162683

7/27/2019 162683

1/13

Rhetoric and Islamic Political PhilosophyAuthor(s): Charles E. ButterworthSource: International Journal of Middle East Studies, Vol. 3, No. 2 (Apr., 1972), pp. 187-198Published by: Cambridge University PressStable URL: http://www.jstor.org/stable/162683 .

Accessed: 28/07/2013 02:33

Your use of the JSTOR archive indicates your acceptance of the Terms & Conditions of Use, available at .http://www.jstor.org/page/info/about/policies/terms.jsp

.JSTOR is a not-for-profit service that helps scholars, researchers, and students discover, use, and build upon a wide range of

content in a trusted digital archive. We use information technology and tools to increase productivity and facilitate new forms

of scholarship. For more information about JSTOR, please contact [email protected].

.

Cambridge University Press is collaborating with JSTOR to digitize, preserve and extend access to

International Journal of Middle East Studies.

http://www.jstor.org

This content downloaded from 146.155.94.33 on Sun, 28 Jul 2013 02:33:32 AMAll use subject to JSTOR Terms and Conditions
http://www.jstor.org/action/showPublisher?publisherCode=cuphttp://www.jstor.org/stable/162683?origin=JSTOR-pdfhttp://www.jstor.org/page/info/about/policies/terms.jsphttp://www.jstor.org/page/info/about/policies/terms.jsphttp://www.jstor.org/page/info/about/policies/terms.jsphttp://www.jstor.org/page/info/about/policies/terms.jsphttp://www.jstor.org/page/info/about/policies/terms.jsphttp://www.jstor.org/stable/162683?origin=JSTOR-pdfhttp://www.jstor.org/action/showPublisher?publisherCode=cup

7/27/2019 162683

2/13

Int. J. Middle East Stud. 3 (1972), I87-I98 Printed in Great Britain

Charles E. ButterworthRHETORIC AND ISLAMIC POLITICALPHILOSOPHY*

Islamic political philosophy has always been pursued in a setting where greatcare had to be taken to avoid violating the revelations and traditions accepted bythe Islamic community, since these offer guide-lines for the secular conduct ofthat community, as well as injunctions about the manner in which its religiouslife should be conducted. Political philosophy is the search for a thorough under-standing of the good or the best political regime. Thus, a Muslim political philo-sopher must temper his conclusions about the character of the good or the bestpolitical regime with what the Islamic community holds to be appropriate forMuslims. This statement of what a Muslim political philosopher does immedi-ately gives rise to two questions: (i) Can a Muslim political philosopher everreally engage in philosophy? (2) If he can, is it not at the expense of Islamicprecepts?Our epoch of unmitigated rationalism has permitted many to consider irra-tional-and therefore unworthy of further study-any inquiry whose state-ments are cast in religious tones. In other words, it has permitted many toconclude that there can be no such thing as Muslim political philosophy. Suchan intellectual posture has led to the unfortunate neglect of many highly im-portant authors and questions. In addition, this posture has occasioned a lossof imagination. Modem man can no longer conceive that authors might have re-sorted to extreme schemes in order to express-without endangering their lives-what they considered to be true. He apparently cannot imagine why anyonewould seek to serve-much less, to preserve-a government which forbade itscitizens to question the divine basis of its laws. Once it is understood how aMuslim political philosopher conducts his inquiries, it might be possible tobecome imaginative once again, to delight in the real issues dealt with in suchinquiries, issues that demand the attention of any thinking man.Of the many possible ways to arrive at an understanding of how a Muslimpolitical philosopher conducts his inquiries, one particularly recommends itself:an investigation of the rhetorical writings of Ibn Rushd, called in the west Aver-roes. By looking at writings on rhetoric as part of the political philosophicalinquiry, one is made aware of the close relationship between speech and politicsas well as of that between the primary legislator of Islam, Muhammad, and the

* An early version of this paper was delivered at the 2nd Annual Meeting of theMiddle East Studies Association on I5-16 November 1968 at Austin, Texas.

I87

http://www.jstor.org/page/info/about/policies/terms.jsphttp://www.jstor.org/page/info/about/policies/terms.jsphttp://www.jstor.org/page/info/about/policies/terms.jsp

7/27/2019 162683

3/13

i88 CharlesE. Butterworthkind of speech used to persuade his followers. One is also led to question therelationship between the basis of public speech-commonly accepted opinion-and the goal of the political philosophical inquiry-true knowledge of the natureof the good regime. Although Averroes expressed his thoughts about rhetoricin the two forms of writing generally used by Muslim authors, that is, treatisesand commentaries, his commentaries on rhetoric' are especially helpful forthe question being examined here because in them he both practiced politicalphilosophy and subtly told others how to continue the investigation.The commentaries helped Averroes to practice political philosophy and toinspire others to continue the investigation by permitting him to apply paganthought to Muslim considerations. A surface reading of either commentaryreveals numerous examples of his attempts to broaden the permissible scope ofinquiry. For instance, in the Talkhis he indicated parallels between Greek andIslamic court procedures (T 63:3-64: I3), and in the Summary he testified tothe universality of Greek logic by indicating the use different Muslim theologianstried to make of it (S no. 36). At no point did he criticize the ancients for holdingopinions different from those of Muslims. He did not even suggest that theseopinions were very different. The casual reader, therefore, would leave thecommentaries with the impression that there are certain universal truths unaf-fected by time or revelation. His religious certitude would remain unchallenged,and he could think about ways to copy the speech of the Greeks. A more tena-cious reader would begin to notice discrepancies suggestive of a broader teaching;he might wonder, for instance, at the way Averroes made subtle allusion to thebroad difference in views between the Arabs and the Greeks about the originof the world-a difference much more significant than minor similarities injudicial procedure and formal logic. On the surface, Averroes presented a simple

1 Averroes wrote two commentaries on rhetoric, both based on Aristotle's Rhetoric.Contrary to what M. Bouyges thought (Mdlanges de l'Universite de St. Joseph, I922),the shorter commentary has only recently been edited. It has also been translated intoEnglish but is not yet published. The text is extant in two Judaeo-Arabic manuscripts:Catalogue des Manuscrits Orientaux, Bibliotheque Nationale, Paris, No. 00oo8;and Ver-zeichnis der orientalischen Handschriften der K. Hof- und Staats-bibliothek, Muinchen, Cod.Arab. No. 650o. Moreover, there is a Hebrew translation of the text in the Paris manu-script and a Latin translation published in the Juncta edition of Aristotle's works:Aristotelis, Opera cum Averrois Commentariis (Venetiis: Apud Junctas, 1562-74), Vol. II,folios I92D-i96M. The Summary was probably written prior to I159 (cf. P. ManuelAlonso, Teologia de Averroes [Madrid: Consejo Superior de Investigaciones Cientificas,I947], pp. 55-6I). The longer, or middle, commentary was edited and published by Abdal-Rahman Badawi in I960. Averroes, Talkhis al-Khatdbah, ed. 'Abd al-Rahman Badawl(Cairo, Maktabat al-Nahdah al-Misriyah, i96o). Salim Salim has also edited the middlecommentary: TalkhA.sal-Khatdbah, ed. Sallm Salim (Cairo, Dar al-Tahrlr li al-Tab' waal-Nashr, I967). A Latin translation of the commentary exists in the Juncta edition, anda Hebrew translation was published in Leipzig in 1842. Averroes indicated that hefinished the middle commentary in I74. Hereafter, the shorter commentary will be citedas S, and references to parts of it will reflect the paragraphing that I have adopted in myedition. The middle commentary will be cited as T, and references will be to the pages andlines of the Badawi edition.


7/27/2019 162683

4/13

Rhetoric and Islamic Political Philosophy 189commentary on some Greek ideas about rhetoric and rhetorical procedures.Beneath the surface a greater controversy was waged: here Averroes examinedthe rational character of many of the accepted teachings.In each of the commentaries, Averrois gave overwhelming attention to thecharacter of proof in rhetoric. But whereas the Talkhls is ordered in accordancewith Aristotle's Rhetoric and discusses the issue by means of departures from theAristotelian text, the Summary is constructed in a manner that gives primaryattention to how rhetorical arguments are proven. The Summary consists offour parts:

(a) An introductionwhich sketchesout the subjectsof the treatise,a short defini-tion of persuasion,and a plan of the work(S nos. I-3).(b)A section devoted to persuasivespeeches. This includes: (i) a subsectionon thesyllogisticcharacterof the enthymeme,i.e., a discussion of the forms of enthymemes(patternedafter the forms of logicalsyllogisms)and their components (S nos. 4-25);(ii) a subsectionon the parallelsbetween the inductionand the examplein which thedifferent classes of examplesare discussed, the two classes of likeness are explained,and reasonswhy an examplecannot be used to reachapodeicticcertaintyareoffered(S nos. 26-32).(c) A section on the persuasive things not occurring by speeches and thereforeusually considered external to rhetoric. This includes subsections on four of theseexternals, i.e., testimonies,written laws, consensus,and challenging S nos. 33-44).(d) Finally,a lengthyconclusionaboutthe purposesof rhetoric, he waythe different

branchesof rhetoric are used, and the considerationswhich prompted Aristotle towrite a treatise on rhetoric(S nos. 45-46).Although much shorter than the Talkh's, the Summary has a very involveddiscussion of the logical character of rhetoric. Two subsections are used toexplain the way in which sound rhetorical arguments are formed. Still, Aver-roes discussed the tricks of rhetoric, i.e., those things he called external to theart of rhetoric, in great detail. He devoted, for example, more than i o % of thetreatise to a discussion of testimonies and reports (S nos. 35-40), but insistedthat 'the enthymemes are more noble and take precedence over these' (S no. 44).The Summary is a very good introduction to the Talkhis. It explains that oneought to be interested in rhetoric because of its political relevance and providesmany examples of the way rhetoric is used in the community. The explanationof why one ought to be interested in rhetoric must be deduced from the text,for Averroes never explained why he wrote his commentary.' He did, however,explain why Aristotle set about writing the Rhetoric. His explicit acknowledge-ment of Aristotle's reasoning and failure to offer a counter-proposal for writing

I The only evidence of a reason for Averroes having composed any of the treatises isin the very opening lines of the whole collection. At that point, he explained that he in-tended 'to abstract the necessary speeches from each and every one of the arts of logic inorder to make clear the ranks of the kinds of concept and conviction employed in eachand every one of the five arts, i.e. demonstrative, dialectical, sophistical, rhetorical, andpoetical '. He thought that to know a certain amount of logic was 'most necessary in orderto study the arts which have already been completed in the way that most of the arts[have already been completed] in this time of ours'. As an example of a completed artwhich logic would help a person to study, he cited medicine.


7/27/2019 162683

5/13

9go Charles E. Butterworththis commentary strongly suggest that he embraced that reasoning. Once Aris-totle understood three things, he was prompted to set down 'the rules and thethings by which a man would be able to persuade': (I) persuasive things have adefinite order of rank based on how well they lead others to assent to a givenview; (2) such assent is valuable because the populace uses it in discussing allkinds of volitional matters; (3) in so far as he is a social being and a citizen, aman must use rhetorical speeches about these matters (S no. 45). Aristotle andAverroes appear, then, to have written about rhetoric because of its relevanceto political life.

By embracing Aristotle's reasoning, Averroes did not endanger any Muslimdoctrines. It was generally admitted that the Qur'an and Muhammad's tradi-tions were obscure about certain matters of conduct. Moreover, the passing oftime had brought new questions which in some ways were related to olderquestions but which had to be treated by suggesting their analogous relation toother legal prescriptions. In addition, it was generally believed that God hadcommanded Muhammad to exhort other Muslims by rhetorical speeches,I aninjunction generally understood as permitting the theologians andjurists to teachand persuade the people about the Divine Law. The effort to persuade theMuslim populace did, however, bring about some major difficulties. Less con-cerned about practical issues-the very things Aristotle and Averroes consideredto be the substance of rhetoric-than about theoretical issues, many Muslimtheologians and jurists tried to steer the populace toward their own traditionalviews and away from what they considered to be false ideas derived from theGreek philosophers. Much later, Averroes wrote a brilliant denunciation of thisactivity,2 but he provided the fundamentals for this denunciation in the Summary.In so doing, he adumbrated the problems in the traditional, theological approachand defended the study of pagan thought against any possible attack. At thesame time, he suggested to the discerning reader some problems inherent inthe views which were thought to be made certain by revelation.

The denunciation of the theologians in the Summary is subtle but effective.The dialectical theologians receive the greatest attention and areattackedthroughtwo prominent representatives, Abu al-Ma'ali and al-Ghazali. Although bothhad pretensions to rhetorical skill, Averroes presented them as ignorant of itsbasic principles. For instance, in the discussion of the more logical part ofrhetoric, i.e., that which was said to be prior and of greater importance by nature,only two references to Abu al-Ma'ali occur. The omission would suggest thatAverroes did not consider their knowledge of this part of rhetoric to be thorough.Moreover, when Abu al-Ma'li is mentioned, it is to illustrate a faulty applica-tion of rhetorical principles. When discussing disjunctive syllogisms and the way

I al-Qur'dn, XVI. I25.2 This was his Kitdb al-Kashlf 'an Manahij al-'Adillah Ff' Aqd'id al-Millah (The Bookof Uncoveringthe Clear Paths of the Signs about the Beliefs of the Religious Communitywhich he claims to have completed in about 1179, i.e., about 5 years after he completedthe Talkhis.


7/27/2019 162683

6/13

Rhetoric and Islamic Political Philosophy 191they may be converted to enthymemes, Averroes cited a syllogism by Abu al-Ma'ali. Seeking to refute the notion of creation from the elements, Abui al-Ma'ali constructed a syllogism from which he omitted one of the subjects thatought to have been included as an object of contention (S no. I2). The syllogismis nowhere accorded the title 'enthymeme', and the context does not permit aclear judgement about its persuasiveness. Even though Abu al-Ma'ali fulfilledthe basic requirements for constructing a persuasive disjunctive syllogism(S no. 1), he omitted the major object of contention (S no. I2), thus weakeningthe basic persuasive appeal of the argument (S nos. 6, 7, io). The only otherprecise references in this section of the Summary are to the 'ancients', i.e., thepagan Greek philosophers, and to Galen. Galen made a conditional syllogismthat was clearly persuasive, but which could easily be refuted (S no. 9). The'ancients' made a conditional enthymeme about the impossibility of creationthat was persuasive and apparently irrefutable. Averroes at least made no attemptto refute it (S no. 8). The 'ancients' appear to have been uniquely gifted with anunderstanding of rhetoric.The short-comings of the dialectical theologians are also made explicit in adifferent context, and the criticism is again directed at Abu al-Ma'ali. In con-cluding a complicated discussion of the differences between induction or exampleand syllogism, Averroes stated that examples can only provide knowledge aboutparticular things since they are based on particular premises. His reasoning wasthat the premises used in examples are derived from sense perceptions and there-fore only lead to particular judgements. He also noted that opinion could neverlead to certainty about universals because it, too, is based on judgements derivedfrom sense perceptions (S no. 30). Abu al-Ma'ali was, admittedly, aware of this,but he did not understand that the syllogism could go beyond the limits of theexample. Averroes apparently concluded that Abu al-Ma'ali failed to recognizethis possible extension of reasoning because of his ignorance of logic and conse-quently neglected the problems in his own approach. Abu al-Ma'ali was there-fore led to make a statement which would reduce all the sciences to child'splay and which would suggest that the question of the origin of the world wasself-evident (S no. 31).To have treated serious matters in such a cavalier fashion was to have helpedmislead the populace and to have added to the difficulties of philosophicallyminded men. Confusion or ignorance about logic not only prompted the theo-logians to employ erroneous methods of persuasion (S no. 36), it also attached tobeliefs they considered dogmas of faith and resulted in false arguments aboutmajor points in theology. Not knowing how certainty arises, they tried to makebinding rules about matters that should not have been binding, e.g., the numberof reporters needed to make a report certain (S nos. 38-40). Averroes also men-tioned the conflicting opinions about consensus as an example of this kind ofconfusion and singled out the contradictory statements of al-Ghazali to illustratehow the theologians created more problems than they solved (S no. 42).


7/27/2019 162683

7/13

192 Charles E. ButterworthOnce the errors of the theologians and the deleterious consequences of theseerrors on the life of the community had been traced to ignorance of logic, and,more precisely, of rhetoric, a plea for the study of these subjects would appearto have been warranted. Averroes made that plea and attempted to render itmore persuasive by stressing that the wisdom of the ancients, i.e., the paganGreeks, about logic and rhetoric could be of inestimable value in regard to many

peculiarly Islamic matters (S no. 44). Thus he asserted that enthymemes couldeven be used to advantage by someone who would claim to be a miracle-worker.He also stressed that all of the persuasive elements of rhetoric could be used toattain a tenable degree of certainty, a problem that apparently troubled him inhis reflections on the beliefs cherished by the Islamic community.Averroes did not stop at recommending a study of Greek thought to theIslamic theologians; he also hinted at difficulties in certain doctrines of Islam,difficulties that could be removed only by careful philosophical discussion. As

part of a discussion of the components of enthymemes, Averroes lamented that'the type of conviction to which we have inclined since youth is that all thingsare possible and that there is nothing here on this earth which is impossible' andnoted that, as a consequence, that very opinion about the possibility of all thingsmust be considered to have no more than possible validity. Faith, however,must be based on some certainties. Among them is the doctrine of the creationof the world. In the context of this lament, Averroes noted the possible characterof any arguments about the different forms in which the heavens might exist(S no. 24) and thus indicated to the careful reader that the issue had to be morethoroughly explained in order for it to be accepted as a certainty. Nonetheless, inthe rest of the treatise he systematically pointed to the weakness of the examplesused as arguments to prove the creation of the world (S no. 26) and finallyconcluded that one could never make an apodeictic conclusion about that issuebecause the conditions for apodeictic proof were lacking (S no. 30).He also indicated the difficulty of proving other key doctrines in Islam,namely, the sending of the Prophet and the existence of the creator. Certaintyabout these doctrines could only be accidental; it would only be possible toattain essential certainty about sense-perceived matters, and essential certaintyderives only from sensation or from syllogistic reasoning (S nos. 39-40). As a con-sequence, testimony or reports about things that arenot perceived by the sensescould be of no use as proof of certainty; they might, however, be used to persuadethe populace as long as the speaker was aware that persuasion, and not certainty,is all that can be attained (S no. 38). Furthermore, testimonies and reports couldbe of no use for persuading more thoughtful people about such matters. Averroesfinally pointed to the fallacy of considering miracles a sufficient proof of whata man claims and asserted that successful miracles could only render the spec-tators more willing to think well of the miracle-worker and to trust in him. Theycould in no way affect the validity of what he says (S nos. 43-44); only soundreasoning could testify to the validity of his claims.


7/27/2019 162683

8/13

Rhetoric and Islamic Political Philosophy I93The reader who has discovered this astonishing teaching in a booklet that was

presented as a simple summary of Aristotle's views on rhetoric should notrashly conclude that Averroes was attempting to subvert the accepted beliefsof his community. In the first place, the teaching does not destroy those beliefs;it only emphasizes the limits which must be attached to them asbeliefs. Secondly,since the context of the teaching is a book on rhetoric, the reader must inquireabout that choice of context. Clearly the massive implication is that the peoplehave been misled because the theologians tried to prove what is not susceptibleof proof and because ignorance of rhetoric prompted the theologians to useconfusing arguments. It appears that Averroes only meant to invite the curiousto consider more carefully how to teach the citizens about basic beliefs of thecommunity. Differently stated, he recommended a new rhetoric for a bettercommunity. The principles of that new rhetoric are set forth in the Talkhis.

Contemporary students of the Talkhis may consider the claim that it setsforth a new rhetoric to be far-fetched. They need, however, only reflect on theirfirst impression of the commentary in order to discern the justification for thatclaim. The first impression of the Talkhfsis that it is a not too faithful commen-tary on Aristotle's Rhetoric.A multitude of divergencies from the text of Aristotlecontribute to this impression. Of these divergencies, the most important are: anemphasis on the logical character of rhetoric, a close association of rhetoric withdialectic in order to stress its investigative possibilities, and a more lenientposture vis-d-vis the use of rhetorical tricks. Throughout the Talkhis, there arealso recurring references to the manner in which a master of logic would employthe art of rhetoric; these references appear to be part of a superimposed theme.Averrois introduced all of these divergencies by inventing Aristotelian speechesor by falsely claiming to relate a thought of Aristotle; at no time did he admitthat the innovations were his own. The second, or reflective, impression of theTalkhzsis, therefore, that the divergencies form a pattern-a pattern that con-tains the new teaching about rhetoric.

According to Averroes, a major reason for classifying rhetoric among thelogical arts was its close association with dialectic (T 4:3-4, I8 :I3-I6). Thesyllogistic character of the rhetorical enthymeme was another reason for con-sidering rhetoric to be a logical art. As part of that argument, Averroes assertedthat the best preparation for the practice of rhetoric was a thorough knowledgeof the components of the syllogism, the reasons for which enthymemes areconstructed, and the differences between enthymemes and the syllogisms used inother logical arts. He then concluded that since these things were set forth in theart of logic, rhetoric must be part of logic (T 9: 9I-Io:7).1 Moreover, rhetoricwas to be grouped among the logical arts because it provides a similitude oftruth, and the same art which indicates how one may arrive at truth encompassesthe art which teaches how one may arrive at a similitude of truth (T 1o:7-I3).Finally, Averroes reasoned that since the populace considered the correct choice

I Cf. also T 247: I3-I9.I 3 MES 3 2


7/27/2019 162683

9/13

I94 Charles E. Butterworthof words to be very important for imparting an understanding and explanation ofideas and that since a knowledge of logic would help one to choose the best wordsfor those ends, rhetoric must be among the logical arts (T 248:4-9, 249:7-I7).The emphasis on the logical character of rhetoric in the Talkhiswas promptedby the same consideration which led to that emphasis in the Summary, butAverroes made a far stronger and more detailed argument in the TalkhMs.Hereasoned that an ignorance of logic and its relation to rhetoric accounted for therhetorical shortcomings of his predecessors, i.e., the theologians (T Io: I4-I5).His thought was that without an understanding of logic, one could never graspthe significance of the pillar of rhetoric, the enthymeme, and without an aware-ness of the enthymeme, one would always remain at a superficial level whentrying to persuade. Moreover, without an awareness of the enthymeme, onewould never be able to talk about the principles of things (T I0: I5-I9). Becausethey remained at this superficial and misleading level of discourse, Averroesaccused his predecessors of straying from the path of righteousness and justice(T I0: 19-2I, 40:7-I3). He also intimated that they might have failed to accountfully for rhetoric and to discuss its association with logic out of a base hope forgain and pre-eminence (T i8: I-I6).There are two immediate consequences of this emphasis on the place ofrhetoric among the logical arts. In the first place, it is evident that a knowledgeof pagan Greek science would have been beneficial to the Muslim and to hiscommunity. Since ignorance of pagan Greek science was the primary cause ofmany of the excesses caused by those who preceded Averroes, more Muslimsought to study pagan Greek books. Secondly, rhetoric must play a very import-ant role in the community, and failure to recognize its place among the logicalarts led to a failure to pay sufficient attention to its role. In order to make thisargument, Averroiesentered upon a long digression and offered reasoning remini-scent of that mentioned by al-Farabi in his Philosophy of Aristotle: Rhetoricprovides a solid understanding and explanation of ideas that the populacecannot grasp by the strict pursuit of logic; since these ideas are necessary for thepopulace to understand, the rhetorician must use the art of rhetoric to communi-cate these ideas to them (T 10:22-I3:6). Rhetoric can be used to translatehighly complex arguments into popular language, and it can preserve an appear-ance of the logical necessity of the original idea. Recognition of the logicalcharacter of rhetoric is thus associated with recognition of the moral duty of therhetorician to instruct the populace. Central to the new rhetoric of the Talkhisis this stress upon the moral duty of the rhetorician.Another aspect of the new rhetoric of the Talkhfs was its closer associationto dialectic, i.e., an association with dialectic that went beyond the rhetoricdescribed by Aristotle. Averrois followed Aristotle in teaching that rhetoricand dialectic were counterparts because they had the same scope of investiga-tion, but he differed from Aristotle in that he broadened the investigatory powersof rhetoric to include speculation into all things and all beings (T 3:8-4:2,


7/27/2019 162683

10/13

Rhetoric and Islamic Political Philosophy I95I6:I -2). Moreover, according to Averroes, all men had recourse to rhetoricfor arguing with others, for instruction, and for guidance-functions that Aris-totle primarily ascribed to dialectic (T 4:5-7). Averroes entered into much moredetail than Aristotle when discussing the ways in which the two arts weresimilarly dependent on what is well known, unable to attain certainty, andhighly useful for arguing about opposites (T I8: I3-I5, 33: 5-34:2I). The onlymajordifference between the two arts which he conceded was that dialectic couldbest be used to speak to one other person, whereas rhetoric was more suited forspeaking to many people, i.e., the citizens. Even the basic difference in the proofsused by each art can be reduced to the different audience to which each art shouldbe directed (T 20:9-22:1).The effect of this rapprochement was to liken rhetoric much more to aninvestigative art, but an investigative art whose findings are to be presentedto the populace. Thus, although Averroes pretended to agree with Aristotle'sview that rhetoric is limited in that it cannot provide a sufficient treatment ofthe subject of legislation or of the different kinds of political regimes, he actuallyopened his rhetoric to a broad discussion of both subjects (T 32:15-39:II;67:2I-71:7). The comprehensiveness of that discussion and the moral burdenwhich it places upon the rhetorician is indicated by the passage in which Aver-roes subtly identified the deliberative rhetorician with the law-giverpar excellence,Muhammad. This was accomplished by referring to the deliberative rhetoricianwith the term traditionally used to designate Muhammad in his legislativecapacity, wadi'al-sunnah,instead of the term by which he had previously referredto the deliberative rhetorician, al-mushir or al-khatib (T 38:2 andpassim). More-over, unlike Aristotle, Averroes did not hesitate to discuss the best regime in hisrhetorical treatise (T 69:7-I6). Finally, Averroes explained some of the tensionsbetween the written and the unwritten law of which the rhetorician would haveto be aware and related the discussion to practices in the Islamic community(T 1 8:7-I2I: I8). By linking rhetoric more closely with dialectic, Averroes thuselevated the concerns of rhetoric and placed heavier responsibility upon therhetorician who would seek to learn about rhetoric by reading the Talkhls.The stress on the logical character of rhetoric and the teaching about its closerelationship with dialectic were not, however, attempts by Averroes to identifyrhetoric with either one. Rhetoric was consistently presented as an art distinctfrom demonstrative logic or from dialectic. It was depicted as an art whosepurpose was persuasive discourse with the populace. Awareness of this primarycharacteristic of rhetoric led Averroes to open the new rhetoric to certain tricks.But these tricks found their justification in their purpose: they should be used toconvince and to instruct the populace. Consequently, they did not detract fromthe emphasis on the logical pillarof rhetoric, the enthymeme. To the contrary, thepurpose to which Averroes restricted the tricks guaranteed the elevated status ofthe enthymeme. The tricks would only be used when other persuasion failed.They would be used, however, as a tool to persuasion and not for adornment.

13-2


7/27/2019 162683

11/13

I96 Charles E. ButterworthThus, early in the Talkhis, Averroes invented an Aristotelian speech in orderto prove that when the rhetorician seeks to establish something by rhetorical

method, he ought to employ anything which has influence in bringing aboutconviction. Averroes then suggested that Aristotle would have considered theman who uses rhetoric to such an end as having become proficient in the art ofrhetoric, intelligent, and refined (T 5: o-6:7)-a suggestion entirely absentfrom Aristotle's text. Similarly, another departure from Aristotle permittedAverroes to state the full significance of the notion that only the moral purpose ofthe rhetorician distinguishes him from the sophist: a rhetorician could use anymeans-even tricks common to sophistry-to persuade an audience, as long asthe object of his discourse was the good of the listener; to that extent, he wouldbe in accordance with the real purpose of rhetoric (T I3:7-I4:2I). Again, whilepretending to relate Aristotle's text, Averroes refuted Aristotle's notion that thepopulace usually has a sufficient grasp of what is simply good and pointed to theneed for virtuous people to learn the principles of rhetoric and to impress thepopulace with their virtue, thereby gaining the honor and respect that wouldhelp them to instruct or exhort the populace (T 62:3-65:2).Since the faults of earlier rhetoricians were said to be faults of technique andof substance, the Talkhzs stressed the logical character of rhetoric in order tocorrect the technique and its association with dialectic in order to lead the rhetori-cian to new depths of investigation. The rhetoric presented in the Talkhis thuswent beyond the formalism of older Muslim rhetoric in that it provided for theexamination or reconsideration of many issues usually communicated to thepopulace. The new rhetoric did not, however, teach what the results of suchexamination or reconsideration would be; only the principal direction wasindicated. To learn the more complex details of the different matters about whichhe should advise the populace and to be able to discuss such matters (e.g., whatto do with citizens who hinder the common effort, whether to go to war or tomake peace, what kind of legislation might be desirable) with the citizens, therhetorician would need to study other arts and sciences-perhaps pagan Greekarts and sciences. This emphasis on the need for the rhetorician to study indi-cated another aspect of the new rhetoric: the moral purpose of public speech. Thenew rhetoric thus demanded a man who was interested in political life and in thepossibility of instructing, as well as exhorting, the citizens. Because the newrhetoric was directed to the good of the citizens, all types of rhetorical trickscould be justified.In the TalkhFs, s in the Summary,the starting-point for concern about rhetoricwas the use made of it by the populace in the conduct of daily affairs. Aristotlejudged the dependence of the citizens on rhetoric to necessitate an elaboration ofthe rules of rhetoric so that they might be aware of the pitfalls of some rhetoricalarguments, but he did not explicitly concern himself with the relation betweenrhetoric and philosophy. Averroes judged that dependence of the citizenson rhetoric to necessitate a reform of the rhetoric practiced in the Islamic


7/27/2019 162683

12/13

Rhetoric and Islamic Political Philosophy I97community. The Summary effectively pointed out the faults in the rhetoric usedby the theologians and the resulting confusion in the beliefs to which the populaceadhered. The Talkhts offered a view of rhetoric which remedied the rhetoricpracticed by the theologians and which would help the qualified rhetoricianto instruct the populace without endangering the accepted faith or leading toconfusion. To the extent that his new rhetoric was an improvement or remedyfor the theologian andjurist to follow, Averroes functioned as a reformer. To theextent that he also provided suggestions about a rhetoric appropriate to thephilosophically minded individual and subtly indicated how the philosophercould learn to speak in a manner that would preserve philosophical inquiryfrom injurious attacks,Averroes acted as a careful Muslim political philosopher.'

The latter statement becomes more persuasive once the allusions to an addres-see other than the theologian or the jurist occurring in the Talkhis are noticed.Averroes insisted, for example, that only the master logician would conduct athorough examination of the art of rhetoric and that he alone would fully under-stand the art (T 9: I9-Io:8). The term 'master of logic' was used again whenAverroes explained that such a man investigated the ways of speech common toall nations and distinguished that investigation from the limited investigation ofthe rhetorician into the ways of speech particularto his own nation (T 249: I 6-20).Clearly, the master of logic is the philosopher.

Distinction between the two types of investigation is fundamental to philo-sophy. The philosopher is in search of ideas and pays little heed to their nationalorigin. Thus, Socrates discerned admirable traits among the Spartans and con-tinually urged the Athenians to consider how they might improve themselvesby emulating the Spartans. But Socrates had great contempt for rhetoric anddemonstrated little patience for the limited intellects of the populace on theoccasion of his one public speech. For his contempt and impatience he had to paya severe penalty. As noted, Averroes sought to avoid this consequence by per-suading his fellow citizens that they could benefit from the study of pagan Greekthought and incur no risk of weakening their faith. Averroes tried, moreover, topersuade the philosopher to speak to the populace with benevolence.In the Talkhis, he taught that the master of logic should study manners ofspeech in order to render demonstrative speaking easier, simpler, and clearer.Demonstrative speech, consequently, would be more readily comprehensible tothe populace or to the followers of particular arts (T 252:15-253:8). Like thetheologian and the jurist, the philosophically minded individual would have tobe concerned about the effect of his thoughts upon the populace. He would haveto take exceeding care to make his thoughts utterly clear to the populace, that is,those thoughts of which he wanted, or was obliged, to speak to the populace. Itis essential to note that Averroes did place a responsibility upon the philosopher;

I This divergence from Aristotle is possibly part of what Averroes meant when heappealed to al-Farabi's authority to assert that many of Aristotle's ideas were eitherincomprehensible or not useful to the Arabs (T 252:19-253:2).


7/27/2019 162683

13/13

I98 Charles E. Butterworthhe forced the philosopher to consider the community. Still, it is equally essentialto be aware that Averroes said nothing about the obligation of the philosopherto make his written ideas comprehensible to the populace or to the followers ofother arts. Obviously, there are some thoughts that the populace ought not tohear. Of these thoughts Averroes did not deem it necessary to speak; those whowere interested knew where to find discussions of them.

The combined teaching of the Summary and the Talkhaswas that there wereproblems in the rhetoric used to persuade the populace and that a new rhetoricwas needed. The new rhetoric placed higher demands upon the theologian andthe jurist; at the same time it reminded the philosopher of his duty to thecommunity. In all important respects it appears to be a great benefit to the com-munity that Averroes wrote these two treaties. Indeed, if questioned, Averroescould have defended his reform by asserting that he was only trying to buttressthe teaching of Muhammad and preserve that teaching for the populace.Once the question of defending Muhammad's teaching or revelation comesinto sight, however, new problems emerge. No attempt was made in the Talkhzsto resolve the tensions in Muhammad's teaching alluded to in the Summary.References to Muhammad or to substantive issues of the faith were extremelysparse in the Talkhis. The Summaryand the Talkhzsthus raise, but do not solve,the key question for Islamic political philosophy: Are the cardinal rules of theIslamic community in accordance with the dictates of reason? It is fitting thatthis question should be dominant in the mind of any Muslim political philo-sopher. It is also fitting that no easy reply is to be found.The adequacy of Muhammad's teaching can be guaranteed only because ofits apparently divine origin. Admittedly, the philosopher has no access to reve-lation. Since philosophy is the quest for theoretical wisdom, the philosopher whoattains his goal could testify to the harmony or disharmony between divine andtheoretical wisdom. If divine wisdom is consonant with theoretical wisdom, anyphilosopher who attains theoretical wisdom could vouchsafe the adequacy ofMuhammad's teaching. A human answer to the question of whether philosophyand revelation are harmonious depends, then, on an answer to the question ofwhether theoretical wisdom is possible. As long as the philosopher has no moreaccess to theoretical than to divine wisdom, he must depend on refined common-sense reasoning. He can only point to limited problems and attempt to preservethe possibility of philosophy. Averrois apparently understood this and tried tocommunicate that idea to others. To recognize this is to learn what he consideredto be the desired relation between rhetoric and political philosophy within theIslamic community.UNIVERSITY OF MARYLANDCOLLEGE PARK, MARYLAND

162683

Documents

Transcript of 162683