1

April Attacks in Nepal

A string of businessmen, foreigners, and

politicians have been targeted for attack in

Nepal in the last three months. The latest

victim was a consular officer, Mehboob

Asif, at the Embassy of Pakistan in Kath-

mandu. According to open sources, two

masked gunmen attacked Asif near his

place of work in the morning on April 14,

firing several shots at him. Asif, despite

being suffering head, stomach, and hand

wounds, survived the attack. The gunmen

fled on a motorbike and are still consid-

ered at large.

This attack came three days after Nepal‘s

newly appointed Energy Minister, Go-

karna Bista, was attacked by two men on

a motorcycle outside of his home on April

11. While taking an evening walk in the

Samakushi area of Kathmandu, Bista be-

gan talking on his cell phone. Two men

drove past on a motorcycle, when the

back-rider slashed at Bista with a khukuri

(also known as a Gurhka knife). The min-

ister sustained wounds to his hands and

head, and the attackers sped off on their

motorcycle. Although many suspects have

been arrested, it‘s not clear if the perpe-

trators of this attack have been caught

yet.

On April 10, Anjani Kumar Chachan, the

Indian owner of a small leather-goods

shop in the Ganabhal area of Kath-

mandu, was shot and killed in his store

by two men who escaped on a motor-

bike. The attack came at 7:00 p.m., dur-

ing one of the daily blackouts in the city.

The death of the businessman prompted

a demonstration by other store owners in

the area, demanding that the interim gov-

ernment do something about crime.

In March, two other high profile attacks

occurred in Kathmandu. On March 24,

two employees at Sipradi Pvt Ltd in the

Teku area of the city came under fire

from an unidentified gang. One em-

ployee was killed and one was injured.

On March 10, an Indian national walked

straight into Nepal‘s Central Prison and

shot and wounded Mohammed Yunus

Ansari, the former head of a TV station in

Nepal. The attacker was subdued.

Crime Trends

It would appear that the law and order

situation in Kathmandu has decreased

somewhat in the past year. Particularly in

the past two months, high profile

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this issue...

Nepalese Attacks P.1

Burkina Faso Update P.2

Red Shirt Leaders Accused of Sedition P.4

EUROPOL‘s 2011 Terror ism Concerns P.4

Peruvian Elections P.5

Unrest in Middle East and North Afr ica P.7

Weekly News Highlights P.17

A p r i l 2 6 , 2 0 1 1

Nepalese Attacks

2

Warden Message: Hydera-bad Possible Civil Unrest

U.S. Consulate Hyderabad released

the following Warden Message on

April 24, 2011:

The Department of State warns U.S.

citizens to anticipate possible civil

unrest around Anantapur in south-

ern Andhra Pradesh following the

death on April 24th of the religious

leader Sathya Sai Baba. We recom-

mend U.S. citizens avoid traveling to

Puttaparthi in Anantapur, as well as

Whitefield (Bangalore) and Kodai

Kanal, Tamil Nadu, the sites of two

other ashrams, due to the possibility

of demonstrations or crowd control

issues arising in the emotionally

c h a r g e d a t m o s p h e r e .

Sai Baba‘s death will be a source of

grief for many of his followers, and

the area around Anantapur has

seen public expressions of mourning

as a large number of people wishing

to pay their respects have arrived in

the area. State police have shifted

significant security resources to the

area and have established barri-

cades in the area around the

Prashanthi Nilayam ashram, where

they are inspecting travel docu-

ments of many visitors. Police have

i m p l e m e n t e d S e c t i o n

144 prohibitions forbidding public

gatherings and many commercial

estab l ishments are c losed.

Devotees of Sai Baba in Hyderabad

and other cities may also express

their grief publicly. Although we ex-

pect no violence, American citizens

are warned to maintain their security

awareness and follow the standard

guidance of avoiding large public

gatherings. Processions or sponta-

neous events may block routes

through the city unpredictably.

To view the full Warden Message,

please visit the OSAC website.

`

murders and murder attempts have grabbed headlines in the Kathmandu Valley. The

reasons for this rise in crime are not clear, although the continuing decline of Nepal‘s

infrastructure and stale-mated government may be partly to blame. Police are claim-

ing that many of the recent crimes have occurred during the frequent blackouts that

plague the city on a daily basis, due to lack of energy infrastructure.

On April 18, Nepalese authorities replaced the Metropolitan Police Chief. It is not yet

known what effect the replacement will have on the crime and safety situation in the

city.

OSAC Private Sector Implications

While much of the crime in Kathmandu can be construed as ―wrong-place, wrong-

time,‖ several of the recent attacks have appeared to specifically target individuals. As

many of the perpetrators of recent attacks remain unknown, their motives are cur-

rently difficult to assess. Constituents should be careful to keep a low-profile and

avoid flashing money or other ostentatious items.

Constituents with operations in Nepal should maintain situational awareness and be

aware of general blackout times in Nepal. If visiting the country for the first time, be

sure to consult OSAC‘s Crime and Safety Report for the country, as well as Nepal‘s

Country Specific Information Sheet.

For more information on Kathmandu and Nepal, please contact OSAC‘s Regional

Analyst for South Central Asia.

Burkina Faso Update

Burkina Faso has been subject to intermittent bouts of unrest spurred by seemingly

disparate issues, (i.e. political disputes, cost of living increases, student grievances).

The most recent round of unrest was caused by a mutiny of government troops, who

were upset about not receiving their housing stipend. While apparently only tangen-

tially linked, these issues all have to do with opposition to President Blaise Com-

paore‘s government. Riots began on April 14 when soldiers of the Presidential Guard

fired their weapons into the air on the presidential compound and then began looting

various parts of the capital city, Ouagadougou. This incident prompted President

Compaore to dissolve his government and name new military chiefs.

In addition to the soldiers‘ pay dispute, there is still lingering resentment amongst the

electorate from the President‘s re-election last November, a lot of momentum was

gathered from student protests last February, and there were protests earlier this

month over commodities price hikes. It is unlikely that there is any coordinated effort

to depose the government, and there is probably no anti-American/anti-Western

nexus at this point. However, U.S. Embassy Ouagadougou has issued several War-

den Messages re-iterating the implementation of a dusk-to-dawn curfew for U.S. Gov-

ernment employees. A travel warning was issued recommending that Americans de-

fer travel to Burkina Faso because of the unstable security situation. In Ouagadougou,

and several other cities throughout the country, including Fada N'Gourma, and

Tenkodogo, mutineering soldiers have protested violently, looted, and committed car-

jackings.

Quiet in Ouagadougou

Ouagadougou is reportedly calm at this time both in the city proper and outlying

3

suburbs. On April 16, the government instituted a daily curfew from 7:00 p.m. to 6:00 a.m. Burkina Faso‘s

national television announced on its afternoon newscast on April 21that the Government of Burkina Faso

relaxed this curfew. Effective immediately through the night of April 23-24, the curfew is from 12:00 a.m.

to 5:00 a.m. The announcement did not say whether the curfew would be extended past April 24 or can-

celled altogether. Some businesses have reopened, with gas stations and hotels being protected by gov-

ernment security forces and banks operating on a curtailed schedule. Fuel and food are widely available.

Ouagadougou Airport is open, but some flights have been modified in accordance with the curfew.

Disturbances outside of the capital have continued in the cities of Po, Tenkodogo, Kaya and Koudougou.

Previously, soldiers in small groups roamed central Ouagadougou, looting local shops, entering private

residences and hotels demanding money, and continuing to carjack and/or steal vehicles (often

SUVs). So far, there is no evidence to indicate the soldiers were targeting Americans or Western-

ers. Local criminal elements reportedly took advantage of the unsecure environment and joined in the

looting of businesses and private residences.

In addition to the widespread looting initiated by the soldiers‘ mutiny, student protesters in Kougougou

have attempted to set fire to, and in some cases burn down offices and homes of prominent government

officials and political parties, including the home of the former Prime Minister, offices of the ruling CDP

party, and headquarters of the UNIR/PS, an opposition party. Soldiers in the northern city of Kaya seized

weapons and were firing in the air during the evening of April 17. There are unconfirmed reports that

these soldiers proceeded on a northwest course toward Kongoussi on April 18 where they continued to

run amok, allegedly attempting to carjack vehicles from mining company employees.

Outlook

The dissolution of the government has apparently decreased tensions somewhat. Newly appointed Prime

Minister Luc Adophe Tiao, in his first major televised interview, promised to build an inclusive government

and select cabinet ministers based on their professional merit. The Burkinabe people will be watching

new appointments closely to ensure that these promises are fulfilled. President Compaore has engaged

in talks with senior military leadership in an effort to curb dissatisfaction and to establish order. The ap-

pointment of new military chiefs is apparently part of President Compaore‘s efforts to address grievances.

This is but a minor step in mitigating long-standing criticisms that are beginning to come to a head. Until

the Burkinabe economy improves sufficiently, the government‘s actions with respect to raising prices for

fuel and basic foodstuffs will continue to frustrate the citizenry. Soldiers were not rioting in defiance of

senior military leadership; they were acting out of frustration with the President‘s administration. Small

steps such as the dissolution of the government will not likely have a substantive impact. The chance for

future unrest remains relatively high. Burkinabe opposition groups have voiced concern in local media

about not being approached for inclusion in the new government. The reaction of the electorate after the

new cabinet is appointed will be a key indication of the potential for tensions to boil over and thus for a

decline in the security environment. It is possible that the military could exploit both the political divisions

in the country and the fragile government coalition to stage a coup d‘état. However, because the military

participated in negotiations with the President, and he has subsequently promised to address the griev-

ances leveled against his administration, that scenario is unlikely in the immediate-term.

The actions of the Burkinabe soldiers involved in the mutiny (i.e. looting and attacks of private resi-

dences/civilians) have severely diminished the respect of the populace for the armed services. The Burk-

ina Faso security services have a checkered past of using excessive force and extrajudicial killing of sus-

pects. This may prove to be a source of additional tension. The students in Koudougou will continue to

feel disenfranchised if no officials are held to account in the Justin Zongo case. There is a strong likeli-

hood that protests in that particular city will continue. OSAC constituents are reminded that protests may

turn unruly and violent without notice. It is best to avoid gatherings of large crowds and abide by the cur-

few at this time. In the event of additional unrest and lawlessness, the embassy recommends restriction

of unnecessary movement and sheltering in place as appropriate.

4

Of concern to the group is that the pending

charges against its leadership could significantly

affect its ability to move forward. If convicted,

lese majeste is punishable by up to 15 years in

prison. However, the group has proved resilient

in the past when faced with a loss of leadership.

After the crackdown and subsequent arrests in

the spring 2009 demonstrations, the group

needed only one year to recalibrate and stage an

even bigger, longer, more disciplined protest.

Concerns for the U.S. Private Sector

Red Shirt activists will continue to hold large-

scale protests, especially as the election date

draws nearer. However, it should be noted that

every demonstration since last May‘s crackdown

was concluded promptly and peacefully. The Red

Shirts are mindful that any violence or chaos at-

tributed to them could ultimately hurt their elec-

toral prospects. Portraying themselves as victims

of government oppression is meant to garner

sympathy amongst the population; sparking

street violence or blocking downtown could have

the opposite effect. In the near-term, OSAC con-

stituents should expect to see plenty of civic ac-

tivity, but this should not pose logistical chal-

lenges or spark violent confrontation.

For Further Information

Please direct any questions regarding this report

or the general security situation in Thailand to

OSAC‘s Regional Coordinator for East Asia Pa-

cific.

EUROPOL’s 2011 Terrorism

Concerns

On April 19, 2011, the European Law Enforce-

ment Agency (EUROPOL) released the 2011 EU

Terrorism Situation and Trend Report (TE-SAT).

The report details the continued threat of terror-

ism within the EU and specifically highlights po-

tential terrorist methods and impact.

The report addresses the real and ever increas-

ing concern of foreign-based Islamic terrorists in

Europe and states that a majority of terrorist

threats in the region are from plots that originate

within Europe. The TE-SAT recorded a total of

249 terrorist attacks in the EU in 2010, of which,

three were attributed to ―Islamist terrorist groups.‖

Additionally, the TE-SAT indicates that 611

For more information, please contact OSAC‘s

Regional Coordinator for Sub-Saharan Africa

Red Shirt Leaders Accused of Sedition, Lese Mejeste Red Shirt Leaders Summoned

Thailand authorities summoned 18 leaders of the

United Front for Democracy Against Dictatorship,

or the Red Shirts as they are commonly known,

to answer charges of sedition and insulting the

monarchy – lese majeste. The 18 individuals in-

clude the acting chairwoman of the group, Thida

Thavornseth, and Jatuporn Prompan, Puea Thai

Party Member of Parliament. The charges stem

from speeches made at an April 10 Red Shirt

rally commemorating the first anniversary of

armed clashes in central Bangkok between mem-

bers of the group and Royal Thai Army soldiers.

The members are expected to answer to the

charges on May 2-6.

Thai authorities are also seeking the revocation

of bail granted to nine Red Shirt leaders already

facing terrorism charges related to last year's

demonstrations. The nine are also accused of

offending the monarchy at the April 10 protest.

Strength of the Red Shirt Movement

At the above-mentioned rally, approximately

30,000 Red Shirt protesters gathered at the De-

mocracy Monument to commemorate their fallen

colleagues and to express solidarity in opposition

to the current government. Although a significant

drop from peaks of close to 100,000 attendees a

year ago, the number still represents the staying

power and strength of the movement. Further-

more, with national elections slated for late June

or early July, the Puea Thai Party (the party clos-

est associated with the Red Shirts) is expected to

pose a serious challenge to the ruling coalition.

Adding to this, influential former Prime Minister

and billionaire Thaksin Shinawatra continues to

support the organization, which in the past has

included monetary backing. Thaksin made a

video call into the rally, stressing the importance

of the elections and telling viewers he would

―return to meet people in the near future.‖ Thak-

sin currently lives in exile in Dubai after receiving

a two-year jail term for corruption during his ten-

ure as prime minister.

5

individuals were arrested for terrorist-related offences in 2010. Of the 611 individuals arrested, 179 had

links to Islamist terrorism, a very significant increase from 2009. However, the report does cite an overall

decrease in the number of terrorist attacks in the EU.

Since the beginning of 2011, OSAC has produced a number of analytical products addressing U.S. pri-

vate sector concerns that are addressed within the TE-SAT, including ―anarchists tactics‖, ―right-wing ter-

rorism‖, ―KGK and Turkey‘s upcoming electoral season‖,‖ transnational anarchists‖, ―Irish Republican

militants‖, ―terrorism in Russia‖, and the ―United Kingdom Travel Alert‖. OSAC‘s previous analyses ad-

dressing the increasing diversification and flexibility of terrorist groups‘ methods, collaboration, sophistica-

tion, and growing connection with regional organized crime syndicates are in line with EUROPOL‘s recent

assessment.

Near-term Security Outlook

The U.S. Department of State has an active Worldwide Caution that highlights the continuing threat of

terrorist actions and violence against U.S. citizens and interests throughout the world. American citizens

are reminded to maintain a high level of vigilance and to take appropriate steps to increase their security

awareness.

OSAC remains concerned about the continued threat of terrorist attacks, demonstrations, and other vio-

lent actions against American citizens. Current information suggests that al-Qa‘ida and affiliated organi-

zations continue to plan terrorist attacks against American interests in multiple regions, including Europe.

These attacks may employ a wide variety of tactics including suicide operations, assassinations, kidnap-

pings, hijackings, and bombings.

Extremists may elect to use either conventional or non-conventional weapons and target both official and

private sector interests. Examples of such targets include high-profile sporting events, residential areas,

business offices, hotels, clubs, restaurants, places of worship, schools, public areas, and locales where

American and Western citizens gather in large numbers, including during holidays.

American citizens are reminded of the potential for terrorists to attack public transportation systems and

other tourism infrastructure. In the past, extremists have targeted and attacked subway and rail systems,

aviation and maritime services, as well as shopping centers. In the past several years, attacks have oc-

curred in cities such as Athens, Belfast, Copenhagen, Glasgow, Istanbul, London, Madrid, Moscow, and

Rome.

For Further Information

Please direct any questions regarding this report or the general security situation in Europe to OSAC‘s

Regional Coordinator for Europe.

Peruvian Elections

Peru‘s financial markets have witnessed a high degree of volatility following the results of the first round

of general elections on April 10. Investors have expressed growing concern over the potential policies of

leftist candidate Ollanta Humala who finished first with 31.7 percent of the vote. Humala will face Con-

gresswoman Keiko Fujimori, who finished second with 23.3 percent of the vote, in a runoff election

scheduled for June 5.

Calls by Humala to raise royalty fees on mining and gas producers and to renegotiate the U.S.-Peru free

trade agreement have spooked investors, causing Lima‘s general stock index to fall 15 percent since Hu-

mala began gaining in the polls on March 28. Furthermore, despite attempts to appeal to moderate voters

6

A victory by Fujimori would likely have a less sig-

nificant impact on the U.S. private sector, and her

administration would probably take a status-quo

approach to economic policies. Fujimori has also

consistently vowed to avoid the autocratic poli-

cies of her father and to focus instead on creating

jobs and opportunities for Peru‘s poor.

Outlook

Assessing the likely outcome of the June 5 runoff

poses a challenge as neither candidate was

widely expected to make it to the second round.

At this point, both candidates appear to stand an

equal chance of winning the election. An April 3

poll by Lima based research group Ipsos Apoyo

indicated that a runoff scenario between Humala

and Fujimori would most likely result in a tie, with

each candidate garnering 42 percent of the vote

in the second round. However, the poll also indi-

cated that the only candidate who was favored to

defeat Humala in a runoff scenario was Alejandro

Toledo, who, with only 15.5 percent of the vote,

finished fourth in the first round. Ipsos Apoyo is

scheduled to release second round polling data

on April 24 which may shed more light on the

comparative rankings of the candidates.

In 2006, a similar scenario played out when Hu-

mala garnered 31 percent of the vote in the first

round and then faced current President Alan Gar-

cia in the second round, only to be defeated by

Garcia by five percentage points. While history

could very well repeat itself, there are some nota-

ble differences in this election that may give Hu-

mala an advantage. Firstly, in 2006, Humala

aligned himself closely with Venezuelan Presi-

dent Chavez which likely contributed to his unfa-

vorable performance, but during this campaign,

he has done everything possible to distance him-

self from Chavez and align himself more with the

moderate policies of former Brazilian President

Lula. Aligning himself with Lula may give Humala

an advantage as Lula is more popular among

vast segments of the Peruvian population than

Chavez.

Secondly, in 2006, Garcia was perceived as a

more moderate candidate that allowed him to

garner a significant portion of the vote from presi-

dential candidates who did not make it into the

second round. In this case, Fujimori may have a

difficult time attracting voters from candidates

who are no longer in the race as polls taken

by toning down his bellicose rhetoric, many in-

vestors and wealthy Peruvians feel that Humala

may still be susceptible to Venezuelan influence

and could adopt radical, anti-capitalist policies

similar to those implemented by Venezuelan

President Hugo Chavez. In the current election

cycle, Humala has tried to distance himself from

Chavez and has sought to portray himself as a

moderate, center-left candidate whose policies

are more in line with the ideology of former Bra-

zilian President Luiz Ignacio Lula de Silva.

A significant portion of the Peruvian population is

equally concerned that a victory by Keiko Fuji-

mori could signal a return to the autocratic poli-

cies, endemic corruption, and human rights

abuses encountered during her father‘s presi-

dency in the 1990s. Her father, former president

Alberto Fujimori, remains imprisoned in Peru for

corruption and human rights abuses. Despite

potential changes in social policies, a Fujimori

presidency would likely be characterized by

status-quo economic policies favorable to busi-

nesses and foreign investors.

Private Sector Implications

A win by Humala would, at the very least, have a

moderate, negative impact on the dramatic eco-

nomic growth Peru has witnessed over the past

few years. Despite the fact that Humala has

toned down his rhetoric, any attempts to raise

royalties on mining and gas producers would

have negative consequences for that vital sector

of the Peruvian economy and could discourage

future investment and/or expansion. Similarly,

any attempts to renegotiate the terms of the free

trade agreement with the U.S. would likely have

a significant detrimental effect on both foreign

investment and the competitiveness of Peruvian

exporters. Furthermore, Humala has expressed a

desire to raise the minimum wage and increase

pensions which could increase labor costs for

U.S. private sector organizations.

The negative impact on the Peruvian economy

would be even more dramatic if Humala were to

reverse course and adopt Venezuelan-style poli-

cies once in office. If Humala were to follow

through on his more moderate stance and avoid

interfering with the economic policies that have

formed a cornerstone of Peru‘s economic growth,

the economic impact of a Humala presidency

would likely be less significant.

7

before the first round indicated that she had high negative ratings among large segments of the Peruvian

populace.

On the other hand, it is unlikely that right leaning voters who voted for Alejandro Toledo, Pedro Kuczyn-

ski, or Luis Castañeda in the first round would vote for the leftist Humala. In the runoff scenario, when

given the choice between leftist Humala and far-right leaning Fujimori, a certain percentage of the popu-

lace who voted for the aforementioned right-leaning candidates will likely end up voting for Fujimori. It is

possible that certain segments of the population will also vote for Fujimori because of concerns that Hu-

mala‘s economic policies could derail Peru‘s economic growth. Humala also registered high negative rat-

ings among voters during pre-election polls.

For Further Information

Please direct any questions regarding this report or the general security situation in Peru to OSAC‘s Re-

gional Coordinator for the Western Hemisphere.

Spreading Civil Unrest in Middle East and North Africa

High Risk: These countries are likely to see frequent large demonstrations in the next 90 days and/or a

high potential for violent outcomes. There is a high possibility that the U.S. private sector will be nega-

tively impacted by civil unrest, and may need to make difficult decisions about whether to allow business

travel to the country, suspending or altering current business operations, and/or drawing down or evacu-

ating personnel.

Medium Risk: These countries may have intermittent small-scale demonstrations (>1000) in the next 90

days, with the potential for some larger demonstrations and some violence. The U.S. private sector may

experience some disruption to their business operations, but will likely to be able to maintain business

continuity with the possible need to adjust current security protocols (e.g. temporarily shelter in place,

work from home, or advising against travel to certain locations). There is a low possibility of mass demon-

strations, but businesses operating in these countries should have updated crisis plans in case demon-

strations escalate.

Low Risk: These countries are not expected to experience significant civil unrest. They may experience

occasional small to medium size demonstrations with some U.S. private sector impact. There is a possi-

bility of some violence accompanying these demonstrations.

Minimal Risk: These countries are not expected to experience significant civil unrest. They may experi-

ence infrequent small demonstrations with little expected U.S. private sector impact.

HIGH RISK MEDIUM RISK LOW RISK MINIMAL RISK

Algeria

Syria

Yemen

Jordan

Lebanon

Saudi Arabia

Morocco

Oman

Kuwait Qatar UAE

8

Factors Mitigating Unrest: The government has

enacted price controls on staple foods and goods

in order to placate demonstrators; however, diffi-

cult global economic conditions and rising prices

in 2011 may undercut the government‘s ability to

keep prices from rising. President Bouteflika lifted

the State of Emergency Law, which was in place

for the last 19 years, and additional concessions

are possible if demonstrations continue.

Although various opposition groups have partici-

pated in protests, the majority of the population

does not wish to return to the 1992-2004 civil war

and does not want Islamist political parties to

take advantage of the situation. While many citi-

zens would like to see reforms enacted, the op-

position is largely disorganized. The majority of

demonstrations in 2010 were in response to spe-

cific local circumstances, such as particular labor

issues and local housing evictions, rather than a

uniform political agenda.

During periods of unrest, Algerian security forces

have been deployed to key locations throughout

Algiers to prevent unrest from spreading.

Conclusions: Given the frequency of demonstra-

tions in 2010 and continuing regional instability in

2011, there is a high likelihood of additional dem-

onstrations occurring throughout the country to

include Algiers. The majority of these protests will

likely be in response to local issues of concern,

such as poor housing conditions, rising prices, or

demands for better wages in specific sectors of

the economy rather than demands for radical

changes to the political system.

While additional localized protests are likely,

there is a possibility of larger political demonstra-

tions fostered by the events in Tunisia, Egypt,

and Libya. Clashes between protesters and po-

lice have already resulted in seven deaths and

hundreds of injuries in 2011; and additional vio-

lence is expected to accompany larger demon-

strations, even if security forces attempt to dis-

perse crowds peacefully.

SYRIA

Factors Contributing to Unrest: Syria has a large

youth population that has been attempting to mo-

bilize demonstrations through the use of social

networking sites, even prior to the lifting of the

government ban on many of the most popular

sites. Like much of the region, Syrians

HIGH RISK

ALGERIA

Factors Contributing to Unrest: Algeria experi-

enced widespread civil unrest in 2010 and Janu-

ary 2011. The number of unauthorized demonstra-

tions increased 300 percent in 2010 over 2009,

with protests from various sectors of society oc-

curring approximately twice a week on average.

While specific sectors of society have protested

against the government under different banners,

diverse segments of society have faced frustration

with rising staple prices and declining standards of

living. Spurred by calls for reform in neighboring

countries, protesters have also increased their

calls for quicker social and economic reforms,

criticism of government corruption, and unequal

distribution of wealth.

The National Coordination for Change and De-

mocracy (CNDC) is a coalition of opposition par-

ties, NGOs, unemployed citizens, and trade un-

ions. The CNDC has called for marches and dem-

onstrations in protest against the government‘s

failure to address poor social and economic condi-

tions, high unemployment rates (~25 percent),

poor housing conditions, and a lack of job oppor-

tunities. In addition the CNDC has demanded that

the government draft a new constitution.

Much of Algeria‘s population will continue to be

frustrated by high unemployment, decreasing

standards of living, and poor housing conditions

throughout 2011. Rising food and oil prices will

likely combine to exacerbate these issues. While

poor economic conditions will contribute to unrest

at every level, it is worth noting that many of the

strikes that occurred in 2011 were supported by

individuals from various socio-economic back-

grounds.

In January 2011, demonstrations erupted through-

out Algeria, including the major cities of Algiers

and Oran. According to official statistics, six peo-

ple were killed, and approximately 800 were in-

jured, including many members of the Algerian

security forces. Security forces appeared to show

restraint in confronting these demonstrations, util-

izing tear gas and water cannons as the primary

means of controlling crowds. However, live fire

was used in isolated incidents. Additionally, in the

early months of 2011, dozens of Algerians at-

tempted self-immolations, leading to at least 4

deaths.

9

have been hurt economically by recent rising food costs and general declines in standard of living. The

government limits freedom of speech, and opposition groups criticize the government for repression. The

emergency law in effect since 1963 enabling arbitrary arrests and detention is also a root of malcontent

within the majority of the population.

The largely anticipated speech by President Bashar al-Asad on March 30 was expected by many to ad-

dress many of opposition‘s stated grievances, but resulted in disappointment for most Syrians and the

international community. The speech blamed the recent unrest on ―foreign conspirators‖ and ―armed

gangs‖ without promising concrete reforms or lifting the emergency law. Small protests began in mid-

March in the southern city of Dera‘a, but escalated following the deaths of local protesters. In the weeks

following, protests spread to several other cities throughout Syria, resulting in violent clashes between

security forces and demonstrators.

On April 1, violent clashes occurred in several locations following Friday prayers, including Damascus,

Douma, and the coastal town of Jebleh. International media reported at least 15 deaths throughout the

country. The most violent clashes occurred in the Damascus suburb of Douma, where at least five people

were killed. Following the clashes, several hundred demonstrators protested overnight calling for regime

change.

On March 31, President al-Asad decreed the formation of three committees to explore studying lifting the

emergency law, investigate the incidents in Daraa and Latakia, and the formation of a new Cabinet.

On March 25, clashes between security forces and demonstrators were reported in Dara‘a, Latakia,

Sanamein, and Homs and several other demonstrations were reported in cities throughout the country,

including Damascus.

On March 23, police reportedly killed approximately 15 people while dispersing a large protest in Dara‘a.

As a result of this violence, additional clashes with security forces were reported in the towns of

Sanamein and the port city of Latakia.

On March 18, security forces fired on protesters in the southern city of Dara‘a, killing five people and

sparking additional demonstrations.

On March 16, a small protest of about 150 people, many of whom were known human rights activists,

gathered outside of the Interior Ministry in Damascus to call for the release of political detainees. Accord-

ing to Human Rights Watch, these protesters were dispersed violently with batons, and a number of

those protesters were detained by police.

Factors Mitigating Unrest: Syria has a strong security force and has been taking preemptive measures to

stifle the opposition, such as monitoring the activities of opposition groups and staging inside mosques

during Friday noon prayers. Security forces will likely use nonlethal and lethal weapons to address large-

scale protests. Opposition groups, which include human rights and youth activists, reformists, and Kurds,

have different aspirations and there is no recognized leadership.

Conclusions: The use of live fire on demonstrators in the city of Dara‘a fomented additional support from

opposition groups and reformists, leading to protests in several of Syria‘s major cities. At this point, the

opposition appears to be fragmented and suffers from a lack of clear leadership, which could limit its abil-

ity to organize an effective resistance.

The violent response by security forces to protesters in the Damascus suburb of Douma, Dara‘a, Latakia,

and elsewhere may discourage some supporters from going to the streets to protest, but on the whole, it

appears to have had the opposite effect. These violent clashes have created additional support for re-

formists; however, it remains unclear if any of these protests will be able to foster large enough numbers

to threaten the ruling regime.

10

mediated by the Qatari Government. Neither side

has shown its intention to fully live up to the de-

mands of the ceasefire.

According to statistics from the CIA World

Factbook, Yemen has an unemployment rate of

35 percent. Its GDP per capita is only $2,600, the

lowest in the region, and nearly half of its popula-

tion lives below the poverty line. Petroleum ac-

counts for roughly 25 percent of GDP and 70 per-

cent of government revenue, but reserves are

rapidly declining. In addition to declining oil re-

sources, Yemen suffers from a severe water cri-

sis due to limited access, a growing population,

and poor allocation of resources (e.g., large

amounts of water used to grow qat), which has

been an additional source of disputes between

local populations and their respective tribes.

The prominence of automatic weapons contrib-

utes to the potential for civil unrest escalating into

violence. Small arms, especially variants of the

Kalashnikov assault rifle, are readily available.

Males are expected to own and understand how

to operate a firearm as a cultural rite of passage.

Factors Mitigating Unrest: In response to early

2011 protests, President Ali Abdullah Saleh

stated that he would not run for president again

in 2013 and would not pass the presidency on to

his son, Ahmed Ali Saleh. In late March, Saleh

fired his cabinet and reportedly claimed he would

be ready to transfer power in late 2011. However,

opposition leaders rejected the conciliatory

measure and continue to call for Saleh‘s resigna-

tion and removal of his family members from mili-

tary and civilian positions.

Early 2011 demonstrations were supported by a

number of different groups; however, these

groups have divergent motives. The fractured

opposition includes youth groups, socialists,

Islamists, human rights activists, and members of

the Houthi rebellion and Southern Movement.

Although these groups have coalesced around

calling for President Saleh‘s ouster and the crea-

tion of a parliamentary system, agreement

around other goals is unknown. Additionally,

President Saleh has ruled Yemen since 1978

and has been able to overcome numerous chal-

lenges to his authority. Throughout his career, he

has demonstrated his ability to play different

sides off of each other and remain in power.

YEMEN

Factors Contributing to Unrest: Unrest in Tunisia

and Egypt appeared to catalyze longstanding

grievances throughout nearby Yemen. Large dem-

onstrations took place throughout February and

March 2011 in major cities throughout Yemen,

including Sana‘a, Ta‘iz, Ibb, and Aden. The major-

ity of protests remained peaceful, but later pro-

tests were violently dispersed by security forces.

On March 8, Yemeni security forces opened fire

on students protesting at Sana‘a University, killing

two. Protests gained additional momentum on

March 18 after security forces again fired on pro-

testers, resulting in the deaths of more than 40

demonstrators. In response to this violence, sev-

eral high ranking military officers and government

officials sided with the protesters. Most promi-

nently, General Ali Mohsen, considered one of the

most powerful figures in the country, joined the

protesters and vowed to protect them. Addition-

ally, members of the Hashed and Bakeel tribal

confederations turned their allegiance to the pro-

test movement and called for Saleh to step down

peacefully.

In addition to the recent wave of protests affecting

Yemen, ongoing divisions between the popula-

tions of the former North and South Yemen per-

sist, resulting in frequent unrest and large demon-

strations that have been attended by hundreds of

thousands of supporters of the Southern Move-

ment. Leaders of the Southern Movement argue

that the central government discriminates against

them both economically and politically. While the

majority of Yemen‘s natural resource wealth is

located in the southern provinces, southern oppo-

sition leaders argue they do not receive an equita-

ble share of the income. President Saleh and his

family, they argue, have siphoned off much of the

government‘s revenue into their own personal cof-

fers. Since 2009, demands for a more federal sys-

tem of government have evolved into calls for full

independence.

In addition to the independence movement in the

south, an intermittent insurgency has been taking

place in the north since 2004. Houthi rebels, made

up of primarily Shi‘a from the Zaidi sect, have

fought six rounds of fighting in the northern prov-

ince of Sa‘dah. In August 2010, the Houthi rebels

and the Sana‘a government declared a ceasefire

11

Conclusions: Yemen has been plagued by high levels of civil unrest for years, and even if President

Saleh is able to remain as President through these demonstrations, possibilities for stability are uncertain.

Houthi and Southern Movement grievances will need to be addressed by whatever government emerges.

Although formal opposition parties have promised to do so, their willingness and commitment to follow

through remains unclear. Saleh‘s ability to remain Yemen‘s leader, however, unlikely. Defections from top

members of the armed forces, particularly Mohsen, and the resignations of several prominent Yemeni

diplomats do not bode well for Saleh‘s long-term future.

President Saleh appears to lack widespread support from his people, but until recently, could depend on

a core military and tribal power base. Much of his military and tribal support appears to be eroding. Tribal

support is especially tenuous as Saleh uses a patronage network to buy support, but the length and de-

gree of this support depends primarily on what tribes believe will best serve their changing interests. In-

ternational support has also been weakened as a result of the violence of March 18. Saleh‘s abrupt de-

parture after more than 30 years in power, should it occur, will likely lead to a number of actors vying to

fill the power vacuum.

MEDIUM RISK

JORDAN

Factors Contributing to Unrest: Protesters have organized marches and demonstrations nearly every Fri-

day from mid-January into April2011. These include both large pro-reform and pro-government demon-

strations. In addition, smaller protests, often in response to labor, union, and land issues, have occurred

with increasing frequency and now take place on a nearly daily basis. The largest protests, which have

resulted in significant media attention, tend to occur on Fridays following afternoon prayers. The size of

Friday protest typically range from a few thousand to up to 15,000. Demonstrator demands have focused

on economic reforms to address rising food costs, the replacement of unpopular officials, and the loosen-

ing of social and political freedoms. Although these protests were able to attract significant numbers,

most protests remained peaceful and required minimal police intervention. However, on several occa-

sions protests have led to more intense clashes between security forces, resulting in significant injuries

and even deaths.

Despite being located adjacent to two of the world‘s largest oil producing nations, Jordan has extremely

limited natural resources. It has a poor economy, which has grown worse due to a large deficit and rising

unemployment. Except for a small population of wealthy Jordanians, Jordanians largely struggle with a

poor standard of living. Income inequality is large and continues to increase. Recent increases in food

and oil prices have only exacerbated these ongoing problems.

Most of the political opposition is fragmented; however, the Islamic Action Front, the local political wing of

the Muslim Brotherhood, is well organized and appears to have firm support from at least a small seg-

ment of the population. If the protest movement grew in strength, the Islamic Action Front would be well

positioned to mobilize demonstrators.

Although most demonstrations remained peaceful, violent demonstrations on March 25 resulted in the

over 100 protester injuries, 83 police injuries, and one death. The severity of this violence quickly esca-

lated the tensions between pro-reformists and both the Jordanian Government and their supporters.

Following these late March events, the Islamic Action Front has felt increased pressure from pro-

government supports, including having its website hacked, its property broken into, and an unknown at-

tacker enter its facility and threaten to blow it up (the device turned out to be a fake).

Factors Mitigating Unrest: Although groups have called for limits on the power of the monarchy, opposi-

tion groups have refrained from specifically criticizing King Abdullah or calling for him to step down.

12

the foreboding atmosphere in the anticipation of

the STL‘s findings, all parties appear to be re-

specting the political process for forming a new

government.

Violent disputes involving members of different

sects are a common occurrence. In May 2008,

Shi‘a supporters of Hezbollah and members of

Saad Hariri‘s Future Party (Sunni backers of

Lebanon‘s government) fought in downtown Bei-

rut for two weeks after the government threat-

ened to dismantle Hezbollah‘s private telecom-

munications network, resulting in the deaths of

approximately 100 Lebanese.

Soon after the onset of fighting, Hezbollah militia-

men took control of access roads to Beirut Inter-

national Airport. If sectarian fighting erupts in the

near-term, Hezbollah is still capable of taking

control of key infrastructure throughout Beirut

and will likely again control the airport.

On August 24, 2010, a dispute over a parking

space escalated into a firefight between a sup-

porter of Hezbollah and a supporter of the pro-

Syrian Sunni political party, the Association of

Islamic Charitable Projects or al-Ahbash. As the

initial incident intensified, local residents joined in

the fighting along their respective sectarian lines,

and it evolved into an approximately four hour

battle with assault weapons and rocket propelled

grenade. Three people were killed, including Mo-

hammed Fawwaz, Hezbollah military commander

of Burj Abi Haider. In the wake of the incident,

both Hezbollah and al-Ahbash downplayed the

potential for further sectarian violence by quickly

labeling it nothing more than a ―personal dis-

pute.‖ The speed and severity in which this

―personal‖ dispute escalated into a wider sectar-

ian battle, however, demonstrates a high degree

of underlying sectarian tension.

Factors Mitigating Unrest: The Lebanese confes-

sional system of politics is prone to internal strife.

However, the same system of sectarian politics is

likely to prevent one broad based coalition from

garnering sufficient support from the population

to challenge the current system. Thus far, all ma-

jor political parties, including Hezbollah, appear

willing to work within the current political system.

Instead opposition groups focused on the removal

of Prime Minister Rifai, and King Abdullah has

already acquiesced to this demand.

In response to protests, King Abdullah took a

number of other preemptive steps to weaken the

strength of the opposition. The King announced

pay raises for civil servants and $125 million in

subsidies to counter rising food and fuel costs.

These concessions seem intended to garner sup-

port from as the East Bankers, i.e. local Bedouin

tribes that are native to Jordan, which for decades

have been the monarchy‘s traditional power base.

In addition, subsidies on staple goods have also

dampened the demands of the poorer communi-

ties of Palestinian origin, also referred to as the

West Bankers. With the exception of the Islamic

Action Front, political parties are small, weak, and

poorly organized. Their influence on and support

from the Jordanian population is comparatively

minimal.

Conclusions: Protests took place in Amman and to

lesser extent outlying cities during the early part of

2011, but King Abdullah made a number of key

concessions that largely placated demonstrators.

Small protests are likely to take place regularly,

with medium sized protests occurring on Fridays.

However, Jordanian security forces are typically

capable of handling these expected demonstra-

tions with limited use of force. Violence is unlikely

unless instigated by hooligans or tribal conflicts.

LEBANON

Factors Contributing to Unrest: In March 2011, a

coalition of civil society, political, and youth groups

organized peaceful demonstrations calling for an

end to Lebanon‘s sectarian political system.

These demonstrations collectively demanded re-

form of the confessional system while some par-

ticipants promoted specific civil rights issues.

On January 12, Hezbollah and its allies in the

March 8 coalition formally withdrew their ten min-

isters from the Lebanese cabinet due to the politi-

cal impasse over the Special Tribunal for Lebanon

(STL). The resignation of the March 8 ministers,

coupled with an eleventh resignation from a Shi‘ite

minister associated with President Michael

Sleiman‘s cabinet bloc, precipitated the constitu-

tional dissolution of the year-old national unity

government of Prime Minister Saad Hariri. Al-

though Hezbollah‘s actions have added tension to

13

Conclusions: Lebanon continues to be at risk for outbreaks of civil unrest stemming from the country‘s

sectarian politics which have previously led to civil war, and as recent as 2008, a temporary paralysis in

Beirut. However, Lebanon does not suffer from the same conditions faced by Middle Eastern nations fac-

ing large-scale unrest, namely long-serving leaders and a centralized power structure. The Lebanese

government is made up of competing factions that are broken down by sectarian lines. Although fre-

quently at odds with one another these groups appear committed to working within the system for the

time being. No single political group or section of society appears capable of mobilizing a cross-cutting

segment of society that can challenge the current system.

SAUDI ARABIA

Factors Contributing to Unrest: The Government of Saudi Arabia (SAG) restricts many basic freedoms

and does not tolerate challenges to the authority of the regime. Although protests are banned, it has al-

lowed some small protests to occur without reacting with force. For example, in January 2011, multiple

small-scale protests occurred in Jeddah in response to the government‘s poor response to the flooding

earlier in the month.

The Shi‘a population, whose majority is centered in Eastern Province, claims religious, social, and eco-

nomic discrimination by the central government. This population has been vocal in calling for protests and

is likely bolstered by large-scale Shi‘a demonstrations in nearby Bahrain. In March 2011, multiple protests

called for the release of nine Shi‘a prisoners who have been incarcerated since 1996 without trial for the

truck bombing of the Khobar Towers where 19 U.S. military, 1 Saudi and 372 others were wounded.

These protests were limited to a few hundred protesters and were dispersed by security forces without

much disruption. Although a number of social media sites called for larger protests to take place during

mid-March, sizeable protests never materialized.

Upward to 40 percent of college educated Saudi nationals between the ages of 22-30 are unemployed

and with minimal options available. Efforts by the SAG to create employment for these Saudi citizens

mandate companies to hire only Saudis through the ―Saudization Program.‖ While the service sector con-

sists primarily of third country nationals from South Asian countries (Sri Lanka, Pakistan, India, Indonesia,

Nepal, Bangladesh, and the Philippines) for much lower wages and benefits, for Saudi nationals to work

such jobs is a social stigma.

Factors Mitigating Unrest: Saudi Arabia maintains a strong and effective security force which is capable

of minimizing dissent among the population. The SAG also bans public gatherings and protests as unlaw-

ful. Their tactics include surveillance and detainment of opposition leaders and suspected agitators. In

addition, senior Saudi clerics preach at sermons that demonstrations against the state are un-Islamic.

In response to growing regional unrest, the SAG announced significant economic concessions. The

country‘s $430 billion dollar economy continues to expand, and its $500 billion in foreign reserves allows

it to invest in infrastructure and other social services. In the past several years, the SAG has spent tens of

billions on universities and other trade schools, hospitals, rail lines, and housing developments. Following

upheavals in Tunisia, Egypt, and Libya, the government announced $29.5 billion in financial benefits to

poorer Saudis and raised pay for public servants. In addition, King Abdullah promised a multibillion dollar

package of reforms, raises, cash, loans and apartments to include an additional two months wages for all

government workers, two extra payments for university students worth around $500 dollars, an increase

in the monthly minimum wage to $800 dollars, and a monthly payment of around $260 dollars to the

country‘s unemployed. The King also set aside around $70 billion to build 500,000 apartments for low-

income residents and promised millions more capital for the government‘s housing loan fund and raised

the maximum loan for homes to around $130,000.

Conclusions: Although calls for demonstrations have taken place via various social media sites, the po-

tential for large-scale demonstrations is extremely low. The opposition is not well-organized, and most

14

concerns, opposition groups have not called for

regime change. Protest organizers have at-

tempted to keep protests peaceful, but additional

violence is possible if criminal or hooligan ele-

ments take advantage of the protests to carry out

criminal acts.

OMAN

Factors Contributing to Unrest: During late Feb-

ruary and early March 2011, protesters blocked

roads leading into Sohar, which is located to the

west of Muscat. There were reports of injuries,

property damage, and at least one fatality. In the

nearby town of Ibri, protesters set fire to a gov-

ernment building. In Dhank, near the UAE bor-

der, protesters blocked a roundabout.

In addition, multiple labor sectors, including

transportation, manufacturing, and hotels, en-

gaged in strikes calling for better salaries. Both

private sector and public sector employees have

gone on strike, including port and industrial work-

ers.

Factors Mitigating Unrest

The Omani population has not called for the re-

moval of Sultan Qaboos. Sultan Qaboos is highly

respected among the Omani population and pro-

testors have largely confined their demands to

calls for additional jobs, higher wages, and a

more accountable government, rather than a

radical change in the political system or regime

change.

Sultan Qaboos has taken steps to address pro-

tester demands, including announcing several

economic measures and reshuffling the cabinet,

and giving legislative powers to the elected coun-

cil, the Majlis Al Shura. Sultan Qaboos also or-

dered an increase in state pension benefits and

payments for families receiving social security.

Conclusions

Sector specific strikes continue in Oman and may

cause some disruption to businesses operating in

the country. However, the larger protests in So-

har appear to have been an isolated phenome-

non. The Omani population regards Sultan

Qaboos highly, and demonstrations against the

regime are unlikely to materialize.

protesters are hesitant to confront the security

forces for fear of reprisal. Previous social media

attempts to organize a ―Day of Rage‖ on March 11

did not result in widespread attendance. Small-

scale protests are possible, particularly in Eastern

Province, but are unlikely to generate mass turn-

outs.

LOW RISK

MOROCCO

Factors Contributing to Unrest: In late February

2011, Morocco experienced protests in Casa-

blanca, Marrakech, Fez, Tangiers, and Rabat, that

each respectively drew several thousand partici-

pants. While protest organizers attempted to

maintain peaceful demonstrations, there were nu-

merous reported incidents of violence and looting.

Nationwide, approximately 33 public buildings, 24

banks, and 50 shops/private buildings were dam-

aged or burned. Additional protests took place but

attracted limited attendance.

Protest organizers have generally focused their

aims on establishing a constitutional monarchy to

limit the powers of King Mohamed VI. However,

protests were also supported by other opposition

groups with their own set goals to include Islamist

groups who have long disputed the legitimacy of

the monarchy and Berber groups who demand

that the Berber language be included as part of

the state‘s official languages.

Factors Mitigating Unrest: King Mohamed VI

maintains considerable support from much of the

population. While some opposition groups seek to

limit the power of the monarchy, they have not

specifically called for King‘s removal. Compared to

leaders in neighboring countries that have experi-

enced greater unrest, King Mohamed VI is seen

as a reformer, even if more liberal segments of

society view these reforms as moving too slowly.

Additionally, the Government of Morocco has en-

acted preventative measures to limit support for

the opposition, including creating additional food

subsidies. This will likely inhibit the opposition‘s

ability to generate a wider following.

Conclusions: Small to medium size demonstra-

tions are likely to occur sporadically throughout

2011, but the possibility of widespread large dem-

onstrations is low. Despite having some legitimate

15

MINIMAL RISK

KUWAIT

Factors Contributing to Unrest: Currently, the most significant source of political dissatisfaction within Ku-

wait has been the five year struggle to oust Prime Minister Nasser Mohammed Al-Ahmed Al-Sabah,

nephew of the Emir. The Prime Minister is accused of mismanaging the economy and helping to erode

freedom of speech in the nation. While opponents of Al-Sabah have called for the Prime Minister‘s re-

placement, the majority of opposition voices are not demanding an overhaul of the political system.

Additionally, the stateless ―bidun‖ population staged demonstrations in February and March, demanding

the Government of Kuwait provide them with greater access to social welfare benefits. These individuals,

estimated to be about 120,000, are denied the many welfare benefits citizens receive, including free edu-

cation and health care, and often do not have the right to obtain identification cards, vital records, or

travel documents.

Factors Mitigating Unrest: In comparison to their Gulf neighbors, Kuwaiti citizens openly engage in politi-

cal dialogue. In addition, the National Assembly of Kuwait functions as more than a symbolic parliament;

on several occasions its members have compelled cabinet ministers to resign and in 2006 helped force

the ailing emir‘s abdication from office.

Kuwaiti citizens enjoy generous welfare benefits with 80 percent of government income paid from the

revenue of exported petroleum products. An effective police presence also contributes to the rarity of

public demonstrations occurring in the nation. Additionally, any criticism directed against the Emir of Ku-

wait is both illegal and punishable by law.

Conclusions: While small-scale protests take place from time to time in Kuwait, large public demonstra-

tions are rare. The level of growth in opposition to the current prime minister has been an ongoing issue

for the last five years with minimal consequences but could potentially lead to a larger protest. The likeli-

hood of any unrest throughout the country is minimal, if at all.

QATAR

Factors Contributing to Unrest: Calls for political demonstrations in support of the wave of Arab uprisings

have occurred on social media outlets, potentially with some input by the youth of Qatar based on various

grievances against the ruling family and civil governance, but have not materialized past the point of plan-

ning. Although neighboring Bahrain and Saudi Arabia have both experienced degrees of unrest, there

have been no indications that demonstrations are likely to occur in Qatar.

Factors Mitigating Unrest: The majority of Qatar‘s population consists of foreign nationals; its citizen

population is estimated to be only about 230,000 out of approximately 1.7 million. Qatar has the highest

GDP per capita in the world at around $88,000. Unemployment in Qatar is very low, and unskilled labor

positions are often filled by foreign nationals. Recently, Qatar became the largest producer of Liquefied

Natural Gas (LNG), supplying increasing global energy demands. These elevated economic conditions

provide an environment with minimal susceptibility to large-scale economic unrest.

Following these late March events, the Islamic Action Front has felt increased pressure from pro-

government supports, including having its website hacked, its property broken into, and an unknown at-

tacker enter its facility and threaten to blow it up (the device turned out to be a fake).

Factors Mitigating Unrest

Although groups have called for limits on the power of the monarchy, opposition groups have refrained

from specifically criticizing King Abdullah or calling for him to step down. Instead opposition groups

16

focused on the removal of Prime Minister Rifai, and King Abdullah has already acquiesced to this de-

mand.

Conclusions: A popular uprising in Qatar is highly unlikely due to the large amount of national wealth and

socialized economic system that affords Qatari citizens access to state-provided funding on many levels,

including free education, medical and an array of government employment positions as well as other

monetary stipends. The lack of participation and development of planned protests originating from social

networking sites also signifies a very minimal interest by Qatari citizens to engage in political opposition

at this level. Protesters have organized marches and demonstrations nearly every Friday from mid-

January into April2011. These include both large pro-reform and pro-government demonstrations. In ad-

dition, smaller protests, often in response to labor, union, and land issues, have occurred with increasing

frequency and now take place on a nearly daily basis. The largest protests, which have resulted in sig-

nificant media attention, tend to occur on Fridays following afternoon prayers. The size of Friday protest

typically range from a few thousand to up to 15,000. Demonstrator demands have focused on economic

reforms to address rising food costs, the replacement of unpopular officials, and the loosening of social

and political freedoms. Although these protests were able to attract significant numbers, most protests

remained peaceful and required minimal police intervention. However, on several occasions protests

have led to more intense clashes between security forces, resulting in significant injuries and even

deaths.

Despite being located adjacent to two of the world‘s largest oil producing nations, Jordan has extremely

limited natural resources. It has a poor economy, which has grown worse due to a large deficit and rising

unemployment. Except for a small population of wealthy Jordanians, Jordanians largely struggle with a

poor standard of living. Income inequality is large and continues to increase. Recent increases in food

and oil prices have only exacerbated these ongoing problems.

Most of the political opposition is fragmented; however, the Islamic Action Front, the local political wing of

the Muslim Brotherhood, is well organized and appears to have firm support from at least a small seg-

ment of the population. If the protest movement grew in strength, the Islamic Action Front would be well

positioned to mobilize demonstrators.

Although most demonstrations remained peaceful, violent demonstrations on March 25 resulted in the

over 100 protester injuries, 83 police injuries, and one death. The severity of this violence quickly esca-

lated the tensions between pro-reformists and both the Jordanian Government and their supporters.

UNITED ARAB EMIRATES

Factors Contributing to Unrest: The UAE has remained stable despite the recent wave of Arab protests

throughout the Middle East. While the country does not have a turbulent history of political demonstra-

tions, workers strikes have occurred. However, the motivation behind these protests has been to lobby

for improved work conditions rather than changes to the political system.

Factors Mitigating Unrest: The current stability in the country can be attributed to two main factors, the

presence of a large foreign worker population and a high standard of living for the small segment of soci-

ety that are Emirati citizens. The UAE is the third largest exporter of oil, creating one of the world‘s high-

est GDP per capita of $47,000. The vast oil wealth that exists in Abu Dhabi and the high levels of trade

and property-fuelled development in Dubai have shielded these areas from the political instability that has

shaken the much more populous and less wealthy nations of North Africa. It is highly likely that the UAE‘s

strong economy will obviate significant unrest.

Conclusions: The high standard of living combined with the diverse population shield the United Arab

Emirates from the wave of Arab protests taking place in surrounding nations. More rural parts of the UAE

are at a greater—although still low—chance of seeing political unrest. However, the government recently

17

announced investments totaling $1.6 billion to improve the infrastructure in these less developed regions

of the country. These trends suggest that the UAE is unlikely to have any significant civil unrest at least

through 2011.

18

Weekly News Highlights Egypt’s Ex-Interior Minister on Trial for Mur-der: One of Egypt's most feared government

ministers on Tuesday pleaded innocent to charges of ordering the killing of unarmed pro-testers during the Jan. 25 uprising that ousted longtime President Hosni Mubarak. Former Interior Minister Habib el-Adly could face a

death sentence if convicted. Full Story

Bombs Strike Two Buses Carrying Workers in Karachi: Two bombs exploded on Tuesday

next to two buses transporting employees of the Pakistani Navy in the southern port city of Karachi, killing at least four people, a senior naval official said. At least 56 other people were wounded. Full Story

M16 Employed Al-Qaeda Assassin: An al-

leged al-Qaeda militant suspected of bombing a luxury hotel and two churches in Pakistan in 2002 was an informer for MI6, it has been claimed. Adil Hadi al Jazairi Bin Hamlili was detained at Guantanamo Bay between 2003 and last year when he was sent back to his

native Algeria by President Obama. Full Story

Al-Qaeda Afghan Number Two Dead: Inter-

national forces in Afghanistan say they have killed their number two insurgent target in the country - senior al-Qaeda leader Abdul Ghani. The Saudi citizen died in an air strike almost two weeks ago in Kunar province, near Paki-stan, Nato-led forces said. Full Story Thai-Cambodia Clashes Spread East: Fight-

ing has erupted between soldiers from Cambo-dia and Thailand along their disputed moun-tainous border for a fifth consecutive day. Spokesmen from both sides said skirmishes broke out near the Preah Vihear temple on

Tuesday. Full Story

Free-Spending Turkey Hopes to Avoid a Fall: Is Turkey‘s booming economy ripe for a

fall? It certainly looks that way. Stock brokers endure four-month waiting lists to pay as much as $150,000 for top-of-the-line Audis and BMWs — twice the manufacturers‘ prices after taxes. A real estate developer recently laid out a record $33.3 million an acre for a 24-acre plot

of land in Istanbul‘s city center. Full Story

NATO Strikes Qaddafi Compound: NATO

warplanes struck Col. Muammar el-Qaddafi‘s compound here early on Monday and also bombed a state television complex in an esca-lation of the air campaign to aid the rebellion

against his four decades in power. Full Story

India Arrests Former Chief of Common-wealth Games: Investigators here arrested the

former chief organizer of the scandal-marred Commonwealth Games on Monday, after un-covering what they said were irregularities in the awarding of contracts for the international

sporting event. Full Story

Foiled Hijacker Wanted to Go to Libya: An

agitated passenger aboard an Alitalia flight from Paris to Rome on Sunday night attacked a flight attendant and demanded the plane be diverted to Libya but other attendants subdued the man, the airline said. The flight landed safely in the Italian capital as scheduled, Ali-talia said in a statement. All 131 passengers aboard flight AZ329 disembarked safely in

Rome. Full Story

Syria Escalates Crackdown as Tanks Go to Restive City: The Syrian Army stormed the

restive city of Dara‘a with tanks and soldiers and helped detain dozens in towns across the country Monday in an escalation of the crack-down on Syria‘s five-week-old uprising, accord-ing to residents and human rights activists. They said at least 25 people had been killed in Dara‘a, with reports of bodies strewn in the streets. Full Story

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The contents of this (U) presentation in no way represent the policies, views, or attitudes of the United States Department of State, or the United States Gov-ernment, except as otherwise noted (e.g., travel advisories, public statements). The presentation was compiled from various open sources and (U) embassy

reporting. Please note that all OSAC products are for internal U.S. private sector security purposes only. Publishing or otherwise distributing OSAC-derived

information in a manner inconsistent with this policy may result in the discontinuation of OSAC support.

Research and Information Support Center (RISC) Contact Information

Europe

Shane O’Brien

Regional Analyst

571-345-2234

O‗BrienSW@state.gov

Shari-Ann Peart

Outreach Coordinator

571-345-7747

PeartSJ@state.gov

South & Central Asia

Marc Solomon

Regional Analyst

571-345-2235

SolomonMB@state.gov

Monica Ortiz

Outreach Coordinator

571-345-2225

OrtizmMR@state.gov

Brent Heminger

Senior Coordinator -

Regional Analysis

571-345-2226

HemingerBG@state.gov

Africa

Todd Woodard

Regional Analyst

571-345-2232

WoodardTM@state.gov

Valerie Schaeublin

Outreach Coordinator

571-345-7782

SchaeublinVA@state.gov

Elena Carrington

Senior Coordinator -

Outreach Programs

571-345-2228

CarringtonEA@state.gov

Near East Asia

Bill Barnes

Regional Analyst

571-345-7746

BarnesWJ@state.gov

Monica Ortiz

Outreach Coordinator

571-345-2225

OrtizmMR@state.gov

East Asia & the Pacific

Josh Richards

Regional Analyst

571-345-2233

RichardsJA@state.gov

Valerie Schaeublin

Outreach Coordinator

571-345-7782

SchaeublinVA@state.gov

Western Hemisphere

Justin Lamb

Regional Analyst

571-345-2221

LambJM@state.gov

Shari-Ann Peart

Outreach Coordinator

571-345-7747

PeartSJ@state.gov

Global Security Unit

Ryan Garvey

Coordinator, Information

Security & Cyber Threats

571-345-7748

GarveyRW@state.gov

Wes Gould

Global Security Coordinator

571-345-7794

GouldCW@state.gov

Jeremy Van Dam

Global Security Coordinator

571-345-7785

VanDamJS@state.gov

Greg Hoobler

Manager, Global

Analysis

571-345-2229

HooblerGD@state.gov

Laura Simmons

Coordinator, Major Events

571-345-7745

SimmonsLK@state.gov

Lauren D’Amore

Senior Coordinator -

Global Security

571-345-2227

D‘AmoreLE@state.gov

Jackee Schools

Chief RISC-

571-345-2219

SchoolsSJ@state.gov