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TheHazards Forum

Newsletter

Issue No. 77

Winter 2012

Web version



1

Hazards Forum Newsletter No 77 – Winter 2012WV

Hazards Forum Newsletter

Issue No. 77 - Winter 2012

Contents

2 Tony Bandle

2 Hazards Forum Executive Committee 2012 - 2013

3 New Member of the Executive Committee

3 Infrastructure Resilience

4 Risk Communication – Industrial Perspectives

12 TRUST: Some thoughts after a recent1 Hazards Forum EveningEvent

14 From the Secretary.....

14 Parliamentary and Scientific Committee

15 HSE eNews – Some Examples

16 Calendar of Events

Edi ted b y D r. N ei l C arhart

Vi ew s ex pres s ed are thos e of th e authors , not n ec es s ari l y of the H azards Forum

Further information regarding the articles in this issue is available from

Tim Fuller on 020 7665 2230, in the Hazards Forum Secretariat Office

E-mail: [email protected]

Hazards Forum website: www.hazardsforum.org.uk

Hazards Forum Executive Secretary: Brian Neale

December 2012



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Tony Bandle

It is with sadness that we report that Tony died on 1st July 2012 at the early age of 63. Hewas an active member of the Executive Committee for many years. He was co-opted to the

committee and acted as the link with HSE, a role which he undertook with much enthusiasm,and in a way that strengthened the links between the Hazards Forum and HSE. He keptthem very active in a number of ways until 2009 when he moved to a new and different rolein HSE. Tony had developed the liaison role to such an extent that the Forum decided tomake the position more formal by creating the position of HSE Observer. Thiscomplemented the other observer positions on the Executive Committee from the RoyalSociety and the Royal Academy of Engineers. The then Chief Scientific Advisor for HSE,took on the new HSE Observer role when Tony stood down. Jane Willis, Director of Cross-cutting Interventions was subsequently appointed to the role earlier this year.

Tony had a long and varied career working for the Health and Safety Executive before heretired in 2010. He undertook senior roles working across the science, inspection, and

policy disciplines and contributed significantly to HSE’s work on risk assessment policy andsensible risk communication. His background discipline was chemical engineering,specialising in radiological protection – an interest he maintained up to and after hisretirement from HSE. He was a member of the Society for Radiological Protection. In atribute on the Society’s website the President states: Tony contributed significantly to thework of the society as a member of the Council and more recently when he took the lead asChairman of the Communications Committee. There he set wheels in motion that will benefit the Society for some considerable time to come.

In private life, Tony was actively involved in scouting for over 40 years. He is survived by hiswife Patricia and children Louise, Charlotte and James.

Brian Neale and Jane Willis

Thanks are given to the Association of Former H.M. Inspectors of the HSE for some of the above text which is from their September 2012 Newsletter.

Hazards Forum Executive Committee 2012 - 2013

Chairman: Rear Admiral (retd) Paul Thomas CB FREng FCGI CEng FIMechE HonFNucI HonFSaRS

Mr Brian Wimpenny CEng FIMechE

Mr Dave Fargie CEng FIChemE

Dr Luise Vassie MInstP CFIOSH

Mr Andrew Petrie CEng MIChemE MIET CMIOSH

Prof Richard Taylor CEng CPhys FIET FInstP FIOSH(hon)

Prof Sue Cox CCIM FBAM FRSA FRSH MIOSH

Mr Ian Wright CEng MICE MIStructE FCIArb QDR Barrister at Law

Prof William Bardo FREng HonFInstMC FIET FInstP FPhysSoc (RAEng Observer)

Lord Hunt of Chesterton FRS HonFICE FIMA FRMetSoc (Royal Society Observer)

Mrs Jane Willis (HSE Observer)

Executive Secretary: Mr Brian Neale CEng FICE FIStructE HonFIDE



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New member of the Executive Committee

Ian Wright CEng MICE MIStructE FCIArb QDR Barrister at Law

The Executive Committee is pleased to announce that Ian Wright has accepted an invitationto join the Committee as a Co-opted member. He joined during the Summer and attendedhis first meeting in September.

Ian is a Barrister as well as a chartered civil and structural engineer. As an engineer he hasworked on major building and civil engineering projects in the UK and Middle East. In hisrole as a Barrister he continues to specialise in construction, engineering and other technicalissues. This has included covering areas such as defects in design, foundation failures,railways and light rail systems, power plant, process plant, professional conduct matters andnegligence of construction professionals. He also acts as Legal Adviser to the ProfessionalConduct Committee of the Institution of Structural Engineers.

Infrastructure Resilience

Brian Neale

The Institution of Civil Engineer’s flagship quarterly journal Civil Engineering publishes twoadditional Special Issues per year. The November 2012 Special Issue was titledInfrastructure resilience and can be seen as building on the Hazards Forum’s series of

evening events held on the subject in 2011.

Readers may thus find the topics of a number of the many refereed papers familiar. Someof the papers deal with broader approaches, particularly on risk engineering, that can beused more widely than the subject title of the journal. However, supporting examples aregiven that complement the journal title, as would be expected. Additionally, there are papersthat focus on specific types of infrastructure, where a variety of approaches are described for examples in both the UK and elsewhere. The broader approaches to risk management thatare described may be of particular interest to many readers, beyond those with specificinterests in Infrastructure resilience. Numerous helpful references are included with thepapers.

The Hazards Forum is also acknowledged in the publication. This includes in theIntroduction where the Forum is thanked for helping with the promulgation the Call for

papers. The Hf web address is also given – and will thus be seen by a wide spectrum of readers.

The journal, published by ICE Publications, is live online at:http://www.icevirtuallibrary.com/content/issue/cien/165/6 . It is understood that hardcopiesare also available from the publisher.

ICE has also promoted the publication, with mention of the Hazards Forum, at (for example):http://www.icevirtuallibrary.com/content/related/advert?advert=291112

The main ICE publications site can be found at: http://www.ice.org.uk/publications



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Risk Communication – Industrial Perspectives

Neil Carhart

On Tuesday 25th September 2012 theHazards Forum hosted an evening event.The event was co-sponsored by TheRoyal Academy of Engineering, theEngineering Council and the Institution of Mechanical Engineers. The event washeld at the Institution of MechanicalEngineers at One Birdcage Walk, London.

This was the second in a series of eventson risk perception and risk

communication. These events set out toexamine the barriers to the effectivecommunication of risk and the strategiesfor breaking them down. The LöfstedtReport made the point that the public,stakeholders and regulators all perceiverisks differently. The first event in thisseries examined public perceptions andhow they had been formed, current goodpractice and ideas on risk communication,all with a strong research perspective.This second event looked at how industry

perceptions can differ from those of thepublic. It also looked at internal and inter-industry differences as significant barriersto effective strategies. The presentationsincluded representation from both theengineering and insurance sectors.

The event began with a few brief wordsfrom Hazards Forum Chairman Rear

Admiral (retd) Paul Thomas CB, whowelcomed the audience and thanked thesponsors and IMechE for hosting theevent. He then introduced the chair for the evening Professor Sue Cox OBE,Dean of the Management School atLancaster University. Prof. Coxrecapped the first event in this seriesbefore introducing each of the evening’sspeakers.

The event’s first speaker was AndrewBuchan, Senior Safety Specialist atSellafield Ltd. He has been engaged in

safety and risk assessment within thenuclear industry for over twenty years,within both operational and

decommissioning facilities. He is also amember of the council of the Safety andReliability Society. In his talk, titled A HighHazard Industry Perspective – whereshould the emphasis be focused , hediscussed whether the key issue ineffective risk analysis and communicationis in fact underpinning the effectiveness of risk control mechanisms, rather than theevaluation and presentation of residualrisks.

The second speaker was Zoë Layden,Senior Broker Development and KeyAccount Manager at Allianz GlobalCorporate and Specialty. Her presentation, Basic Qualities of a Well Protected Risk , focused on knownhazards, and how the insured areencouraged to protect themselves, fromthe perspective of the insurance carrier .She also discussed some related aspectsfrom the aviation industry.

The final talk of the evening was given byGraham Dalzell, currently acting asSenior Technical Advisor for SafetecUK. He has over thirty years experiencein the offshore industry, the majority of itas BP’s head of Fire Engineering. Hegave evidence at the Piper Alpha inquiryand contributed to the Prevention of Fireand Explosion Regulations. In hispresentation, Who Carries the Can –challenge to risk specialists and linemanagers, he examined the roles of engineers and line managers with respectto the management of critical equipment,hazards and facility risks. He questionedwhether these responsibilities aresufficiently well defined or recognised, andchallenged the current dependenceupon risk specialists and consultancies.

Andrew Buchan began his talk bydiscussing the public’s casual interest in

risk, and their willingness to expend timeplanning for unlikely outcomes (for example the National Lottery and natural



Hazards Forum Newsletter No 77 – Wint

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Hazards Forum Newsletter No 77 – Wint

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industry needs to communicthe different requirements tthis process. Senior responsible for corporatesetting the acceptable levelsafety culture, react well tabout risk in the languahazards. One potential dralevel is the extrapolationsafety metrics, and the tendeonly that which getsDisproportionate attention

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7


recommendations and reduce their riskprofile. These ten qualities are:

1) Suitable Construction – Combustionis a significant issue, and the

‘suitability’ owes a lot to the occupancyand extent of fire to which theconstruction must withstand. Lighthazard occupancies, for example, willrequire less demanding fire resistantconstruction, whereas structuresinvolved with food preparation mayrequire more stringent demands.Sometimes insulation can cause moreof a fire hazard than the constructionitself. Natural hazards are alsosignificant in determining suitability.

Many airports are built on floodplains,which needs to be taken into accountwhen assessing risk and insurancepremiums.

2) Commitment to property lossprevention – The insurer is interestedin witnessing formalised objectives andresponsibilities as well asendorsement of the safety programmefrom the highest level.

3) Sprinklers where needed –

Sprinklers are usually requiredwherever there is a combustiblematerial or a source of fuel, butsometimes sprinklers can be thoughtto cause more damage than theyprevent, in which case alternativessuch as CO2 based fire suppressionsystems may be required.

4) Special hazards protection – If thereare special hazards (such asflammable liquids) then these will

require their own special safeguards.5) Adequate water supply – Some

facilities have their own water supplyas a result of regulatory requirements,but it is important that sprinklers andthe fire service have access to anadequate volume and pressure of water.

6) Fire prevention programmes –Having protection is not sufficient.Processes to ensure protection is in an

operational condition are also

necessary, as are efforts to activelyprevent fire.

7) Good housekeeping – Keeping theworking environment clean and tidycan have a positive impact on loss

prevention.8) Maintenance – It is far easier to keep

equipment repaired than to suffer theimpact of the damage it would cause if it failed. This is about investing timeand effort, and having a sensible planin place to maintain equipment.

9) Emergency response and public fireservice – It is important to know whois responsible for every aspect of theemergency response, for example who

will direct the emergency services tothe location of the fire. This will needto be tailored to the needs of thefacility.

10) Adequate protection againstexposure hazards – There is a needto take into account third party effects.Others, in nearby facilities, might nottake the same precautions, but may bethe source of risk or affect preventionand response efforts.

In each of these qualities it is possible for the human elements in the system tointervene and ruin the precautions or protections.

In the second part of her talk Zoë movedon to specifically address insurance withinthe aviation/aerospace industry. Thisincludes everything from manufacturers toairports and service providers, operatorsand owners. As discussed in Andrew’s

previous talk, each of these requires adifferent approach, different questionsneed to asked and different views arerequired. With many different groupsinvolved this can be particularly importantin terms of understanding who is liable or responsible for an accident.

Accident investigation is a forensicprocess which looks at the whole chain of events. Potentially, anybody involved atany stage in the process could be found

liable, from the flight crew andmaintenance staff to Air Traffic Control



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and airport operators. The nature of aviation insurance is such that even thoseinvolved in putting the paint on the planecould be found liable as the supplier of aproduct or service has a duty of careduring the provision of, and arising fromthe use of, that product or service. Theresponsibility for risk control is pervasiveacross the whole industry.

29/10/2012© Copyright Allianz Global Corporate & Specialty10 basic qualities

3Slide Library

Who else could be found liable?

Flight crew

Aircraft

Maintenance

Weather

Airport/ATCOther

What caused the accident?

The flow of liability following an air accident

Air Accident Airline

Airframemanufacturer?Componentmanufacturer?Enginemanufacturer?MRO?ANSP?Ground Handler?Fuelprovider?Securityprovider? Or…?

Strict Liability

Claimants not satisfied

Claims

Within the aviation industry it is commonfor lawyers to try and get insurance claimsheard in American courts even if the casedoes not involve a US-owned plane, a US-based operator or American passengers.Plaintiffs have a tendency to seek wealthy

defendants under negligent entrustmentclaims (that is to say a party is accused of negligence in its provision of a service or equipment which resulted in the plaintiff’sloss). Following an accident, the owner of a plane (the majority are leased tooperators) could therefore be foundnegligent in allowing an unsafe flightoperator to use their property.


5Slide Library

How can Service Providers be found legally liable?

The supplier of a Product or

Service has a duty of care duringthe provision of, and arising from

the use of, that Product or Service.

That duty of care exists to its

customers or any other party

affected by its use, e.g.passengers.

If that Product or Service fails to

perform its intended function, thesupplier can be held responsible at

law for the consequences of that

failure.

Along with the human element, technologyand technological advances can have asignificant impact on risk, and the controlof loses. For example losses associatedwith ‘Controlled Flight into Terrain’ eventswere significantly reduced following theintroduction of new Enhanced GroundProximity Warning Systems.

In conclusion, significant losses can occur for many different reasons, and are notlimited to high-profile, graphic andcatastrophic failures. The liability for thelosses can rest with anyone in a diversechain of suppliers and operators involvedin the aerospace industry. Following theloss of an Air France Concorde in 2000

resulting from debris on the runway from aContinental Airlines DC-10, a Continental Airlines mechanic was found to bepersonally responsible as well as thecompany he worked for. Risk and thesources of risk can be complex; theinsurance industry plays an important rolein understanding and managing that risk.


6Slide Library

Service Providers Legal Liability (cont.)

If that failure causes death,

injury or damage the

supplier may be held legally

liable to pay compensation

to the third parties that

suffered the loss.

The aviation insurance

market provides cover for

that liability, generally

known as Aerospace or

Products Liability

The final talk was given by GrahamDalzell on responsibility within the contextof safety and risk. During his talk heposed a number of thought provokingquestions. Again acknowledging thatdifferent approaches are required for different risk audiences, Graham firstidentified two broad groups: External andInternal. We are in danger of mixing-upthe two, as well as the risk communicationwe deliver to them.

The external audience, which includes thepublic and regulators, are approached



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very differentially to the internal audience.Communication with the external audiencenormally involves providing argumentsand evidence that risk is understood andunder control, that processes andsafeguards are in place. If this sameapproach was used on an internalaudience this could have a negative effecton knowledge and information availabilityamongst those who have a direct impacton the risk and its prevention.

Graham’s presentation focused on howwe communicate risk to those with aresponsibility for managing safety, whatthey do with it, and how it affects their perceptions. Safety is a line responsibility,

as is compliance with procedures, plantintegrity, hazard management, facility riskmanagement and corporate riskmanagement. When it comes tocompliance with procedures and plantintegrity, there is a clear responsibility. Itis clear in these areas what should bedone and what shouldn’t. When it comesto hazards and risk the responsibility maynot be clearly defined. The risk level maynot be communicated to those responsiblein a way that they can understand or

visualise it. Therefore it may not beavailable to them in a way that they canmanage the hazards and risks. Do thoseresponsible understand what thequantitative assessment of the riskactually means? While the acceptancecriteria for competence or compliance maybe well defined, the acceptance criteria for corporate risk may not, and it may not bewell understood. In terms of corporaterisk, what is and isn’t acceptable may notbe clear. Competence in managing these

risks is also less clear, which led Grahamto suggest an important question for assessors: where do those responsibleget their training in managing hazards,facility risk and corporate risk?

Risk is a variable, so it is important thatmanagers know what affects it, what theactual risk is and when it becomesunacceptable. But how do they do this?Even if the acceptable levels are

documented in the Safety Case, wouldthose responsible actually say “no”? TheSafety Case may be based on Average

Statistical Risk, but the actual risk variesand fluctuates over time as a result of many different factors, including: activity,equipment condition, exposure, weather,people (e.g. tiredness), level of supervision, time of day, operating mode,etc. At some level is a limiting risk, anupper bound to the envelope of acceptability, but how is this defined andwhere is it documented? How aremanagement informed that the risk hasbecome too high? There may beindividual criteria (i.e. relating to the failureof a single piece of equipment), but thisdoes not necessarily provide adequateinformation about the fluctuation of theaverage total risk from the summation of

all hazards. How is this informationcommunicated to the right people?

The long term facility risk changes over time due to many different long termvariables and trends such as the seasons,maintenance campaigns, constructionprojects, shutdowns, process changes,plant deterioration, changes in personnel,resource and support relationships,production pressures and investmentlimitations. Despite these different

influences on the long term fluctuations of total average risk, the evaluation is stillconducted using the same criteria as for short-term individual hazards. Thepresented quantitative risk assessment isprobably going to be the same. On a day-to-day basis the people running the plantare trying to keep all of these pieces of the

jigsaw together, but it is less clear how thepeople in charge of the overall risk areevaluating its longer term trends.

Line managers may assess risk based onstatistical/analytical models, deviationfrom ‘normal’, predefined limiting criteriaor even a gut feeling and sense of discomfort. This sense of discomfort isimportant, and must be based on thoseresponsible being exposed to the correctinformation. If the information is beingprepared to demonstrate to the public andregulators that the plant is safe, thenthose internally responsible for managing

risk may be sheltered from this sense of discomfort. Graham suggested that



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perhaps it is necessary to have a SafetyCase for the public and regulator, and aDanger Case for internal use, but whatwould happen to public perceptions of riskshould these reports prepared for aninternal audience become public?

There are many different statistical andanalytical tools available (e.g. QRA, CBA,HAZOP, ALARP, HAZID, FMEA, FERA,etc.) mainly through consultants. Is therea danger that we have handed over riskmanagement as well as risk analysis tothese consultancies? It has been turnedinto such a complex process thatmanagers may no longer adequatelyunderstand it. Ultimately, risk

management comes down to whether youcan control a risk and whether you candefend against it. If you cannot do either of these two things then the activity shouldnot be undertaken. However, thisassessment requires knowledge of therisk, and the current process of contracting risk analysis may not becreating the right information andknowledge for those in charge to bemaking this kind of decision. All of thetools tend to exist in isolation from one

another, and there is no structuredapproach to join up the dots or communicate the correct informationabout hazard and risk to the correctaudience. How do we use the toolsproactively, to help those responsible at alllevels and all responsibilities, and not justas a means to justify decisions?

Risk management is influenced by linemanagers’ judgements, and these are inturn based upon:

Their understanding of the hazardsand risks

Their awareness of the risk variablesand underlying drivers

Their confidence in their ability tomanage the hazards

Their ability to monitor and estimaterisks

Their perception of the risks andtolerability

The assurances of others

A manager’s judgement and resultantactions are the primary controls of risk.Their judgement is based on the quality of hazard and risk knowledge from formalanalysis, their own experience, their perception of the risks and their ability tomanage the risks. Graham concluded histalk by asking one final question: ‘Are weexpecting too much and do we takecompetence and judgement for granted?’

Prof. Cox thanked the speakers for their presentations and introduced thediscussion period.

The first question asked, from theperspective of safety within the aviation

industry, whether the insurance industrywas as great a force for good as it couldbe. Some aircraft designs seem, fromaccident reports, to have a propensity toproduce a particular mode of failure, andthe insurance industry does not appear tobe encouraging improvement in this areaby increasing the premiums associatedwith these designs. The questioner posited that, if this were the case, it mightbe because the purpose is less about therisk management and more about blame

management. In response to this, it wassuggested that if any defects, faults or error traps became apparent, servicebulletins would be issued or standingoperating procedures updated. In somecircumstances there may be productrecall. Therefore, some issues are beingcontrolled by the manufacturer becausethey do not want to increase their reputational risk. This led to the question,is regulation as great a force for good asit could be?

Measurements, blame and accountabilityare very easy to deal with at the lower level where responsibilities appear muchclearer. Once you get to the higher levelsof corporate risk, the issues becomenebulous and difficult to measure. Thereis a tendency to only regulate the lower,measurable levels of the hierarchy. Thequestion then is: how do we create aninsurance and regulatory structure which

ensures that the senior management arecompetent and capable of saying ‘no’ to



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unacceptable risks? If there aren’t peoplewithin the company to ask the rightquestions, if there is too much reliance onthe regulator, then the company has aproblem.

The biggest contribution within thenuclear industry to address many of theissues discussed throughout the eveningmight be the establishment of the Instituteof Nuclear Power Operators within theUnited States following the event at ThreeMile Island. This spread across the worldfollowing the Chernobyl event. Thesegroups recognised that if there was anevent within the nuclear industry, it didn’t

just affect the utility that had the accident,

or indeed even just the country that hadthe accident, it could have a significanteffect on the whole industry. Thus, therewas a shared interest in driving up safetystandards, and sharing knowledge andlearning. Over a number of years aprocess was developed whereby a utilitycould invite in members of other utilitieswho have the same responsibilities for running and managing plants. Theseguests were invited and encouraged toidentify gaps between excellence and

what they saw. They were encouraged tobe extremely critical, and to report thiscriticism to the very top of the utility. In

America this led to a system of ratingswhich are highly respected and used byinsurers.

This process of peer review is extremelyuncomfortable for the utility and reducescomplacency. It is not about compliance,and goes beyond regulatory requirements.This system has been continuallystrengthened and improved, and could beof benefit within other industries.

A further contributor described theintroduction of the International SafetyRating System (ISRS) which focuses onprocess, because you are trying tomeasure something that is declining, i.e.how many things did you stop happeningrather than how many things happened.You can’t use outcome performance

measures; you have to use processperformance measures such as

leadership. ISRS set out what ahypothetical perfect company would looklike, to which the performance of otherscould be compared. The description of the hypothetical company came from agroup of operators who came together todecide what best practice might look like.Instead of being judged against theminimum acceptable standard, operatorswere now judged against an unobtainablehigh level of performance. Processessuch as peer review within the nuclear industry and ISRS should be the start of the risk conversation within the senior management of the organisation.

The final question of the evening asked

about communicating risk within other industries such as railway andconstruction which have less regulationthan petrochemical, aviation and nuclear.There was specific concern over thenumber of contractors and sub-contractorsinvolved in these industries, but in reality itmay not be that different from some of themore heavily regulated industries, such asoff-shore platforms. In thesecircumstances the contractors are stillunder the oversight of a plant manager.

Sometimes there may be a fear of talkingabout risks and consequences.

Some high-hazard industries have a largeturnover of staff, but this is coupled withthe fact that many of the individuals couldbe directly and personally affected by anaccident, and self-preservation can play arole in these conditions to the approach torisk management and the desire tounderstand the risks. Trying to place thislevel of risk communication in thecontract and throughout the relationshiphas a cost. It takes time and effort tomaintain the risk conversation, but theorganisation must be willing to invest inthis with their contractors and suppliers.

Prof. Cox thanked the speakers oncemore for their contributions. Sheconcluded the session by acknowledgingthe commonality of issues covered despitethe different industries represented, and

highlighting the third and final event in theseries scheduled for 28th November.



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TRUST

- Some thoughts after a recent1

Hazards Forum

Evening EventDick Vote

Technical Director, John Brown Consultants

The “safety”community has

broadened;communication andco-operation hasintensified, guidelines,

standards, techniquesand competences arematuring to ensuresafe an d r el iab le

engineering to defend against everyeventuality. Unnecessary disasters (and asingle serious injury is a disaster to thatunfortunate person) still occur andirritating unreliability all too often wastesresource. Greed and ego however willalways be attracted by short termadvantage especially when detection is

unlikely or the person having achievedtheir selfish aims has moved on andcovered their tracks. Risks feed on theinability or unwillingness to consider themhonestly and objectively. Not surprisinglysociety has become increasinglysuspicious of those whose responsibility itis to manage risk, from financial tradingthrough to dependable and sustainableenergy sources.

A believable image to create a believableimpression in the public mind irrespectiveof the rational truth is easy with modernmedia and exploited by those seeking topush their own agendas or gain political or social power. Journalists severalthousand miles from Fukushimaextrapolated and interpolated the actualrisk position on very scant information for their own short term aims, while therewere many lessons to be learned thatprocess is not facilitated following such

short term reactions which were designedto file copy not address risk.

Safety processes, techniques etc are finebut unless a position of clearly reasonedtrust is reached engineering will struggleagainst those who assume the emotionalhigher ground to invoke irrational fears.To gain trust we need to reconsider our

position from the traditional hierarchicalformat.

From this…

To this…

This may seem pure semantics but it is a

fundamental change in attitude andconsequent public perception. People are

Political and Legislative

Professional

Public and W orkplace

Political and Legislative

Professional

Public and W orkplace



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seen to be supported, not “managed” or even worse “spun”. The second paradigmshift must be to replace the disparatemechanisms with a single one that canengender change. There have been callsfor a single “body” to be responsible for engineering safety, some scurrying aroundby some who feel that THEY should be itand stiffening of resolve to defend turf byothers. To create a single body withexecutive authority would take manyyears, much effort and probably spill largequantities of blood. It may evolve but Iwould suggest that there is one already; itis called The Hazards Forum. There is noexecutive authority per se but that is anadvantage because it gathers and

considers all the specialist voices andaccords equal weight to each. This Iwould contend would present a moreacceptable face of the profession to thepublic, one where there is no singlehegemony and where every branch of engineering is held to account by their peers.

To develop this further, and it seems to beprogressing by its own momentum, if ALLthe rational professional bodies, medicine

as well as law speak with a visibly unified

voice on risk with the same overt androbust peer review it will be seen thatnone can over-rule another. This “voice”will be confident enough to speak withauthority to government, by appropriategrouping of members or as indeed as asingle body. Ordinary people will feel thatthey are supported not ruled.

What specific developments arenecessary to achieve this? May I suggestdevelopment of comparable andcompatible guidelines, visibly tracked tothe Engineering Council’s, to engineers inspecific aspects across all the professionsand a focus on comparable andcompatible communication and

competences within the bodiesrepresented, drawing on the specialistsocieties. A single voice and well thoughtprocesses to achieve trust.

1 Hazards Forum Evening Event 12th June2012, reported in Hf Newsletter 76,

Autumn 2012

Dick Vote is Technical Director of anindependent verification company taskedwith business and technical risk for developments in heavy oil refining. His 25years experience in oil and gas includedfast track fleet” performance reviews,

design and mature asset optimisation for production and integrityband a review of performance for UK Government.

He served in the Royal Navy as a MarineEngineer Officer and was inspired tospecialise in reliability assessment 30years ago following achieving the ambitionof appointment as MEO when in a shipdesign project he also inherited the

original Systems Availability Model in theMoD, reactivated it and validated it againstthe first of class in service.

A founding Fellow and member of Councilof the Safety and Reliability Society and

from 2007-11 Chairman of the Institutionof Mechanical Engineers Safety andReliability Group. He is also active in theInstitute of Marine Engineering Scienceand Technology and participated in theEngineering Council ad hoc working groupon Risk Guidelines.



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From the Secretary.....

The 2013 AGM is scheduled to begin at 16.30 on the 19th March. As usual, an eveningevent will follow. Members are urged to attend, if possible, and will be made most welcome.

A formal notice will be sent to members early in 2013. More details can be seen in theCalendar of Events in this Newsletter on Page 16.

The next two Evening Events are being planned for 19th March and 19th June respectively.The latter is scheduled for the third week of June, is a departure from recent schedulingwhich helps prevent clashes in programmes of activities with other like-mindedorganisations.

Readers will have seen in recent editions, articles by various bodies describing who theyare and what do, often with background about that organisation. What may not be clear always is why they appear in the Newsletter. It is because they are member bodies on the

Forum and the reason for the articles is to help with mutual understanding of our fellowmembers.

Brian Neale

Parliamentary and Scientific Committee

The latest issues of “Science in Parliament”, the journal of the Parliamentary and ScientificCommittee of which the Hazards Forum is a member, has among its contents the followingarticles. Any member who would like any further information on any of the articles belowshould visit the PSC website www.ScienceInParliament.org.uk

MARS – A HAPPY LANDING Professor John Zarnecki

LARRGE HADRON COLLIDER COMES TO PARLIAMENT Professor John Womersley

HOW WE CAN MEET THE MEASUREMENT CHALLENGESOF THE COMING DECADE

Kamal Hossain

MEETING THE NEED FOR PHYSICS TEACHERS Professor Peter Main

ANIMAL EXPERIMENTS: ARE EU REGULATIONS ADEQUATE?

Addresses to the P&SC by Dr JudyMacArthur Clark, Dr Maggy Jennings andDr Stephen Mitchell

PLUGGING IN Paul Davies

HIV/AIDS AND TUBERCULOSIS IN THE GOLD MININGINDUSTRY IN SOUTH AFRICA

Rt Hon Peter Hain MP and Martin CatonMP

THE QUEEN’S DIAMOND JUBILEE: A CELEBRATION OFSCIENCE

Ken Brown, Brian Cox, Paul Glendinning,Natasha McCarthy, Nancy Rothwell,Christopher White, Lesley Yellowlees

AN UNSCIENTIFIC CAPAIGN Bradley Keelor

NORTHERN LIGHTS Hazel Gibson

INNOVATIVE TECHNOLOGY IN EDUCATION Dr Ellie Dommett

SCIENCE AND THE DEVOLVED BODIES



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HSE eNews – Some Examples

++ Judith Hackitt’s Blog on Unintended Consequences

“The blizzard of signs and warnings that we all encounter every day carry a risk inthemselves - that we become blind to the ones that really matter, where there is a real risk tolife and limb”. To read more, please visit:http://www.hse.gov.uk/news/judith-risk-assessment/consequences211112.htm?ebul=hsegen&cr=1/26-nov-12

++ ONR grants nuclear site licence for new UK power stationThe Office for Nuclear Regulation (ONR) has granted the first new site licence for a UKnuclear power station in 25 years. The licence has been granted to NNB GenerationCompany (NNB GenCo), which wants to build a new nuclear power station at Hinkley Pointin Somerset.http://news.hse.gov.uk/onr/2012/11/onr-grants-nuclear-site-licence-for-new-uk-power-station/

++ Waste site dangers highlighted in Barnsley court ++ A South Yorkshire waste management firm has admitted neglecting the safety of itsworkforce after two men were injured within just a week at its site in Barnsley. The twoincidents were investigated by the HSE, which prosecuted the firm for serious safety failings.http://www.hse.gov.uk/press/2012/rnn-yh-19212.htm

++ Consultation opens on first aid changes ++

Plans to remove the requirement for first aid training providers to be approved by the HSEhave gone out to consultation. The proposal to amend the Health and Safety (First-Aid)Regulations (1981) was made in the Löfstedt report into health and safety.http://www.hse.gov.uk/press/2012/hse-first-aid-consultation.htm

++ Radical revamp for workplace safety and health advice ++ A radical revamp of the way small businesses access official advice about health and safetyonline has been launched. The new Health and Safety Toolbox is the latest in a package of online guidance, bringing together in one place everything a small, low-risk business couldneed to manage health and safety.http://www.hse.gov.uk/press/2012/hse-toolbox.htm

++ Research reveals secrets of Olympic safety success ++The secret factors behind the safety successes during construction of the London 2012Olympic Park have been revealed in a new study. Researchers identified 13 distinctcharacteristics in relationships between clients, contractors, designers, workers andregulators during Olympic Delivery Authority's Big Build which created the 'pre-conditions' for ground breaking safety performancehttp://www.hse.gov.uk/press/2012/hse-olympics-research.htm?ebul=hsegen&cr=1/3-dec-12



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Calendar of Events

Please check the Events section of the Hazards Forum website for more information atwww.hazardsforum.org.uk and to see any updates in the calendar. These may includeadditional events or perhaps amendments to the Events shown below.

Please note that attendance is by invitation.

Date Event Venue Contact/further information

February

5 IMechE Event, Hf Supported:Managing Risk. Is competencein safety and reliability amirage?

Institution of MechanicalEngineers, OneBirdcage Walk, London,SW1H 9JJ

[email protected]

March6 SaRS Event, Hf Supported:

How Important is Reliability? An insight into reliability toolsand their application toindustry

Friends House,173Euston Road, London

[email protected]

19 >> Hazards Forum Event: Annual General Meeting

Institution of CivilEngineers, One GreatGeorge Street,Westminster, London,SW1P 3AA

Tim [email protected]

19 >> Hazards Forum EveningEvent: Education, social mediaand the internet -inspiring riskunderstanding in the Ygeneration (Working Title)

Institution of CivilEngineers, One GreatGeorge Street,Westminster, London,SW1P 3AA

Tim [email protected].

uk



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The Hazards Forum’s Mission is to contribute to government, industry, science, universities,

NGOs and Individuals to find practical ways of approaching and resolving hazard and risk

issues, in the interests of mutual understanding, public confidence and safety.

The forum was established in 1989 by four of the principal engineering institutions because

of concern about the major disasters which had occurred about that time.

The Hazards Forum holds regular events on a wide range of subjects relating to hazards and

safety, produces publications on such topics, and provides opportunities for interdisciplinary

contacts and discussions.

The Hazards Forum

One Great George Street

Westminster

London SW1P 3AA

E-mail: [email protected]

Telephone: 020 7665 2230

Fax: 020 7799 1325

Website: www.hazardsforum.org.uk

Registered charity number 1047047

121210-Hf Nl77 Webversion-winter 2012

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