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NOS. 14-556, 14-562, 14-571, 14-574
IN THE
Supreme Court of the United States
J AMES OBERGEFELL, ET AL.,
Petitioners ,
v.
RICHARD HODGES,
Respondent .
BRITTANI HENRY , ET AL.,
Petitioners ,
v.
RICHARD HODGES,
Respondent .
Consolidated Case Captions Listed on Inside Front Cover
On Writs of Certiorari to the United States Court of
Appeals for the Sixth Circuit
BRIEF OF MICI CURI E WYOMING
LEGISL TORS ND SCHOL RS OF FULL F ITH
ND CREDIT IN SUPPORT OF RESPONDENTS
HERBERT K. DOBY N ATHANIEL S. HIBBEN
Counsel of Record Nathaniel S. Hibben, P.C.
215 East 21st Avenue 215 East 21st Avenue
PO Box 130 Torrington, WY 82240
Torrington, WY 82240 (307)532-2700
(307) 532-2700 [email protected] [email protected]
Counsel for Amici Curiae
mailto:[email protected]:[email protected]:[email protected]:[email protected]
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A PRIL DEBOER, ET AL.,
Petitioners ,
v.
RICHARD SNYDER, ET AL.,
Respondents .
V ALERIA T ANCO, ET AL.,
Petitioners ,
v.
WILLIAM EDWARD “BILL” H ASLAM, ET AL.,
Respondents .
TIMOTHY LOVE, ET AL. AND GREGORY BOURKE, ET AL.,
Petitioners ,
v.
STEVE BESHEAR,
Respondents .
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i
QQQQUUUUEEEESSSSTTTTIIIIOOOONNNNSSSSPPPPRRRREEEESSSSEEEENNNNTTTTEEEEDDDD
1. DoestheFourteenth Amendmentrequireastateto license a marriage between two peopleof thesamesex?
2. DoestheFourteenth Amendmentrequireastateto recognize a marriage between two people of the same sex when their marriage was lawfullylicensedandperformedout-of-state?
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ii
TTTTA AA ABBBBLLLLEEEEOOOOFFFFCCCCOOOONNNNTTTTEEEENNNNTTTTSSSS
QUESTIONSPRESENTED.......................................i
TABLEOF AUTHORITIES.....................................iv
INTERESTOF AMICICURIAE...............................1
SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT....................................2
ARGUMENT..............................................................4
I. States are Not Required to RecognizeMarriages That Conflict With Their OwnMaritalDefinitionorPublicPolicy.....................4
A. States Have Long Asserted andExercised the Power to DenyRecognitiontoMarriagesPerformedinOther Jurisdictions that are ContrarytotheirOwnPublicPolicy............................4
B.
The
Full
Faith
and
Credit
Clause
Does
Not Compel States to RecognizeMarriages that are Contrary to TheirPublicPolicy................................................10
C. On Matters of Choice of Law, Statesare Free to Apply Their Own LawUnder the Due Process Clause if MinimallyConnectedtothePartiesof theTransaction...........................................17
D.
States
Must
Be
Permitted
to
Avoid
Applying Laws of Other States ThatOffendForumPolicies.................................19
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iii
E. Declining to Recognize MarriageRights Does Not Destroy theUnderlyingMarriage..................................26
II. The Marriage Recognition LawsChallengedinTheseCasesareUnliketheFederal Law that the Court Struck DowninWindsor (Section3of FederalDOMA).........26
III. A Ruling for the States on the First
Question
Presented
Necessarily
Requires
a Ruling for the States on the SecondQuestion.............................................................29
CONCLUSION.........................................................31
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iv
TTTTA AA ABBBBLLLLEEEEOOOOFFFF A AA AUUUUTTTTHHHHOOOORRRRIIIITTTTIIIIEEEESSSS
Alaska Packers Ass’n v. Indus. Acc. Comm’n ., 294 U.S.532(1935).....................................................23
Allstate Ins. Co. v. Hague ,449U.S.302(1981)......21 Baker v. General Motors Corp ., 522U.S.222 (1998)
...............................................................................12 Baker v. Nelson ,409U.S.810(1972)......................32
Bradford
Elec.
Light
Co.
v.
Clapper ,
286
U.S.
145
(1932)......................................................................7 Bradford Elec. Light Co. v. Clapper , 286 U.S. 145
(1932)....................................................................30 Bucca v. State , 128 A.2d 506 (N.J. Super. Ch. Div.
1957)..................................................................9,17 Catalano v. Catalano ,170 A.2d726(Conn.1961)....9 Christiansen v. Christiansen , 253 P.2d 153 (Wyo.
2011)........................................................................5 Conde-Vidal v. Garcia-Padilla (D.P.R.) (D.P.R. Oct.
21,2014)(No.14-1253),2014WL5361987.........32 De
Sylva
v.
Ballentine ,
351
U.S.
570,
76
S.Ct.
974
(1956)....................................................................28 Ex parte Bowen ,247S.W.2d379(Ky.1952)..........10 Franchise Tax Board of California v. Hyatt ,538U.S.
488(2003)..............................................................13 Huntington v. Attrill ,146U.S.657(1892)..............26 In re Est. of Toutant , 633 N.W.2d 692 (Wis. App.
2001)........................................................................8 Lanham v. Lanham ,117N.W.787(Wis.1908)........8 Nehring v. Nehring , 164 Ill. App. 527 (Ill. App. 2d
Dist.
1911)...............................................................
8 Nevada v. Hall, 440 U.S. 410, 99 S.Ct. 1182, 59
L.Ed.2d416(1979)................................................13
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v
New State Ice Co. v. Liebmann ,285U.S.262 (1932) ...............................................................................35
New York Life Insurance Co. v. Head , 234 U.S.149 (1914)....................................................................27
Oregon v. Ice ,555U.S.160(2009)..........................35 Osoinach v. Watkins ,180So.577(Ala.1938)..........9 Pacific Employers Ins. Co. v. Industrial Accident Comm'n ,306U.S.493,59S.Ct.629(1939).........12
Phillips Petroleum Co. v. Shutts ,472U.S.797(1985) ...............................................................................20
Phillips
Petroleum
Co.
v.
Shutts ,
472
U.S.
797,
105
S.Ct.2965(1985)..................................................13 State Farm Mutual Automobile Insurance Co. v. Campbell ,538U.S.408(2003).............................26
Toler v. Oakwood Smokeless Coal Corp ., 4 S.E.2d 364(Va.1939).........................................................9
True v. Ranney ,21N.H.52(1850)..........................10 United States v. Windsor , 133 S.Ct. 2675 (2013)
........................................................................passimWilliams v. North Carolina ,317U.S.287(1942)...16
28U.S.C.§1738C....................................................16
Audioof Oral Argumentat29:23-30:13,Obergefell v. Himes ,No.14-3057(6thCir. Aug.6,2014).........30
Erin O’Hara O’Connor, Full Faith and Credit Clause , in THE HERITAGE GUIDE TO THE CONSTITUTION(2DED.)..........................................10
Jeffrey
L.
Rensberger,
Interstate
Pluralism:
The
Role of Federalism in the Same-Sex Marriage Debate ,2008B.Y.U.L.REV.1703........................13
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vi
Jeffrey L. Rensberger,Same-Sex Marriages and the Defense of Marriage Act: A Deviant View of an Experiment in Full Faith and Credit ,32CreightonL.Rev.409(1998).................................................12
Judicial Activism vs. Democracy: What Are theNational Implications of the MassachusettsGoodridge Decision and the Judicial Invalidationof TraditionalMarriageLaws?:HearingBeforetheUnitedStatesSenateCommitteeontheJudiciary,108thCong.63,68-67(2004)...............................15
Lynn
D.
Wardle,
From
Slavery
to
Same-Sex
Marriage: Comity Versus Public Policy in Inter- Jurisdictional Recognition of Controversial Domestic Relations , 2008 B.Y.U. L. Rev. 1855(2008)......................................................................9
MarkD.Rosen,Why the Defense of Marriage Act Is Not (Yet?) Unconstitutional: Lawrence, Full Faith and Credit, and the Many Societal Actors That Determine What the Constitution Requires , 90MINN.L.REV.915(2006).....................................5
Patrick
J.
Borchers,
Baker
v.
General
Motors: Implications for Interjurisdictional Recognition of
Non-Traditional Marriages , 32 Creighton L. Rev.147(1998...............................................................12
Ralph U. Whitten, The Original Understanding of the Full Faith and Credit Clause and the Defense of Marriage Act ,32CreightonL.Rev.255(1998)16
RESTATEMENT(FIRST)OFCONFLICTOFLAWS(1934).................................................................5,6,
RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONFLICT OFLAWS(1971).......................................................6,7
Richard
S.
Myers,
The
Public
Policy
Doctrine
and
Interjurisdictional Recognition of Civil Unions and
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vii
Domestic Partnerships , 3 Ave Maria L. Rev. 531 (2005)....................................................................12
Stanley E. Cox, DOMA and Conflicts Law: Congressional Rules and Domestic Relations Conflicts Law , 32 CREIGHTON L.REV. 1063 (1999) ...............................................................................22
U.S.Const.art.IV,§1.............................................10
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1
IIIINNNNTTTTEEEERRRREEEESSSSTTTTOOOOFFFF A AA AMMMMIIIICCCCIIIICCCCUUUURRRRIIIIA AA AEEEE1111
Amici Curiae include legislators of the State of Wyoming who support their state law definingmarriageastheunionof amanandawoman. Theyare concerned that if this Court agrees with thearguments Petitioners raise, their state’s autonomyover the definition of marriage within their borderswillbesubvertedbythevaryingmarriagepoliciesof their sister states. These legislators are Cheri
Steinmetz,
Curt
Meier,
Nathan
Winters,
Scott
Clem,
MarkJennings, GeraldGay,Garry Piiparinen, TomReeder, Allen Jaggi, Marti Halverson, RobertMcKim, Kendell Kroeker, Roy Edwards, HarlanEdmonds, Bunky Loucks, and Theodore J. (Jim)Blackburn.
Amici Curiae also include scholars who havestudied and written on the Full Faith and CreditClause, conflicts of laws, and marriage recognition.They are concerned that Petitioners’ “marriagerecognition”
arguments
mischaracterize
the
relevant
legal principles and risk compromising well-established conflicts-of-law principles. Thesescholarsarelistedasfollows:
Jeffrey L. Rensberger is a Professor of Law and Vice-President for Strategic Planning andInstitutional Research at South Texas College of
1 Parties
to
these
cases
have
consented
to
the
filing
of
this
brief
and
letters
indicating
their
consent
are
on
file
with
the
Clerk. Amici state that no counsel for a party authored this brief in
wholeorinpart,andnopersonotherthantheamici andtheircounsel made any monetary contribution intended to fund thepreparationorsubmissionof thisbrief.
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2
Law. He has written scholarly works on conflict of lawsissuesraisedbysame-sexmarriages.
Richard S. Myers is a Professor of Law at AveMariaSchoolof Law.Heteachescoursesonconflictsof lawsandhaswrittenmultiplescholarlyarticlesonthe inter-jurisdictional recognition of same-sexmarriages.
Lloyd Cohen is a Professor of Law at George
Mason
University.
He
has
published
writings
on
numerous legal issues including marriage anddivorce.
SSSSUUUUMMMMMMMMA AA ARRRRY YY Y OOOOFFFF A AA ARRRRGGGGUUUUMMMMEEEENNNNTTTT
The overarching question before the Court inthese fourcases isnotwhetheranexclusivelymale-femalemarriagepolicy isthebest,butonlywhetherit is allowed by the U.S. Constitution. In otherwords, the question is not whether government-
recognized
same-sex
marriage
is
good
or
bad
policy,
but only whether it is required by the U.S.Constitution. Andthespecificquestionaddressedinthis brief is whether the Constitution requires aState that defines marriage as a union between amanandawomantorecognizeasame-sexmarriagevalidlyperformedinanotherState. Itdoesnot.
States have never been constitutionallymandated to recognize marriages that conflict withtheir marriagedefinitionor their public policy. See Part
I.A.,
infra .
The
Full
Faith
and
Credit
Clause
does not compel states to recognize marriages thatarecontrarytotheirpublicpolicy,sowhetherornot
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3
torecognizeasister-statemarriageisachoiceof lawmatter. See Part I.B, infra . The constitutionallimitations on choice of law, as opposed toenforcement of judgments, are minimal. See PartI.C., infra . In addition, the constitution should notbe interpreted to require each state to enforce itssister-state’s policies. See Part I.D., infra .Furthermore,arefusal torecognizeamarriagedoesnotendthemarriage;itsimplydeclinestoenforceorrecognize themarriage in that state. See Part I.E.,infra .
Petitioners and their amici mistakenly assertthat individual states, much like the federalgovernment, are constitutionally bound to recognizeas valid same-sex marriages entered into in otherstates. Suchclaimspersistently ignorebothhistoryand the decisions of this Court, including United States v. Windsor ,2 whichprovide thatstatesretainthe traditional right to define marriage, each for
themselves.
See
Part
II,
infra .
Finally, a ruling for the states on the firstquestion presented necessarily requires a ruling forthe states on the second question presented. For if this Court finds a sufficient rational or compellingbasis for defining marriage as the union of a manand a woman, such a basis will suffice for a state’sdecision not to recognize out-of-state unions thatconflict with its marriage definition. See Part III,infra .
2 133S.Ct.2675(2013).
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A AA ARRRRGGGGUUUUMMMMEEEENNNNTTTT
IIII.... SSSSttttaaaatttteeeessss aaaarrrreeeeNNNNooootttt RRRReeeeqqqquuuuiiiirrrreeeedddd ttttoooo RRRReeeeccccooooggggnnnniiiizezezezeMMMMaaaarrrrrrrriiiiaaaaggggeeeessssTTTThhhhaaaatttt CCCCoooonnnnf ff flllliiiicccctttt WWWWiiiitttthhhh TTTThhhheeeeiiiirrrr OOOOwwwwnnnn MMMMaaaarrrriiiittttaaaallllDDDDeeeef ff fiiiinnnniiiittttiiiioooonnnnoooorrrrPPPPuuuubbbblllliiiiccccPPPPoooolllliiiiccccyyyy....
InWindsor ,theCourtappliedahigher—“carefulconsideration”—level of scrutiny to Section 3 of thefederalDefenseof Marriage Act(“DOMA”)becauseitwas an untraditional intrusion of federal law into
the
marriage
relation.
That
section,
according
to
the
Court, “rejects a long-established precept.”3 It“departs from [the] history and tradition of relianceon state law to define marriage.”4 Because of this,Section 3 of DOMA merited “careful consideration”as a “discrimination of an unusual character.”5 Incontrast to that provision, there is nothing novel or“unusual” about state laws that define marriage astheunionof amanandawoman.
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EEEExxxxeeeerrrrcccciiiisssseeeedddd
tttthhhheeee
PPPPoooowwwweeeerrrr
ttttoooo
DDDDeeeennnnyyyy
RRRReeeeccccooooggggnnnniiiittttiiiioooonnnn
ttttoooo MMMMaaaarrrrrrrriiiiaaaaggggeeeessss PPPPeeeerrrrf ff foooorrrrmmmmeeeedddd iiiinnnn OOOOtttthhhheeeerrrrJJJJuuuurrrriiiissssddddiiiiccccttttiiiioooonnnnssss tttthhhhaaaatttt aaaarrrreeee CCCCoooonnnnttttrrrraaaarrrryyyy ttttoooo tttthhhheeeeiiiirrrrOOOOwwwwnnnnPPPPuuuubbbblllliiiiccccPPPPoooolllliiiiccccyyyy....
The long tradition in American law is thatalthough a marriage is generally to be regarded asvalid if valid at the place of celebration, it need notbe recognized if it is contrary to the forum’s publicpolicy. The “‘place of celebration rule’ is a statecommon-law rule rather than a constitutional
3Windsor ,133S.Ct.at2697. 4 Id.at2692. 5 Id.
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mandate.”6 Thatis,eachstatehasgenerallydecidedon its own to adopt this rule, with whateverexceptions it may decide to engraft upon it as amatterof itsownchoiceof lawapparatusandwhollyapart fromanyconstitutionalcompulsion.7 NothingintheConstitutionrequirestheStatestodothis.
TheFirstRestatementof Conflictof Lawsstatedthe place of celebrations as a general rule.8 But theRestatement also excepted from this general rule of
recognition
marriages
contrary
to
the
public
policy
of
the domicile of either party.9 Moreover, one of theexceptions under the First Restatement is preciselydescriptive of cases involving state laws definingmarriageastheunionof amanandawoman. TheFirst Restatement provided for non-recognition of a“marriage of a domiciliary which a statute at thedomicile makes void even though celebrated in
6 SeeMarkD.Rosen,Why the Defense of Marriage Act Is Not (Yet?) Unconstitutional: Lawrence, Full Faith and Credit, and the Many Societal Actors That Determine What the Constitution Requires ,90MINN.L.REV.915,933(2006).7 See,
e.g.,
Christiansen
v.
Christiansen ,
253
P.2d
153,
156-7
(Wyo.2011).8 See RESTATEMENT (FIRST) OF CONFLICT OF LAWS §121(1934)(“amarriageisvalideverywhereif therequirementsof themarriagelawof thestatewherethecontractof marriagetakesplacearecompliedwith.”).9
See
id.
§
132
(marriage
void
if
“against
the
law
of
the
state
of domicile
of
either
party,
though
the
requirements
of
the
law
of
thestateof celebrationhavebeencompliedwith”—forexample,in cases of polygamy, incest, miscegenation, or marriagescontrarytoastatuteof thedomicile).
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6
another state.”10 This shows how far state non-recognitionlawsarefrombeingnovelorunusual.
The First Restatement also excepted from theplaceof celebrationrulethegivingof anyeffecttoamarriage which was “offensive to the policy” of theforum,whetherornotapartytothemarriagewasadomiciliary.11 This rule of non-recognition of marriages against public policy was a part of abroaderprincipleunderwhichastategenerallyneed
not
recognize
foreign
law
if
it
was
contrary
to
public
policy.12 Andnotably,thisCourtlongagorecognizedthatastatemaydeclinetoapplysister-state lawonthe grounds of public policy.13 To do otherwisewould allow one State to dictate policy in a sisterState—something entirely contrary to oursystem of federalisminwhicheachStateissovereign.
The Second Restatement carries these rulesforward.14 Like the First Restatement, the Second
10Id.
§
132(d).
11 Seeid.,§134(“If anyeffectof amarriagecreatedbythelawof onestateisdeemedbythecourtsof anotherstatesufficientlyoffensive to the policy of the latter state, the latter state willrefusetogivethateffecttothemarriage.”).12 See
id.,
§
612
(“No
action
can
be
maintained
upon
a
cause
of
action created in another state the enforcement of which iscontrarytothestrongpublicpolicyof theforum.”).13 SeeBradford Elec. Light Co. v. Clapper , 286 U.S. 145, 160(1932) (a state might deny a right under sister-state law“because the enforcement of the right conferred would be
obnoxious
to
the
public
policy
of
the
forum”).14 See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OFCONFLICT OFLAWS
§ 283 (1971) (“A marriage which satisfies the requirements of the state where the marriage was contracted will everywhereberecognizedasvalidunlessitviolatesthestrongpublicpolicy
http:///reader/full/domiciliary.11http:///reader/full/domiciliary.11http:///reader/full/policy.12http:///reader/full/policy.12http:///reader/full/policy.13http:///reader/full/policy.13http:///reader/full/forward.14http:///reader/full/forward.14http:///reader/full/domiciliary.11http:///reader/full/policy.12http:///reader/full/policy.13http:///reader/full/forward.14
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7
Restatement has a broad and general exception tonormal choice of law results for any type of lawcontrarytopublicpolicy.15
That there are relatively few cases in recenttimesapplyingtheauthoritytorefuserecognitiontoa marriage on the ground of public policy is due tothe largely homogenous array of state marriagelaws. Until same-sex marriage became possible insome states, there were few occasions for a state to
decline
to
recognize
another
state’s
marriage
as
against public policy; most states had all butidenticalmarriagepolicies.
Notwithstanding this general homogeneityamong the states’ marriage laws throughout ourNation’s history, there havebeen many examplesof states asserting this authority and declining torecognize another state’s marriage. For example,theWisconsinSupremeCourtrefusedtorecognizeasister-state marriage that was in violation of theforum’s
temporary
prohibition
on
remarriage
followingadivorce.16 Thecourtthereexplainedthata “state undoubtedly . . . has the power to declarethat marriages between its own citizens contrary toitsestablishedpublicpolicyshallhavenovalidityinits courts, even though they be celebrated in otherstates, under whose laws they would ordinarily be
of anotherstatewhichhadthemostsignificantrelationshipto
the
spouses
and
the
marriage
at
the
time
of
the
marriage.”).
15 Seeid.§90(“Noactionwillbeentertainedonaforeigncause
of action the enforcement of which is contrary to the strong publicpolicyof theforum.”). 16Lanham v. Lanham ,117N.W.787,788(Wis.1908).
http:///reader/full/policy.15http:///reader/full/policy.15http:///reader/full/divorce.16http:///reader/full/divorce.16http:///reader/full/policy.15http:///reader/full/divorce.16
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valid.”17 Illinois courts have reached the sameoutcomeonsimilarfacts,statingthat“courtswillnotunder the guise of comity between states enforce orcarry into effect or recognize a foreign contract,which isvoidunderthestatutesof thisstate,wherethestatuteisadeclarationof publicpolicy.”18
The Alabama Supreme Court employed similarreasoning when declining to recognize a marriagebetween an uncle and niece even though the
marriage
was
valid
at
the
place
of
celebration.19 It
held that the “Legislature is fully competent todeclare what marriages shall be void in its ownstate, notwithstanding their validity in the statewhere celebrated, whether contracted betweenpartieswhowereingoodfaithdomiciledinthestatewhere the ceremony was performed, or betweenpartieswholeftthestateof domicileforthepurposeof avoiding its statute, when theycome orreturn tothe state.”20 And when faced with the same
question,
Connecticut
and
New
Jersey
courts
have
likewise declined to recognize out-of-statemarriages.21
17 Id.;seealsoIn re Est. of Toutant ,633N.W.2d692,697(Wis. App.2001)(similarremarriageprohibitionandresult). 18Nehring v. Nehring ,164Ill. App.527,532(Ill. App.2dDist. 1911). 19Osoinach
v.
Watkins ,
180
So.
577,
581
(Ala.
1938).
20
Id. 21 See, e.g., Catalano v. Catalano , 170 A.2d 726, 728 (Conn.
1961) (declining to recognize Italian marriage between uncle andniece);Bucca v. State ,128 A.2d506, 510 (N.J.Super.Ch. Div.1957)(similarfacts).
http:///reader/full/celebration.19http:///reader/full/celebration.19http:///reader/full/marriages.21http:///reader/full/marriages.21http:///reader/full/celebration.19http:///reader/full/marriages.21
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9
The VirginiaSupremeCourthasalsorefused torecognize a foreign marriage that conflicts with itsstate’s public policy.22 New Hampshire courts too,have declined to recognize out-of-state marriages,explaining that the place of celebration “rule holdsonlywhereitdoesnotstandopposedtothereligion,morality, or . . . institutions of the [jurisdiction] inwhich it is sought to be applied.”23 Finally,Kentucky’shighestcourthasdeclaredvoidanout-of-statemarriagebetweenfirstcousinseventhoughtheparties
at
the
time
of
their
marriage
were
domiciled
in the place of celebration and the marriage wasvalidthere.24
Theforegoingdiscussionthusdemonstrates,andour country’s history further attests, that there isnothing novel or unusual about a state declining torecognizeamarriagefromanother jurisdictionwhenextending that recognition would conflict with thestate’sownpublicpolicy.25
22Toler v. Oakwood Smokeless Coal Corp .,4S.E.2d364,368-69(Va.1939) (refusing torecognizesister-statemarriagebecauseitwas“bigamousandcontrarytoourlawsandpublicpolicy”).23 True
v.
Ranney ,
21
N.H.
52,
55
(1850)
(in
refusing
to
recognize a sister-state marriage because one party lackedmentalcapacity).24Ex parte Bowen ,247S.W.2d379,379(Ky.1952).25 See also Lynn D. Wardle, From Slavery to Same-Sex Marriage: Comity Versus Public Policy in Inter-Jurisdictional
Recognition
of
Controversial
Domestic
Relations ,
2008
B.Y.U.L.
Rev.
1855,
1863
(2008)
(“The
tension
between
comity
and
domestic policy when a foreign-created controversialrelationship is introduced into another jurisdiction is [not]novelintheareaof familylaw....”).
http:///reader/full/policy.22http:///reader/full/policy.22http:///reader/full/there.24http:///reader/full/there.24http:///reader/full/policy.25http:///reader/full/policy.25http:///reader/full/policy.22http:///reader/full/there.24http:///reader/full/policy.25
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BBBB.... TTTThhhheeee FFFFuuuullllllll FFFFaaaaiiiitttthhhh aaaannnndddd CCCCrrrreeeeddddiiiitttt CCCCllllaaaauuuusssseeee DDDDooooeeeessssNNNNooootttt CCCCoooommmmppppeeeellll SSSSttttaaaatttteeeessss ttttoooo RRRReeeeccccooooggggnnnniiiizezezezeMMMMaaaarrrrrrrriiiiaaaaggggeeeessss tttthhhhaaaatttt aaaarrrreeee CCCCoooonnnnttttrrrraaaarrrryyyy ttttoooo TTTThhhheeeeiiiirrrrPPPPuuuubbbblllliiiiccccPPPPoooolllliiiiccccyyyy....
The Full Faith and Credit Clause, Article IV,Section1,of theConstitutionstates,“FullFaithandCreditshallbegiventoeachStatetothepublic Acts,Records, and judicial Proceedings of every otherState. And the Congress may by general Laws
prescribe
the
Manner
in
which
such
Acts,
Records,
and Proceedings shall be proved, and the Effectthereof.”26 TheFullFaithandCreditClauseenabledthe sovereign states to come together to form oneunion without requiring that everything citizensestablish in one state must be forfeited when theymove to another state,27 but the Clause does notrequire a state to recognize the policies of anotherstate when doing so would undermine that state’sownpublicpolicy.
In
Baker
v.
General
Motors
Corp .,28 this
Court
explained the differing constitutional obligations of stateswhenassessingsister-state lawasopposedtoasister-state judgment:
Our precedent differentiates the creditowed to laws (legislative measures and
26U.S.Const.art.IV,§1.27 See
Erin
O’Hara
O’Connor,
Full
Faith
and
Credit
Clause ,
in
THEHERITAGE GUIDE TO THECONSTITUTION (2D ED.),
availableat
http://www.heritage.org/constitution#!/articles/4/essays/121/full-faith-and-credit-clause.28522U.S.222(1998).
http://www.heritage.org/constitution#!/articles/4/essays/121/fullhttp://www.heritage.org/constitution#!/articles/4/essays/121/full
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common law) and to judgments. “Innumerous cases this Court has heldthat credit must be given to the
judgmentof anotherstatealthoughtheforum would not be required toentertain the suit on which the
judgment was founded.” Milwaukee County , 296 U.S., at 277, 56 S.Ct., at234. The Full Faith and Credit Clausedoes not compel “a state to substitutethe
statutes
of
other
states
for
its
own
statutes dealing with a subject matterconcerning which it is competent tolegislate.”Pacific Employers Ins. Co. v. Industrial Accident Comm'n , 306 U.S.493, 501, 59 S.Ct. 629, 632 (1939); seePhillips Petroleum Co. v. Shutts , 472U.S. 797, 818–819, 105 S.Ct. 2965,2977–2978 (1985). Regarding
judgments, however, the full faith and
credit
obligation
is
exacting.
A
final judgment inoneState, if renderedbya
court with adjudicatory authority overthe subject matter and personsgoverned by the judgment,qualifies forrecognition throughout the land. Forclaimandissuepreclusion(res judicata)purposes, inotherwords, the judgmentof therenderingStategainsnationwideforce. A court may be guided by theforum State’s “public policy” in
determining
the
law
applicable
to
a
controversy. See Nevada v. Hall, 440U.S.410,421–424,99S.Ct.1182,1188–
-
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1190, 59 L.Ed.2d 416 (1979). But ourdecisions support no roving “publicpolicy exception” to the full faith andcreditdue judgments.29
Since laying out this standard inBaker , this Courtreaffirmed in Franchise Tax Board of California v. Hyatt 30 that“fullfaithandcredit ‘islessdemandingwithrespecttochoiceof laws’thanitiswithrespectto judgments.”31 Thus, because a marriage is not a
judgment,32 courts
may
consult
“the
forum
State’s
‘publicpolicy.’”33
29Id.at232-33(emphasisinoriginal).30538U.S.488(2003).31 Richard S. Myers, The Public Policy Doctrine and Interjurisdictional Recognition of Civil Unions and Domestic Partnerships ,
3
Ave
Maria
L.
Rev.
531,
536
(2005)
(quoting
Hyatt , 538 U.S. at 494). This Court inHyatt confirmed that“the Full Faith and Credit Clause does not compel ‘a state tosubstitute the statutes of other states for its own statutesdealing
with
a
subject
matter
concerning
which
it
is
competent
to
legislate.’”
Hyatt ,
538
U.S.
at
494
(quoting
Sun Oil Co. v. Wortman, 486U.S.717,722 (1988)andPacific Employers Ins. Co. v. Industrial Accident Comm’n, 306U.S.493,501(1939)).32 See Patrick J. Borchers, Baker v. General Motors: Implications for Interjurisdictional Recognition of Non- Traditional
Marriages ,
32
Creighton
L.
Rev.
147,
167
(1998)
(“Totreatamarriage...asa ‘judgment’wouldmakenonsenseoutof agreatdealof existingfull-faith-and-creditdoctrine. If amarriage license is a ‘judgment,’ then every one of thehundreds of decisions that have refused to recognize out-of-state marriages has been an undetected violation of the
Clause.”)
(footnote
omitted);
Jeffrey
L.
Rensberger,
Same-Sex Marriages and the Defense of Marriage Act: A Deviant View of
an Experiment in Full Faith and Credit ,32Creighton L.Rev.409,421-22(1998)(“A marriageisnota judgmentforfullfaithandcreditpurposes...but(truly)a“ministerial”act. ... [A]ll
http:///reader/full/judgments.29http:///reader/full/judgments.29http:///reader/full/judgments.29
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Windsor pointsoutthat“[m]arriagelawsvaryinsome respects from State to State,” such as “therequiredminimumage”and“thepermissibledegreeof consanguinity.”34 Becauseastatehasgoodpolicyreasons for promoting marriage as the union of amanandawoman,itdoesnothavetoacceptout-of-state marriages that undermine its own policypreferences. A state may apply its own marriagelaws in preference to an out-of-state policy that it
judges would undermine its own policy, because “asa
sovereign
[it]
has
a
rightful
and
legitimate
concern
inthemaritalstatusof personsdomiciledwithin itsborders.35
That a state can defer to its own public policymeans that when a state is considering whether torecognizeasister-statemarriage,thestateissimplydeciding whether to apply itsown law or the law of anotherstate. Itisachoiceof lawmatter. Itisnotamatter of recognizing a judgment under full faith
and
credit.
of thehallmarksof a judicialproceedingaremissing. There is neither adversariness nor a neutral decisionmaker with the power to grant or deny relief. Indeed, there is no decisionmaker
empowered
to
decide
what
law
to
apply
.
.
.
.”)
(footnotesomitted). 33Baker ,522U.S.at232-33. 34 Windsor , 133 S.Ct. at 2691-92. See also Jeffrey L. Rensberger, Interstate Pluralism: The Role of Federalism in the Same-Sex Marriage Debate , 2008 B.Y.U. L. REV. 1703,
1743-1795
(assessing
the
empirical
snapshot
of
the
states
to show
how
states
are
fundamentally
different
from
one
another
inculture,conditions,andsocietalvalues). 35 Williams v. North Carolina , 317 U.S. 287, 298 (1942) (emphasisadded).
http:///reader/full/borders.35http:///reader/full/borders.35http:///reader/full/borders.35
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Notably, there is widespread agreement amonglegalscholarsthattheFullFaithandCreditClausedoes not require states to recognize out-of-statemarriages that conflict with their own domesticrelations policy. Indeed, a recognized expert in theconflictsof lawfield,ProfessorPatrickBorchers,haslong recognized that “the Full Faith and CreditClausecannotbelegitimatelyinvolvedtoremovethe[same-sexmarriage]debatefromthepoliticalarena.Likealargenumberof otherissuesof contemporaryconcern,
same-sex
marriage
will
have
to
be
decided
statebystate.”36
Even supporters of same-sex marriage readilyacknowledge that the Full Faith and Credit Clausedoes not require one state to recognize a same-sexmarriageformedinanotherstate. ProfessorJoannaGrossman, for instance, has stated that “[t]heassumption that recognition of . . . same-sexmarriages by other states would be both compelled
and
automatic
.
.
.
represented
.
.
.
wishful
thinking”
on the part of same-sex marriage proponents.37
Going further, she acknowledged that “[t]he legalpredicate” for the claim that the Full Faith andCredit Clause would require one state to recognizeanother state’s same-sex marriage “was at bestexaggerated” and “at worst a complete fiction.”38
“Historically speaking,” Professor Grossmanobserved,“over the long history of variations among
36
Borchers,
supra ,
at
185. 37 Joanna L. Grossman, Resurrecting Comity: Revisiting the
Problem of Non-Uniform Marriage Laws , 84 Or. L. Rev. 433, 449(2005)(emphasisadded). 38Id.at452.
http:///reader/full/proponents.37http:///reader/full/proponents.37http:///reader/full/proponents.37
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and conflicts between state marriage laws, full faith and credit principles have never been understood to compel one state to recognize another’s marriages .”39
YaleLawProfessorLeaBrilmayerhasexpressedsimilarsentiments:
[M]arriages entered into in one state havenever been considered constitutionallyentitled to automatic recognition in other
states.
This
is
in
part
because
marriages
are
not like judicial judgments, which areannounced only after lengthy formal courtproceedings in which both sides arerepresentedbycounsel. It isalsobecauseof the special importance in American law of familyrelationships,which...makesfamilylaw distinctive. Finally, it has always beentooeasy forpeopletoavoidtheirhome-statelaw by traveling to another state to takeadvantage of more lenient marriage laws.For
all
of
these
reasons,
states
have
always
had greater freedom to re-examine thevalidity of marriages entered into elsewherethantheyhavetore-examinethemeritsof a
judicialawardinatortorcontractcase. Thestatehasarighttotakeintoaccountitslocal“publicpolicy.”40
39Id.
40
Myers,
supra ,
at
540
(quoting
Judicial
Activism
vs. Democracy:
What
Are
the
National
Implications
of
the
Massachusetts Goodridge Decision and the Judicial Invalidationof TraditionalMarriageLaws?:HearingBeforethe UnitedStatesSenateCommitteeontheJudiciary,108thCong.
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Thus, “most scholars agree, as a matter of constitutional theory and interpretation, that statesare not compelled under the Full Faith and CreditClause to honor a marriage that undermines astrongpublicpolicyof thestate.”41
This is especially true where, as here, Congresshas spoken pursuant to its express authority underthe Clause.42 Although this Court invalidatedSection 3 of DOMA in Windsor —which simply
forbade
the
federal
government
from
recognizing
same-sex marriages performed in a state thatpermitted them—the Court left intact DOMA Section 2, which specifically frees the states fromanyobligation theymightotherwisehaveunder theClause to recognize same-sex marriage performedout of state.43 Section2 of DOMA clearly foreclosesanyopportunityforPetitionerstorelyupontheFull
63,
68-67
(2004)
(prepared
statement
of
R.
Lea
Brilmayer,
Professor,
Yale
University
School
of
Law)).
41Grossman, supra ,at454.42 See Ralph U. Whitten, The Original Understanding of the Full Faith and Credit Clause and the Defense of Marriage Act ,32 Creighton L. Rev. 255, 391 (1998) (explaining that thehistorical
“evidence
is
compelling
that
Congress
was
intended
tohavebroadpowertocreatestatuteslike[Section2of]DOMA under
the
Effects
Clause”).
43 See28U.S.C.§1738C (“NoState,territory,orpossessionof the United States, or Indian tribe, shall be required to giveeffect to any public act, record, or judicial proceeding of any
other
State,
territory,
possession,
or
tribe
respecting
arelationship
between
persons
of
the
same
sex
that
is
treated
as
a marriage under the laws of such other State, territory,possession, or tribe, or a right or claim arising from suchrelationship.”).
http:///reader/full/Clause.42http:///reader/full/Clause.42http:///reader/full/state.43http:///reader/full/state.43http:///reader/full/Clause.42http:///reader/full/state.43
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Faith and Credit Clause in challenging the man-womanmarriagelawsatissueinthesecases.
To be sure, DOMA Section 2 and the FullFaithand Credit Clause do not by themselves dispose of Petitioners’recognitionclaimsundertheFourteenth
Amendment. But the mere existence of the FullFaith and Credit Clause—combined with theabsence of any language in the Fourteenth
Amendment dealing with recognition issues—
strongly
suggests
that
the
Fourteenth
Amendment
does not require a state to recognize an out-of-statemarriagethatconflictswithitsownpublicpolicy. If the Congress that adopted the Fourteenth Amendmentandsent ittothestates forratificationhad intended to restrain the states in exercisingtheir traditional authority to determine whether torecognize rights afforded under the laws of anotherstate, that Congress would have been expected toinclude such a provision in the Fourteenth
Amendment.
The
absence
of
such
a
provision
strongly suggests that recognition claims should bedealt with exclusively under the Full Faith andCreditClause. Andasexplainedabove,thatClausedoes not require states to recognize same-sexmarriagesformedotherstates.
CCCC.... OOOOnnnn MMMMaaaatttttttteeeerrrrssss oooof ff f CCCChhhhooooiiiicccceeee oooof ff f LLLLaaaawwww,,,, SSSSttttaaaatttteeeessss aaaarrrreeeeFFFFrrrreeeeeeee ttttoooo A AA AppppppppllllyyyyTTTThhhheeeeiiiirrrrOOOOwwwwnnnnLLLLaaaawwwwUUUUnnnnddddeeeerrrr tttthhhheeeeDDDDuuuueeee PPPPrrrroooocccceeeessssssss CCCCllllaaaauuuusssseeee iiiif ff f MMMMiiiinnnniiiimmmmaaaallllllllyyyyCCCCoooonnnnnnnneeeecccctttteeeedddd ttttoooo tttthhhheeee PPPPaaaarrrrttttiiiieeeessss oooof ff f tttthhhheeee
TTTTrrrraaaannnnssssaaaaccccttttiiiioooonnnn....
Theconstitutional limitationsonchoiceof law— as opposed to enforcement of judgments—are
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minimal. A statemayapply itsown law if ithas“asignificant contact or significant aggregation of contacts,creatingstateinterests,suchthatchoiceof its law is neither arbitrary nor fundamentallyunfair.”44 ThisisthetestunderboththeFullFaithand Credit Clause and under the Due ProcessClause.45 Of course, in the marriage-recognitioncasesbeforethisCourt,thesame-sexcouplesseekingrecognition of their out-of-state unions aredomiciliariesof therespondentstates. Thattheyaredomiciled
in
those
states
provides
more
than
significant contact with those states to justify thestates’ application of their own laws and publicpolicy.
More broadly, sufficient connections will likelyexist in the vast run of same-sex marriagerecognition cases. The factors that influence andlimit forum selection also create an interest in theforum. If,forexample,thesuitisbroughtinastate
because
the
party
opposing
recognition
of
a
same-sex
marriage has connections with that state, the statewill have an interest in not burdening that partywith liability based upon recognition of thatmarriage. On theotherhand, if the suit is broughtin the state because the same-sex couple, or one of the spouses, has some residence, property,employment, or other connections with that statemakingitconvenienttosueinthatforum,theforum
44 See Phillips Petroleum Co. v. Shutts , 472 U.S. 797, 818 (1985)(quoting Allstate Ins. Co. v. Hague ,449U.S.302,312-13 (1981)). 45Id.
http:///reader/full/Clause.45http:///reader/full/Clause.45http:///reader/full/Clause.45
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state will likewise have an interest due to theconnectionsof oneof thesame-sexspouses.
Indeed, the law of jurisdiction ensures that astate will almost always have a connection to thecase. Andthatsameconnectionwillsatisfythedueprocess and full faith and credit test for sufficientcontactscreatingstate interests. In theeventof anoutlier,sayacase inwhich jurisdiction isnotbaseduponcontactsbutuponserviceof processwithinthe
state,
the
completely
unconnected
forum
would
be
barred from applying its own law under theShutts test.46
Thus, interested states are constitutionallypermitted to apply their own law to same-sexmarriages, and any concern about unconnectedstates applying their law is already handled byexistinglimitations.
DDDD.... SSSSttttaaaatttteeeessss MMMMuuuusssstttt BBBBeeee PPPPeeeerrrrmmmmiiiitttttttteeeedddd ttttoooo A AA Avvvvooooiiiidddd
A AA Appppppppllllyyyyiiiinnnngggg
LLLLaaaawwwwssss
oooof ff f
OOOOtttthhhheeeerrrr
SSSSttttaaaatttteeeessss
TTTThhhhaaaatttt
OOOOf ff ff ff feeeennnnddddFFFFoooorrrruuuummmmPPPPoooolllliiiicccciiiieeeessss....
Should the Court declare that the Constitutionrequires interstate recognition of same-sexmarriages, the traditional autonomy of each statefrom the laws of their sister-states will beundermined. Ournationisapluralone. Statesareallowed,withinconstitutionallimits,tomakechoicesas to how their societies will be structured. Onmanymatters,statesdifferlittle. Suchwasthecaseuntil
recently
on
the
definition
of
marriage.
But
46Shutts ,472U.S.at818.
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occasionally spectacular disagreements arise amongthe states. Traditionally, the Constitution has notbeeninterpretedtorequireeachstatetoagreetotheother’s policy. In fact, such a result is logicallyabsurd, as it would appear to require that “thestatute of each statemust be enforced in the courtsof theother,butcannotbeinitsown.”47
Today, in addition to same-sex marriage, statesare divided over legalization of marijuana. Must a
state
that
has
not
legalized
marijuana
recognize
and
enforce a contract for the sale of marijuana inanother state that has legalized use of thatsubstance? State law also differs on the legality of prostitution. Surelyastatecandeclinetorecognizea Nevada contract for prostitution services on theground of public policy. Are states bound to acceptall contracts from other states involving surrogatemothers? Must states enforce gambling contractseventhoughsuchcontractsarevoidundertheirown
law?
If
a
state
has
decided
as
a
matter
of
consumer
protectionthatarbitrationclausesareagainstpublicpolicy, must it nonetheless enforce them if they areenforceable under the law of another state? Muststates enforce contracts formed in other states forthesaleof bodypartsor tissue formedicalresearchortreatment?
Inshort,muchuncertaintywouldbeunloosed if the Court refuses to allow states the autonomy todecline toapplysister-state lawwithwhich ithasa
profound
disagreement.
Unless
the
Court
carves
out
47 Alaska Packers Ass’n v. Indus. Acc. Comm’n .,294 U.S.532,547(1935).
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one rule for same-sex marriage and another for allother legal relationships—a proposition that seemsindefensible—it is hard to see where the rush toenforcement of sister-state law will end. This willhave the unfortunate effect of impoverishing thediversity of legal and political arrangementsthroughoutourpluralnation.
Moreover,if recognitionistobedemandedinthecontextof same-sexmarriages,itishardlyclearthat
the
state
to
do
the
yielding
should
be
the
state
of
domicile rather than the state of celebration. As amatterof respect for sister-state law, itwould seemthattherealinterloperisthestateof celebrationif itgrantsamarriagetotwopersonsdomiciledinstatesthat disallow same-sex marriages. As ProfessorStan Cox has argued, the place of celebration ruleseems perverse when applied to couples whoknowinglyevadethelawsof theirhomestate:
A more arbitrary and illogical choice of law
rule
is
hard
to
imagine.
Although
the place of celebration can hardly becalled “fortuitous” (after all, the brideandgroomquitedeliberatelyarrangetobethere),theplacewherethemarriageis celebrated is merely the place wherethe marriage is celebrated. It is notnecessarilytheplacewherethemarriedcouple will live out their married life.Surely the state where the marriage is
manifested,
in
the
living
out
of
themarried life together, has the only
legitimate interest in placingprohibitionsuponwhocanmarrywhom
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22
orwhatmustbedonebeforeacoupleisconsideredqualifiedtomarry. Afterall,thepointof aprohibitiononmarriageisnot for purposes of the ceremony, butfor purposes of living togetherthereafter as man and wife. Thus, thelawof thestateof themaritaldomicile,not the law of the place of celebration,should determine the validity of amarriage.48
States have interests in recognizing or notrecognizing marriages wholly apart from tangible,material, consequentialist reasons. Windsor explicitly recognizes this. One reason New Yorkallowedsame-sexmarriageswastogrant“dignity”tosuch relations.49 Now, if a state has a sufficientinterestindignifyingagivenrelationship—if thatisa sufficient basis for state action as Windsor suggests—thenbythesamereasoningastatewould
equally
have
an
interest
in
choosing
to
dignify,
perhaps uniquely, other relationships. States, thatis, have interests in asserting their people’s ownvalues through their laws and in avoiding the
48 Stanley
E.
Cox,
DOMA
and
Conflicts
Law:
Congressional
Rules and Domestic Relations Conflicts Law ,32CREIGHTONL.REV.1063,1069-70(1999).49 SeeWindsor , 133 S. Ct. at 2692. (“By its recognition of thevalidityof same-sexmarriagesperformedinother jurisdictionsand then by authorizing same-sex unions and same-sex
marriages,
New
York
sought
to
give
further
protection
anddignity
to
that
bond
.
.
.
a
far-reaching
legal
acknowledgment
of
the intimate relationship between two people, a relationshipdeemedbytheStateworthyof dignity inthecommunityequalwithallothermarriages”).
http:///reader/full/marriage.48http:///reader/full/marriage.48http:///reader/full/relations.49http:///reader/full/relations.49http:///reader/full/marriage.48http:///reader/full/relations.49
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imposition of contrary values adopted by otherStates.50
ThisCourthasrecognizedthesame principle inanalogous contexts. For example, in State Farm Mutual Automobile Insurance Co. v.Campbell ,51 theCourtinvalidatedondueprocessgroundsapunitivedamageawardbased inpartonout-of-stateconductthat was (or might have been) treated differentlyunderthelawsof thesecondstate. Inreachingthat
conclusion,
the
Court
quoted
with
approval
an
earlier decision,Huntington v. Attrill ,52 which heldthatstate“[l]awshavenoforceof themselvesbeyondthe jurisdictionof theStatewhichenactsthem,andcanhaveextra-territorialeffectonlybythecomityof other States.”53 Requiring a State that does notallow same-sex marriage to recognize such amarriage formed in another state would flatlycontravene that bedrock principle—in effectpermittingthesecondstatetosetmarriagepolicyfor
the
first
state.
Similarly, the Court inState Farm quoted withapproval its earlier decision in New York Life Insurance Co. v. Head ,54 whichheldthat”itwouldbe
50 Professor Joseph Singer has argued for an “expansive definition[] of state interests . . . . [He rejects] the usual practice of confining state interests to the pragmatic or expedient, like keeping people off the welfare rolls.” Joseph William Singer, A Pragmatic Guide to Conflicts , 70 B.U. L.
REV.
731,
741
(1990). 51538U.S.408,421(2003)(Kennedy,J.).
52146U.S.657(1892). 53Id.at669. 54234U.S.149(1914).
http:///reader/full/States.50http:///reader/full/States.50http:///reader/full/States.50
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impossible to permit the statutes of [one state] tooperate beyond the jurisdiction of that State . . .without throwing down the constitutional barriersby which all the States are restricted within theorbits of their lawful authority.”55 That principleapplies here as well: Forcing a state that definesmarriageasaunionbetweenamanandawomantorecognize a same-sex marriage obtained in anotherstatewouldallowthesecondstatetoextend itsownpolicy beyond the “orbit of [its] lawful authority.”Such
a
rule
would
thus
“throw[]
down
the
constitutional barriers” that ensure that each Stateremainssovereignwithinitsown“orbit.”
Thesesettledprinciples—andthefactthatstateshaveinterestsinrecognizingorrefusingtorecognizemarriages—clearlydistinguishWindsor . Thereisnofederal interest in determining whetherpersons aremarried. AstheCourtexplained,
Consistent with this allocation of authority,
the
Federal
Government,
through our history, has deferred tostate-law policy decisions with respectto domestic relations. In De Sylva v. Ballentine , 351 U.S. 570, 76 S.Ct. 974(1956), for example, the Court heldthat, “[t]o decide who is the widow orwidower of a deceased author, or whoarehisexecutorsornextof kin,”undertheCopyright Act “requiresa reference
to
the
law
of
the
State
which
createdthose legal relationships” because
55Id.at161.
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wherever performed, so long as itwas lawful at theplaceof celebration.
EEEE.... DDDDeeeecccclllliiiinnnniiiinnnngggg ttttoooo RRRReeeeccccooooggggnnnniiiizezezeze MMMMaaaarrrrrrrriiiiaaaaggggeeee RRRRiiiigggghhhhttttssssDDDDooooeeeessss NNNNooootttt DDDDeeeessssttttrrrrooooyyyy tttthhhheeee UUUUnnnnddddeeeerrrrllllyyyyiiiinnnnggggMMMMaaaarrrrrrrriiiiaaaaggggeeee....
Denying recognition does not take awaymarriagerights. It justrefusestorecognizethemina particular state. A same-sex couple can still
enforce
their
marriage
rights
in
other
states
that
grantorchoosetorecognizesame-sexmarriages. A refusal to recognize a marriage does not end themarriage,itsimplyrulesthatitmaynotbeenforcedor recognized in a particular state. Indeed, thisCourt has observed that a “state may, on occasion,decline to enforce a foreign cause of action. In sodoing, it merely denies a remedy, leavingunimpaired the plaintiff’s substantive right, so thatheisfreetoenforceitelsewhere.”57
IIIIIIII....
TTTThhhheeee
MMMMaaaarrrrrrrriiiiaaaaggggeeee
RRRReeeeccccooooggggnnnniiiittttiiiioooonnnn
LLLLaaaawwwwssss
CCCChhhhaaaalllllllleeeennnnggggeeeedddd
iiiinnnn
TTTThhhheeeesssseeee CCCCaaaasssseeeessss aaaarrrreeee UUUUnnnnlllliiiikkkkeeee tttthhhheeee FFFFeeeeddddeeeerrrraaaallll LLLLaaaawwww tttthhhhaaaatttttttthhhheeeeCCCCoooouuuurrrrttttSSSSttttrrrruuuucccckkkkDDDDoooowwwwnnnn iiiinnnnW WW Wi ii in nn nd dd ds ss so oo or rr r ((((SSSSeeeeccccttttiiiioooonnnn3333oooof ff f FFFFeeeeddddeeeerrrraaaallllDDDDOOOOMMMMA AA A))))....
Petitioners wrongly assert that as a result of Windsor , individual states, much like the federalgovernment, are now constitutionally bound torecognize as valid same-sex marriages entered intoin other states. (See Bourke App. Br. 52-54).Whether it was right or wrong as to Section 3 of DOMA,
Windsor
strongly
supports
the
authority
of
a
57Bradford Elec. Light Co. v. Clapper ,286U.S.145,160(1932).
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state to define marriage: Every single time thatWindsor talksabouttheinfirmitiesof DOMA Section3,itmentionsthatthestatehadchosentorecognizea union that the federal government was excluding.Themajorityopinionthusexpresslysaidthat itwasCongress’sdeviationfromthedefaultof deferencetostatemarriagedefinitionsthatdroveitsopinion.
Windsor confirms that there is nothing unusualabout the autonomy of the states to define and
regulate
marriage
for
themselves.
The
Court
stated
inWindsor that “[t]herecognitionof civil marriagesis central to state domestic relations law applicableto its residents and citizens.”58 In addition, “[t]hedefinitionof marriageisthefoundationof theState’sbroaderauthoritytoregulatethesubjectof domesticrelationswithrespect to the ‘protectionof offspring,property interests, and the enforcement of maritalresponsibilities.’”59 Furthermore,theCourtaffirmedthat “[t]he states, at the timeof the adoptionof the
Constitution,
possessed
full
power
over
the
subject
of
marriage and divorce . . . [and] the Constitutiondelegated no authority to the Government of theUnited States on the subject of marriage anddivorce.”60
Most notably, the Windsor Court held that“consistent with this allocation of authority, theFederal Government, through our history, hasdeferredtostate-lawpolicydecisionswithrespectto
58Windsor ,133S.Ct.at2691. 59Id. 60Id.
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domestic relations.”61 InWindsor , the public policyof New York reflected its own community’sperspectivebyfirstrecognizingthevalidityof same-sex marriages performed in other jurisdictions andthen later licensing same-sex marriages in state.Sincethestatesatissuehavenotchosentoredefinemarriage,theyshouldbelefttoautonomouslyretaintheir interest indefiningandregulating themaritalrelationship to reflect their own communities’consideredperspectives.62
Furthermore, Windsor carefully distinguishesthe federal intrusion of DOMA Section 3 from therun-of-the-mill responsibility of the states for theregulation of their own domestic relations. Thisresponsibility is “an important indicator of thesubstantialsocietal impactthestate’sclassificationshave in the daily lives and customs of its people.”63
TheSupremeCourt inWindsor struckdownSection3 of federal DOMA because it created two
contradictory
marriage
regimes
within
a
state
that
had redefined marriage.64 However, the strongthreadof Windsor stillremainsthatthestateshavethe right, without intrusion of the federalgovernment, to reflect their own public policies intheir own laws. United States District Judge JuanPerez-Gimenez recently highlighted this feature of Windsor :
61Id. 62Id.at2692-93. 63Id.at2693. 64Id.at2694.
http:///reader/full/perspectives.62http:///reader/full/perspectives.62http:///reader/full/marriage.64http:///reader/full/marriage.64http:///reader/full/perspectives.62http:///reader/full/marriage.64
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The Windsor opinion did not create afundamental right to same gendermarriagenordid itestablish thatstateopposite-gender marriage regulationsare amenable to federal constitutionalchallenges. If anything, Windsor stands for the opposite proposition: itreaffirms the States’ authority overmarriage, buttressing Baker ’sconclusionthatmarriageissimplynotafederal
question.65
This Court too should conclude that Windsor supports the authority of states to define marriagefortheirowncommunitiesandtodeclinetorecognizeout-of-state unions that conflict with their chosenmarriagedefinition.
IIIIIIIIIIII.... A AA A RRRRuuuulllliiiinnnngggg f ff foooorrrr tttthhhheeee SSSSttttaaaatttteeeessss oooonnnn tttthhhheeee FFFFiiiirrrrsssstttt QQQQuuuueeeessssttttiiiioooonnnnPPPPrrrreeeesssseeeennnntttteeeedddd NNNNeeeecccceeeessssssssaaaarrrriiiillllyyyy RRRReeeeqqqquuuuiiiirrrreeeessss aaaa RRRRuuuulllliiiinnnngggg f ff foooorrrr tttthhhheeeeSSSSttttaaaatttteeeessssoooonnnntttthhhheeeeSSSSeeeeccccoooonnnnddddQQQQuuuueeeessssttttiiiioooonnnn....
The outcome of these cases rises or falls on theCourt’s resolution of the first question presented:whethertheFourteenth Amendmentrequiresastatetolicenseamarriagebetweentwopeopleof thesamesex. If Petitioners prevail on that question, theinterstate recognition issue becomes irrelevant
65Conde-Vidal v. Garcia-Padilla (D.P.R.)(D.P.R.Oct.21,2014)(No. 14-1253), 2014 WL 5361987. See also Baker v. Nelson ,
409
U.S.
810
(1972).
“It
takes
inexplicable
contortions
of
themind
or
perhaps
even
willful
ignorance—this
Court
does
not
venture an answer here—to interpretWindsor ’s endorsementof thestatecontrolof marriageaseliminatingthestatecontrolof marriage.” Conde-Vidal ,2014WL5361987at*8.
http:///reader/full/question.65http:///reader/full/question.65http:///reader/full/question.65
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becausesame-sexmarriageswillpresumablyexistinall50states. Butif Petitionersdonotprevailonthefirst question presented, the Court will necessarilyhave found a sufficient rational or compelling basisfor defining marriage as the union of a man and awoman. And this same basis suffices for a state’sdecision not to recognize out-of-state unions thatconflictwithitsmarriagedefinition.
Judge Sutton observed this very point during
oral
arguments
in
the
proceedings
below,
stating:
Isn’t the first question whether a State candecide for itsownpurposes, itsowncitizens,whetherto[license]same-sexmarriage? Andif itdecidesit’snotgoingtodothat,fornow,andif theU.S.Constitution .. .permitsthatchoice,...itseemsreallyoddtomethat[theState] can be told, “Okay, even though youcanmakethatchoiceforyourowncitizen, if someone comes from another State, thatpublic-policy
choice
doesn’t
bind
you.”
... Andviceversa,...if theState...underthe Fourteenth Amendment must [license]same-sexmarriageswithin itsState, thenof course, it follows, [the plaintiffs] win therecognitionpoint.66
There is thus no logical basis for this Court’sanswer to the first question presented to deviate
66
Audio
of
Oral
Argument
at
29:23-30:13,
Obergefell
v.
Himes ,No.
14-3057
(6th
Cir.
Aug.
6,
2014),
available at http://www.ca6.uscourts.gov/internet/court_audio/aud1.php.This citation is to the audio recording downloaded from thereferencedwebsite.
http:///reader/full/point.66http:///reader/full/point.66http://www.ca6.uscourts.gov/internet/court_audio/aud1.phphttp:///reader/full/point.66http://www.ca6.uscourts.gov/internet/court_audio/aud1.php
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from its answer to the second. Therefore, once theCourtaffirmsthattheConstitutiondoesnotrequirethe states to redefine marriage, it shouldcorrespondingly confirm, for the reasons stated inthisbrief,thatstatesneednotrecognizeout-of-stateunions that conflict with their public policy onmarriage. In both licensing and recognition, thestates’ sovereignty over the definition of marriageremainsinviolate.
CCCCOOOONNNNCCCCLLLLUUUUSSSSIIIIOOOONNNN
The staggering implications of Petitioners’recognition claims starkly illustrate theirfoundational flaws. Their constitutional theory, if credited, would effectively require each state toconform itsmarriagepolicy tothevaryingmarriagepoliciesenactedinotherstates. That,inturn,wouldterminate states’ ability to serve as “laboratories”that independently experiment with domestic-relations (and other social) policy.67 Rather thanfostering
the
states’
freedom
to
experiment
with
different approaches to difficult social questions,Petitioners’theorywouldempowerone laboratorytocommandeertheothers,essentiallynationalizingthemarriagepolicyof themostinventivestate. Becausethat cannot be the law, theCourt should affirm theCourtof Appeals’decision.
67 SeeOregon v. Ice , 555 U.S. 160, 171 (2009);New State Ice Co. v. Liebmann , 285 U.S. 262, 311 (1932) (Brandeis, J.,dissenting).
http:///reader/full/policy.67http:///reader/full/policy.67http:///reader/full/policy.67
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Respectfully submitted,
HERBERT K. DOBY
Counsel of Record
215 East 21st Avenue
PO Box 130
Torrington, WY 82240
(307) 532-2700
N ATHANIEL S. HIBBENNathaniel S. Hibben, P.C.
215 East 21st Avenue
Torrington, WY 82240
(307) 532-2700
mailto:[email protected]:[email protected]:[email protected]:[email protected]