(1915) Our Navy and the Next War

8/9/2019 (1915) Our Navy and the Next War

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Cornell UniversityLibrary

The original of tliis book is intine Cornell University Library.

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OUR NAVYAND

THE NEXT WAR


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OUR NAVYAND

THE NEXT WARBY

ROBERT WILDEN NEESER

NEW YORKCHARLES SCRIBNER'S SONS

191S


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COPSSISHT, I915, BVCHARLES SCRIBNER'S SONS

Published March, 1915


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PREFACEIf ever the navy of the United States needed

the intelligent support of the American people, itis at the present moment. And it is fortunatethat interest is now growing, and that a dispositionon the part of our citizens to force action towardthe meeting of the needs of the service is beginningto show itself.On one point there seems to be no difference ofopinionthat if we are to have a navy at all, itshould be as efficient as it possibly can be made.We have to-day individual ships that are the ad-miration of foreign naval architects. We haveofficers and men on board of them that we believeare the equal of those in any other service. Wehave certain materials of war that are as good asthose mantifacttu-ed for other fleets. But whatwe have not appreciated is that efficient individualships and efficient crews do not alone make apowerful navy. These units must be welded intoan efficient whole by an organization and adminis-tration which co-ordinate their capabilities anddirect their efforts toward a common end.


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vi PREFACEIn building up our navy, the public mind has

been centred too much on the power of the singleship. It has taken no account of all the variousaccessories essential to the maintenance of thefleet.

In a recent article on the British navy, Ad-miral Lord Charles Beresford said: "We havehad no naval war that threatened our existencefor over a century. But if such a war had occurredany time in the last forty years preceding thecreation of a war staff, our disorganization wouldhave been complete. How in those years thenavy ever carried out its duties without a warstaff is a marvel; it could only have been done bythe superb loyalty of those afloat, who have al-ways done their best and never allowed the word' impossible * to exist. The Beresford committeeof 1909 proved up to the hilt the unreadiness ofthe fleet if a sudden war had been declared. Thecreation of a war staff (as a result of the investi-gation) has removed this danger."

In that same year, 1909, the President of theUnited States appointed a commission to con-sider the state of our own navy. The report ofthat board is strikingly similar to that of the Beres-ford committee. It revealed a condition thatastounded even the service. But it accomplishednothing. For Congress refused to supply theremedy.


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PREFACE viiFortunately the superb loyalty of our own

ofiBcers and men, who " have always done theirbest and never allowed the word 'impossible' toexist," enabled our ships to carry on their worksince then in a way that has, on many occasions,won the praise of foreign experts. In the face ofa policy that threatened the very existence of theservice, in spite of an unbalanced battle fleet, inspite of a serious shortage in its personnel, inthe face of every discotu-agement, our officersand men have striven, and are still striving, forefficiency. But this goal will not be reached, noreven closely approached, until the doctrine isthoroughly understood that there must be anintelligent comprehension on the part of the gov-ernment of the purpose for which a navy exists.The people through their representativesthatis, the government^must encourage further thenavy's legitimate efforts and fill its unquestionedmilitary needs. They must develop a policy, freefrom any taint of partisan politics, that will se-cure the development of the navy in harmonywith the pvu-pose for which it exists. They mustdemand of the navy a policy, for which officers of"the navy should be held to strict accountabiHty,and must secure with equal loyalty plans in sup-port of that policy.

Shall we continue to neglect our military needsand withhold that support which alone can supply


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via PREFACEthe dynamic force that will make of the fleet anefficient instrument capable of fulfilling the pur-pose for which it exists ?

Robert W. Neeser,New Yore, March i, 1915,


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X CONTENTSPACEAppendix I ^The Report op the Gen-

eral Board 179Appendix II ^The Report op Board on

Increased Efficiency ofTHE Personnel op theNavy 200

Appendix III ^The Price of Unprepared-NESS 204


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OUR NAVYAND

THE NEXT WAR


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"He that commands the sea is at greatliberty, and may take as much and aslittle of the war as he will. Whereasthose that be strongest by land are manytimes nevertheless in great straits."

Bacon.


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CHAPTER IOUR SITUATIONANATION should develop its physical powerfor offense or defense in the same way thatan individual keeps his body strong and

healthy for his daily tasks. The nation is butan elaboration of the individual. Both are gov-erned by the same laws. Each is endowed withspiritual and physical attributes. The develop-ment of these is entirely in the hands of the na-tion or of the individual. A nation that developsits vital attributes but fails to develop its spiritualand physical attributes is in the class with anindividual who has grown, through indolence andoverfeeding, too obese to defend himself and toodull-witted to avoid his antagonist.

It is strange but nevertheless true that thestatesmen of our government have never beenable to appreciate the true meaning of Clause-witz's philosophy that: "War is only a continu-ation, by other means, of national policy." War,by the statesman, must be considered as an in-strument of his nation's policy. If we accept the

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4 OUR NAVY AND THE NEXT WARtruth of this philosophy we are confronted withthe conclusion that our statesmen in Washing-ton are directly responsible to the people forthe preparedness of its armed forces. The na-tion's policies are in the keeping of its states-men. Such policies require, for their continu-ance, national force, both moral and physical. Ifthe outside pressure against a just policy isstrong, a greater national force must be exerted.National force is, in time of peace, diplomatic.Diplomatic notes, ententes, and understandingsare the life-giving force behind a policy. Whenthese have failed and the policy is vital to thewelfare and progress of the nation, military forcetakes the place of diplomatic intercourse. Thusit is seen that the nation's policies become thestarting-point in all calculations of war strength.The statesman must distinguish between thoseaims which his nation can abandon and thosewhich are worth fighting for. The statesmanmust be a man of keen understanding, with agrasp of the fimdamentals of history. He muststudy the history of those nations to which hisown nation may, in the course of time, draw nearin the field of competition, with danger of collision.Thus it becomes his duty to study the purposeand policy of those nations which may, in thecourse of their own expansion, challenge his poli-cies, and he must, therefore, understand the


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OUR SITUATION smethods that can be employed to assert his owngovernment's purpose.

Unhappily, in America, our statesmen havenot reckoned with the necessity of maintainingbehind our policies sufficient armed forces to per-petuate them. They seem to believe that if thenations of the world have given their tacit con-sent to our policies nothing more is necessary.They have been sustained in this method ofdiplomacy through the increasing acceptance ofthe principle of arbitration by the people ofthis nation, notwithstanding the fact that thecauses of every one of our own great nationalstruggles were such as to prohibit settlement byany other means than a resort to arms. Butwhen this creation of man's credulity has failed,the nation will come face to face with a condi-tion from which there can be no turning. Apolicy vigorously challenged by another nationcan be settled in two ways only: either by theabandonment of the policy, or else by a war tomaintain it. There is no more despicable figurein history than the man who rushes his coimtryinto a war for which that nation is tmprepared.A true statesman aims to harmonize the nationalpolicies with his country's readiness for war. Hedoes not attempt to assert ideals which the armedforces of his country are incapable of defending.Under the moral code the true responsibility of a


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6 OUR NAVY AND THE NEXT WARnation is not for the preservation of peace, but forabstention from wrong, and it must be assumedamong the civilized nations that each strives tobe morally right in its dealings with others. Ournational policies are held by the people of theUnited States to be morally right and necessaryto the life and happiness of the people; yet,knowing this, we as a nation refuse to face theimpleasant realization that we may some daybe called upon to engage in war in the defenseof these policies.Those who champion the cause of arbitration

and universal peace, beUeving that thereby theymay cast off the burden of armaments, by sodoing only bring the country they serve nearer tothe very thing that they wish most to avoid;and when that hideous monster, War, is at hand,their country lies helpless before the nations thathave prepared themselves for the fray. Can anyman really believe that such poHcies as the Mon-roe Doctrine, the exclusion of Asiatics, and theguarantee of the neutrality of the Panama Canalcan be enforced by a court of arbitration?Yet these three great policies of American di-

plomacy are our policies of self-defense. Theyare the paper bulwarks behind which the Ameri-can nation defends its position and principles inthe world of competing nations. Once this bar-rier is overthrown, the very life of the nation as


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OUR SITUATION 7an independent and free people may cease to exist.Once the military nations of Europe or Asia haveseciired a foothold on the American continent,the United States will be forced to join the ranksof the military nations and, through a long,bloody, and exhausting war, hurl from the con-tinent those who have invaded the territories ofour assumed overlordship.In all discussions over armaments in this coun-try nowhere do we hear the voice of the states-men. Their influence has been directed to thecurtailment of our national defenses. How, then,can they acquit themselves before the nationwhen we are face to face with that final arbiter,war? These statesmen at the head of the gov-ernment cannot shirk the responsibility for themaintenance of an adequate force to insure vic-tory. A nation of 90,000,000 people, once setin motion against aggression, cannot easily bechecked. That the nation is unprepared for warand that defeat is inevitable cannot be forcedhome after the patriotic fervor of a nation isaroused. The statesman who has forced theissue, regardless of the unpreparedness of hiscountry, may well tremble and endeavor to avertthe danger so near at hand; but his puny poweris swept aside by the momentum of the outragednation, and he can only impotently contemplate theunequal struggle for which he alone is to blame.


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8 OUR NAVY AND THE NEXT WARThe only conclusion to be drawn is that the

American nation to-day is sorely in need of states-men who have studied the problems of our na-tional existence and are able to apply to theirsolutions organized knowledge, which is the onlybasis of success in modern life. The nation'swelfare must be intrusted to a continuing body ofstatesmen whom the nation can hold responsible.If we are to remain supreme in our territorialpossessions, including the Panama Canal; if weare to enforce the Monroe Doctrine in spite ofthe cupidity of nations that are now ruthlesslysacrificing hundreds of thousands of their men onthe battle-fields of Europe; if we are to excludethe Asiatic from our Pacific coast; if we are toinsist upon the open door in China for our trade,then the statesmen of our nation must keep incloser touch with the preparedness for war of thetwo arms of our national forces. They muststand ready to go before the covmtry and tell thepeople just which policies can be maintainedand which policies must be abandoned. It isthe statesmen, and not the military or naval men,who should be using their efforts to increase thepower and efficiency of our nation for the comingstruggle for the maintenance of oiu: position inthe world.

In every civilized country the organization andapplication of its resources is the basis of success


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OUR SITUATION 9InVar, Resources, when stripped of all collateralelements, reduce down to men, material, andmoney. The organization of these is whollywithin the province of the statesmen.

In Section VIII of the Constitution of theUnited States the authority is vested in Congressto raise and support armies and to provide andmaintain a navy, and, further, to make rules forthe government and regulation of the land andnaval forces. Who else shall decide upon thesize of the army and navy? If the army andnavy are inadequate for the purpose of supportingthe national policies, whom must the coimtryhold responsible ?

In time of war the civilian, as much as the sol-dier, is responsible for defeat and disaster. Bat-tles are not lost on the field alone; they may belost beneath the dome of the Capitol; they maybe lost in the cabinet; or they may be lost in theprivate office of the secretary of war or the secre-tary of the navy. But wherever they may belost, it is our people who will suffer and our sol-diers^patriotic citizens^who will die, with asudden, bitter knowledge that our military policyis a crime against life, a crime against property,and a crime against liberty.War affects the life, the liberty, and the prop-erty of every individual citizen. Beyond that,it imperils the life of the nation. On its issue


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lo OUR NAVY AND THE NEXT WARnecessarily depend the fate of governments andthe happiness of human beings, present andfuttire. The statesman should, therefore, con-sider it his duty to study peace and the causeswhich tend to preserve or destroy peace. Historyteaches us that peace ends in war. If the causeswhich terminate peace and produce war cannot beremoved, and if the legislator does not recognizeand know how to create a powerful army, he ceasesto be a statesman.We thus see that we cannot divorce ourselvesfrom the fact that national preparedness mustremain in the keeping of the statesmanthat is,the representative of the individualand that itis the statesman whom the nation must hold re-sponsible for the development of its physicalpowers. It is idle, nay, useless, to base the sizeof armies and fleets upon local opinions. Theseinstruments of diplomacy cannot be consideredas benefits to a section of the country only. Theyare national instruments, to be used by the nationfor the purpose of maintaining itself a free agentin the world of nations. That the Pacific coastor the Atlantic coast is not adequately preparedto repel an invader is not the care of the localpoliticians, but of the national statesmen. Theymust consider, in their demands for miUtary force,the political situation of the entire country andits probable enemies. AH decisions which a gov-


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OUR SITUATION iiernment is called upon to make are intimatelyconnected, and in the relations between them isto be sought the continuity of design or unityof purpose, which are different names for a policy.The endeavors of local politicians to deter na-

tional preparedness are the outcroppings of self-seeking in the nation. Their influence uponlegislation is harmful, and their effect is to dragthe national question of national defense into thearena of local party politics.A nation which becomes so absorbed in money-making pursuits as to neglect to take all thosesteps which are necessary to secure immvmityfrom attack ceases to impose respect, and socomes to be looked upon as an easy prey. It isonly by making costly sacrifices that a nationcan earn peace. History shows fuU well that

"HI fares the land, to hastening ills a prey,Where wealth accumulates and men decay."

Our present lack of preparedness will force usinto a slow and irregular transition to a warfooting, exposing the coimtry to the dangers ofthe defensive and the horrors of invasion. Thereal strength of a definite force depends upon thequality of its soldiers and its officers. Yet theUnited States has only one-tenth of one per centof its men trained for war. It is, therefore, onlyone-tenth of one per cent strong.


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12 OUR NAVY AND THE NEXT WARIn this agitation for naval and military pre-

paredness the country should not make the mis-take of laying the blame upon the shoulders ofthe political party in power. We must remem-ber that the party of opposite beliefs, during atenure in office of nearly a score of years, duringwhich our military weaknesses were just as evi-dent as they are to-day, often did very little toremedy the defects. It is the duty of the partynow in power, after it has seen the besettingdangers of the country's situation, to push reme-dial legislation. National defense should becomea national issue. The party out of power, if itis tmpatriotic, will grasp the opportunity of push-ing an advantage by declaring that the party inpower is failing to provide for the nation's safety,saying nothing of the fact that itself, when inpower, was as careless of the national needs.With national defense a party issue, those inpower will try to hush things up and prevent apanic. The effect wiU be, as usual, to defeat thetrue ends of the nation. The nation should besufficiently patriotic to agree that national defenseis outside of party lines, and both parties shouldbe willing to bring the search-light of pubUcopinion to bear upon the country's needs andstand together to enforce the remedy. Nationaldefense is not a political issue; it is a personalissue.


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CHAPTER IIOUR DIPLOMATIC POSITION

THE United States stands to-day as the greatarbiter of the western hemisphere. It hasexpanded, by conquest and ptirehase, from

the Atlantic to the Pacific. Its northern bordertouches the frontier of Canada, its southern bound-ary is washed by the waters of the Rio Grande,Conquest has carried the American symbol ofsovereignty into the waters of the Pacific to thevery gateway of China. The Caribbean, oncethe spoil of European nations, now may be saidto be almost Americanized by our acquisition ofPuerto Rico, by our virtual political dominationof these islands still vmder the rule of tropicalraces, and by owe possession of the Canal routeacross the Isthmus of Panama, through whichwill soon pass the commerce of the world.We have, in our hands, the making of a greatempire^not an empire of kings, but an empire inwhose womb lies the seed of the nation's funda-mental beliefs, recorded with such clearness inthe Declaration of Independence. The power is

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14 OUR NAVY AND THE NEXT WARours, if we are men enough to grasp it, to giveto the great world over which our policies haveflung their protecting arm those principles ofsocial life to us now fundamental: "that all menare created equal; that they are endowed bytheir Creator with certain inaUenable rights; thatamong these are hfe, Hberty, and the pursuit ofhappiness; that to secure these rights govern-ments are instituted among men, deriving theirjust powers from the consent of the governed."The individual has no right to regard the state

as a means for attaining his own ambitions. Thenation owes a duty to posterity which can be per-formed only through the self-sacrifice of the na-tion to-day. The territories over which flies theAmerican flag, and those territories over whichour institutions have spread their protecting wing,are a legacy from the past. They were handeddown to us, not to fritter away, but to developand conserve.With the avowed object of safeguarding these

principles of government to those over whom ournation has assumed the guardianship, we havelaid down certain policies which other nationsare called upon to respect. The most importantof these is contained in the message which Presi-dent Monroe sent Congress in 1823, in which hesaid: "We owe it to candor and to the amicablerelations existing between the United States and


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OUR DIPLOMATIC POSITION 15those European powers to declare that we shouldconsider any attempt on their part to extend theirsystem to any portion of this hemisphere asdangerous to our peace and safety."When we contemplate the great struggle ofblood which is now going on in Europe, a strugglefor survival, a struggle for domination, a strugglefor conquest, where the wealth of entire nationsis risked, can we still adhere to the belief thatthe mailed fist of some of those nations will notbe stretched across the seas to grasp the vastresources, as yet untouched, in the countries tothe south of us, from the Rio Grande to Terradel Fuego ?The Hmited boundaries of Eturope have becometoo narrow to confine the people of strong andvigorous nations seeking expansion. Alreadythose nations have peacefully penetrated intoMexico and Central and South America. Some ofthese nations have enunciated the principle thatit is the duty of a state to make war to advanceits own ideals and its own civilization. Upon thecompletion of this world war Europe will be evenmore of an armed camp. The devastation ofwar will have reduced the resources within theirown borders. The rich countries beyond theseas, basking under the sunshine of peace, willoffer them alluring inducements to sweep awaythat doctrine which has been so long distasteful.


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i6 OUR NAVY AND THE NEXT WARWhether this happens or not will depend onlyupon our power to prevent it. That power willrest with our naval and military forces. If theyare weak and incapable of maintaining the Mon-roe Doctrine, then that doctrine will pass intothe unknown. The integrity and neutrality ofthe Panama Canal will, of necessity, suffer thesame fate as the Monroe Doctrine, and, imless weare prepared to defend our position in the world,we shall all see the day when the fruits of Ameri-can labor, enterprise, and ingenuity will be con-trolled and administered by a foreign nation.Our colonial possessions and our control over theweak republics of the Caribbean will pass fromus because we shall have demonstrated our un-fitness to control their destinies. Our trade withthe Orient, even that with South America, will beparalyzed through hostile tariffs. Our own shoresmay feel the iron tread of the invader, and ourcities may suffer destruction.

It is a misconception entirely unsupported byhistory that nations, at the end of a great war,are exhausted. We have only to look to the con-dition of Germany after her war with France in1870 and to the military strength of the UnitedStates after the four long years of the Civil War.In 1865 the United States had a trained army ofa million men. Those men were warriors withfighting blood in their veins. Their love of coun-


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OUR DIPLOMATIC POSITION \^try was high above the mere lust for gold. Wehad great men and tried leaders^men trained onthe battle-field.But wherein lie our dangers, and how can they

be met ? The nearest and most important dangeris in the Pacific. By otir own hand we freedJapan from the isolation of centitries of seclusioninto a nation fully armed and equipped with thatmilitary spirit of which we, as a nation, are solacking. The rapid assimilation of Western ideasand the successftil appropriation of all the mate-rial elements of our Christian civilization by thatisland empire have astotmded the world. Withinthe last decade Japan has emerged conquerorfrom the struggle of two modem wars.

Ttie growth of the Japanese naval power mustcause us to look to the efficiency of our navy, forthe interests of Japan and those of the UnitedStates are, in some quarters, diametrically op-posed. Japan, at first friendly, has suddenlychanged her attitude in the tone of her diplomaticintercourse to one not as amicable. ! Nations areno more mindful of past favors than are indi-viduals. Friraidship between nations cannot al-ways stand the strain of a conflict of interests.A peaceftil conquest of China, and the domina-tion of its markets is apparently Japan's aimpeaceful if possible, but by force if necessary.During the present war Japan has seized the


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1 8 OUR NAVY AND THE NEXT WARislands that belonged to Germany, lying at thedoor of our own islands in the Pacific. Thesenew possessions of Japan threaten, if they do notsever, the lines of communication to our owncolonies. The occupation of Kiauchau by Japanis only another step in that domination of Chinawhich the Japanese statesmen have long in-tended.^An antipathy between races is not itself acause of war. The true causes of war betweennations have their roots in trade rivalry and inthe necessity for an expansion of territory for thesurplus population of a vigorous race; yet raceantipathy in the Pacific contains germs of possi-ble danger. The exclusion of Japanese from ourcountry might be used by Japan as a casus belli.However, the imderlying cause of a war betweenthe United States and Japan would not be forthe settlement of such a trivial matter. The truereason would be to enforce the Japanese "MonroeDoctrine" and cause the United States to evacu-ate her commanding positions in the Pacific. TheJapanese question may be definitely settled byliberating the Philippines and Guam and retiringfrom the Orient; but in the event of such an ac-

' It is interesting to note that Japan's ultimatum to the Germansat Kiauchau was the identical one which the Germans had pre-sented to the Japanese after the latter had won Port Arthur fromthe Chinese. Thus does the Oriental know how to bide his time.


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OUR DIPLOMATIC POSITION 19tion the United States must also give up its navalbases in those islands.^There are now only two great powers that canenter into a war for the supremacy of the Pacific;they are the United States and Japan. Japan'sadvantage in such a struggle is mainly due tothe fact that her entire empire is not only onthat ocean, but in the strategic centre of itswestern border.

Until the day when Japan has succeeded inclosing the ports of China to the commerce of allother countries by hostile tariffs, our commercewill seek to compete for its share in the trade ofthe Flowery Kingdom. That trade, once large,is dwindling year by year. American goods arebeing forced out of the Chinese market by similararticles manufactured more cheaply in Japan.To regain that trade is impossible unless greateraid is given by our government. No country canever win the trade of the Orient that does notmake it a national concern.As long as Japan is engaged in a commercial

penetration of China she may not yet divert herattention to a further development of the islandslying south of her. Japan, like Germany, isdominated by the military spirit, which accepts

* So far as the Philippines are concerned, we must either abandonthem 01 else provide ample means for their defense. There is notertium quid.


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20 OUR NAVY AND THE NEXT WARas fundamental the biological necessity of warand the duty of self-assertion. Such a nation ofwarriors will not hesitate to follow through itscarefully worked-out plan of national expansion,even though it encounters a nation of double thepopulation and treble the resources. Within thelast few years the contact with Western civili-zation has had a marked effect upon the Japanesepeople. Their character is undergoing a change.They are losing their military spirit and becom-ing more wedded to commercialism. This facthas been deplored by their statesmen, who werebom and trained under the precepts of Bushido,"the soul of Japan."Thus we see that in owning islands at her very

doors there will be many points of possible con-tact with this military nation of the Pacific. It,therefore, becomes our duty to prepare our armedforces in the event that we may be called uponto use them, not for aggressive action, but tomaintain our dignity in the Orient.

In the Atlantic our Monroe Doctrine has everbeen distasteful to Germany. For years she hasbeen colonizing Brazil until now she has there apopulation of over a million Germans. Whoeveris the victor in the present war in Europe, thespirit of the German nation cannot long remainsubdued. Even if defeated, it wiU rise up strongerthan ever, with its convictions as solidly implanted


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OUR DIPLOMATIC POSITION 21as before the war. Germany is one of the world'sgreatest maniifacturing peoples. She requirescolonies to supply the raw materials and food-stuffs needed in the Vaterland and colonieswherein to open a field of activity for the im-mense intellectual labor forces now lying unpro-ductive in Germany. Furthermore, Germanyrequires, for the protection of her trade, a basein the Caribbean. She has already entered intonegotiations with several of the minor independentgovernments bordering on that sea for the ac-qtiisition of such harbors for commercial pur-poses. WiU not the occupation of such harbors,even for commercial reasons, be considered bythe United States as a step toward a more generaloccupation later on, and would it not be resisted ?t If Germany shotdd be victorious in the strugglein Europe, which is not beyond the realms ofpossibility^if Germany were to wrest the com-mand of the sea from Englandthen our states-men will have to consider the question of theapplication and limits of the Monroe Doctrine.If we are willing to engage in a war with Germany,which wotdd probably be a naval war, at least atfirst, it is doubtful whether we cotdd protect ourinterests in the Caribbean and in South America.The movement of a fleet across the Atlanticwould not be a difficult task for her. It is onethat the German general staff has already worked


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22 OUR NAVY AND THE NEXT WARout to the minutest detail. She would have allthose diflQculties of long lines of communicationfor the transportation of supplies from her homebases to her fleet that the United States wouldhave if it attempted to move its fleet for hostilepurposes across the Pacific; but those are diffi-culties that German national efficiency, as re-flected in her army and navy, can much moreeasily overcome.While we should be engaged with Germany in

the Atlantic, Japan, no longer under the influenceof English politics, could work her will in thePacific. All our island possessions would fall be-fore her forces. America would be driven in be-hind her own original borders.The United States has long enjoyed immunity

from the interference of Europe and Asia in itspolitical affairs. This immunity has been duelargely to the policy of Great Britain. Throughthe powerful sentiment of the blood-tie betweenEngland and the United States the former hasbeen able to further its purposes on the Americancontinent without seriously alienating the friend-ship of the great republic. As long as Englandwas able to thwart Germany in her colonizationschemes she was content to tolerate the rivalryof America and willingly granted her moral sup-port to our Monroe Doctrine, while through heralliance with Japan she held the control over that


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OUR DIPLOMATIC POSITION 23country's aspirations in the Pacific. With sucha champion as England, our thoughts havenattirally been turned away from the possibledangers to our interests in case the equilibriumof forces in the world should become distxurbed.We have, in fact, reasoned, as a matter of course,that this equilibrium would always be maintainedand that the United States would never be re-quired to exert any effort to this end. This idea,to the American nation, has become an obses-sion. But the equilibrium is now about to bedisturbed. The present struggle in Europe can-not bring about any other result. Either Ger-many will emerge vanquished or England willsurrender the command of the sea to Germany.Whichever happens, it matters not which, thetime has now arrived for the people of the UnitedStates to awaken and realize the besetting dangerssurrounding them.

Let us stop and consider the characteristicsand attributes of this military power in thePacific. Japanese militarism is, perhaps, difficultto separate from patriotism. One is simply theexpression of the other. The organized strengthand patriotism of Japan is her defense. EveryJapanese considers it a privilege rather than amere duty to serve in the army. Under herefficient form of government the strength andefficiency of the army and navy have kept pace


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24 OUR NAVY AND THE NEXT WARwith the nation's commercial and industrial prog-ress. The well-ordered organizations of her gov-ernment and of her military services are funda-mentally sound. No conflicting lines of authorityor responsibility are permitted to exist. There-fore the greatest efficiency has been realized withthe money appropriated. Her military and navaldevelopment has been guided by miHtary states-men and executed by military and naval men.The size and power of her army and navy is basedupon a definite national policy. In efficiency andstrength both military services have thus far re-mained outside of politics. High command hasgone to those who have demonstrated their abil-ity in active service in war and peace. Such weU-ordered methods have given to the personnel theprecious qualities so vital to successful cohesion.The Japanese nation is united. Her navy hasbeen trained in the school of war. Her positionin the Pacific and her instant preparedness giveher the advantage of initiative. She owns nooutlying possessions which might, if captured byus, seriously affect the issue, while we have manysuch possessions lying defenseless within hersphere of operations. Her large and well-organizedarmy can be utilized to occupy as many of ourpossessions

, as she will deem advisable in orderto deny them to otu- fleet. With all possibleavailable bases in the hands of the Japanese, our


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OUR DIPLOMATIC POSITION 25fleet will have no base near enough to the Japa-nese coast from which it could operate in orderto control the seas in that area. Yet it is only bycontrolling the seas that we can hope to succeed ina war with Japan.

In the event of hostilities in the far East, then,the first decision that will have to be made byour statesmen will be: How shall we bring thewar to a successful conclusion? Hawaii will beovti only remaining island possession in the Pa-cific. With the fleet at Hawaii, and with Japancontrolling the waters of the far East how shallwe operate to bring her to terms? This is aquestion that would have to be decided by ovirnaval general staff, if one existed.A study of the history of the conflicts in whichgreat nations have engaged reveals two underlyingcauses of war: one is the control of commerce;the other is the possession of the sources of thosetwo great industrial necessities^metal and fuel.But the prime factor involved in the evolution ofa navy is the protection of trade, for the safe-guarding of which the laws of nations should beframed so as to give every confidence to thoseembarking on commercial ventures across the seas.In other words, a government should protect itscommerce as if it were its own enterprise. In an-cient times commerce was exposed to great risks,subject to constant pillage, and hunted down in


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26 OUR NAVY AND THE NEXT WARpeace as well as in war. Nations, therefore, ap-preciated the necessity of protecting their mer-chantmen, and commerce became an armed forcein the world. Even the purely commercial statesbecame armed powers for the protection of theirtrade routes.

But, curiously enough, the great political em-pires of the world formerly imperfectly developedtheir own industries and had little sympathy withany means of prosperity from without. Their soleaim was either to absorb under their own power-ful sceptre or else to destroy whatever was rich orgreat beyond their borders. Nothing is moremarked in the early history of the world than thisstruggle of commerce to obtain security.The strength of Rome lay in her legions; that

of Carthage in her ships. Carthage became thegreatest power in the Mediterranean and inheritedthe trade of her Phoenician ancestors, and also thetrade of Egypt, Greece, and Asia Minor. Butantagonism between the great military non-com-mercial power of Rome and the great militarycommercial power of Carthage, whose interestscrossed at so many points, caused the downfall ofCarthage and her destruction. At the same timeRome accomplished the destruction of anothergreat trade centre of which she was jealous,Corinth. Palmyra likewise fell half a centtiryafter the spoliation of Athens. And this policy


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OUR DIPLOMATIC POSITION 27of Rome, of wiping out all the outlying centresof trade, eventually caused her own downfall, be-cause it hampered her own power to hold orturn to profitable account these valuable con-quests.Rome never became a great trade centre, al-though the city grew to great size and requiredimmense imports of food to support its popula-tion. These imports came in the nature of taxes.For Rome neither supplied exports nor built up acarrying trade. Her contribution to civilizationwas her organization and her administration. Herservice to humanity was, therefore, political andnon-economic in character. In the arts and indiplomacy her citizens excelled, and through theirskill in these they succeeded in living on the laborof subject people. The "Pax Romana" was thecommodity which Rome exchanged for these con-tributions.By many the analogy between England andRome is considered noteworthy. England is theRome of to-day, but, unlike Rome, she herself isa great maritime nationa military one on theseas. Her geographical position was believed byher statesmen not to require a great army. Eng-land spread her civilization over the other conti-nents, as did Rome. England has organized theworld's commerce and by so doing has givenenormous impulses to the manufacturing Indus-


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28 OUR NAVY AND THE NEXT WARtries. But a nation, having fulfilled its mission incivilization and reached the zenith of its power,will decline. This is the law of nature. Germanyand the United States, and possibly Japan, arethe modem Carthage, Athens, and Venice. There-fore, if England is to remain predominant thesecommercial powers must be controlled. Evennow England employs in her industrial life manyGermans and Americans, because they are moreefficient, reliable, and painstaking than English-men. And for the maintenance of her enormouscommerce England, to-day, is indebted to thevolume of American and German trade.The rapid rise of the economic power of Ger-many has shaken England's faith in her own pre-

dominance. She fears the loss of her naval su-premacy and of her control over the commerceof the world. Her policy has been to restrictGermany's colonial expansion, for she fears therivalry of a more efficient race. Yet her fearof Germany is not half so great as her fear ofAmerica. Her statesmen see the importance offirst settling with Germany before the UnitedStates waxes stronger. Once the German fleethas been annihilated, then the suppression of po-tential American ambitions will be immeasurablyeasier. So long as the German fleet is a forceto be reckoned with, England dare not show hercloven hoof to the United States. Great Britain


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OUR DIPLOMATIC POSITION 29must sacrifice every consideration for the main-tenance of her naval supremacy.In i860 the United States owned 5,000,000 tonsof shipping, England only 4,000,000. The UnitedStates at the outbreak of the Civil War was in aposition to control the carrying trade of the world.The action of England in supporting the Con-federacy and desiring their independence waslogical and necessary were she to remain the mis-tress of the sea. Much of the shipping of theUnited States was destroyed by war-ships fittedout by the Confederates in English ports; andwhen the Civil War was over, England's carryingtrade totalled 6,000,000 tons, while that of theUnited States amounted to only 4,000,000, andwas rapidly on the decline.

In 1873 England owned 43 per cent of the mer-chant carrying trade of the world. The UnitedStates owned 14 per cent, and Germany 6 percent. In 1914 England owned 53 per cent, theUnited States 9 per cent, and Germany 13 percent. England's vital interest in the rebating oftolls to our coastwise shipping through the Canalis evident to all students of her commercialhistory. Even without rebating, the ship-build-ing industry in the United States will increase.There will, therefore, be a cut in England's carry-ing trade, for some of our trade that is now carriedin English bottoms will be carried under our own


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30 OUR NAVY AND THE NEXT WARflag. With the United States and Germany cut-ting into her 53 per cent, England fears she willlose her advantage.We have seen wherein lie possible points of con-tact between the United States and the three greatmilitary nations that are each determined tosecure its proportion of the world's commerce,and more than its proportion if possible. Be-tween these four nations^England, Germany,Japan, and the United States^the bulk of thecommerce of the world is divided. Where is thepower capable of limiting the share of each?There is but one power capable of accomplishingthis. That is the power of diplomacy backed byforce, or, in other words, the power of nationalefficiency.

It is not too much to believe that in the strugglefor commercial supremacy England will use everytool within her power to maintain her position.It is not too much to believe that England, some-time in the near future, may employ the militarypower of her ally^Japanfor the purpose ofeliminating one of her competitors. We havereason to believe that, thus far, England has pro-tected us from the military aggression of Japan.There is a report that in 1907 the Japanese mili-tary party had actually ordered operations againstthe United States^which contemplated nothingless than the occupation of the Philippine Islands.


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OUR DIPLOMATIC POSITION 31It has been said that troops were already on boardthe transports, and that these vessels were loadedand ready to sail at a moment's notice. Eng-land's veto alone stopped this movement. Shewas not ready to see America involved in astruggle with her ally, for America's trade wasstiU carried in British bottoms. How will she actafter our merchant flag again covers the seas ?America is too prone to confound military re-sources with miHtary strength. Military resourcescomprise the wealth of the nation, the numberof able-bodied men of miHtary age, and the num-ber of ships available for war. Military strength,on the other hand, is measured by the number oftrained soldiers properly organized and equippedthat may be brought to a given point at a giventime, and the number of war-ships fully mannedand trained that can be quickly concentrated forthe purpose of meeting the enemy's fleet. Let usremember that in 1900 China had a populationestimated at over 400,000,000. Yet her militarystrength was so inadequate that she was unableto prevent 15,000 foreign troops of Europe, Asia,and America from marching ninety miles inland,capturing her capital, and dictating terms ofpeace humiliating to every inhabitant of theMiddle Kingdom from within the very walls ofher Forbidden City.


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CHAPTER IIIMILITARY PEACE PREPARATION

IT is easily within the reach of every citizen todiscover the failure of our military policy.Our military writers have eloquently con-

demned it. General Washington, in his corres-pondence, dispassionately set forth its evils.

It is tmfortunately the popular impression thatour people acquitted themselves creditably as anation during the war of the Revolution, and itcomes as a shock to know that such was not thecase. Even with our country fanned to flameby the invasion by British troops it was difficult,almost impossible, for us to raise men to repel theenemy. Fortimately there were plenty of trainedofficers who voltmteered their swords, and thesewere influential enough in their communities toenroll volunteers. In the first skirmishes of thewar, notably at Bunker HiU, such veterans asPrescott, Putnam, Stark, and Knowlton were astrong factor in the behavior of the minutemen.But there were many occasions when, even whencommanded by experienced leaders, our miUtiaacquitted themselves none too well.

32


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MILITARY PEACE PREPARATION 33At this time the nation was a loosely knit con-

federation, an assemblage of small nations, eachsuflficient unto itself and jealous of all the rest.Congress called upon the colonies to furnish troops.Those that did not feel the effects of thewar in some cases refused to obey; the othersgrudgingly sent men, but far less than the numbersneeded. The necessity of a force owing allegianceto the United States exclusively, consequentlybecame imperative, and Congress fortunatelyheeded the timely advice and ordered the raisingof Continental troops in certain States near thepoints of invasion. It was a small beginning, butthis handful of regularly enlisted troops formedthe nucleus of the army which finally won us ourindependence.

Washington, who had the power of appointingofficers, at times was greatly discouraged at theimpatriotic attitude of those who sent in theirnames. Companies enlisted in one State refusedto serve under officers from another State."Many of the officers," he wrote, "sent in theirnames to serve in expectation of promotion;others stood aloof to see what advantage theycould make for themselves, while a number whohad declined have again Sent in their names toserve. So great has the confusion arising fromthese and many other perplexing circumstancesbeen, that I found it absolutely impossible to fix


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34 OUR NAVY AND THE NEXT WARthis very interesting business exactly on the planresolved on in the conference. The difficultywith the soldiers is as great, indeed more so, ifpossible, than with the officers. They will notenUst unless they know their colonel, lieutenant-colonel, major, and captain, so that it was neces-sary to fix the officers the first thing, which is, atlast, in some manner done, and I have given outenlisting orders."So discouraged was Washington at the failure

of his countrymen that he later added: "Theremust be some other stimulus besides love of coun-try, to make men fond of the service. Instead ofpressing to be engaged in the cause of their coun-try, which I vainly flattered myself woidd be thecase, I find we are likely to be deserted in a mostcritical time. Those that have enlisted musthave a furlough. The Connecticut troops, uponwhom I reckoned, are as backward, indeed, ifpossible, more so than the people of this (Massa-chusetts) colony. Our situation is truly alarming."

Again, in a private letter to a friend he unbur-dens his heart more completely. "Such a dearthof pubhc spirit and such want of virtue, such stock-jobbing and fertility in all the low arts to obtainadvantages of one kind or another in this greatchange of military arrangement I never saw be-fore, and pray God's mercy that I may never bewitness to again."


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MILITARY PEACE PREPARATION 35But there were so many desertions that it was

almost impossible for Washington and his officersto hold the men. Any system of voluntary en-listment necessarily places a government in theposition of a suppliant, and when patriotism andpopular enthusiasm no longer suffice to fill theranks, resort must be had to the vicious practiceof giving bounties to recruits. And that systemhas been found necessary in almost all of ourmilitary operations.

If we read the true military history of our coun-try, and not the highly colored accounts writtenfor the school-reading of our children, we shalllearn some startling facts of the disastrous efEectsof our past military policy. We shall find outthat at no time during the Revolutionary Wardid we have sufficient dependable troops. Afterfive years' experience, Washington, in a letter toCongress, expressed his opinion of ovir policyin these words: "Had we formed a permanentarmy in the beginning, which, by the continuanceof the same men in service, had been capable ofdiscipline, we never shotdd have had to retreatwith a handful of men across the Delaware in1776, trembling for the fate of America, whichnothing but the infatuation of the enemy couldhave saved; we shotild not have remained all thesucceeding winter at their mercy, with sometimesscarcely a sufficient body of men to mount the


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36 OUR NAVY AND THE NEXT WARordinary guards, liable at any moment to be dis-sipated, if they had only thought proper to marchagainst us; we should not have been under thenecessity of fighting at Brandywine, with an un-equal number of raw troops, and afterward ofseeing Philadelphia fall a prey to the victoriousarmy; we should not have been at Valley Forgewith less than half the force of the enemy, desti-tute of everything, in a situation neither to resistnor to retire; we should not have seen New Yorkleft with a handful of men, yet an overmatch forthe main army of these States, while the principalpart of their force was detached for the reductionof two of them; we should not have found our-selves this spring so weak as to be insulted byS,ooo men, unable to protect our baggage andmagazines, their security depending on a goodcountenance and a want of enterprise in theenemy; we should not have been the greatestpart of the war inferior to the enemy, indebtedfor our safety to their inactivity, enduring fre-quently the mortification of seeing inviting op-portunities to ruin them pass unimproved forwant of a force which the country was completelyable to afford, and of seeing the country ravaged,our towns burnt, the inhabitants plundered,abused, murdered with impunity from the samecause."Such were Washington's thoughts on our mill-


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MILITARY PEACE PREPARATION 37tary policy; on the value of raw recrviits; on thevalue of undisciplined men; on the value of the pa-triotism of oiur people. Since then has that valueincreased ? Has it not, on the contrary, lessened ?Even with our vast numbers, are we not worseoff to-day because we shall have pitted againstus a military force increased in like proportionsto our great increase in population ? Our smallarmy cannot furnish a sufficient nucletis of trainedtroops. The great disorganization and inex-perience so eloquently condemned by Washingtonwill be magnified many times to-day, for the fibreof the nation has degenerated since the days of '76.A truly dispassionate investigation of our otherforeign wars, and of our Civil War, will disclose

almost identical defects in policy. Tracing nearlyall of our sacrifices to the want of a military systemin our Civil War, and the abortive strategy of theWar Department, General Upton laid down theaxiom: "that a natioii which goes to war impre-pared educates its statesmen at more expense thanits soldiers." The strategy of the Civil War wasdecided by civilians who feared the power of adictator, not realizing that, while armies are cre-ated by war, dictators are bom only of disaster.Washington was not made a dictator until disasterovertook us. Yet this fear of a dictator inducedus, during the Civil War, to dispense with ourgeneral-in-chief after our armies had been disci-


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38 OUR NAVY AND THE NEXT WARplined and drilled ready for battle, with the resultthat the conflict was prolonged for four yearsthrough defective strategy, the blame for whichwe must ascribe to the system of government,which, in every war since the adoption of theConstitution and during the intervals of peace,has permitted a civil oflScer below the Presidentto override ovu military leaders and bring tonaught their wisdom and counsel.

Is it not time that we recognize the moral dutyof the State to train as many of its citizens aspossible in the use of arms ? Such training is notonly in preparation for war but also in order thateach individual may be benefited by a certainamount of military service which unquestionablyimproves his physical and moral stamina. It isfar wiser yearly to spend sufficient funds for pur-poses of defense than to waste vast simis ofmoney in futile attempts, at the last moment, toavoid a peril that has been disregarded during ageneration of fundamental blunders.

Military qualities are not second nature. As anation the American people shun military service.The occupations of peace are more pleasing andless exacting than the duties of a soldier. Theindividual looks upon military service as one inwhich his individualism will be stifled. His in-tellect resists such repression. But military train-ing, on the contrary, has the opposite effect.


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MILITARY PEACE PREPARATION 39For it reveals to the recruit the true plane of thenation's welfare, which is materially higher thanthat of the individual himself. If this couldonly be recognized by our people, the Americansoldier's calUng would be better understood andthe uniform of the government's defenders wouldbecome to him a badge of honor rather than, whatsome consider it now, a Hvery of shame.

Fvuthermore, our mihtary system must be de-veloped. War is the means of obtaining politicalends and of supporting the moral strength of anation when those ends are contested by rivalpowers. Without the means of waging war thenation's moral strength rapidly degenerates. Alarge standing army is not essential if the citizensof the country are trained in the use of arms. Allthat is required is a workable military system bywhich we can concentrate at the point of attacka sufficiently trained force to repel an invader.Our permanent coast defenses are of no valueagainst the attacks of a military nation unless

we have sufficient trained men and modem armsto protect them. For the defense of every har-bor of importance on both our Pacific and At-lantic coasts Congress has provided land forts.These fortifications can prevent an enemy onlyfrom landing on our shores within the range ofthe fortifications' guns. Their guns deny to theenemy the facilities of a commodious harbor for


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40 OUR NAVY AND THE NEXT WARdisembarking his troops until those guns havebeen silenced and captured. But recent warshave demonstrated that efficient military nationscan disembark large armies even in localitieswhere harbor facilities are not available. TheUnited States, dtiring the campaign of Santiago,when that harbor was denied us by Spanish guns,landed 15,000 soldiers on the open coast withouta single casualty. A more military nation thanourselves can readily disembark several hundredthousand men beyond the range of our forts'guns and, if we lack a mobile army of trained men,can attack our big guns from the rear and in anincredibly short time reduce our fortifications andobtain command of our harbors for their own use.Expensive fortifications, unguarded by a mobilearmy are, therefore, in the light of the lessons ofLiege and Maubeuge, a waste of the nation'smoney.A military nation such as Germany or Japancan, once our fleet has been destroyed or blockaded

in port, throw a trained army upon our coast-linewithin two weeks of the commencement of hos-tilities. Even if it were possible to know thepoint of landing, and we had the time to concen-trate our. entire regular force at that point, itwotild not be large enough or sufficiently equippedto stop the invader. The militia and State troopswould be of no value to us until they had been


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MILITARY PEACE PREPARATION 41trained as soldiers. This would require manymonths. Great Britain is now suffering the pangsof remorse over her military tmpreparedness.Millions of men are to-day being trained in Eng-land. If these men could have been despatchedto the Continental battle-field in the first week ofhostilities, the decisive battle of the war wouldhave been fought long since, and successfully forEngland! But the very men who should havebeen trained during peace in the use of arms ar-rived on the firing-line too late.To-day the United States is justified in devot-

ing most of its energies to the increase of its navalpower, for its fleet is now, as it was in 18 12 andin 1898, the nation's first line of defense. ,But

' with our fleet weaker than our probable antago-nist's, shotdd not our second line of defense bemaintained at double strength ? That secondline comprises our land fortifications and ourmobile army.. We all understand the value ofboundary fortifications. In following the greatwar in Europe, we have seen what great towersof strength they are when used legitimately torest the flanks of an army. The incalculable valueof the fortifications of Verdun, Toul, Epinal,and Belfort is apparent. Between these fortifica-tions the allied armies have been drawn up. Themobile army has saved the fortifications from de-struction, while the fortifications have supported


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MILITARY PEACE PREPARATION 43and the indemnity levied wovild cripple the na-tion for years to come. The cost of a navy tomake such a debdcle impossible is a mere pittancecpmpared to the great financial loss which wouldresult from a catastrophe such as this.The loss to the country through indemnity,

through loss by destruction, and loss by disloca-tion wotild amount to a figure beyond our com-prehension. In 187 1 Germany exacted an in-demnity from France of $1,000,000,000anamount sufficient to build fifty dreadnaughts.The loss by destruction from such a campaign in apopulous locality like New York would amountin addition to even more than the indemnity paidby France. And the loss in trade and commerce(for from the day the invader's foot sullied ourshores all business would stop) would amount toadditional htmdreds of millions.No military man of intelligence can refute thepossibility of such a disaster. And this would beonly part of the nation's losses. All of our coastcities covild be as easily reduced, laid waste, orplaced under tribute. Let us remember how, in18 14, the city of Washington was burned by ahandful of British troops. All the patriotism ofotir colonial ancestors did not suffice to arrest themarch of a few thousand regtilar British soldiers.Patriotism is a military asset only when it pro-duces trained soldiers for the nation's defense.


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44 OUR NAVY AND THE NEXT WARKnowing all this, we naturally ask ourselves

what defect in our system permits us to remainso vulnerable. The answer is known already toevery military student. It is the lack of sound mil-itary policy. The statesmen must hearken to thevoice of the country's military experts. Thestatesmen must be prevented from frittering awaythe legacy which our ancestors have handed downto us. They must put away the confusions thatwaste human possibilities. Good intentions donot constitute a strong government, nor do theyproduce an efficient nation. The noblest senti-ments can never supply the want of soldiers. Wemust, each one of us, urge our statesmen to studythe problems of national existence, and apply totheir solution the organized knowledge of the mili-tary experts, which can be the only basis of suc-cess to the nation. The statesmen must recognize,in their diplomacy, the real strength of the mili-tary and naval arm of the nation.

Universal military service in some form is theonly way of saving the country from itself. InAmerica the idea of patriotism is new, and hasbeen shaken by the constant introduction of for-eign blood. This introduction of new blood isdangerous for countries which are not sufficientlystrong to absorb it. The teaching of patriotismshould be one of the fundamental points whichthe educators should insist upon themost. The


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MILITARY PEACE PREPARATION 45educators, especially those who teach the child,must always remember that it is patriotism thatmust dominate in order to inspire in the child agreat admiration for his own cotmtry. We mustinsist that the teachers of our children do not ex-pound doctrines harmful to the nation. A teacheris free to be a peace man, an antimilitarist, oran antipatriot if he chooses, but at school hemust be silent upon these subjects. If he re-fuses to be silent, he should be at once removed.The effect upon the masses of those who harpupon antimilitarism and antipatriotism is almostas disastrous to the nation as its eflEect upon thegrowing child. This Utopian dream of a worldconfederation and the banishment of nationalcompetition and war addresses itself to the in-stinctive reflexes of a man or woman, to the spiritof self-preservation not of the nation but of theindividual. The proletariat, until it has beentaught, cannot conceive of such an indefiniteentity as a nation. If our teachers are allowed toinstruct our children that defeat is of small in-terest to their future, and that to fight is not goodfor them personally, then they will no longerfight when the national safety is menaced. Thosewho teach the masses that the good of the indi-vidual is higher than the good of the nation teacha lesson of cowardice that introduces egotism.A nation can Uve only if its citizens possess ideas


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46 OUR NAVY AND THE NEXT WARin common, and the idea of patriotism is the mostpowerful one for cementing a people together.Militarism may be a relative evil. In its extremeit is dangerous and ruinous to resources, butthere would be a still greater danger to the soulof the people if we attempted to repress patriot-ism. The police are very costly to maintain, yetno one talks of dispensing with them.Probably nothing at this moment is more dan-gerous to the future of America than the manyspeeches that are made by never-fight philan-thropists upon disarmament and universal peace.If we followed their advice our patriotism wotddbe entirely destroyed. We should be left at themercy of adversaries who have not disarmed.Let us rather wait before disarming until we knowthat we have no enemies in the world.

Universal military training should have as itsaim the development of moral qualities in the in-dividualsuch qualities as attention, reflection,judgment, and initiative. How seldom we findthese qualities among our masses and yet howfrequently they are encountered among those who,whatever their origin, have been trained as sol-diers or sailors! There are other qualities whichmilitary training-can produce, the most importantof which are submission to discipline, a spirit ofsolidarity, perseverance against difficulties, and awill to succeed. These qualities cannot be acquired


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MILITARY PEACE PREPARATION 47from books, but only from experience, and theirdevelopment results only from their exercise.We obey the laws of the community because thestrong arm of justice compels us to. As a nationwe can do right only when the habit of doingright and avoiding wrong has been learned bythe nation and becomes a subconscious act. Bytraining the individual, by making him subcon-sciously choose ttie right, the nation composed ofindividuals will subconsciously act according tothe principles of righteousness. Military train-ing will teach the individual to govern himself andhave a respect for duty. This military trainingfor the defense of the nation will create senti-ments in common and, above aU, an ideal in com-mon. Moral rules will be appreciated and ad-mitted to be fundamental. A nation cannotbuild its hopes on reason. "Htmian reason hasonly served to build fragile edifices which fall inruins before they are finished. It has built noth-ing solid, but has shaken everything. Peoplewho have trusted in reason believe no longer intheir gods, in their traditions, or in their principles.They believe, to no greater extent, in their chiefs,and they overturn them as soon as they have ac-claimed them. Not possessing in any degree thedirection of possibilities and realities, they livemore and more in the unfeasible and the unreal,following continually delusive chimeras." How


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48 OUR NAVY AND THE NEXT WARstrikingly this reminds us of our times! Popularheroes scarcely rise in prominence before they areoverthrown.

Of necessity, the ideal in whose defense a na-tion should exert itself is always a child of tradi-tion and never the offspring of will. An idealcannot be created by human will, and we mustaccept it without argument. The idea of "coun-try" cannot be created by our wills, and we mustaccept it without argument. This idea of "coun-try" represents, with us, a heritage of sentiments,of traditions, of thoughts, of common interests.To cherish and defend this idea must be learnedin our childhood. It is this idea in a nation thatmakes it strong, vigorous, progressive; Lackingthis idea makes it weak, spineless, and leads toits destruction.The general indifference of our people toward

national defense, the size and efiEectiveness of theirarmy and navy, is the result of a blind confidencein fate, which the faulty training in the schoolsfosters. If the children of the nation cotdd knowthat in every war in which the country has en-gaged otu- untrained soldiers broke and ran atalmost the first shot, while our trained soldierschallenged the admiration of the world by theirsteadfast courage; if the children could be toldthat our wars have been enormously protractedby the lack of sufficient trained forces in the be-


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MILITARY PEACE PREPARATION 49ginning to taie the initiative; if it could be im-pressed upon them that hundreds of thousands ofour women were made widows, and children or-phans, and that millions of men were crippled forlife because they were sent to the battle-fields un-prepared, knowing nothing of what awaited themthere, with officers as ignorant and incompetentin military duties as the soldiers themselves; ifour children covild be shown that $1,000,000 inpreparation before any of our wars would havesaved $50,000,000 later^if all this could be done,then indifference to the nation's safety wouldimmediately cease.Where is the historian who will write the realhistory of our past and point out to our children

the lessons so bitterly forgotten by this nation?Who . will tell them that the superb isolationwhich was once our protection is no more; thatin these days of great fleets of swift merchantmenan army can be moved by sea even faster than byland, and that we owe our immunity from attacknot to the enemy's fear of our latent strength butto the international jealousies and mutual dis-trust of those nations that desire to challenge ourcommercial supremacy and our political controlover the American continent ? Who will tell ourchildren that, despite arbitration treaties andtreaties to gain time, some day, not far inthe future, that challenge will come? The uni-


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50 OUR NAVY AND THE NEXT WARversal law must be obeyed. Already Europe andAsia are hungry. If we are to maintain otu" posi-tion in the world and acquit ourselves with honor,it cannot be done by written peace doctrines orby training one-half of one per cent of our peo-ple to oppose millions of trained soldiers. Who,in the most forcible language that can be written,will tell our children to pluck from their heartsthat deep-seated belief that somehow we couldbeat off any force that could be thrown againstus? This faulty tradition held to so doggedlyby the American nation will be its imdorng if itbe not eradicated from our national thought.


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CHAPTER IVNAVAL PEACE PREPARATION

MODERN history has shown us the neces-sity for the instant preparedness not onlyof our land forces but also of our navy.How rapidly in these days of rapid transportation

and of qtiick information a nation is hurried fromthe blessings of peace to the horrors of war theexperience of the last few years has brought home.A nation is given no time to collect its fleet, torepair it, to dock its ships, to call in its reserves(if it has any), to fill up the complements of thepersonnel.^ Time spent in placing in commissionreserve ships is time lost. The opportunity fortarget practice and training is past. Even thetime required to collect the necessary auxiliary

* "We have nosfeserve and never have had one," the secretary ofthe navy recently wrote to the Senate Committee on Naval Afiairs,in urging a small appropriation to perfect the organization of one."We are turning out every year into civil life 3,000 to 4,000 highlytrained men, who, if organized, would be ready on short notice toman our battleships, armored cruisers, and otiier naval vessels inreserve, and supplement the crews of the battleships of the fleet incase of war. No nation keeps in regular service in time of peacesufficient men to man all its fighting vessels, but there is none that

SI


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52 OUR NAVY AND THE NEXT WARvessels, which our fleet now lacks, may not begiven by a ready opponent. All these are peacepreparations that should be attended to in ad-vance of the declaration of war. The fleet is aninstrument that should always be ready. Itsplans of campaign should be prepared and knownto those of its officers upon whom the responsi-bility of success or failure in time of emergencyrests. Its administration diuing peace is not,therefore, a civil concern but a military one. Thedisposition of the ships, their training, the timesfor their repairs and docking, or, more compre-hensively, the entire work of the fleet should,in consequence, be outlined and decided bythe naval officers who will be called upon tofight it.From the beginning, one hundred and forty

years ago, the navy has been the willing andfaithful subordinate of the civil power and theindispensable instrument of the American peoplefor carrying into effect their national poHcy asexpressed by their chosen representatives in Con-does not provide for a trained reserve. The enlisted men of thenavy have been for years urging upon Congress and the department,the passage of legislation which will permit of their retirement upongraded rates of pay for certain periods of service. This measure willaccomplish what they want and at the same time give the countrya claim on their services as well as provide for the much-neededreserve."

This recommendation, most fortunately, was favorably actedupon by Congress only a few days ago. ,


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NAVAL PEACE PREPARATION 53gress. That control of national policy lies in thehands of our statesmen. The fleet, with its shipsand its bases, is the means to the end. Oncethe statesmen have invoked war to continue thepolicy of the government, they call upon themilitary to act. From that time forward an in-strument is called into the service, of diplomacywhich requires knowledge outside of the states-man's art. Its mastery requires a life study.The statesmen indicate the end to be attainedthat is a function of the State^but the method ofusing that force to accomplish the end requiresexpert knowledge beyond the knowledge of thestatesman. The statesmen continue to controlthe course of the war in so far as its developmentaffects the nation's policies with the enemy orwith other countries. They must stand readyto open negotiations whenever they feel that byso doing their country wiU be benefited. When-ever a statesman at the head of the administra-tion of our military departments assumes thathis position gives him the right of making militarydecisions, he materially weakens the efficiencyof that instrument of power which he shouldconsider it his duty to increase. Even duringthe years of peace the same principles of conductfor the statesmen and civil administrators holdgood. The creation of the instruments of force,their number and character, the location and


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54 OUR NAVY AND THE NEXT WARequipment of naval bases, the number of sailorsrequired to man the fleet, the employment andtraining of the fleet, the military administrationand up-keep of the fleet, together with all thosethings upon which the fleet is dependentallthese are functions which the miUtary must per-form. Untechnical civilian influence over anyof these functions must, in the end, prove dis-astrous.The civilian brings to his council the idea of

economy. His training in civil life, in mercantilepursuits, where the object of all business is finan-cial gain, has warped his mind to a worship ofeconomy. To him military efficiency has nomeaning. His attitude is a material one. Whenforced to decide between several articles of ma-terial, all of which in his imsdentific eye appearequally efficient, his decision naturally will goto the one in which the least money is involved.In consequence the article accepted by him maybe totally unserviceable to the mihtary require-(ment. The military man, on the other hand,takes no thought of the cost where efficiency isat stake. For him there is no second best. Onegun that will reach the enemy is worth a hundredwhose range is just too short. A milhon dollarsspent where military necessity demands may savea hundred million when war is declared. Allsuch questions are military ones, and where


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NAVAL PEACE PREPARATION 55these are involved the military decision aloneshould be considered.Naval ships are btdlt each for its peculiar r61e

in the service of the nation. Battleships, cruisers,scouts, destroyers, and submarines should becalled upon to perform only those duties whichwill perfect their training as instruments of war.Their organization and service should be con-trolled solely by military minds. These shipsshoiild not be scattered or dispersed on diplo-matic service. Their power lies in unity ofaction and in co-ordinate training. Their func-tion is battle and the preparation for battle.They should always be kept in the pitik of con-dition, fully manned and trained for the objectfor which they alone owe their existence. Thestatesman's control over this force should be onlyto unleash it against an enemy's fleet for thepurpose of emphasizing the national will. Thepeace duty of representing the nation on a foreigncoast belongs to gunboats, the non-nulitary unitsof the fleet, which should be built for that solepurpose. Such vessels may carry few gtms andsmall crews, but the emblem of nationaUty flyingat their flagstaffs is, nevertheless, still the em-bodiment of the diplomatic and military powerof the nation. Such a representative in a foreignport carries with it the same quantity of prestigeas the entire fleet, were it there assembled. It


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56 OUR NAVY AND THE NEXT WARis a mistaken idea of our diplomacy that a pur-pose can be better accentuated with many shipsof war than with one. Such a conception revealsonly a glaring weakness in a diplomacy, pointingto the hope of avoiding more drastic measuresby the use of a great show of force. If diplomacyhas proved its strength and its determination ofpurpose, then the sending of one gunboat will besufficient to announce that otu* diplomacy callsfor certain action, which, if refused, wUl lead toacts of coercion that will impose the dictum.Keeping the battle fleet as a unit at its work ofpreparation strengthens the hands of diplomacy;scattering it, using the units on eccentric mis-sions, destroys the unity and cohesiveness of thefleet as an instrument of war.

This is a point of view which the naval oflBceroften finds it most difficult to explain to thecivilian. Between him and his civilian friendsthere lies a great gulf which neither seems ableto bridge. Each apparently thinks in a differentlanguage. Words and phrases do not conveythe same meaning to each of them. It has beenrepeatedly asserted by some of our naval officersfor many years, and with more emphasis duringthe last two years, that the navy was not pre-pared for war. The civilian looked at the navallist and at the types and numbers of ships, heconsidered our great navy-yards, and refused to


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NAVAL PEACE PREPARATION $7believe that the naval man was in earnest. Hethen went aboard a battleship, he observed theofficers and men at work; he saw the marvellousorganization that exists on board our ships ofwar; he made a cruise in a single ship or withthe fleet; he noted jthe precision with which theships kept position and the ease with which theships were handled in manoeuvres, and then hecame to the conclusion that the naval man iswrong and belittled the efficiency of his owninstruments.But the naval man knows. He has studied

and observed the work of other nations. Heknows that, while we have the ships, the othernations not only have them also but use themlegitimately in preparation for war. He appre-ciates that the foreign governments make appro-priations each year for mobilizations and formanoeuvres in which each type falls into the placethat it would actually occupy in war. He knowsthat his country will spend the money to buildships, and to partially man them, but that it be-grudges the money for the training essential tomake them proficient in the art of fighting anenemy's fleet. He knows that while other na-tions have created general staffs, whose sole careis the making of plans and directing of the peaceadministration and training of the fleet, that inhis own country this most technical and neces-


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58 OUR NAVY AND THE NEXT WARsary work, when it is done at all, is usually directedby civilian control.^ He knows that military ad-vice upon the use of the fleet, upon the prepara-tion of the fleet, upon the training of the fleet,although given, is not always accepted.What we civilians do not seem to appreciate is

that the naval men have more than a personalinterest in the navy. They have a personal in-terest in the welfare of their cotmtry which thenavy alone can protect. The ban of secrecy hasprevented them from openly expressing their fullviews. Occasionally, an anonymous writer daresto raise his voice against the methods of navalcontrol. His criticisms are honest, and usuallyreflect the unanimous opinion of his colleagues.The mouthpiece of the navythe United StatesNaval Institute^has published article after articlecondemning our naval administration as faulty

* The General Board of the Navy has the supervision of the mak-ing of war plans, but as it has no legal status or executive power,it can neither compel action nor interest the "dvilian control" tounderstand them and take the action necessary. The dvilian secre-tary of the navy, thanks to our faulty system of administration, isleft in a state of complete isolation as regards the general manage-ment of the navy at large. There exists, as Secretary Moody testi-fied before the Naval Committee of the House, on April ii, 1904,"no body charged with the duty of giving responsible advice uponmilitary matters." " It is not enough," he added, " that there shouldbe plenty of officers ready to give him advice when he seeks it.There should be those charged expressly with the duty of studjringmilitary questions, and of giving advice for which they can be heldresponsible." What this "defect in a vital part" of our naval ad-ministration is, will be shown further on.


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NAVAL PEACE PREPARATION 59in principle, disastrous to the efficiency of thenavy, and dangerous to the welfare of the nation.The civil administrators, whenever they feel thatthey have been personally attacked, defend them-selves by appealing to our form of government,which, according to their statements, provides forcivilian control over the military. But suchstatements are only true in the wording and notin the intention of our form of government.Our government reflects the will of the people.

Our people are civilized and scientific in theircommercial dealings. If our citizens would stopand consider that one like themselves, untrainedand uneducated in naval matters, was makingfar-reaching military decisions; that, in fact, heheld in his hand the military direction of our navy,with all that goes with it, he would be aghast anddoubtless tremble for the futiure of the nation incase it went to war. The spirit of oiu: govern-ment requires a civilian at the head of the NavyDepartment to administer the financial expendi-tures allotted to the service by Congress.^ That

"It has been asserted," wrote Admiral Luce a few years ago,"that a naval officer of rank and experience should be placed at thehead of the navy. But naval officers are not fitted by training orhabits of thought for making good ministers of state. This is wellillustrated by the experience in England, where the civilian FirstLord, assisted by naval men, has proved the ideal. From the ex-perience of the greatest naval power of the day, we are, therefore,led to conclude that a civilian secretary of the navy, assisted by aboard of naval officers, is the main point in a naval administrationthat will stand the test of a great war."


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6o OUR NAVY AND THE NEXT WARcivilian should bring to the Navy Department aknowledge of business methods. The business ad-ministration of the Navy Department is in hishands. He is intrusted by the nation with thisgreat instrument of force, and the nation will ex-pect him to render an accotmt of his stewardship.The ultimate test of his success in war will be inthe exploits of the fleet. If he is truly honest withhimself and big enough to acknowledge thatthere is a great field of effort beyond his mentalcapabilities, through no fault of his own, he will,as any man would upon whom has been thrusta great responsibility, surround himself with menof known integrity and ability to direct thoseparts of his organization to which his knowledgedoes not extend. These men would further sur-round themselves with men whose knowledgewas more minute in the collateral branches of thenaval profession. In this way in the office of thecivil administrator of the navy would be formedwhat is termed in Europe a general stafiE.Our navy, in time of peace, is kept at peace

strength. For the purposes of war, either in theAtlantic or in the Pacific, a great increase of ourfleet would be necessary. There would have tobe purchased, or chartered, merchant ships, col-liers, oilers, supply vessels, ammtmition ships,tenders, mother ships, hospital ships, mine-layingships, and trawlers for mine-sweeping. Many of


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NAVAL PEACE PREPARATION 6ithese vessels would be ready for immediate use,but some would require conversion for their newmilitary duties. It has been found that, in orderto supply these auxiliary vessels to the numberand kind required for an oversea campaign, 80per cent of the American merchant marine onthe Atlantic and Pacific would have to be im-pressed on the outbreak of hostilities. The ac-quisition of all these vessels by the governmentwould completely paralyze our coastwise trafficand decrease the efficiency of the nation in itsmanufacturing and commercial activities duringthe continuance of military operations. If thewar is in the Pacific the transcontinental railroadswill have to utilize their fuel-carrying facilitiesto the utmost to carry the navy's fuel from thegreat coal and oil fields of the east to the Pacificslope. Foreign merchant vessels might be boughtby the government in large numbers, but theirpurchase would have to be completed before thedeclaration of war, and, besides, tmder our formof government no funds would be available forsuch purpose until actually appropriated by Con-gress. After the declaration of war no neutralcountry would permit its citizens to sell merchantvessels for war ptirposes to a belligerent. Aworkable scheme must, therefore, be preparedand prepared immediately to furnish the fieetwith this required quota of auxiliary ships, and,


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62 OUR NAVY AND THE NEXT WARat the same time, secure the nation's coastwisetrade to the ptirposes of the nation. This vastfield requires a study by both military and com-mercial men for its successful accomplishment. -The responsibility for the preparation of this

necessary means of prosecuting a naval war restSjin the meantime, with the navy. It would b^the duty of a naval general stafiE, did we havqone. The broad field of naval mobilization mustbe scientifically investigated. Investigation byindependent individuals or by the Navy Depart-ment bureaus working within themselves mayaccomplish a result

(1915) Our Navy and the Next War

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