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College of Law – Pitbol University

NOVEMBER 12, 2009Espiritu vs Cipriano G.R. No. L-32743 February 15, 1974 Filed under: Statutory Construction — ryanmendez @ 2:36 pm

Republic of the PhilippinesSUPREME COURTManila

FIRST DIVISION

G.R. No. L-32743 February 15, 1974

PRIMITIVO ESPIRITU and LEONORA A. DE ESPIRITU, petitioners,vs.RICARDO CIPRIANO and THE COURT OF FIRST INSTANCE, RIZAL, BRANCH XV, respondents.

Concepcion, Victorino, Sanchez and Associates for petitioners.

Jose G. Ricardo for respondent Ricardo Cipriano.

ESGUERRA, J.:p

In this petition for certiorari, petitioners seek the review and nullification of two orders of the Court of First Instance of Rizal, Branch XV, the first, dated August 4, 1970 sustaining private respondent Ricardo Cipriano’s motion to dismiss “on the authority of Republic Act 6126″, and the second, dated October 16, 1970, denying the motion for reconsideration of the first order. The

question before Us involves the retroactive application of the provisions of Republic Act 6126, otherwise known as the Rental Law.

The case originated as one for unlawful detainer instituted on May 30, 1969, by plaintiffs, now petitioners, in the Municipal Court of Pasig, Rizal, against private respondent Ricardo Cipriano for the latter’s alleged failure to pay rentals. An adverse judgment having been rendered against said respondent, he appealed to the Court of First Instance of Rizal where the case was docketed as Civil Case No. 338-M. In the said Court private respondent sought to amend his Answer filed in the Municipal Court on the grounds that (1) for lack of time he was not able to disclose to his former counsel all the material facts surrounding his case and, therefore, he was not able to fully determine his defenses; and (2) that prior to the hearing of the case in the lower court he wanted to cause the filing of an amended answer but was not able to do so for his alleged failure to contact his counsel. The motion to file amended answer was denied by the Court. The parties eventually submitted a stipulation of facts, the salient provisions of which read as follows:

1. The plaintiffs are the owners of the property in question, leased to the defendant since 1954;

2. The house of the defendant was built on the property with the knowledge and consent of the plaintiff pursuant to an oral contract of lease;

3. Before 1969 the lease of the property was on year-to-year arrangement, rentals being then payable at or before the end of the year;

4. The following are the rates of rentals:

(a) 1954 to 1957 P12.00 a year

(b) 1968 to 1959 P13.20 a year

(c) 1960 to 1961 P14.00 a year

(d) 1962 P16.00 a year

(e) 1963 to 1965 P24.70 a year

(f) 1967 to 1968 P48.00 a year

5. Effective January 1969 the lease was converted to a month-to-month basis and rental was increased to P30.00 a month by the plaintiffs;

6. The defendant has remained in possession of the property up to the present;

7. Since January 1969 the defendant has not paid rental at the present monthly rate;

8. A formal notice to vacate, dated March 22, 1969, was sent by registered mail to, and received by, defendant.

On July 7, 1970, Judge Vivencio Ruiz of the Court of First Instance of Rizal issued an order giving private respondent herein seven days within which to file his motion to dismiss. Subsequently, on July 13, 1970, respondent moved to dismiss petitioner’s complaint, invoking the prohibitory provision of Republic Act 6126, entitled “An Act To Regulate Rentals of Dwelling Units or of Land On Which Another’s Dwelling Is Located For One Year And Penalizing Violations Thereof.

Petitioners opposed the motion to dismiss but respondent Judge issued an order on August 4, 1970, which reads:

On the Authority of Republic Act 6126, this Court hereby sustains the Motion for Dismissal filed by the defendant through counsel, dated July 13, 1970.

A motion for reconsideration of said order was likewise denied by respondent Judge. Hence this petition.

Thrust upon Us, therefore, for resolution is the problem of whether Republic Act 6126 may be held applicable the case at bar. For convenience We reproduce the pertinent provisions of law in question:

Section 1. No lessor of a dwelling unit or of land on which another’s dwelling is located shall, during the period of one year from March 31, 1970, increase the monthly rental agreed upon between the lessor and the lessee prior to the approval of this Act when said rental does not exceed three hundred pesos (P300.00) a month.

Section 6. This Act shall take effect upon its approval.

Approved June 17, 1970.

It is the contention of respondent which was upheld by the trial court that the case at bar is covered by the aforecited law. We rule otherwise. Established and undisputed is the fact that the increase in the rental of the lot involved was effected in January, 1969, 1 while the law in question took effect on June 17, 1970, or after a period of one year and a half after the increase in rentals had been effected. Private respondent, however, puts forward the argument that there was no perfected contract covering the increased rate of rentals and conversion thereof into monthly payments of P30.00 effective January 1969, as he did not give his consent thereto. In his brief he alleges:

Defendant (respondent) herein also begs to disagree with the contention of plaintiffs. We believe and respectfully submit that there would be no impairment of obligation of contract if Republic Act 6126 were to be applied to the present case. The alleged new contract of lease and subsequent increase in the amount of rental were not effected as of January 1969 with respect to the defendant. He did not accept the new rate of rental. The eloquent testimonies on record to show that defendant never accepted the new rate of rental imposed upon him by the plaintiffs were the pretrials on the case wherein defendant offered to accept the increase to the tone of 100%. Hence, the new contract of lease increasing the rental had never been agreed upon by both the plaintiffs

and the defendant because the defendant never gave his consent to the new rate of rental. In effect, therefore, the alleged new contract of lease was not a contract at all since it did not have the consent of the other party, the defendant.

Private respondent’s contention is devoid of merit. There is nothing in the stipulation of facts to show that his consent to the increase in rentals and change in the manner of payment was essential to its validity. There was no more subsisting yearly contract of lease at a fixed amount. It had already expired when the increase and conversion into monthly payments took effect in January, 1969. The lessor was free to fix a higher amount than that previously paid by the lessee (private respondent herein) and if the latter did not agree to the increased amount, he could have vacated the premises and thus rendered himself free from liability. Respondent Cipriano, therefore, cannot invoke lack of consent on his part as basis for declaring the contract of lease ineffective.

Likewise the claim of private respondent that the act is remedial and may, therefore, be given retroactive effect is untenable. A close study of the provisions discloses that far from being remedial, the statute affects substantive rights and hence a strict and prospective construction thereof is in order. Article 4 of the New Civil Code ordains that laws shall have no retroactive effect unless the contrary is provided and that where the law is clear, Our duty is equally plain. We must apply it to the facts as found. 2 The law being a “temporary measure designed to meet a temporary situation”, 3 it had a limited period of operation as in fact it was so worded in clear and unequivocal language that “No lessor of a dwelling unit or land … shall, during the period of one year from March 31, 1970, increase the monthly rental agreed upon between the lessor and lessee prior to the approval of this Act.” Hence the prohibition against the increase in rentals was effective on March, 1970, up to March, 1971. Outside and beyond that period, the law did not, by the express mandate of the Act itself, operate. The said law, did not, by its express terms, purport to give a retroactive operation. It is a well-established rule of statutory construction that “Expressium facit cessare tacitum” 4 and, therefore, no reasonable implication that the Legislature ever intended to give the law in question a retroactive effect may be accorded to the same. A perusal of the deliberations of Congress on House Bill 953 which became Republic Act No. 6126, as recorded its Congressional Records of March 5, 1970 reveals the sponsors of the Rental Law did not entertain for a moment that a retroactive operation would be given to this enactment. We quote pertinent portions of the discussion:

Remarks of sponsor, Mr. Roces:

Mr. Roces — Mr. Speaker, the President is still observing the effect of the newly established floating rate. In the meantime we feel that, in line with the policy that those who have less in life should have more in law, apartment dwellers are entitled to protection. Therefore this bill proposes that the rentals paid today will not be increased in the next 18 months.

and on pages 66 and 72 respectively of the same Congressional Record We likewise find the following:

Mr. Gonzales — Will the gentleman from Manila interpret for us the phrase “during the period of 6 months preceding the approval of this Act” in Section 2? 5

Mr. Roces. — My interpretation is that the rent being paid during that period not before will be the one considered.

Mr. Montano — … The term moratorium as utilized by the gentleman from Manila at the start of his sponsorship was applied not in its legal acceptance but generally. For purposes of the bill, the term is construed as suspension of increasing rents in the meantime that we have not yet determined the real value of the currency … .

Respondent’s tenacious insistence On the retroactive operation of Republic Act 6126 represents a last ditch effort on his part to hold on to the premises while at the same time escaping the obligation to pay the increased rate. We can not countenance such a situation, for to permit the same to obtain would be sanctioning a sheer absurdity and causing injustice to the petitioner herein. Well-settled is the principle that while the Legislature has the power to pass retroactive laws which do not impair the obligation of contracts, or affect injuriously vested rights, it is equally true that statutes are not to be construed as intended to have a retroactive effect so as to affect pending proceedings, unless such intent in expressly declared or clearly and necessarily implied from the language of the enactment, 6 Similarly, in the case of La Previsora Filipina, Mutual Building and Loan Association v. Felix Ledda, 66 Phil. 573, 577, this Court said:

It is a principle generally recognized that civil laws have no retroactive effect unless it is otherwise provided therein (Manila Trading & Supply Co. v. Santos, G.R. No. 43861). Act No. 4118 does not state that its provisions shall have retroactive effect, wherefore, it follows, as it is hereby declared, that it is not applicable to the contracts entered into by the parties, and, hence the trial court erred in granting possession to the petitioner.

The petitioner contends that said law is applicable because when the property in question was sold at public auction said law was already in force. This contention is in our opinion untenable. The date which should be taken into account in order to determine the applicability of the law is the date when the contracts were entered into by the parties and not the date of the public sale, … .

Under the circumstances of this case, We, therefore, rule that Republic Act 6126 is not applicable to the case at bar. As the language of the law is clear and unambiguous, it must be held to mean what it plainly says.

WHEREFORE, the assailed orders of August 4 and October 16, 1970, are hereby nullified and set aside. The court a quo shall proceed with the prompt disposition of Civil Case No. 338-M (12285) on the merits in accordance with Republic Act 6031 if applicable, otherwise under the prevailing procedure prescribed by the Rules of Court.

Costs against respondent.

Makalintal, C.J., Castro, Teehankee, Makasiar and Muñoz Palma, JJ., concur.

Footnotes

1 Stipulation of Facts, paragraph 5, March 3, 1970, 24 of Rollo.

2 Cf. People v. Mapa, 20 SCRA 1164; Pacific Oxygen & Acetylene Co. v. CB, 22 SCRA 917; Luzon Surety Co., Inc. v. De Gracia, 30 SCRA 111.

3 Explanatory Note (RA 6126) H. No. 853 Congressional Record of the House, 1970 Vol. I, Part I, March 5, 1970.

4 “That which is expressed puts an end to that which is implied.” (Sutherlands Statutory Construction, Vol. 2. Section 4945 p. 412.)

5 “Section 2. It is unlawful for any owner, administrator, agent or any person, within a period of 18 months from the approval of this Act, to increase the rental of any building, part or unit thereof for residential purposes, or to collect any amount in excess of the rental paid for such building, part or unit thereof during the period of six months preceding the approval of this Act.” … .

EN BANCG.R. No. L-18566             September 30, 1963

IN THE MATTER OF THE ADOPTION OF ELIZABETH MIRA, GILBERT R. BREHM and

ESTER MIRA BREHM, petitioners-appellees, vs. REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES, oppositor-

appellant.PAREDES, J.: chanrobles virtual law library

          Finding that only legal issues are involved in the instant case, the Court of Appeals certified the same to this Court for disposition. chanroblesvirtualawlibrary chanrobles virtual law library

          Gilbert R. Brehm is an American citizen, serving the U.S. Navy with temporary assignment at Subic Bay. On October 9, 1958, he married Ester Mira, a Filipino citizen, who had a daughter Elizabeth, by another man, also of the American Navy, who left the country in 1952, and never heard from since then. After the marriage, the couple established residence at Intramuros, Manila, and the minor Elizabeth had always been under their care and support of Brehm. chanroblesvirtualawlibrary chanrobles virtual law library

          On January 28, 1959, the spouses filed a Joint Petition with the Juvenile and Domestic Relations Court for the adoption of the minor Elizabeth, claiming that they have mutually given their

consent to the adoption, not only to promote her best interest and well-being, but also to give her a legitimate status. They prayed that after the proper proceedings, judgment be entered, freeing the child Elizabeth Mira from all legal obligations of obedience and maintenance with respect to her natural father, and be, for all legal intents and purposes, the child of the petitioners, with all the rights pertinent thereto. chanroblesvirtualawlibrary chanrobles virtual law library

          An opposition to the petition with respect to Gilbert Brehm was registered by the Republic of the Philippines, it appearing that Brehm testified that his residence in Philippines was merely temporary, same being effective only for purposes of his tour of duty with the Navy, thus disqualifying him from making an adoption (Art. 335 [4], New Civil Code; Sec. 2, Rule 100, Rules of Court), and that being a non-resident alien, the Court has no jurisdiction over him.chanroblesvirtualawlibrary chanrobles virtual law library

          A reply to the opposition was presented by petitioners. They claim that Art. 335 does not apply in the case, reasoning out that it covers only adoptions for the purpose establishing a relationship of paternity and filiation, where none existed, but not where the adopting parents are not total strangers to said child; that there is already a relation between the child and Brehm, created by affinity that Art. 338 of the New Civil code, expressly authorizes the adoption of a step-child by

a step-father, in which category petitioner Brehm falls. Petitioners contend that the records show their residence is Manila, for while Brehm works at Subic, he always goes home to Manila, during week-ends and manifested that he intends to reside in the Philippines permanently, after his tour of duty with the U.S. Naval Forces. chanroblesvirtualawlibrary chanrobles virtual law library

          The Juvenile & Domestic Relations Court rendered judgment, the Pertinent portions of which read -          ... Since residence is principally a matter of intention, the Court is of the opinion that notwithstanding the nature of Petitioner Gilbert R. Brehm's coming to the Philippines, his subsequent acts, coupled with his declared intention of permanently residing herein, have cured the legal defect on the point of residence. chanroblesvirtualawlibrary chanrobles virtual law library

          Finally, we must consider the status of the minor Elizabeth Mira whose welfare deserves paramount consideration. Being a natural child of the petitioning wife, it cannot be in conscience be expected that when petitioners married, the mother would reduce her responsibility and her affection toward her child.... chanroblesvirtualawlibrary chanrobles virtual law library

          WHEREFORE, finding that the principal allegations of the petitioners are true, it is hereby adjudged that henceforth the minor Elizabeth is freed from all obligations of obedience and

maintenance with respect to her natural father, and is, to all legal intents and purposes, the child of the petitioners Gilbert R. Brehm and Ester Mira Brehm, said minor's surname being change from "Mira" to "Mira Brehm".          The Solicitor General took exception from the judgment, claiming that it was error for the Court in adjudging the minor Elizabeth Mira the adopted child of petitioner Gilbert R. Brehm. The appeal, however, did not assail the right of petitioner Ester Mira Brehm, the natural mother of the minor, to adopt her.chanroblesvirtualawlibrary chanrobles virtual law library

          There is no question that petitioner Gilbert R. Brehm is a non-resident alien. By his own testimony, he supplied the conclusive proof of his status here, and no amount of reasoning will overcome the same. For this reason, he is not qualified to adopt. On this very point, We have recently declared:          The only issue in this appeal is whether, not being permanent residents in the Philippines, petitioners are qualified to adopt Baby Rose. Article 335 of the Civil Code of the Philippines, Provides that - chanrobles virtual law library

          The following cannot adoptx x x           x x x           x x x chanrobles virtual law library

          (4) Non-resident aliens;x x x           x x x           x x x chanrobles virtual law library

          This legal provision is too clear to require interpretation. No matter how much we may sympathize with the plight of Baby Rose and with the good intentions of petitioners herein, the law leaves us no choice but to apply its explicit terms, which unqualifiedly deny to petitioners the power to adopt anybody in the Philippines (Ellis & Ellis v. Republic, L-16922, Apr. 30, 1963).          Prior to the above decision, We have also denied petitions to adopt by persons similarly situated as petitioner Brehm. Thus, in the case of Caraballo v. Republic, G.R. No. L-15080, April 25, 1962, giving some reason why non-resident aliens are disqualified to adopt, We said -          ... Looking after the welfare of a minor to be adopted the law has surrounded him with safeguards to achieve and insure such welfare. It cannot be gain said that an adopted minor may be removed from the country by the adopter, who is not a resident of the Philippines, and placed beyond the reach and protection of the country of his birth. (See also S/Sgt. Katancik, v. Republic, G.R. No. L-15472, June 20, 1962).          This notwithstanding, petitioners press the argument that Brehm being now the step-father of

the minor, he is qualified to adopt, in view of the provisions of par. 3, Art. 338, Civil Code, which states -          The following may be adopted:(1) The natural child by the natural father chanrobles virtual law library

(2) Other legitimate children, by the father or mother chanrobles virtual law library

(3) A step-child, by the step-father or step-mother.          We should construe, however, Article 338 in connection with article 335. Art. 335 clearly states that "The following cannot adopt: ... (4). Non-resident aliens". It is therefore, mandatory, because it contains words of positive prohibition and is couched in the negative terms importing that the act required shall not be done otherwise than designated (50 Am. Jur. 51). On the other hand, Art. 338, Provides "the following may be adopted: (3) a step-child, by the step-father or step-mother", which is merely directory, and which can only be given operation if the same does not conflict with the mandatory provisions of Art. 335. Moreover, as heretofore been shown, it is article 335 that confers jurisdiction to the court over the case, and before Article; 338 may or can be availed of, such jurisdiction must first be established. We ruled out the adoption of a step-child by a step-father, when the latter has a legitimate child of his own (Ball v.

Rep., 50 O.G. 145; and McGee v. Rep., L-5387, April 29, 1959).chanroblesvirtualawlibrary chanrobles virtual law library

          IN VIEW HEREOF, the decision appealed from, in so far as it affects the petitioner Gilbert R. Brehm, is hereby reversed, and his Petition to adopt the child EIizabeth Mira, denied. Without costs.

Republic of the PhilippinesSUPREME COURT

Manila

EN BANC

G.R. No. L-17915           January 31, 1967

TEODORO M. CASTRO, petitioner and appellant, vs.AMADO DEL ROSARIO as Commissioner of Civil Service, DOMINADOR AYTONA as Secretary of Finance, MELECIO R. DOMINGO, as Commissioner of Internal Revenue, and TOMAS C. TOLEDO, respondents and appellants.

Ramon C. Aquino, Teodoro M. Castro, Leandro C. Sevilla and Antonio M. Castro for petitioner and appellant.Emma Quisumbing-Fernando and E. M. Fernando for respondent and appellant Toledo.Office of the Solicitor General Edilberto Barot and

Solicitor Ceferino S. Gaddi for respondents and appellants Secretary of Finance, et al.

MAKALINTAL, J.:

This is a proceeding in quo warranto, certiorari and mandamus originally filed in the Court of First Instance of Manila. The controverted position is that of Assistant Regional Revenue Director II, Manila, which became vacant on August 24, 1959, upon the promotion of its occupant, Alfredo Jimenez. Respondent Tomas C. Toledo was appointed in his place, and it is this appointment that is being questioned by petitioner Teodoro M. Castro in this proceeding. The court a quo annulled Toledo's appointment, but did not grant Castro's prayer that respondent officials be ordered to appoint him.

Toledo's appointment by the Secretary of Finance, upon recommendation of the Commissioner of Internal Revenue, was made on November 24, 1959, effective as of October 1, 1959. When he was appointed Toledo's position was that of Chief Revenue Inspector, or Chief Revenue Examiner, stationed in Manila. The appointment was protested by Castro in a letter he wrote the Commissioner of Internal Revenue on January 19,

1960, wherein he alleged that in accordance with the provisions of Section 23 of Republic Act No. 2260, otherwise known as the Civil Service Act of 1959, he was the one who should have been considered for the position. Copy of the letter-protest was furnished the Secretary of Finance. On February 8, 1960 the Commissioner of Internal Revenue, in a first indorsement, informed Castro that "the position of Assistant Revenue Regional Director II, R-53, at P6,000.00 adjusted to P6,597.60 per annum, is for Regional District No. 3, Manila, and the appointment thereto had to be issued to the person actually performing the functions of the position," namely, respondent Toledo, who was then acting as Assistant Revenue Regional Officer II, Manila.

On March 8, 1960 Castro appealed to the Commissioner of Civil Service, who indorsed the matter to the Commissioner of Internal Revenue with a request for a statement of the comparative qualifications of Toledo and Castro. After setting forth the qualifications as requested, the Commissioner explained that the next two Assistant Revenue Regional Directors in line for the protested position, as reported for purposes of Administrative Order No. 171, were Teodoro

Lucero, Assistant Revenue Regional Director I (Regional District No. 4), with a salary of P6,900 per annum; and Lauro Abraham, Assistant Revenue Regional Director I (Regional District No. 6), with a salary of P6,000 per annum, but that since the protested position was for Regional District No. 3, Manila, where Toledo was next in rank, and since he was actually performing the functions of the controverted office, there was no need to make a comparison between his qualifications and those of Castro.

On July 1, 1960 the Commissioner of Civil Service rendered his decision dismissing Castro's protest on the ground that the contested position belonged properly to Regional District No. 3, where Toledo was the next ranking employee, while Castro was in Regional District No. 5, San Pablo City. Hence, Castro filed the present petition asking that Toledo's appointment be annulled and that he be declared entitled to the position. As already stated, the trial court rejected Castro's claim, but at the same time annulled Toledo's appointment — this last on the ground that his previous appointment as Chief Revenue Examiner was illegal.

Both sides appealed from the decision. Respondents claim that the lower court should not have nullified Toledo's appointment. They contend (1) that the question as to the legality of his previous appointment as Chief Revenue Examiner was neither raised in the pleadings nor proven at the trial with the consent of the parties; (2) that petitioner was precluded by laches from questioning said appointment; and (3) that the same was not contrary to the Revised Administrative Code.

On the other hand, petitioner argues that the lower court should have ordered respondents Commissioner of Internal Revenue and Secretary of Finance to appoint him to the controverted position because (1) he was senior in rank to Toledo and was the competent and qualified employee next in line for the position; and (2) the eight other Assistant Revenue Regional Directors I had waived their rights to the position.

Castro entered the government service in 1931 as a messenger in the Bureau of Forestry. He became a clerk in the Bureau of Internal Revenue on February 1, 1937. Then he became successively law clerk, income tax examiner, Chief

of Tax Audit Branch and eventually, on July 1, 1957, Assistant Revenue Regional Director I.

On the other hand , Toledo first worked in the Metropolitan Water District on July 16, 1948. He became employed in the Bureau of Internal Revenue on December 4, 1952, when he was appointed distillery agent. At the time he left the Bureau on January 15, 1958 his position was that of income tax examiner with a salary of P3,300 per annum. On said date he became a Technical Assistant to the Executive Secretary of the President of the Philippines at P7,200 per annum. On July 1, 1958, when he returned to the Bureau he was appointed Chief Revenue Inspector (a new position created under the Appropriation Act of 1958-1959, which look effect on July 1, 1958) at P6,787 per annum.

This case is principally a special civil action in quo warranto. A quo warranto proceeding is one to determine the right to the use or exercise of a franchise or office and to oust the holder from its enjoyment, if his claim is not well founded, or if he has forfeited his right to enjoy the privilege.1 The action may be commenced for the Government by the Solicitor General or by a fiscal;2 or a person

claiming to be entitled to a public office or position usurped or unlawfully held or exercised by another may bring an action in his own name.3 Where a private person files the action, he must prove that he is entitled to the controverted position, otherwise respondent has a right to the undisturbed possession of his office.4

Castro claims the position by virtue of Section 23, paragraph 3, Republic Act 2260, which provides:

Whenever a vacancy occurs in any competitive or classified position in the government or in any government-owned or controlled corporation or entity, the officer or employee next in rank who is competent and qualified to hold the position and who possesses an appropriate civil service eligibility shall be promoted thereto: Provided, That should there be two or more persons under equal circumstances, seniority shall be given preference: And provided, however, That should there be any special reason or reasons why such officer or employee should not be promoted, such special reason or reasons shall be stated in writing

by the appointing official and the officer or employee concerned shall be informed thereof and be given opportunity to be heard by the Commissioner of Civil Service, whose decision in such case shall be final. If the vacancy is not filled by promotion as provided herein, then the same shall be filled by transfer of present employees in the government service, by reinstatement, by reemployment of persons separated through reduction in force, or by certification from appropriate registers of eligibles in accordance with rules promulgated in pursuance of this Act.

It appears that for internal revenue tax purposes the Philippines is divided into ten regional districts, with Manila as District No. 3. Each district has a Revenue Regional Director and an Assistant Revenue Regional Director. The Revenue Regional Director for the Manila District outranks the nine other Revenue Regional Directors, while the Assistant Revenue Regional Director for Manila outranks the nine other Assistant Revenue Regional Directors. These nine Assistant Revenue Regional Directors therefore usually aspire to be promoted either to the position of Revenue

Regional Director or to that of Assistant Revenue Regional Director for Manila.At the time the controverted petition became vacant Toledo was occupying the position of Chief Revenue Inspector, (or Examiner) while the positions of Assistant Revenue Regional Director outside the Manila District were occupied by the following:

Name Salary1. Teodoro Lucero . . . . . . . . . . . . . P6900      

2. Lauro D. Abraham . . . . . . . . . . . 6000      

3. Ricardo A. Rivera . . . . . . . . . . . . 6000      

4. Gaspar L. Angeles . . . . . . . . . . . 5100      

5. Jaime Araneta . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 6000      

6. Policronio Blanco . . . . . . . . . . . . 6000      

7. Francisco Tantuico . . . . . . . . . . 6266.40

8. Pedro D. Uy . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 6000      

9. Teodoro M. Castro . . . . . . . . 6000      

. . .

According to the Commissioner of Internal Revenue, the next two in line for the position in question were Lucero and Abraham. Obviously the position of Chief Revenue Inspector (Examiner) was considered to be of the same rank as the position of Assistant Revenue Regional Director for regions other than Manila. And Toledo, who was then Chief Revenue Inspector (Examiner), was chosen because in the opinion of the Commissioner of Internal Revenue he was already in the region where the vacancy occurred and therefore was more familiar with the work there, and both his salary range and efficiency rating5 were higher than Castro's aside from the fact that he was already performing the functions of the office.

Even on the assumption that Castro possessed, as he claims, better qualifications and a higher efficiency rating than Toledo, it would avail him nothing because he has failed to prove that his position was the one next in rank to the vacant office. He was not even the most senior among the different Assistant Revenue Regional Directors outside the Manila District. However, he insists

that the eight other Assistant Revenue Regional Directors waived their rights to the position by their failure to complain against Toledo's appointment.

Waiver is the intentional relinquishment of a known right. The silence of the eight other Assistant Revenue Regional Directors does not amount to a waiver on their part. Waiver must be predicated on more concrete grounds. The evidence must be sufficient and clear to warrant a finding that the intent to waive is unmistakable.

Castro himself, when he testified, could not categorically state that the eight others were not interested in the position.6 Not having shown either seniority in rank among the nine Assistant Revenue Regional Directors outside the Manila District or waiver on the part of those who were senior to him Castro has failed to establish a clear right to the office which would entitle him to oust respondent Toledo.

Upon the other hand, the supposed illegality of Toledo's appointment as Chief Revenue Officer of the Manila District cannot be a ground for the annulment of his appointment to the controverted position.7 The legality of that earlier appointment may not be questioned except in a quo warranto

proceeding brought by the proper person at the proper time. To be sure, as heretofore stated this is principally such a proceeding, but only insofar as the position of Assistant Revenue Regional District II is concerned. It is true there is an allegation in Castro's petition that the earlier appointment of Toledo as Chief Revenue officer was illegal.8 But Castro does not claim to be entitled to that other position and consequently the legality of Toledo's appointment thereto is not properly in issue. Besides, even if Castro were the proper party to raise that issue, he did so beyond the time limit prescribed by law.9 Toledo was appointed to said position on July 1, 1958. Castro had one year from that date to assail the legality of the appointment. The petition here was filed only on August 6, 1960, or beyond the one-year period.

Wherefore, the judgment appealed from is modified by eliminating therefrom that portion annulling respondent Toledo's appointment to the position in dispute, and is affirmed in other respects. Costs against petitioner.

Concepcion, C.J., Reyes, J.B.L., Dizon, Regala, Bengzon, J.P., Zaldivar, Sanchez and Castro, JJ., concur.

Republic of the PhilippinesSUPREME COURT

Manila

EN BANC

G.R. No. L-25245      December 11, 1967

FRANKLIN BAKER COMPANY OF THE PHILIPPINES, petitioner, vs.MAURICIO ALILLANA and WORKMEN'S COMPENSATION COMMISSION, respondents.

Paulino Manongdo for petitioner.Paciano C. Villavieja and M.E. Lanzona, Jr. for respondents.

BENGZON, J.P., J.:

Franklin Baker Co. of the Philippines, a domestic corporation engaged in producing copra, on July 19, 1947 took Mauricio Alillana into employment, as truck loader. In 1956 he was assigned as washer. Four months later, he became shell collector therein, performing duties of this nature: To pick up unshelled coconuts from a moving conveyor; place them in a "caritilla" and hand them to the shellers; four times during the 8-hour work, he and some assistants had to personally rotate the pulley to keep the conveyor running when it gets stuck up by coconut shells.

On April 21, 1958, Alillana suffered from pains at the ribs he was found with bronchitis and went on leave. On May 9, 1958, however, he was allowed by the company to resume his work.

Starting May 31, 1958, he from time to time complained of cough, with chest and back pains, for which he was treated. Referred for physical and X-ray examinations, on July 6, 1958, his condition was found to be as follows: "Far advanced pulmonary tuberculosis at the left lung, associated with bronchitis." The next day, on July 7, 1958, he retired from the company. Franklin Baker Co. paid him P188.16 under its non-occupational sickness and disability benefit plan for the period from July 7, 1958 to October 29, 1958; and P669.12 as retirements benefits.

Alillana subsequently filed a claim for disability compensation under the Workmen's Compensation Act. On February 28, 1963, the Regional Office hearing officer awarded disability benefits. Franklin Baker Co. elevated the case to the Workmen's Compensation Commission.

The Workmen's Compensation Commissioner, on October 11, 1963, affirmed the award, slightly reducing the amount to P3,015.06. Section 14 was

applied, on temporary total disability, i.e., 60% of his average weekly wage of P27.01, times the maximum of 208 weeks less a brief period when he had "odd-lot" or sporadic employment.

On July 25, 1964, Franklin Baker Co. paid said award of P3,015.06. Satisfaction thereof was acknowledge by Alillana in writing (Annex "C" to Petition).

Thereafter, on August 10, 1964, alleging continuing disability from his ailment, Alillana filed a motion in the same case for additional compensation. The Workmen's Compensation Commission, on September 16, 1964, ordered a physical examination of Alillana. And on September 7, 1965, after said physical examination by one of the Commission's doctors, finding Alillana still suffering from temporary total disability due to his ailment, the Workmen's Compensation Commission issued an order for additional compensation of P984.94, thus raising the total award to the then statutory maximum of P4,000.

Franklin Baker Co. moved for reconsideration. On October 13, 1965, the Workmen's Compensation Commission en banc denied the motion, stating

that the period of disability can be extended beyond 208 weeks under Sec. 18 of the Act.

Hence, this petition was filed by the Franklin Baker Co., to raise on appeal from the Workmen's Compensation Commission's orders the issue: Does the Workmen's Compensation Commission have power under Sec. 18 to extend the period of disability under Sec. 14 of the Act?

Section 14 provides:

Sec. 14. Total disability. — In case the injury or sickness causes total disability for labor, the employer, during such disability but exclusive of the first three days shall pay to the injured employee a weekly compensation equivalent to sixty per centum of his average weekly wages; but not more than thirty-five pesos nor less than ten pesos per week, except in the case provided for in the next following paragraph. Such weekly payments shall in no case continue after disability has ceased, nor shall they extend over more than two hundred and eight weeks, nor shall the aggregate sum paid as compensation exceed in any case four

thousand pesos. But no award of permanent disability shall take effect until after two weeks have elapsed from the date of injury.

In Avecilla Building Corporation vs. Workmen's Compensation Commission, L-10668, September 26, 1957, this Court already ruled that said maximum period of 208 weeks can be extended under Section 18, as amended by Republic Act 772:

Speaking of this right of the Workmen's Compensation Commissioner to reopen a case already decided by him, it is an innovation introduced by Rep. Act 772, particularly, Sec. 13 thereof, amending Section 18 (last par.) of the original Workmen's Compensation Law, namely, Act 3428. Before amendment, the last paragraph of Section 18 read thus:

"The total compensation prescribed in this and the next preceding section and the total compensation prescribed in sections fourteen and fifteen of this Act shall, together, not exceed the sum of three thousand pesos."

As amended, the said last paragraph now reads as follows:

"The total compensation prescribed in this and the next preceding section and the total compensation prescribed in sections fourteen and fifteen of this Act, shall, together, not exceed the sum of four thousand pesos: Provided, however, that after the payment has been made for the period specified by the Act in each case, the Workmen's Compensation Commissioner may from time to time cause the examination of the condition of the disabled laborer, with a view to extending, if necessary, the period of compensation which shall not, however, exceed the said amount of four thousand pesos."

One change introduced is the increase from P3,000 to P4,000 of the total compensation provided in the original provision. The more important change, however, is that contained in the proviso, which is the last part of the paragraph. This

legal provision empowering Workmen's Compensation Boards or Commissioners to reopen a case is contained in the Workmen's Compensation Acts of many of the States of the American union, including the Territory of Hawaii. 1awphil.net The reason for this legal provision is explained by Arthur Larson in his authoritative work entitled. The Law of Workmen's Compensation, Vol. 2, as page 330, as follows:

"In almost all states, some kind of provision is made for reopening and modifying awards. This provision is a recognition of the obvious fact that, no matter how competent a commission's diagnosis of claimant's condition and earning prospects at the time of hearing may be, that condition may later change markedly for the worse, or may improve, or may even clear up altogether. Under the typical award in the form of periodic payments during a specified maximum period or during disability, the objectives of the legislation are best accomplished if the commission can increase, decrease,

revive or terminate payments to correspond to claimant's changed condition. Theoretically, then, commissions ought to exercise perpetual and unlimited jurisdiction to reopen cases as often as necessary to make benefits meet current conditions. But the administrative problem lies in the necessity of preserving the full case records of all claimants that have ever received any kind of award, against the possibility of a future reopening.1awphil.net Moreover, any attempt to reopen a case based on an injury ten or fifteen years old must necessarily encounter awkward problems of proof, because of the long delay and the difficulty of determining the relationship between some ancient injury and a present aggravated disability. Another argument is that insurance carriers would never know that kind of future liabilities they might incur, and would have difficulty in computing appropriate reserves."

It will be noticed, however, that while in the several states of the union, the reopening is intended for the benefit of both employer and employee in the sense that, in case of aggravation or deterioration of the disability of the employee, the period of compensation should be extended up to a certain limit, or in case the condition of the employee improves or the disability disappears altogether, the period of compensation is shortened or compensation stopped, our law, under Section 18, is a little one-sided and is all for the benefit of the employee, for the reason that as may be gathered from the proviso, the Commissioner may from time to time cause examination of the condition of the disabled laborer, with a view to extending, if necessary, the period of compensation. In this respect there is room for improvement of the law as to make it more equitable to both parties, labor and management. Furthermore, while in the several states of the American Union, the time within which the Commissioner or Board may reopen a case is limited

anywhere from one year to several years, our law contained in the proviso in question, sets no time limit. The disadvantage of making this period within which the case may be reopened, too long, or as in our law, with no limit at all, is touched upon by Larson in the latter part of his commentary, as above-reproduced, namely, that in case such a period is too long, there may be difficulty in completing and preserving the record of the injury, or determining the relationship, if any, between the aggravation or deterioration of the employee's disability and some ancient injury, to say nothing of the fact that insurance companies which are interested in similar cases, by having insured employees of companies against injuries, may find difficulty in adjusting their finances, such as putting up reserve funds to take care of future liabilities.

But there is no question that under Section 18 of the Workmen's Compensation Act, as amended, the Commissioner was authorized to reopen the case of Carpeso and to direct that the compensation to him

by petitioner be increased or continued. The claim of petitioner that it had not been given an opportunity to traverse the claim that Carpeso's condition had deteriorated, is not supported by the record. 1awphil.net

Clearly, therefore, the Workmen's Compensation Commission did not incur in any error in extending to cover beyond 208 weeks the period of Alillana's disability compensation, up to a total of not more than P4,000.

Alillana's having signed a satisfaction receipt can not result in waiver; the law does not consider as valid any agreement to receive less compensation than what the worker is entitled to recover under the Act (Sec. 29).

WHEREFORE, the appealed order of the Workmen's Compensation Commission are hereby affirmed. No costs. So ordered.

Concepcion, C.J., Reyes, J.B.L., Makalintal, Zaldivar, Sanchez, Castro, Angeles and Fernando, JJ., concur

Republic of the PhilippinesSUPREME COURT

Manila

EN BANC

G.R. No. L-24022             March 3, 1965

ILOILO PALAY AND CORN PLANTERS ASSOCIATION, INC., ET AL., petitioners, vs.HON. JOSE, Y. FELICIANO, ET AL., respondents.

Jose C. Zulueta and Ramon A. Gonzales for petitioners.Office of the Solicitor General for respondents.

BAUTISTA ANGELO, J.:

On December 26, 1964, Jose Y. Feliciano, Chairman and General Manager of the Rice and Corn Administration, wrote the President of the Philippines urging the immediate importation of 595,400

metric tons of rice, thru a government agency which the President may designate, pursuant to the recommendation of the National Economic Council as embodied in its Resolution No. 70, series of 1964.

On December 27, 1964, the President submitted said letter to his cabinet for consideration and on December 28, 1964, the cabinet approved the needed importation. On January 4, 1965, the President designated the Rice and Corn Administration as the government agency authorized to undertake the importation pursuant to which Chairman Jose Y. Feliciano announced an invitation to bid for said importation and set the bidding for February 1, 1965.

Considering that said importation is contrary to Republic Act 3452 which prohibits the government from importing rice and that there is no law appropriating funds to finance the same, the Iloilo Palay and Corn Planters Association, Inc., together with Ramon A. Gonzales, in his capacity as taxpayer, filed the instant petition before this Court seeking to restrain Jose Y. Feliciano, in his capacity as Chairman and General Manager of the Rice and Corn Administration, from conducting the bid scheduled on the date abovementioned, and from doing any other act that may result in the contemplated importation until further orders of this Court. For reasons that do not clearly appear, the Secretary of Foreign Affairs and the Auditor General were made co-respondents.

Pending decision on the merits, petitioners prayed for the issuance of a writ of preliminary injunction, which, in due course, this Court granted upon petitioners' filing a bond in the amount of P50,000.00. This bond having been filed, the writ was issued on February 10, 1965.

Respondents, in their answer do not dispute the essential allegations of the petition though they adduced reasons which justify the importation sought to be made. They anchor the validity of the importation on the provisions of Republic Act 2207 which, in their opinion, still stand.

It is petitioners' contention that the importation in question being undertaken by the government even if there is a certification by the National Economic Council that there is a shortage in the local supply of rice of such gravity as to constitute a national emergency, is illegal because the same is prohibited by Republic Act 3452 which, in its Section 10, provides that the importation of rice and corn is only left to private parties upon payment of the corresponding taxes. They claim that the Rice and Corn Administration, or any other government agency, is prohibited from doing so.

It is true that the section above adverted to leaves the importation of rice and corn exclusively to private parties thereby prohibiting from doing so the Rice and Corn Administration or any other government agency, but from this it does not follow that at present there is no law which permits the government to undertake the importation of rice into the Philippines. And this we say because, in our opinion, the provision of Republic Act 2207 on the matter still stands. We refer to Section 2 of said Act wherein, among other things, it provides that should there be an existing or imminent shortage in the local supply of rice of such gravity as to constitute a national emergency, and this is certified by the National Economic Council, the President of the Philippines may authorize such importation thru any government agency that he may designate. Here there is no dispute that the National Economic Council has certified that there is such shortage present which, because of its gravity, constitutes a national emergency, and acting in pursuance thereof the President lost no time in authorizing, after consulting his cabinet, the General Manager of the Rice and Corn Administration to immediately undertake the needed importation in order to stave off the impending emergency. We find, therefore, no plausible reason why the disputed importation should be prevented as petitioners now desire.

The contention that Republic Act 2207 has already been repealed by Republic Act 3452 is untenable in the light of the divergent provisions obtaining in said two laws. Admittedly, Section 16 of Republic Act 3452 contains a repealing clause which provides: "All laws or parts thereof inconsistent with the

provisions of this Act are hereby repealed or modified accordingly." The question may now be asked: what is the nature of this repealing clause ? It is certainly not an express repealing clause because it fails to identify or designate the Act or Acts that are intended to be repealed [ Sutherland, Statutory Construction, (1943) Vol. 1, p. 467]. Rather, it is a clause which predicates the intended repeal upon the condition that a substantial conflict must be found in existing and prior Acts. Such being the case, the presumption against implied repeals and the rule against strict construction regarding implied repeals apply ex proprio vigore. Indeed, the legislature is presumed to know the existing laws so that, if a repeal is intended, the proper step is to so express it [Continental Insurance Co. v. Simpson, 8 F (2d) 439; Weber v. Bailey, 151 Ore. 2188, 51 P (2d) 832; State v. Jackson, 120 W. Va. 521, 199 S.E. 876]. The failure to add a specific repealing clause indicates that the intent was not to repeal any existing law (Crawford, Construction of Statute, 1940 ed., p. 631), unless an irreconcilable inconsistency and repugnancy exist in the terms of the new and old laws. Here there is no such inconsistency.

To begin with, the two laws, although with a common objective, refer to different methods applicable to different circumstances. Thus, the total banning of importation under normal conditions as provided for in Republic Act 2207 is one step to achieve the rice and corn sufficiency program of the Administration. The philosophy behind the banning is that any importation of rice during a period of sufficiency or even of a minor shortage will unduly compete with the local producers and depress the local price which may discourage them from raising said crop. On the other hand, a price support program and a partial ban of rice importation as embodied in Republic Act 3452 is another step adopted to attend the sufficiency program. While the two laws are geared towards the same ultimate objective, their methods of approach are different; one is by a total ban of rice importation and the other by a partial ban, the same being applicable only to the government during normal period.

There is another area where the two laws find a common point of reconciliation: the normalcy of the time underlying both laws. Thus, with respect to the matter of importation Republic Act 2207 covers three different situations: (1) when the local produce of rice is sufficient to supply local consumption; (2) when the local produce falls short of the supply but the shortage is not enough to constitute a national emergency; and (3) when the shortage, on the local supply of rice is of such gravity as to constitute a national emergency. Under the first two situations, no importation is allowed whether by the government or by the private sector. However, in the case of the third situation, the law authorizes importation, by the government.

Republic Act 3452, on the other hand, deals only with situations 1 and 2, but not with. Nowhere in said law can we discern that it covers importation where the shortage in the local supply is of such gravity as to constitute a national emergency. In short, Republic Act 3452 only authorizes importation during normal times, but when there is a shortage in the local supply of such gravity as to constitute a national emergency, we have to turn to Republic Act 2207. These two laws therefore, are not inconsistent and so implied repeal does not ensue.

Our view that Republic Act 3452 merely contemplates importation during normal times is bolstered by a consideration of the discussion that took place in Congress of House Bill No. 11511 which was presented in answer to the request of the Chief Executive that he be given a standby power to import rice in the Philippines. On this matter, we quote the following views of Senators Padilla and Almendras:

SENATOR PADILLA: But under Republic Act No. 3452 them is a proviso in Sec. 10 thereof "that the Rice and Corn Administration or any government agency is hereby prohibited from importing rice and corn."

SENATOR ALMENDRAS: That is under normal conditions.

SENATOR PADILLA: "Provided further", it says, "that the importation of rice, and corn is left to private parties upon payment of the corresponding tax." So therefore, the position of the Committee as expressed by the distinguished sponsor, is that Sec. 10 of Republic Act No. 3452 is applicable under normal conditions.

SENATOR ALMENDRAS: "Yes". (Senate Debate, June 16, 1964).

Much stress is laid on the content of Section 12 of Republic Act 3452 which gives to the President authority to declare a rice and corn emergency any time he deems necessary in the public interest and, during the emergency, to conduct raids, seizure and confiscation of rice and corn hoarded in any private warehouse or bodega subject to constitutional limitations, to support the claim that said Act also bans importation on the part of the government even in case of an emergency. The contention is predicated on a misinterpretation of the import and meaning of said provision. Note that the section refers to an emergency where there is an artificial shortage because of the apparent hoarding undertaken by certain unscrupulous dealers or businessmen, and not to an actual serious shortage of the commodity because, if the latter exists, there is really nothing to raid, seize or confiscate, because the situation creates a real national emergency. Congress by no means could have intended under such a situation to deprive the government of its right to import to stave off hunger and starvation. Congress knows that such remedy is worthless as there is no rice to be found in the Philippines. Seizure of rice is only of value in fighting hoarding and profiteering, but such remedy cannot produce the rice needed to solve the emergency. If there is really insufficient rice stocked in the private warehouses and bodegas such confiscatory step cannot remedy an actual emergency, in which case we have to turn to Republic Act 2207.

The two laws can therefore be construed as harmonious parts of the legislative expression of its policy to promote a rice and corn program. And if this can be done, as we have shown, it is the duty of this Court to adopt such interpretation that would give effect to both laws. Conversely, in order to effect a repeal by implication, the litter statute must be irreconcilably inconsistent and repugnant to the prior existing law [United States v. Greathouse,. 166 U.S. 601, 41 L. Ed., 1130; In re Phoenix Hotel Co., 13 F. Supp. 229; Hammond v. McDonald, 32 Cal. App. 187, 89 P (2d) 407; Sutherland, Statutory Construction, supra, p. 462]. The old and the new laws must be absolutely incompatible (Compañia General de Tabacos v. Collector of Customs, 46 Phil. 8). A mere difference in the terms and provisions of the statutes is not sufficient to create a repugnancy between them. There must be such a positive repugnancy between the provisions of the old and the new statutes that they cannot be made to reconcile and stand together (Crawford, Construction of Statute, supra, p. 631). The clearest case possible must first be made before the inference of implied repeal may be drawn [Nagano v. McGrath, 187 F (2d) 759]. Inconsistency is never presumed.

Republic Act 3848 entitled "An Act Providing for the Importation of Rice During the Calendar Year Nineteen Hundred Sixty-Four in the Event of Shortage in Local Supply" cannot be given any nullifying value, as it is pretended, simply because Section 6 thereof provides that "except as provided in this Act, no other agency or instrumentality of the Government shall be allowed to purchase rice from abroad." The reason is that it is a mere temporary law effective only for a specific year. As its title reads, it is merely an authority to import rice during the year 1964. The same, therefore, is now functus officio at least on the matter of importation.

Neither can petitioners successfully pretend that as Section 4 thereof provides that pending prosecutions for any violation of Republic Acts 2207 and 3452 shall in no way be affected by said Act 3848 the implication is that the aforesaid Acts have already been repealed. That provision is merely a safeguard placed therein in order that the prosecutions already undertaken may not be defeated with the enactment of Republic Act 3848 because the latter provides for penal provisions which call for

lesser penalty. The intention is to except them from the rule that penal statutes can be given retroactive effect if favorable to the accused.

To further bolster our view that Republic Act 2207 has not been impliedly repealed by Republic Act 3452, we wish to briefly quote hereunder the views expressed by some senators during the discussion of House Bill 11511 already mentioned above. It should be here repeated that said bill was presented to accede to the request of the President for a stand-by power to import in case of emergency in view of the uncertainty of the law, but that during the discussion thereof it was strongly asserted and apparently upheld that such request for authority was not necessary because Republic Act 2207 was still in force. It is probably for this reason that said bill, after having been approved by the Senate, was killed in the conference committee that considered it. These views, while not binding, are of persuasive authority and throw light on the issue relative to the effectivity of Republic Act 2207.

SENATOR LIWAG: ... Now Mr. Chairman, is it the sense of the Committee that in the case of emergency, in case of an impending shortage, we can import rice under the provisions of R.A. No. 2207?

SENATOR ALMENDRAS: Yes, that is what we mean, your Honor, in this paragraph (c), Section 2, page 2, that when we say "under the provisions of existing law," we are referring to R.A. No. 2207.

x x x           x x x           x x x

SENATOR PADILLA: I notice, Mr. Senator, that Section 2 paragraph (c) of the amendment by substitution reads:

Importation of rice and/or corn should be resorted to only in cases of extreme and under the provisions of existing law.

I suppose that the existing laws referred to are Republic Act No. 2207 and Republic Act No. 3452. Does this section in the proposed bill by substitution recognize the continued existence of the pertinent provisions of Republic Act No. 2207 and Republic Act No. 3452 on rice importation ?

SENATOR ALMENDRAS: Yes, that is the reason, Your Honor, why we struck out the stand-by power on the part of the President to import rice.

x x x           x x x           x x x

SENATOR ALMENDRAS: The position of your Committee, Your Honor, because of the existing law — that is, Republic Act No. 3452 and Republic Act No. 2207 — that is the reason your Committee eliminated that stand-by power of the President to import rice. Because you know, Your Honor, what is the use of that stand-by power, inasmuch as under Republic Act No. 3452 and Republic Act No. 2207 the President can designate any government agency to import rice?

SENATOR PADILLA: Well, it is good to make that clear because in the decision of the Supreme Court, as I said, there was no clear-cut holding as to the possible co-existence or implied repeal between these two Acts.

SENATOR ALMENDRAS: Yes, Your Honor, but the gentleman from Nueva Ecija, Senator Liwag, informed me that Republic Act No. 2207 has never been repealed.

SENATOR PADILLA: Well, I also concur with that view, but we want to make that clear ... .

SENATOR PADILLA: "Provided, further," it says, "That the importation of rice and corn is left to private parties upon payment of the corresponding taxes." So, therefore, the position of the Committee, as expressed by the distinguished sponsor is that Sec. 10 of Republic Act No. 3452 is applicable under normal conditions.

SENATOR ALMENDRAS: Yes.

SENATOR PADILLA: So, both provisions of law are in existence.

SENATOR ALMENDRAS: Yes.

SENATOR PADILLA: One is not repealed by the other.

x x x           x x x           x x x

SENATOR TOLENTINO: Mr. President, there are two views already expressed on whether Republic Act No. 2207 has been repealed by Republic Act No. 3452. One view sustains the theory that there has been a repeal of Republic Act No. 2207 by Republic Act No. 3452 insofar as rice importation is concerned. The other view is that there is no repeal. The Supreme Court does not state clearly which side prevails. I take the view that the two laws can be reconciled ... .

Now, Mr. President, reading those two provisions together, I maintain that they are not totally repugnant to each other, that it is possible for them to stand together except on certain points: First, is importation in case of a national emergency certified by the National Economic Council permissible? By reading the two provisos together I would say yes because there is nothing in the proviso contained in Republic Act No. 3452 which would be inconsistent with importation during a shortage amounting to a national emergency.

Another circumstance that strengthens our view is that when said House Bill No. 11511 was finally approved by the Senate, it carried a clause which expressly repeals, among others, Republic Act No. 2207 (Section 14), but which bill, as already said, was later killed in the conference committee. This attitude clearly reveals that Congress preferred to fall back on Republic Act 2207 with regard to future importations.

Anent the point raised relative to the lack of necessary appropriation to finance the importation in question, suffice it to state that under Republic Act 663 the National Rice and Corn Corporation is authorized to borrow, raise and secure the money that may be necessary to carry out its objectives. We refer to Section 3 (e) of said Act which empowers said corporation to secure money and to encumber any property it has as a guaranty, and Republic Act No. 3452, which creates the Rice and Corn Administration, transferred its functions and powers to the latter, including the power to borrow money under Section 3(e). This provision gives the RCA enough power with which to finance the importation in question.

WHEREFORE, petition is dismissed. The writ of preliminary injunction issued by this Court is hereby dissolved. Costs against petitioners.

Paredes, Regala, Makalintal, Bengzon, J.P., and Zaldivar, JJ., concur.

Separate Opinions

REYES, J.B.L., J., dissenting:

It is regrettable that in their effort to uphold the Government's power to import rice, under Section 2 of Republic Act 2207, the majority opinion seems to have overlooked that the repeal of statutes is primarily a matter of legislative intention; and that on its face, Republic Act No. 3452 was plainly intended to supersede the prior law, Republic Act No. 2207.

The specific issue, in brief, is whether the extraordinary emergency power to import rice and corn, granted to the President by Section 2 of Republic Act 2207, may still be considered as subsisting at present, notwithstanding the terms of Section 10 of the subsequent Republic Act No. 3452.

For convenience, we present in parallel columns the specific provisions of the respective acts:

REP. ACT NO. 2207 (1959)

REP. ACT NO. 3452(1962)

SEC. 2. Prohibition. It shall be unlawful for any person, association, corporation or government agency to import rice and corn into any point in the Philippines: Provided, however, That should there be an existing or imminent shortage in the local supply of the abovementioned commodities of such gravity as to constitute a national emergency, upon certification to this effect by the National Economic Council, based on the studies of the Office of Statistical Coordination of said body, the President of the Philippines may authorize the importation of the commodities, through any government agency that he may designate in such quantities as the National Economic Council may determine necessary to cover the shortage, subject to the taxes, duties and/or special charges as now provided by law: Provided, further, That contracts for such importation

SEC. 10. ... Provided, that the Rice and Corn Administration or any other government agency is hereby prohibited from importing rice and corn: Provided, further, That the importation of rice and corn is left to private parties upon payment of the corresponding taxes. (Emphasis Supplied)

shall be only on straightsales basis, and awarded only after a public bidding, with sealed bids. (Emphasis supplied)

It is apparent at first sight that the two provisions contradict each other. First, in policy; because under Republic Act No. 2207, the general rule is that no person or entity, public or private, shall import rice and corn; while under the later Act, Republic Act No. 3452, the importation of rice and corn is left to private parties, with no restriction other than the payment of tax. Second, in procedure; under Republic Act 2207, the President, in case of emergency, may import rice and corn in quantities certified by the National Economic Council as necessary, through any government agency that he may designate; while by Act 3452 any government agency is prohibited from importing rice and corn, said prohibition being express, absolute, total, and unconditional. Not only this, but violation of the prohibition is sanctioned by a P10,000 fine and imprisonment for not more than 5 years (sec. 15, Act 3452).

We cannot see how the majority opinion can contend that the presidential power to make importations of rice and corn still subsists, in view of the unqualified terms of Republic Act 3452. If any government agency is prohibited from importing rice and corn by the later law, and the violation of the prohibition is penalized by fine and imprisonment, in what manner can the President make the importation? He cannot do so directly, since Act 2207 specifically requires that it be done "through any government agency". How, then, may he import?

It is unnecessary to resort to legal gymnastics in order to realize why this must be so. Suffice it to note that the Administration's power to import rice in certified emergencies under Act 2207 was but a mere corollary to the total ban on rice and corn imports under that Act, and the existence of such exceptional import power necessarily depended on the continuation of that total prohibition. 1äwphï1.ñët

Section 2 of Republic Act No. 2207 clearly shows how intimate was this dependence between the emergency importing authority granted to the government and the maintenance of the normal non-import policy.

SEC. 2. Prohibition: It shall be unlawful for any person, association, corporation or government agency to import rice and corn into any point in the Philippines, provided, however, that should there be an existing or imminent shortage in the local supply of the above-mentioned commodities, of such gravity as to constitute a national emergency, upon certification to this effect by the National Economic Council, based on the studies of the Office of Statistical Coordination of said body, the President of the Philippines may authorize the importation of these commodities, through any government agency that he may designate, in such quantities as the National Economic Council may determine necessary to cover the shortage, subject to taxes, duties and/or special charges as now provided by law; provided, further, that contracts for such importation shall be only on straight sales basis, and awarded only after a public bidding, with sealed bids. (Emphasis supplied)

So closely linked were the policy and the emergency import power that the latter was not even set apart in a section. Therefore, repeal of the absolute ban on imports, prescribed in the opening portion of the section quoted, necessarily entails the disappearance of the emergency power to import rice and corn established by the later part of the same legal provision. Where the basic rule disappears, the exception thereto must necessarily cease to operate, since the exception becomes automatically functus officio for lack of basis.

The total banning of cereal imports logically, under Act 2207, meant that whenever the domestic crop became insufficient to satisfy the demand for rice and corn, the latter had to be brought from outside to fill the gap; and the legislature decided (in Act 2207) that it should be done through governmental agencies. But under Republic Act 3452, the total prohibition to import disappeared, and private parties were authorized to bring in the cereals at any time; hence, the exceptional importing power of the Government lost all reason for its existence, because the private imports allowed by Act 3452 were contemplated and intended to make up for the difference between demand and supply, without necessity of government intervention. In truth, the expression in Section 10 of Act 3452 —

SEC. 10. ... Provided, That the Rice and Corn Administration or any other government agency is hereby prohibited from importing rice and corn; Provided, further, That the importation of rice and corn is left to private parties upon payment of the corresponding taxes. (Emphasis supplied)

can only mean that the Administration must desist from importing, and leave to private parties the task of bringing such cereals from without in order to make up for whatever shortages in production should occur.

That only private parties, and not the government, can import the cereals finds confirmation in the legislative journals. In the Congressional Record, No. 48, March 30, 1962, page 1360, containing the transcript of the Senate debates on the bill that later became Republic Act No. 3452, the following appears:

CUENCO AMENDMENT

Mr. CUENCO. Mr. Speaker, on page 3, line 16, change the period (.) to colon and add the following: PROVIDED, THAT THE RICE AND CORN ADMINISTRATION OR ANY OTHER GOVERNMENT AGENCY IS HEREBY PROHIBITED FROM IMPORTING RICE AND CORN: PROVIDED, FURTHER, THAT THE IMPORTATION OF RICE AND CORN IS LEFT TO PRIVATE PARTIES UPON PAYMENT OF THE CORRESPONDING TAXES.

Mr. OCAMPO. Suppose there is a calamity, Mr. Speaker.

Mr. CUENCO. Leave that to private parties.

Mr. OCAMPO. Accepted, Mr. Speaker.

The SPEAKER. Is there any objection? (After a pause). The chair does not hear any. The amendment is approved. (Congressional Record, No. 48, March 30, 1962, p. 1360)

The Senate Journal, No. 59, May 8, 1962, also contains the following illuminating remarks:

SENATOR LEDESMA: So it is on the understanding then, Your Honor, that we could proceed with the discussion.

Your Honor, House Bill No. 339, as I have already stated, specifically provides that appointment of personnel should be in accordance with the Civil Service Law as well as with the WAPCO. It seems to me that this provision is very laudable and very, very reasonable. The second important feature in this proposed measure is that it prohibits

importation by the government. I think this should be clarified in the sense that, at the same time, it allows importation by private parties but with the payment of the corresponding duties. Or rather, under House Bill No. 339, the general policy which is being set in the proposed measure is that the government should not resort to importation but that importation of the cereal is open at all times to any citizen of this country so long as he pays the corresponding duties and other taxes which are imposed by our government. (Senate Journal, No. 59, May 8, 1962)

It is thus clear that if section 16 of Republic Act 3452 providing that —

All laws or parts thereof inconsistent with the provisions of this Act are hereby repealed or modified accordingly",.

intended to refer to any preceding statute at all, it must have referred to Republic Act No. 2207. Hence, the Presidential power to import no longer exists.

In arguing in favor of the Government's power to import even now, the majority opinion avers that Republic Act No. 3452 is designed to apply only to normal times and conditions. This is plainly absurd, for in normal times, when production equals consumption, no importation need be authorized, for none will be required.

The majority opinion stresses that Republic Act 3452 does not repeal Act 2207 in express terms. Granting arguendo that this were true, despite the express prohibition of government imports in section 10 of the later Act, yet it does not elucidate why the legislature found it necessary, or expedient, to enact an entirely different law, instead of merely providing for the amendment of the prior statute (R.A. 2207). If both laws were designed to attain the same end, rice and corn sufficiency for our country, and only a change of method was intended, why enact two statutes not only unconnected with each other, but actually contradictory?

That the two laws are inconsistent with each other cannot be gainsaid. Under Act 2207, no person or entity, public or private, could import rice or corn, since under Section 2 thereof "it shall be unlawful for any person, association, corporation or government entity to import rice and corn"; while under Act 3452, on the contrary, "importation of rice and corn is left to private parties" (sec. 10) at any time, with no other restriction than the payment of taxes. How can it be said that the two laws, with so diametrically opposite philosophies, were intended to co-exist?

Because the two laws covering the same field are plainly incompatible with each other (since private importation of rice and corn cannot, at the same time, be unlawful under Act 2207 and lawful under Act 3452), it is inescapable to conclude that the later statute (3452) is, and must have been, intended to revise, supersede, and replace the former law (Act 2207).The established rule in this jurisdiction in such a case is that —

While as a general rule, implied repeal of a former statute by a later one is not favored, yet if the later act covers the whole subject of the earlier one and is clearly intended as a substitute it will operate similarly as a repeal of the earlier act (Posadas vs. National City Bank of New York, 296 U.S. 497, 80 Law Ed. 351) (quoted and applied in In re Guzman, 73 Phil. 52).

pines adopted the American doctrine that in such a revision of the law, whatever is excluded is discarded and repealed (In re Guzman supra, at pp. 52-53).1

It has been held that "where the legislature frames a new statute upon a certain subject-matter, and the legislative intention appears from the latter statute to be to frame a new scheme in relation to such subject-matter and make a revision of the whole subject, that whatever is embraced in the new statute shall prevail, and that whatever is excluded is discarded". (People v. Thornton, 186 Ill. 162, 173, 75 N.E. 841.)

And an author says: "So where there are two statutes on the same subject, passed at different dates, and it is plain from the frame-work and substance of the last that it was intended to cover the whole subject, and to be a complete and perfect system or provision in itself, the last must be held to be a legislative declaration that whatever is embraced in it shall prevail and whatever is excluded is discarded and repealed."

Or, as more tersely put in Madison vs. Southern Wisconsin R. Co., 10 A. L. R. 910, at page 915:

6. A subsequent statute, evidently intended as a substitute for one revised, operates as a repeal of the latter without any express words to that effect; and so any distinct provision of the old law, not incorporated into the later one, is to be, deemed to have been intentionally annulled. Smith, Stat. Constr. sec. 784; Bartlett v. King, 12 Mass. 537, 7 Am. Dec. 99:

This rule, expressly adopted by this very Supreme Court, utterly destroys the contention of the majority opinion that because the Government's power under Republic Act 2207, to make imports of rice and corn in case of certified emergency, is nowhere expressly repealed by Republic Act 3452, such power must be still deemed to exist. No such power can now exist for the reason that the Act conferring it was totally and unconditionally superseded and repealed by Act 3452. The contradictory philosophies of both Acts testify to that effect.

The majority also avers that Republic Act No. 3452 does not contemplate situations where the shortage in local supply is of such gravity as to constitute a national emergency. It also asserts that Act 3452 refers only to artificial shortages through hoarding, and does not cover natural shortages where the rice and corn crops do not suffice to meet the demands of consumption. Unfortunately, the opposite of these assertions is precisely true. Thus,

Section 1 of Act 3452 provides: The Government shall engage in the purchase of these basic foods from tenants, farmers, growers, producers and landowners in the Philippines ... and whenever circumstances brought about by any cause, natural or artificial, should so require, (the Government) shall sell and dispose of these commodities to the consumers ... .

Section 3 of Act 3452 — With a view to regulating the level of supply of rice and corn throughout the country, the Administration is authorized to accumulate stocks as a national reserve in such quantities as it may deem proper and necessary to meet any contingencies. ...

Section 12, Act 3452 — "The President of the Philippines is hereby authorized to declare a rice and corn emergency any time he deems necessary in the public interest. During the emergency period, the Rice and Corn Administration, upon the direction of the President, shall, subject to constitutional limitation, conduct raids, seizures, and confiscation of rice and con hoarded in any private warehouse or bodega: Provided, That the Rice and Corn Administration shall pay such confiscated

rice and corn at the prevailing consumer's price of the Rice and Corn Administration. (Emphasis supplied)

Certainly the words used by the statute, "any cause, natural or artificial", "any contingencies", "rice and corn emergency" are broad enough to cover all contingencies, natural deficiency due to insufficient production, as well as artificial shortages due to hoarding. The terms employed exempt the legislature from the accusation that it still has left some emergency unprovided for. What it did deny the Government was the power to import rice and corn whenever it so chooses; instead, the law expressly prescribed "that the Rice and Corp. Administration or any government agency is hereby prohibited from importing rice and corn" (sec. 10, R.A. 3452), a command that, as previously observed, squarely contradicts and vacates that permission to import previously granted under Republic Act 2207. The Government, therefore, may not now bring in rice and corn from abroad, unless special legislative authorization is first obtained, as was done for 1964 by Republic Act No. 3848.

The very fact that the Administration went to and obtained from the Legislature permission to import 300,000 metric tons of rice during the calendar year 1964 (Rep. Act No. 3848), and made use of that permission, is the best proof that the Executive felt that its former power under Republic Act No. 2207 no longer existed after the passage of Republic Act No. 3452. Such action places the Administration in estoppel to assert the contrary. Why should it seek authority to make importation during 1964 if it still possessed that granted by Republic Act 2207?

Note that, in consenting the Government's importing 300,000 tons of rice in 1964, the Legislature once more re-affirmed the prohibition of further government imports in section 6 of the enabling law, Republic Act No. 3848:

SEC. 6 — Except as provided in this Act, no other agency or instrumentality of the Government shall be allowed to purchase rice from abroad." (Emphasis supplied)

which is a virtual repetition of the restraint imposed by Republic Act 3452. In addition, the law imposed the further condition that the importation be made only upon two-thirds vote of the National Economic Council, where Republic Act 2207 specified no particular majority.

The main opinion seeks to minimize the effect of these reiterated prohibitions by claiming that said section 6 was intended to operate only for 1964. If that had been the intention, then section 6 was absolutely unnecessary because the authority given by Act 3848 was a limitation in itself, as it only permitted the importation of 300,000 metric tons for the calendar year 1964. Under such a grant, any excess beyond the quantity fixed, and any import after 1964, were automatically forbidden. The enactment of section 6 of Act 3848, therefore, was an actual reassertion of the policy of outlawing Government imports, as declared in Republic Act 3452. If anything, it meant that to import rice now, the Executive must first obtain an enabling law.

Moreover, the financing by the Government of its foreign purchase of rice would violate the Constitutional restraint against paying money out of the Treasury, "except in pursuance of an appropriation made by law" (Art. VI, sec. 23, par. 3), and no law making such appropriation has been enacted. Under the Revised Administrative Code, sections 606 and 607, no contract involving the expenditure of public funds can be made without previous appropriation therefor, duly certified by the Auditor General. Nor can these inhibitions be evaded by the ruse of causing a Government agency to borrow the funds required for the purpose, considering that any and all government agencies are flatly forbidden to import rice (Republic Act 3452, sec. 10), and the borrowing of funds to finance importation is essential for the execution thereof.

Finally, we see no point in the quotations from statements made in the Senate during the deliberations on House Bill No. 11511. That bill never became law, and is not before the Court. The statements quoted are not binding, this Court having the exclusive prerogative of construing the legislative enactments.

The effect in the majority decision is, after the Legislature had expressly prohibited government agencies to import rice and corn, and after the lawmaking body refused to pass the bill (House Bill No. 11511) granting the Executive a stand-by authority to import, a decision of this Court now reverses this clear policy of the Legislature, and hands the Executive a blanket power to do what the laws have expressly forbidden.

Bengzon, C.J., Concepcion, Barrera and Dizon, JJ., concur.

EN BANC

G.R. No. L-24022     March 3, 1965

ILOILO PALAY AND CORN PLANTERS ASSOCIATION, INC., ET AL. Petitioners, vs. HON. JOSE, Y. FELICIANO, ET AL., Respondents.

BAUTISTA ANGELO, J.: chanrobles virtual law library

On December 26, 1964, Jose Y. Feliciano, Chairman and General Manager of the Rice and Corn Administration, wrote the President of the Philippines urging the immediate importation of 595,400 metric tons of rice, thru a government agency which the President may designate, pursuant to the recommendation of the National Economic Council as embodied in its Resolution No. 70, series of 1964.chanroblesvirtualawlibrary chanrobles virtual law library

On December 27, 1964, the President submitted said letter to his cabinet for consideration and on December 28, 1964, the cabinet approved the needed importation. On January 4, 1965, the President designated the Rice and Corn Administration as the government agency authorized to undertake the importation pursuant to which Chairman Jose Y. Feliciano announced an invitation to bid for said importation and set the bidding for February 1, 1965. chanroblesvirtualawlibrary chanrobles virtual law library

Considering that said importation is contrary to Republic Act 3452 which prohibits the government from importing rice and that there is no law appropriating funds to finance the same, the Iloilo Palay and Corn Planters Association, Inc., together with Ramon A. Gonzales, in his capacity as taxpayer, filed the instant petition before this Court seeking to restrain Jose Y. Feliciano, in his capacity as Chairman and General Manager of the Rice and Corn Administration, from conducting the bid scheduled on the date abovementioned, and from doing any other act that may result in the contemplated importation until further orders of this Court. For reasons that do not clearly appear, the Secretary of Foreign Affairs and the Auditor General were made co-respondents. chanroblesvirtualawlibrary chanrobles virtual law library

Pending decision on the merits, petitioners prayed for the issuance of a writ of preliminary injunction, which, in due course, this Court granted upon petitioners' filing a bond in the amount of P50,000.00. This bond having been filed, the writ was issued on February 10, 1965. chanroblesvirtualawlibrary chanrobles virtual law library

Respondents, in their answer do not dispute the essential allegations of the petition though they adduced reasons which justify the importation sought to be made. They anchor the validity of the importation on the provisions of Republic Act 2207 which, in their opinion, still stand. chanroblesvirtualawlibrary chanrobles virtual law library

It is petitioners' contention that the importation in question being undertaken by the government even if there is a certification by the National Economic Council that there is a shortage in the local supply of rice of such gravity as to constitute a national emergency, is illegal because the same is prohibited by Republic Act 3452 which, in its Section 10, provides that the importation of rice and corn is only left to private parties upon payment of the corresponding taxes. They claim that the Rice and Corn Administration, or any other government agency, is prohibited from doing so. chanroblesvirtualawlibrary chanrobles virtual law library

It is true that the section above adverted to leaves the importation of rice and corn exclusively to private parties thereby prohibiting from doing so the Rice and Corn Administration or any other government agency, but from this it does not follow that at present there is no law which permits the government to undertake the importation of rice into the Philippines. And this we say because, in our opinion, the provision of Republic Act 2207 on the matter still stands. We refer to Section 2 of said Act wherein, among other things, it provides that should there be an existing or imminent shortage in the local supply of rice of such gravity as to constitute a national emergency, and this is certified by the National Economic Council, the President of the Philippines may authorize such importation thru any government agency that he may designate. Here there is no dispute that the National Economic Council has certified that there is such shortage present which, because of its gravity, constitutes a national emergency, and acting in pursuance thereof the President lost no time in authorizing, after consulting his cabinet, the General Manager of the Rice and Corn Administration to immediately undertake the needed importation in order to stave off the impending emergency. We find, therefore, no plausible reason why the disputed importation should be prevented as petitioners now desire. chanroblesvirtualawlibrary chanrobles virtual law library

The contention that Republic Act 2207 has already been repealed by Republic Act 3452 is untenable in the light of the divergent provisions obtaining in said two laws. Admittedly, Section 16 of Republic Act 3452 contains a repealing clause which provides: "All laws or parts thereof inconsistent with the provisions of this Act are hereby repealed or modified accordingly." The question may now be asked: what is the nature of this repealing clause ? It is certainly not an express repealing clause because it fails to identify or designate the Act or Acts that are intended to be repealed [ Sutherland, Statutory Construction, (1943) Vol. 1, p. 467]. Rather, it is a clause which predicates the intended repeal upon the condition that a substantial conflict must be found in existing and prior Acts. Such being the case, the presumption against implied repeals and the rule against strict construction regarding implied repeals apply ex proprio vigore. Indeed, the legislature is presumed to know the existing laws so that, if a repeal is intended, the proper step is to so express it [Continental Insurance Co. v. Simpson, 8 F (2d) 439; Weber v. Bailey, 151 Ore. 2188, 51 P (2d) 832; State v. Jackson, 120 W. Va. 521, 199 S.E. 876]. The failure to add a specific repealing clause indicates that the intent was not to repeal any existing law (Crawford, Construction of Statute, 1940 ed., p. 631), unless an irreconcilable inconsistency and repugnancy exist in the terms of the new and old laws. Here there is no such inconsistency. chanroblesvirtualawlibrary chanrobles virtual law library

To begin with, the two laws, although with a common objective, refer to different methods applicable to different circumstances. Thus, the total banning of importation under normal conditions as provided for in Republic Act 2207 is one step to achieve the rice and corn sufficiency program of the Administration. The philosophy behind the banning is that any importation of rice during a period of sufficiency or even of a minor shortage will unduly compete with the local producers and depress the local price which may discourage them from raising said crop. On the other hand, a price support program and a partial ban of rice importation as embodied in Republic Act 3452 is another step adopted to attend the sufficiency program. While the two laws are geared towards the same ultimate objective, their methods of approach are different; one is by a total ban of rice importation and the other by a partial ban, the same being applicable only to the government during normal period. chanroblesvirtualawlibrary chanrobles virtual law library

There is another area where the two laws find a common point of reconciliation: the normalcy of the time underlying both laws. Thus, with respect to the matter of importation Republic Act 2207 covers three different situations: (1) when the local produce of rice is sufficient to supply local consumption; (2) when the local produce falls short of the supply but the shortage is not enough to constitute a national emergency; and (3) when the shortage, on the local supply of rice is of such gravity as to constitute a national emergency. Under the first two situations, no importation is allowed whether by the government or by the private sector. However, in the case of the third situation, the law authorizes importation, by the government.chanroblesvirtualawlibrary chanrobles virtual law library

Republic Act 3452, on the other hand, deals only with situations 1 and 2, but not with. Nowhere in said law can we discern that it covers importation where the shortage in the local supply is of such gravity as to constitute a national emergency. In short, Republic Act 3452 only authorizes importation during normal times, but when there is a shortage in the local supply of such gravity as to constitute a national emergency, we have to turn to Republic Act 2207. These two laws therefore, are not inconsistent and so implied repeal does not ensue. chanroblesvirtualawlibrary chanrobles virtual law library

Our view that Republic Act 3452 merely contemplates importation during normal times is bolstered by a consideration of the discussion that took place in Congress of House Bill No. 11511 which was presented in answer to the request of the Chief Executive that he be given a standby power to import rice in the Philippines. On this matter, we quote the following views of Senators Padilla and Almendras:

SENATOR PADILLA: But under Republic Act No. 3452 them is a proviso in Sec. 10 thereof "that the Rice and Corn Administration or any government agency is hereby prohibited from importing rice and corn." chanrobles

virtual law library

SENATOR ALMENDRAS: That is under normal conditions. chanroblesvirtualawlibrary chanrobles virtual law library

SENATOR PADILLA: "Provided further", it says, "that the importation of rice, and corn is left to private parties upon payment of the corresponding tax." So therefore, the position of the Committee as expressed by the distinguished sponsor, is that Sec. 10 of Republic Act No. 3452 is applicable under normal conditions.chanroblesvirtualawlibrary chanrobles virtual law library

SENATOR ALMENDRAS: "Yes". (Senate Debate, June 16, 1964).

Much stress is laid on the content of Section 12 of Republic Act 3452 which gives to the President authority to declare a rice and corn emergency any time he deems necessary in the public interest and, during the emergency, to conduct raids, seizure and confiscation of rice and corn hoarded in any private warehouse or bodega subject to constitutional limitations, to support the claim that said Act also bans importation on the part of the government even in case of an emergency. The contention is predicated on a misinterpretation of the import and meaning of said provision. Note that the section refers to an emergency where there is an artificial shortage because of the apparent hoarding undertaken by certain unscrupulous dealers or businessmen, and not to an actual serious shortage of the commodity because, if the latter exists, there is really nothing to raid, seize or confiscate, because the situation creates a real national emergency. Congress by no means could have intended under such a situation to deprive the government of its right to import to stave off hunger and starvation. Congress knows that such remedy is worthless as there is no rice to be found in the Philippines. Seizure of rice is only of value in fighting hoarding and profiteering, but such remedy cannot produce the rice needed to solve the emergency. If there is really insufficient rice stocked in the private warehouses and bodegas such confiscatory step cannot remedy an actual emergency, in which case we have to turn to Republic Act 2207.chanroblesvirtualawlibrary chanrobles virtual law library

The two laws can therefore be construed as harmonious parts of the legislative expression of its policy to promote a rice and corn program. And if this can be done, as we have shown, it is the duty of this Court to adopt such interpretation that would give effect to both laws. Conversely, in order to effect a repeal by implication, the litter statute must be irreconcilably inconsistent and repugnant to the prior existing law [United States v. Greathouse,. 166 U.S. 601, 41 L. Ed., 1130; In re Phoenix Hotel Co., 13 F. Supp. 229; Hammond v. McDonald, 32 Cal. App. 187, 89 P (2d) 407; Sutherland, Statutory Construction, supra, p. 462]. The old and the new laws must be absolutely incompatible (Compa�ia General de Tabacos v. Collector of Customs, 46 Phil. 8). A mere difference in the terms and provisions of the statutes is not sufficient to create a repugnancy between them. There must be such a positive repugnancy between the provisions of the old and the new statutes that they cannot be made to reconcile and stand together (Crawford, Construction of Statute, supra, p. 631). The clearest case possible must first be made before the inference of implied repeal may be drawn [Nagano v. McGrath, 187 F (2d) 759]. Inconsistency is never presumed. chanroblesvirtualawlibrary chanrobles virtual law library

Republic Act 3848 entitled "An Act Providing for the Importation of Rice During the Calendar Year Nineteen Hundred Sixty-Four in the Event of Shortage in Local Supply" cannot be given any nullifying value, as it is pretended, simply because Section 6 thereof provides that "except as provided in this Act, no other agency or instrumentality of the Government shall be allowed to purchase rice from abroad." The reason is that it is a mere temporary law effective only for a specific year. As its title reads, it is merely an authority to import rice during the year 1964. The same, therefore, is now functus officio at least on the matter of importation. chanroblesvirtualawlibrary chanrobles virtual law library

Neither can petitioners successfully pretend that as Section 4 thereof provides that pending prosecutions for any violation of Republic Acts 2207 and 3452 shall in no way be affected by said Act 3848 the implication is that the aforesaid Acts have already been repealed. That provision is merely a safeguard placed therein in order that the prosecutions already undertaken may not be defeated with the enactment of Republic Act 3848 because the latter provides for penal provisions which call for lesser penalty. The intention is to except them from the rule that penal statutes can be given retroactive effect if favorable to the accused.chanroblesvirtualawlibrary chanrobles virtual law library

To further bolster our view that Republic Act 2207 has not been impliedly repealed by Republic Act 3452, we wish to briefly quote hereunder the views expressed by some senators during the discussion of House Bill 11511 already mentioned above. It should be here repeated that said bill was presented to accede to the request of the President for a stand-by power to import in case of emergency in view of the uncertainty of the law, but that during the discussion thereof it was strongly asserted and apparently upheld that such request for authority was not necessary because Republic Act 2207 was still in force. It is probably for this reason that said bill, after having been approved by the Senate, was killed in the conference committee that considered it. These views, while not binding, are of persuasive authority and throw light on the issue relative to the effectivity of Republic Act 2207.

SENATOR LIWAG: ... Now Mr. Chairman, is it the sense of the Committee that in the case of emergency, in case of an impending shortage, we can import rice under the provisions of R.A. No. 2207? chanrobles virtual law library

SENATOR ALMENDRAS: Yes, that is what we mean, your Honor, in this paragraph (c), Section 2, page 2, that when we say "under the provisions of existing law," we are referring to R.A. No. 2207.

x x x           x x x           x x x chanrobles virtual law library

SENATOR PADILLA: I notice, Mr. Senator, that Section 2 paragraph (c) of the amendment by substitution reads: chanrobles virtual law library

Importation of rice and/or corn should be resorted to only in cases of extreme and under the provisions of existing law.chanroblesvirtualawlibrary chanrobles virtual law library

I suppose that the existing laws referred to are Republic Act No. 2207 and Republic Act No. 3452. Does this section in the proposed bill by substitution recognize the continued existence of the pertinent provisions of Republic Act No. 2207 and Republic Act No. 3452 on rice importation ? chanrobles virtual law library

SENATOR ALMENDRAS: Yes, that is the reason, Your Honor, why we struck out the stand-by power on the part of the President to import rice.

x x x           x x x           x x x chanrobles virtual law library

SENATOR ALMENDRAS: The position of your Committee, Your Honor, because of the existing law - that is, Republic Act No. 3452 and Republic Act No. 2207 - that is the reason your Committee eliminated that stand-by power of the President to import rice. Because you know, Your Honor, what is the use of that stand-by power, inasmuch as under Republic Act No. 3452 and Republic Act No. 2207 the President can designate any government agency to import rice? chanrobles virtual law library

SENATOR PADILLA: Well, it is good to make that clear because in the decision of the Supreme Court, as I said, there was no clear-cut holding as to the possible co-existence or implied repeal between these two Acts.chanroblesvirtualawlibrary chanrobles virtual law library

SENATOR ALMENDRAS: Yes, Your Honor, but the gentleman from Nueva Ecija, Senator Liwag, informed me that Republic Act No. 2207 has never been repealed. chanroblesvirtualawlibrary chanrobles virtual law library

SENATOR PADILLA: Well, I also concur with that view, but we want to make that clear ... . chanroblesvirtualawlibrary chanrobles virtual law library

SENATOR PADILLA: "Provided, further," it says, "That the importation of rice and corn is left to private parties upon payment of the corresponding taxes." So, therefore, the position of the Committee, as expressed by the distinguished sponsor is that Sec. 10 of Republic Act No. 3452 is applicable under normal conditions.chanroblesvirtualawlibrary chanrobles virtual law library

SENATOR ALMENDRAS: Yes. chanroblesvirtualawlibrary chanrobles virtual law library

SENATOR PADILLA: So, both provisions of law are in existence. chanroblesvirtualawlibrary chanrobles virtual law library

SENATOR ALMENDRAS: Yes. chanroblesvirtualawlibrary chanrobles virtual law library

SENATOR PADILLA: One is not repealed by the other.

x x x           x x x           x x x chanrobles virtual law library

SENATOR TOLENTINO: Mr. President, there are two views already expressed on whether Republic Act No. 2207 has been repealed by Republic Act No. 3452. One view sustains the theory that there has been

a repeal of Republic Act No. 2207 by Republic Act No. 3452 insofar as rice importation is concerned. The other view is that there is no repeal. The Supreme Court does not state clearly which side prevails. I take the view that the two laws can be reconciled ... . chanroblesvirtualawlibrary chanrobles virtual law library

Now, Mr. President, reading those two provisions together, I maintain that they are not totally repugnant to each other, that it is possible for them to stand together except on certain points: First, is importation in case of a national emergency certified by the National Economic Council permissible? By reading the two provisos together I would say yes because there is nothing in the proviso contained in Republic Act No. 3452 which would be inconsistent with importation during a shortage amounting to a national emergency.

Another circumstance that strengthens our view is that when said House Bill No. 11511 was finally approved by the Senate, it carried a clause which expressly repeals, among others, Republic Act No. 2207 (Section 14), but which bill, as already said, was later killed in the conference committee. This attitude clearly reveals that Congress preferred to fall back on Republic Act 2207 with regard to future importations.chanroblesvirtualawlibrary chanrobles virtual law library

Anent the point raised relative to the lack of necessary appropriation to finance the importation in question, suffice it to state that under Republic Act 663 the National Rice and Corn Corporation is authorized to borrow, raise and secure the money that may be necessary to carry out its objectives. We refer to Section 3 (e) of said Act which empowers said corporation to secure money and to encumber any property it has as a guaranty, and Republic Act No. 3452, which creates the Rice and Corn Administration, transferred its functions and powers to the latter, including the power to borrow money under Section 3(e). This provision gives the RCA enough power with which to finance the importation in question.chanroblesvirtualawlibrary chanrobles virtual law library

WHEREFORE, petition is dismissed. The writ of preliminary injunction issued by this Court is hereby dissolved. Costs against petitioners.

EN BANC

G.R. No. L-25619 June 30, 1970

DOMINGO B. TEOXON, petitioner-appellant, vs. MEMBERS OF THE BOARD OF ADMINISTRATORS, PHILIPPINE VETERANS ADMINISTRATION, respondents-

appellees.

FERNANDO, J.:

The pivotal question raised by petitioner, a veteran who suffered from permanent physical disability, in this appeal from a lower court decision dismissing his suit for mandamus, is its failure to accord primacy to statutory provisions fixing the amount of pension to which he was entitled. 1Instead, it sustained the plea of respondent officials, members of the board of Administrators of the Philippine Veterans Administration, relying on the administrative rules issued by them presumably in pursuance of their duty to enforce the Veterans' Bill of Rights. We have to resolve, then, whether or not there has been a failure to apply the doctrine to which this Court has been committed that if it can be shown that there is repugnancy between the statute and the rules issued in pursuance thereof, the former prevails. Unfortunately, as will be hereafter shown, the lower court did not see it that way. It found nothing objectionable in respondents

following a contrary norm and thus disregarding petitioner's legal right for which mandamus is the proper remedy. We cannot lend our approval then to such conclusion especially so in the light of our decision barely two months ago, Begosa v. Chairman, Philippine Veterans Administration,

2where we categorically held that a veteran suffering from permanent disability is not to be denied what has been granted him specifically by legislative enactment, which certainly is superior to any regulation that may be promulgated by the Philippine Veterans Administration, presumably in the implementation thereof. We reverse.chanroblesvirtualawlibrary chanrobles virtual law library

Petitioner, on April 23, 1965, filed his suit for mandamus before the Court of First Instance of Manila alleging that he filed his claim for disability pension under the Veterans' Bill of Rights, Republic Act No. 65, for having been permanently incapacitated from work and that he was first awarded only P25.00 monthly, thereafter increased to P50.00 a month contrary to the terms of the basic law as thereafter amended. 3His claim, therefore, was for a pension effective May 10, 1955 at the rate of P50.00 a month up to June 21, 1957 and at the rate of P100.00 a month, plus P10.00 a month, for each of his unmarried minor children below 18 years of age from June 22, 1957 up to June 30, 1963; and the difference of P50.00 a month, plus P10.00 a month for each of his four unmarried minor children below 18 years of age from July 1, 1963. He would likewise seek for the payment of moral and exemplary damages as well as attorney's fees. 4The answer for respondents filed on May 25, 1965, while admitting, with qualification, the facts as alleged in the petition, would rely primarily in its special and affirmative defenses, on petitioner not having exhausted its administrative remedies and his suit being in effect one against the government, which cannot prosper without its consent. 5In the stipulation of facts dated Oct. 13, 1965, it was expressly agreed: "That the petitioner sustained physical injuries in line of duty as a former member of a recognized guerilla organization which participated actively in the resistance movement against the enemy, and as a result of which petitioner suffered a permanent, physical disability." 6Mention was likewise made in the aforesaid stipulation of facts that while petitioner would rely on what is set forth in the Veterans' Bill of Rights, as amended, respondents in turn would limit the amount of pension received by him in accordance with the rules and regulations promulgated by them.chanroblesvirtualawlibrary chanrobles virtual law library

In the decision now on appeal, promulgated on Dec. 4, 1965, the lower court, in dismissing the petition, expressed its conformity with the contention of respondents. Thus: "Upon examination of the issues involved in this case, the Court believes that a case for mandamus will not lie. The respondent Board has authority under the Pension law to process applications for pension, using as guide the rules and regulations that it adopted under the law and their decisions, unless shown clearly to be in error or against the law or against the general policy of the Board, should be maintained." 7 The lower court went even further in its recognition of the binding force to be given the administrative rules and regulations promulgated by respondents. Thus: "As mentioned above, under the provisions of the Veterans Law as subsequently amended, the Board is authorized to promulgate regulations to carry into effect the provisions of the law. In accordance with said law, the Board has promulgated rules and regulations which are considered in the approval of the claims for pension. The court sees no reason why the case of petitioner should be considered as an exception. There is no question that his disability is not complete, and, therefore, he cannot be entitled to complete disability allowance. That the decision of the Board is based on its regulations is also, according to the Court, justified because that is how the Board functions." 8

Hence, this appeal, which, as noted at the outset, calls for an affirmative response. Petitioner's contention that his right as conferred by law takes precedence to what the administrative rules and regulations of respondents provide is indisputable. So our decisions have indicated with unfailing uniformity.chanroblesvirtualawlibrary chanrobles virtual law library

1. The recognition of the power of administrative officials to promulgate rules in the implementation of the statute, necessarily limited to what is provided for in the legislative enactment, may be found in the early case of United States v. Barrias 9 decided in 1908. Then came, in a 1914 decision, United States v. Tupasi Molina, 10a delineation of the scope of such competence. Thus: "Of course the regulations adopted under legislative authority by a particular department must be in harmony with the provisions of the law, and for the sole purpose of carrying into effect its general provisions. By such regulations, of course, the law itself can not be extended. So long, however, as the regulations relate solely to carrying into effect the provisions of the law, they are valid." In 1936, in People v. Santos, 11this Court expressed its disapproval of an administrative order that would amount to an excess of the regulatory power vested in an administrative official. We reaffirmed such a doctrine in a 1951 decision, where we again made clear that where an administrative order betrays inconsistency or repugnancy to the provisions of the Act, "the mandate of the Act must prevail and must be followed." 12Justice Barrera, speaking for the Court in Victorias Milling Company, Inc. v. Social Security Commission, 13citing Parker, 14as well as Davis 15did tersely sum up the matter thus: "A rule is binding on the courts so long as the procedure fixed for its promulgation is followed and its scope is within the statutory granted by the legislature, even if the courts are not in agreement with the policy stated therein or its innate wisdom .... On the other hand, administrative interpretation of the law is at best merely advisory, for it is the courts that finally determine what the law means." chanrobles virtual law library

It cannot be otherwise as the Constitution limits the authority of the President, in whom all executive power resides, to take care that the laws be faithfully executed. 16No lesser administrative executive office or agency then can, contrary to the express language of the Constitution, assert for itself a more extensive prerogative. Necessarily, it is bound to observe the constitutional mandate. There must be strict compliance with the legislative enactment. Its terms must be followed. The statute requires adherence to, not departure from, its provisions. No deviation is allowable. In the terse language of the present Chief Justice, an administrative agency "cannot amend an act of Congress." 17Respondents can be sustained, therefore, only if it could be shown that the rules and regulations promulgated by them were in accordance with what the Veterans' Bill of Rights provides. chanroblesvirtualawlibrary chanrobles virtual law library

We examine, then, the original act approved in 1946 18and its later amendments. The Veterans' Bill of Rights, as it read when enacted in 1946, insofar as pertinent, provides: "The persons mentioned in sections one and two hereof, who are permanently incapacitated from work owing to sickness, disease, or injuries sustained in line of duty, shall be given a life pension of fifty pesos a month unless they are actually receiving a similar pension from other government funds, and shall receive, in addition, the necessary hospitalization and medical care." The act took effect upon its approval, on Oct. 18 of that year. Then, in 1955, came the first amendment in these words; "[Sec.] 9; The persons mentioned in sections one and two hereof who permanent incapacitated from work owing to sickness, disease, or injuries sustained in line of duty, shall be given a life pension of fifty pesos a month, and ten pesos a month for each of his unmarried minor children below

eighteen years of age, unless they are actually receiving a similar pension from other government funds, and shall receive, in addition, the necessary hospitalization and medical care." 19The present Section 9, as again amended in 1957, reads as follows: "The persons mentioned in sections one and two hereof who are permanently incapacitated from work owing sickness, disease, or injuries sustained in line of duty, shall be given a life pension of one hundred pesos a month, and ten pesos a month for each of his unmarried minor children below eighteen years of age, unless they are actually receiving a similar pension from other Government funds, and shall receive, in addition, the necessary hospitalization and medical care." 20

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To the extent, therefore, that petitioner would base his suit on the legal rights thus conferred on him by the above statutory provisions, he is entitled to a favorable judgment. That is what was decided in Begosa v. Chairman, Philippine Veterans Administration, referred to by us earlier in the opinion as decisive of a controversy of this nature. We do so again. Hence, a reversal of the appealed decision is indicated.chanroblesvirtualawlibrary chanrobles virtual law library

2. The affirmative defenses as to non-exhaustion of administrative remedies as well as a proceeding of this character being a suit against the State were considered and rejected in the aforesaid Begosa decision.chanroblesvirtualawlibrary chanrobles virtual law library

WHEREFORE, the decision of December 4, 1965 of the lower court is reversed, and another one entered granting this petition for mandamus. Respondents are ordered to pay petitioner a pension effective as of May 10, 1955 at the rate of P50.00 a month up to June 21, 1957 and at the rate of P100.00 a month, plus P10.00 a month for each of his unmarried minor children below 18 years of age from June 22, 1957 up to June 30, 1963; and the difference of P50.00 a month plus P10.00 a month for each of his four unmarried minor children below 18 years of age from July 1, 1963 until the statutory rate has been satisfied. Thereafter petitioner is entitled to the amount of P100.00 a month plus P10.00 a month for each of his four unmarried minor children below eighteen years of age, in accordance with law. Without pronouncement as to costs.

Concepcion, C.J., Reyes, J.B.L., Dizon, Makalintal, Zaldivar, Castro and Teehankee, JJ., concur.chanroblesvirtualawlibrary chanrobles virtual law library

Barredo and Villamor, JJ., took no part.

Republic of the PhilippinesSUPREME COURT

Manila

SECOND DIVISION

 

G.R. No. L-30061 February 27, 1974

THE PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, plaintiff-appellees, vs. JOSE JABINAL Y CARMEN, Defendant-Appellant.

ANTONIO, J.:

Appeal from the judgment of the Municipal Court of Batangas (provincial capital), Batangas, in Criminal Case No. 889, finding the accused guilty of the crime of Illegal Possession of Firearm and Ammunition and sentencing him to suffer an indeterminate penalty ranging from one (1) year and one (1) day to two (2) years imprisonment, with the accessories provided by law, which raises in issue the validity of his conviction based on a retroactive application of Our ruling in People v. Mapa. 1

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The complaint filed against the accused reads:

That on or about 9:00 o'clock, p.m., the 5th day of September, 1964, in the poblacion, Municipality of Batangas, Province of Batangas, Philippines, and within the jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, the above-named accused, a person not authorized by law, did then and there wilfully, unlawfully and feloniously keep in his possession, custody and direct control a revolver Cal. .22, RG8 German Made with one (1) live ammunition and four (4) empty shells without first securing the necessary permit or license to possess the same.

At the arraignment on September 11, 1964, the accused entered a plea of not guilty, after which trial was accordingly held.chanroblesvirtualawlibrary chanrobles virtual law library

The accused admitted that on September 5, 1964, he was in possession of the revolver and the ammunition described in the complaint, without the requisite license or permit. He, however, claimed to be entitled to exoneration because, although he had no license or permit, he had an appointment as Secret Agent from the Provincial Governor of Batangas and an appointment as Confidential Agent from the PC Provincial Commander, and the said appointments expressly carried with them the authority to possess and carry the firearm in question. chanroblesvirtualawlibrary chanrobles virtual law library

Indeed, the accused had appointments from the above-mentioned officials as claimed by him. His appointment from Governor Feliciano Leviste, dated December 10, 1962, reads:

Reposing special trust and confidence in your civic spirit, and trusting that you will be an effective agent in the detection of crimes and in the preservation of peace and order in the province of Batangas, especially with respect to the suppression of trafficking in explosives, jueteng, illegal cockfighting, cattle rustling, robbery and the detection of unlicensed firearms, you are hereby appointed a SECRET AGENT of the undersigned, the appointment to take effect immediately, or as soon as you have qualified for the position. As such Secret Agent, your duties shall be those generally of a peace officer and particularly to help in the preservation of peace and order in this province and to make reports thereon to me once or twice a month. It should be clearly understood that any abuse of authority on your part shall be considered sufficient ground for the automatic cancellation of your appointment and immediate separation from the service. In accordance with the decision of the Supreme Court in G.R. No. L-12088 dated December 23, 1959, you will have

the right to bear a firearm, particularly described below, for use in connection with the performance of your duties.chanroblesvirtualawlibrary chanrobles virtual law library

By virtue hereof, you may qualify and enter upon the performance of your duties by taking your oath of office and filing the original thereof with us.

Very truly yours, chanrobles virtual law library

(Sgd.) FELICIANO LEVISTEProvincial Governor

FIREARM AUTHORIZED TO CARRY: chanrobles virtual law library

Kind: - ROHM-Revolver chanrobles virtual law library

Make: - German chanrobles virtual law library

SN: - 64 chanrobles virtual law library

Cal:- .22

On March 15, 1964, the accused was also appointed by the PC Provincial Commander of Batangas as Confidential Agent with duties to furnish information regarding smuggling activities, wanted persons, loose firearms, subversives and other similar subjects that might affect the peace and order condition in Batangas province, and in connection with these duties he was temporarily authorized to possess a ROHM revolver, Cal. .22 RG-8 SN-64, for his personal protection while in the performance of his duties.chanroblesvirtualawlibrary chanrobles virtual law library

The accused contended before the court a quo that in view of his above-mentioned appointments as Secret Agent and Confidential Agent, with authority to possess the firearm subject matter of the prosecution, he was entitled to acquittal on the basis of the Supreme Court's decision in People vs. Macarandang 2 and People vs. Lucero. 3 The trial court, while conceding on the basis of the evidence of record the accused had really been appointed Secret Agent and Confidential Agent by the Provincial Governor and the PC Provincial Commander of Batangas, respectively, with authority to possess and carry the firearm described in the complaint, nevertheless held the accused in its decision dated December 27, 1968, criminally liable for illegal possession of a firearm and ammunition on the ground that the rulings of the Supreme Court in the cases of Macarandang and Lucero were reversed and abandoned in People vs. Mapa, supra. The court considered as mitigating circumstances the appointments of the accused as Secret Agent and Confidential Agent.chanroblesvirtualawlibrary chanrobles virtual law library

Let us advert to Our decisions in People v. Macarandang, supra, People v. Lucero, supra, and People v. Mapa, supra. In Macarandang, We reversed the trial court's judgment of conviction against the accused because it was shown that at the time he was found to possess a certain firearm and ammunition without license or permit, he had an appointment from the Provincial Governor as Secret Agent to assist in the maintenance of peace and order and in the detection of

crimes, with authority to hold and carry the said firearm and ammunition. We therefore held that while it is true that the Governor has no authority to issue any firearm license or permit, nevertheless, section 879 of the Revised Administrative Code provides that "peace officers" are exempted from the requirements relating to the issuance of license to possess firearms; and Macarandang's appointment as Secret Agent to assist in the maintenance of peace and order and detection of crimes, sufficiently placed him in the category of a "peace officer" equivalent even to a member of the municipal police who under section 879 of the Revised Administrative Code are exempted from the requirements relating to the issuance of license to possess firearms. In Lucero, We held that under the circumstances of the case, the granting of the temporary use of the firearm to the accused was a necessary means to carry out the lawful purpose of the batallion commander to effect the capture of a Huk leader. In Mapa, expressly abandoning the doctrine in Macarandang, and by implication, that in Lucero, We sustained the judgment of conviction on the following ground:

The law is explicit that except as thereafter specifically allowed, "it shall be unlawful for any person to ... possess any firearm, detached parts of firearms or ammunition therefor, or any instrument or implement used or intended to be used in the manufacture of firearms, parts of firearms, or ammunition." (Sec. 878, as amended by Republic Act No. 4, Revised Administrative Code.) The next section provides that "firearms and ammunition regularly and lawfully issued to officers, soldiers, sailors, or marines [of the Armed Forces of the Philippines], the Philippine Constabulary, guards in the employment of the Bureau of Prisons, municipal police, provincial governors, lieutenant governors, provincial treasurers, municipal treasurers, municipal mayors, and guards of provincial prisoners and jails," are not covered "when such firearms are in possession of such officials and public servants for use in the performance of their official duties." (Sec. 879, Revised Administrative Code.) chanrobles virtual law library

The law cannot be any clearer. No provision is made for a secret agent. As such he is not exempt. ... .

It will be noted that when appellant was appointed Secret Agent by the Provincial Government in 1962, and Confidential Agent by the Provincial Commander in 1964, the prevailing doctrine on the matter was that laid down by Us in People v. Macarandang (1959) and People v. Lucero (1958). Our decision in People v. Mapa reversing the aforesaid doctrine came only in 1967. The sole question in this appeal is: Should appellant be acquitted on the basis of Our rulings in Macarandang and Lucero, or should his conviction stand in view of the complete reversal of the Macarandang and Lucero doctrine in Mapa? The Solicitor General is of the first view, and he accordingly recommends reversal of the appealed judgment. chanroblesvirtualawlibrary chanrobles virtual law library

Decisions of this Court, although in themselves not laws, are nevertheless evidence of what the laws mean, and this is the reason why under Article 8 of the New Civil Code "Judicial decisions applying or interpreting the laws or the Constitution shall form a part of the legal system ... ." The interpretation upon a law by this Court constitutes, in a way, a part of the law as of the date that law originally passed, since this Court's construction merely establishes the contemporaneous legislative intent that law thus construed intends to effectuate. The settled rule supported by numerous authorities is a restatement of legal maxim "legis interpretatio legis vim obtinet" - the interpretation placed upon the written law by a competent court has the force of law. The doctrine

laid down in Lucero and Macarandang was part of the jurisprudence, hence of the law, of the land, at the time appellant was found in possession of the firearm in question and when he arraigned by the trial court. It is true that the doctrine was overruled in the Mapa case in 1967, but when a doctrine of this Court is overruled and a different view is adopted, the new doctrine should be applied prospectively, and should not apply to parties who had relied on the old doctrine and acted on the faith thereof. This is especially true in the construction and application of criminal laws, where it is necessary that the punishability of an act be reasonably foreseen for the guidance of society.chanroblesvirtualawlibrary chanrobles virtual law library

It follows, therefore, that considering that appellant conferred his appointments as Secret Agent and Confidential Agent and authorized to possess a firearm pursuant to the prevailing doctrine enunciated in Macarandang and Lucero, under which no criminal liability would attach to his possession of said firearm in spite of the absence of a license and permit therefor, appellant must be absolved. Certainly, appellant may not be punished for an act which at the time it was done was held not to be punishable.chanroblesvirtualawlibrary chanrobles virtual law library

WHEREFORE, the judgment appealed from is hereby reversed, and appellant is acquitted, with costs de oficio.

Zaldivar (Chairman), Barredo, Fernandez and Aquino, JJ., concur. chanroblesvirtualawlibrary chanrobles virtual law library

Fernando, J., took no part.