This article was downloaded by: [Universidad de Chile]On: 15 May 2014, At: 05:45Publisher: RoutledgeInforma Ltd Registered in England and Wales Registered Number: 1072954 Registeredoffice: Mortimer House, 37-41 Mortimer Street, London W1T 3JH, UK

Journal of Global EthicsPublication details, including instructions for authors andsubscription information:http://www.tandfonline.com/loi/rjge20

Equality, priority and global justiceNils Holtug aa Centre for the Study of Equality and Multiculturalism ,University of Copenhagen , DenmarkPublished online: 09 Dec 2009.

To cite this article: Nils Holtug (2009) Equality, priority and global justice, Journal of Global Ethics,5:3, 173-179, DOI: 10.1080/17449620903403283

To link to this article: http://dx.doi.org/10.1080/17449620903403283

PLEASE SCROLL DOWN FOR ARTICLE

Taylor & Francis makes every effort to ensure the accuracy of all the information (the“Content”) contained in the publications on our platform. However, Taylor & Francis,our agents, and our licensors make no representations or warranties whatsoever as tothe accuracy, completeness, or suitability for any purpose of the Content. Any opinionsand views expressed in this publication are the opinions and views of the authors,and are not the views of or endorsed by Taylor & Francis. The accuracy of the Contentshould not be relied upon and should be independently verified with primary sourcesof information. Taylor and Francis shall not be liable for any losses, actions, claims,proceedings, demands, costs, expenses, damages, and other liabilities whatsoever orhowsoever caused arising directly or indirectly in connection with, in relation to or arisingout of the use of the Content.

This article may be used for research, teaching, and private study purposes. Anysubstantial or systematic reproduction, redistribution, reselling, loan, sub-licensing,systematic supply, or distribution in any form to anyone is expressly forbidden. Terms &Conditions of access and use can be found at http://www.tandfonline.com/page/terms-and-conditions

Equality, priority and global justice

Nils Holtug�

Centre for the Study of Equality and Multiculturalism, University of Copenhagen, Denmark

Derek Parfit has argued that prioritarianism “naturally” has global scope, i.e. naturally appliesto everyone, irrespective of his or her particular national, state or other communal affiliation.In that respect, it differs from e.g. egalitarianism. In this article, I critically assess Parfit’sargument. In particular, I argue that it is difficult to draw conclusions about the scope ofprioritarianism simply from an inspection of its structure. I also make some suggestions asto what it would take to argue that prioritarianism has either global or merely domestic scope.

Keywords: prioritarianism; egalitarianism; global justice; cosmopolitanism; Parfit; axiology

1. Introduction

According to Derek Parfit, unlike egalitarianism, prioritarianism ‘naturally’ has global scope.

That is, this distributive principle naturally applies to everyone, irrespective of his or her particu-

lar communal affiliation (such as nationality, citizenship, etc.). More precisely, our prioritarian

concerns extend not only to the people with whom we happen to co-inhabit some territory or

share some language or history, but to everyone alike. In this article, I critically assess

Parfit’s argument. Not because I disagree with the conclusion that prioritarianism has global

scope. In fact, I myself accept this conclusion. However, I also believe that Parfit’s argument

is flawed. Thus, I argue that there are a number of ways in which the scope of prioritarianism

could be coherently restricted and that it is difficult to draw conclusions about the scope of

this view simply from an inspection of its structure.

2. Equality and priority

The versions of egalitarianism and prioritarianism I shall be concerned with are welfare-axiological

ones. That is, they are concerned only with the goodness of outcomes and hold outcome value to

be a function only of welfare.1 More specifically, I define (such welfare-axiological) egalitarianism

and prioritarianism as follows (Holtug 2006, 127–36; 2010, Chs. 7 and 8):

Egalitarianism. An outcome is non-instrumentally better, the more equal a distribution of individualbenefits it includes.

Prioritarianism. An outcome is non-instrumentally better, the larger the sum of weighted individualbenefits it contains, where benefits are weighted such that they gain a greater value, the worse off theindividual is to whom they accrue.

One main difference between these two principles is that egalitarianism is a relational view in a

way that prioritarianism is not. According to egalitarianism, an increase in an individual’s

welfare from n to n þ 1 non-instrumentally improves an outcome if everyone else it at n þ 1,

but not if everyone else is at n. According to prioritarianism on the other hand, the weight of

ISSN 1744-9626 print/ISSN 1744-9634 online

# 2009 Taylor & Francis

DOI: 10.1080/17449620903403283

http://www.informaworld.com

�Email: nhol@hum.ku.dk

Journal of Global Ethics

Vol. 5, No. 3, December 2009, 173–179

Dow

nloa

ded

by [

Uni

vers

idad

de

Chi

le]

at 0

5:45

15

May

201

4

an additional benefit to an individual depends only on her own level of welfare, not on the levels

of others.

Furthermore, and related to this, egalitarianism can hardly be our only axiological principle.

This is because this principle implies that it is better to level down whenever doing so will

increase equality. That is, it implies that for example (2, 2) is better than (10, 5), where these

numbers refer to individual welfare levels. After all, the former outcome is more (in fact per-

fectly) equal. Therefore, we may want to combine our concern for equality with other concerns

or efficiency requirements, such as to avoid the implication that the levelled down outcome is

better. To entirely avoid the implication that levelled down outcomes are sometimes better,

we may require our principle to satisfy the pareto principle. The pareto principle implies that

if an outcome is better for some and worse for none than another, then the former outcome is

better. Nevertheless, as Parfit points out, even paretian egalitarianism will imply that (2, 2) is

in one respect non-instrumentally better than (10, 5). It is better as regards equality. Therefore,

even paretian egalitarianism is vulnerable to the ‘levelling down objection’, according to which

it cannot be in any respect better to level down (Parfit 1991, 17). Since prioritarianism, on the

other hand, does not involve a commitment to the value of equality, it is not vulnerable to this

objection (Holtug 2006, 136–40; 2010, Ch. 8).

It seems plausible that what egalitarians ascribe non-instrumental (dis)value to are states of

(in)equality. But what do prioritarians ascribe such value to? I want to suggest that they ascribe

non-instrumental value to compound states of affairs, each consisting of the state that a benefit of

a certain size befalls an individual and the state that this individual is at a particular welfare level,

where this value increases when the size of the benefit increases, but decreases when the level of

welfare increases. Thus, the (compound) state that a benefit befalls an individual at a lower level

is non-instrumentally better than the (compound) state that an equal benefit befalls an individual

at a higher level. To illustrate, the compound state where Amy, who has two welfare units,

receives an extra unit is non-instrumentally better than the compound state where Becky, who

has three welfare units, receives an extra unit.

With these clarifications in place, I want to focus on the (alleged) difference between egali-

tarianism and prioritarianism with respect to scope. Let us call a prioritarian principle that has

global scope ‘cosmopolitan prioritarianism’. Obviously, it makes a great difference whether

or not, insofar as we are prioritarians, we should be cosmopolitan prioritarians. After all,

given the grossly unequal global distribution of resources, it is plausible that cosmopolitan prior-

itarianism implies a very harsh verdict on the present global distribution, where obviously no

such harsh verdict on global distribution is implied by a prioritarian principle that has domestic

scope only.

3. Global justice

According to Parfit, the difference in structure between egalitarianism and prioritarianism has

implications with respect to the scope we may reasonably assign to these principles. As he

argues, when explaining the difference between egalitarianism and prioritarianism:

The chief difference is, then, this. Egalitarians are concerned with relativities: with how eachperson’s level compares with the level of other people. On the Priority View, we are concernedonly with people’s absolute levels.

This is a fundamental structural difference. Because of this difference, there are several ways inwhich these views have different implications.

One example concerns scope. Telic Egalitarians may, I have said, give their view wide scope.They may believe that inequality is bad even when it holds between people who have no connectionswith each other. But this can seem a dubious view. Why is it bad if, in some far away land, and quiteunknown to me, there are other people who are better off than me?

174 N. Holtug

Dow

nloa

ded

by [

Uni

vers

idad

de

Chi

le]

at 0

5:45

15

May

201

4

On the Priority View, there is no ground for such doubts. This view naturally has universal scope. . . If it is more important to benefit one of two people, because this person is worse off, it is irrele-vant whether these people are in the same community, or are aware of each other’s existence. Thegreater urgency of benefiting this person does not depend upon her relation to the other person. Itdepends only on her lower absolute level. (Parfit 1991, 17)

It is not entirely clear to me what Parfit’s argument is here for why, unlike egalitarianism, prior-

itarianism naturally has global scope, but let me consider three possible readings. According to

the first, it is simply intuitively unappealing to hold that egalitarianism has global scope whereas

there is no similar intuitive restriction on prioritarianism. According to the second, whereas ega-

litarianism is a relational view and so implies that relations between individuals have underived

significance, prioritarianism is a non-relational view and therefore denies the underived signifi-

cance of co-citizenship, co-nationality and the like. And according to the third, it is because the

urgency of benefiting an individual depends only on her absolute level of welfare that prioritar-

ianism has universal scope. Let us consider these three arguments in turn.

According to the first argument, unlike egalitarianism, prioritarianism retains its intuitive

plausibility even when global in scope. As Parfit asks with respect to egalitarianism: ‘why is

it bad if, in some far away land, and quite unknown to me, there are other people who are

better off than me?’ On the other hand, it does not seem intuitively strange to claim that it is

more urgent that worse-off people benefit than that better-off people benefit, even if they are

members of distinct societies that do not have any form of contact to each other.

Now, I doubt that this is in fact the argument that Parfit has in mind. Even if cosmopolitan

prioritarianism has a sort of intuitive plausibility that a cosmopolitan version of egalitarianism

does not have, it would be peculiar to express this by saying that prioritarianism naturally has

universal scope. This expression suggests a stronger link between prioritarianism and cosmopo-

litanism than that cosmopolitan prioritarianism has intuitive plausibility (or more such plausi-

bility than a similar version of egalitarianism). In any case, while I myself consider

cosmopolitan prioritarianism an intuitively plausible view, my concern here is with whether

there is some kind of more fundamental ‘built in’ bias in prioritarianism towards global

scope, such as to warrant the claim that prioritarianism naturally has such scope.

Furthermore, insofar as we find the claim that it is (in at least one respect) bad if inequality

occurs between societies that have no contact intuitively troubling, this may be because when

that sort of inequality occurs, it is particularly obvious that inequality need not harm anyone.

That is, if I have no knowledge of these people in a far-away land who are better off than me

(and indeed there are no other causal connections between us), then it is plausible that their

being better off than me does not render me worse off. It is not as if I would have been better

off, had they (unknown to me) been no better (or worse) off than I am.2 But if this is why we

hesitate to consider the relevant kind of inequality bad, then it would seem that what we are

really motivated by is the levelling down objection.3 We do not find it in any respect better if

we go from inequality to equality, where this benefits no one. And if we are motivated by the

levelling down objection, then what we should question is not so much the claim that egalitar-

ianism has global scope as egalitarianism itself. This is because just as we can have cases of

levelling down between societies, we can also have cases of levelling down within societies.

According to the second argument, it is because, unlike egalitarianism, prioritarianism is a

non-relational view that it implies a global scope. But from the fact that prioritarians deny the

underived significance of how much an individual has relative to others, it does not follow

that they cannot assign underived significance to a different relation, for example, that of

being a co-national. Nor, for that matter, does it follow from the fact that a certain principle

ascribes underived significance to some relations that it ascribes underived significance to

others. So, for example, it does not follow from the fact that egalitarianism ascribes underived

Journal of Global Ethics 175

Dow

nloa

ded

by [

Uni

vers

idad

de

Chi

le]

at 0

5:45

15

May

201

4

significance to relations between different people’s welfare levels that it assigns underived

significance to co-nationality. Therefore, I shall not consider this argument any further here.

According to the third argument, it is because the urgency of benefiting an individual

depends only on this individual’s absolute level (and so not on nationality and the like) that

prioritarianism has global scope. However, according to this argument, it is not just ‘local’ or

‘non-cosmopolitan’ versions of prioritarianism that are ruled out, but in fact any restriction

on the scope of prioritarianism. And while I may be willing to go along with this myself

(Holtug 2010, Chs. 8–10), I take it that most prioritarians will not be similarly inclined. Consider

the implications. When allocating resources between human and non-human animals, all that

matters is the absolute levels of welfare. It is plausible to claim that, in general, non-human

animals are significantly worse off – and so are entitled to higher levels of priority – than

humans. Therefore, prioritarianism may imply that a massive shift of resources from humans

to non-human animals would be a great improvement (Holtug 2007a; Vallentyne 2006).

Furthermore, if all that matters is the absolute welfare level of the beneficiary, her temporal

and modal status is in itself insignificant. Therefore, it does not matter whether she is present (i.e.

exists now), actual (i.e. exists in the actual history of the world), necessary (i.e. exists in all the

outcomes compared) or merely possible; everyone counts equally.

Likewise, it is in itself insignificant whether an individual is herself responsible for being

worse off; all that matters is her absolute level. Thus, this version of the argument rules out the

possibility of what we might call ‘priority of opportunity for welfare prioritarianism’, according

to which an individual is only entitled to compensation for being worse off insofar as she is not

herself responsible for so being.4

However, I doubt that Parfit intends to rule out every possible restriction in scope.5 Thus, he

says that prioritarians may hold either a ‘telic’ or a ‘deontic’ version of this view,6 where a

deontic view is not about the badness of outcomes (or axiology), but about what we ought to

do. One version of such a view about what we ought to do implies that ‘injustice essentially

involves wrongdoing’ (Parfit 1991, 10). With such a version, whether an individual is entitled

to compensation depends not just on her absolute level of welfare, but also on, for instance,

whether her (low) welfare level is a result of her being wronged by someone. In other words,

on this view, the scope of priority is restricted to cases that involve wrongdoing. If it is possible

to restrict the scope of priority in this way, then why, in principle, could we not restrict the scope

of prioritarianism such that it includes only, say, co-nationals? Nevertheless, perhaps we should

ignore Parfit’s claims about the possibility of a deontic priority view and simply take his con-

sidered position to be that priority has unrestricted scope.

A further question is then why Parfit thinks a prioritarian is committed to the view that the

urgency of benefiting an individual depends only on her absolute level of welfare. When Parfit

says that ‘if it is more important to benefit one of two people, because this person is worse off, it

is irrelevant whether these people are in the same community’ (my emphasis), this may mean

that if the rationale for benefiting the one simply is that it is more important to benefit the

worse-off, then this rationale drives us towards claiming that the globally worse-off have pri-

ority. After all, this rationale does not distinguish between the locally and the globally worse-

off. Parfit’s argument would then be a particular instance of Simon Caney’s claim that the

standard justifications for principles of distributive justice entail cosmopolitan principles

(Caney 2005, 107).

Let me make this argument more specific in light of the way I have characterised prioritar-

ianism. I have suggested that what prioritarians ascribe non-instrumental value to are compound

states of affairs, each consisting of the state that a benefit of a certain size befalls an individual

and the state that this individual is at a particular welfare level, where this value increases when

the size of the benefit increases but decreases when the level of welfare increases. If this is what

176 N. Holtug

Dow

nloa

ded

by [

Uni

vers

idad

de

Chi

le]

at 0

5:45

15

May

201

4

has non-instrumental value, it would seem that we are forced towards cosmopolitan prioritarian-

ism. After all, such non-instrumental value can be realised by any human (in fact sentient) being

anywhere in the world.

However, to start, this reading of Parfit’s argument does not explain the alleged difference

between egalitarianism and prioritarianism with respect to scope. After all, a cosmopolitan ega-

litarian may similarly argue that if inequality is what has non-instrumental disvalue, then since

inequality can be realised anywhere (and not just within but also across communities), inequality

holds such disvalue wherever it occurs between people. That is, egalitarians can appeal to an

argument for cosmopolitanism of the same form.

Second, and more importantly, one need not believe that the prioritarian conception of non-

instrumental value to which I have referred is the whole story about why we should give priority

to the worse off. Even if we hold that what has non-instrumental value is the compound state of

affairs referred to above, this does not automatically imply that prioritarianism has global scope.

Consider again the principle that I have called priority of opportunity for welfare prioritarianism.

Proponents of this principle may appeal to the claim that it is non-instrumentally better to benefit

a worse-off individual than to (equally) benefit a better-off individual, but only if the worse-off

individual is not responsible for being worse off. That is, the non-instrumental value of the com-

pound state of affairs that a benefit of a certain size befalls an individual and that this individual

is at a particular welfare level may be conditional on the appropriate absence of responsibility.

Similarly, and more importantly for present purposes, it may be conditional on an appropriate

communal identity.7

For example, it may be claimed that from the perspective of a decision-maker in society A,

the compound state that Charlie, who has a welfare level of two, receives an extra unit is non-

instrumentally good, whereas the compound state that Doug, who likewise has a welfare level of

two, receives an extra unit does not hold any such value, if indeed Charlie is a member of A and

Doug is not. Of course, this need not imply that, from the perspective of the decision-maker,

there is no value to be found when Doug benefits, only that this value should not be explained

in prioritarian terms.

Furthermore, there is of course the possibility that the non-instrumentally valuable com-

pound state is extended such as to also include a further state. For instance, it may include

the state that an individual is not responsible for her welfare level herself. Alternatively, it

may include the state that she is a member of a particular community. While this will involve

an expansion of the original compound state, it is a move that is open to anyone with prioritarian

but non-cosmopolitan inclinations.

Therefore, it seems to me that Parfit’s argument does not establish that prioritarianism ‘natu-

rally has universal scope’. The relevant question, then, is not whether cosmopolitanism naturally

flows from prioritarianism, but whether the revision of prioritarianism needed to escape cosmo-

politanism has independent plausibility. Such a revision may, of course, take either of the forms

mentioned above; it may involve the claim that priority is conditional on communal affiliation,

and it may include further, community-related states in the compound states it claims to have

non-instrumental value.

4. Conclusion

I have argued that the disagreement between cosmopolitan and non-cosmopolitan prioritarians

cannot be settled by claiming that global scope ‘naturally’ follows from the structure of prior-

itarianism. Rather, the crucial question is whether there exist special relations between individ-

uals or groups in the domestic case that do not (similarly) exist between individuals or groups on

a global level, where these relations (a) have genuine moral significance, (b) are relevant to

Journal of Global Ethics 177

Dow

nloa

ded

by [

Uni

vers

idad

de

Chi

le]

at 0

5:45

15

May

201

4

distributive (prioritarian) justice, and (c) give rise to an appropriate agent-relative ordering of

outcomes.8

I have also suggested that, likewise, the disagreement between cosmopolitan and non-

cosmopolitan egalitarianism cannot be settled simply on the basis of the structure of egalitarian-

ism. In fact, structurally, egalitarianism and prioritarianism seem to be equally capable of

accommodating cosmopolitan and non-cosmopolitan versions.

Interestingly, some political philosophers who are sometimes labelled ‘prioritarians’ expli-

citly reject the notion that our distributive principles have global scope, namely Thomas Nagel

and John Rawls.9 Thus, Rawls (1999) argues that unlike in the case of domestic justice, a global

‘social contract’ will not include a principle of distributive justice (but only, say, a duty of assist-

ance). Nagel suggests that the requirements of distributive justice attach to states whose

members are joint authors of a coercive system, and therefore only members of the state fall

within the scope of these requirements.10 What each of these rationales does (or attempts to

do) is to explain why certain special relations occur between members of the same people or

state that do not occur between these members and members of other peoples or states.

Whether they succeed in explaining this in a plausible manner is, of course, a different matter

(Abizadeh 2007; Pogge 1994). As I have indicated, I believe that prioritarianism has global

scope. However, to fully argue this, I would need to consider all the particular relations

between individuals that may be claimed to limit the scope of justice, including co-nationality,

co-citizenship, etc., and obviously this is a task I cannot undertake here.

Acknowledgements

I would like to thank Chris Armstrong, John Baker, Kasper Lippert-Rasmussen, Sune Lægaard,

Søren Flinch Midtgaard and an anonymous referee for helpful comments on an earlier version of

this article.

Notes

1. This characterisation of welfarism may be insufficient for various purposes (see Holtug 2003a), but forpresent purposes it will suffice.

2. Some theorists would deny this. They claim that the badness of inequality resides in the individuals forwhom it is bad, i.e. it renders them worse off. For such a ‘person-affecting egalitarianism’, see Broome(1991, Ch. 9).

3. More generally, we may be motivated by the thought that our axiology should take a person-affectingform. Roughly, this means that an outcome cannot be better (worse) than another in any respect, if thereis no one for whom it is better (worse) in any respect. For the suggestion that the levelling down objec-tion derives at least part of its force from some kind of person-affecting principle, see Holtug (1998,2003b, 2006, 140–43, 2010, Chs.7–8); and Temkin (1993, Ch. 9). I claim, and Temkin denies, thatthere exists a person-affecting principle that can ultimately support the levelling down objection.

4. For a statement and discussion of a couple of similar views, which he calls ‘luck prioritarianism’ and‘desert prioritarianism’, see Arneson (2000, 2006).

5. For a similar point, albeit with respect to Parfit’s account of the scope of egalitarianism, see Lippert-Rasmussen (2006, 110).

6. Parfit (1991, 20).7. In fact, there are numerous ways in which values such as equality and priority may be conditional.

Thus, according to a ‘socially located’ egalitarianism the (dis)value of (in)equality is conditional onits occurrence in a context of social cooperation. And according to Rawls, the (dis)value of (in)equalityis conditional on its being non-deserved (Rawls 1971, 74–75). Furthermore, according to AndrewMason, the (dis)value of (in)equality is conditional on its (harming) benefiting someone (Mason2001). I critically discuss Mason’s view in Holtug (2007b).

8. To illustrate the significance of (c), consider axiological nationalism. Thus, consider the view that Ishould apply prioritarianism to my co-national Danes, but not to people who have other nationalities.

178 N. Holtug

Dow

nloa

ded

by [

Uni

vers

idad

de

Chi

le]

at 0

5:45

15

May

201

4

Thus, I will give priority to worse-off Danes over better-off Danes, but I will not give priority to worse-off Ethiopians over better-off Danes. However, it would be ludicrous to claim that everyone else,including Ethiopians, should similarly give priority to Danes. Therefore, the only kind of nationalismthat could have any credibility is what Jeff McMahan has called ‘universalist nationalism’, whichrequires individuals to have partiality towards their co-nationals (McMahan 1997, 108). Thus,Danes should be partial towards fellow Danes, Ethiopians towards fellow Ethiopians, etc. The orderingwill therefore be agent-relative, in that it varies depending on the individual ordering the outcomes(more specifically, on her nationality).

9. I say they are sometimes ‘labelled’ prioritarians because they may not qualify as prioritarians in thesense of this term I use here. In fact, Rawls most certainly will not because his difference principle(a) is concerned with groups rather than individuals, (b) is concerned with the distribution ofprimary goods rather than welfare, (c) concerns only the basic structure of society, and (d) does notallow for ‘trade-offs’ between the very worst off and others (Rawls 1971). For Nagel’s ‘prioritarian’account, see Nagel (1979, 1991).

10. Nagel (2005). In Nagel (1991), he defends prioritarianism and in Nagel (2005), he argues that distri-butive justice applies only within the state. Therefore, I am assuming that he takes prioritarianism toapply only within the state. However, as Chris Armstrong has pointed out to me, it is conceivable thathe believes that it is bad but not unjust if people in other parts of the world are worse off, because justiceapplies only within the framework of the state. Thus, prioritarianism would have global scope eventhough distributive justice does not.

References

Abizadeh, A. 2007. Cooperation, pervasive impact, and coercion: on the scope (not site) of distributivejustice. Philosophy and Public Affairs 35: 318–58.

Arneson, R.J. 2000. Luck egalitarianism and prioritarianism. Ethics 110: 339–49.Arneson, R.J. 2006. Desert and equality. In Egalitarianism. New essays on the nature and value of equality,

ed. N. Holtug and K. Lippert-Rasmussen, 262–93. Oxford: Clarendon Press.Broome, J. 1991. Weighing goods. Oxford: Basil Blackwell.Caney, S. 2005. Justice beyond borders. A global political theory. Oxford: Oxford University Press.Holtug, N. 1998. Egalitarianism and the levelling down objection. Analysis 58: 166–74.Holtug, N. 2003a. Welfarism – the very idea. Utilitas 15: 151–74.Holtug, N. 2003b. Good for whom? Theoria lxix: 4–20.Holtug, N. 2006. Prioritarianism. In Egalitarianism. New essays on the nature and value of equality, ed.

N. Holtug and K. Lippert-Rasmussen, 125–56. Oxford: Clarendon Press.Holtug, N. 2007a. Animals: equality for animals. In New waves in applied ethics, ed. J. Ryberg, T.S.

Petersen and C. Wolf, 1–24. Basingstoke: Palgrave MacMillan.Holtug, N. 2007b. A note on conditional egalitarianism. Economics and Philosophy 23: 45–63.Holtug, N. 2010. Persons, interests and justice. Oxford: Oxford University Press.Lippert-Rasmussen, K. 2006. The insignificance of the distinction between telic and deontic egalitarianism.

In Egalitarianism. New essays on the nature and value of equality, ed. N. Holtug and K. Lippert-Rasmussen, 101–24. Oxford: Clarendon Press.

Mason, A. 2001. Egalitarianism and the levelling down objection. Analysis 61: 246–54.McMahan, J. 1997. The limits of national partiality. In The morality of nationalism, ed. R. McKim and

J. McMahan, 107–38. New York: Oxford University Press.Nagel, T. 1979. Equality. In Mortal Questions, 106–27. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.Nagel, T. 1991. Equality and priority. New York: Oxford University Press.Nagel, T. 2005. The problem of global justice. Philosophy and Public Affairs 33: 113–47.Parfit, D. 1991. Equality or priority? The Lindley Lecture, University of Kansas (reprinted in

ed. M. Clayton and A. Willliams, 2000. The ideal of equality, 81–125. Basingstoke: MacMillanPress Ltd).

Pogge, T. 1994. An egalitarian law of peoples. Philosophy and Public Affairs 23: 195–224.Rawls, J. 1971. A theory of justice. Oxford: Oxford University Press.Rawls, J. 1999. The law of peoples. Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press.Temkin, L.S. 1993. Inequality. New York: Oxford University Press.Vallentyne, P. 2006. Of mice and men: Equality and animals. In Egalitarianism. New essays on the nature

and value of equality, ed. N. Holtug and K. Lippert-Rasmussen, 211–37. Oxford: Clarendon Press.

Journal of Global Ethics 179

Dow

nloa

ded

by [

Uni

vers

idad

de

Chi

le]

at 0

5:45

15

May

201

4