Introduction

Eva Feder Kittay, Alexa Schriempf, Anita Silvers, Susan Wendell

Hypatia, Volume 16, Number 4, Fall 2001, pp. vii-xii (Article)

Published by Indiana University Press

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IntroductionEVA KITTAY, ALEXA SCHRIEMPF, ANITA SILVERS, AND SUSAN WENDELL

Looking back over the course of philosophical thinking during the twentieth century, we can see how feminist philosophy transformed the philosophical climate. Initially, philosophers who adopted a feminist stance pursued critical analyses of the prevailing philosophical standards, methodologies, and views. Their aim was to query if and why women had been excluded from the philo-sophical tradition. They questioned whether the universality to which philoso-phy aspired extended to women or applied to women’s lives. And they wished to remedy the philosophical inadequacies resulting from philosophy’s tradition of silence about the way the world looks to women.

In doing so, they made interventions that changed the course of philosophy. Recognizing the importance of experiences of limitations is one prominent contribution. Feminist philosophers examined the limitations that pervaded their lives, and the lives of women generally, asking whether these resulted from alterable social arrangement or immutable biological destiny. Everywhere in the practice of the discipline they found traces of a bias that disregarded their interests and occluded their views. Subsequent feminist philosophical work has aimed at remedying the imbalances in traditional philosophical positions, paradigms, and methodologies, as well as identifying a narrowness in the issues with which philosophers customarily grapple.

To induce change, feminist philosophers have crafted approaches that derive from the limitations they encounter when attempting to pursue women’s inter-ests within philosophy. Women have been alienated, unsatisfi ed, and uncon-vinced by traditional epistemology’s paradigm of the isolated knower and by its detached, universalizing, and controlling approach to knowledge. Dis-satisfaction with this kind of view prompts epistemological insights about the advantages of collaborative practices in acquiring knowledge, the possibilities for achieving objectivity without insisting that everyone see things the same way, and the importance of situating, contextualizing, and nuancing truths. Women also have been dismayed by traditional meta-ethical analyses and moral theories that appear to infl ate typical male behaviors into paradigmatic moral actions. Although these theories have claimed to embrace everyone alike, feminist critiques show that their principles often exclude devalued kinds of people from important ethical roles and agency. Consequently, feminist philosophers have pioneered in exploring more inclusive alternative theories centering on the ethics of trust and care, the virtues of dependency, and the establishment of moral interconnectedness among people who do not occupy similar positions in life (see Mahowald 1998, 209–10).

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All of this work offers stimulating ideas to philosophers seeking to import the singular insights and different perspectives of other subordinated groups to infl uence the fi eld. Disabled people’s philosophical interests fi nd ready-made conveyances in several of feminist philosophy’s signature themes. First among these is the grounding of identity in distinctive kinds of embodiment and dis-tinctive ways of interpersonal relating. The interplay of disabled people’s biologi-cal and social identities—whether these be innate, imposed, or embraced—is a subject of fi rst-order importance in disability studies.

The inclusiveness of the various identity theories promoted both in feminist philosophy and in disability studies is of preeminent and continuing concern to women with disabilities. Discussing whether women with disabilities can comfortably be feminists, Anita Silvers asks whether feminism privileges the functional capabilities and social roles characteristic of “normal” women. She fi nds some feminist theories guilty of “magnifying these until they become standards of womanhood against which disabled women shrink into invis-ibility” (Silvers 1998a, 331). Considering whether disability studies comfortably refl ects the experiences of women, Susan Wendell points to masculinist infl u-ences on the fi eld’s standard model of disability (Wendell 1996). The social model of disability, which until very recently has been the unquestionable paradigm for disability studies, tends to obscure how disability is tied to illness. This model also promotes self-reliance over dependence and replaces trust with strategies for taking control. As Wendell reminds us, it is a mistake to suppose that affi rming our bodies by getting our political positions right will make us feel right about our bodies or make our bodies feel right.

Experiences of exclusion loom large in many disabled people’s lives (see Silvers 1998b, 35–53). Disabled women fi nd themselves vulnerable to an assort-ment of exclusions. In the disability community as well as in the larger social world, disabled women often are left out of cooperative efforts that emphasize strength of body or mind. Among women, the practice of treating the well-functioning female body as the primary locus of womanhood sometimes leaves disabled women seeing themselves as less than women. Perhaps more than other women, they feel the coerciveness of our culture’s somatic idealizations.

Disabled women also have a much lower sociocultural participation rate than disabled men and nondisabled women do. In our culture, physical, sensory, and mental impairments often are considered to be globally disabling. So being impaired is imagined to prevent women from successfully fulfi lling female social roles. As a consequence, disabled women often are not permitted to occupy these roles.

Perhaps because their personal and professional experiences make them especially vigilant about exclusion, women have been concerned to shape disability theory so that it responds to the diverse situations of people with different disabling conditions. Further, as Eva Kittay reminds us, social policies

Introduction ix

that pertain to disabled people also affect their family members, friends, and professional caregivers (Kittay 1998). So disability theory should recognize that disability touches many people beyond those who are themselves disabled.

In view of all these differences, feminist disability philosophy faces the challenge of constructing accounts of disability identity in which no one counts as a normal example. That is to say, no one should claim to speak, or be spoken about, as the typical disabled person. The enormous diversity of disabled people, and the overriding importance of refl ecting all their differences in formulating disability theory, encourages sensitivity to nuance and context. The resulting scholarship therefore can be of immense benefi t to philosophy generally, and especially to feminist philosophy’s efforts to refl ect the situations of many dif-ferent women. Approaches to reformulating theory in response to differences among disabled people may be extrapolated to help resolve the broader issues of difference beyond disability theory.

The essays in this issue advance the theoretical work on disability identity. They illustrate a variety of sophisticated approaches to the question of how the sensibilities and histories of people with very different kinds of limitations can be collected into a cohesive philosophical account. Some of the authors write with the perspective of lifelong disability identity, others describe their transition into the world of disability, and still others write about disability without having experienced being disabled themselves. Unlike race and sex, disability is a permeable classifi cation. Some people have always been disabled, some are newly so, and others have lived through periods in which they were disabled but now are not so. A large number of us should expect to become disabled later in our lives. Further, many of us fi nd ourselves intimately involved in the lives of family members or friends who now are disabled or who face a future of disability.

In many ways, the contributors to this issue stimulate philosophical thought about these situations. Jenny Morris, whose landmark writing on feminism and disability has infl uenced the work of both Silvers and Wendell, reconstructs the ethics of care within the framework of the social model of disability. Susan Wendell asks why disability theory has failed to appreciate the realities and the nuances of chronic illness. Licia Carlson, Kate Lindemann, and Andrea Nicki all explore conditions that once were collected under the label “mental disability.” So far, neither feminist nor disability studies has done much to advance philosophical understanding of these psychiatric and cognitive impair-ments. Mairian Corker and Alexa Schriempf both challenge aspects of the divisive “either/or” thinking of doctrinal disability studies.

In “Impairment and Disability: Constructing an Ethics of Care That Pro-motes Human Rights,” Jenny Morris appeals to the feminist principle that “anatomy is not destiny” to argue that the social model of disability is best suited for advocating and protecting disabled people’s human rights. The social model

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makes it possible to talk about impairment in terms of personal experience rather than in a detached and medicalized way. Doing so enables disabled people to defi ne their own bodies and their differences. Such self-authorization by receivers of care is a much-needed change in the way care ethics is thought about and practiced.

Susan Wendell offers a critique of the disability politics of promoting an image of the healthy disabled, which is similar to the feminist politics of excluding disabled women in an effort to advance more appealing and powerful icons. In “Unhealthy Disabled: Treating Chronic Illnesses as Disabilities,” she argues not only that disability politics must support examination of impairment issues but also that the implications of chronic illnesses (those that mark the unhealthy disabled) for feminist and disability politics must be considered. One such implication concerns the reaction to suffering: the social response in both mainstream society and disability circles is to support cures for chronic illnesses, as though the suffering caused by illnesses renders them less epistemically and ontologically valuable than other disabilities are claimed to be by advocates of disability pride.

Mairian Corker challenges the dichotomy underlying disability studies’ approach to theorizing disability identity. Arguing that disability studies doc-trine wrongly renders impairment unimportant because it is a stable, biological given, she calls for understanding both impairment and disability in mutually constitutive terms. Such an approach is achieved by “sensing disability” (hence the title of her essay) and includes everyone whether or not they are disabled, regardless of what their disability or lack thereof is. Because they often seek to weave together global and local knowledge, feminist philosophers will fi nd illumination when they view disabled people’s experiences through the lens of “sensing disability.” Here they will fi nd a model for releasing divergent embodi-ment and fl eshly difference from the constraints imposed by the conventions of social practice.

Alexa Schriempf, in “(Re)fusing the Amputated Body: An Interactionist Bridge for Feminism and Disability,” argues that bridging feminist and disability theories requires an interactionist approach. Interactionism denies that binaries such as nature/culture, impairment/disability, and sex/gender are dichotomies. Instead, these pairs link material and cultural concepts that are dynamically related. Recognizing these complexly fl uid relationships enables us to decon-struct multiple, intersecting “identities,” yet understand them in ways that interweave the natural and conventional aspects of gender and disability. An interactionist philosophical framework can address the lived experiences of disabled women because it distorts neither the biological nor the social dimen-sions of their lives.

In “The Abused Mind: Feminist Theory, Psychiatric Disability, and Trauma,” Andrea Nicki calls upon feminists and disability theorists who are undermin-

Introduction xi

ing the paradigm of the young and the healthy to extend their efforts to liberate psychiatrically disabled people from the idealization of the uniformly sound mind. She skillfully untangles concepts of mental illness, craziness, biopsychiatry, mind-body dualism, and traumatic disorders to show the benefi ts of embracing psychological diversity. To acknowledge the value of divergent psychological states, feminist ethics should appreciate some dimensions of typically devalued feelings such as aggression and anger. Feminists do not ordinarily think of aggression and anger as especially valuable; their use is for competitive rather than cooperative purposes, if they are useful at all. In some circumstances, however, anger and aggression facilitate autonomy and independence. These may be crucial for attaining morally valuable outcomes for psychiatrically disabled people—for instance, by making it possible to end an abusive relationship.

“Persons with Adult-Onset Head Injury: A Crucial Resource for Feminist Philosophers” centers on Kate Lindemann’s compelling account of living and continuing to do philosophical work after a traumatic brain injury. Lindemann discusses philosophical topics where feminists stand to gain by paying atten-tion to the epistemic questions provoked by the situation of adults with brain injuries: personal identity, mind-body dualism, conceptions of the self, moral philosophy, philosophical pedagogy, and the overspecialization of academic feminism. Her critiques of feminist thinking point to more radical and profound ways in which feminism can enlarge the domain of philosophical inquiry and thereby transform how it is pursued both within the academy and in the larger world.

Through a provocative but painstaking analysis of the genealogy of the category “feebleminded women,” Licia Carlson discusses the complex connec-tions between cognitive disability and gender oppression. In “Cognitive Able-ism and Disability Studies: Feminist Refl ections on the History of Mental Retardation,” Carlson argues that mental retardation is a gendered classifi ca-tion. This analysis should compel feminist philosophers to reconsider their understanding of cognitive disability. They should question whether they privi-lege their own modes and levels of cognition, just as they once questioned the privileged status of masculine ways of thinking. They should, further, ask whether they have constructed feminist philosophizing in terms that make it a privileged undertaking.

The essays grouped here all address theoretical dimensions of understanding women’s disability identity. Among the excellent papers offered for Hypatia’s exploration of women and disability were works with a different focus, one more concerned with concrete and practical aspects of living with disability. To preserve and present clearly the different threads of discussion evident in the articles we collected, Hypatia editors Laurie Shrage and Nancy Tuana generously proposed to publish a double issue. We therefore are pleased to

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invite readers to return to Hypatia to fi nd, in vol. 17 no. 3 (Summer 2002), further feminist philosophical refl ections on women and disability. The second part of this double issue will examine personal and political practical themes of disabled women’s lives, in both North America and other parts of the globe.

This publication marks the fi rst time a philosophy journal has devoted a full issue—in this case, a double issue—to what can be learned from and about disability. The groundbreaking achievement would never have occurred without the patient leadership and unstinting support of Laurie Shrage and Nancy Tuana. We have no doubt as well that there would be no issue were it not for the intelligent judgment, work ethic, and dedication of Alexa Schriempf, who fi lled the double role of Associate and Managing Editor.

References

Kittay, Eva. 1998. Love’s labor: Essays on women, equality, and dependency. New York: Routledge.

Mahowald, Mary. 1998. A feminist standpoint. In Disability, difference, discrimination, ed. Anita Silvers, David Wasserman, and Mary Mahowald. Lanham, Md.: Rowman and Littlefi eld.

Silvers, Anita. 1998a. Disability. In A companion to feminist philosophy, ed. Alison Jagger and Iris Marion Young. Oxford: Blackwell’s.

. 1998b. Formal Justice. In Disability, difference, discrimination, ed. Anita Silvers, David Wasserman, and Mary Mahowald. Lanham, Md.: Rowman and Littlefi eld.

Wendell, Susan. 1996. The rejected body: Feminist philosophical refl ections on disability. New York: Routledge.