Republic of the PhilippinesSUPREME COURTManilaEN BANCG.R. No. 78239 February 9, 1989SALVACON A. MONSANTO, petitioner, vs.FULGENCO S. FACTORAN, !R., respondent. FERNAN, C.J.:The principal question raised in this petition for review is whether or not a public officer, who has been ranted an absolute pardon b! the Chief E"ecutive, is entitled to reinstate#ent to her for#er position without need of a new appoint#ent.$n a decision rendered on March %&, '()*, the +andianba!an convicted petitioner +alvacion A. Monsanto ,then assistant treasurer of Calba!o Cit!- and three other accused, of the co#ple" cri#e of estafa thru falsification of public docu#ents and sentenced the# to i#prison#ent of four ,.- !ears, two ,%- #onths and one ,'- da! ofprision correccional as #ini#u#, to ten ,'/- !ears and one ,'- da! of prision mayor as #a"i#u#, and to pa! a fine of P*,&//. The! were further ordered to 0ointl! and severall! inde#nif! the overn#ent in the su# of P.,)(%.&/ representin the balance of the a#ount defrauded and to pa! the costs proportionatel!.Petitioner Monsanto appealed her conviction to this Court which subsequentl! affir#ed the sa#e. +he then filed a #otion for reconsideration but while said #otion was pendin, she was e"tended on1ece#ber '2, '(). b! then President Marcos absolute pardon which she accepted on 1ece#ber %', '()..B! reason of said pardon, petitioner wrote the Calba!o Cit! treasurer requestin that she be restored to her for#er post as assistant cit! treasurer since the sa#e was still vacant.Petitioner3s letter4request was referred to the Ministr! of 5inance for resolution in view of the provision of the 6ocal 7overn#ent Code transferrin the power of appoint#ent of treasurers fro# the cit! overn#ents to the said Ministr!. $n its .th $ndorse#ent dated March ', '()&, the 5inance Ministr! ruled that petitioner #a! be reinstated to her position without the necessit! of a new appoint#ent not earlier than the date she was e"tended the absolute pardon. $t also directed the cit!treasurer to see to it that the a#ount of P.,)(%.&/ which the +andianba!an had required to be inde#nified in favor of the overn#ent as well as the costs of the litiation, be satisfied. 1+ee8in reconsideration of the foreoin rulin, petitioner wrote the Ministr! on April '2, '()& stressin that the full pardon bestowed on her has wiped out the cri#e which i#plies that her servicein the overn#ent has never been interrupted and therefore the date of her reinstate#ent should correspond to the date of her preventive suspension which is Auust ', '()%9 that she is entitled to bac8pa! for the entire period of her suspension9 and that she should not be required to pa! the proportionate share of the a#ount of P.,)(%.&/. 2The Ministr! of 5inance, however, referred petitioner3s letter to the :ffice of the President for further review and action. :n April '&, '();, said :ffice, throuh 1eput! E"ecutive +ecretar! 5ulenio +. 5actoran, e disaree with both the Ministr! of 5inance and the petitioner because, as borne out b! the records, petitioner was convicted of the cri#e for which she was accused. $n line with the overn#ent3s crusade to restore absolute honest! in public service, this :ffice adopts, as a juridical guide ,Miranda v. $#perial, 22 Phil. '(;;-, the Resolution of the +andianba!an, %nd 1ivision, inPeople v. Lising, Cri#. Case No. ;;2&, :ctober ., '()&, that acquittal, not absolute pardon, of a for#er public officer is the onl! round for reinstate#ent to his for#er position and entitle#ent to pa!#entof his salaries, benefits and e#olu#ents due to hi# durin the period of his suspensionpendente lite.$n fact, in such a situation, the for#er public official #ust secure a reappoint#ent before he can reassu#e his for#er position. ...Anent the civil liabilit! of Monsanto, the Revised Penal Code e"pressl! provides that ?a pardon shall in no case e"e#pt the culprit fro# pa!#ent of the civil inde#nit! i#posed upon hi# b! the sentence.? ,+ec. *;, par. %-.$N @$E> :5 TAE 5:RE7:$N7, this :ffice holds that +alvacion A. Monsanto is not entitled to an auto#atic reinstate#ent on the basis of the absolute pardon ranted her but #ust secure an appoint#ent to her for#er position and that, notwithstandin said absolute pardon, she is liable for the civil liabilit! conco#itant to her previous conviction. 3Aer subsequent #otion for reconsideration havin been denied, petitioner filed the present petition inher behalf >e ave due course on :ctober '*, '()2.Petitioner3s basic theor! is that the eneral rules on pardon cannot appl! to her case b! reason of the fact that she was e"tended e"ecutive cle#enc! while her conviction was still pendin appeal in this Court. There havin been no final 0ud#ent of conviction, her e#plo!#ent therefore as assistantcit! treasurer could not be said to have been ter#inated or forfeited. $n other words, without that final0ud#ent of conviction, the accessor! penalt! of forfeiture of office did not attach and the status of her e#plo!#ent re#ained ?suspended.? More i#portantl!, when pardon was issued before the final verdict of uilt, it was an acquittal because there was no offense to spea8 of. $n effect, the President has declared her not uilt! of the cri#e chared and has accordinl! dis#issed the sa#e. "$t is well to re#e#ber that petitioner had been convicted of the co#ple" cri#e of estafa thru falsification of public docu#ents and sentenced to i#prison#ent of four !ears, two #onths and one da! of prision correccional as #ini#u#, to ten !ears and one da! of prision mayor as #a"i#u#. Thepenalt! of prision mayor carries the accessor! penalties of te#porar! absolute disqualification and perpetual special disqualification fro# the riht of suffrae, enforceable durin the ter# of the principal penalt!. # Te#porar! absolute disqualification bars the convict fro# public office or e#plo!#ent,such disqualification to last durin the ter# of the sentence. $ Even if the offender be pardoned, as to the principal penalt!, the accessor! penalties re#ain unless the sa#e have been e"pressl! re#itted b! the pardon. 7 The penalt! of prision correccional carries, as one of its accessor! penalties, suspension fro# public office. 8The propositions earlier advanced b! petitioner reveal her inadequate understandin of the nature ofpardon and its leal consequences. This is not totall! une"pected considerin that the authorities on the sub0ect have not been wholl! consistent particularl! in describin the effects of pardon.The benin #erc! of pardon is of British oriin, conceived to te#per the ravit! of the Bin3s wrath. But Philippine 0urisprudence on the sub0ect has been larel! influenced b! A#erican case law.Pardon is defined as ?an act of race, proceedin fro# the power entrusted with the e"ecution of thelaws, which e"e#pts the individual, on who# it is bestowed, fro# the punish#ent the law inflicts for a cri#e he has co##itted. $t is the private, thouh official act of the e"ecutive #aistrate, delivered to the individual for whose benefit it is intended, and not co##unicated officiall! to the Court. ... A pardon is a deed, to the validit! of which deliver! is essential, and deliver! is not co#plete without acceptance.? 8%aAt the ti#e the antecedents of the present case too8 place, the pardonin power was overned b! the '(2* Constitution as a#ended in the April 2, '()' plebiscite. The pertinent provision reads=The President #a!, e"cept in cases of i#peach#ent, rant reprieves, co##utations and pardons, re#it fines and forfeitures, and with the concurrence of the Batasan Pa#bansa, rant a#nest!. 9The '()' a#end#ents had deleted the earlier rule that cle#enc! could be e"tended onl! upon final conviction, i#pl!in that cle#enc! could be iven even before conviction. Thus, petitioner3s unconditional pardon was ranted even as her appeal was pendin in the Aih Court. $t is worth #entionin that under the '()2 Constitution, the for#er li#itation of final conviction was restored. But be that as it #a!, it is our view that in the present case, it is not #aterial when the pardon was bestowed, whether before or after conviction, for the result would still be the sa#e. Aavin accepted the pardon, petitioner is dee#ed to have abandoned her appeal and her unreversed conviction b! the +andianba!an assu#ed the character of finalit!.Aavin disposed of that preli#inar! point, we proceed to discuss the effects of a full and absolute pardon in relation to the decisive question of whether or not the plenar! pardon had the effect of re#ovin the disqualifications prescribed b! the Revised Penal Code.$n Pelobello v. Palatino, 1& >e find a reiteration of the stand consistentl! adopted b! the courts on the various consequences of pardon= ?... we adopt the broad view e"pressed in Cristobal v. Labrador, 7.R. No. .2(.', 1ece#ber 2, '(./, that sub0ect to the li#itations i#posed b! the Constitution, the pardonin power cannot be restricted or controlled b! leislative action9 that an absolute pardon not onl! blots out the cri#e co##itted but re#oves all disabilities resultin fro# the conviction. ... ,>-e are of the opinion that the better view in the liht of the constitutional rant in this 0urisdiction is not to unnecessaril! restrict or i#pair the power of the Chief E"ecutive who, after an inquir! into the environ#ental facts, should be at libert! to atone the riidit! of the law to the e"tent of relievin co#pletel! the part! ... concerned fro# the accessor! and resultant disabilities of cri#inal conviction.The Pelobello v. Palatino and Cristobal v. Labrador cases, 11 and several others 12 show the un#ista8able application of the doctrinal case of Ex Parte Garland, 13 whose sweepin eneraliCations to this da! continue to hold swa! in our 0urisprudence despite the fact that #uch of its relevance has been downpla!ed b! later A#erican decisions.Consider the followin broad state#ents=A pardon reaches both the punish#ent prescribed for the offense and the uilt of the offender9 and when the pardon is full, it releases the punish#ent and blots out of e"istence the uilt, so that in the e!e of the law the offender is as innocent as if he had never co##itted the offense. $f ranted before conviction, it prevents an! of the penalties and disabilities, consequent upon conviction, fro# attachin9 if ranted afterconviction, it re#oves the penalties and disabilities and restores hi# to all his civil rihts9 it #a8es hi#, as it were, a new #an, and ives hi# a new credit and capacit!. 1"+uch eneralities have not been universall! accepted, reconiCed or approved. 1# The #odern trend of authorities now re0ects the undul! broad lanuae of the Garland case ,reputed to be perhaps the #oste"tre#e state#ent which has been #ade on the effects of a pardon-. To our #ind, this is the #ore realistic approach. >hile a pardon has enerall! been rearded as blottin out the e"istence of uilt so that in the e!e of the law the offender is as innocent as thouh he never co##itted the offense, it does not operate for all purposes. The ver! essence of a pardon is foriveness or re#ission of uilt. Pardon i#plies uilt. $t does not erase the fact of the co##ission of the cri#e and the conviction thereof. $t does not wash out the #oral stain. $t involves foriveness and not foretfulness. 1$The better considered cases reard full pardon ,at least one not based on the offender3s innocence- as relievin the part! fro# all the punitive consequences of his cri#inal act, includin the disqualifications or disabilities based on the findin of uilt. 17 But it relieves hi# fro# nothin #ore. ?Tosa!, however, that the offender is a ?new #an?, and ?as innocent as if he had never co##itted the offense9? is to inore the difference between the cri#e and the cri#inal. A person ad0uded uilt! of an offense is a convicted cri#inal, thouh pardoned9 he #a! be deservin of punish#ent, thouh left unpunished9 and the law #a! reard hi# as #ore danerous to societ! than one never found uilt! of cri#e, thouh it places no restraints upon hi# followin his conviction.? 18A pardon loo8s to the future. $t is not retrospective. 19 $t #a8es no a#ends for the past. $t affords no relief for what has been suffered b! the offender. $t does not i#pose upon the overn#ent an! obliation to #a8e reparation for what has been suffered. ?Since the offense has been established b! 0udicial proceedins, that which has been done or suffered while the! were in force is presu#ed to have been rihtfull! done and 0ustl! suffered, and no satisfaction for it can be required.? 2&This would e"plain wh! petitioner, thouh pardoned, cannot be entitled to receive bac8pa! for lost earnins and benefits.Petitioner #aintains that when she was issued absolute pardon, the Chief E"ecutive declared her not uilt! of the cri#e for which she was convicted. $n the case of State v. Hazzard, 21 we find this stron observation= ?To assu#e that all or even a #a0or nu#ber of pardons are issued because of innocence of the recipients is not onl! to indict our 0udicial s!ste#, but requires us to assu#e that which we all 8now to be untrue. The ver! act of foriveness i#plies the co##ission of wron, and that wron has been established b! the #ost co#plete #ethod 8nown to #odern civiliCation. Pardons #a! relieve fro# the disabilit! of fines and forfeitures attendant upon a conviction, but the! cannot erase the stain of bad character, which has been definitel! fi"ed. 22$n this ponencia, the Court wishes to stress one vital point= >hile we are prepared to concede that pardon #a! re#it all the penal consequences of a cri#inal indict#ent if onl! to ive #eanin to the fiat that a pardon, bein a presidential preroative, should not be circu#scribed b! leislative action, we do not subscribe to the fictitious belief that pardon blots out the uilt of an individual and that once he is absolved, he should be treated as if he were innocent. 5or whatever #a! have been the 0udicial dicta in the past, we cannot perceive how pardon can produce such ?#oral chanes? as to equate a pardoned convict in character and conduct with one who has constantl! #aintained the #ar8 of a ood, law4abidin citiCen.Pardon cannot #as8 the acts constitutin the cri#e. These are ?historical? facts which, despite the public #anifestation of #erc! and foriveness i#plicit in pardon, ?ordinar!, prudent #en will ta8e intoaccount in their subsequent dealins with the actor.? 23Pardon ranted after conviction frees the individual fro# all the penalties and leal disabilities and restores hi# to all his civil rihts. But unless e"pressl! rounded on the person3s innocence ,which israre-, it cannot brin bac8 lost reputation for honest!, interit! and fair dealin. 2" This #ust be constantl! 8ept in #ind lest we lose trac8 of the true character and purpose of the privilee.Thus, notwithstandin the e"pansive and effusive lanuae of the Garland case, we are in full aree#ent with the co##onl!4held opinion that pardon does not ipso acto restore a convicted felon to public office necessaril! relinquished or forfeited b! reason of the conviction 2# althouh such pardon undoubtedl! restores his eliibilit! for appoint#ent to that office. 2$The rationale is plainl! evident Public offices are intended pri#aril! for the collective protection, safet! and benefit of the co##on ood. The! cannot be co#pro#ised to favor private interests. To insist on auto#atic reinstate#ent because of a #ista8en notion that the pardon virtuall! acquitted one fro# the offense of estafa would be rossl! untenable. A pardon, albeit full and plenar!, cannot preclude the appointin power fro# refusin appoint#ent to an!one dee#ed to be of bad character, a poor #oral ris8, or who is unsuitable b! reason of the pardoned conviction.5or petitioner Monsanto, this is the botto# line= the absolute disqualification or ineliibilit! fro# publicoffice for#s part of the punish#ent prescribed b! the Revised Penal Code for estafa thru falsificationof public docu#ents. $t is clear fro# the authorities referred to that when her uilt and punish#ent were e"puned b! her pardon, this particular disabilit! was li8ewise re#oved. Aenceforth, petitioner #a! appl! for reappoint#ent to the office which was forfeited b! reason of her conviction. And in considerin her qualifications and suitabilit! for the public post, the facts constitutin her offense #ust be and should be evaluated and ta8en into account to deter#ine ulti#atel! whether she can once aain be entrusted with public funds. +tated differentl!, the pardon ranted to petitioner has resulted in re#ovin her disqualification fro# holdin public e#plo!#ent but it cannot o be!ond that. To reain her for#er post as assistant cit! treasurer, she #ust re4appl! and undero the usual procedure required for a new appoint#ent.5inall!, petitioner has souht e"e#ption fro# the pa!#ent of the civil inde#nit! i#posed upon her b!the sentence. The Court cannot oblie her. Civil liabilit! arisin fro# cri#e is overned b! the Revised Penal Code. $t subsists notwithstandin service of sentence, or for an! reason the sentenceis not served b! pardon, a#nest! or co##utation of sentence. Petitioner3s civil liabilit! #a! onl! be e"tinuished b! the sa#e causes reconiCed in the Civil Code, na#el!= pa!#ent, loss of the thin due, re#ission of the debt, #erer of the rihts of creditor and debtor, co#pensation and novation. 27>AERE5:RE, the assailed resolution of for#er 1eput! E"ecutive +ecretar! 5ulencio +. 5actoran,