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138 STC 16 EOriginal: English

NATO Parliamentary Assembly

SCIENCE AND TECHNOLOGY COMMITTEE

MISSION REPORT

GREATER WASHINGTON, D.C. AREA, UNITED STATES

11 - 15 APRIL 2016

www.nato-pa.int 4 July 2016

This Mission Report is presented for information only and does not necessarily represent the official view of the Assembly. This report was prepared by Henrik Bliddal, Director of the Science and Technology Committee.

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I. INTRODUCTION

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1. The NATO Parliamentary Assembly’s Science and Technology Committee (STC) visited Washington DC from 11 to 15 April to focus on US defence and security science and technology (S&T) efforts. Seventeen members of parliament from 13 NATO member states took part in the visit, led by Baroness Ramsay of Cartvale (United Kingdom), Chairperson of the STC. The visit also featured discussion of other topics of interest to the Committee, including the implementation of the Iranian nuclear deal; cyber security, privacy, and internet governance; energy security; implications of climate change for international security; new trends in weapons of mass destruction; and airborne intelligence, surveillance, and reconnaissance. It included site visits to the US Naval Research Laboratory (NRL) and the US Navy’s Naval Air Station, Patuxent River.

II. US DEFENCE AND SECURITY SCIENCE AND TECHNOLOGY EFFORTS

2. Welcoming the delegation at NRL, Dr Walter Jones, Executive Director of the US Office of Naval Research, told the delegates that “NATO collaboration is very important for us. No one has enough funding to do defence and security S&T alone.”

3. At NRL, the lawmakers visited a number of laboratories, including the Laboratory of Autonomous Systems Research; Advanced Electrochemical Materials Section; Nanoscience Institute; and the Space Robotics Laboratory.

4. Captain Mark Bruington, Commanding Officer of NRL, gave the delegates an overview of the Office of Naval Research (ONR) and NRL. ONR was the science and technology provider for the US Navy and the Marine Corps, employing over 4,000 people in 23 locations with a budget of USD 2.1 billion per year. At NRL, over 2,500 people were employed. Over 1,000 partners were involved in ONR’s efforts at a global scale. NATO Allies played a major part in these global science and technology efforts.

5. ONR’s task was to discover, develop, and deliver the technological advantage to the US Navy and the Marine Corps. The Office focused on three work streams:

- the current fleet and force, with quick reaction and other science and technology initiatives (time horizon: 1 to 2 years);

- the fleet and force in development, with efforts focusing on technology maturation (time horizon: 2 to 4 years) and leap ahead innovations (time horizon: 4 to 8 years); and

- future fleet and force, with leap ahead innovations and discovery and invention (time horizon: 5 to 20 years).

6. Captain Bruington underlined that for science and technology efforts, a steady funding stream was important, as the consistency of efforts made them successful. He also highlighted the importance of a good working relationship between government institutions, academia, and industry. ONR and NRL focus should not be beholden to the fleet of today, he argued, but look toward the future. NRL had a budget of USD 1.22 billion per year. He underlined that not all funding was provided by the Navy or the Marine Corps; 40% of the budget came from other organisations.

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7. Captain Bruington also presented some of the research focus areas at NRL, which included battlespace environment, electronics, electromagnetic warfare, space resiliency and space technology, undersea warfare, information technology, and materials and chemistry. NRL employed over 1,500 researchers, including 900 PhDs. The laboratory also had 88 agreements with 21 countries. He also explained to the delegates how the laboratory’s overview committee worked, when rating the different research projects in a very competitive process.

8. At the US National Defense University (NDU), Major General Frederick M. Padilla, NDU’s President, welcomed the delegation. NDU’s Center for Technology and National Security Policy put together a full day of discussions between NDU and government officials and outside experts. This included a roundtable on science and technology for national and homeland defence and security.

9. Christopher Zember, Director at the Center for Technology and National Security Policy at NDU, highlighted three trends that were important in the context of defence and security science and technology. First, science and technology innovation was shifting from the government to the private sector. For governments, it thus became crucial to reach out to commercial companies for innovation, for example in biotech, robotics, medicine, sensor technology, cyber technology, and energy sectors. The commercial market had a much higher growth rate, and innovation was thus shifting into the commercial market. Second, innovation was shifting away from the United States to the global level. As examples, Mr Zember cited that the fasted computer stood in China; the European Space Agency landed a probe on a comet; and the Higgs-Boson particle was detected at CERN (European Organisation for Nuclear research). Third, innovation moved away from organisations towards individuals. In the biological sciences, for example, a growing “do-it-yourself” community had been sprung up. Community laboratories offered the possibility to “hack” genomes, for example. Governments had thus realised that there were benefits to open government laboratories to outsiders to import some of the innovation occurring outside government-sponsored programmes. Mr Zember also explained which concrete defence and security science and technology projects his centre was engaging in, for example on the Army’s future operating environment and the commercialisation of space. The centre also had a national security technology incubator where they trained national security professionals on how to work with commercial technologies.

10. Dr Chris Fall, Assistant Director of Defense Programs at the Office of Science and Technology Policy in the White House, took the delegates through the White House’s approach to science and technology. His office was tasked with coordinating science and technology across all agencies and work with the private sector and academia. In terms of national security, the office worked very closely with all concerned agencies, including the Departments of Defense, Homeland Security, and Energy as well as the intelligence services. The President would normally only examine efforts where more than one agency was involved or where a broader and comprehensive understanding of national security was needed. The agencies had the best understanding of their respective fields, and the White House would therefore not unduly interfere. Rather, it would enable policies that supported their own policies. Today, there were still existential problems of national security still existed, but there were also asymmetric and unconventional threats that did not require much science and technology or infrastructure, for example biotech and cyber. He acknowledged that the government struggled with keeping the technology edge vis-à-vis industry. Problems included that technological capacities were being outsourced abroad; infrastructure was aging; many scientists and engineers recruited at the tail end of the Cold War were going to retire in the near future; and resources were constrained. The White House thus focused on creating the right workforce and providing the right infrastructure, making it more attractive for young scientists and engineers to work for the government. A certain reticence against innovation in the government was real, Dr Fall admitted. The civil service was in part conservative, at least compared to the private industry.

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11. Dr Dimitri Kusnezov, Chief Scientist and Senior Advisor to the Secretary in the National Nuclear Security Administration at the Department of Energy, explained the department’s way of thinking about science and technology. It was responsible for the United States’ nuclear stockpile and energy infrastructure for example. The department encountered its biggest problems where solutions could not be tested; hence, they resorted to science and technology to solve them. The world of monolithic threats was gone because of globalisation, he argued. Technology barriers were constantly lowered. The United States could not afford to stand up separate programmes for every new problem. Instead, the government had to create a workforce with enough “head room” to think about the future and with the basic skills to engage a multitude of new threats. The US government needed to move away from tactical problems and put in place the core skills that were needed to any new problem.

12. Dr Stacey Dixon, Deputy Director of the Intelligence Advanced Research Projects Activity, explained the work of her office. It was examining problems that were likely to emerge in the long term (five years or more). Particular emphasis was placed on anticipatory intelligence, the effects of the Internet of Things, and chemical detection. Most importantly, they had a big initiative on open source intelligence, for example in predicting disease outbreak and civil unrest. Most of today’s important data was unclassified, which meant that many people could collaborate on these projects.

13. Dr Paul Ragsdale, Acting Director of the International Cooperative Programs Office in Science and Technology Directorate at the Department of Homeland Security, addressed how the Department partnered with private and public organisations, both at the national and international levels. He took them through the visionary goals his department had: screening at speed, for example at airports; a trusted cyber future; enabling of decision makers; shaping the responders of the future; and creating resilient communities. They also had six integrated product teams: aviation security; biological threats; counterterrorism; border security; cyber security; and first responders.

14. During the discussions, delegates and the roundtable participants had a dialogue on, inter alia, the growing diffusion of science and technology, the need to anticipate the future with an unconstrained workforce, CBRN terrorism, and the importance of collaboration. All panellists argued that international science and technology cooperation was increasingly necessary, as solutions were increasingly found outside the United States.

15. The Committee also visited the Navy’s Patuxent River Naval Air Station, where the delegates learned about the US Navy’s testing of its aircraft systems, from carrier-based manned aircraft to its newest unmanned system, the MQ-4C Triton based on Northrup Grumman’s Global Hawk system.

16. The Patuxent River site was first established in 1943, and a test centre followed in 1945. Naval Air Warfare Center Aircraft Division provided full spectrum aircraft research, development, test and evaluation and logistics support services. The Division aimed to increase the focus on rapid prototyping and irregular warfare. Indeed, the demand for its unique intellectual capital and capabilities continued to grow, delegates learned. The Naval Air Station was, inter alia, host to the Air Test & Evaluation Squadron One, the Scientific Development Squadron One, and the Fleet Air Reconnaissance Squadron Four. The Station had over 740 buildings and five runways, with the longest one being 11,800 feet. Some of the main efforts took place in fields of propulsion & power, surface air integration, advanced maritime technology, electromagnetic pulse, as well as aircraft test and evaluation. Rapid prototyping was yet another specialty. Indeed, the Station had the same (and sometimes even more) capabilities as the defence industry for prototyping small and medium projects.

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17. Captain Pat Herring, Vice Commander of the Naval Air Warfare Center Aircraft Division, told members about the projects and programmes of the Naval Air Systems Command of which Patuxent River was a part of. The Command conducted annual business worth USD 34 billion. It employed 35,000 people at eight primary sites, executing 85 programmes of record each year, with science and technology playing a big part in them. Patuxent River itself was the busiest test centre in the world, Captain Herring said. Cooperation with industry was key, Captain Herring argued, as they needed to have the right things in place to test their aircraft. Additive manufacturing was a huge development for a test centre like Patuxent River, but also for the Navy as a whole. Other crucial programmes concentrated on information age technology and operating in GPS-denied environments. Patuxent River’s strategic imperatives were to align their resources to “win the future”, but also to better support today’s readiness, and to reduce the cost and increase the speed of delivery of products to the fleet. During the discussions with the parliamentarians, Captain Herring explained the business model of Naval Air Systems Command in greater detail.

18. James “Buddy” Denham of the Aeromechanics Division at the Naval Air Systems Command presented the project “MAGIC CARPET”, ”, which is a totally integrated carrier landing philosophy that includes aerodynamics, propulsion, flight controls, active cockpit inceptors, helmet mounted displays, and a novel shipboard visual guidance system that ensures precision carrier landings. MAGIC CARPET’s solution to the problem of how to make landings on carriers exponentially easier was to have an on-board sensor and control capability, to decouple flight path changes, to have flight path control on single inceptor, to make the system robust, redundant, and reliable, and to install task-tailored HUD displays. The members were able to test the system themselves on a flight simulator. They were also able to see the new MQ-4C Triton up close in its hangar.

III. RUSSIA, ARMS CONTROL AND DETERRENCE

19. The National Institute for Public Policy (NIPP) hosted a roundtable on Russia, Arms Control and Deterrence.

20. Dr Keith B. Payne, President and Co-founder of NIPP, laid out his views on Russia’s world view and focused in particular on the role of nuclear weapons in its grand strategy. The current nuclear strategy was a consensus strategy in the Russian elite, going back more than 15 years. For a number of years, Russia’s nuclear strategy had evolved into a nuclear first-use strategy, he said. The country had specialised low-yield nuclear weapons to make it credible to employ nuclear weapons pre-emptively. He said Russia thought of them as “nuclear scalpels” to de-escalate confrontations. This was not inherently destabilising, but it became so in combination with Russia’s expansionist strategy. In general, the transatlantic community faced a more dangerous situation than in the Cold War. Dr Payne was concerned that NATO had gaps in its deterrence posture. Nuclear deterrence had a prime role to play in filling these gaps, he argued. Russia, in his view suffered from self-induced paranoia, but a paranoia which needed to be taken into account. He also described the perception of Russia’s actions in the United States and the effect on policy prescriptions. In conclusion, he argued that a first step in adapting to Russia was to recognise that an optimistic view did not reflect reality. He did not know how far Russia would go, but he did know that NATO and Russia had no partnership.

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21. Rebecca Heinrichs, a Fellow at the Hudson Institute, presented her views on missile defence and NATO security. While she noted that some consensus on missile defence existed, there was a great divide in many ways. The strategic environment concerning missiles was very different than in the Cold War. The world was living in a new missile era: more countries had ballistic missiles or were working on them; the total worldwide ballistic missile arsenal was growing; the production of ballistic missiles was becoming cheaper; rogue states had become more devoted to them; and new missile technology was proliferating. Traditionally, policymakers divided ballistic missile threats into two categories: near-peer threats and threats from rogue states. However, the gap between these two categories was narrowing. In terms of NATO’s ballistic missile defence, she believed that NATO’s consistent attempts to show that it was not designed against Russia and what she saw as an assuaging of Russia from the US government had only meant that the United States had slowed its technological progress in missile defence. She argued that NATO needed to rethink the role that missile defence played: NATO needed to remain firmly committed to the current approach; to stop conceding the arguments and to insist on the fact that NATO was responding to real threats; and to look for an expansion of missile defence, including against cruise missiles, in order to complicate the Russian military strategy.

22. Thomas Scheber, Vice President of NIPP, talked to the delegates on key issues in the US debate on deterring Russia and assuring Allies. He argued that three assertions on US nuclear modernisation needed to be countered. First, critics argued that nuclear modernisation was unaffordable. He argued that the amount of USD 1 trillion equalled half of the money spent on nuclear weapons in the 1980s, and conventional forces cost a lot, as well. Second, critics argued that deterrence was the only driver of nuclear modernisation. Mr Scheber argued that reassurance for allies was crucial as well, and it needed to be taken into account by US policymakers. Third, some experts believed that a low number of nuclear weapons were sufficient for stable deterrence. Mr Scheber, however, argued that deterrence analysis cannot be conducted by numbers only. In conclusion, nuclear modernisation was not cheap, but certainly affordable, in his view. The size and composition of the nuclear force needed to be based on the many roles they had.

23. Hon. Franklin C. Miller, Principal at the Scowcroft Group, recommended a five step programme to adjust NATO’s nuclear policies. The Alliance had largely ignored its nuclear weapons, he said, and governments had not spoken to their publics about them. First, NATO had to recognise that a threat existed. Russia had an arsenal of 2,000 to 4,000 non-strategic nuclear weapons, was cheating on the 1991 presidential declarations and the INF treaty, was conducting a major build-up of its nuclear forces, and was engaged in nuclear sabre-rattling. As a consequence, governments and NATO had to inform publics about the threat. He argued that NATO had not responded to Russia’s nuclear rhetoric in a sufficient manner. A perception existed that NATO was intimidated, he said. In a nuclear war, there could be no winners, and NATO needed to ensure that Russia understood this. NATO needed to modernise its non-strategic nuclear weapons and make sure that they could be delivered. The Alliance needed to maintain solidarity and return to its roots, Hon Miller argued.

24. Ambassador Robert G. Joseph, Senior Scholar at NIPP, delivered his perspective on NATO’s deterrent requirements. He underlined that NATO was at a very critical juncture. The Alliance had to invest in resources that would allow it to study Russia’s nuclear developments. In particular, the intelligence community needed to re-build its capabilities to understand their nuclear policies. Also, the Alliance needed to think through its own nuclear strategy. NATO had to make it clear that nuclear use would be self-destructive, but also engage in nuclear modernisation on all fronts and demonstrate resolve. In sum, he argued that the risk of nuclear use was higher than it had ever been, as the risk of misunderstanding was elevated.

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25. In the discussions, the members of the delegation, inter alia, asked the experts on differences between Putin and his close policy circle; the evolution of Russian strategy; missile defence; the effects of the Iranian nuclear deal on NATO-Russia relations; the credibility of NATO’s deterrence; options to change Russia’s course; conventional deterrence; defence spending; and Russian military modernisation.

IV. AIRBORNE INTELLIGENCE, SURVEILLANCE, AND RECONNAISSANCE

26. Lieutenant General John N.T. Shanahan, Director of Defense Intelligence (Warfighter Support) in the Office of the Under Secretary of Defense for Intelligence, addressed airborne Intelligence, Surveillance, and Reconnaissance (ISR) and NATO Joint ISR. He underlined that there would always be an insatiable thirst for ISR. The question the military and policymakers had to ask themselves: how much ISR was enough; what was the purpose of NATO ISR; and what was ISR asked to do? He argued that, in terms of the desired capabilities, single source platforms were no longer affordable. Furthermore, full-motion video was no longer the primary need; signals intelligence and image intelligence was crucial, too. Key questions on future airborne ISR included cost and effectiveness of ISR, its purpose, emerging technologies, and system endurance. Militaries could no longer afford waiting times of 20 years to acquire systems. Today, some systems that came into the field were already outdated compared to the technology edge of the day. Instead, rapid fielding was necessary, based on a “spiral model”, where upgrades could come into play quickly. Large numbers of good capabilities was better than small number of exquisite capabilities, he argued. In ISR, quantity had a quality all of its own. The differences between strategic and tactical assets were becoming obsolete, Lt Gen Shanahan underlined. Today, the architecture of ISR was much more important than platforms. Information needed to be transferred as fast as possible to the point where it was needed. Understanding the kinds of analyses that were possible, proximity of the sensors to the decision-makers, interoperability, processing, exploitation and dissemination, as well as collection and data management were all important aspects that needed to be taken into account.

27. During the discussion, Lt Gen Shanahan addressed the issues of data overload, which the United States was seeing in Iraq and Syria. The solution was, according to him, new technology, such as fibre optics, and the training of a new generation of analysts. The new generation was very comfortable operating technology and “swimming in big data”, but they needed “a direction to swim in”. He also highlighted the issue of human intelligence, which was more important today than it had ever been. However, the United States was not very good in bringing such intelligence into other environments. Trust between Allies was also crucial to put in place good ISR structures for NATO, but building trust took time and proven track records. For NATO, he brought up the idea of an assistant secretary general for intelligence, but he was unsure if this could politicise intelligence at NATO. Training and exercising was extremely important as well. Conducting ISR in combat first was a disaster waiting to happen. Interoperability was always claimed but almost never existed in the field. He also underlined that unmanned systems needed to improve in survivability and resilience to survive in denied air space. Given increasingly contested air spaces, manned ISR platforms would serve important purposes for the foreseeable future.

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28. Bill Anderson, Chief Executive Officer of Textron AirLand, talked about the Scorpion ISR strike airplane that his company had developed in a very short time on a very lean budget. When it started on the Scorpion, the company had a light attack aircraft in mind. However, looking at the market, they identified a large demand for an ISR airplane with strike capabilities. Over 1,900 aircraft in the Scorpion market segment needed to be replaced in the coming years. The advantages of the Scorpion were that it cost little compared to other alternatives (USD 120 million per platform and USD 3,000 dollars per operating hour) and was multi-mission, mission relevant, and reliable. The aircraft had long endurance with over 5 hours, was manned with two people, optionally in-flight re-fuelable, and very agile. Mr Anderson pitched the Scorpion as the perfect aircraft for smaller countries with lower absolute defence budgets. He underlined, however, that was not a high-end fighter aircraft.

29. Brent Upson, Director for Europe and Airborne ISR Programs at Lockheed Martin, saw airborne ISR challenges emerging from three major trends: improvements in sensors, communications, and rapid processing. A large challenge was how to build national systems that could collaborate with other states’ militaries. Indeed, today, airborne ISR programmes’ key challenges included how to integrate systems. Information sharing and cyber security and defence were crucial. If systems were not built for resilience, they would not be of long-term value. He echoed Lt Gen Shanahan’s argument that multirole capabilities were needed. A single platform could not be all things for all people. Commercial technology would also continue increasing in importance. Technology had advanced so much that we could bring systems to work together into a “sharing environment”. This would allow militaries to shift from being platform to mission-centric. 

30. John W. Brown, President and Chief Executive Officer at Silent Falcon UAS Technologies, presented his small high-tech start-up company focused on ISR innovation. Silent Falcon worked with limited resources, but high ambitions. The company needed to think out of the box and to move very rapidly. Software drove the technology, and the company was very happy to borrow sensors and other technology from other companies. Their unmanned system was designed to optimise energy use and to fly very quietly. Silent Falcon could not compete with the big aerospace and defence companies, but sought markets mainly outside the United States. He talked about the huge overlap between commercial applications of unmanned technology and defence and security usages. Open architecture was key for a small company in driving innovation.

31. Nick Gritti, Senior Manager for Advanced ISR Systems in the Intelligence Systems Division at the Northrop Grumman Corporation, addressed NATO ISR needs. He argued that decision-makers needed the information and the technology that could help them in making the right decisions. Mr Gritti also underlined that there was insatiable demand. The key limiting factor for the Alliance was processing, exploitation, and dissemination, however. Multiple sources of intelligence needed to be integrated into an Allied system. Data links were crucial, but it was a daunting task, as information needed to be shared not only among states, but also between different levels of authority. Nevertheless, Allies were recognising that. In ISR, the perfect was the enemy of the good, he argued. Throwing more manpower at the problem was not the solution. Instead, visualisation technology and ways to avoid data overload was needed.

V. EMERGING TECHNOLOGIES AND WEAPONS OF MASS DESTRUCTION

32. Charles D. Lutes, Director of the Center for the Study of Weapons of Mass Destruction at NDU, opened a roundtable on Weapons of Mass Destruction (WMD) by laying out some of the key questions of the day. A rapid emergence of technologies was taking place which might have a great impact on how we understand WMD. Emerging technologies might even mean that the term “WMD” needed to be rethought, i.e. going beyond chemical, biological, radiological, and nuclear weapons. The current tools for dealing with the changes taking place in science and technology were not suitable to affect real change. Moreover, there was large inertia in developing new

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governance and policy frameworks. The security community might find itself at an important inflection point today.

33. Dr Natasha E. Bajema, Research Fellow at the Center for the Study of Weapons of Mass Destruction addressed the challenges additive manufacturing posed for WMD non-proliferation. Additive manufacturing was revolutionising industries, Dr Bajema argued, but she also warned members to keep an open mind: what if malicious actors could print guns, custom-shaped improvised explosive devices, drones, nuclear bomb components or harmful chemical compounds? Manufacturing could become ‘democratised’: all an individual needed to produce something was a digital or physical blueprint, a computer with modelling software, the raw material, and a 3D printer. Large chain stores already let you bring your own digital files to print out whatever you wanted. She took the members through all the new positive possibilities. However, Dr Bajema also argued that malicious actors – no matter if they were states or terrorist groups – could reap three crucial advantages from additive manufacturing. First, it afforded actors more time and space: terrorist groups no longer needed safe havens and states had greater ability to hide their WMD programmes. Second, 3D Printing allowed bad actors to circumvent the need for engineers and scientists with embedded expertise: digital blueprints were enough. Third, it gave states and non-state actors easier access to materials and equipment, as they could procure “innocent” material rather than controlled items. She further argued that the international community had possibilities to thwart bad actors from fully utilising the new possibilities. A range of new governance measures should be put in place at the national and international levels, within institutions, at the product and equipment level, and at the individual level, including through awareness raising.

34. Dr Diane DiEuliis, Senior Research Fellow at the Center for the Study of Weapons of Mass Destruction, discussed the opportunities and challenges of the new field of synthetic biology, which found itself at the intersection of biology and engineering. In essence, synthetic biology enabled biological manufacturing. One could create alternative fuels, enable rapid drug production, or produce living, self-repairing materials, for example. The biotechnology market in 2012 in the United States was already worth USD 324 billion, and it would continue to grow. A game changing technology is the so-called CRISPR technique (which stands for “Clustered Regularly Interspaced Short Palindromic Repeats”). It was a gene targeting/editing technology of unprecedented precision at very low costs. However, it was categorically dual use in application, Dr DiEuliis warned. The new biotech developments meant that news risks of bio errors, i.e. mistakes and accidents, bio crime, and bioterror had emerged. Synthetic biology made the traditional dangers of biotechnologies more acute. This meant that new measures need to be put into place. The Biological Weapons Convention needed to be strengthened; screening guidelines for DNA providers needed to be written and applied; outreach needed to be conducted; the possibility of introducing “barcodes” or DNA signatures into biological material needed to be examined; and synthetic biology for biodefense needed to be looked into.

VI. IRANIAN NUCLEAR PROGRAMME

35. Osman Askin Bak, Special Rapporteur of the Science and Technology Committee, and Congressman David Scott, a Member of the United States Delegation to the NATO PA and former Special Rapporteur of the Committee, moderated a panel of experts on the Iranian nuclear programme.

36. Mr Bak told delegates that he truly believed that the Committee’s work had contributed to consolidating and strengthening the transatlantic community’s resolve against a nuclear weapons-capable Iran. As the world moved into the implementation phase of the nuclear deal, this Committee would continue to foster transatlantic unity on the Iranian nuclear issue. He reminded his colleagues that implementation was often the hardest part of policy.

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37. Congressman Scott informed members on his position on the Iranian nuclear deal, which he opposed. He argued that the international community may have done too little too late. He also provided his view of the current international security environment, which connected with the debates on the Iranian nuclear deal. He said that the Middle East and the international community as a whole were currently caught “in a vortex”.

38. James M. Acton, Co-Director of the Nuclear Policy Programme at the Carnegie Endowment for International Peace, told the Committee members that he thought that the deal was a good one. Now that it had been put in place, the international community had an interest in making it work. He had already seen second-order changes, for example that the international community could focus on Iran’s regional policies. The deal was a very complicated deal and would last for a long time. Implementing the deal would be a real challenge, however. Several challenges stood out. In terms of violations of the deal’s provisions, how should the international community respond? When should unilateral sanctions be imposed and when should the so-called “snapback provisions” be invoked? Technical challenges presented themselves as well, for example in the redesign of the nuclear reactor at Arak. Political challenges loomed large, too, in particular because each side retained leverage over the other. It would remain an amazingly complex diplomatic dance. Iran’s ballistic missile defence programme was the most immediate threat. The United States could impose sanctions because of its behaviour, which Iran sees as not prohibited. However, he asked at what point Iran could renounce the deal if the United States added harsh sanctions. No one should be under any illusions that it was a “done deal”, especially since especially the Republican Party in the United States remained very opposed to it. Mr Acton looked towards the longer term possibilities of a successful deal as well. He argued that the international community had a window of time in which to enhance the non-proliferation regime in general. Some aspects of the deal were very positive, for example regarding the monitoring of additional nuclear-related sites. Such restrictions should become part of a global non-proliferation regime and become normal behaviour for nuclear states. Also, nuclear safety in Iran should be put higher on the agenda, as for example the Bushehr reactor did not adhere to key safety principals.

39. David Albright, President of the Institute for Science and International Security, was much more sceptical of the Iranian nuclear deal. He lamented that on the key limits the deal had a fairly limited duration. He argued that the deal was weakened because its principal limitations only lasted 10 years. The deal would give Iran time to work on the tremendous problems it had regarding its centrifuges and to work on its ballistic missile programme. He argued that over the longer term, if the region did not change fundamentally, Iran would be tempted to build nuclear weapons. He argued that weaknesses in the deal were introduced based on political decisions. The IAEA reports also contained far fewer details as in the past, and even the United States’ public reporting was limited. Secrecy could mean hiding, he said. In any case, the public did not have a means to scrutinise the deal’s implementation with too much secrecy. Access to military sites was also severely limited in the deal. Furthermore, the procurement channel for nuclear-related material and equipment had been a disappointment. Here in particular, Russia and China had played spoilers.

40. Cornelius Adebahr, Associate in the Europe Program at the Carnegie Endowment for International Peace, argued the nuclear issue was taken off the table in conversations about Iran, which he saw as a positive change. Iran was not a normal country and probably would not be a normal country after the deal expired. He argued that engaging with Iran and regional cooperation were necessities to get the deal to stick. While compartmentalisation had been important to get a deal, spill-over effects might not be avoidable anymore. However, for as long as Iran complied, it would be difficult to single Iran out on the nuclear issue. A real question was how long the deal could stand difficulties in Iran in other matters. He saw regional cooperation as a key. Environmental and water issues around the Gulf, disaster relief, and perhaps cooperation under the law of the sea could lead to normalisation between regional countries. The deal was reality and needed to be implemented in an enabling environment, with the ultimate goal of making Iran less of a spoiler.

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41. Discussions with the panellists, inter alia, zoomed in on several technical issues of the deal, the economic effects on Iran’s economy, the pace of sanctions relief, and the political decisions behind the deal.

VII. IMPLICATIONS OF CLIMATE CHANGE FOR INTERNATIONAL SECURITY

42. During a roundtable at the Carnegie Endowment for International Peace, Karnig Ohannessian, the Deputy Assistant Secretary for Environment of the US Navy, talked about the Navy’s approach to energy security, energy efficiency, and environmental security. The Department was closely monitoring the effects of climate change on international security and taking appropriate responses. In terms of mitigation, the driver was enhanced combat capability. For example, they were trying to increase vessels’ time on station, to reduce refuelling, to increase the efficiency of the Navy’s logistics chain. Furthermore, Mr Ohannessian argued that environmental stewardship was not just a cherished value, but also a path towards sustainability. In terms of adaptation, the Navy was concerned about sea level rise in particular. They were thus making their installations more resilient. They engaged heavily with surrounding communities, as the Navy relied on their resilience as well.

43. Deborah Gordon, Program Director of the Climate and Energy Program at the Carnegie Endowment for International Peace, talked about the Oil-Climate Index that Carnegie had developed in cooperation with Stanford and Calgary universities. Oil was the most geopolitical resource in the energy sector. The Index looked at the differences between oils, as they were not all the same, in particular in their environmental footprint. She argued that innovative solutions could be found to reduce oil’s environmental and climate change impact. The oil industry could play a key role, as it was very innovative when invited to the table.

44. Rear Admiral David W. Titley, US Navy (ret), Founding Director of the Penn State Center for Solutions to Weather and Climate Risk, and Professor of Practice in Meteorology at Penn State University, laid out the relationship of climate risks and national security. He underlined that this issue was about people, water, and change. Climate risks were accelerating and they were catalysts for conflicts. The international community was suffering from a failure of imagination. Climate impacts on the military were focused on the Arctic as a region, had impacts on military bases and disaster relief operations, and constituted security threats. He argued that this was fundamentally a risk management issue for the military.

45. Dakota Wood, a Senior Research Fellow on Defense Programs at The Heritage Foundation, was very sceptical of increasing the military’s focus on climate risks. The primary purpose of the US military was to fight and win the nation’s wars. Anything that clearly enhances their ability to do this should be embraced; anything that detracts should be avoided. Discussing the implications of climate change for international security was an interesting exercise, he said, but, when it came to military forces and military affairs, he thought this largely irrelevant due to the three major factors: the primary purpose of military forces, money, and time. Assessing risk in making major investments and/or detracting from current and near-future military capabilities and resources was problematic since one had to place a bet on what might happen environmentally many years in the future, likely measured in decades if not centuries. Unless necessary funding and organisational attention was additive to current demands – and it would never be cost-free across a national budget – it would necessarily take away from the military’s ability to meet current needs. He said that there was not much to be concerned about when considering how climate change may impact environmental or ecological aspects of posts, bases, and stations in practical terms, and certainly not within the time horizon of military installation planning. However, he acknowledged that there was some utility in looking at energy issues relevant to major facilities. More options were generally better since more options disperse risk and lessen vulnerability in the event of an attack. Moreover, he argued that, for the military forces themselves, non-conventional energy supplies became very problematic. By dint of their purpose, military forces were mobile and had to remain so. Thus, they

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needed high energy-density sources that enhanced mobility and delivered performance on demand for extended periods of time. In sum, he argued that, when considering the relationship between military forces and the potential impact of climate change on national or international security interests, it was important to consider the practical realities of military forces and supporting infrastructure, how and why they operated the way they do, and what one could reasonably expect in the way of modifications to them.

46. During the discussions, members and the panellists delved deeper into topics such as the effects of climate change on the Arctic, climate change’s connections to the Syria crisis and migration patterns.

VIII. ENERGY SECURITY

47. David Livingston, a Resident Scholar in the Climate and Energy Program at the Carnegie Endowment for International Peace, examined the US and EU energy systems and markets in his remarks to the parliamentarians. He underlined that energy security and a low-carbon intensity energy portfolio needed to be maintained at the same time. While the US energy system was integrated and unionised a long time ago, the United States still did not have a fully coherent and market based system. The European Union did not yet have a truly integrated energy system. The EU energy system thus came under pressure in the late 2000s. The EU was now constructing an Energy Union based on competitive economies, but it remained to be seen what the final outcome would be.

48. Dr Tim Boersma, a Fellow and Acting Director of the Foreign Policy, Energy Security and Climate Initiative at The Brookings Institution, noted that crude oil production doubled in just five years. He welcomed the US decision to lift the petroleum export ban. It would bring real relief in the short term and make the market more like a market. Tight oil producers in the United States could ramp up production relatively quickly, acting as swing producers, but the availability of finance and labour posed problems. Regarding global markets, he told delegates that while consumption had risen substantially and turmoil was great in the Middle East and North Africa, these factors had had little effect on prices. He pointed to increasing investments in drilling in the Middle East and North Africa and wondered if the region’s countries foresaw oil shortfalls in the future. Climate change posed a real problem, but many unanswered questions remained, including on finance and transparency. He wondered whether the topic could slip on the global agenda after the Paris agreement. Natural gas could help reduce carbon emissions – and the United States still possessed abundant natural gas deposits – but it remained a fossil fuel. He had hopes that carbon capture and storage could turn natural gas into the bridge fuel that it had the potential to be. He also briefly discussed the Northstream 2 in Europe, which he did not see as a game changer.

49. Neil Brown, a Non-Resident Fellow at The German Marshall Fund of the United States and a Principal at KKR Global Institute, presented a US view on energy markets. First, he presented them with how the US Congress traditionally thinks about energy. Energy was seen, first, as an economic issue, with a focus on macroeconomic competitiveness, the trade balance, jobs, and local views; second, energy had an environmental side, with climate change as well as clean air and water at its core; third, security was paramount as well, with energy’s role in conflicts, as a source of revenue for corrupt or authoritarian leaders, as a target for terrorists, or as a weapon. In Congress, no bill could pass if it only focused on one of these three issues. Energy remained a less polarised issue across parties. The general view focused on a lower-carbon economy with a smarter energy system. In terms of European energy security, he worried very little about Russia. Russia did not abide by the rules and Gazprom struggled with innovation because its leaders could not make decisions without asking the Putin regime. This would hurt them in the longer run. The EU needed to take stronger steps, however, especially on regional integration. On the question whether to include energy in Transatlantic Trade and Investment Partnership, he was in favour of including it. TTIP is part of a strategic relationship and the United States should extend its hands to

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help its European partners, not least because could facilitate real, physical trade and because it would help the United States’ fight against protectionism.

50. During the discussions, the members and panellists delved deeper into global energy trends, including global and European gas supply and demand, the TAP/TANAP project, Iran’s energy exporting potential, nuclear energy developments, the Northstream 2 pipeline, and the balance and potential of existing and emerging energy technologies.

IX. CYBER SECURITY, PRIVACY, AND INTERNET GOVERNANCE

51. Ross Schulman, Co-Director of New America's Cybersecurity Initiative and Senior Policy Counsel at New America's Open Technology Institute, and Andi Wilson, a Policy Program Associate at New America’s Open Technology Institute, led an interactive discussion with the lawmakers on cyber security. Much of the discussion focused on software vulnerabilities and how to deal with them in a democracy. Ms Wilson discussed the market for software vulnerabilities. Individuals, non-state groups, and governments were increasingly stockpiling vulnerabilities. Researchers who found such vulnerabilities were selling them, often to states or the companies that created the software. For example, Google sometimes paid up to USD 50,000 for vulnerability and vulnerabilities for Apple’s iOS went for up to USD 1 million. In essence, a grey market existed and governments still needed to find out how to deal with these markets.

52. The legal situation in the United States was complicated. A federal law existed, which some people think made not reporting a vulnerability illegal, but others believed this not to be the case. The legal system judged that if researchers had not harmed anyone and told the company, then they normally would not get prosecuted. However, prosecutors had a lot of leeway, and it was indeed hard to precisely define what was good and what bad security research was. Experts needed to help the Department of Justice understand what was useful and what was harmful. However, Mr Schulman and Ms Wilson argued that a culture was being developed to change the way people thought about security research. However, the conversation had just begun. That is why New America had started with its Cyber Initiative, with the explicit aim of broadening the conversation beyond the technical community.

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