1779 Massachusetts Avenue, NW Washington, DC 20036€¦ · Euro-Atlantic region. We set as our goal...

Carnegie Endowment for International Peace © 2012 All rights reserved

The Euro-Atlantic Security Initiative has been made possible by funding from the Robert Bosch Stiftung, the Calouste Gulbenkian Foundation, the Carnegie Corporation of New York, the Hurford Foundation, the Robert & Ardis James Foundation, the Nuclear Threat Initiative, and the Starr Foundation, and by support from the Institute of World Economy and International Relations of the Russian Academy of Sciences and the United World International Foundation.

The statements made and views expressed in these reports are solely the responsibility of their authors.

For electronic copies of this report, visit: CarnegieEndowment.org/pubs

Carnegie Endowment for International Peace 1779 Massachusetts Avenue, NW Washington, DC 20036 Phone: +1 202 483 7600 Fax: +1 202 483 1840 CarnegieEndowment.org

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E U R O - A T L A N T I C S E C U R I T Y I N I T I A T I V E | F I N A L R E P O R T

CONTENTS

INTRODUCTION ............................................................ 6

THE CHALLENGE ........................................................... 7

THE PROPOSAL ............................................................ 8

Military Security ................................................................ 10

Human Security ................................................................. 12

Economic Security.............................................................. 14

INITIAL PROGRAM OF ACTION ....................................... 16

CONCLUSION ............................................................. 18

COMMISSION MEMBERS ............................................. 19

THE EURO-ATL ANTIC SECURIT Y INITIATIVE ..................... 32

THE CARNEGIE ENDOWMENT FOR INTERNATIONAL PE ACE ............................................... 32

The report we present here is the product of two years of effort by a group of former senior officials from government, the private sector, and nongovernmental organizations who came together as participants in the Euro-Atlantic Security Initiative. Our agenda has been to address the future security needs of the Euro-Atlantic region. We set as our goal the development of an intellectual framework for our nations, societies, and peoples to build a security system that will meet the twenty-first-century security challenges that face our region.

Our report sets forth practical steps to begin building this future and calls upon our leaders, governments, and societies to act. As co-chairmen of the Euro-Atlantic Security Commission, we present this report with the endorsement and support of all commission members. We hope that our effort will lead to greater security for all in our region and to our region’s strengthened capacity for global leadership in the promotion of increased stability, safety, and progress in the world beyond.

Funding for the project has come from all three corners of the Euro-Atlantic region, and for that we are deeply grateful to the Robert Bosch Stiftung, the Calouste Gulbenkian Foundation, the Carnegie Corporation of New York, the Hurford Foundation, the Robert & Ardis James Foundation, the Nuclear Threat Initiative, the Starr Foundation, the Institute of World Economy and International Relations of the Russian Academy of Sciences, and the United World International Foundation. Throughout the two years, the staff of Carnegie Endowment for International Peace has provided critical organizational support.

Igor Ivanov Wolfgang Ischinger Sam Nunn

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Today, unprecedented challenges from without and within threaten to reverse the progress toward the safe, secure, undivided Euro-Atlantic world hoped for in the wake of the Cold War. Moreover, these challenges risk both overwhelming the security structures of the Euro-Atlantic region and leaving our nations incapable of global leadership in the new century. To overcome that future, a twenty-first-century problem demands a twenty-first-century solution, one that at last builds an inclusive, effective Euro-Atlantic Security Community.

I N T R O D U C T I O N

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THE CHALLENGETwo decades after the breakup of the Soviet Union, Euro-Atlantic security cooper-ation continues to be blighted by Cold War postures and thinking. The vision of a safe, secure, and undivided Euro-Atlantic world that so many hoped for has not come to pass. Old twentieth-century divisions along with unresolved post–Cold War security issues and patterns of thinking rooted in confrontation perpetuate mistrust and division within the region and leave its nations and societies dangerously ill-prepared to handle the challenges of the twenty-first century.

To remedy this urgent problem, a unique process was created in 2009 called the Euro-Atlantic Security Initiative (EASI). This project brought together former policymakers, diplomats, generals, and business leaders from Russia, North America, and Europe to look at options to address the region’s faltering security system and to chart a roadmap of practical action that would lead to a more secure future.

What was a good idea two years ago has now become a political imperative. Eco-nomic malaise and a crisis of leadership and legitimacy have left the peoples of this huge region feeling disillusioned, discontented, and skeptical of politics. There has been a renationalization of decisionmaking and a weakening of traditional bonds between North America and Europe as nations turn inward. Historical enmities between Russia and the United States and among others across the region inhibit effective cooperation in meeting urgent security challenges, such as the risk of renewed violence raised by unresolved conflicts between and within Euro-Atlantic states, the threat of cyberwar, and the tensions generated over the critical trade in gas. At the same time, the lack of Euro-Atlantic unity prevents governments and leaders from providing the global leadership so essential in a stressed and increasingly fragmented international order.

There are precedents that give hope that today’s dysfunctional system can change for the better. The successful manner in which European economic cooperation was built out of the wreckage of the Second World War and the way in which the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) has successfully brought old enemies together under a common security umbrella show that it is possible to work together.

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The ideological divide between a communist East and capitalist West has disap-peared. Precedents have also addressed historical mistrust, providing practical exam-

ples of cooperative efforts that have united rivals in the past: Russia and the United States share responsibil-ity for a research station in space; it is accepted practice for Russian companies to engage European and American directors and for Europe and the United States to host

investment from Russia’s market. There is a growing pattern of cooperation and engagement across formerly impassable frontiers that provides a base on which to build.

THE PROPOSAL As a result of our discussions and study, we concluded that the only means to assure the long-term security of our peoples lies in building an inclusive, undivided, functioning Euro-Atlantic Security Community—a community without barriers, in which all would expect resolution of disputes exclusively by diplomatic, legal, or other nonviolent means, without recourse to military force or the threat of its use. Governments within this community would share a common strategy and understanding in the face of common threats and a commitment to the proposition that the best and most efficient way to tackle threats, both internal and external, is through cooperation. As part of this process, the security of Ukraine, Georgia, Moldova, and other new states must be assured and the area’s frozen conflicts resolved. We believe, in short, that our security problems can only be solved by working together and that we can no longer afford or accept the divisions of the past that stand in the way of that cooperation.

Our target is ambitious and will be the work of decades. But unless we begin to move in this direction now, the risk that the Euro-Atlantic community may retreat to old patterns of suspicion, confrontation, and distrust is all too real.

To avoid such a regression and the decrease in security for each of our countries that would certainly follow, our region will need to take an approach to security different from that of the last two decades: rather than relying primarily on expanding existing alliances, creating more new institutions, or drafting more treaties and declarations,

Nothing short of a transformation of relations among states and

societies will suffice.

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nothing short of a transformation of relations among states and societies will suffice. The way forward must focus on overcoming mistrust between Russia and the United States and the security fears that perpetuate it. No less must it strive for a historical reconciliation between states whose lingering enmities plague many parts of the Euro-Atlantic region. To begin, we urge steps that will foster cooperation on practical tasks, initiate new patterns of action, and open a process in which key parties work together. They in turn must be guided by ambitious goals. Two are particularly important:

• To transform and demilitarize strategic relations between the United States/ NATO and Russia

• To achieve historical reconciliation where old and present enmities (for example, between Russia and its neighbors, Turkey and Armenia, Moldova and Transnistria, and the communities in Cyprus) prevent normal relations and cooperation

Launching and advancing this process depends on identifying a few critical areas where progress would break the current inertia and give the idea of building a Euro-Atlantic Security Community tangible form. We propose six initiatives in three critical areas. These six initiatives, however, only have a chance if there is strong leadership from the United States, Russia, and the European Union (EU) acting together. Strong leadership on the part of the three, moreover, must involve more than invigorated traditional diplomacy. In a world of new communications technolo-gies, global information space, and populations demanding their voice, effective security can only be built by making better use of underutilized institutions such

The way forward must focus on over-coming mistrust between Russia and the United States and the security fears that perpetuate it.

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as the Organization for Security and Cooperation in Europe (OSCE) and the untapped potential of civil society (churches, academic and scientific institutions, and nongovernmental organizations).

1. MILITARY SECURIT Y

The bedrock of Euro-Atlantic security depends on eliminating the use—or threat of use—of military force to settle disputes within the region. Two steps are particularly important:

Dialogue to Increase Stability and Reduce Tension

We urge U.S., NATO, and Russian national leaders to mandate a serious and sustained dialogue at both the military and political level on steps to increase warning and decision time so that no nation is left to fear a “short warning” attack. If Cold War nuclear postures are to be eliminated and security policies reoriented to address twenty-first-century threats, military leaders and defense officials must be charged with engaging in a comprehensive and sustained dialogue that includes all aspects of the problem: perceptions, capabilities, operational doctrines, and intentions.

The goal would not be a formal negotiated treaty or new security architecture but rather a dynamic confidence-building process to lengthen warning and decision-making time in both of Europe’s military spheres—conventional and nuclear. It would unfold in a variety of forums, with some involving all Euro-Atlantic states, others at a bilateral level.

In the conventional area, the dialogue could, for example, focus on transparency in deployments, limits on exercises near the NATO-Russian border, constraints on maneuvers and reinforcements in quarters of Europe where sensitivities are highest, and a readiness to eschew the forward deployment of certain offensive weapons systems. In the area of tactical nuclear weapons it might stress the stabilizing effect of separating warheads from delivery systems and storing them some distance apart. And in the area of missile defense, the dialogue, by stressing steps such as shared intelligence and jointly manned operations centers, would seek to eliminate the risk that either NATO or Russia would misread a decision to launch interceptors.

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In addition, the dialogue could address new areas of concern such as cybersecurity. The United States, Europe, and Russia have unmatched resources for dealing with this problem, provided that together they define legitimate and illegitimate cyber-activity, standardize and strengthen national legislation against cybercrime, create cooperative early warning systems, share information on “best practices,” and develop a network of national agencies willing and able to share research and innovation for enhancing the resilience of key Internet protocols.

Missile Defense

To bury lingering Cold War attitudes once and for all and become genuine strategic partners, NATO and Russia must learn to cooperate at the strategic level. We believe that, despite the current diplomatic impasse, cooperative missile defense offers an avenue to the larger goal of transforming the very nature of security relations between the Russian Federation and the United States/NATO. In other words, it can be a game changer.

Success must be the highest priority of our governments. Were the three sides to begin fashioning such a shared system, they would be removing an issue that has poisoned U.S.-Russian relations for two decades and instead be creating a powerful new instru-ment of cooperation. U.S.-NATO-Russian missile defense cooperation is not only insurance against a potential intrinsic threat but also a critical component in building a larger security community, and it must not be allowed to fade from the very center of the security agenda.

In turn, failure to achieve a cooperative approach to missile defense risks being a “game spoiler,” with deeply damaging effects not only on the prospects of moving toward a more inclusive Euro-Atlantic Security Community but also on the future of security cooperation in general and U.S.-Russian relations in particular. The consequences of failure are predictable. We have been there before: an arms buildup

NATO and Russia must learn to cooperate at the strategic level.

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at great economic cost, heightened tension and mistrust, and the increased likelihood of nuclear miscalculations on both sides. This is a failure we cannot allow to happen.

The seasoned policymakers and senior experts in EASI’s Working Group on Missile Defense, drawn from the United States, Europe, and Russia, were able to agree on a basic concept for a cooperative missile defense system, the principles under-lying it, and an architecture giving it practical expression. Their success

can be found in the working group’s paper, and should serve as a model for both process and substance as the sides negotiate the issue.

2. HUMAN SECURIT Y

The issues of historical reconciliation and protracted conflicts are intertwined. Pro-tracted conflicts make it harder to achieve historical reconciliation, and the absence of historical reconciliation complicates the resolution of conflicts.

Promoting Historical Reconciliation

A process of historical reconciliation will be essential to establishing a new and effec-tive Euro-Atlantic Security Community. Recent success in addressing old frictions in Polish-Russian relations, the settlement of long-standing border issues between Russia and Norway, and the long-term experience of Finnish-Russian relations indicate that leadership and commitment can yield progress toward normal relations. All countries in this region need to work on removing historical impediments to normal relations and cooperation.

We have carefully reviewed the potential for such positive diplomacy. We believe that relations between Russia and the Baltic states hold a promising opportunity. Success will not come easily, but the recent Polish-Russian experience provides useful lessons. Building on steps that have already been taken, the leaders of the Baltic states and Russia should intensify efforts to address the issues that continue to divide them and their societies. In doing so, certain principles deserve attention as guideposts for this process, recognizing, however, that only strong and self-confident partners can reconcile:

All countries in this region need to work on removing historical

impediments to normal relations and cooperation.

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• Seeking justice for the sake of justice is not enough.

• The perception of being in the national interest is a necessary prerequisite for historical reconciliation.

• Demonstrating respect for the formerly aggrieved party by treating it as a genuine equal is critical.

• Reconciliation is primarily a bilateral process driven by the specific needs of the parties and the opportunities open to them.

• The more powerful partner should take the moral lead.

• Reconciliation can be achieved only by dealing squarely and with the greatest sensitivity with the most serious historical grievances and topics of potential controversy.

• Symbolic gestures count.

• Formal statements laying down the agreed official view of history should be strongly considered.

• Civic forums and churches can play a leading role in rebuilding ties between the influential elements of civil societies.

Protracted Conflicts

Protracted regional conflicts poison the politics of the societies party to them, retard broader regional economic development and integration, and pose the very real risk of escalation to crisis. For too long, conflicts in Cyprus, the South Caucasus, and the Balkans have disrupted efforts at broader regional cooperation. Together Russia, the United States, and the leaders of Europe should lead the way in reenergizing conflict resolution in the Euro-Atlantic region. The emphasis should be on developing new means to strengthen diplomacy, to supplement traditional negotiation with the use of instruments of civil society, and to build support for peace within the elite and wider publics of conflicting parties. In reviewing the present protracted conflicts, we

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believe that applying the following approaches to them, including the long-standing impasse in Moldova and between Armenia and Azerbaijan, could hold promise:

• Implement a new civil-society approach to protracted conflicts.

• Insist that leaders on all sides of the conflict work actively to make rejection of war by the population a top priority.

• Expand traditional diplomacy to include Track II dialogue, “next generation” meetings, and the use of social media to foster a spirit of greater accommodation at the popular level.

• Employ former heads of state and government, such as the assembly of elders created by Nelson Mandela, to address critical bottlenecks.

• Make the rights of national minorities and of individuals and the right to self-determination on individual and group levels—without necessarily a right to secession—central to conflict resolution.

• Encourage intersocietal links and a culture of dialogue.

• Elevate the OSCE to a key, albeit nonexclusive, role in providing the framework for a reenergized effort to resolve protracted conflicts, including initiatives with civil society and as the link between traditional and Track II diplomacy.

3. ECONOMIC SECURIT Y

Economic security, specifically energy security, is integral to the overall security of the Euro-Atlantic region. Two areas in particular are fundamental to advancing cooperation and economic security: natural gas and the Arctic.

Natural Gas

The mutual prosperity and economic security of Russia and the EU depend on a stable and sustainable system of production, transit, and consumption of natural gas. While energy disputes among regional actors have frequently escalated into security disputes, a stable supply of energy benefits all of the region’s economies. The current economic stresses afflicting European economies, which will not soon disappear, make it more essential than ever to convert this central dimension of the region’s

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security into a positive resource for cooperation rather than a source of friction and division. It is important, therefore, that states across the Euro-Atlantic region adopt a program of action emphasizing several key cooperative steps:

• Increase cooperation on improving energy efficiency as pursued in both the U.S.-Russian Bilateral Presidential Commission and the EU-Russia Energy Dialogue.

• Create formal machinery, drawing on resources across the Euro-Atlantic region, tasked with jointly advancing research and design in energy innovation and efficiency.

• Explore specific steps by which the divergent Russian and EU energy markets can be made more compatible.

• Strengthen the new EU-Russia early warning mechanism with defined responsibilities for all parties.

• The national leadership of the EU and Russia should endorse and set about implementing the concrete steps to improve energy-related investment recommended by the bilateral business-led working group organized under the EU-Russia Energy Dialogue.

The Arctic

The Arctic is where three of the twenty-first century’s greatest challenges intersect: the pressing need for hydrocarbon resources, climate change, and the tendency to securitize areas containing these resources as well as the passages to them. Hence, the Arctic is a test of Euro-Atlantic countries’ capacities to deal constructively not only with each of these challenges but with the synergy among them. Plainly put, the

Natural gas and the Arctic are fundamental to advancing cooperation and economic security in the Euro-Atlantic region.

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Arctic should be thought of as an auspicious chance to build the groundwork for a Euro-Atlantic Security Community.

To do so, the states of the Euro-Atlantic region, and first among them the Arctic littoral states (Canada, Denmark, Norway, Russia, and the United States) and other members of the Arctic Council (Finland, Iceland, and Sweden) must find ways to collaborate in addressing six core challenges. They are:

• First, to achieve peaceful, legal resolution of claims to hydrocarbon resources;

• Second, to meet the technological challenges in procuring and transporting hydrocarbon resources;

• Third, to protect the Arctic’s fragile ecology;

• Fourth, to create the institutional wherewithal by which to effect these goals;

• Fifth, to protect the interests of indigenous peoples within the region; and

• Sixth, to ensure that the Arctic does not become a new arena of military competition.

There are several important means of addressing these challenges, including the strengthening of the Arctic Council’s authority, the conscientious development and use of technologies to safely exploit the hydrocarbons in this region, and the establishment of ongoing multilateral dialogues to avoid military competition.

INITIAL PROGRAM OF ACTIONTo begin building a new security community, we urge the leaders of Russia, the United States, and Europe to demonstrate their commitment to this idea by action. There are a number of practical steps that can be taken within the next eighteen months to begin the process:

1. The leaders should publicly pledge their support for the vision of a Euro-Atlantic Security Community in advance of the May 2012 NATO summit.

2. At the NATO summit, the leaders should adopt a two-part agenda to arrest the trend toward increasing confrontation and conflict in Europe:

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• Mandate senior military leaders and defense officials to explore reciprocal steps designed to lengthen warning and decision time in Europe in both the conventional and nuclear spheres.

• Further missile defense cooperation by restoring NATO-Russia military exchanges and exercises in ballistic missile defense under the NATO-Russia Council.

3. The leaders should establish and fund a group of former heads of state/ government (analogous to the Elders created by Nelson Mandela) to reenergize conflict resolution in the Euro-Atlantic region under OSCE auspices, beginning with Moldova and Armenia/Azerbaijan.

4. To promote further progress in Polish-Russian historical reconciliation and stimulate a more comprehensive effort between Russia and the Baltic states, each of the countries concerned should open all archives essential for addressing difficult issues between the parties involved.

5. The leaders of Russia and the European Union should establish a joint Center for Energy Innovation and Energy Efficiency as urged in the 2010 EU-Russia Energy Dialogue report, but enlarged to include countries from the entire Euro-Atlantic region.

6. The EU and Russia should strengthen the early warning mechanism established in 2009 to deal with potential short-term disruptions in the European gas supply by undertaking mutual obligations and a detailed backup plan.

7. Leaders, under the auspices of the OSCE, should announce the goal of visa-free travel across the entire region and begin the step-by-step abolition of visa regimes through action to allow multiple-entry visas to citizens of all nations.

8. The members of the Arctic Council should begin a formal high-level dialogue exchanging information on national defense planning for the Arctic and seek specific ways to coordinate initiatives with the aim of enhancing mutual security in the region.

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CONCLUSIONThis initiative began at a time when numerous international developments of a global and regional nature had reawakened frictions between old adversaries. Two years on, the states of the Euro-Atlantic world are in the midst of complex and difficult moments of political and economic change and social uncertainty, making both the international environment and the course of events within our societies ever more unpredictable.

Animated by the dangers of renewed strategic confrontation and by a determination to look for an alternative way, we came together to develop an intellectual framework for a different future, a future that could deliver on the promise of a Euro-Atlantic world undivided, prosperous, and at peace.

The foregoing report is based on a strategy of cooperation, not confrontation, in the belief that this is the only way for the region to prosper in a world of shifting and of-ten dangerous global dynamics. The ultimate goal should be a Euro-Atlantic Security Community that is built on mutual respect, concern for the other party’s security, the elimination of the fear of military threats from neighboring states or alliances, and cooperation in meeting new security and economic challenges.

C O M M I S S I O N M E M B E R S

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CO-CHAIRS

WOLFGANG ISCHINGER Germany

Wolfgang Ischinger is the chair of the Munich Security Conference and global head of government relations at Allianz SE in Munich. He has served as Germany’s ambassador to the United Kingdom and the United States, and as state secretary (deputy foreign minister) of the Federal Foreign Office. He was previously the German political director, leading the German delegation at the Dayton peace talks. He started his career on the staff of the secretary- general of the United Nations in New York, was part of the Policy Planning Staff of the Federal Foreign Office, and worked at the German embassies in Washington and Paris. He serves on a number of boards and advisory councils of international and European institutions.

IGOR IVANOV Russia

Igor Ivanov is the president of the Russian International Affairs Council and a professor at the Moscow State Institute of International Relations. Previously, he served as Russia’s minister of foreign affairs and secretary of the Security Council. Prior to those positions, he represented the Soviet Union and then the Russian Federation as ambassador to Spain. Ivanov has also worked as a researcher at the Institute of World Economy and International Relations of the USSR Academy of Sciences. He has published a number of studies and articles on the history of Russian foreign affairs and foreign policy.

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SAM NUNN United States

Sam Nunn is co-chairman and chief executive officer of the Nuclear Threat Initiative. He served as a senator from the state of Georgia for twenty-four years and is retired from the law firm King & Spalding. He previously served as a member of the Georgia House of Representatives. During his tenure in the Senate, Nunn served as chairman of the Senate Armed Services Committee and on the Permanent Subcommittee on Invest- igations. He also served on the Intelligence and Small Business Committees. He is a distinguished professor in the Sam Nunn School of International Affairs at the Georgia Institute of Technology and the chairman of the board of the Center for Strategic and International Studies in Washington, D.C.

DIRECTOR

ROBERT H. LEGVOLD United States

Robert H. Legvold is Marshall D. Shulman Professor Emeritus in the Department of Political Science at Columbia University, where he specializes in the international relations of the post-Soviet states and earlier served as director of Columbia’s Harriman Institute. Legvold is a former trustee of the Carnegie Endowment for International Peace and a member of various advisory boards, including those of the Committee on International Security Studies of the American Academy of Arts and Sciences, the Watson Institute for International Studies at Brown University, the Center for Global Politics at the Freie Universität Berlin, and the Foundation for International Peace and Democracy, led by Mikhail Gorbachev. He is a fellow of the American Academy of Arts and Sciences, where he recently directed the Academy’s project, “Rethinking U.S. Policy toward Russia.” He is also a foreign member of the Russian Academy of Social Sciences.

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MEMBERS OF THE COMMISSION

CHARLES BOYD United States

Charles Boyd is the Starr Distinguished National Security Fellow at the Center for the National Interest. He served as president of Business Executives for National Security (BENS) from 2002 to 2010. Before joining BENS, he served as senior vice president and Washington program director of the Council on Foreign Relations. He retired from the United States Air Force in 1995 as a four-star general and deputy commander in chief of the U.S.-European Command. He previously served in NATO’s Southern and Central Commands. Following his retirement from active duty, he was director of the 21st Century International Legislators Project for the Congressional Institute, a strategy consultant to the Speaker of the House of Representatives, and executive director of the Hart-Rudman National Security Commission.

DESMOND BROWNE United Kingdom

Desmond Browne is a British Labour Party politician who was a member of Parliament for Kilmarnock and Loudoun from 1997 to 2010, and a member of the cabinet under Tony Blair and Gordon Brown. After holding successive ministerial posts, he served as secretary of state for defense from 2006 to 2008. Currently, he is the convenor of the Top Level Group of UK Parliamentarians for Multilateral Nuclear Disarmament and Non-Proliferation and convenor of the Executive Board for the European Leadership Network for Multilateral Nuclear Disarmament and Non-Proliferation.

HIkMET ÇETIN Turkey

Hikmet Çetin is a former minister of foreign affairs of Turkey. His political career began after his election to Parliament in 1977 as a member of the Republican People’s Party (CHP). He was appointed deputy prime minister in 1978. After being reelected to the Parliament from the Social Democratic People’s Party (SHP), Çetin

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worked at various executive levels within the SHP, including as secretary-general. In 1991, he was reelected to the Parliament and later served as minister of foreign affairs in the two coalition governments between 1991 and 1994. Following the merger of CHP and SHP, he was elected chairman by the joint convention of both parties. He was once again appointed minister of state and deputy prime minister in 1995 and was elected speaker of the Turkish Grand National Assembly in 1997. In 2003, he was appointed as NATO senior civilian representative for Afghanistan and served in Kabul until 2006.

OLEkSANDR CHALYI Ukraine

Oleksandr Chalyi served as foreign affairs adviser to the Ukrainian president from 2006 to 2008. Prior to assuming this position, he was first deputy foreign minister from 1998 to 2001 and again from 2002 to 2004; state secretary of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs on European integration issues (2001–2002); and the permanent representative to the Council of Europe (2001). Chalyi also served as ambassador to Romania (1995–1998) and as head of the Department for Treaties and Legal Af-fairs in the Ministry of Foreign Affairs (1993–1995). He holds the diplomatic rank of Ambassador Extraordinary and Plenipotentiary and is an Honored Lawyer of Ukraine. Chalyi graduated from Taras Shevchenko National University of Kiev in 1977 with a degree in international law and holds a PhD in law.

ALEx ANDER DYNkIN Russia

Alexander Dynkin serves as director of the Institute of World Economy and Interna-tional Relations of the Russian Academy of Sciences. He is a professor of economics and a member of the Russian Academy of Sciences. Since 2008, Dynkin has served on the Presidential Council for Science, Technology, and Education, and has been a member of the board of trustees of the Institute of Contemporary Development. From

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1998 to 1999, he was the economic adviser to the Russian prime minister. In 1994 and 1996, he was a visiting professor at Georgetown University in Washington, D.C.

VIkTOR ESIN Russia

Viktor Esin is adviser to the commander in chief of the Strategic Rocket Forces of the Russian Federation. He also serves as first vice president of the Academy of Security, Defense and Law and Order. Esin is a retired colonel general in the Russian armed forces, and as such served as chief of the General Staff of the Strategic Rocket Forces, deputy chief of staff of the Presidential Defense Council, and head of the Russian Security Council. He is a graduate of the General Staff Academy and the Dzerzhinsky Military Academy.

HERMAN GREF Russia

Herman Gref graduated from the law department of Omsk State University with a degree in jurisprudence. He served in the Soviet armed forces in the 1980s, and in 1991, he joined the administration of the Petrodvorets district of St. Petersburg. From 1994 to 1997, he worked for the Committee for Economic Development and Property of the St. Petersburg municipal government. In 1998, he became a member of the advisory council of the Ministry of State Property and later that year became first deputy minister. In 1999, he became director of the government’s oversight commission for the Russian Federal Bankruptcy Service and in 2000, was named director of the Center of Strategic Research. From 2000 to 2007, he served as minister of economic development and trade. Since 2007, he has been president and chairman of the board of Sberbank.

IST VáN GYARMATI Hungary

István Gyarmati, a former diplomat, is president and chief executive officer of the International Center for Democratic Transition and the Tom Lantos Institute in

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Budapest. His career has spanned numerous postings in the Foreign Affairs and Defense Ministries. His positions have included deputy state secretary of integration, Ministry of Defense; undersecretary of policy, Ministry of Defense; chairman of the Missile Technology Control Regime; special adviser to the minister of foreign affairs; chairman of the Organization for the Prohibition of Chemical Weapons; and senior vice president of the EastWest Institute.

STEPHEN HADLE Y United States

Stephen Hadley is the senior adviser for international affairs at the United States Institute of Peace and a principal at the RiceHadley Group. From 2005 to 2009, he served as national security adviser under President George W. Bush. In addition to serving as the principal White House foreign policy adviser and director of the National Security Council staff, he also ran the interagency national security policy development and execution process. Prior to that post, he served as deputy national security adviser and as a senior foreign and defense policy adviser to George W. Bush during his first presidential campaign. He served as assistant secretary of defense under George H. W. Bush, was a partner in the Shea & Gardner law firm, and a principal in the Scowcroft Group. He graduated magna cum laude from Cornell University and holds a law degree from Yale Law School.

TEDO JAPARIDzE Georgia

Tedo Japaridze is a former foreign minister and national security adviser of Georgia. He is currently the director of the Center for Energy and Environmental Security at the Azerbaijan Diplomatic Academy. Formerly, he served as director general at the International Center for Black Sea Studies in Athens. Japaridze has held many posi-tions in the Georgian Ministry of Foreign Affairs including: first deputy chairman of the UNESCO Council; head of the Department of Political Analysis and Infor-

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mation; head of the Department of Political Analysis and Prognostication; deputy minister of foreign affairs; and first deputy minister of foreign affairs. He was also the assistant to the chairman of the National Security and Defense Council, ambassador to the United States, and assistant to the president on security issues at the National Security Council.

DONALD J. JOHNSTON Canada

Donald J. Johnston, P.C., O.C., Q.C., is senior counsel to preeminent Canadian law firm Heenan Blaikie LLP, of which he was founding partner in 1973 (Johnston Heenan Blaikie). Johnston has had an active political career as a senior cabinet mem-ber of the Pierre Trudeau and John Turner governments, including as minister of state for economic and regional development, minister of science and technology, minister of justice, and attorney general. He was elected president of the Liberal Party of Canada in 1990. In 1994, he was elected secretary-general of the Organiza-tion for Economic Cooperation and Development, the first non-European to hold that post. He stepped down after two five-year terms and returned to Heenan Blaikie in 2006. He chaired the International Risk Governance Council in Geneva from 2006 until 2010 and was a Distinguished Visiting Professor at Yonsei University in Seoul from 2006 until 2009. He is the chair of the McCall MacBain Foundation in Geneva.

CATHERINE kELLEHER United States

Catherine Kelleher is a College Park Professor in the School of Public Policy at the University of Maryland and a senior fellow at the Watson Institute for International Studies at Brown University. She is an expert on U.S., European, and Russian security issues and arms control. Kelleher served as President Bill Clinton’s deputy assistant secretary of defense for Russia, Ukraine, and Eurasia and as representative of the secretary of defense to NATO in Brussels. She was on President Jimmy Carter’s National Security Council staff and was the first president of Women in International Security. Kelleher also founded the Center for International and Security Studies at the University of Maryland.

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JOHN kERR United Kingdom

John Kerr is deputy chair of Royal Dutch Shell PLC. A former diplomat, he has served as ambassador to the United States, UK permanent representative to the European Union, and head of the Diplomatic Service. Previously, he served as pri-vate secretary to the permanent undersecretary at the Foreign and Commonwealth Office, principal private secretary to the chancellor of the exchequer, and head and assistant undersecretary of state at the Foreign and Commonwealth Office.

JOHN C. kORNBLUM United States

John C. Kornblum is senior counsel at Nörr Stiefenhofer Lutz in Berlin and former chair of Lazard and Company in Germany. He served as U.S. ambassador to Ger-many from 1997 to 2001 and was the special envoy for the Dayton Peace Agree-ment. A career diplomat, he served as minister and deputy commandant in Berlin, was chosen as deputy permanent representative to NATO, and was ambassador to the Conference on Security and Cooperation in Europe. He served as chief of the American delegation to the 1992 Helsinki Review Conference.

JACqUES L ANx ADE France

Jacques Lanxade is chairman of the Académie de Marine and president of the Mediterranean Foundation for Strategic Research. A retired admiral in the French navy, he served as chief of the Defense Staff of the Armed Forces from 1991 to 1995. Prior to this, he was appointed as a strategic adviser to the French president from 1989 to 1991. He also served as ambassador to Tunisia from 1995 until 1999.

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VL ADIMIR LUkIN Russia

Vladimir Lukin is the Russian president’s human rights ombudsman and a former ambassador to the United States. He previously served as deputy chairman of the Duma and as chairman of the Duma’s Foreign Affairs Committee. Lukin was a member of the editorial board of the international journal World Review in Prague but was recalled to the USSR in 1968 for protesting the Soviet invasion of Czechoslovakia. From 1969 to 1987, Lukin was a research fellow at the Institute of U.S. and Canadian Studies of the USSR Academy of Sciences. He then served in the Soviet Union’s Foreign Ministry as deputy head of the Foreign Policy Analysis and Prognosis Department until 1990, when he was elected as a People’s Deputy of the Supreme Soviet of the Russian Socialist Federal Soviet Republic. There he served as chairman of the Supreme Soviet Committee on International Affairs and Foreign Economic Relations.

kL AUS MANGOLD Germany

Klaus Mangold studied law and economics at the universities of Munich, Geneva, London, Heidelberg, and Mainz and has held various positions in German industry. He is chairman of the Supervisory Board of Rothschild GmbH, Frankfurt, and was chairman of the Committee on Eastern European Economic Relations of German Industry until the end of 2010. After serving as a member of the Board of Management of DaimlerChrysler AG from 1995 to 2003, he became chairman of the Supervisory Board of TUI AG, Germany. He has also served as a member of a number of supervisory and advisory boards, including those of Alstom SA, France; Foster + Partners, Great Britain; Ernst & Young, United States; Metro AG, E.ON AG, and Continental AG, Germany. Mangold has been Honorary Consul of the Russian Federation for Baden-Württemberg since 2005.

RICHARD MATzkE United States

Richard Matzke is president of NESW Solutions, a member of the board of direc-tors of OAO LUKOIL, Eurasia Drilling Company, and PHI Inc., and former vice chairman of Chevron Corporation. Matzke retired from Chevron in February 2002,

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having served as vice chairman of the board since January 2000 and as a member of the board of directors since 1997. From November 1989 through December 1999, Matzke served as president of Chevron Overseas Petroleum Inc., where he was re-sponsible for directing Chevron’s oil exploration and production activities outside of North America. Matzke was employed by Chevron Corporation and its predecessors and affiliates from 1961 through his retirement in 2002.

RENé NYBERG Finland

René Nyberg became the chief executive officer of the East Office of Finnish Indus-tries in April 2008. Nyberg joined the Finnish Ministry of Education in 1969 after completing a degree in political science at the University of Helsinki. Two years later, he moved to the Ministry for Foreign Affairs, where he served in various capacities in Moscow, Leningrad, Brussels, Bonn, Vienna (Organization for Security and Coopera-tion in Europe), and Berlin. His areas of expertise include Russian affairs and security policy. In 2000, he was appointed ambassador to the Russian Federation, a position he held until 2004. From 2004 to 2008 he served as ambassador to Germany.

ADAM DANIEL ROTFELD Poland

Adam Daniel Rotfeld is a former minister of foreign affairs of Poland. Presently, he is the co-chairman of the Polish-Russian Group on Difficult Matters. Rotfeld served as a researcher at the Polish Institute of International Affairs in Warsaw and participated in the 1973 Conference on Security and Cooperation in Europe. He was director of the Stockholm International Peace Research Institute from 1991 to 2002 and in this capacity was appointed personal representative of the Organization for Security and Cooperation in Europe’s chairman on a political solution to the conflict on the left bank of the Dniester River in Moldova. Since 2006, he has been an appointed

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member of the United Nations secretary-general’s Advisory Board on Disarmament Matters. Presently, Rotfeld is a professor at the University of Warsaw.

VOLkER RüHE Germany

Volker Rühe joined the German Christian Democratic Union in 1963, was elected to the Bundestag representing his home city of Hamburg in 1976, and served until 2005. He held the position of secretary-general of his party from 1989 until 1992, including during the period of German reunification. He assumed office as minister of defense in 1992 and served in this position until 1998. From 2002 to 2005, he served as chairman of the Foreign Relations Committee of the German Bundestag. In 2005, he stepped down from Parliament and currently works for international think tanks, gives lectures, and works as a consultant both nationally and internationally.

ARMEN SARkISSIAN Armenia

Armen Sarkissian served as prime minister of Armenia from 1996 until 1997. He is currently chair of the Knightsbridge Group, founder and director of the Eur-asia Center at the Judge Business School at Cambridge University, and founding president of Eurasia House International. Sarkissian is also chairman of the Global Agenda Council on Energy Security at the World Economic Forum, a member of the Dean’s Advisory Board at the Harvard Kennedy School of Government; a member of the Dean’s Advisory Board at the Harris School of Public Policy Studies, University of Chicago; and a board member of the Global Leadership Foundation. In October 1991, after joining the diplomatic service, Sarkissian established the first Armenian embassy in the West, in London. He went on to become Armenia’s senior ambassador to Europe (deputy foreign minister) and concurrently served as ambas-sador to the European Union, Belgium, the Netherlands, Luxembourg, and the Vatican. In 1995 and 1996, he was the Armenian head of mission to Europe. He was reappointed ambassador to the United Kingdom in 1998.

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V YACHESL AV TRUBNIkOV Russia

Vyacheslav Trubnikov is a former deputy foreign minister, former director of the Foreign Intelligence Service, and a retired general of the army of Russia. He graduated from the Moscow State Institute of International Relations in 1967 and began his career with the Foreign Intelligence Service. From 1971 to 1977, he worked in India as a correspondent for RIA Novosti. From 1977 to 1984, he was employed in the central office of the First Chief Directorate and from 1990 to 1991 served as the chief of the Southeast Asia Department of the Foreign Intelligence Service. In 1992 he became the first deputy to the director of the Russian Foreign Intelligence Service and in 1996 was promoted to director. From June 2000 to July 2004, he worked as a first deputy to the foreign minister. In July 2004 he was appointed by then Russian president Vladimir Putin to the post of ambassador to India, a position he held until August 2009.

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ABOUT THE EURO-ATLANTIC SECURITY INITIATIVE To move toward the goal of an inclusive Euro-Atlantic Security Community, a unique process was created in 2009 called the Euro-Atlantic Security Initiative (EASI) by the Carnegie Endowment for International Peace.

For the first time, former policymakers, diplomats, generals, and business leaders from Russia, the United States, Canada, Central Europe, and European Union nations came together to chart a roadmap of practical action that would allow the region to leave its past behind and to start to build a more secure future based on mutual trust and cooperation.

ABOUT THE CARNEGIE ENDOWMENT FOR INTERNATIONAL PEACEThe Carnegie Endowment for International Peace is a private, nonprofit organization dedicated to advancing cooperation between nations and promoting active international engagement by the United States. Founded in 1910, its work is nonpartisan and dedicated to achieving practical results.

As it celebrates its Centennial, the Carnegie Endowment is pioneering the first global think tank, with flourishing offices now in Washington, Moscow, Beijing, Beirut, and Brussels. These five locations include the centers of world governance and the places whose political evolution and international policies will most deter-mine the near-term possibilities for international peace and economic advance.

1779 Massachusetts Avenue, NW Washington, DC 20036€¦ · Euro-Atlantic region. We set as our goal...

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