte r

is

p rovided

to

shut

out

either

of the

l ights

so

th at only

onecan

show

ata

time.

2. USEDURING CON VOYS

Only theleading vehicle will norm ally useitsblack

out headlight w hen convoys are close to opposing

forces.

Allthe

o ther vehicles will have only

the in

terval -judging rear light on. I tcannot beseen from

theair,andcannot beseen on theground atdistances

of moreth an 325yard s.


50/183

Section V I I . INSTRUCTIONS IN CASE

OF CAPTURE

1. INTRODUCTION

At least some of you will have occasion, before the

war is over, to cap ture a G erm an prisoner. T here

fore, the instructions the G erm an H ig h Command

gives to all soldiers to follow in case th ey a re cap

tured should be of definite interest.

Br it ish forces in L ibya cap tured a German manua l

which gives these in structions. The in structions a re

very thorough and show the g reat care the Germans

take to w a rn th eir soldiers against giving m ilitary

information to the opposing forces. T he B r itis h I n

telligence Service has italicized certain p ar ts of the

text with a warn ing tha t these passages may indicate

Germany's ownmethods of t reat ing prisoners. Un ited

N ations tro op s should rea d th e ma nu al w ith th is in

mind.

2. THE CAPTURED GERMAN M A N U A L

SECRET.

Subject: Behavior of German Soldiers Who May Be Captured by

the British.

Recent reports from rel iable sources indicate how the Brit ish

t reat and question German soldiers who are taken prisoner on

the battlefield.

43


51/183


These reports giveallranks of the army achance tostudythe

correct attitud e to adopt in theevent ofcapture.

Every soldier who isunfortunate enough tobe taken prisoner,

must consciously,

and

from

the

first moment

ofhis

capture,be

have in such away that no mil i tary information isgiven.

German prisoners whoshow a mi li ta ry bea ring areusually

very well t rea ted by theBri t ish. The prisoner is first of all

hurriedly searched at the place of capture, and all papers, money,

rings, his watch

—

in fact, everything he has on him

—

is taken

away. On reaching England, he is taken to the first police sta

tion

and put in a

cell

by

himself.

A few

hours later

an

offi er

of the Intelligence Service who speaks fluent Germ an appears

for the first questioning. Under the pretext of wishing to in-

form his relatives as soon as possible, the prisoner is required

to fill in an extensive questionnaire. This contains mostly mili

tary questions— especially the field post number, v)hieh is of

great interest to the British.

The inqu iring B ritish officers have agreat deal ofmaterialfor

thequestioning

of

prisoners

of

war.

This includes, among other

things, the putting together of other

prisoners'

1

statements. The

information they have deals wi th field pos t numbers , organiza

t ion , orders of bat tle , also peacetime establishments .

F rom c ap tu re d Br iti sh m a te ria l it hasbeen established that

German so ld iers whowere ta ke n p risoners in N orth Africa

talkedfreely ofmilitarymatters,therebygivingtheBritishmuch

information

forthe

questioning

of

other pr isoners .

At questioning, such material is used to convince the prisoner

that any refusal to give information is useless, as the enemy

already has exact knowledge of Germ an military matters. If

the prisoner refuses, his attitude is respected— even if a few

threats are made in the first place.

A

few days later the prisoners are moved from the first place

to

a

transit camp, where

a

political questioning takes p lace.

The

questions here deal with the relations between the Army and


52/183

GERMANY INSTRUCTIONS IN CASE OF CAPTURE 4 5

the Parti/, with the prisoner's own feeling towards National

Socialism, and with the military and economic situation. As

the Englishman in this case wants to get an idea of the political

attitude of the armed forces, purely military secrets are not

mentioned. This questioning is carried out by an officer in

civilian dress, who frequently speaks German less well than

the offi er who ashed the first questions.

Some hours later the prisoners are taken in special transport

to the real "questioning camp." There a medical inspection

takes place to establish the general state of the prisoners^ health

as regards feeding, etc., then two to three weeks confinement,

either alone or with one other prisoner.

During this time the prisoner is questioned several times a

day by Intelligence Corps officers on purely military matters; the

statements of the various prisoners are played off against each

other. Questions are asked about peacetime garrisons, military

developments, the use of units in previous campaigns, and so

on. Listening apparatus is installed in rooms in which two

prisoners are put together. Germ ans in uniform, who have mi

grated to England, are also used as spies.

On one occasion a former Austrian in the uniform of an Air-

Force

offi er

introduced himself to a newly-arrived prisoner. He

spoke German with a Viennese accent and claimed to be a

reserve offi er in a certain unit. He lived in a two-man cell w ith

the prisoner and in the course of conversations tried to gain

information on military and technical points of the prisoner's

arm of the service.

The strict isolation in the "questioning" is supposed to induce

a feeling of loneliness and helplessness in the prisoner, in order

to break down his resistance. When the Intelligence Corps

officer considers any further questioning useless, the prisoners

are sent to officers' or other ranks'

1

prison camps, as the case

may be.

Recent reports show tha t similar procedures are carried out in

othertheaters of war besidesG reat B ritain .


53/183


Onthebasisofthis,theGermansissuedthefollowing

ins t ruct ions :

A.

Behavior

at the

Questioning.

1.

Be

strictly military,

at the

same time polite. Threatsof

punishment

or ill

tre atm e nt m ust

not

influence

the

prisoner's

duty to keep hismouth shut, anymore than genial treatment,

drinks,etc.

2. Never speak

in the

enemy\s language; through interpreters

at

a

questioning, gain time

to

think over

the

answer.

3.

D o n't

let

yourself

beledto

give

any

statements

orto

adopt

any par ticula r a t ti tude through

the

chance rem ark

ofa

comrade.

Also,

seemingly unimpo rtant s ta tements of single prisoners often

give useful poin ts to the enemy's Intell igence Service , when

pieced together. Therefore,

atthe

questioning, only name, rank,

bir thday, and home address aretobegiven, and these points

aretobedealtwithonlyinquestionnaires.

Any other information—for example ,

to

w hat un it prisonerbe

longs,

depot, ro le of unit , s trength , andsoon—istobe refused

on thegrounds tha t theanswering of these questions isagainst

the international

law

dealing with

the

treatment

of

prisonersof

war.

4.

Noreaction to technical questions istobeshown, not even

when

the

questioner tries

to

provoke

an

argument

by

belittling

German weapons.

5.

Don't

try

to deceive by false answers.

6. The prisoner must not let himself be fooled by an assumed

knowledge,

on the

questioner's part,

of the

subject under

dis-

cussion. This

is

only meant

to

convince

the

prisoner that

he is

giving away no secrets.

B. In

the Prisoner

of

War Gamp.

1.

The questioning

is

not ended with yourindividual interview.

Therefore becareful when talk in g:


54/183

GERMANY INSTRUCTIONS IN CASE OF CAPTURE 4 7

(a ) To o ther comrades in the camp, barracks, etc., because

listening apparatus is installed.

(b)

To strangers, toho, sometimes in German uniforms, try to

win the prisoner's confidence. Spies.

2. Don't speak over the radio or on a phonograph record.

3. No writing of war experiences, either before or during the

period of captivity.

4.

E very prisoner must exert him self to get back hom e as

soon aspossible.

E very p risoner remains a G erman soldier. H e must realize

th at after h is re tu rn he w ill, if necessary, be called upon to

answerforhisbehaviorduringhistimeofcaptivity.


55/183

Section

VI I I .

SECRET

1

W E A PO N AGAIN?

R ememb er how G e rma ny , j us t before she opened

her campaign agains t F rance , Holland, and Belgium,

spread rep orts th rough n eu tra l countries tha t the

Germ ans soon were going to pu t into use a new secret

w e ap on ? T hese r ep o rts specu lated on th e n a tu re of

the weapon. They described i t as a gaswhich affected

arm am ent but not m en, as a gas w hich would put

t roops to sleep long enough for them to be disarmed,

and as super-duper tanks that could easily b at ter their

way throug h fortified l ines.

Well,all thesereportsprovedtobefalse—theywere

p ro du cts of th e huge G erm an p ro p ag an d a program ,

whichseekstostrike fear and confusion intothe ranks

of U nited Nations forces.

Now, more than two years la ter , the Germ an propa

g an da org anizatio n is s pre ad in g re po rts of another

secret developm ent. This tim e the G erm an claim

dea ls wi th a new tac tica l formation , which allegedly

is being used in th e 1942 camp aig n a ga in st Russia.

The form ation has been designated by various names,

one of w hich is " M o tp u lk ." T his is p ro bab ly an ab

breviatio n of a G erm an expression w hich m eans a

forcemadeupofmotorized,armored,andaircolumns.

48


56/183

49ERMANY 'SECRET* WEAPON AGAIN?

According to r eports from neu tr al European coun

tries— reports which most probably were put outby

Germanpropagandists—thenewformation isahollow

squareof t anksandother armored units , inside which

are in fan try , a rtille ry , a ntita nk , a ntia irc ra ft, and

"flying" w orkshops. P ow erful

air

elem ents

sup

posedlyflyoverhead dur ing operations of the fo rma

tion and cooperate in the fighting. The combined

forces, or " M o tp ulk s," carry enough supplies for

limited periods. W hen these supp lies

run low,

they

arerestockedwith newsupplies dropped from planes.

The distance around some of the " M o t p u l k s " is said

to be n ea rly 300 miles. The fo rmation is shaped

somewhat liketheoldGreekPhalanx, whichwaspop

ularbackinthedaysofshieldsandspears.

Such

a

massing

of

a rmored

and

me.chanized forces

calls for large num bers of tan ks and motorized ve

hicles, B erlin adm its. But the G erm ans insist th at

their indust ries produced sufficient quanti ties dur ing

the winter months to care for all their needs.

The "M ot pu l ks " aresubstitutes for spearhead for

mations used

bythe

Germans,

sothe

story goes.

The

new formation allegedly ismuch better thanthespear

head formations—because thedirection of a ttack can

bechanged quickly tow ard anyofthefour sidesofthe

square. Also, the new fo rmation permi ts the quick

forming of a wedge. "M o tp ulk s" are throw n into

the attack

to

disorganize

and

confuse re treating

op

position troops after the la t ter have been forced back

by the G erm an in fa ntry , according to the reports .


57/183


Other"Motpulks,"ordetachmentsfromtheadvancing

"M ot pu lk ," are left behind to mopu p or surroundany

remaining centers of opposition res is tance . The Ger

m ans claim the "M o tp u lk s" have proved exceptionally

s trong in resis t ing Russian counterat tacks in theDon

r iv e r a re a. T he fo rma tio n is said to h av e been able

to res is t every th rea t to the German flanks by coun

terat tack ing forces.

The reports of the new form ation are believed to be

p ro p ag an d a. P r o p ag a n d a is an effective instrument

of war, and the Germans use it to theutmost . Aswith

other kind s of weapons, a defense m ust be devisedand

used.

F ea r of the unknown is one of the greatest dangers

on the battlefield . The Germans spread false reports

to cause the ir opponen ts to f ea r so-called "n ew " or

" sup er " weapons or tactics which they do not have.

This i s done to crea te an uneasy s ta te of mind which

readily leads to confusion when the action really does

s ta r t . W h ile carry ing out an attack, the Germans

con tinue to spread as much confusion as possible in

the i r opponent 's command. They do th is by dropping

bombs tha t make f righ ten ing no ises, by using sirens

on d ive bombers, by ter ro r iz ing c iv ilian refugees so

they w ill ru sh away from the ir homes and block the

roads, by d ro pp in g disguised p ara ch utis ts , and by

t ap p in g telephone lin es to s pre ad false re po rts and

even to give commands in the opposit ion 's language.

I n many instances , the Germans also have used Fifth


58/183

GERMANY "SECRET' WEAPON AGAIN? 5 1

Columnists to do some of these th ings, as well as to

perform sabotage missions.

As an in te re sting sidelight, an American observer

asked aG erman general staff officer imm ediately after

thecampaigninFranceaboutthenatureofthe"secret"

weapon announced by th e G erma ns before th e cam

paign. H elaugheda ndrepliedth at i twasthem embers

and u nits of all th e a rms a nd services o pe ra tin g to

gether in a task force combat team . The " se c re t"

weapon was cooperation. The German officer added

that th is coopera tion was possible only when a ll ele

ments of the task force were under one comm ander.

I n the fu tu re th ere w ill be other G erm an re po rts

of newweapons o r tactic s. I t may be gas, or a t ank ,

or an a irplane, o r someth ing en ti re ly new. These re

ports will be s tudied care fu lly because they may in

dicate new weapons or combat methods, o r they may

be propaganda— which can be as effective as bulle ts .

Of course, the re w ill be some improvemen ts in Ger

man a rms and tactic s as a re su lt of experience, bu t,

in the m ain, th eir present com bat m ethods are th e

ones they employed in P o la nd , F r a n ce , a nd R u ssia .

Theseare allwell-known to our officers.


59/183

P A R T T W O : J A P A N

Section I. GRO UND FORCES

1.

INTRODUCTION

The Japa nes e m ust be recognized as vicious enemies

who are h ighly t ra ined and exceptionally well organ

ized. They have p roved themselves formidab le foes

in bat tle . Their calculated advances, successfully car

r ied out, have shown them to be mas te rs of detailed

pla nn ing and execution of policies.

Nevertheless, the early successes of the Japanese

were not the resul t of brand-new tactics or new super

w eapons. Basically, their tactics are no different

from those em ployed by other m odern arm ies and

thei r equipment i s, as a whole, infer ior to tha t of the

U n ite d N a tio ns . T hey h ad la rg e n umb ers of experi

enced troops and la rge amounts of equ ipmen t' ready

when they s truck the ir first blows. They were much

closer to the areas of battle than the bulk of our

fo rces, and they had the added advantage of strik ing

w ith surprise and getting the " j u m p " on all the

f ron ts . I n addition to these advantages, the Japanese

modified th e ir basic tactics to a da pt th em to jungle

conditions. T he ir o peration s w ere ca rried out with

52


60/183

53APAN—GROUND FORCES

great speed and deception. Thorough reconnaissance

usually wasmade ahead of each operation, and com

munications were well coordinated down

tothe

lowest

units. Camouflage, F i ft h Columnists,

and

deceptions

were widely used. The J apanese found in m a n yin

stances that bluff wascheaper than force.

2.

TACTICS

a. Movements

The fast movement of the Ja pan ese d urin g th eir

early successes inthe t rop ica l ba ttle a reas wasmade

possibleby theirphysicalstamina,l ightequipmentand

armament, aswellastheuseofall means of t ranspor

tation and the aid given them by F if th C olum nist

guides. They rode trucks and t ra ins when possible,

theyobtainedbicycles

and

smallboatsfrom thena tives,

andtheyswamstreamswhen noothermeansofgetting

across were availab le . They made thefullest useof

captured t rucks , tanks , guns, and ammunition which

were taken in tact, or only p ar t ly destroyed. They

quickly repa ired the la t ter and used them. In addi

tion

tothe

boats obtained from

the

natives,

the

J a p a

nesebrought w ith them specially-designed small r iver

boats to assist their movements. These they used

often inMalayaandBurma to infil trate pa trolstothe

flanksandrear

of

defending forces.

The

patrols

gen

erallymovedsilentlyandatnight.

TheJapanesehaveused

air

transportplanesboth

for

personnelandsupplies,butnotona large scale. I tis

known tha t they have t ra ined a ir-borne troops.


61/183


b. Infiltration

(1)

General.

— The Jap ane se used infiltration tactics

to g rea t adv an tage in conquering the jungle areas

now in thei r possession. Th is k ind of a ttack iswell

suited for jungle w arfare, especially when the attack

ing forces havemore troops than the opposi tion. And

in n ea rly every place w h ere th ey fought d urin g the

first few mon ths of the war, they were ab le to mass

a much larger fo rce than the Uni ted Nations.

Therewasnothingpart icular ly newabout theJapa

nese infi lt ra tion tac tics . The pr incip les they used are

practically the sam e as those set out in our Basic

F ield M anual on " J u ng le W a r f a r e " (F M 31-20).

Our methods of defense agains t infil trat ion , as given

in FM 31-20, when properly ca rr ied out, a re consid

ered the bestbasis for combatting the Japa nese .

(2) Methods Used.—Usually the Japanese avoided

a ttacks to the f ron t of Uni ted Nations fo rces, except

in cases where the enemy sought to deceive our troops.

The f ron ta l a ttacks genera lly were made wi th a com

p ara tiv ely small n umb e r of men. T hese w ere armed

wi th ligh t machine guns, which were fired a t a rapid

ra te in order to m ake our troops believe a much

larger force was a ttack ing . Also, on numerous occa

sions, the Japa nese set off firecrackers to add to their

efforts to confuse.

R eg ard less of w h eth er these fro nta l a tta ck s were

m ade, the Japan ese nearly always moved patrols


62/183

5 5

APAN—GROUND FORCES

around the flanks of our forces, and, in m any in

stances, patro ls crept through gaps in our lines to

ireach the rea r. The pa tro ls usually were small, num

ibering from two to a few dozen men. They were

ilightly dressed, and genera lly were armed with light

1machine guns an d grenades. E ach of th e m en car

iried enough com pact food to last for several days.

By collecting food from the countryside, they often

had enough to las t much longer. These men had been

itra ined and hardened to wi thstand many discomforts.

All, or nearly all, were expert swimm ers and handlers

of small boats. They had been instructed to look

upon woods and wa te r as th ings to assist them—not

as obstacles.

The in filtra ting Japanese pa tro ls had various mis

sions. In all cases camouflage was widely used , and

all movements w ere m ade as silently as possible.

Some of th e J ap a ne se w ho acted as sn ip ers p ain te d

their faces and hands g reen to conform to the leaves

of the trees and covered th eir clothes w ith leafy

branches. O th ers dressed as n atives or in u niform s

of opposing fo rces. Many of them climbed trees and

tied themselves wi th ropes so they would not fa ll out

if they w ent to sleep or w ere w ounded. I n ma ny in

stances they w ere accom panied by F if th Column

guides. The sn ip er 's equipm ent included the fol

lowing :

Gas mask, green combination mosquito net, camou

flagehood covering h is helmet, head, and shoulders ;


63/183

56 INTELLIGENCE BULLETIN

green corded nettocamouflage the rest ofhisbody-

black wire eye-screen for p ro tection from sunglare;

coil or rope touseinclimbing and tying himselfto

t rees ; a sm all sack of r ic e; sm all bagof hardtack;

one-half poundofhardcandy;package ofconcentrated

food; canof fie ld rat ions, canof tea;canofvitamin

pi l ls ;

can of chlorine to purify w ate r; mess kit;

canteen; a trea tm ent for m ustard gas; quinine;

stomach p i l ls ; gauze pads , ro ll and tr ia ng ula r band

ages; spare socks; gloves; toothbrush; flashlight with

ro ta t ing lenses of d ifferen t colors (onecolor appar

entlytobeusedasarecognition sig na l), and six spare

lensesforeyeholesofgasm ask (someusableinsubzero

weather) .

Besides sniping, other missions perform ed by thein

filtration g ro up s w e r e:

to

c arry

out

reconnaissance,

d is rup t opposition telephone lines and block roads,

destroy command pos ts , and create confusion in the

rea r ofopposing forces . This las t was oneofthemost

impor tan t missions. The J apanese would withhold

th eir fire u n til they gotbehind, andto thesidesof,

Un ited Nations forces. Thenthey would openupwith

the rap id firing of l ight machine guns, and, frequently,

with theexplosion of firecrackers. Sometimes great

batchesof firecrackers were drop ped from planes,with

alightedfuse toexplodethemafter theyfell. Bygiving

the impression that large num bers ofthe ir troopswere

attacking, the Ja pan ese tr ied to force quick with


64/183

5 7

APAN—GROUND FORGES

draw als in th e hope of c ap tu rin g larg e am ounts of

weapons, t rucks and other vehicles, supplies, and men.

Often the Ja pa ne se opened fire for the purpose of

drawingfirefromtheopposingforcessothattheirposi

tionscouldbelocated. TheJapan es ethenwould attack

the positions wi th m or tar s, or infiltra te between our

positions.

In their infi lt ration tactics, the Jap an ese moved fast

at certain t imes and veryslowlyat others. They stood

in rice-field d itches for hou rs, up to their necks in

water,w aiting for targets to appear . They lay hidden

in underbrush for long periods wai ting for chances to

advancew ithout being seen.

Often when the opposition counterattacked, the J a p

anese hid unt i l opposing troops had passed, and then

firedonthe irflanks and rear .

On some battle fronts the J apanese fortified their

positions after infiltrating th ro ug h and a ro un d the

opposition flanks. These positions were prepared for

all-around defense, and they included an unusually

large number of foxholes with connecting trenches.

Thepositions for the foxholes and trenche

(1942) Intelligence Bulletin, Vol. I, No. 1

Documents

Transcript of (1942) Intelligence Bulletin, Vol. I, No. 1