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    Concluding Remarks

    Mark Solms (London) and

    Edward Nersessian (New York)

    When embarking on a journey into unchartered terri

    tory, curiosity tinged with apprehension is to

    be

    ex

    pected. This first endeavor to bring neuroscientists and

    psychoanalysts into closer dialogue has evoked mixed

    feelings. Clearly psychoanalysts are as much in the

    dark and affected by misconceptions about neurosci

    ence as are neuroscientists about psychoanalysis, and

    the lack of reciprocal knowledge is inevitably compli

    cated by an unshared vocabulary. Under the circum

    stances, therefore, it is most encouraging to see that

    the initial phase of what is hoped will become an ever

    increasing and deepening dialogue is already

    so

    rich

    and fertile. In this regard, Damasio s warning against

    premature closure is very pertinent. Much remains

    tentative in both fields, and much more remains to be

    learned at the interface between them. Unprejudiced

    and open-ended research, sharing

    of

    data, discussion,

    and debate, seem the only viable paths to take forward.

    Psychoanalysis and neuroscience provide two

    different perspectives (subjective and objective, re

    spectively) on the functions of the mental apparatus.

    Although we may be studying the same underlying

    entity, these two complementary observational per

    spectives are irreducible to one another. This

    is abun

    dantly illustrated by the problem of affect, where, even

    at the basic level of taxonomic classification, the nat

    ural kinds of subjective feelings and their associated

    neurochemical circuitry can only be clearly discerned

    when viewed together, with each casting light on the

    other.

    Panksepp has eloquently argued for consilience

    between these different perspectives within the new

    Mark

    Solms, Ph.D., is Hon. Lecturer, Academic Department of Neu

    rosurgery, St. Bartholomew s and Royal London School of Medicine; and

    Associate Member of the British Psycho-Analytical Society.

    Edward Nersessian, M.D., is Training and Supervising Psychoanalyst,

    New York Psychoanalytic Institute; and Clinical Associate Professor, Cor

    nell University Medical College.

    field that he calls affective neuroscience In our view

    this requires,

    as

    a first step, an effort to reconcile the

    theoretical yields

    of

    the different

    approaches-to

    cor

    relate the different functional maps that each per

    spective has produced. In the process

    of

    attempting

    this correlation, it will of course be found that the

    elements of the one map do not correspond isomorphi

    cally with those of the other. That should come as no

    surprise. It is precisely the lack of correspondence that

    acts as a mutual corrective of viewpoint-dependent er

    rors, and thereby helps us to gradually draft a more

    accurate, unified map. Once the disparities between

    the theoretical models are exposed, the only way to

    reconcile them is to return once more to the observa

    tional data, both psychoanalytic and neuroscientific,

    with these new questions in mind, in order to see

    where we might previously have been led astray.

    Nothing else can determine whether and to what ex

    tent a century

    of

    psychoanalytic inquiry into emotional

    life might contribute to the scientific elucidation

    of

    the

    emotional brain. Likewise, nothing else can de

    termine whether and to what extent the mass of knowl

    edge currently emanating from neuroscience might

    contribute to psychoanalytic understanding of affect.

    Naturally, one of the tempting goals of this type

    of interdisciplinary endeavor is to test aspects of psy

    choanalytic metapsychology against the newly emerg

    ing neuroscientific findings. However, it is important

    to emphasize that psychoanalytic theories cannot be

    tested against neuroscientific data (or vice versa) un

    less we have validly and definitively identified the neu

    ral correlates of the psychological component

    functions in question. psychological model only be-

    comes accessible physical methods

    investigation

    once the neural correlates

    the components

    the

    model have been identified To do otherwise is to risk

    testing apples by measuring pears. But as the neural

    correlates are incrementally determined, a host of

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    9

    powerful new research tools for testing and refining

    the original model become available. To this end, then,

    it seems appropriate to round off this preliminary in

    terchange with some provisional conclusions in re

    spect of the goal that we set for ourselves at the

    outset-which was to begin to clarify the neural corre

    lates of the basic ideas and most general concepts of

    psychoanalysis.

    Freud s conceptualization of affect as an internally

    directed perceptual modality is relatively easy to rec

    oncile with current neuroscientific views. Although

    LeDoux questions this conceptualization at one point

    in his commentary, his reservations evidently apply

    equally to all perceptual modalities. Accordingly, he

    states that the conscious experience of being in dan

    ger (the feeling

    of

    being afraid) is mediated in the

    same way as the conscious experience that an apple

    is red. He states in addition that affect can be subdi

    vided into a number of

    distinct submodalities

    (SEEKING, RAGE, FEAR, PANIC, etc.) which, inci

    dentally, applies equally to some exteroceptive modal

    ities. LeDoux s conclusion in this respect, then, is

    simply that the multiple overlapping networks under

    lying all the perceptual modalities (including affect)

    are ultimately represented in the global workspace

    of

    working memory. This conclusion, in itself, will

    not attract much controversy.

    However, there is sharp disagreement between

    LeDoux and Panksepp over the question as to whether

    each of the subcortical systems serving the various

    affective submodalities is imbued with a primary con

    sciousness of its own. In Panksepp s view, all

    of

    these

    systems discharge into a core brain-stem system, and

    this generates the different varieties of primary af

    fective consciousness; working memory merely

    blends, modifies, complexifies, and (perhaps above all)

    inhibits these background states, which are fundamen

    tally generated elsewhere.

    2

    In LeDoux s view, on the

    other hand, the entire subcortical process is fundamen

    tally unconscious. Using the FEAR system as an ex

    ample, he argues that:

    Similar considerations apply to Damasio s remarks about affect be

    ing not only a perceptual modality but also an action modality. As

    Panksepp mentions

    at

    one point, all perceptual systems presumably

    evolved for purposes of modulating motor output. Indeed, this might be a

    useful way of conceptualizing the causal efficacy

    of

    emotions.

    2 A similar proposal regarding multiple levels

    of

    consciousness arose,

    from a different point of view, in Shevrin s interesting commentary.

    Solms-Nersessian

    When working memory becomes occupied with the

    fact that the amygdala is active (either by way

    of

    direct connections from the amygdala to cortical ar

    eas, by way

    of

    connections from the amygdala to

    brain stem areas that then flood the cortex with non

    specific neurochemical messages, or by way

    of

    con

    nections from the amygdala to areas controlling

    peripheral responses that then feedback to the brain),

    then

    we

    have some

    of

    the ingredients that turn an

    experience into a fearful experience

    the various

    networks that the amygdala activates ultimately pro

    vide working memory with inputs that are labeled

    as

    fear.

    LeDoux goes on to point out that this is all compati

    ble with the Freudian notion that conscious emotion

    is the awareness

    of

    something that is basically uncon

    scious.

    The anatomical distribution, and chemical coding

    of the subcortical command systems, together with

    their generalized efferent connections, as set out in

    detail by our neuroscientific correspondents, therefore

    go some way toward clarifying the anatomical corre

    lates of the unconscious mechanisms that generate af

    fect. This speaks directly to a question that Freud

    posed in one of his last discussions of this problem:

    i t

    is

    hard

    to

    say, to be sure, by what means and

    with the help of what sensory terminal organs these

    perceptions [affective feelings] come about (Freud,

    1940, p 198). However, in our attempt to delineate

    in broad outline the anatomical correlates of Freud s

    functional topographic concepts, we are still left with

    a question as to whether the perceptual system which

    registers primary affective consciousness is to be lo

    cated in deep subcortical structures (principally in the

    region of the PAG) or in neocortical forebrain struc

    tures (principally the prefrontal lobes). LeDoux ac

    cepts that core brainstem structures play a crucial

    quantitative role in sustaining every form

    of

    con

    sciousness (see quotations above and below), but he

    attributes the generation of conscious quality itself to

    working memory alone. A different

    solution-which

    Panksepp seems to

    accept-is

    suggested by Damasio s

    distinction between animals having feelings (gener

    ated subcortically) and knowing that they have feel

    ings (which requires additional forebrain processing).

    The distinction between subcortical and cortical

    consciousness-generating systems leads Panksepp to

    make the further proposal that consciousness should

    be divided into two broad types- cognitive

    and

    affect ive (or

    somatic

    and visceral )-which

    are generated by distinct dorsal/neocortical and ven-

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    Concluding Remarks

    tral/limbic systems. This comes closest to Freud s own

    conclusion to the effect that consciousness is regis

    tered by two perceptual surfaces, one oriented outward

    toward the external object world, and the other inward

    toward the interior

    of

    the body (cf. the statement,

    quoted by both Yorke and Panksepp, to the effect that

    the

    id, cut off from the external world, has a world

    of perception

    of

    its

    own ).

    However, it should be re

    membered that the

    inner

    surface of consciousness

    in Freud s model is further divisible into two subcom

    ponents, only one

    of

    which registers primary affective

    qualia (the perceptual world

    of

    the id). The other part

    involves internal activation

    of

    the external sur

    face-generating

    inner speech (thinking) and other

    forms

    of

    mental imagery, including hallucinations (see

    Solms, 1997). Only the former subcomponent would

    correspond to what Panksepp calls the emotional (or

    visceral) type

    of

    consciousness.

    It cannot be emphasized enough that Freud s

    two

    perceptual surfaces model

    of

    consciousness,

    like all his topographical constructs, is a functional

    model, which need not map onto anatomical structures

    in a simple, isomorphic fashion (cf. Damasio s warn

    ing concerning neophrenology ). More important

    from the functional standpoint than the question

    of

    localization, is the idea, which found general agree

    ment from both Panksepp and LeDoux, that affect is

    generated by global state (mass-action) control sys

    tems, whereas external object perceptions (and the

    cognitive processes derived from them) involve rela

    tively discrete information transfer systems. Pank

    sepp endorsed this aspect

    of

    Freudian affect theory

    explicitly, but the idea seemed to be implicit also in

    LeDoux s remarks to the effect that working memory

    becomes occupied with feeling states by way of con

    nections to brainstem areas and peripheral response

    loops which flood the cortex with nonspecific neuro

    chemical messages. It was also implicit in his conclu

    sion that emotions feel different from nonemotions

    because the former involve more brain and body sys

    tems, which adds intensity and duration to warking

    memory systems (see also footnote 4 below). These

    distinctions coincide quite closely with Freud s funda

    mental distinction between ideas and quotas

    of

    affect, and with his inferences about the very differ

    ent mechanisms underlying them.

    3

    3

    Green r igh tly po inted out that in our introductory summary

    of

    Freud s affect theory we conftated this distinction with the (closely related)

    quality/quantity distinction, which, properly speaking, cannot

    applied

    to unconscious mental processes.

    This leads directly to the crucial question: What are

    affects perceptions of? and therefore to a consider

    ation

    of

    Freud s claim that emotions are perceptions of

    oscillations in the tension

    of

    instinctual needs (drives).

    Damasio answered this question unequivocally:

    , the answer to the question

    is that they are percep

    tions

    of

    body states along a number of biological di

    mensions, chemical as well as macrostructural. The

    state

    of

    the flesh, real and as-if, as determined in part

    by the very process of emotion, is the thing repre

    sented in feelings. Bearing in mind Freud s (1915a)

    definition

    of drive

    ( the psychical representative

    of

    the stimuli originating from within the organism

    and reaching the mind, as a measure

    of

    the demand

    made upon the mind for work by virtue

    of

    its connec

    tion with the

    body ),

    Damasio s view approximates

    very closely indeed to Freud s understanding

    of

    the

    essential mechanism

    of

    affect. It is therefore not sur

    prising that Damasio considered Freud s general

    model to be consonant with the most advanced con

    temporary neuroscience views.

    Damasio went on to explain that:

    The

    body,

    real, and as represented in the brain, is the theater for

    the emotions and that feelings are read-outs of

    body changes really enacted in the body and really

    constructed in an as-if mode in body mapping struc

    tures. The body mapping structures begin in spinal

    cord but coalesce most dramatically in the brain stem

    and hypothalamus before arriving in the telen

    cephalon. ,

    A similar view was elaborated in more detail in

    Panksepp s theory

    of

    a body-mapping neurosymbolic

    SELF system, and his suggestion that

    t he

    resting

    level

    of

    reverberation within this system is an epicen

    ter (homeostatic settling point) upon which the various

    basic pleasures and unpleasures

    of

    life may be predi

    cated. LeDoux did not offer a general theory of emo

    tion, but his remarks on the neuroanatomy of the

    FEAR system at least did not contradict Damasio s

    and Panksepp s models in this respect.

    Both Panksepp and Damasio emphasize that the

    body-mapping homeostatic control system operates

    above all through discharge mechanisms, and that it

    is a stable motor representation

    of

    the body (a basic

    Once the amygdala responds, it broadcasts to the cortex, to brain

    stem areas that control bodily responses, and to brain stem reticular forma

    tion arousal areas that then activate the forebrain

    the sensory systems

    and their representations in the thalamus and cortex provide the amygdala

    with qual ity and the amygdala, by way

    of

    triggering the brain stem,

    participates in the generation

    of

    quantity .

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    action system) ; thus feelings may ultimately reflect

    the various types

    of

    action readiness that permeate the

    extended neurodynamics of the SELF. Regarding this

    point, Green commented that Panksepp might be sur

    prised to read here that this is probably the closest

    assessment

    of

    what Freud meant by the cardinal role

    he attributed to the drives (which, as he stated, are

    always active). Drives are internalized patterns

    of

    un

    successful attempts at motor discharge.

    Notwithstanding the different emphases of the dif

    ferent authors, then, what all seem to agree about is that

    affectis amotivational mechanismwhich is closely tied

    to changes in the state of the body-as-represented-in

    the-brain; and this view is clearly consonant with

    Freud s. The putative consensus view would appear to

    be that emotions are g.enerated when various quasi in-

    stinctual limbic ideomotor command circuits dis-

    charge into a brain stem homeostatic control system

    which represents the current state

    the body the

    form a basic action readiness matrix and which

    turn influences the state the higher corticothalamic

    systems a motivatedfashion.

    Leaving aside the con

    troversy as to whether affective consciousness itself is

    generated near the beginning

    of

    this process, or only at

    the end, all the specific empirical findings discussed by

    the various authors can be systematically arranged

    around this generic picture. This provides a first, rough

    approximation of how the relationship between affects

    and

    drives-as

    conceptualized by Freud-might be

    represented in the tissues

    of

    the brain.

    In this connection, the illuminating dialogue be

    tween Panksepp and Yorke on the nature of drives and

    their relation to affects demonstrates most clearly how

    an attempt to correlate Freud s model of affect with

    contemporary neuroscientific views might contribute

    directly to theadvancementofpsychoanalyticmetapsy

    chology. As Panksepp observed, the internal composi

    tion

    of

    the id remains one of the most obscure and

    unresolved areas

    of

    psychoanalytic theory. Accord

    ingly, we have good reason to grasp eagerly the oppor

    tunities that beckon inPanksepp s remarks to the effect

    that affective neuroscience has now provided an em

    pirically based set

    of

    neuropsychological conceptual

    izations by which some of the subcomponents of the id

    can be more systematically discussed We are

    fi-

    nally in a position to construct new and neuroscientifi

    cally substantive images of the id

    Panksepp has laid a useful groundwork for the de

    liberations that must now follow. He accepts that

    something like drive surely exists in the brain and

    that drives, in theirbroadermeaning, can govern all

    brain and psychological activities. However, he sug-

    Solms-Nersessian

    gests that in the crucible

    of

    neuroscience [the drive

    concept] may fragment into many subsidiary pro

    cesses. He concludes that it should be replaced by a

    more differentiated set of functional constructs, princi

    pally including, (1) his basic emotion command sys

    terns, , which make sense

    of

    the intrinsic action

    readiness that is so evident in animal and human emo

    tions; (2) interoceptive homeostaticdetectors, bymeans

    of which the organic forces of bodily imbalances be

    come reflected in psycho-behavioral urges; and (3)

    mechanisms for widely broadcasting nonspecific con

    sequences

    of

    these urges within the brain.

    Of necessity, similar considerations would apply

    to Freud s pleasure-unpleasure principle, closely

    linked as it is to his conception of drive. In fact, Pank

    sepp points out that there are many varieties

    of

    plea

    sure and unpleasure in the brain, each

    of

    which

    is governed by its own command system and modu

    lated by its own regulatory principle. All of these nar

    rower constructs can be linked empirically with the

    anatomy, physiology, and chemistry

    of

    various spe

    cific brain systems, which is

    of

    crucial importance in

    relation to our stated goal.

    Although Panksepp makes clear that he person

    ally believes that the

    Freudian

    drive concept incor

    porates all of the subsidiary constructs he enumerates,

    he leaves open the possibility that it correlates more

    narrowly with (1) the SEEKING command system; (2)

    the homeostatic detectors alone; or (3) the generalized

    broadcasting systems. On close assessment, however,

    as Panksepp himself acknowledges, none of these lat

    ter possibilities seems altogether tenable.

    Yorke is therefore surely right to point out that

    the concept of drive as Freud came to understand it,

    is a deep, inferential construct concerning the mental

    representation of the fundamental processes of organic

    life, which

    is

    too far removed from direct observa

    tional data to be meaningfully linked with anything

    as

    concrete

    as

    a specific command system or detector

    mechanism (Freud, 1920). However, by the same to

    ken, one has to take very seriously Panksepp s appeal

    for the parsing

    of

    such general concepts into a range

    of

    more specific constructs which lend themselves more

    readily to detailed scientific research. This would spec

    ify in neuroscientific terms the complex vicissitudes

    that drive energies (in Freud s sense) undergo during

    their phylogenetic and ontogenetic passage through

    the differentiating structures

    of

    the mental apparatus.

    A careful consideration of these issues might start

    from the observation that much

    of

    the theoretical work

    done by Freud s drive concept is done by the body

    representing homeostatic control system in Pank-

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    Concluding Remarks

    sepp s (and Damasio s) model. A heuristic correlation

    of

    these two concepts would at least reproduce the

    relationships that exist in Freud s model between af

    fect (Panksepp s

    emotion

    command systems ),

    drive (Panksepp s

    virtual body ,

    and psychical en

    ergy in general (Panksepp s generalized broadcast

    ing

    mechanisms).

    5

    We will not speculate any further on these mat

    ters here; we would rather invite our readers and con

    tributors to take up these very difficult and extremely

    important questions by submitting original theoretical

    and research papers, which can be collected together

    in a future issue

    of

    this journal devoted to the topic

    of

    drive. If we all approach these problems with

    the spirit

    of

    open-mindedness, tolerance

    of

    doubt, ad

    mission

    of

    ignorance, and willingness to learn from

    one another that Panksepp himself has displayed, then

    we cannot but make substantial progress in this ex

    tremely important area.

    III

    One aspect

    of

    the present interchange aboutwhich there

    seems to be no disagreement at all is the idea that affects

    release innate patterns

    of

    ideomotor discharge, and that

    these patterns reflect

    the

    major evolutionary pas

    sages

    throughwhich our ancestors progressed. In

    deed, the bulk

    of

    Panksepp swork in this field,

    as

    sum

    marized in his breathtaking new

    (1998)

    textbook, may

    readily be described as a detailed account

    of

    the precise

    anatomical, physiological, and chemical processes un

    derlying just these ideomotor discharge mechanisms.

    As most of the commentators note, in this respect the

    degree of overlap between Freud s model and contem

    porary neuroscientific perspectives is almost uncanny.

    The overlap seems to extend even to the central mecha

    nisms

    of

    affect discharge that Freud intuitively deduced

    in his

    1895 Project

    for a Scientific Psychology

    (1950, pp. 320-21).6

    In this respect, one fruitful area for future neuro

    psychoanalytic inquiry would be the elucidation

    of

    the

    epigenetic developmental processes by which the in

    nate discharge patterns (id predispositions) are trans

    formed through experience into personal ego

    5

    Compare the putat ive consensus view described above with

    Freud s various descriptions

    of

    these relationships,

    as

    quoted in our intro

    ductory summary of his 1895 theory (1900, pp. 467-468; 1915b, p 179n;

    1950, pp. 320-321).

    6

    That is, the experience-dependent centripetal release

    of

    excitation

    into the interior of the body through affect innervation keys, and the

    subsequent conveyance upward

    of

    fresh excitation in the form of endoge

    nous chemical products,

    of which there may be a considerable number.

    acquisitions-processes around which individual dif

    ferences (and varieties

    of

    psychopathology) coalesce.

    In his commentary LeDoux barely touched on his im

    portant work

    on

    emotional learning.

    Another area

    of

    research which seems particu

    larly promising derives from Freud s intriguing sug

    gestion (neglected by almost all the commentators) to

    the effect that hysterical conversion involves a mecha

    nism akin to that

    of

    affect generation. This suggestion

    has important implications, not only for a neurological

    understanding of the central mechanisms underlying

    conversion disorders, but also for psychosomatic med

    icine as a whole.

    Freud s ideas concerning the inhibition of affect

    and the concept

    of

    signal affects also seemed to

    enjoy general endorsement from all our commentators.

    Damasio s and LeDoux s comments on the relation

    between these functions and the physical maturation

    (and life-long plasticity) of the frontal lobes, in partic

    ular, suggests some promising avenues for future

    neuro-psychoanalytic research. In this connection,

    Yorke s discussion

    of

    the developmental line for

    anxiety serves as a useful reminder that valuable pre

    liminary work in this area has been conducted by child

    psychoanalysts which might now prove useful to neu

    roscientific investigators. Allan Schore s

    (1994)

    wide

    ranging book, also barely mentioned in his commen

    tary, demonstrates that the same applies to a number

    of related developmental psychology paradigms.

    IV

    It seems appropriate to close with one or two remarks

    about interdisciplinary neuro-psychoanalytic research

    methodology. Notwithstanding. the shortcomings of

    the psychoanalytic method, as Shevrin and Panksepp

    note there are certain phenomena that can only be

    accessed subjectively, and in the area of affective

    neuroscience these include some

    of

    the more im

    portant phenomena at issue. This is the most obvious

    contribution that psychoanalysis can make to contem

    porary neuroscience: It has elaborated sophisticated

    methods for analyzing human subjective experience

    in a controlled naturalistic setting. In this connection,

    Panksepp made the proposal that the psychological

    effects of various psychopharmacological agents

    might be systematically explored by psychoanalytic

    investigators. Yorke, in turn, pointed to some

    of

    the

    specifically psychoanalytic difficulties that are intro

    duced by research

    of

    this kind.

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    96

    We have found that the psychoanalytic method

    can be usefully applied within a clinico-anatomical

    paradigm, for understanding the subjective experi

    ences of patients with focal brain lesions (Solms, 1995,

    1998, 1999; Kaplan-Solms and Solms, 1996, 1999).

    This approach has proved useful not only for clarifying

    complex, hidden mechanisms that underlie some stan

    dard neuropsychiatric syndromes, but also for eluci

    dating the anatomical and physiological correlates of

    some basic metapsychological concepts. For example,

    in shedding new light on the neuropsychological

    mechanisms underlying anosognosia and neglect

    (Solms, 1995, 1999; Kaplan-Solms and Solms, in

    press), psychoanalytic investigations

    of

    patients with

    right perisylvian lesions simultaneously shed light on

    the neural correlates of such fundamental psychoana

    lytic concepts as word versus thing representation and

    narcissistic cathexis versus object cathexis.

    7

    The neurological patients that we studied in this

    way were not experimental subjects in the conven

    tional sense. Their lesions w r 'experiments of na

    ture, as a result of which they suffered disturbing

    psychological disorders. Our psychoanalytic research

    into the subjective structure of these disorders coin

    cided,

    as

    psychoanalytic research always must, with

    attempts to alleviate psychological suffering by means

    of

    psychoanalytical therapy.

    This research program primarily involved neuro

    psychological syndromes associated with cortical le

    sions. Obviously the clinico-anatomical paradigm is

    less suitable for research into the densely packed and

    interdigitated limbic and brainstem mechanisms that

    underlie central affective functions. In this respect,

    as

    Panksepp suggests, certain pharmacological interven

    tions have more focused effects on the neural systems

    in question. There is therefore good reason to accept

    his suggestion that we use selected psychopharmaceu

    ticals

    as

    experimental probes into the various emo

    tional command systems that he describes. Much

    could be learned by studying carefully, in a psychoan

    alytically informed setting, the differential emotional

    effects of the various pharmacological agents. There

    is no reason not to begin doing so with the large num

    bers of psychoanalytic patients who already receive

    adjunctive pharmacotherapy for independent, clinical

    reasons. A systematic descriptive investigation along

    these lines would provide extremely valuable informa-

    7 Incidentally, this body

    of

    research casts considerable doubt on the

    equation commonly tnade (in Schore's commentary too) between right

    hemisphere functioning and the special characteristics

    of

    Freud's system

    Unconscious.

    Solms-Nersessian

    tion of a kind that cannot be obtained by any other

    method. Just

    as

    we found with our clinico-anatomical

    research, such an investigation is bound simultane

    ously

    to

    elucidate the neurophysical correlates of some

    basic psychoanalytic concepts. Few tasks are more im

    portant at this stage in the development

    of

    the interdis

    ciplinary field to which this new journal is dedicated.

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    Mark Solms Ph.D.

    Academic Department of Neurosurgery

    Royal London Hospital

    London E 1BB England

    e mail: [email protected]

    Edward Nersessian M.D.

    72

    East

    9

    st Street

    New York 10128

    e mail: [email protected]