11.07.2013 - Jenny Aker
-
Upload
amdseminarseries -
Category
Business
-
view
229 -
download
0
description
Transcript of 11.07.2013 - Jenny Aker
Jenny C. Aker, Tufts UniversityIFPRI
November 7, 2013
Jenny C. Aker
Cash or Vouchers?The Relative Impacts of Cash and Vouchers in
the Democratic Republic of Congo
Cash and Vouchers in DRC
• How should society (donors, governments and NGOs) redistribute to the poor?
• Cash transfer programs are an increasingly important part of social protection programs in both developed and developing countries
• Majority of welfare transfers are still “in-kind” Food aid, food stamps, medicines, inputs, vouchersEspecially in developing (conflict) countries
Motivation
Jenny C. Aker Cash and Vouchers in DRC
In-Kind _x000d_(Local/Re-gional Purchase)
Vouchers Cash Transfers0%
10%
20%
30%
40%
50%
60%
70%
80%
90%
79.0%
9.0%12.0%
44.0%
14.0%
42.0%
% of USAID Emergency Food Security Program Budget
2011_x000d_Total: $232 mil-lion
2012_x000d_Total: $374 mil-lion
Type of Assistance
% o
f EFS
P Bu
dget
Source: Congressional Research Service, 2013Jenny C. Aker Cash and Vouchers in DRC
International Cash and In-Kind Transfers
• If program recipients would weakly prefer an equal-valued cash transfer to an in-kind transfer, why not use cash?
• Cash might not be the preferred modality for redistributing wealthTargeting Local supplyPolitical feasibility “Paternalism”
• Little evidence of the relative effects of each modality in developing countries
Motivation
Jenny C. Aker Cash and Vouchers in DRC
Jenny C. Aker Cash and Vouchers in DRC
Jenny C. Aker Cash and Vouchers in DRC
Research Goals
• What are the relative effects of cash versus in-kind transfers (vouchers) on household purchases, consumption and other measures of well-being?
• Households randomly assigned to equal-valued cash or voucher transferNo pure comparison group
• Assess impact on purchasing decisions, consumption, other indicators of well-being
• Investigate mechanisms• Calculate the cost-effectiveness of each modality
Research Questions
Jenny C. Aker Cash and Vouchers in DRC
• Starkly different purchasing patterns between the two modalitiesVoucher transfer extra-marginal for some food items
• Few differential effects on other outcomes (food security, food expenditures, assets, coping strategies)Cash households were able to save more of their transfer
• Different purchases primarily due to program design, but voucher could be resold
• Costs of voucher program higher for implementing agency (and potentially program recipients)
Jenny C. Aker Cash and Vouchers in DRC
Preview of Findings
• In-kind transfers Food stamps in the US (Moffitt 1989, Fraker et al 1995,
Whitmore 2002, Hoynes and Schazenbach 2009)• Unconditional cash transfers
Increased food consumption (Hoddindott and Skoufias 2004, Attanasio and Mesnard 2005, Maluccio 2007), improved child health (Gertler 2004)
• Conditional versus unconditional cash transfers (Baird et al 2011)
• Cash versus food transfers (Del Ninno and Dorosh 2003, Ahmed et al 2009, Cunha 2012, Hoddinott et al 2013, Gilligan et al 2013)
• Cash, food and vouchers (Hidrobo et al 2012)Jenny C. Aker Cash and Vouchers in DRC
Related Literature
• Civil war since the 1990s “Africa’s world war” Over three million people killed Peace deal in 2003, but continued fighting and millions internally
displaced (1.7 million as of July 2011)• Internally displaced populations live in host communities and/or
camps Few income-generating opportunities, little access to basic needs International organizations provide in-kind transfers (seeds and tools,
non-food items, vouchers) and cash (primarily cash-for-work)• Limited investment in basic infrastructure (roads, power, landlines,
mobile phones) Markets still function (three markets within a 20-km radius of the camp)
Democratic Republic of Congo
Jenny C. Aker Cash and Vouchers in DRC
• Implemented by Concern Worldwide in one informal camp (Bushani) All households in the camp eligible for the transferTransfer provided to the woman within the household
• US$130 transfer provided in three installments between September 2011 and March 2012US$90 provided in September 2011, US$20 provided in
October 2011 and US$20 in March 2012Provided to increase asset accumulation (NFIs) and meet
food needsAll households had to travel to Masisi (3 hours’ walk) to
obtain their transferJenny C. Aker Cash and Vouchers in DRC
Transfer Program
Bushani Camp
Masisi
Nyabiondo
• 474 households stratified by neighborhood and randomly assigned to one of two transfer modalities
• T1: Unconditional cash transfer. Cash transfers provided in three installments
• T2. Voucher. Vouchers provided in three installments First voucher could be spent on food and non-food items at a
“multisectoral fair” Second and third vouchers could only be spent on food items
• Equivalently-valued transfers provided at same time and same amounts
• Both groups had to travel to main urban center (Masisi, 15 km from camp) to pick up their transfer
• Voucher households informed of the restriction in advance• No pure comparison group
Research Design
Jenny C. Aker Cash and Vouchers in DRC
Voucher Fair
• First voucher fair: Included over 122 vendors and four primary schools in the area, and provided access to NFIs, household items, clothes, school fees, agricultural inputs (seeds and tools), and small animals.
• Second and third voucher fairs: Vouchers could be spent on food at “open markets”, whereby program recipients could circulate freely among pre-arranged boutiques and kiosks. o Vouchers could not be used to purchase meat and
condiments.
Voucher Fair
• Paternalism• Targeting• Market supply• Political feasibility• Security
Why Vouchers?
Jenny C. Aker Cash and Vouchers in DRC
• Paternalism• Targeting• Market supply• Political feasibility• Security
Why Vouchers?
Jenny C. Aker Cash and Vouchers in DRC
• Design similar to other voucher programs in humanitarian contexts
• Differs from “traditional” voucher transfers by:• Timing – had to be spent in one day• Location – could only be spent at voucher fair
(rather than vendors, kiosks or marketes in different locations)
External Validity
qNFI
qFood
A
B
Theoretical Framework
Jenny C. Aker Cash and Vouchers in DRC
qNFI
qFood
A
B
A’
B’
T/pFood
Jenny C. Aker Cash and Vouchers in DRC
Cash Transfer
qNFI
qFood
A
B
A’
B’
qF=T/pFood
A’’
Voucher with no resale
Jenny C. Aker Cash and Vouchers in DRC
B’: Voucher is infra-marginal
A’’: Voucher is extra-marginal and binding
qNFI
qFood
A
B
A’
B’
qF=T/pFood
A’’
A’’’
A’’: Voucher is extra-marginal and binding
B’: Voucher is infra-marginal
A’’’: Voucher is extra-marginal and non-binding
Voucher with resale
Jenny C. Aker Cash and Vouchers in DRC
Can also affect preferences and make
the goods more substitutable
• If transfers are extra-marginal, then there should be differential effects of cash and vouchers on household purchases
• If vouchers are binding, then there should be differential effects of cash and vouchers on consumption
• But would these differences lead to improved well-being?
Theoretical Predictions
Jenny C. Aker Cash and Vouchers in DRC
Data
• Panel survey of 250 households over three rounds (September 2011, November 2011 and March 2012)Data on uses of transfer, assets, income sources, food
securityNo full expenditure or consumption module but income and
food expenditures from the previous weekExtensive margin of purchases for each transfer, and
quantities purchased for subset of goods• Price data for 40 products on the primary market and
voucher fairs• Exit surveys from voucher fairs and cash transfer recipients
on purchases• Cost data for each transfer modality 25Jenny C. Aker Cash and Vouchers in DRC
Data
Project Timeline
26
Year February March April May June July August September October November December
2011
Design program
Identify program
recipients and assign household
sBaseline survey
First cash transfer and
voucher (multisector
al fair)
Second cash
transfer and
voucher distributio
n (food fair)
Midterm survey
Monitor voucher fairs, prices, security situation
2012 Third cash transfer
and voucher
distribution
Final household
survey
Project Timeline
Jenny C. Aker Cash and Vouchers in DRC
Project Timeline
Jenny C. Aker Cash and Vouchers in DRC
Table 1. Comparison of Pre-Program Characteristics
Variables Voucher Cash p-value
Mean (s.d.) Mean (s.d.)
Panel A: Socio-Demographic Characteristics
Household size 5.40 5.55 0.314
(2.00) (1.85)
Number of children (less than 15 years of age) 3.23 3.21 0.888
(1.87) (1.58)
Program recipient is married 0.69 0.78 0.285
(0.42) (0.42)
Program recipient is widowed 0.21 0.15 0.272
(0.35) (0.41)
Age of program recipient 34.15 34.87 0.503
(14.19) (13.12)
Program recipient has some education 0.50 0.48 0.767
(0.50) (0.50)
Program recipient born in Masisi Territory 0.96 0.87 0.04**
(0.19) (0.33)
Number of years living in the camp 1.53 1.42 0.867
(0.76) (0.82)
Jenny C. Aker Cash and Vouchers in DRC
Table 1. Comparison of Pre-Program CharacteristicsVariables Voucher Cash p-valuePanel B: Income and Income SourcesNumber of income sources 1.73 1.82 0.345
(0.72) (0.93)Total income earned during the past week (Congolese Franc) 2387 2491 0.885
(4610) (4863)Value of food purchases in the past week (Congolese Franc) 1883 1729 (4531) (1536) 0.678Panel C: Agricultural Production and LivestockHad access to land 0.02 0.02 0.863
(0.15) (0.13)Owned poultry 0.02 0.04 0.284 (0.12) (0.20) Panel D: Asset OwnershipTotal value (USD) of assets 62.30 60.60 0.821
(24.52) (25.50)Number of durable goods categories owned 0.01 0.01 0.834
(0.09) (0.09)Number of non-durable goods categories owned 10.87 11.00 0.453 (3.58) (3.55) Panel E: Food SecurityHousehold diet diversity score (out of 12) 2.77 3.04 0.204
(1.82) (1.67)Number of meals in last day (household 1.27 1.29 0.908
(0.58) (0.47)Number of meals eaten in last day (children) 1.29 1.29 0.885
(0.59) (0.49)Suffered from food insecurity since last harvest 0.99 0.99 0.838
(0.09) (0.09)Months of adequate food provisioning 1.57 1.86 0.042**
(1.23) (1.16)Number of observations 133 120 253
Well-balanced
Jenny C. Aker Cash and Vouchers in DRC
• yi is outcome of household i (uses of the transfer, quantities purchased, food security and asset ownership)
• cashi is the treatment status indicator of household i
• Xi0 is vector of baseline covariates
• θN is neighborhood fixed effects (level of stratification)
• εi individual shocks or ability• Use pooled data (November and March) and control for round fixed
effects• Also control for baseline outcome variable as a robustness check
(MacKenzie 2012)• Main threats to identification: Attrition, spillovers, multiple
hypothesis-testing30Jenny C. Aker Cash and Vouchers in DRC
Empirical Strategy
• Quantity of goods purchased by cash transfer households as compared with voucher households: Identifies whether transfer is infra- or extra-marginal
• Quantity of goods purchased versus consumed for voucher households: Identifies whether transfer is binding or non-binding
31
Are Transfers Infra- or Extra-Marginal?
Jenny C. Aker Cash and Vouchers in DRC
2346 FC = Weekly value
of VoucherWeekly value of
voucher: 2400 FC
Cdf of weekly household food expenditures: Cash Transfer Group
Voucher infra-marginal for 50% of
households
Total Food Expenditures
Jenny C. Aker Cash and Vouchers in DRC
Extra-marginality for
some food items
Stronger differences for
second and third transfers
Table 2: Uses of the Transfer
All Transfers Third Transfer(1) (2) (3)
Voucher Cash CashPanel A: Food Items Mean (s.d.) Coeff(s.e.) Coeff(s.e.)Number of different purchases made (last transfer) 4.94 3.07*** 4.03***
(2.75) (0.33) (0.45)
Staple grains (maize, maize flour) 0.49 0.25*** 0.25***(0.50) (0.06) (0.07)
Other grains (cassava flour, rice) 0.73 -0.12** -0.10*(0.45) (0.06) (0.08)
Beans 0.27 0.22*** 0.38***(0.45) (0.06) (0.07)
Condiments 0.15 0.27*** 0.26***(0.36) (0.05) (0.05)
Oil 0.56 0.21*** 0.27***(0.50) (0.06) (0.08)
Meat 0.03 0.65*** 0.55***(0.18) (0.04) (0.06)
Vegetables 0.08 0.36*** 0.35***(0.26) (0.05) (0.06)
Salt 0.93 -0.12** -0.12**(0.26) (0.05) (0.05)
Fish 0.45 -0.02 -0.02 (0.50) (0.08) (0.08)Panel B: Agricultural ItemsLivestock 0.09 0.05 0.08**
(0.30) (0.04) (0.03)Seeds 0.37 -0.06 0.03 (0.48) (0.06) (0.05)Panel C: Other Non-Food ItemsClothing 0.38 0.26*** 0.42***
(0.49) (0.06) (0.06)Housing Materials 0.232 0.15*** 0.11*** (0.42) -0.06 (0.03)Panel D: Education and Health ExpendituresSchool fees 0.28 0.42*** 0.64***
(0.45) (0.06) (0.06)Medicines 0.01 0.08*** 0.05*
(0.12) (0.03) (0.03)Reimburse debts 0.301 0.31*** 0.43***
(0.46) (0.06) (0.06)Observations 308 178
Stap
le g
rain
s
Other
gra
ins
Beans Oil
Condi
men
tsMea
t
Veget
able
sSa
ltFis
h
Lives
tock
Land
(par
cel)
Seed
s
Agricu
ltura
l mat
eria
l
Hire la
bor
Pay
scho
ol fe
es
Medici
ne
Pay
debt
s
Cloth
ing
House
hold
mat
eria
l
Metal
shee
ting
Plas
tic she
etin
g0.0%
10.0%
20.0%
30.0%
40.0%
50.0%
60.0%
70.0%
80.0%
90.0%
100.0%
Cash
Voucher
Uses of the Transfer (Second)
• Among food items, salt and rice were more likely to be purchased by voucher households (for all three transfers, but stronger for second and third transfers)o Fish not statistically significant across all rounds, just
second round
• This gives a sense of the extensive margin of over-provision
• What about intensive margin of over-provision?
35Jenny C. Aker Cash and Vouchers in DRC
Are Specific Items Extra-Marginal?
Jenny C. Aker Cash and Vouchers in DRC
Table 3: Quantities Demanded of Specific Food Items
(1) (2)
Voucher Cash
Mean (s.d.) Coeff(s.e.)
Salt (kg) 12.34 -9.97***
(18.57) (2.64)
Rice (kg) 1.77 -0.57***
(1.40) (0.18)
Fish (number) 1.75 -1.41***
(2.52) (0.32)
Number of observations 130 130
Intensive Margin of Overprovision
• Individual welfare losses associated with overprovision can be mitigated if the transfer is non-binding
• To measure whether the transfer is binding, we want to measure the difference between purchases and consumption for extra-marginal goods
• No data on actual quantities consumed, just whether consumed
• (Given quantities of fish and salt, we could estimate daily consumption of these goods between last transfer and food recall period, assuming transfers were binding)
Jenny C. Aker Cash and Vouchers in DRC
Are the Transfers Binding?
Data were collected 3 weeks after
each transfer, so difficult to
separate between resale,
storage or lumpy
consumption
Table 5: Food Security
All Transfers Third Transfer(1) (2) (3)
Voucher Cash CashMean (s.d.) Coeff(s.e.) Coeff(s.e.)
Panel A: Household Diet DiversityHousehold diet diversity (out of 12) 2.62 0.09 -0.07
(1.91) (0.19) (0.23)Grains 0.708 -0.02 0.02
(0.46) (0.06) (0.08)Tubers 0.736 -0.00 -0.01
(0.44) (0.06) (0.08)Beans 0.222 0.02 -0.01
(0.42) (0.05) (0.07)Vegetables 0.618 0.03 -0.01
(0.49) (0.06) (0.08)Fruits 0.041 -0.01 -0.03
(0.20) (0.03) (0.04)Fats 0.416 0.08 0.02
(0.49) (0.06) (0.08)Eggs 0 0.02 0.01
(0.00) (0.01) (0.01)Milk 0 0.00 0.00
(0.00) (0.00) (0.00)Meat 0.06 0.02 -0.03
(0.23) (0.03) (0.03)Fish 0.153 0.03 0.04
(0.36) (0.05) (0.06)Condiments 0.013 -0.01 -0.04
(0.12) (0.02) (0.03)Sugar 0.298 -0.04 -0.02 (0.46) (0.05) (0.07)
• Food security (number of meals per day, number of months of adequate household food provisioning, food insecurity since previous harvest)
• Asset ownership and savings (durable and non-durable goods categories)
• Agricultural assets (land, livestock)• Coping strategies
Jenny C. Aker Cash and Vouchers in DRC
Did the Vouchers lead to Differential Effects on Well-Being?
Food Security
Table 5: Food Security
All Transfers Third Transfer
(1) (2) (3)
Voucher Cash Cash
Mean (s.d.) Coeff(s.e.) Coeff(s.e.)
Panel B: Other Measures of Food Security
Number of meals per day (household) 1.41 0.01 -0.03
(0.28) (0.07) (0.10)
Number of meals per day (children) 2.12 -0.26 -0.51
(2.79) (0.31) (0.51)
Months of adequate food provisioning 2.06 0.13 0.08
(0.84) (0.09) (0.12)
Number of observations 308 178
Jenny C. Aker Cash and Vouchers in DRC
Income and Asset OwnershipTable 5: Proxy Indicators of Well-Being
All TransfersThird Transfer
(1) (2) (3)Voucher Cash Cash
Mean (s.d.) Coeff(s.e.) Coeff(s.e.)
Panel A: Income, Expenditures and SavingsIncome in the previous week (Congolese Francs) 3,357 739 834.22
(2938.83) (639.74) (1,039.19)Amount spent on food in previous week (Congolese Francs) 2,601 -119 -336.90
(2371.64) (274.58) (373.81)Money left from transfer (Congolese Francs) 0.00 0.09*** 0.07**
(0.00) (0.03) (0.03)Amount of money remaining (savings) 0.00 1,787** 1,130** (0.00) (704.44) (513.64)Panel B: AssetsTotal value of household assets (USD) 89.07 -1.15 0.36
(35.20) (4.53) (5.09)Number of durable assets owned 0.00 -0.01 0.01
(0.00) (0.02) (0.01)Number of non-durable assets owned 10.62 0.33 0.44
(7.03) (0.67) (0.91)Own poultry 0.1294 -0.04 -0.08
(0.34) (0.04) (0.05)Own rabbits 0.0117 0.02 0.04 (0.11) (0.02) (0.03)
Jenny C. Aker Cash and Vouchers in DRC
Table 5: Proxy Indicators of Well-Being
All Transfers Third Transfer
(1) (2) (3)
Voucher Cash Cash
Mean (s.d.) Coeff(s.e.) Coeff(s.e.)
Panel C: Coping Strategies
Sold household goods 0.0161 -0.02 -0.01
(0.13) (0.02) (0.01)
Reduced number of meals per day 0.27419 0.03 0.07
(0.45) (0.06) (0.08)
Took children out of school 0.0161 -0.02 -0.01
(0.13) (0.02) (0.02)
Number of observations 308 178
Coping Strategies
Jenny C. Aker Cash and Vouchers in DRC
• Different purchases in both groups – voucher households purchased more rice, salt and perhaps fishNo differential effects on individual food consumption
• Proxy indicators of well-being the same between the two groupsHowever, cash households saved some of their transfer
and reported suffering less from food insecurity
Summary
Jenny C. Aker Cash and Vouchers in DRC
• Why did purchases differ between the two groups?• Vouchers restricted to food fairs for last two transfers
Voucher households had to purchase items in food fairs on that day (location and timing of purchases)
Voucher households would have had to pay transport costs for many (or heavy) items
• Voucher households had more (less ) bargaining power vis-à-vis traders – had to pay higher prices
• Women in voucher households had more (less) bargaining power within the household
44Jenny C. Aker Cash and Vouchers in DRC
Mechanisms
Table 7: Mechanisms on Purchases(1) (2)
Voucher CashMean (s.d.) Coeff(s.e.)
Panel A: Location of PurchasesBoutique in camp 0.01 0.00
(0.11) (0.01)Market outside camp 0.02 0.97***
(0.12) (0.02)Masisi Center market (20 km from camp) 0.00 0.45***
(0.00) (0.08)Nyabiondo market (2 km from camp) 0.00 0.46***
(0.00) (0.08)Hospital 0.00 0.01
(0.00) (0.01)Voucher fair 0.99 -0.99***
(0.12) (0.01)School 0.00 0.01 (0.00) (0.01)Panel B: Timing of PurchasesSpent money in more than one purchase 0.013 0.77*** (0.12) (0.04)Panel C: Intra-Household Decision-Making with Respect to Transfers
Beneficiary responsible for spending all or part of transfer 0.94 -0.02(0.24) (0.03)
Husband responsible for spending transfer 0.46 -0.03(0.50) (0.06)
No one else responsible for spending transfer 0.06 -0.02(0.24) (0.03)
Discussed how to use transfer in advance with other person 0.79 -0.03(0.40) (0.05)
Number of observations 308
Jenny C. Aker Cash and Vouchers in DRC
If something was too heavy, I didn’t buy it…I wanted to buy two boxes of salt but could only carry one, so I
bought one plus other things.Voucher program recipient, Masisi camp
Mechanisms
Jenny C. Aker Cash and Vouchers in DRC
• Why did consumption not differ between the two groups?
• Time delay between purchases and consumption Storage or lumpy consumptionWouldn’t explain lack of difference in salt consumption
• Resale of goods purchasedAlmost all households stated that they purchased the
overprovided goods for resale
• Sharing of goods (and cash) between the two groups
47Jenny C. Aker Cash and Vouchers in DRC
Mechanisms
Sharing of money and
goods
No differential effects on
intra-household decision-making
Jenny C. Aker Cash and Vouchers in DRC
Table 8: Mechanisms on Outcomes
(1) (2)
Voucher Cash
Mean (s.d.) Coeff(s.e.)
Panel A: Transfers are Non-Binding
Program recipient shared part of money received 0.25 0.11*
(0.44) (0.06)
Program recipient shared part of goods purchased 0.46 -0.15**
(0.50) (0.06)
Panel C: Intra-Household Decision-Making with Respect to Transfers
Husband makes education decisions alone 0.3 0.05
(0.46) (0.06)
Husband makes agriculture decisions alone 0.26 0.05
(0.44) (0.06)
Husband decides whether to share with other households alone 0.16 0.03
(0.04) (0.06)
Husband decides whether/how to save alone 0.31 0.02
(0.47) (0.06)
Ratio of women to men's clothing 2.32 -0.08
(1.58) (0.40)
Number of observations 308
Heterogeneous Effects
• Household size• Female-headed households• Baseline food expenditures
49
• Differential take-up or leakage• Differential shocks• Differential price effects• Spillovers• Multiple hypothesis-testing
50Jenny C. Aker Cash and Vouchers in DRC
Threats to Identification
Table 9: Alternative Explanations
(1) (2)
Voucher Cash
Mean (s.d.) Coeff(s.e.)
Panel A: Take Up and Leakage
Received transfer 1.00 -0.00
(0.00) (0.00)
Number of transfers received 2.98 -0.01
(0.03) (0.01)
Amount received (first two transfers) 80,825.00 1,142.94
-6042 (717.43)
Amount received (second transfer) 18,352.54 159.25
(167.97) (229.52)
Panel B: Illness and Death
Affected by conflict 0.54 0.07
(0.05) (0.07)
Household member affected by illness 0.27 0.04
(0.05) (0.06)
Household member died 0.08 -0.00
(0.03) (0.04)
Number of observations 308
• Impact of cash on vouchers:Cash transfers relatively small (total of 474 households and
USD$60,000 over six months, amidst IDP population of 60,000 in the area)
Purchases occurred in three different markets 15-20 km apart
Maximum prices at voucher fair were based upon recent market prices for the same goods and same market
• Impact of vouchers on cash: If vouchers increased prices, consumers could have chosen
other markets closer to the camp
52Jenny C. Aker Cash and Vouchers in DRC
Differential Price Effects
• Spillovers Spillovers less of an issue for purchasing decisions (as
compared with other outcomes)Would be less likely to observe a difference in purchasing
decisions
• Multiple hypothesis-testing Bonferroni correction on families of outcomes (Sankoh et al
1997)Most differences remain statistically significant for extensive
margin (for cash households) and intensive margin (for voucher households)
53Jenny C. Aker Cash and Vouchers in DRC
Threats to Identification
• Costs to implementing agency• Costs to program recipients
54Jenny C. Aker Cash and Vouchers in DRC
Cost Effectiveness Analysis
Cash Voucher$0.00
$2.00
$4.00
$6.00
$8.00
$10.00
$12.00
$14.00
$16.00
Transfer Fees
Account Opening Costs
Voucher printing
Materials (plastic sheeting, sticks)
Transport (fuel, lodging)
Staff time
Cost per recipient is US$3 more for the voucher program
Even if double the number of recipients per voucher fair, the voucher fair still
US$1 more
Costs per Program Recipient
Jenny C. Aker Cash and Vouchers in DRC
• Welfare cost (loss) to voucher recipients due to changes in purchasing decisions Mitigated by the fact that vouchers and goods could be sold
• Similar travel and opportunity costs for each modality Both groups had to travel to Masisi Center (3-4 hour walk),
but only voucher recipients had to spend there
• Potentially higher security risks for voucher recipients Had to travel and spend on particular days Goods purchased were more observable to looters and
militia than cash Specifically an issue with gender-based violence in eastern
DRCJenny C. Aker Cash and Vouchers in DRC
Cost Effectiveness Analysis
• Voucher changed household purchases for some goodsVoucher households purchased more salt, fish and rice than
they would have if given cashCash households purchased more diverse food items
(overall), school fees, medicines and debt reimbursement – not “temptation” goods
• No differential effects on welfareNon-binding transfers – could sell goods
• Cash transfers more cost effective
Jenny C. Aker Cash and Vouchers in DRC
Conclusions
• If markets can provide necessary goods, cash is a preferred option from a welfare perspectiveMight be other reasons to provide vouchers
• Environment with high marginal utility of income• But how much cash and how often?
“If we receive (a large sum) of cash all at once, I will spend it on silly things…like beer, or beers for my
friends, or cookies for the children….”Cash and voucher recipients and spouses, Masisi camp
Jenny C. Aker Cash and Vouchers in DRC
Conclusions
• Variety of voucher and cash-based programs in conflict and emergency situationsDRC, Sudan, Niger
• Availability of supplies on local markets and self-targeting importantPoor and vulnerable populations are easily identified with
IDPs – more difficult among host communitiesMarkets were able to provide goods
Jenny C. Aker Cash and Vouchers in DRC
External Validity