# 121SPOUSES MINIANO B. DELA CRUZ & LETA L. DELA CRUZ, petitioner VS. ANA MARIE CONCEPCION, respondentGR NO. 172825 (11 OCTOBER 2012)

FACTS:

Petitioner sold a house and lot to respondent on the condition that it would be paid on installment with interest of 18% per annum and penalties if payment is delayed. It amounted to P 2,000,000.00, and by July 1997 it was fully paid excluding the penalties and interest. Respondent remaining obligation was P 200,000.00, both parties agreed that it was the right computation of respondents remaining obligation.

The title to the property was then transferred to respondents name even though the remaining balance is not yet paid. Months passed, no payment was received from respondent as petitioner claimed. But respondent said it was already paid and proof of that is the receipt showed by respondent as evidence. The payment was given to Adoracion Losloso, who is allegedly authorized by petitioner to receive payment on their behalf.

ISSUES:

Whether or not another person aside from the creditor is allowed to collect and receive payment from the debtor.

HELD:

Yes. Art. 1240 of the Civil Code. Payment shall be made to the person whose favor the delegation has been constituted, or his successor in interest, or any person authorized to receive it.

The court explained, payment made by the debtor to the person of the creditor or to one authorized by him or by the law to receive it extinguishes the obligation.

Loslosos authority to receive payment was embodied in petitioners letter addressed to respondent, dated August 7, 1997, where they informed respondent of the amount they advanced for the payment of the 1997 real estate taxes. Thus, as shown and pursuant to the authority granted by petitioners to Losloso, payment made to the latter is deemed payment to petitioners.

#122HEIRS OF THE LATE SPOUSES LAURA YADNO & PUGSONG MAT-AN, petitioners VS. HEIRS OF THE LATE SPOUSES MAURO & ELISA ANCHALES, respondentsGR NO. 174582 (11 OCTOBER 1012)

FACTS:

Respondents predecessors filed to Urdaneta RTC a complaint for ownership, delivery of possession damages with preliminary injunction and attachment against petitioners predecessors, on the year 1982 December 1st. RTCs decision was in favor of the Anchales and made the absolute owner of the land.

October 10, 1988, the Urdaneta Sheriff issued a notice of levy on the property of Orani Tacay, one of the defendants in the above case. November 14, 1988, public auction was executed and Mauro Anchales was the highest bidder, making him the new owner.

February 10, 1989, the Mat-an spouses filed a complaint to Baguio RTC, saying that the sheriff indiscriminately levied and conducted a public auction on the property of Tacay, who died on December 1986. They further contended that the decision of the Urdaneta RTC was made on September 1987 after Tacay died, therefore the property was made the estate to his legal heirs and cannot be levied. Thus, it was illegal and the decision of the Urdaneta RTC was null and void. The Baguio RTC denied their complaint for lack of jurisdiction. They then appealed the decision to the CA which was dismissed.

ISSUES:

Whether or not the CA committed a reversible error when it affirmed the Baguio RTCs dismissal for lack of jurisdiction.

HELD:

No. The Baguio RTC had no jurisdiction over the nature of action. It cant sought the nullification of a final & executor decision rendered by the Urdaneta RTC and its subsequent orders issued pursuant thereto for the satisfaction of the said judgment.No court has the power to interfere by injunction with the judgments or decrees of a court of concurrent or coordinate jurisdiction. The carious trial courts of a province or city. The same or equal authority, should not, cannot, and are not permitted to interfere with their respective cases, much less with their orders or judgments. A contrary rule would obviously lead to confusion and seriously hamper the administration of justice.

#123FILINVEST LAND, INC., EFREN C, GUTIERRE & LINA DE GUZMAN-FERRER, petitioners VS. ABDUL BACKY, ABEHERA BAIYA, EDRIS, HADJI GULAM, JAMELLA, KIRAM, LUCAYA, MONER, OMAR, RAMIR, ROBAYCA, SATAR, TAYBA ALL SURNAMED NGILAY, EDMER ANDONG, UNOS BANTANGAN & NADJER ESQUIVEL, respondentsGR NO. 174715 (11 OCTOBER 2012)

FACTS:

Respondents were grantees of agricultural public land in Tambler, General Santos City through Homestead and Free Patents sometimes in 1986 and 1991.

In 1995, petitioners entered a Deed of Conditional Sale with the respondents. A downpayment was then given to respondents on October 28, 1995. Few days after, respondent learned that the sale was null and void because it was done within the year that it was not allowed and prohibited as conditions given for the free patent. Respondents then filed a petition to nullify the Deed. The RTC was in favor to the FILINVEST Land, Inc. and upheld the Deed. It was then elevated to the CA. Judgments were modified, the patent obtained on 1986 was allowed to be sold, while the patent obtained on 1991 was null and void.

Petitioners filed a Motion for Reconsideration which was denied by the CA.

ISSUES:

Whether or not the Deed of Conditional Sale on the 1991 patent violated any rights therein in the Public Land Act.

Whether or not the petitioners are entitled with a refund of their downpayment on the 1991 patent land if ever the Deed of Conditional Sale be nullified.

HELD:

Yes. Section 118 of the Commonwealth Act no. 141. No alienation, transfer, or conveyance of any homestead after 5 years and before 25 years after issuance of title shall be valid without the approval of the secretary of Agriculture and Commerce, which approval shall not be denied except on constitutional and legal grounds.

Any act which would have the effect of removing the property of subject of the patent from the hands of the grantee will be struck down for being violative of the law.

The rule is settled that the declaration of nullity of a contract which is void ab initio operates to restore things to the state and condition in which they were found before the execution thereof. Thus, the sale which created the obligation of petitioners to pay the agreed amount having been declared void, respondent have the duty to return the downpayment as they no longer have the right to keep it.

#124LUCIA O. MAGTIBAY, complainant VS. JUDGE CADER P. INDAR, AL HAJ, respondentAM NO. RTJ 11 2271 (24 SEPTEMBER 2012)

FACTS:

Complainant filed a complaint against Atty. Dumlao, claiming that Atty Dumlao collected a huge amount of money through forging, manufacturing, falsifying documents and even fraudulently misrepresenting a non-existing person. Along the course of the case, complainant and her counsel experienced undue delay on the part of the respondent judge. She further added that the respondent seemed to be lawyering to Dumlao. Respondent judge, as claimed by complainant, was rude and treated her representatives boorishly and scurrilously and even said to file a complaint against him in administration of the SC which the complainant did. Respondent judge didnt deny the allegations that were filed against him.

ISSUES:

Whether or not the respondent judge is guilty of Undue Delay in rendering an order.

Whether or not respondent judge is guilty of conduct unbecoming to a judge.

HELD:

Yes. Respondent judge admitted that he did not act on the motion pending before his court, albeit, he justified this by saying that his silence or inaction should be construed as denial.

Even if the motion is unmeritorious, he could have simply acted on the said motions and indicated the supposed defects in his resolutions instead of just leaving them unresolved. Undue delay in the disposition of cases and motions erodes the faith and confidence of the people in the judiciary and unnecessarily blemishes its stature.

Respondent judge exhibited rude behavior in dealing with the public. Whether the complainant or her counsel were entitled to the requested documents is not the issue, but the manner of how he declined the request. This we will not tolerate.

#125PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, appellee VS. DINA DULAY y PASCUAL, appellantGR NO. 193854 (24 SEPTEMBER 2012)

FACTS:

Appellant was a friend of AAAs sister, whom introduced them to each other. AAA was 12 years old at that time, a minor, according to her testimony, appellant invited AAA to attend a wake. Along their way, appellant said to AAA that she has to meet up with her boyfriend first, which they did at the Fish Port. They went to the Kubuhan, located at the back of the Fish Port, where the appellant drag her inside and gave her to a man called Speed who paid the appellant and said to her to bring a younger girl. After that, the appellant went out and speed raped her using intimidation and threat. AAA asked for help but appellant ignored her plea. When the deed was done, both speed and appellant threatened her that if she told anyone about what happened to her, they will get back at her. She went home and told her sister who told their mother and filed a complaint. Appellant then denied the allegation filed against her and made a different testimony that she didnt deliver her to the man called Speed.

Appellant was found guilty of the crime of rape as co-principal. She then filed a petition to the CA which affirmed the previous ruling with modification.

ISSUES:

Whether or not appellant is guilty beyond reasonable doubt of rape as co-principal.

HELD:

No. Under the Revised Penal Code, an accused may be considered a principal by direct participation, by inducement, or by indispensable cooperation. To be a principal by indispensable cooperation, one must participate in the criminal resolution. Nothing in the evidence presented by the prosecution does it show that the acts committed by appellant are indispensable in the commission of the crime of rape.

#126BELLE CORPORATION, petitioner VS. ERLINDA DE LEON-BANKS, RHODORA DE LEON-TIATCO, BETTY DE LEON-TORRES, GREGORIA DE LEON, ALBERTO DE LEON, EUFRONIO DE LEON, & MARIA ELIZA DE LEON-DE GRANO, respondentsGR NO. 174669 (19 SEPTEMBER 2012)

FACTS:

On September 23, 1997, BELLE Corp and NELFRED Property Corp entered a Deed of Sale covering 13.29 hectares, a property of the late Eufronio and Josefa De Leon. A Deed of absolute sale was executed on 1998 (1998 Deed) and BELLE Corp was made new owner of the property. Before the 1998 Deed was executed, respondents (herein) filed a complaint for annulment of the Deed of Sale on the ground that it was simulated. The disputed property was entrusted to Nelia De Leon-Alleje, principal stockholder of NELFRED, by the late spouses Eufronio and Josefa De Leon on the conditions that the profit gained from it will be divided equally to their children (Nelia included) and in case the property will be sold, all 8 children must give their consent and the profit will be divided among them. Respondents were not aware of Deed of Sale executed between BELLE and their sister Nelia. They were only notified when Nelia collected P10,400,000.00 in cash, representing a portion of the proceed. They inquired about Sale which was ignored. A complaint was then filed to the RTC but was dismissed in favor of BELLE. The case was then raised to the CA, whom revised the decision and set it aside. BELLE filed a motion for reconsideration which was dismissed.

ISSUES:

Whether or not the CA was correct in reversing the order of the RTC whom dismissed respondents annulment complaint on the ground of failure to state a cause of action.

HELD:

Yes. Section 2, rule 2 of the rules of court defines cause of action as the acts or omission by which a party violates a right of another.

BELLE Corp knew that the vendors were not the true owner of the land and yet continued to purchase it. They didnt inquire further to whoever the true owner is. Assuming that the allegation is true, respondents can, therefore, validly seek nullification of the sale of the subject property to petitioner because the same effectively denied them their rights to give or withhold their consent if and when the subject property is intended to be sold, which right was alleged by respondents to have been provided for in the trust agreement between their parents and their sister, Nelia Alleje. The court thus, finds no error on the part of the CAs ruling.

#127JOSE MIGUEL T. ARROYO, BENJAMIN S. ABALLOS, SR., & GLORIA MACAPAGAL-ARROYO, petitioners VS. DEPARTMENT OF JUSTICE; COMMISSION ON ELECTIONS; HON. LEILA DE LIMA, in her capacity as Secretary of the DEPARTMENT OF JUSTICE; HON. SIXTO S. BRILLANTES, JR., in his capacity as chairperson of the COMMISSION ON ELECTIONS; SEN. AQUILLINO M. PIMENTEL, III & THE JOINT DOJ-COMELEC PRELIMINARY INVESTIGATION TEAM, respondentsGR NOs. 199082, 199085, 199118 (18 SEPTEMBER 2012)

FACTS:

August 2, 2011, new evidences and surfacing of witnesses about the massive electoral fraud and manipulation of election results on 2004 and 2007 National Elections were found. Thus, COMELEC issued resolution No. 9266 approving the creation of joint committee with the DOJ to conduct preliminary investigations during the 2004 and 2007 elections.

August 15, 2011, COMELEC and the DOJ issued Joint Order No. 001-2011 creating and constituting a joint committee and Fact Finding Team on the 2004 and 2007 elections, whose purpose of the latter is to gather real documentary and testimonial evidences which will be utilized in the preliminary investigation.

October 17, 2011, Sen. Pimentel III filed a complaint affidavit for electoral sabotage against petitioners and 12 others. November 3, 2011, petitioners, through counsel, appeared before the Joint Committee. Respondents were likewise ordered to submit counter-affidavit on November 14, 2011. Thereafter, petitioners filed before the court separate petitions.

ISSUES:

Whether or not Joint Order No. 001-2011 creating and constituting a joint DOJ-COMELEC Preliminary Investigation Committee and Fact Finding Team on the 2004 and 2007 National Elections electoral fraud and manipulation case is constitutional.

Whether or not the COMELEC has jurisdiction under the law to conduct preliminary investigation jointly with the DOJ.

HELD:

Yes. The general rule is that this court shall exercise only appellate jurisdiction over case involving the constitutionality of a statute, treaty or regulation. However, such rule is subject to exception that is in the circumstances where the court believes that resolving the issue of constitutionality of a law or regulation at the first instance is paramount importance and immediately affects the several, economic and normal well-being of the people.

Section 265 of Batas Pambansa Bilang 881 Omnibus Election Code: Prosecution. The commission shall through its duly authorized legal officers, have the exclusive power to conduct preliminary investigation of all election offenses punishable under this code, and to prosecute the same. The commission may avail the assistance of other prosecutory arms of the government. Provided, however, that in the event that the commission fails to act on any complaint may file the complaint with the office of the fiscal or with the ministry of justice for proper investigation and prosecution, if warranted.

#128DANILO R. QUERIJERO, JOHNNY P. LILANF & IVENE D. REYES, petitioners VS. LIMA PALMES-LIMITAR, ISAGANI G. PALMES & THE COURT OF APPEALS, respondentsGR NO. 166467 (17 SEPTEMBER 2012)

FACTS:

Petitioners were charged of the violation of sec.3 of RA 3019, which they collaborated, conspired and took advantage of their position as employees of Community Environment and Natural Resources Office, where they gave original certificates of titles to people that were not qualified resulting to undue injuries to the heirs and family of Isidro R. Palmes. They filed a petition to quash the information and that the case filed against them were already been dismissed. It was denied on September 3, 2003. Petitioners sought relief to the CA but were dismissed for lack of merit.

ISSUES:

Whether or not the appellate Court erred in denying petitioners motion to quash.

HELD:

No. The established rule is that, when such an adverse interlocutory order is rendered, the remedy is not to resort forth with to certiorari, but to continue with the case in due course and when an unfavorable verdict is handed down to take an appeal in the manner authorized by law. The appellate court did not err in denying petitioners motion to quash.

#129CRISPINO PANGILINAN, petitioner VS. JOCELYN N. BALATBAT substituted by her heirs, namely, VICENTE BALATBAT, ANA LUCIA N. BALATBAT, JOSE VICENTE N. BALATBAT, JOCELYN BEUNA B. DE GUZMAN, GARVACIO ALFREDO N. BALATBAT, PIO ROMULO N. BALATBAT & JUNIOPERO PEDRO N. BALATBAT, respondentsGR NO. 170787 (12 SEPTEMBER 2012)

FACTS:

Respondents have landholdings total of 25.2548 hectares, consisted of 9.8683 hectares of rice lands covered by Land Reform and 15.3864 hectares of sugar land. The latter was subdivided into 4.8836 hectares subdivision lot to support themselves and their family.

The 8.6402 hectares rice land was under PD 27 and EO 228. 2.9941 hectares out of the 8.6402 hectares was transferred to petitioner which was on the Register of Deeds for the province of Pampanga on May 30, 1997, pursuant to emancipation patent issued by DAR on April 18, 1997. Respondent sought to cancel emancipation paten hence they applied for Application for Retention of their land holdings under PD 27 on December 23, 1975 but was not acted upon. Thus they filed for re-application but was dismissed.

On October 1998, PARAD rendered decision in favor to petitioner and was further affirmed by DARAB. May 2005 the CA rendered its decision in favor to respondents. Petitioner filed a Motion for Reconsideration.

ISSUES:

Whether or not the CA erred in reversing and setting aside the decision of the DARAB and its resolution.

HELD:

Yes. Landowners covered by PD 27 are entitled to retain 7 hectares, except those whose entire tenanted rice and corn lands are subject of acquisition and distribution under Operation Land Transfer. An owner of tenanted rice and corn lands may not retain their lands under the following cases: By virtue of LOI 474, if he, as of October 21, 1976, owned less than 24 hectares of tenanted rice or corn land, but additionally owned the following: Lands used for residential, commercial, industrial, or other urban purposes from which he derives adequate income to support himself and his family.

By these policy, PARAD and DARAB found respondents are disqualified to retain the parcel of lands, there was no ground to cancel emancipation patent of petitioner.

#130PARK HOTEL, Js PLAYHOUSE, BURGOS CORPORATION, INC., and/or GREGG HARBUTT, general manager; ATTY. ROBERTO ENRIQUEZ, president & BILL PERCY, petitioners VS. MANOLO SORIANO, LESTER GONZALES, & YOLANDA BADILLA, respondentsGR NO. 171118 (10 SEPTEMBER 2012)

FACTS:

Park Hotel is managed and owned by Harbutt and Percy, respectively. Percy, Harbutt and Atty. Enriquez are also officer and stockholders of Burgos Corp, Inc., sister company of Park Hotel.

On October 1997, respondents were dismissed of their work and was accused of theft which respondent denied the allegation and said that the real reason was because they were organizing a union for the companys employees. September 1998, LA decided in favor of respondents. The case was then raised to the NLRC who affirmed the latters decision with modification. The case was further raised to the CA, ascribing grave abuse of discretion mounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction on the decision of the NLRC in holding Park Hotel, Harbutt and Percy jointly and severally liable to respondents.

ISSUES:

Whether or not Park Hotel, Harbutt and Percy are jointly liable with Burgos for the dismissal of respondents.

HELD:

Park Hotel and Burgos cannot be considered as one and the same entity and Park Hotel cannot be held solidarity liable with Burgos.

Section 31 of the Corporation Code makes a director personally liable for corporate debts if he willfully and knowingly votes for or assents to patently unlawful acts of the corporation. It also makes a director personally liable if he is guilty of gross negligence or bad faith in directing the affairs of the corporation. Thus, both Harbutt and Percy held liable.