100:00:03,490 --> 00:00:04,300Hi.In this presentation, I want to focus onnew thinking that's goingon in the East Bloc, especially theSoviet Union, in the late 1980s.All through this course, we've talkedabout how new thinking happens,that it just doesn't come out of the blue.That first, there's a situation peopleunderstand.And you try to understand, what theynoticed about the situation.You look at what problems or opportunitiesdid they see in that situation.Then, what kind of solutions did theythink they had.And you see what solutions they chose.And then how that created a new situation.So to explain the new thinking in theSoviet Union, which has momentousconsequences, you start by noticing thatthey think they're in a period of crisis.In other words, they see a situation.They see problems.By the way, your later hindsightunderstandingof what the situation was, in youropinion,or what problems they should have seen, isinteresting but you can't let thatblur your ability to see the problem asthey saw it, through their eyes.And also, it's really important to thinkabout what their alternatives were intheir minds.They're not going to make a move to dosomething unless they believe they've gota viable option.So, what is the problem as Soviet leadersmighthave perceived it in the middle of the1980s?From their point of view, they look attheir leadership, and they see an aging oldguard.Brezhnev dies.Andropov dies. Chernenko dies. Men intheir 70s, even in their 80s,this is the image of the Sovietleadership to many of the Soviet people.The impassive leaders, standing on thereviewing stand.They also notice the politicalinternational trends.After the big crisis of 1983 as you gointo �84, �85, there's a definite sense inthe Soviet Union that the political and

internationalmomentum seems to be running a bit againstthem,that they feelmore and more isolated by the way thingsare going.But that's not all, they've got this wargrinding on in Afghanistan,killing Soviet soldiers every month,draining Soviet attention, Sovietprestige.As they look at their economic situation,they also see problems.Imagine: You�re in the Soviet leadership,it's 1985, 1986, you're looking athow the economies of the world are doing.Now you saw this chart before.I showed it to you, in 1976, to give you asense of the way Chinese leaders mighthave seen the world.Now I've run it forward to 1986.Now again, the Soviet leaders did not havethis chart.But I think this chart gives you somesense ofthe way the world looked to people in themid-1980s,when they tried to figure out whicheconomieswere most dynamic.And what you'd notice here, look at thegreen line for the Soviet Union, it'sflattening out.Look at the contrast, even with a countrylike South Korea, between thesituation in 1966 in the Soviet Union andnow look, 20 years later.You might even notice that China isbeginning to slowly pick up.You look around the Soviet Union and theysee the aging consequences of a devotionto heavy industry,to the mining and exploitation of rawmaterials.This map is just one way of graphicallydepicting that layout.An interesting thing about this map is ituses the color orange to point outareas of severe environmental damage,around these areaswhere a lot of mineral exploitation hasoccurred.And you can see howextensive these are, including this areaaround Chernobyl, wherea Soviet nuclear reactor, in 1986, suffereda catastrophic meltdown.At the end of the 1970s, though, theSoviet economy had good news.All that oil they were producing was

sellingon the world markets for a terrific price.The Soviets were bringing in all sorts ofhard currency.They could use that to get terrific loansfrom the West to buy lots of consumergoods and other things.But from the point of view of a Sovietleader in, say1986, take a look at what's happened totheir income from oil sales.Here's 1986 right here.Youcan see what's happened to the oil price.That drop means that their income from oilsales is lessthan half of what it was only a few yearsearlier.If that's your principal source of hardCurrency, and then youneed that hard currency to service thoseloans you took out inthe banner days, loans that are alsohelping you subsidize some ofthe economies dependent on you in EasternEurope, you have a severedebt problem,severe problems in maintaining thestandard of livingyour citizens had started gettingaccustomed to having.And then of course, the Soviets arelooking over their shoulders at China.Again, imagine the year, it's �85, �86,here's some ofthe way the world was perceiving China in1985, 1986.For instance, this cover of Time Magazinecaptures the popular moodfrom September 1985.[LAUGH] By the way, you can see this, onthewall screen over here on the left, intraditional Chinese style,carrying the posters of Karl Marx with thecitizens working in rice paddies.And, now look.[LAUGH].Riding bicycles.Blue jeans.Cameras.Tennis shoes.Time Magazine, in fact, named DengXiaoping its Man of the Year for 1985.And here you see a collage of images thatcaptures whathe seems to represent in the eye of theworld right then.If you're a Soviet leader, how are youprocessing this?

What do you make of this?And then you might also ask yourself, whatisthe real path to the security of theSoviet Union?Should we continue to invest principallyin our military establishmentas the path to security or should we havesomeother conceptions?So question, do they have some otherconceptions?Are they seeing any alternative?Answer is yes, they are.In 1985, Mikhail Gorbachev becomes the newleader of the Soviet Union.He truly represents a model product of theSoviet communist system.Born in the Caucasus,his family had experienced some of theterrors of Stalinism.But he's risen through the ranks, the bestParty schools,all the good experience in government.The other leaders would look at himas a youthful, dynamic person, thoroughlyimbuedwith all the training the Soviet socialistsystem can provide to its young leaders.Gorbachev looks around and analyzes thecommunist movement as of the 1980s.He's quite takenwith some of the ideas of the Eurocommunistparties in places like Spain, andespecially in Italy.Taken with the way they're trying to bringback ideas of democratic socialism in theredefinitionof communism. He adopts, after he comesin,the goal of perestroika: renewal for theSoviet Union.He wants to reduce foreign requirements.In other words, let's ease upon confrontations with the West so that Ican cut back on the amount of resourcesI have to devote to my militaryestablishmentand can put more into my domestic economy.He also believes in glasnost: a newopenness, amore open dialogue about the problems ofthe country,the past of the country, and options forthe future.Why, you might ask, did the Sovietleadership choose someone like this toleadthe country in 1985?Well, a couple points.

One, it was a very close call in 1985.There was no inevitability about theselection of Gorbachev from among thefield.His principal rival, the party boss ofLeningrad, might've beenselected and the Soviet Union might'vefollowed a very different path.But Gorbachev was the man they picked.After the previous three leaders,that image of youthfuldynamism and his reputed successes withSoviet agricultureseemed to make him look like the best guy.But a really important explanation for whyGorbachev adopts this agenda and hassupportfor a while, is that he's embodyingmultiple agendas of people within thecommunist elite.On the one hand, he does embody the agendaof people who really do want to liberalizethe definitionof communism.People like this man,Alexander Yakolev, a long time CommunistParty official thathad spent a lot of time serving in foreigncountries.He'd thought a lot about how to renew theSoviet system.Take, for example, this memorandum thatYakolev wrotesecretly to Gorbachev at the end of 1985.You can see on the priority of politicaldevelopment.He believes the Soviet Union really needsto change its politicalsystem in order to keep up with whatmodern times demand.You can see here he's arguing toinvigorate the legislative side of theSoviet government.Because right now, of course, thelegislature isreally a nominal legislature that'scrushed by the executive power.He's talking here about votes ofconfidence, a decisive strengtheningof accountability on the part of theexecutive branch.He wants policy discussions to be realdiscussions, not just dry reports.Elections, he writes, should be not just aselectionbut a choice and, importantly, a choiceamong the best.Notice how he keeps finding quotes fromLenin that make thesearguments seem like they're in tune with

the original communist inspiration.And notice here his argument on thePayoff:colossal increase in real responsibilityfor themasses, accountability, and mainly, agenuine engagement ofthe masses in the management of theaffairs of the region, oblast, republic,and country.Transformation of local governments intogenuine organs of power.And again, he renews the argument that forthis you need glasnost, you need openness.Again, he finds a quote from Lenin, toaffirm that value, thoroughand timely information an unavoidableconditionof the further democratization of publiclife.These are pretty radical views to beexpressingsecretly at the top of the communistgovernment.But Yakovlev and that kind of agenda isonly one of the tributaries to newthinking.Another really powerful tributary actuallycomesfrom people in the mainstream Sovietnational security establishment.People like this man, Marshal SergeyAkhromeyev.Akhromeyev is an innovative, vigorousmilitary thinker.He believes the Soviet military isgoing tohave trouble keeping up with the Americanmilitary unless it can adopt scientificandtechnical revolutions, innovate rapidly,show real agility.He thinks new thinking, andrenewal, is also critical to the renewalof the Soviet militaryto keep it strong.So you see the converging agenda thatGorbachev pulls into his coalition for newthinking --not only more liberal-minded people likeYakovlev,but also people who believe that somehowtheSoviet system needs to be rebooted inorderto make it stronger in very traditionalterms.It's that combination that givesGorbachev vital domestic politicalmomentum to carry forward his ideas about

new thinking in the late 1980s and open upa world of new possibilities.We'll explore what happened in that worldnext time.[BLANK_AUDIO]