120416 Cr-germduringcreative Destruction - Globalizationf

8/12/2019 120416 Cr-germduringcreative Destruction - Globalizationf

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Competitiveness within Czech Republic during

time of the Creative Destruction

Prof. Michal MejstkCharles University in Prague & chairman of EEIP, a.s.Chairman of International Chamber of Commerce CR

Nmecko a esk republika:Konkurenceschopnost obou silne exportne

orientovanch zem v mezinrodn soutei.Prague Czech Republic

April 1, 2012


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22

Contents

Introduction

Background of the crisis

Czech Republic in Europe

Consequences

Conclusion


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Zdroj: EEIP, OECD, IMF, ICC, IFO

Global (?) economic crises accelerated

creative destruction of processesEconomic crises weakened

economic position of

matured economies and

expectations are poor.

In contrast, emerging and

developing countries havenot been affected by the

crisis so deeply yet and in

spite of their slowing down

they contribute the most to

the revitalization of the world

economy, their share has

increased.

The crucial risk seen in the

future eurozone member

countries development .

Economic growth of

emerging economies

increases global competition

among exporters, that is

multiplied by export slow

down.

GDP growth diversified(IMF 1/2012)

Bad world business climate ICC-IFO

Probable slowing down of EurozoneGDP in relative terms (IMF 1/2012)

Poor expectation of foreign trade

(IMF 1/2012)

| Strana

3


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Source: IFO (2012): IFO Business Survey, March 2012

BUTIFO business development indices for Germany continuedto look well after previous improvement (March 2012)

4

Germany is still relatively highly industrialized country with 24

%of industry contribution to GDP in 2010 (no.14) as well as the

Czech republic with 29.5% (No.6)http://w3.unece.org/pxweb/quickstatistics/readtable.asp?qs_id=11
http://w3.unece.org/pxweb/quickstatistics/readtable.asp?qs_id=11http://w3.unece.org/pxweb/quickstatistics/readtable.asp?qs_id=11


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Contagion of EU Public Sector

The efforts of national governments to mitigate the negative impacts of theglobal financial sector led to a rapid growth of public debtscurrently, the

contagion of the private financial sector spilled over to the public sector

This situation unveils the long-lasting problems of both old and new EU

Member States with appropriate and prudent management of budgetdeficits as well as EU divide in competitiveness (as suggest the case ofPIIGS countries, but also of Belgium, etc.)

Still no light at the end of the tunnel - huge governmental debt instrumentsto be issued in 2012-15 again to cover structural budget deficits and lack of

banking capital to cover regulatory risks fierce competition amongcountries (e.g.states in Eurozone vs non-eurozone countriesmaking riskypublic debts much more expensive) and private and public bonds.

5


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6

What a cycle downswing ?

The same features of crises - cycles of abundant liquidity expanded by smoothingmonetary policy , rapid credit/indebtedness growth, and a low-inflationenvironment followed by an asset-price bubble (and share-price buble)

The US imbalanced macroeconomic position in the LTerm Clinton/Bush gmts (HUD) support of ownership housing / sub-primespoliticians

forced bankers to make bad loans Description of key investment banking and risk management practices going global Mounting defaults in the US sub-prime mortgage market -> market instability ->

world economic upheaval

The failure of capital market regulation due to unregulated CDS , to what extentGreek voluntary haircut does trigger CDS ?

Eurozone response to its periphery problems escalation etc.

What are the long-term (LT) structural problems ? Are they solved within a crisisby the proper creative destruction ?


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7

Contents

Introduction


Czech republic in Europe

Consequences

Conclusion


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Background of the crisisLT Current account balances and political regimes

8Source: Roeller, Vernon (2008), www.bruegel.org

1: Transfer of wealth

2: Emerging economies

favor free trade(?)

over protectionism for

the first time

3: Developed economies

private & public deficits

financed by borrowings

from underdeveloped

countries

4: G20 new strategic set

up

MULTILATERAL

WORLD

West

Emerging east

and different levels of

productivity!


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Learning from the crisis 20082009who responded by trade?

9


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Zdroj: NERV, EUROSTAT (2012)

Both CR and Germany in the situation : The trade figures were "in contrast" to the downwardtrend in the economy, and the economy had been "flirting with a technical recession recently.

(Carsten Brzeski on Germany)

CR opennessexport quota -

ratio of export/GDP nearly70%.

Over 83% share of intra

EU27 exports from CR,.

31.9% share of CR exports to

or via Germany No.1

partner with 33 bn. EUR,

then Slovakia 20, Poland,

France, UK, Italy etc.

German openness export

quota41.3% .

Still 60% share of intra EU27

exports from Germany, and

71% within Europe.

Since 2009 German extra

Europe exports have grown

significantly both in absolute

and relative terms but

reached only 16% for Asia,

and 10% for America, while

Africa with 2% and

Australian/Oceania 1%.

Imports are similar 69%

Europe, 19% Asia and 9%

America. Top 3 Dutch,China, France

Net Exports contribution to CR GDP growth, in 2011 positive again

Germany was unseated as the world's biggest exporter by China in 2009 and was

overtaken by the US in 2010, according to ifo.

China remained export champions in 2011 - accounting for 11 percent of worldwide exports to be

followed by the US with 8.4 percent and Germany with 8.3 percent.

However, Germany was in for a "strong comeback in 2012. Countries outside the European Union

drove the rising German figures, with the volume of non-EU exports rising by 13.4 percent in recent

few months. EU exports have grown as well.In 2011 another export surplus of 158 bil. EUR and the highest total volume of exports (1060

bn.EUR) with No. 1 France (9.6%), No.2 US (7%), No.3 Netherlands (6.5%), No.4 UK (6.2%),

No.5 China (6.1%), No.6 Italy (5.9%), No.7 Austria (5.5%), No.8 Switzerland (4.5%), No.9

Belgium (4.4%), No.10 Poland (4.1%), No.11 Spain (3.3%), No.12 Russia (3.3%), No.13 Czech

Republic (2.9% with 30.6 bn exports), No.14 Sweden (2.1%),..No.19 Slovakia (1%)


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Zdroj: EEIP, EUROSTAT (2009)

Export openness outside EU 27

CR extra EU openness

export quota - ratio of

export/GDP lower for

China and Latin America but

higher for Russia.

Since 2009 German exports

toward China has grownsignificantly. Countries

outside the European Union

drove the rising German

figures, with the volume of

non-EU exports rising by

13.4 percent jus in last few

months of 2012.

ECAs role in the Czech

republic relatively smaller

than in number of other

neighbors.

Exports extra EU 27 excluding developed OECD countries in absolute terms (2009)

Export openness towards Latin America, Russia and China and share of ECAs

supported exports per 1000 EUR


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LT tendencies in CA and disbalances rooted in competitiveness.

Zdroj: www.ft.com 12


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2. Global net foreign debt contextpermanent ? Why ? Who ?

13


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2. The global context of eurozone problem

Sovereign risk of EMU countries now reflected in interest rates!

Source: EEIP based on Kohutikova (2011)

2

4

6

8

10

12

14

16

4.

90

4.

91

4.

92

4.

93

4.

94

4.

95

4.

96

4.9

7

4.9

8

4.9

9

4.0

0

4.0

1

4.0

2

4.0

3

4.0

4

4.0

5

4.

06

4.

07

4.

08

4.0

9

4.1

0

4.1

1

Germany Spain Portugal Ireland

Greece Italy Belgium France

Virtual Euro

(Jan 2009)FX rates fixed

to Euro(May 1998)

Greeces entry to Eurozone

(Jan 2011)

Lehman Brosfall

(Sep 2008)

Greek debtsrevision

(Oct 2009)

10YGoytbondyields(%)

Sovereign risk =

FX risk + credit riskNo FX risk -> PIGS as

safe heavenUnderpricing risk!

Investors distinguish risk Investors do not distinguish Investorsdistinguish

risk again!In credit risk

Interest ratesconvergence

14


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Increase of Risk reflected by the financial market

Source: www.ft.com 15


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Sourcce: www.ft.com

Now relatively low credit risk of CZE and SLK vs. PIGS!

10Y Bond yields

Sovereign Credit DefaultSwapCDS- spreads (basispoints)

16


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and importance of competitiveness

Zdroj: www.ft.com, NERV (2011)17
http://www.ft.com/http://www.ft.com/


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also CEE heterogeneous statusIn several countries borrowings in foreign currencies seemed

to be cheaper and FX risk was neglected by debtors (state,

households, enterprises)

But country-specific risk due to current account deficits,foreign exchange indebtedness, fragile national CEE

currenciesCEE bank exposure to foreign currency risk has

grown then, risk premium has increased

Danger of quasi-homogeneous CEE risk biastodetriment of less-risky countries such as Czech Republic

and what about shock adjustment by

BELL countries and future ? 18


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CEE statusRapid expansion and consolidation of CEE Banks due to CEE

rapid growth and attractive return : Upside vs. Downside ?

Source: CEE Banking Sector Report, Raiffeisenbank, 09/2008

What risk level accounted for in risk premium ?19


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Source: CEE Banking Sector Report, Raiffeisenbank, 09/2008

CEE statusForeign owners are purely regional consolidators

CEE bank exposure to global banks is limited

Originally

both globally

& EU highly

integrated

banks

accountable totheir EU &

global

shareholders

but many

parent banks

received state

preferredequityin fact

partially

nationalized

20


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CEE heterogeneous bank and country statusParent by parent exposed to CEE specific country/bank risks

Risky countries/subsidiaries add-up in

different bank portfolios. What response? 21


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22

Contents

Introduction


Basel III status

Consequences

Conclusion


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Source: The Economist 8/2009

ConsequencesHigh expectations from state interventions

(over 60% in both China and the US!!!)

Temporary (!) nationalization of

banks, government stimulus

packages according to

economic openness (US vs.Germany vs. CR)

creative destruction of the

current architectureshould not stop but fuel

structural changes resulting in

higher competitiveness

23


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Source: www.bbc.com

Rescue packages

total interventions of

governments and centralbanks

ConsequencesEnormous state help/packagestax, revenue, legislative changes

24


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Contagion of Public Sector

The efforts of national governments to mitigate the negative impacts of theglobal financial sector led to a rapid growth of public debtscurrently, the

contagion of the private financial sector spilled over to the public sector

This situation unveils the long-lasting problems of both old and new EU

Member States with appropriate and prudent management of budgetdeficits as well as competitiveness (as suggest the case of PIIGS countries,

but also of Belgium, etc.)

Still no light at the end of the tunnel - huge governmental debt instrumentsto be issued in 2012-15 again to cover structural budget deficits and lack of

banking capital to cover regulatory risks fierce competition amongcountries (e.g.states in Eurozone vs non-eurozone countriesmaking riskypublic debts much more expensive) and private and public bonds.

25


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Consequences of the crisisLessons from HistoryCumulative increase in public debt

26Source: Reinhart & Rogoff (2008)

(after 3 years from the banking crisis end)

2 Forgotten Consequences


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2. Forgotten Consequences

Now sharp increase in loans from Bundesbank to the Eurosystem

Source: Bundesbank, Monthly Bulletins (- 2011) presented in http://www.voxeu.org/index.php?q=node/7391

based upon seminal work of H.W.Sinn (2011)

As we can see in Figure , the drastic decline in securities held by the Bundesbank tracks

closely the sharp increase in loans from the Bundesbank to the Eurosystem: the securitiesof the Bundesbank declined from268 billion in December 2007 to21 billion in October2011. Meanwhile, the loans to the Eurosystem increased by nearly400 billion. The latternumber is larger because the Bundesbank also borrowed in the private capital marketbytaking deposits. Any limit ?

27

2 Forgotten Consequences
http://www.voxeu.org/index.php?q=node/7391http://www.voxeu.org/index.php?q=node/7391


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2. Forgotten ConsequencesAny Limit for Claims on the Eurosystem via TARGET 2 ? (up to September 2011)

Source: IFS and Bundesbank Monthly Bulletin, (November 2011) presented in

http://www.voxeu.org/index.php?q=node/7391based upon seminal work of H.W.Sinn (2011)

In principle the sky is the limit. De facto, however, this monetary process may face a political limit

28
http://www.voxeu.org/index.php?q=node/7391http://www.voxeu.org/index.php?q=node/7391


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2. Inevitable Consequences - S&P downgrade 2012 after Creditwatch warning

Source: Standard & Poor 2012 January 13

While we see a lack of fiscal prudence as having been a major

contributing factor to high public debt levels in some countries,

such as Greece, we believe that the key underlying issue for the

eurozone as a whole is one of

a growing divergence in competitiveness between the core andthe so-called "periphery." Exacerbated by the rapid

expansion of European banks' balance sheets, this has led to

large and growing external imbalances, evident inthe size of

financial sector claims of net capital-exporting banking systemson net importing countries.

29

2 Inevitable Consequences S&P sovereign downgrades 2012 after Negative


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2. Inevitable Consequences - S&P sovereign downgrades 2012 after Negative

Creditwatch warning

Source: Standard & Poor 2012 January 13

RATINGS LIST

To From

Austria(Republic of) AA+/Negative/A-1+ AAA/Watch Neg/A-1+

Belgium (Kingdom of) (Unsolicited Ratings) AA/Negative/A-1+ AA/Watch Neg/A-1+

Cyprus (Republic of) BB+/Negative/B BBB/Watch Neg/A-3

Estonia (Republic of) AA-/Negative/A-1+ AA-/Watch Neg/A-1+

Finland(Republic of) AAA/Negative/A-1+ AAA/Watch Neg/A-1+

France(Republic of) (Unsolicited Ratings) AA+/Negative/A-1+ AAA/Watch Neg/A-1+

Germany(Federal Republic of) (Unsolicited Ratings) AAA/Stable/A-1+ AAA/Watch Neg/A-1+Ireland (Republic of) BBB+/Negative/A-2 BBB+/Watch Neg/A-2

Italy (Republic of) (Unsolicited Ratings) BBB+/Negative/A-2 A/Watch Neg/A-1

Luxembourg(Grand Duchy of) AAA/Negative/A-1+ AAA/Watch Neg/A-1+

Malta (Republic of) A-/Negative/A-2 A/Watch Neg/A-1

Netherlands(The) (State of) (Unsolicited Ratings) AAA/Negative/A-1+ AAA/Watch Neg/A-1+

Portugal (Republic of) BB/Negative/B BBB-/Watch Neg/A-3SlovakRepublic A/Stable/A-1 A+/Watch Neg/A-1

Slovenia(Republic of) A+/Negative/A-1 AA-/Watch Neg/A-1+

Spain(Kingdom of) A/Negative/A-1 AA-/Watch Neg/A-1+N.B.--This does not include all ratings affected.

30


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Slide 31

IMF: Recapitalization of EU banks needed,

S&P downgrade warning

Source: IMF (2011). Global Economic Prospects and Policy Challenges, October 2011


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Slide 32

IMF: Spillovers and higher spreads

Source: IMF (2011). Global Economic Prospects and Policy Challenges, October 2011


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33

Contents

Introduction



Consequences

Conclusion


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GDP growth , Inflation, Current account and

unemployment

34

Source: IMF (2011)

2010 2011 2012 2010 2011 2012 2010 2011 2012 2010 2011 2012Evropa 2.2 2 1.5 2.4 3.1 2.1 0.3 0.1 0.4 . . .

Vyspl Evropa 1.8 1.6 1.3 1.9 2.8 1.7 0.8 0.8 1 9.4 9.2 9.1

Eurozna 1.8 1.6 1.1 1.6 2.5 1.5 0.4 0.1 0.4 10.1 9.9 9.9

Nmecko 3.6 2.7 1.3 1.2 2.2 1.3 5.7 5 4.9 7.1 6 6.2

Rakousko 2.1 3.3 1.6 1.7 3.2 2.2 2.7 2.8 2.7 4.4 4.1 4.1ecko 4.4 5.0 2.0 4.7 2.9 1 10.5 8.4 6.7 12.5 16.5 18.5

Portugalsko 1.3 2.2 1.8 1.4 3.4 2.1 9.9 8.6 6.4 12 12.2 13.4

Irsko 0.4 0.4 1.5 1.6 1.1 0.6 0.5 1.8 1.9 13.6 14.3 13.9

Slovensko 4 3.3 3.3 0.7 3.6 1.8 3.5 1.3 1.1 14.4 13.4 12.3

R 2.3 2 1.8 1.5 1.8 2 3.7 3.3 3.4 7.3 6.7 6.6Dnsko 1.7 1.5 1.5 2.3 3.2 2.4 5.1 6.4 6.4 4.2 4.5 4.4

Rozvojov Evropa 4.5 4.3 2.7 5.3 5.2 4.5 4.6 6.2 5.4 . . .

Rst HDP Inflace Bn et Nezamstnanost


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Deficit and Gross central government debt (as a percentage ofGDP)

35

Source: Minitry of Finance (2011)

2007 2008 2009 2010 2011 2007 2008 2009 2010 2011

EU27 0.9 2.4 6.8 6.4 4.6 59 62.3 74.4 80 81.6

EA17 0.7 2.0 6.3 6.0 4.2 66.2 69.9 79.3 85.1 87

R 0.7 2.7 5.9 4.7 4.2 29 30 35.3 38.5 41.4

Dnsko 4.8 3.2 2.7 2.7 3.8 27.5 34.5 41.8 43.6 43

Irsko 0.1 7.3 14.3 32.4 9.5 25 44.4 65.6 96.2 102.2

Itlie 1.5 2.7 5.4 4.6 3.9 103.6 106.3 116.1 119 120

Maarsko 5.0 3.7 4.5 4.2 2 66.1 72.3 78.4 80.2 75.5

Malta 2.3 4.5 3.7 3.6 2.8 62 61.5 67.6 68 67.9

Nmecko 0.3 0.1 3.0 3.3 2.5 64.9 66.3 73.5 83.2 81.8

Polsko 1.9 3.7 7.3 7.9 5.6 45 47.1 50.9 55 54.9

Portugalsko 3.1 3.5 10.1 9.1 . 68.3 71.6 83 93 .

Rakousko 0.9 0.9 4.1 4.6 3.9 60.7 63.8 69.6 72.3 73.6

ecko 6.4 9.8 15.4 10.5 7.4 105.4 110.7 127.1 142.8 154.8

Slovensko 1.8 2.1 8.0 7.9 4.9 29.6 27.8 35.4 41 44.1

Saldo (v % HDP) Dluh (v % HDP)


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Gross national saving (as a percentage of GDP)

36Source: Statistical Annex of European Economy Autumn 2010, Tables 43, 44 a 45,

http://ec.europa.eu/economy_finance/publications/european_economy/2010/pdf/ee-2010-7_en.pdft

0

5

10

15

20

25

30

1997-01 2002-06 2006 2007 2008 2009 2010

Germany

Greece

Slovakia

Finland

Czech rep.

Hungary

Poland

EU


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Net Lending (+) or net borrowing(-) nation(as a percentage of GDP)What was the quality of GDP growth ?

37

-20

-15

-10

-5

0

5

10

1997-01 2002-06 2006 2007 2008 2009 2010

Germany

Greece

SlovakiaFinland

Czech rep.

Hungary

Poland

EU

Source: Statistical Annex of European Economy Autumn 2010, Tables 43, 44 a 45,

http://ec.europa.eu/economy_finance/publications/european_economy/2010/pdf/ee-2010-7_en.pdft

World Economic Forum Global Competitiveness Index rankings


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World Economic Forum Global Competitiveness Index rankings subjective measure but Germany back in Top 10, CR in Top 40 only

38

2011 38. place

placeplace


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Competitivenessprice and non-price

Source: NERV 2011 report on competitiveness

Unit labor costs processing industry onlyUnit labor costs (full employee compensation

over labor productivity)

Main problems

Problem 3 i: inadequte institutions, infrastructure and underutilization of

inovation potential threatens competitiveness RAnother foreign trade threat koruna appreciation and excess growth of unit

labor costs in comparison to the slower productivity growth

Slovac example shows that eura is not a key

R:

STRATEGY MIX ?

Both traditional efficiency

factors and innovation

Here R competitive

3 C titi i t d i


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3. Competitiveness in costs and price

source: Mejstk et al (2011)http://www.vlada.cz/cz/media-centrum/aktualne/nerv-ramec-strategie-konkurenceschopnosti-82538/

Real effective exchange rate (rok 1999=100)

R

Polsko

Maarsko

Slovensko

Nmecko

Finsko

80

100

120

140

160

180

200

1999

2000

2001

2002

2003

2004

2005

2006

2007

2008

2009

Unit labor costs (2000=100, upwards = cost

increase).

EUR/CZK

EUR/HUF

EUR/PLN

EUR/SKK

60

70

80

90

100

110

120

130

1999

2000

2001

2002

2003

2004

2005

2006

2007

2008

2009

2010

2011

Exchange rate (january 1999=100, downwards= currency appreciation )

Nmecko

ecko

panlsko

Irsko

80

90

100

110

120

130

140

1999

2000

2001

2002

2003

2004

2005

2006

2007

2008

2009

Real effective exchange rate (rok

1999=100)

R

Slovensko

Polsko

Maarsko

Nmecko

90

100

110

120

130

140

150

160

1999

2000

2001

2002

2003

2004

2005

2006

2007

2008

2009

2010

40

Competitiveness supported by the innovation


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Competitiveness supported by the innovation

Different levels of productivitysupport of zombies!!!

Source: Mejstk & Chytilov (2008) based on Gretschmann (2006),The Economist 11/2009

-2%

-1%

0%

1%

2%

3%

4%

5%

6%

7%

Most

prod.

2nd

prod.

3rd

prod.

Least

prod.

EU

USA

Growth of Employment by Productivity Quartiles is a Long-Term Signal

(China and CEE show a similar pattern as the US)

Some un-wise bail-outs and state subsidies might block necessarystructural/ innovation changes and fix old problems

Old EU member states might lag behind China and US in terms of

productivityCEE growth might not!!!

41

CR Energy intensity too high


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CR Energy intensity too highGross domestic energy consumption (summ of kgoe coal, power,oil, gas, renewables) divided by GDP (kg of oil equivalent per 1000 Eur)

(2009)

R sice snila z 1208 (1991) na 514 kgeo/1000 Euro HDP v roce 2009

Ale stle mnohem vy (4,5krt) ne prmr energetick intenzity starch lenskch zem EU-15 - 148 kgeo/1000

42

3. competitiveness


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p

nonpricefactor pyramide

source: Mejstk et al (2011)http://www.vlada.cz/cz/media-centrum/aktualne/nerv-ramec-strategie-konkurenceschopnosti-82538/ 43

4. Problem 3I


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Global Competitiveness Index: problems R

44

Zdroj: WEF (2011): The Global Competitiveness Report 2011201244

4. Problem 3I


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Global Competitiveness Index: problem 3i

Zdroj: EEIP

R is close to theaverage levels, but

there is visible

difference in

inovation,

infrastructure, and

mainly ininstitutions

(problem 3I).

Source: WEF (2011)

45

Coordination towards utilization of


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Coordination towards utilization of

our global comparative advantages

Full utilization of CRcomparative advantages

potential, (adaptation of

business environment

3iincluding strategic

location rent)

Strategic vision, whereCR should go and be

willing to go

Orgware - co-ordination of strategies

and politicies (incl.Foreign policies) that are

often autonomous

without synergy efects

See NERV report oncompetitiveness (2011)

46


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The Competitiveness Strategy 2011 and its tools

nine pillars

43 specific projects250 measures in 4 implementation programs

Public sector

Education and employment

Business environment

Economy of global innovation

twolinksto other strategic documents (cohesion

policy, export strategy)

Interactionwith other conceptual documents and

policies (Energy Policy, National Reform

Program, National Innovation Strategy)

OECD Report on the CR (2011) highly appreciated CzechCompetitiveness Strategy (20122020) adopted by the government. We

have entered the implementation phase


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Czech republic as a small player with huge potential, niches ?

Source: HSBC

49

Sensitive teritorial structure: keep competitive in Europe and expand


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Sensitive teritorial structure: keep competitive in Europe and expand

outside

Source: NERV (2011)

50

Comparative advantage fragile structure of product and service structure


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Source: NERV (2011)

Comparative advantagefragile structure of product and service structure

Czech foreign trade with

growing concentration in

several custom duty items

Exports of goods dominated

by the automotive industry

and electronics (locally

assembled) relevantsubdeliveries also imported.

Export of services dominated

by the travel and tourism.

The more sophisticated

services (such as finance,

science and research, design)

often imported.

Development of CR foreign trade with goods in goods classification (HS-6)

Development of CR foreign trade with services by groups (HS-6)

| 51


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Required move of Czech enterprises in value chains

Source: EEIP

52

To fix the dynamic competitive position of Czech enterprises


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To fix the dynamic, competitive position of Czech enterprises

in global value chains

53

An important feature of globalization is that enterprisessplit their production processes into

a number ofbusiness functionswhich they then move around the world to gain efficiency

and/or new markets. This subscribes to the well known concepts of global value chains and

international sourcing.

Destination of international sourcing - Share of core and or support functions sourced

internationally (%), 2009

Segmentation of focus oriented foreign trade strategy
http://epp.eurostat.ec.europa.eu/statistics_explained/index.php/Glossary:Enterprisehttp://epp.eurostat.ec.europa.eu/statistics_explained/index.php/Glossary:Business_functionshttp://epp.eurostat.ec.europa.eu/statistics_explained/index.php/Glossary:Business_functionshttp://epp.eurostat.ec.europa.eu/statistics_explained/index.php/Glossary:Enterprise


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Segmentation of focus oriented foreign trade strategy

54


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55

Contents

Introduction



Consequences

Conclusion

Trade as a joint interest of EU citizens


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Success in global trade can be influenced by changes inparameters:

Old EU Member States might lag behind China and US in terms ofproductivityNMS growth might not, but the post-crisis financial

cuts mostly in the research and innovation field

But still high share of nonR&D innovators in NMS (technologyadoption) than technology creation

Structural changes and further modifications of European SocialModel needed given the level of debt created in the course of

crisis and the need of flexibility of labor market

Revision of the whole Lisbon agendastructural funds should bemore oriented for development, no exclusion of centers ofexcellence such as Prague

Corporate governance in the era of creative destruction moredemanding

Trade as a joint interest of EU citizens

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BCG (2008): Get ready for private shakeout, www.bcg.com

ICC (2011): Financing of Investment and Trade, Paris

IMF (2009-12) reports www.imf.org

CR Gmt Strategy of International Competitiveness, www.vlada.cz

McKinsey (2008): Mapping global capital markets: Fifth Annual Report, McKinseyGlobal Institute, October 2008

NERV (2011) Mejstk M.et al: Framework of Competitiveness Strategy for CR,http://www.vlada.cz/assets/ppov/ekonomicka-rada/aktualne/Ramec_strategie_konkurenceschopnosti.pdf

Mejstk M., (2004): Cultivation of Financial Markets in CEE, Karolinum press,Czech Republic

Reinhart C.M., Rogoff K. S. (2008): The Aftermath of Financial Crises, paperprepared for presentation at the American Economic Association meetings in SanFrancisco, January 3, 2009

Sinn H.W., Wollmershaeuser T., (2011), TARGET loans, current account balancesand capital flows:The ECBs Rescue Facility, NBER http://www.nber.org/papers/w17626

www.bbc.com

Useful sources

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http://www.bcg.com/http://www.imf.org/http://www.vlada.cz/http://www.vlada.cz/assets/ppov/ekonomicka-rada/aktualne/Ramec_strategie_konkurenceschopnosti.pdfhttp://www.nber.org/papers/w17626http://www.bbc.com/http://www.bbc.com/http://www.nber.org/papers/w17626http://www.vlada.cz/assets/ppov/ekonomicka-rada/aktualne/Ramec_strategie_konkurenceschopnosti.pdfhttp://www.vlada.cz/assets/ppov/ekonomicka-rada/aktualne/Ramec_strategie_konkurenceschopnosti.pdfhttp://www.vlada.cz/assets/ppov/ekonomicka-rada/aktualne/Ramec_strategie_konkurenceschopnosti.pdfhttp://www.vlada.cz/http://www.imf.org/http://www.bcg.com/


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Prof. Michal Mejstk

Chairman

EEIP, a.s.

esk Republika

E-mail: [email protected] eeip cz

International Chamber of Commerce R

Chairman

Thunovsk 12

110 00 Praha 1

esk RepublikaE-mail: [email protected]

www.icc-cr.cz

Or

http://ies.fsv.cuni.cz

Contacts
http://www.eeip.cz/http://www.icc-cr.cz/http://ies.fsv.cuni.cz/http://ies.fsv.cuni.cz/http://ies.fsv.cuni.cz/http://www.icc-cr.cz/http://www.icc-cr.cz/http://www.icc-cr.cz/http://www.eeip.cz/

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