100:00:02,120 --> 00:00:03,840Hi.Welcome back.Make yourself comfortable.Last time, we talked about the WashingtonConsensus thatseemed to be ordering the world of the1990s.Now, I'd like to take stock of how theworld had changedand the new era of world historythat seemed to be dawning during the 1990s.In Week Seven, I said that we had usheredina kind of hundred year struggle ofcontestingideologies about how to organize thesemodern industrial societies.The constant issues in this contest wereissues of identity.Who am I?What do I stand for?Am I a worker?Am I a capitalist?Am I an Aryan?Am I an American?Who am I?Security, how do I protect myself?What dominant power will look after me?In what block will I reside?And political economy, how will weorganize my state domestically?Who will take charge of private propertyor public property?What are the basic principles forpolitics?And in the resolution of these issues,I argue that you increasingly see therenaissance of classical liberalism.Liberalism the way Europeans originallywere usingthat term, back in the early to mid-1800swhen classical liberalism was at itszenith.Let's think about some of the waysin which liberal ideals are making acomeback.First, in the area of identity.As in classicalliberalism, a lot about the individualand individual rights and liberties.Remember our discussion of the RightsRevolutionthat becomes so important beginning in the1960s.Rights of women, rights of racialminorities,ideals that harken back to a lot of that

rhetoricof the late 1700s and the first half ofthe 1800s.Security.Liberals sought security primarily ininternational cooperation,relying somewhat less on military powerand rival blocs or rival empiresas the source of their security.In political economy, liberals wanted aslittle government intrusioneconomic life as possible in the classicalliberal mode.They celebrated free market principles andcapitalism.[BLANK_AUDIO]Free markets at home.Free trade between countries.As you can see the terms of the post-ColdWar settlement in the early 1990sactually seemed to bedoing quite a lot to be enshrining theseprincipals andmaking adherence to these principles morewidespread than ever before.China, for example, signs up to the WorldTrade Organization andbasic principles of free trade by thebeginning of the 21st century.The spread of democracy is visible in amap like this one.Before 1939, really just a handful ofdemocracies left.A couple of states in Europe, Scandinavia,North America.You can see a lot of these countries nowshaded in green.The spread of democracy across almost allof South America.The spread of democracy, or at leastpartialdemocracies, through actually much ofsub-Saharan Africa. Theintroduction, at least, of elections andpartial democracythrough much of Eurasia including the oldSoviet Union.Though here, there's a spectrum ofpractices.More democracy in Southeast Asia, placeslike Indonesia.And even here in the Muslim world, and insomeof East Asia, you can see even in the lastcoupleof years, beyond the scope of this map,how democraticrevolutions or inspired revolutions havebeen shaking up the Muslim world.If you look at in the spread of individual

liberties, one simple testis to look at the extension of the rightof vote to women.This map shows you howthis has become more and more a universalpractice.If you look at this category here nosuffrage, here's Saudi Arabia and Oman.The Gulf Emirates.But very few other exceptions now,anywhere else in the world.By the way, you can also see some parallelshifts ofwomen moving into employment, where womenare making up more and moreof the workforce in these modernsocieties.Now, to go back to an earlier lecture, theone that we had in Week Eight of thecourse, where I talked about the originsof modern feminism and modern women,I centered the entry of women into theworkforce, the extension of the rightto vote, as starting out especially in theAtlantic world and especially in theUnited Statesof America,to some extent in Britain, also Scandinavia,in the 1910s and the1920s. So here we are a hundred yearslater, you can see how nowmodern feminism, and then all the socialand cultural arguments that go withit, are now a commonplace for discussionin every part of the world.So, now, moving from identity issues tosecurityissues, we can also see the way those havechanged.Remember in the world in which nationalempires and great power blocs arebattlingagainst each other, lots of interstateconflicts,including many interstate conflicts allthrough the 1800s.But look at this chart, and it's a crudechart, it's just the numbers of wars.It doesn't gauge their intensity.But you can generally get the impressionofa small number of interstate conflictsreally up until around the middle of the1980s, at which point they reduce, and,afterthe American conflict with Iraq in 2003,essentiallyin the last ten years reducing tovirtually zero.What's taking its place are a lot of

internal conflicts that rise since the1970s andremain a significant theme.But internal conflicts are very differentfrom the kind of international blocsthat had characterized a lot of the worldorder ever since the 1600s.So, the way in which people get securityis more focused on how they get securityat home against social dangers arisingwithin their societies,not so much the obsession with themilitary balance between rival blocs ofstates.If you turn to the economic principles,the rise of these economicliberal principles, internationalfinanciers, globalization area big topic all through the 1990s.The notion of a Washington Consensusaroundthese principals, and maybe even a littlebitof the hubris surrounding that moment atthe end of the 1990s, is captured here.Depicted in the picture,towards the end of the administration ofBill Clinton, is theChairman of the Federal Reserve Board, AllenGreenspan, in the center,and two former Secretaries of the Treasuryfromthat era: Robert Rubin over here onthe left side of the picture, and LarrySummers, on the right side of the picture.It is interesting to notice why they areon the cover of this magazine.They're on the cover of this magazinebecause, for about the preceding twoyears, there had been a constant run offinancial crisesinvolving Russia, Brazil, Southeast Asia,Korea,because one thing that goes with this new,freer international financial system ismore volatility of the kind that was alsoevident in the early gold standard era.That volatilityis being managed by American officials,central bankers,but of course, to us now, we know that nineyears after this picture istaken the world will be plunged into afinancial crisis ofextraordinary proportions that brings ustothe precipice of another Great Depression.So by the early 1990s, that hundred yearstruggle isending in a kind of great convergence,

an ideological convergence that we cantrace using some of our old charts.Remember this menu of political familiesin whichthe most important ones were theDemocratic Socialists,that the state should own all property,Liberals, National Conservatives -- but theNational TraditionParty, Revolutionary Socialist Party.Then by the 1920s that had morphed.These families, theRevolutionary Socialists turn intoCommunists and Fascists and, by the1920s, all of these political families areof roughly comparable influence.That then turned into the world of the1930s,in which the Communists and the Fascistswere probably the most influentialpolitical movements, with the new hybridSocial Democracy coming in third.Then we saw that in the postwar era thetwo dominant factions are the Communistsand the Social Democrats.Democratic Socialists remain important,as do National Conservatives,top-down modernizers oftenin authoritarian or semi-authoritarianstates,with some residuum of liberalism, but nowmuch smaller in influence,and fascism almost disappearing from view.But now look how this morphs into thepresent day.Social Democracy massively important,remaining massively important.Indeed most of the politicalparties in what we think of as the UnitedStates, Europe, are different shadingsalong a spectrum of Social Democraticparties, in my definition of this term.But the other hugely important faction areNational Conservative ideologies.For instance, I classify the leadership ofChina today as National Conservatives.I classify the leadership ofRussia today as National Conservatives.I frankly can classify the leadership of aplace like Iran also asNational Conservatives, though I'll noteina moment of a particularly idiosyncratickind.Liberalism probably is third mostimportant as a continuing influenceand an undercurrent underneath SocialDemocracy,with Democratic Socialism still there butrunning kind of a fourth, and

communism and fascism on the extremes,almost at the vanishing point.This is a little bit what I mean by asense of ideological convergence.But, I want to admit to some problems ofclassification with my fancy typologies.For example, National Conservativeoligarchies.Take, for instance, the problem of China.China is ruled by a communist party.The Communist Party not only controls theministries of the state, the CommunistParty effectively select the leaders ofallof China's leading companies, also partymembers.Including many other non-profit andacademic organizations.So what are we to make of a NationalConservative oligarchy of this kind?Is it turninginto some other variant of a total state?Anyway, challenging.Or an Islamic republic,like, for example, the Islamic Republic ofIran or the new Islamic republic thatfor the moment has taken hold inEgypt after the Muslim Brotherhood hasbeen elected.We could classify it as NationalConservative but somehow that categorydoesn't fitas neatly there.The Iranian leadership, for example, doeshave transnational revolutionarygoals for the spread of Islamic ideals -- ahard problem.Maybe this is some new type, limited atthe moment only afew countries, but it might become moreimportant in the Muslim world.Too soon to tell. And there's a thirdcategory which we can just call: enabledpredators.They may carry the title of president andsay they're in charge of ademocratic republic, but if you look atthe rule of someone like Robert Mugabein Zimbabwe, it's hard not to just simplysee them as these are dictatorswho are simply looting the instruments oftheir state and looting their countries,to dignify this with an ideological titlelike National Conservative does them toomuch justice.But as we step back, it is remarkable tonotice, in the early 1990s, the degree ofconvergencethat's going on,the beckoning, perhaps, of a new dawn in

which the era ofgreat power conflict and the rivalryof great power blocs andlarge rival empires has finally come to anend, at least cometo an end in a form in which we knew itbefore.That doesn't mean that a new utopia is takingover the world.It does mean, though, that we haveentered, in this period,the last 20 years, a really new phase ofworld history withdifferent kinds of issues than the issuesthat have dominated so muchof the world's political and economic lifeover the previous hundred years.It's that new worldI want to spend some more time on, when Isee you again next time.See you then.