1921 Revolution

8/12/2019 1921 Revolution

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The Mongolian Revolution of 1921Author(s): Fujiko IsonoReviewed work(s):Source: Modern Asian Studies, Vol. 10, No. 3 (1976), pp. 375-394Published by: Cambridge University PressStable URL: http://www.jstor.org/stable/311912.

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ModernAsianStudies,10, 3 (1976), pp. 375-394. Printed in Great Britain.

TheMongolian evolutionf 1921FUJIKO ISONO

MOST historians agree that the Mongolian revolution of 192I wasinitiated by Soviet Russia and was imposed on the Mongols, who werenothing more than their passive tools. This must be at least partly dueto the fact that so far, works on this subject have almost exclusively beenbased on materials of Russian and Chinese origin. Materials publishedin the Mongolian People s Republic, however, provide ample evidencethat the Mongolian revolution originated in a purely Mongolian situa-tion, though the Mongols could never have succeeded in their revolu-tion without Soviet support.The aim of this article is to show the Mongol initiative in the revolu-tion and the nature of this movement, using mainly Mongol sources,particularly the reminiscences of those who were directly involved.These records have the genuinely personal and realistic touches whichno later compositions can recapture. As the revolution of 1921 wasa logical outcome of the Declaration of Mongolian Independence in1911, both in its nationalistic phase and in the revolutionary phase,the discussion has to begin with this event.

Declaration of Mongolian independenceIn December 1911 the Khalkhas of Outer Mongolia declared in-dependence with the Bogd (the Living Buddha of Urga) as their

1The most important of them include A ShortHistoryof How theMongolianNationalRevolutionWas Startedand Achieved Ulan Bator, I934), by Choibalsan, Losol andDemid, the first two of whom were members of the secret mission to Soviet Russia(hereafter Three-ManHistory).The Narratives f theMongolPartisans,published in twovolumes (Ulan Bator, 1961 and 1969), containing the narratives of over 470 partisans,in their own words, is another unique document of the period. In addition toReminiscencesoncerning . SiikhbaatarUlan Bator, I969), and SourceMaterials Con-cerningD. Siikhbaatar sWorkandLife (Ulan Bator, I964), with Io9 documents, includ-ing his correspondence, Tales qf an Old Scribe(Ulan Bator, 1956), by G. Nabaan-namjil, an autobiographical account of the period, should not be omitted from thelist.All books published in Ulan Bator (Ulaanbaatar in the Mongol form) cited in thesenotes are in Mongol.375


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sovereign.2 This is often called the First Mongolian Revolution , butI prefer to avoid this terminology because no fundamental change insocial structure was brought about by this event. It was a purelynationalistic movement for liberation from the Manchu rule which hadlasted for 200 years.

Though the declaration of independence was made soon after theoutbreak of the Hsin Hai Revolution in China (October I9II), theMongols had already been preparing their own move since the summerof that year. The Ch ing (Manchu) Government had just put intoeffect their New Mongolian Policy, which reversed their traditionalpolicy of protecting Mongolian land from Chinese colonization, andhad placed Outer Mongolia as well as Inner Mongolia directly underPeking administration.3The religious and secular ruling classes of Outer Mongolia turnedagainst this New Policy, which would deprive them of autonomy in theirown respective territories (Banners); and the common herdsmen felta great danger of losing the best pasture land to Chinese colonists.When all the appeals to abolish the New Policy proved to be ineffec-tive, the Mongol princes and high lamas held a secret consultation inJuly and sent a delegation to St Petersburg hoping to get assistance fortheir separation from the Ch ing Government. The delegation washeaded by Khanddorj, one of the most influential princes, with a lamaholding high office and an intellectual from Inner Mongolia accom-panying him.4As the New Mongolian Policy was primarily aimed at building aChinese defence line along the northern frontier against Russian ex-pansion toward the east, the Mongol movements against the NewPolicy were not unwelcome to the Russian Government. Nevertheless,the Tsarist Government did not give the Mongols support for fullindependence from China, fearing objections from the other Powers.Some of its ministers were, moreover, unwilling to take over the

2 The Eighth Reincarnation of Zebtsundamba Khutukhtu. For the origin of theLiving Buddhas of Urga see A. M. Pozdneyev, Mongoliaandthe Mongols(Originalin Russian published in St Petersburg I896; English translation, Indiana, I97I),Ch. 8.It is interesting that this Living Buddha, who was of Tibetan origin, became thesymbol of Mongolian nationalism, because of his transcending religious prestige andhis non-involvement in the rivalry among the descendants of Chinges Khaan.3 Though defacto colonization had been going on for a long time, especially inInner Mongolia, the official abolition of the restrictionswas significant as a symbolof the shift of the Manchu position from being protective overlords of the Mongolsto acting as patrons of the Chinese colonists.4This shows that the seeking of independence was not limited to Outer Mongolia.

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THE MONGOLIAN REVOLUTION OF I92 Iresponsibility of looking after a weak and backward country likeMongolia.The Russians finally chose to play the role of mediators, persuadingthe Mongols to abandon their ambition for an independent stateuniting Outer and Inner Mongolia, while making the Chinese respectOuter Mongolian autonomy in exchange for Mongol recognition ofChinese suzerainty. Naturally, these good offices were to be recom-pensed by special privileges for Russian trade in Outer Mongolia.In spite of their stubborn resistance, the Mongols finally bowed to thepressure of their two powerful neighbours and were forced to accept thecompromise of Outer Mongolian autonomy under the TripartiteAgreement of Kyakhta (June I915).5 Many of the Inner Mongolianprinces who had rallied to the Bogd s Government returned to theirBanners, having been promised, by the Chinese, restitution of their ownformer ranks and status.

Though their nationalistic aspiration for Mongolian independencewas frustrated, the ruling classes of Outer Mongolia (now defined as theland of the Khalkhas and Western Mongolia) enjoyed a de factoindependent power as far as internal affairs were concerned. Unsettledconditions in China and Russian vigilance prevented the Chinese fromhaving any effective influence in Outer Mongolia.While princes and high lamas could monopolize the exploitation oftheir subjects, having been freed from their former obligations to theCh ing Emperor, and drew profits out of loans from Russia, the life ofthe common herdsmen became even worse under the Bogd s Govern-ment. They had to perform the same corvees for the Bogd s Govern-ment as they had done for the Manchus. The system of khamjilga(a kind of serf personally attached to a prince) was kept intact. Theycontinued to be obliged to pay even the personal debts which theirmasters owed to Chinese merchant-usurers as well as their own debts.Immediately after the declaration of independence, many of theChinese merchant-usurers had fled, frightened by Mongol raids on theirshops and warehouses. Nevertheless, the Mongols still had to buy manyof their daily necessities, such as tea and cloth, from Chinese merchantson credit. Progressive commutation of taxes in kind to money paymentalso forced them to borrow ready cash at exorbitant interest.Even though some reforms were introduced, like modern seculareducation (on a small scale) and a Diet with two Chambers, they were

5The details of these diplomatic negotiations are given in Gerard M. Friters,Outer Mongolia and Its International Position (Baltimore, 1949), but only the Mongolsources give a full account of their pathetic struggles and deep frustration.

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of no immediate benefit to the ordinary herdsmen. Children had to besent far away from home, depriving the family of their labour, and theDiet had no real power, its members being appointed, not elected.Popular movements, which had been increasing since the end of thelast century, died down for a while after the declaration of indepen-

dence, and their leaders cooperated with their rulers to drive out theManchu officials and Chinese merchant-usurers. Very soon, however,popular protests grew more active than ever.6With the disappearance of Manchu control, the Mongol princes feltfreer to ally themselves with Chinese, providing facilities for theusurers to collect debts from the people, and leasing to Chinese colonistspatches of the Banner territories which the Mongols traditionallyregarded as belonging to the Banner as a whole. Monasteries went intobusiness with Chinese merchants and held shares in their firms. Thesepractices made it clear to the people that national liberation was notenough to get them out of misery.One remarkable thing about the people s movements in Mongoliawas that a majority of them took the form of law-suits against their ownruling princes. A group of commoners, generally with the participationof a few lower aristocrats and lamas, would prepare a document ofaccusation and sign their names in a circle (a round robin ), so that theringleaders could not be identified. Though most of the complaintswent no further than demands for faithful observance of feudal regula-tions by the princes, the great number of such law-suits during thisperiod show that the commoners had already developed some idea oftheir legitimate rights; these movements were not mere blind uprisingscaused by destitution.The commoners sometimes succeeded in having a very bad princereplaced by a better one of the same ruling family, but even when a pro-test movement succeeded, those who had participated in it werepunished. The futility of expecting justice from the feudal court musthave made some of them realize that something was wrong with theexisting system of society. In one Banner the people adopted theslogan: We don t want to be ruled by the Banner Prince. 7

6 The most prominent case was that of People s Ayush, who from 903 carried on anuntiring resistance to the Prince of his Banner. He resumed his activities at the endof I9I3.7 Sh. Natsagdorj s People s Movements in Outer Mongolia (Ulan Bator, 1956), andPeople s Law Suits (Ulan Bator, I968), a collection of documents, give a clear idea ofthe potentialities and limitations of these legal protest movements. The quotation isfrom the section on How Economy of the People Deteriorated and Struggles Againstthe Oppressors and Feudal Lords Became Widespread , History of the People s Republicof Mongolia, Vol. II (Ulan Bator, 1968), p. 585.

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THE MONGOLIAN REVOLUTION OF I92IA new factor that appeared under the Bogd s Government was

mutiny in the army barracks. As there were practically no industrialworkers, the only possibility of organized movements was in the newlycreated national army. For the first time, young men of poor herdingfamilies from various parts of the country were brought together in aclose contact which gave them an opportunity to develop a sense ofsolidarity as a class and not as subjects of a particular Banner.It is true that these movements in barracks did not go beyonddemands for amelioration of service conditions and complaints againstthe brutality of Russian instructors as well as the corruption of Mongolofficials, but they taught the soldiers the effectiveness of organizedaction.8In this way, embryonic class conflicts were developing under theBogd s Government. At the end of this period some of the herdsmenalready knew that in Russia the White Khaan (the Tsar) had beenoverthrown and the people had become equal without superior andinferior. 9

Liquidation of Outer Mongolian autonomy (I9I9) andformation of secret groupsThe class consciousness of the people, especially in Urga, was par-ticularly stimulated by the rumour that the Mongol ruling circles werein secret negotiation with Ch en Yi, the Chinese High-Commissioner,for the abrogation of autonomy in exchange for preservation of theirranks and privileges. The outbreak of revolution in Russia in 1917 andthe spread of civil war in Siberia removed the Russian guarantee ofOuter Mongolian autonomy, both politically and financially. Theruling classes were frightened by the infiltration of dangerous ideas intoMongolia.The general discontent of the lower sections of the population and

8The above mentioned section also describes protests by soldiers. The BiographyfD. SiikhbaatarUlan Bator, I973), by Bat-Ochir and D. Dashjamts, and the PartisansNarrativesalso give personal accounts of barrack life and protest activities. Forexample, the NarrativesVol. I, No. I2.9E.g. Partisans Narratives,Vol. I, No. 2I; Vol. II, No. 155. D. Dashjamts in hisrecent book, How Marxism-Leninismpreadand Developedn Mongolia (Ulan Bator,1974), gives evidence on the influence of the Russian revolution in Frontier Bannersbeginning as early as 1918 (pp. I8-22), though he points out that in the early period,the Mongols understandingof socialismwas limited to the idea of universal equality(ibid., p. 73).

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the sense of being betrayed by the ruling classes accounted for theformation, about the end of 1918, of two small secret groups, each witharound a dozen members, one in East Urga and the other on the shelf(above the river) where the Russian consulate was situated. To the firstgroup belonged Siikhbaatar, who later became the first hero of theMongolian revolution, and in the second was Choibalsan, the secondhero and successor to Siikhbaatar.

Siikhbaatar (1893-1923) was the son of a poor herdsman. Con-scripted at the age of 19, he served eight years in the new army underthe Bogd s Government. He enjoyed much admiration and popularityamong the soldiers for his military talent and the leading role he playedin their protest activities.Choibalsan (I895-I952) also had been trained for his future careerunder the Bogd s Government. The bastard son of a poor woman, hewas made a boy lama, but ran away and went to Urga where he gotinto a newly opened school for interpreters. Because of his intelligence,he was included in a small group of students who were sent to a middleschool in Irkutsk. Though the Bogd s Government called back theseboys at the outbreak of the Russian revolution, they had already seenand heard something of the progressive ideas fermenting in the Russiancity.The members of the East Urga group were mostly minor officials likeDanzan and Dogsom, while the Consulate Shelf group had many lamaslike Bodoo, who was highly educated and had visited China and Rus-sia; a rich lama, Losol, who had been to Europe, and Shagdarjab,who was a lama attached to the Bogd s army. It may be that Siikh-baatar was more nationalistic and Choibalsan more revolutionary , atleast at this stage;10 but as their later course will show, both groups alikeproduced anti-revolutionaries . It would be more accurate to say thatthe second group was more international and sophisticated than thefirst. In contrast to secular commoners who were confined within theirBanners, lamas, if they were intelligent and fortunate, could haveopportunities for education and even travel abroad.Out of their naivety, Siikhbaatar s group, in their early days, triednot only to influence the Bogd through high officials but also to get helpfrom Kolchak s Government in Siberia, through Orlov, the TsaristRussian Consul-General who continued to represent Russia in Mongolia.Even Choibalsan s group was not consciously revolutionary in thebeginning. Facing the danger of a reassertion of Chinese rule, their

10See Owen Lattimore, NationalismandRevolutionn Mongolia (Leiden and NewYork, 1955), p. 67.

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THE MONGOLIAN REVOLUTION OF I92 Iattention was first and foremost concentrated on the question of how toresist the return of the Chinese and defend the status of autonomy.As Bodoo was teaching Mongol language at the interpreters schoolfor Russians attached to the consulate, it was through him that themembers of his group came into contact with two Russian revolution-aries, Kucherenko and Gembarjevskii, who belonged to a clandestinegroup of progressive Russians. At that time, including refugees fromSiberia, there were about 3,000 Russians in Urga. Among them about300 were active revolutionaries and sympathizers, though it is notpossible to say who, among these progressives were already com-munists and who became communists only later.

The two Russian revolutionaries had been trying to find some pro-gressive elements among the Mongols, but it was some time after theirfirst acquaintance with Bodoo and Choibalsan that they revealed theirtrue position. It was also Bodoo who took the initiative in contactingthe East Urga group when they came to know of its existence. Accord-ing to the account given by Choibalsan and Losol, they were extremelycautious in approaching the other group. Even after they had beenassured that the other group was working for the same purpose andbegan to cooperate, the two groups continued to remain separate.11In the meantime, in spite of the efforts made by these nationalists,Outer Mongolian autonomy was forcibly liquidated by Hsii Shu-cheng,an energetic general of the pro-Japanese Anfu Clique, at the end of1919. In the summer of 9199 Ch en Yi, frightened both by the Bol-shevik menace and the threat of Semenov, who was preparing to marchon Urga to force the Bogd s Government to join his Great Pan-MongolState proclaimed in Buryatia with Japanese backing, had asked thePeking Government for reinforcements. Hsii Shu-cheng, who headedthe expedition sent by Peking, brushed aside Ch en Yi and his negotia-tions with the Mongol princes, and exacted from the Bogd s Govern-ment a petition to be re-admitted to China , threatening them withforce of arms.

Even the Mongol ruling circles, who were ready to negotiate withCh en Yi, were scandalized by this high-handed liquidation of auto-nomy, but had to comply with Hsii s order. The people, however,suspected that Prime Minister Badamdorj had been bribed by Hsii, anda popular song said that Badamdorj and the princes have sold theMongols for silver and silk. 12

11 The Three-Man History gives a very frank and detailed account of the formationof these groups. Vol. I, pp. 44-87.12 Tales of an Old Scribe, p. 227.

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The extremely humiliating ceremony of the abrogation of autonomystaged by Hsii, with the Bogd forced to prostrate himself before aphotograph of the President of China, and the subsequent completesubjugation of the Mongols by the Chinese once again kindled nationalindignation and revived the sense of national identity.13

The Mongolian People s Party and Soviet RussiaThe members of the secret groups tried to conceal weapons before allarms were confiscated at the disbanding of the Bogd s army, but this

scheme did not succeed. Their plot to assassinate Hsii when he planneda trip to Kyakhta also failed. The propaganda posters which theypasted up at various places in Urga seem to have been mostly of ananti-Chinese nature, but their continued contact with the Buryat pro-gressives is reflected in a poster proposing that the stupid hereditaryruling princes should be removed and the election system should beadopted as in so many other countries in the world. 14

Though up to this point the members of the groups were pre-dominantly nationalistic, even Siikhbaatar s group was not totallyignorant of the new ideas generated by the Russian revolution. Someof the political exiles in Siberia had found their way into Mongolia,and after the revolution the herdsmen along the northern frontier hadopportunities of meeting Siberian revolutionaries and seeing whatkinds of change were going on in Russia. Intellectuals like Jamtsarano,the celebrated Buryat scholar, were teaching at a school in Urga, and itwas through him that Danzan first heard of the new ideas.15In the spring of I920 Siikhbaatar and Danzan made an unsuccessfulattempt to cross the frontier to see with their own eyes what really wastaking place between the Reds and the Whites . After the two groupsbegan to collaborate, they held long conversations with the Russianrevolutionaries, with Choibalsan as interpreter.

13 The humiliation suffered by the Bogd probably added to his importance asa symbol of national independence.14 The text of the poster, in the modernized writing, is found in the Documents

Concerning he History of the Mongolian People s RevolutionaryParty, Vol. I (Ulan Bator,1966), p. 9. The Mongol newspapers published in Urga during the Bogd s Govern-ment Period, under the editorship of Jamtsarano carried a number of progressivearticles.15H. G. C. Perry-Ayscough, who was in the Chinese Postal Service and travelledin Mongolia at this time, also mentions that Jamsarao, a Buryat, was the head-master of the school for the sons of Mongols. With the Russians in Mongolia (New Yorkand Toronto, I914, in joint authorship with R. B. 0. Otter-Barry), p. I Io.

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THE MONGOLIAN REVOLUTION OF 1921In this way, when Sorokovikov was sent by the Far Eastern Bureau ofthe Comintern to Urga, the two Russian revolutionaries introduced themembers of these groups to him.16 After having put questions about

their aims and activities, Sorokovikov suggested that they should senda delegation to the Comintern, and he also pointed out the necessityof organization. Sometime after this, at the end of June 1920, themembers of the groups assembled to form a Mongolian People s Party.The Ten Oaths adopted at this meeting stated the purpose of theParty as: first of all to strive for the welfare of the people and toabolish all exploitation ; but the same First Clause went on to say: torestore (our) lost political power and defend (our) religion. As Choibal-san later pointed out, the members interpreted this first Party documenteach in his own way. For some it was a true reflection of what theythought, and for others it was a matter of tactics. It should be remem-bered that not only was the whole life of the Mongols steeped inLamaism, but the lamaist religion and the Bogd had become symbols ofanti-Chinese nationalism and autonomy (de acto independence).In any case, the most important and urgent objective of the Party wasto get support as widely as possible to get rid of the Chinese. Thisunited front policy can also be seen in the assigning of some membersto gain sympathy from sincerely nationalistic elements among thereligious and secular aristocrats,17 while others were given the task ofkeeping contact with the Soviet side.The Party also chose two delegates to be sent to Soviet Russia torequest support. By drawing lots, Choibalsan and Danzan were chosen.They left Urga at the end of June, but contrary to the popular imageof the Russian communists taking innocent Mongols to Soviet Russia tocamouflage their own expansionist designs, the two men were left to theirown devices, having been given no precise instructions except for theaddress of Makstenek, the Soviet Consul in Troitskosavsk, the Russianside of Kyakhta.18 Even when the two men managed to slip across the

16 The existence of the Mongolian revolutionaries may have been first reported tothe Soviet side by a communist named Naum Burtman, who visited Urga in March1920 on his way back from China to Soviet Russia. It was probably shortly after hisvisit that I. Sorokovikov went to Irkutsk.Sorokovikov had been living in Urga and was a member of the clandestine groupof pro-Soviet Russians. Having been to Irkutsk to report, he was sent back to workin Mongolia. Three-Man History, Vol. I, pp. 88-98; also G. Kungrov and I. Soro-kovikov, Herdsmen sRevolution (Irkutsk, 1957, in Russian), pp. 82-5.17 Those who remained faithful to the Party to the end were Jalkhan Khutukhtu(who died while Prime Minister in 1923) and Magsarjab (i879-1927).18 At that time Kyakhta belonged to the Far Eastern Republic of Siberia.

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frontier at great risk, they had to wander about in the streets of Troits-kosavsk, trying to find Makstenek.When Makstenek was reassured that they were really the Mongolsabout whom Sorokovikov had informed him, he made arrangementsfor them to go on to Verkhneudinsk (the present Ulan Ude), where theywere received by Shumyatskii, who was the Deputy Premier of the FarEastern Republic. Choibalsan and Danzan, who had expected toobtain a ready promise of support, were very much disappointed to betold to wait. Although, at their request, two Buryat intellectuals,Jamtsarano (whom Danzan had known in Urga) and Rinchino (afriend of Choibalsan in his school days in Irkutsk) were called to helpthem, each time the two Mongol delegates went to ask Shumyatskii foran answer, he only repeated that to achieve a revolution a great deal ofpatience was needed.19In the meantime, their comrades in Urga were waiting anxiously fornews from the delegates. At last, at the end of July, a telegram arrivedfrom them with instructions to send some more delegates and to bring aletter, asking for Soviet support, bearing the seal of the Bogd. Througha member of the Party, who was an official and had connexions withhigher court circles, they finally succeeded in obtaining the Bogd s sealon the letter they had prepared.

Though Hsii Shu-cheng had already been removed from office inJuly 1920, shortly before the fall of the Anfu Clique, the total subjuga-tion to China he had imposed on the Mongols had caused such intenseresentment that even the ruling classes were secretly seeking foreignsupport against the Chinese. It was after he had put his seal on lettersto Japan and to the United States that the Bogd finally agreed to dothe same with the letter to Soviet Russia.

After thrilling adventures, the five delegates, Siikhbaatar, Bodoo,Losol, Dogsom and Shagdarjab escaped the eyes of the Chinesefrontier guards and joined the first two in Verkhneudinsk. A few dayslater, one month after the arrival of Choibalsan and Danzan, they weretold to go on to Irkutsk, because Verkhneudinsk was the capital of theBuffer State (the Far Eastern Republic) and nothing definite on theMongol question could be decided there.It is understandable that the Far Eastern Republic did not want totake responsibility for the Mongol delegation to Soviet Russia. At thatvery moment Yurin was on his way to Peking to negotiate recognition

19The Three-Manistory ivesthe mostvividaccountsof the difficulties ncoun-teredby the Mongoldelegatesand their impatientand agonizingwaitingfor theSoviet answer. Vol. I, pp. o06-40.

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THE MONGOLIAN REVOLUTION OF I92Iof the Far Eastern Republic not only by the Chinese but by the otherPowers also, if possible.20 There is some reason to suspect that it was theFar Eastern Republic which insisted on the importance of the Bogd sseal, in order to justify their having helped the Mongol delegates throughtheir territory.In any case, on arriving in Irkutsk the Mongols discovered that forthe Soviet side the Bogd s seal was not so important after all, and theywere advised to prepare a letter in the name of the Party. Here the firstopen quarrel among the delegates broke out. Official histories now em-phasize that it was a conflict between the progressives and the con-servatives who maintained that the Bogd s seal was enough for thepurpose. According to the amazingly frank account by Choibalsan andLosol, however, it seems that they also quarreled about the significanceof the Bogd s seal which the second group had obtained at such a greatrisk. Rinchino, who had accompanied the delegation, reasoned withthem, saying that if they were going to quarrel among themselves atthis point, they could not hope to carry out their revolution success-fully.21

Upon this the delegates made up their quarrel and prepared a letterin the name of the Party. In this document, the delegation made it clearthat what they wanted was financial aid and a supply of arms to regainautonomy ; but the term autonomy here should not be equated withthe status defined under the Tripartite Agreement of I9I5. On therestoration of autonomy they wanted to extend their rights to includethe right to make decisions without consulting either China or Russia;in other words, what they wanted was full independence.In another document prepared at this time, the delegation stated the

policy of the Party. The first step would be to make the Bogd a consti-tutional monarch and concentrate on curtailing the power of the bigaristocrats. Then, after endeavouring to enlighten the public mind theywould stage another revolution in one or two years and put an end tothe minor privileged classes. They considered that in this way theywould be able to make a social revolution without internal disturban-ces and external criticism. 22 To make the big secular princes the firsttarget was necessary because of the very deeply rooted influence of

20 M. I. Kazanin, Memoirs of a Secretary of Mission (Moscow, I963, in Russian).Kazanin was the secretary-interpreter, in English and Chinese, of the Yurin Mission.21 Three-Man History, Vol. I, pp. I83-6.22 The first document, dated 25 August I920, is found in B. Shirendeb s Historyof the Mongolian People s Revolution (Ulan Bator, I969), pp. 167-8. The second, dated20 August I92o, is in the Documents Concerningthe History of the M.P.R.P., Vol. I,

pp. 11-12.

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lamaism in the minds of the Mongols, which made it unwise to attackthe ecclesiastical establishment without proper preparation.In the beginning of September, the delegation divided into threegroups, Danzan and two others going to Moscow with the requests,Siikhbaatar and Choibalsan remaining in Irkutsk to be trained at themilitary school there, both in military art and in political studies, andBodoo and another going back to Urga to carry on Party activities.Siikhbaatar and Choibalsan had to go through another anxiousperiod of waiting in Irkutsk, longing for news from Moscow and Urga.The letter which at last arrived from Urga was full of disturbing in-formation. When the Chinese authorities in Urga discovered the anti-Chinese plot of the Mongols, they began to arrest not only Partymembers but also nobles and high lamas who had shown sympathywith the revolutionaries. The comrades of the Party had to hide in themountains and forests. There was no possibility of continuing Partyactivities. There was no news from Moscow. Siikhbaatar and Choi-balsan were depressed, thinking that after all Shumyatskii was right,and the revolution might not be achieved until the generation of theirsons or even that of their grandchildren.

Ungern s invasion of MongoliaWhile Siikhbaatar and Choibalsan were in Irkutsk, Ungern-Sternbergcrossed the frontier into Mongolia in the beginning of October. Shortlybefore the final defeat of Semenov s forces in Siberia, he had parted withSemenov, having decided to make Mongolia his base for counter-attack, with the crazy idea of restoring monarchy in Russia, China andMongolia. Some of the Mongol princes joined him, in the hope ofwinning liberation from Chinese rule. Ungern attempted an attack onUrga at the end of October 1920, but after a few days of fierce fightinghis army was beaten back by the Chinese. When Ungern was approach-ing Urga, the Chinese locked up the Bogd in a part of their headquarters,accusing him of having conspired with Ungern.23It was precisely at the time of Ungern s first attack on Urga thatDanzan, who had been kept waiting in Moscow, was at last given a

23 In fact, Ungern sent letters to the Bogd, asking his authorization to enter Urga(Shirendeb, History of the Mongolian Revolution, p. 182). When Ch en Yi once againcame back to Urga as the High Commissioner, after the downfall of Hsu Shu-cheng,he changed the status of the Bogd to palace-arrest , trying to placate the feeling of theMongols.

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THE MONGOLIAN REVOLUTION OF I92Idefinite Soviet promise to provide unlimited quantities of money andarms. The Mongol delegates were advised to hurry back to Mongoliaand to organize their Party members and enlist soldiers. As this wasmore than four months after Danzan and Choibalsan had left Urga, itcan only be inferred that the Bolsheviks had hesitated to intervene inMongolia until they felt forced to act by Ungern s use of Mongolia as abase.

Siikhbaatar and Choibalsan came back to Troitskosavsk on 22November 1920. Obtaining visas from the F.E.R. authorities to cross thefrontier at any time and as often as they wanted,24 they began to carryon propaganda activities in the frontier Banners and sent appeals toprinces and high officials of these Banners. At the same time, through aParty member whom they had stationed near Kyakhta, they sent aletter to the Bogd and to the comrades in Urga.25When the messenger with the letters arrived in Urga the Bogd wasconfined in his palace, and there were no Party members to be found.He finally managed to have the letter delivered to the Bogd through theassistance of the palace doctor. In reply, the Bogd secretly instructed theParty leaders to contact some of his trusted high lamas and noblemen.

Though the Bogd s instructions did not lead to any concrete result,this move on the part of the Party leaders shows that at this point theywere still carrying on the united front policy of keeping the Bogd ontheir side; but this policy was suddenly disrupted by Ungern s secondattack on Urga.

Ungern, also wanting to use the prestige of the Bogd, began hissecond attack with a raid which liberated the Bogd from his palace. Hewas removed to a monastery in the mountains guarded by Ungern smen. When he finally captured the capital in the beginning of Febru-ary I921, Ungern restored the Bogd to the throne as Mongol Khaan.He liberated the lamas and nobles who had been in prison and formeda new Government of the Bogd. His ingenious tactics gained him fameas the liberator of the Mongols, and the Bogd issued an edict enjoiningunconditional obedience to Ungern on his subjects.This development radically changed the situation. Makstenek, theSoviet Consul in Troitskosavsk, told Stikhbaatar that now that theBogd s Government had allied itself with Ungern, it would be difficultfor the Soviet side to provide the promised aid. Siikhbaatar sat silent in

24 The text and a photograph of the visa granted to Siikhbaatar are included in theSource Materials ConcerningD. Siikhbaatar s Work and Life, pp. 64-5.25 B. Puntsag, who helped Sukhbaatar and others to cross the frontier at Kyakhta.His account is in the Partisans Narratives, Vol. I, No. I37.

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deep thought, and then lifting his head, answered that the Party wasworking for the oppressed Mongol people and not for the Bogd.26Some scholars maintain that the Ungern menace was nothing but apretext for the Red Army to occupy Mongolia.27 Nevertheless, in 192ISoviet Russia was not in a position to engage in territorial expansion.Its position in Europe was by no means secured, and after the devasta-tion of the world war and the civil war, the country was facing thegrave problems of hunger and internal unrest.After the Allied Intervention, the Japanese were still holding on toEastern Siberia, so that Lenin had to endorse the compromise of theFar Eastern Republic in order, at any cost, to avoid a war with Japan.As Henry Norton, a contemporary American professor, pointed outafter his visit to the Republic, the mere presence of Ungern in Mongoliawould have caused the financial collapse of the Republic by obligingit to station troops along the frontier between it and Mongolia.28 Thefall of the Buffer State would have meant nothing less than a directconfrontation with Japan. If Ungern s adventure in Mongolia hadproved successful Japan, or at least the Japanese Army, would mostlikely have given him support.29It is not difficult to understand why the Soviet leaders hesitated solong to promise the Mongol delegation their support, however sympath-etic they may have been to their cause. On the other hand, it is difficultto imagine that Soviet Russia would have gone ahead with an unpro-voked expansion into Mongolia just at the time when the other Powersbegan to see that the Soviet regime was going to last, and were begin-ning to withdraw their recognition of Tsarist representatives in theircapital. For Soviet Russia, Ungern s invasion of Mongolia was anextension of the Siberian civil war, and it did not exclude the danger ofanother foreign intervention.30

26 L. Dembrel, who was present at this meeting, describes the scene in detail.(Reminiscencesoncerningiikhbaatar,p. 81-3.)27 E.g. George G. S. Murphy, Soviet Mongolia (University of California Press:Berkeley, 1966), pp. 6-7.28 H. K. Norton, The Far Eastern Republic of Siberia (London, I923), p. 228.29 It is generally maintained that a Japanese officer who called himself Suzuki(this does not seem to have been his real name; most of the Japanese adventurers didnot use their real names), accompanied Ungern on his adventure in Mongolia, but thereports on theseJapanese and their testimony preserved in the Library of the ForeignOffice in Japan shows that they were about 50 in number and were mostly pettyadventurers who posed as important officers. At the same time, their testimonyreveals that Ungern was in touch with Captain Kuroki, who had been adviser toSemenov, and his group.30 The counter-revolutionary coupd etat in the Maritime Provinces (May 192 i) wasprobably supported by the Japanese.

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THE MONGOLIAN REVOLUTION OF I92I

Recruitment of the Mongol partisans and the war of revolutionIn the middle of February 192 , Siikhbaatar personally visited severalfrontier watch-posts to the west of Kyakhta to recruit volunteers for thePeople s Army. The men serving under the Chinese at these watch-posts were the best source of recruitment because they had somemilitary training and had their own weapons. In less than one monththe strength of the People s Army reached about 400. This numberincluded soldiers drafted from the frontier Banners by their Bannerprinces who had responded to the appeal of the People s Party; butabout two-thirds of the Mongol partisans , whose stories are found inthe Narratives , were genuine volunteers who rallied to the cause,though a few of them enlisted for personal reasons; one man, for in-stance, because he was not on good terms with his stepmother.31The overwhelming majority of these soldiers were poor herdsmen.Especially after the capture of Urga by Ungern, when the bulk of theChinese forces in Urga had taken refuge in Kyakhta, the Mongolherdsmen around the suddenly over-populated city were badly harassedby requisitions of the Chinese soldiers, which often degenerated intosheer plundering. Many of them moved to remote places and the morecourageous ones were ready to rise in arms against the foreign enemy.Moreover, the personal confidence enjoyed by Siikhbaatar during hismilitary service attracted ex-soldiers, who rallied to his cause. In fact,at least nearly one-half of the volunteers among the Mongol partisansseems to have been at one time in the Bogd s army.In the beginning of March 1921, the People s Party held its FirstParty Congress in Troitskosavsk, attended by about 26 participants inall, including some Buryat intellectuals and a representative of theComintern.32 The Party Platform adopted at this Congress is muchmore revolutionary than the previous Ten Oaths (which were alsorevised on this occasion). The preamble to the Party Platform shows theinfluence of the Buryat intellectuals33 in many Marxist terms and ex-pressions translated into Mongol, but the contents are more moderate,

31Almost all of the partisans, in the Narratives, ive accounts of how they came tojoin the army of the People s Party. Many of the conscripts from the Banners madeno secret of their parting from their families in tears.32 It is also possible that a representative of Soviet Russia, probably Makstenek,attended the meeting (A ShortHistory of the MongolianPeople sRevolutionaryarty(Ulan Bator, I967), p. 33).33The draft of the First Party Programwas drawn up by Jamtsarano (Dashjamts,Marxism-Leninismn Mongolia,p. 69).

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setting the immediate objective as liberation from the oppressive ruleof the Chinese , while the ultimate aim was to create an independentMongol state. The element of the united front was still retained to someextent, without any clear statement about class conflict, though thepurpose of the Party was defined in Article I as to vindicate the rightsof the masses and to attain equal prosperity for everyone , and Article4 hints at proletarian dictatorship, saying: After having restored therights of the Mongols, the Party will establish the firm discipline of arevolutionary party.At this Congress, also, there were heated discussions between themore revolutionary and the more nationalistic members, but thetheoretical divergence was side-stepped, leaving the interpretation ofthe texts once again to the different views of the members. The urgenttask for the Party was to set up a Provisional People s Government andto liberate Kyakhta from the Chinese troops.34Even the Provisional People s Government reflected the predominantimportance of military operations at the time, with a special Minister ofthe Western Frontier and a Minister of the Frontier Watch-postZone.

The liberation of Kyakhta was successfully carried out on 15 MarchI92I. This battle was almost exclusively fought by the Mongol parti-sans, using Soviet-supplied arms and with Soviet troops standing inreadiness on the frontier. A few words should be said here as to why theMongol partisans, numbering barely 400 men, should win a battleagainst 8,ooo to Io,ooo Chinese soldiers in the region of Kyakhta.35Firstly, there are no Mongols who cannot ride. Once they have learnedhow to use guns, they can shoot with great accuracy from gallopinghorses. Besides, many of the poor herdsmen in those days were huntersof small animals to supplement their income. Therefore, it was quitea different story from recruiting peasants and training them to besoldiers.

From the military point of view, the capture of Kyakhta was a turn-ing point from the war of national liberation to the war of revolution. InApril, the Provisional People s Government made a formal request fordirect Soviet military involvement in the war against Ungern. The com-bined forces of the Red Army and the Mongol partisans, with participa-34It is interesting to know that the contemporary Soviet leaders referred to theearly revolutionariesas progressivenationalists (ibid.,p. 30).35It is also true that the Chinese soldiers in Kyakhta, in spite of their superiornumbers,were utterly demoralized, and there must have been a considerablenumberof Chinesecolonistsand merchantswho had been hurriedlymobilized at the approachof Ungern.

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THE MONGOLIAN REVOLUTION OF 1921tion of the forces of the Far Eastern Republic, were to confront Ungern sarmy and the Bogd s troops under him.36In May, Ungern moved his main forces from Urga toward the north,intending to seize Kyakhta from the Mongol partisans and smother theMongolian revolution in its cradle. For him Kyakhta was a strategicpoint for counter-attack into Siberia. The first attack on Kyakhta wasled by a Mongol prince. His troops were defeated by the partisans, hehimself being wounded and captured. Shortly after this, Ungern andhis men fell on Troitskosavsk, but were beaten back by the Red Armyand the Army of the Far Eastern Republic. It was after these decisivebattles that the Provisional Government for the first time requestedthat Soviet troops march into Mongolia in pursuit of the routed Whitetroops.37At the end of June, the Mongol partisans in Kyakhta, now number-ing about 700, and the Red Army with around 0,000 men, began theirmarch on Urga. The White officials and officers whom Ungern had leftin Urga ran away with their men at the approach of the revolutionarytroops. The Bogd and his high lamas and officials, abandoned to theirfate, met in daily consultation and finally decided that the safest waywould be to receive the revolutionary forces in a friendly manner.38

The peaceful capture of Urga enabled the People s Party to resumeits united front tactics. When the Provisional People s Governmentmoved into the capital, it took over the ministerial seals from theBogd s Government, and made the Bogd a constitutional monarchwhose power was limited to religious matters.39The seating of the People s Government in the capital, however, didnot put an end to the war of revolution. West Mongolia was still in thehands of the White generals who had driven out the Chinese officialsand troops in the regions of Uliastai and Kobdo. The non-Khalkha

36 This was a very difficult time for the Provisional Government, because quite afew of the Mongols were satisfied with the restoration of the Bogd by Ungern, and theParty had to intensify its propaganda against the wicked feudal aristocrats insteadof for the restoration of autonomy.37 George Murphy maintains that there was really no need for the Soviet troops toinvade Mongolia, because at that time Ungern had already been defeated (SovietMongolia, p. Io). Nevertheless, Ungern s troops had not been annihilated, and theWhite troops in the West were still intact. The Mongol Partisans, numbering less than2,000, could not have mopped them up without inviting the Soviet forces intoMongolia.

38 The Bogd s Government had sent at least two decrees to the People s Party tosubmit to the Bogd s authority and to enter Urga unarmed.39 Constitutional is not quite the right word here. The first Constitution had notyet been adopted, and the authority of the Bogd was limited by the Agreement underOaths between the Bogd and the People s Government.

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tribes in the West, though they had joined the I9I independencemovement, were dissatisfied with the Khalkha domination under theBogd s Government. Ungern was trying to reach West Mongolia toreorganize the White forces, and sent a secret message urging the Bogdto escape to the West. Nevertheless, on his way to the West, Ungernhimself was betrayed and handed over to the Soviet side by a Mongolprince Sundui, who had been the last commander to follow Ungernafter the defeat at Troitskosavsk.40

Another and more important event was the coup of Magsarjab at theend of July 1921. He had been one of the heroes in the capture ofKobdo from the Chinese in 1912. Being a sincere nationalist, he hadbeen sympathetic to the cause of the People s Party. During the Chineserule he was imprisoned, and subsequently liberated by Ungern. In thespring of 1921 he was sent to Uliastai by the revived Bogd s Governmentto command the Mongol troops in the West, but having been approach-ed by the People s Party through Choibalsan, he suddenly staged acoup at the end of July, and sided with the revolutionaries with histroops.41This was a decisive event which reversed the balance of powerin the West. His coup was entirely on his own decision. It was more thana month before Soviet reinforcements could join him. In January 1922the remnants of the White forces capitulated and the war of revolutioncame to an end.

The People s Government under the BogdEven while the war was still going on in the West, the People s Govern-ment began to publish a series of new policies, making land and naturalresources the property of the state, abolishing the system of Khamjilga,giving equal rights to all men and women, etc. Though the rulingprinces of the Banners were not immediately deprived of the right ofsuccession, their heirs had to be confirmed by the people.42

40 The narrative of a partisan named Yarin reveals that Sundui, after the defeatof Ungern, secretly sent two of his officials to Urga to find out how to save the situa-tion for himself. Yarin, who was assigned the task of inducing Mongols serving withUngern to come over to the revolutionary side, told them that if Sundui wouldcapture Ungern, he would not only be forgiven for having served with Ungern butwould be amply rewarded (Partisans Narratives, Vol. II, p. 648).41 The Three-Man History shows how Choibalsan approached Magsarjab, whomhe describes as a comrade of the Party and one of the first members of the Party(Vol. II, pp. 283-6). It is more likely, however, that here Choibalsan refers to theoriginal secret groups of nationalist-revolutionaries.

42 Dashjamts points out that the reforms at this stage were not really socialistic.The Mongols were not yet ready for the stage of socialism; but they could prepare

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THE MONGOLIAN REVOLUTION OF I92 IAs there had been no exclusive private land-ownership in Mongolia,and there had been no real industry operated by the Mongols, thesemeasures did not cause any particular disturbance. (It was only during

the period of the leftist deviation, from I929 to I93I, that the rashcommunization of livestock frightened the commoners into massrebellion.)As a very broad generalization, we can call the leaders of the People sParty revolutionaries , though not all of them were aiming at asocialist revolution. The partisans rallied to the Party predominantlyout of nationalistic zeal, but in the course of the war they becamerevolutionary enough to fight willingly against the Bogd s troops. Thecommon herdsmen, who were vaguely nationalistic, came to be accus-tomed to the new system during the three years of the transitionalperiod, and do not seem to have been particularly shocked when thePeople s Republic was proclaimed on the death of the Bogd in MayI924.43On the other hand, as the social and political reforms were graduallyput into effect from the autumn of 1921, the ruling classes started plot-ting against the revolution. As in any other revolution, moreover, someof the original members of the Party thought that the revolution wasgoing too far and too fast. Finally, because of the scarcity of literatemen, former officials had to be used to carry out the new policies, andthis gave them an opportunity for sabotage.The People s Government had requested that Red Army forces bestationed in Mongolia until the anti-revolutionary elements could bebrought under control (they were withdrawn in March 1925). As earlyas 1922, a big conspiracy was discovered and Bodoo and some othermembers of the Party were among those who were executed in connexionwith it. It was in one of these anti-revolutionary crises that Siikhbaatarcaught a bad chill during his nightly inspections of the city defence,which led to his death on 20 February i923.44themselves for socialism by avoiding a trend toward capitalism. He describes thisas a new type of non-capitalistic democracy, the stage of revolutionary democracy(Marxism-Leninism in Mongolia, pp. IOI-8).43The People s Party put an end to the monarchy by declaring that ZebtsundambaKhutukhtu was not to reincarnateagain. At the Third Party Congressin August 1924the decision was accepted without discussion. During this Congress Danzan wasaccused and executed for his affiliation with foreign capitalistic elements.The First Great National Assembly, convened in November I924, formally pro-claimed the Mongolian People s Republic and adopted the First Constitution.

44 It had been generally believed that Sukhbaatar was poisoned by lama medicine-men; but now the official biography attributes his death entirely to a bad cold,perhaps pneumonia.

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Ever since the revolution of 192I, the People s Republic of Mongoliahas maintained a younger brother, elder brother relationship with theSoviet Union. Without Soviet support and protection the Mongolianrevolution could never have survived. It is an illusion to think that asmall country with less than one million population, sandwichedbetween the two biggest nations in the world, could be entirely inde-pendent of both of its neighbours. China continued to claim sovereigntyover Outer Mongolia until I945. Moreover, Japanese expansionists,whose influence was growing rapidly at the time of the Mongolianrevolution, were always trying to extend their domination into OuterMongolia. There is evidence that some of the Mongol anti-revolution-aries requested support from Japan, and a faction of the Japanese Armywas making plans to incite rebellions in Outer Mongolia, using theinfluence of Lamaism.45

The process of the Mongolian Revolution cannot be understoodwithout keeping in mind Mongolia s peculiar international position;and the meaning of the revolution to the life of the Mongols should beevaluated not in comparison with Western standards, but bearing inmind the problems of life and survival in Mongolia a little over fiftyyears ago.It is true that if the Bolshevik revolution had not taken place inRussia, the Mongol nationalists could never have become really revo-lutionary, and their mission to Russia would only have been a repetitionof what happened in I9I . It is doubtful whether the Mongols couldhave become even bourgeois revolutionaries. There had been practic-ally no way for them to be influenced by the ideology of Western demo-cracy; and in any case, Western democracy was introduced in Asiancountries predominantly in the form of imperialism and colonialism,allying itself with the local feudal and conservative elements.The other neighbour, China, especially in the North, was not yetliberated from the Warlord struggles; and the only philosophy whichconfronted Bolshevism was lamaism which had nothing to offer in theway of changing the existing order of society.

45Among the unpublished documents kept at the Japanese Foreign Office, thereare letters sent by anti-revolutionary Mongol lamas and princes trying to obtainJapanese support for their activities.

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1921 Revolution

Documents

Transcript of 1921 Revolution