1006686

Search for Security: The United States and Central America in the Twentieth CenturyAuthor(s): Thomas M. LeonardSource: The Americas, Vol. 47, No. 4 (Apr., 1991), pp. 477-490Published by: Academy of American Franciscan HistoryStable URL: http://www.jstor.org/stable/1006686 .Accessed: 08/05/2014 09:42

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the Americas XLVII(4), April 1991, 477-490 Copyright by the Academy of American Franciscan History

4 Research Issues SEARCH FOR SECURITY: THE UNITED STATES AND CENTRAL AMERICA IN THE TWENTIETH

CENTURY

he fall of Nicaraguan strongman Anastasio Somoza in July 1979 contributed to the publication of an abundance of literature on United States-Central American relations and, like the literature be-

fore it, focused largely upon the crisis at hand. Two historical surveys appeared. Walter LaFeber's Inevitable Revolutions: The United States and Central America represented a revisionist approach, charging that United States economic imperialism is responsible for the present crisis. John Fin- dling's Close Neighbors, Distant Friends: United States-Central American Relations is a straightforward account describing Washington's response to various crisis. Still an analysis of the literature is absent.1 In an effort to address that issue, this article examines the literature on United States-Cen- tral American relations in the twentieth century and concludes that the United States acted on behalf of its own security interests, whether or not the threat of foreign intervention had been real or imagined. In effect, the United States maintained the status quo and failed to deal with the structural problems responsible for the contemporary crisis.

Imposing Responsible Government

During the first generation of the twentieth century, presidential policies toward Central America differed, but they shared a common characteristic

1 Walter LaFeber, Inevitable Revolutions: The United States in Central America (New York,1983) and John E. Findling, Close Neighbors, Distant Friends: United States-Central American Relations (Westport, 1987). Usually Central America is treated as part of United States policy toward the Carib- bean region. For example see Lester D. Langley, The United States and the Caribbean in the Twentieth Century (Athens, Ga., 1985). With the exception of Karl Berman's criticism of United States policy in Under the Big Stick: Nicaragua and the United States since 1848 (Boston, 1986), scholarly studies surveying United States relations with any one of the five Central American republics is lacking.

477


478 THE SEARCH FOR SECURITY: UNITED STATES AND CENTRAL AMERICA

and objective. Teddy Roosevelt set the tone for these policies in his instruc- tions to the United States delegates attending the 1901-1902 Inter-American Conference at Mexico City:

Every failure on their part to maintain social order, every economic distress which might give rise to domestic disturbance, every discord between them impede their industries, menace their stability, or bring upon them the ca- lamity of foreign intervention would be a misfortune to us.2

Roosevelt based his observation about Central American instability on nearly eighty years of field reports from both public and private representa- tives to the five republics (Costa Rica, El Salvador, Guatemala, Honduras and Nicaragua). Policymakers in Washington understood the Central Amer- icans to be victimized by unstable governments and societies in which power, prestige and wealth rested in the hands of a few at the expense of the majority. Minister Charles N. Riotte's 1861 observation remained a bench- mark:

The family feuds become affairs of State, and the ascendancy to political preponderance is often sullied with acts of unwarrantable cruelty, practiced not so much against the political adversary as upon the enemy of the tribe. It is seldom the greediness of gain whichcauses the outbreak of hostilities, but rather the desire for power. 3

Until the United States determined to construct its own transisthmian canal, it gave little attention to Central America, except at times of a foreign threat, such as the British in the 1840s and 1850s, with the French canal effort in the early 1880s and the British again in the 1890s.4 With the exception of a few individuals like Minor Keith in Costa Rica, and the various banana companies along the isthmian Caribbean coast, commercial interests in Central America rested with British and German investors and merchants throughout the nineteenth century.5

2 U.S. Congress, Senate, Document 330, Second International Congress, Message from the President of the United States Transmitting a Report With Accompanying Papers, of the Delegates of the United States, Held at Mexico City from October 22, 1901 to January 22, 1902, pp. 31-32.

3 United States National Archives, Despatches from Costa Rica, 1861-1873, Charles N. Riotte to Secretary of State William H. Seward, August 29, 1861. Dana G. Munro's The Five Republics of Central America (New York, 1918) illustrates the United States perception that Central America was a backward area.

4 Craig L. Dozier, Nicaragua's Mosquito Shore: The Years of British and American Presence (Uni- versity, Ala., 1985); Lester D. Langley, Struggle for the American Mediterranean: United States-Euro- pean Rivalry in the Gulf Caribbean, 1776-1904 (Athens, Ga., 1976); Mary W. Williams, Anglo-Amer- ican Isthmian Diplomacy, 1815-1915 (Washington, 1916).

5 J. Fred Rippy, British Investments in Latin America, 1822-1949 (Minneapolis, 1959); and Thomas Schoonover, "Imperialism in Middle America: United States Competition With Britain, Germany and France in Middle America," in Rhodri Jeffrey-Jones (ed.), Eagle against Empire: American Opposition to European Imperialism (Aix-en-Provence, 1983), pp. 41-58.


THOMAS M. LEONARD 479

Washington's interest in Central America would increase after its deci- sion to construct a canal at Panama in 1903. Political instability in Central America might spill over into Panama and the failure to meet foreign financial obligations invited foreign gunboats into the Caribbean. In either in- stance, the security of the Panama Canal was threatened.

Thus, Roosevelt's corollary to the Monroe Doctrine justified United States actions as an international policeman and the use of the "Big Stick" in cases of flagrant wrongdoing.6 President William Howard Taft accepted the advice of his Secretary of State Philander C. Knox to refund debts and establish customs collectorships in order to "render their Governments stable and keep them from foreign intervention."' In short, "Dollar Diplo- macy" replaced the "Big Stick." Although Woodrow Wilson came to the White House as an outspoken foe of imperialism, he eventually carried out more interventions in the Caribbean region than any of his predecessors, but justified his actions on the grounds that he was seeking constitutional order. In this respect, Wilson's moral crusade paralleled that of his immediate predecessors, but the outbreak of World War I called for a reaffirmation of the Monroe Doctrine in order to protect the Panama Canal from foreign, particularly German, interlopers.8 Thus, while policies differed, the objective remained the same: political and financial stability in Central America prevented the spread of chaos to Panama and, at the same time, kept Euro- peans from intruding in the region.

Political instability prompted the 1907 Washington Conference. That year, war between El Salvador and Nicaragua threatened to spread across the isthmus, a possibility that led United States policymakers to conclude that the conflict served as a possible excuse for foreign intervention to protect lives and property. In the end, the conference results reflected the United States determination to impose constitutionalism through a treaty system. Henceforth, unconstitutional governments would be denied recog-

6 For a discussion of Roosevelt's policy see Howard K. Beale, Theodore Roosevelt and the Rise of America to a World Power (Baltimore, 1956); Howard C. Hill, Roosevelt and the Caribbean (Chicago, 1937); and Frederick W. Marks, III, Velvet on Iron: The Diplomacy of Theodore Roosevelt (Lincoln, 1980).

7 United States Department of State, Papers Relating to the Foreign Relations of the United States 1912 (Washington, 1916) p. 1091 (hereafter referred to as FRUS); Huntington Wilson, "The Relation of Government to Foreign Investment," Annals of the American Academy of Political and Social Sci- ences, 68:3 (November, 1916), 298-311; Dana G. Munro, Intervention and Dollar Diplomacy in the Caribbean 1900-1921, (Princeton, 1964), pp. 65-216.

8 George W. Baker, Jr. "The Caribbean Policy of Woodrow Wilson" (Ph.D. dissertation, University of Colorado, 1961); and Holger H. Herwig, Politics of Frustration: The United States in German Naval Planning, 1889-1941 (Boston, 1976).



nition, neighboring countries would no longer harbor revolutionaries, a Central American Court of Justice, rather than bullets, would settle disputes among the five nations and, the oft exploited Honduras was neutralized.9 Orderly government forestalled foreign intervention.

The quest for constitutional government and Jos6 Santos Zelaya's ten- dency to disrupt the peace justified United States intervention in Nicaragua beginning in 1909. The subsequent refinancing schemes and customs recei- vership were designed to prevent the use of foreign force to collect debts.10 While the Nicaraguan Conservatives welcomed these programs because they secured their political position, the State Department's efforts to impose financial restructuring upon Honduras and Guatemala met with failure. The United States Congress along with the Hondurans and Guatemalans resisted "Dollar Diplomacy." When Guatemalan strongman Manuel Es- trada Cabrerra finally succumbed to the threat of British gunboats, Secre- tary of State William Jennings Bryan quietly acquiesced because the action forestalled perceived German intervention."1

Construction of the Panama Canal did not preclude the development of the Nicaraguan route by another world power. In 1908 rumors circulated that Zelaya, angered at the United States for choosing the Panama site, attempted to interest the Japanese in a transisthmian route. Two years later, the British, in return for cancellation of its portion of the Nicaraguan debt, were tempted with an offer of the Corn Islands near the Caribbean terminus of the proposed Nicaraguan route. Subsequently, reports circulated regarding German and Canadian interests. Persuaded by the possibility that continued intrigue might bring foreign navies near the Panama Canal, the United States concluded the Weiztel-Chamorro Treaty in 1913, only to have the Senate refuse consideration of it because of the so called "Platt Amend- ment" feature insisted upon by Nicaraguan President Adolfo Diaz. A year

9 FRUS, 1907, II, pp. 601-728; and William J. Buchannan, The Central American Peace Confer- ence, 1907 (Washington, 1907).

1o Karl Berman, Under the Big Stick, pp. 123-181; Lester D. Langley, The Banana Wars: An Inner History of American Empire, 1900-1934 (Lexington, 1983), pp. 53-76; and Whitney T. Perkins, Con- straint of Empire: The United States and Caribbean Interventions (Westport, 1981), pp. 21-39.

" For Honduras see George W. Baker, "Ideals and Realities in Wilson's Administration's Relations with Honduras," The Americas, 21:1 (July, 1964), 3-6; Warren Kneer, Great Britain and the Carib- bean, 1901-1913 (East Lansing, 1975), pp. 134-163; and Juan E. Paredes, The Morgan-Honduran Loan, 1908-1911 (New Orleans, 1912). For Guatemala see David H. Dinwoodie, "Expedient Diplo- macy: The United States and Guatemala, 1898-1920" (Ph.D. dissertation, University of Colorado, 1966), pp. 88-92, 104-120; George W. Baker, "The Woodrow Wilson Administration and Guatemalan Relations," The Historian, 27:2 (February, 1963), 159-161; and Peter Calvert, "The Last Occasion on Which Britain Used Coercion to Settle a Dispute with a Non-Colonial Territory in the Caribbean: Gua- temala and the Powers, 1903-1913," Inter-American Economic Affairs, 25:2 (Winter, 1971), 57-75.



later, Secretary Bryan renegotiated the treaty, minus the "Platt Amend- ment" feature and, in 1915, the Senate ratified the agreement. During its deliberations, the Senate focused upon the need to secure the Nicaraguan canal route from potential foreign adventurers.12

While the United States focused upon the anticipated causes for foreign intervention, it failed to develop a Caribbean military defense policy that included Central America. Therefore, Washington was satisfied with isthmian pro-Allied neutrality from 1914 until 1917. Once the United States entered the European war, however, all but El Salvador declared war on Germany and, at the encouragement of Washington, took steps to curtail German activities within their borders.13 Still, United States policymakers did not consider the German threat too serious, as witnessed by the continued non-recognition of the Federico Tinoco administration in Costa Rica. President Wilson determined that constitutional order took precedence over Tinoco's pro-Allied declarations, restrictions upon German nationals and descendants and warnings that German plots against the Panama Canal were being formulated in Costa Rica.14

For fifteen years following the end of World War I, United States policy toward Central America was at cross currents. On the one hand, the search for constitutional and financial order continued. On the other, the inability to achieve these objectives contributed to a growing frustration, which along with the diminished European threat, contributed to increased pressure for withdrawal.

The threat of yet another isthmian war led to the 1923 Washington Con- ference on Central America. The agreements concluded at this meeting, considered an advance over those reached in 1907, included a clearer defi- nition of unconstitutional governments not worthy of recognition and steps to limit the size of the Central American armies in order to remove them as

12 Thomas A. Bailey, "Interest in a Nicaraguan Canal, 1903-1931," Hispanic American Historical Review, 16:1 (February, 1936), 1-4; Berman, Under the Big Stick, pp. 167-171; and Peter E. Brown- back, "The Acquisition of the Nicaragua Canal Route: The Bryan-Chamorro Treaty" (Ph.D. dissertation, University of Pennsylvania, 1952); and Charles T. Weitzel, "American Policy in Nicaragua," United States Senate, Document 334, 64th Congress, 1st session.

13 FRUS,1917, Supplement I, pp. 237-238, 259, 290-291; FRUS, 1918, Supplement II, pp. 89 and 379; John Barrett, "La America Central Continental y Insular," in Frank H. Simonds, Historia de la Guerra del Mundo(Garden City, 1920), Vol. IV., p. 370; Percy A. Martin, Latin America and the War (Baltimore, 1925); pp. 491-501; Warren H. Kelchner, Latin American Relations with the League of Nations (Boston, 1930), pp. 137-138.

14 Hugo Murillo-Jimenez, "Wilson and Tinoco: The United States and the Policy of Non-Recognition in Costa Rica, 1917-1919" (Ph.D. dissertation, University of California-San Diego, 1978). This work was subsequently published in Costa Rica as Tinoco y los Estados Unidos: ginesis y caida de un regiem (San Jose, 1981).



a source of political intrigue. Secretary of State Charles Evans Hughes expressed his satisfaction with the agreements because the United States could not "tolerate much disturbance in the Caribbean region because of the vital importance to our self-defense of the Panama Canal."1" But the agreements failed to bring political stability to the isthmian nations, nor prevent United States intervention in their internal affairs. The ink barely dried on the 1923 treaties when Washington found itself involved in Honduran and Nicara- guan internal affairs. In 1934, the Minister to Guatemala, Sheldon White- house, brokered the presidential election of Jorge Ubico. Non-recognition on the grounds that he achieved office in violation of the 1923 treaties, failed to unseat Salvadoran President Maximiliano Hernindez Martinez between 1931 and 1935.16 The quest for constitutional government remained an elusive goal.

Arms reduction also remained an ideal. Except for Costa Rica, military expenditures throughout the 1920s continued to consume approximately twenty-five percent of the national budgets and the suggestion that a Na- tional Guard be established to replace the highly politicized armies was accepted only by Nicaragua. Like the armies in El Salvador, Guatemala and Honduras, however, the Nicaraguan Guard became a major player in national politics. 17

The frustration caused by the failed search for order surfaced immedi- ately after the 1923 conference when Secretary Hughes observed that there was "considerable force in the argument that these peoples were entitled to their revolutions." Three years later, Latin American Affairs Division Chief Stokeley W. Morgan noted that several of his colleagues regretted that the United States insisted upon the implementation of the 1923 treaties because Central American realities failed to provide the opportunity for peaceful change of governments. Successive heads of the Division Leo S.

's Kenneth J. Grieb, "The United States and the Central American Federation," The Americas, 24:2 (October, 1967), 107-121; and Thomas M. Leonard, "U.S. Policy and Arms Limitation in Central America: The Washington Conference of 1923," Occasional Paper Series, Center for the Study of Armament and Disarmament, California State University-Los Angeles, 1982, 1-20.

16 Charles Hackett, "The Background of the Revolution in Honduras," Review of Reviews, 69:4 (April, 1924), 390-396; Dana G. Munro, The United States and the Caribbean Republics, 1921-1933 (Princeton, 1974), pp. 132-290; Henry L. Stimson, American Policy in Nicaragua (New York, 1927); Langley, U.S. and Caribbean, pp. 108-125; Langley, Banana Wars, pp. 181-193; Perkins, Constraint of Empire, pp. 110-116; Kenneth J. Grieb, "American Involvement in the Rise of Jorge Ubico," Caribbean Studies, 10:2 (April, 1970), 5-21; Grieb, "The United States and the Rise of General Maxi- miliano Hernindez Martinez," Journal of Latin American Studies, 3:1 (November, 1971), 151-172; and Thomas P. Anderson, Matanza: El Salvador's Communist Revolt of 1932 (Lincoln, 1971), pp. 40-77.

17 Leonard, "1923 Conference," 29-40; and Richard L. Millett, Guardians of the Dynasty (New York, 1977).



Rowe, Francis G. White and Edwin C. Wilson believed it no longer neces- sary to extend unwelcomed protection or to meddle in Central American political affairs. Policymakers also understood that the European threat to the region had all but disappeared because the necessities of post war reconstruction negated any desire for adventurism abroad. The coming policy change was signalled by President-elect Herbert Hoover who undertook a Latin American goodwill mission in 1928 that included a stopover in Hon- duras. Following Hoover's inauguration, opposition intensified, at home and in Latin America, against the Marines pursuance of Augusto C. San- dino in Nicaragua.'8

When Franklin D. Roosevelt proclaimed the "Good Neighbor" policy in 1933 he culminated a decade of changing thought. As a result of the con- comitant non-interventionist policy, the United States withdrew the Marines from Nicaragua and remained an observer to Anastasio Somoza's march to the presidential palace in 1937 and to the consitutional maneuverings by Tiburcio Carfas, Hernindez Martinez, Ubico and Somoza from 1939 to 1941 that illegally extended their presidencies.'9

Incorporating Central America into Global Strategies

From 1936 until 1940, United States policymakers directed their attention to the rising war clouds in Europe and Asia, not to constitutional nice- ties. Attention focused upon the German trade offensive in Central

18 United States Library of Congress, Papers of Charles Evans Hughes, Period of International Ac- tivity, "Latin American Conferences, 1922-1929," 1-4; Leonard, "1923 Conference," 24 and 45; Kenneth J. Grieb, The Latin American Policy of Warren G. Harding (Fort Worth, 1976); Charles Evans Hughes, Our Relations with the Nations of the Western Hemisphere (Princeton, 1928); Alexander De- Conde, Herbert Hoover's Latin American Policy (Stanford, 1951); Ethan Ellis, Republican Foreign Policy, 1921-1933 (New Brunswick, 1968); Joseph S. Tulchin, The Aftermath of War: World War I and U.S Policy Toward Latin America (New York, 1971); William Kamman, A Search for Stability: United States Diplomacy Toward Nicaragua, 1925-1933 (South Bend, 1968); Neill Macaulay, The Sandino Affair (Chicago, 1967); Richard V. Salisbury, Anti-Imperialism and International Competition in Cen- tral America, 1920-1939 (Wilmington, 1989); and Report of the Delegates of the United States of America to the Sixth International Conference of American States Held at Havana, Cuba, January 16 to February 20, 1928 (Washington, 1928).

19 J. Reuben Clark, Memorandum on the Monroe Doctrine (Washington, 1930); Irwin F. Gellman, Good Neighbor Diplomacy: United States Policies Toward Latin America (Baltimore, 1979); Bryce Wood, The Making of the Good Neighbor Policy, (New York, 1961); and Thomas M. Leonard, "The Recognition Policy in United States-Central American Relations, 1933-1949," Occasional Paper Series, Latin American and Caribbean Center, Florida International University, 1985.



America; the professed admiration for Mussolini (and to a lesser extent Hitler) by Ubico and Hernindez Martinez; and the potential for sabotage by residents of the German "colonies" across the isthmus.

The German trade offensive centered around the Aski mark system, under which Germany bought Central American foodstuffs and raw materials with Aski marks that remained in Germany for the purchase of machinery, metal goods, coal, chemicals and the like. By 1938 Germany replaced Great Britain as the major supplier of goods to Guatemala and El Salvador.20

Like some military leaders elsewhere in the hemisphere at that time, Her- nindez Martinez and Ubico looked favorably upon fascist principles. The presence of Italian and German military missions contributed to the spread of such ideas through the officer corps. Furthermore, the German legation in Guatemala City served as the distribution center for Nazi propaganda in Central America. Washington officials also looked upon the large German "colony" in Guatemala and the smaller ones in the other countries as potential centers for subversive activities. Only after the German invasion of Poland in September 1939 did the Central American leaders begin to line up behind the United States.

United States regional defense policy did not call for the use of Central American forces in combat abroad, but solely to assist in the defense of the Caribbean region and to contain any external invasion until the arrival of United States forces. At first, military staff agreements provided for the interchange of security information, development of a secret service to keep aliens and subversive groups under surveillance and for the elimination of Axis propaganda. Subsequently, all five republics signed defense site agreements which permitted United States airplanes and naval ships to use appropriate facilities to guard approaches to the Panama Canal and the Ca- ribbean sea lanes. Nearly $400 million in Lend-Lease aid supported the larger Caribbean strategy. At the request of Washington, the Central Amer- ican governments interned hundreds of the German nationals and descendants and, in some cases, shipped them to the United States for internment for the war's duration. To adjust for the economic dislocations caused by Central America's loss of its primary markets in Europe and for cooperating with the implementation of the "black listed" German firms, the United States increased its share of imports from the republics. By the war's end the United States took in over seventy percent of the region's exports, a

20 Howard J. Trueblood, "Trade Rivalries in Latin America," Foreign Policy Reports, 13:9 (Sep- tember, 1937).



dependency that remains to the present. In sum, United States wartime policy focused upon a possible external attack and internal subversion.21

As the threat of war receded from the Central America in 1943, internal threats to the established order surfaced. Before the war ended both Ubico and Martinez were forced from office, Somoza gave the appearance of ab- dicating power, and the Costa Ricans elected socialist Teodoro Picado president. Only Honduran strongman Tiburcio Carfas weathered the storm. As in the 1930s, the United States remained an observer.22 Events in Europe and Asia took precedence.

As its containment policy developed, the United States determined to secure the western hemisphere from an external attack. Measures adopted the inter-American Conferences at Mexico City in 1945, at Rio de Janeiro in 1947 and at Bogoti in 1948 met this objective. In 1951, after several years of debate, Congress approved the $51 million Mutual Security Act that provided for direct military assistance to Latin America. The military assistance to Central America emphasized security of the Panama Canal, the Caribbean sea lanes and Mexican and Venezuelan oil.23

In the immediate post war period, diplomats in Central America, however, consistently cautioned that the region's poverty served as a breeding ground for communist exploitation and, as Washington's position toward the Soviet Union hardened after 1947, the fear that communists would capi- talize upon regional problems intensified. Field reports compared local communists efforts to communist activities in Eastern Europe and China. Some United States policymakers questioned the role of international communism in the 1948 Costa Rican civil war.24

By the end of the Truman administration, the threat of communist subversion appeared real, particularly in Guatemala, although Washington had

21 Laurence Duggan, The Americas: The Search for Hemispheric Security (New York, 1947); Alton Freye, Nazi Germany and the American Hemisphere 1933-1941 (New Haven, 1967); David Haglund, Latin America and the Transformation of U.S. Strategic Thought, 1936-1941 (Albuquerque, 1984); Stetson Conn and Byron Fairchild, United States Army in World War II:. The Western Hemisphere (Washington, 1960); Stetson Conn, Rose C. Engeman and Byron Fairchild, Guarding the United States and Its Outposts: The United States Army in World War II (Washington, 1964); Kenneth J. Grieb, Guatemalan Caudillo: The Regime ofJorge Ubico (Athens, Ohio, 1979); and Carmelo F. Astilla, "The Martinez Era: Salvadoran-American Relations" (Ph.D. dissertation, Louisiana State University, 1976).

22 Thomas M. Leonard, The United States and Central America, 1944-1949: Perceptions of Political Dynamics (University, Alabama, 1984).

23 J. Lloyd Mecham, The United States and Inter-American Security, 1889-1960 (Austin, 1963), pp. 246-351; Harold Molineu, U.S. Policy toward Latin America: From Regionalism to Globalism (Boulder, 1986), pp. 15-29; and Lester D. Langley, America and the Americas: The United States in the Western Hemisphere (Athens, Georgia, 1989), pp. 161-188.

24 Leonard, United States and Central America.



no evidence of a Soviet connection.25 The programs of Presidents Juan Jos6 Arevalo and his successor, Jacobo Arbenz, appealed to the lower socio-economic groups at the expense of the traditional landed aristocracy and the United Fruit Company, both of which branded Arevwlo and Arbenz as communists. The myopic vision of the Eisenhower administration and the national obsession with communism exacerbated the situation. Commu- nists, however identified, were considered agents of the Soviet Union and, therefore linked to the international conspiracy against the United States. Nowhere in the lexicon of the day could one find, much less accept, the concept of revolutionary nationalism which meant the destruction of an im- perial based semi-feudal based society by an identifiable group of people in order to establish an economic, political and social order that more equit- ably integrated the majority of the population into the nation's dynamics.26

Perceiving a Soviet sponsored threat, Secretary of State John Foster Dulles sponsored a resolution at the tenth Inter-American Conference of American States, meeting in Caracas in March 1954, which asserted that any American nation subjected to communist political control was considered foreign intervention and therefore a threat to the western hemisphere. Accordingly, decisive action was called for, presumably under the 1947 Rio Treaty.27

At the same time, the United States determined to remove Arbenz from political power. Given the conspiracy thesis, and the Arbenz land reform program, the Eisenhower administration justified its sponsorship of General Castillo Armas "invasion" in June 1954 that toppled Arbenz. The Amer- ican people were told that this was an "invasion" which removed a communist threat from the hemisphere and restored stability.28 The facade of stability was shattered in 1958 during Vice President Richard Nixon's "goodwill tour" of Latin America, which in turn caused a three month

25 Thomas M. Leonard, "Nationalism or Communism: The Truman Administration and Guatemala, 1945-1952," Journal of Third World Studies, 7 (Spring, 1990), 169-191.

26 Jim Handy, Gift of the Devil: A History of Guatemala (Toronto, 1984), pp. 103-148; Stephen G. Rabe, Eisenhower and Latin America: The Foreign Policy of Anti-Communism (Chapel Hill, 1988); Richard H. Immerman, The CIA in Guatemala: The Foreign Policy of Intervention (Austin, 1982), pp. 3-132; Herb Addo, "On the Crisis in the Marxist Theory of Imperialism," Contemporary Marxism, 9:3 (Fall, 1984), 123-147; and Seymour M. Lipset, First New Nation: The United States in Historical and Comparative Perspective (New York, 1963).

27 Mecham, Inter-American Security, pp. 436-445. 28 Immerman, CIA, pp. 133-186; Stephen Schlesinger and Steven Kinzer, Bitter Fruit: The Untold

Story of the American Coup in Guatemala (New York, 1982); John Foster Dulles, "Communist Influ- ence in Guatemala," Department of State Bulletin, 30 (June, 1954), 873-874; John Foster Dulles, "International Communism in Guatemala," Department of State Bulletin, 31 (July 12, 1954), 43-45; and John E. Purifoy, "The Communist Conspiracy in Guatemala, " Department of State Bulletin, 31 (November 8, 1954).



delay in the Central American visit of Milton Eisenhower. The administration placed responsibility at the communist doorstep.29 Importantly, the in- cidents awakened Washington's policymakers to the need to address the region's social and economic problems.

Fidel Castro's 1959 victory in Cuba brought the consequences of social and economic disparities and political repression to the forefront, and contributed to President-elect John F. Kennedy's warning that it was "one minute to midnight" in Latin America. Although Kennedy expressed a willingness to accept moderately leftist governments that sought to imple- ment economic, political and social reform and, demonstrated its position by withholding recognition from and suspending aid to the Oswaldo Lopez Arenallo junta in Honduras in November 1963, he made clear his intentions to prevent further communist inroads.30

Kennedy also shifted military policy. The 1961 Foreign Assistance Act provided training for the Central American military to meet internal security needs, while, at the same time engage in civic action programs-construction of roads, schools, hospitals and the like-in order to improve its status among the people. Subsequently, the Alliance for Progress became the centerpiece of Kennedy's Latin American policy. It, along with the Peace Corps and Food For Peace Program, gave promise for the improvement of the region's social and economic conditions and for broadening the base of political participation in order to remove the reasons for communist subversion.31 These programs never achieved their stated goals, as Central America became lost in the Vietnam quagmire and domestic violence that followed Kennedy's assassination.

29 John D. Martz, Central America: The Crisis and the Challenge (Chapel Hill, 1959); Marvin Zah- niser and W. Michael Weis, "A Diplomatic Pearl Harbor? Richard Nixon's Goodwill Mission to Latin America in 1958," Diplomatic History, 13:2 (Spring, 1989), 163-190; Dwight D. Eisenhower Presiden- tial Library, Abilene, Kansas, Papers of Dwight D. Eisenhower, White House Office Files, Office of the Special Assistant for National Security Affairs, Records, 1952-1961, Box 12, "U.S. Policy Toward Latin America;" and "Proposed Central American Visit of Dr. Milton Eisenhower, July 3, 1958," Declassified Documents 1984-000759.

3 De Lesseps Morrison, "The U.S. Position on OAS Consideration of Coup d' etats," Department of State Bulletin, 39 (October 6, 1962), 439-451; Edward E. Martin, "U.S. Policy Regarding Military Governments in Latin America," Department of State Bulletin, 40 (June 29, 1964), 698-700; and Stephen G. Rabe, "Controlling Revolutions: Latin America, The Alliance for Progress and Cold War Anti-Communism," in Thomas G. Paterson (ed.) Kennedy's Quest for Victory: American Foreign Policy, 1961-1963 (New York, 1989).

31 Adolf A. Berle, "Alliance for Progress vs. Communism," Department of State Bulletin, 38 (June 24, 1961), 763-764; Victor Alba, Alliance Without Allies: The Mythology of Progress in Latin America, translated by John Pearson, (New York, 1965); Arthur Schlesinger, Jr. "The Alliance for Progress: A Retrospective," in Ronald G. Hellman and H. Jon Rosenbaum (eds.), Latin America: The Search for a New International Role (New York, 1975); and Willard F. Barber and C. Neale Ronning, Internal Security and Military Power. Counterinsurgency and Civic Action in Latin America (Athens, 1966).



Kennedy's successor, Lyndon Baines Johnson, deferred to his Assistant Secretary of State for Latin American Affairs, Thomas C. Mann, who emphasized national security while giving only verbal assurances for economic, political and social reform.32 In practice, Mann's policy meant the military suppression of internal subversives as illustrated by the massive amounts of military assistance to Guatemala that enabled its army to bru- tally suppress a guerilla movement that dated to the social protest of the 1950s.33 Like the Eisenhower-Dulles team before them, the Johnson-Mann tandem tolerated no changes in the status quo instigated by alleged communists.

Confident that local militaries could handle insurgents across the isthmus and, preoccupied with Europe and Asia, Presidents Richard M. Nixon and Gerald R. Ford gave only cursory attention to Central America. Until the 1974-1976 period, when insurgency again reared its head, Congress slashed economic, social and military assistance by 50 percent. When Washington again noticed the region, it was too late.34 The political corruption, economic disparities and social stagnation that plagued all but Costa Rica was about to boil over when Jimmy Carter took the presidential oath in 1977.

At first, Carter appeared to understand the legitimacy of the leftist reform movements and the need for the United States to identify with them. His efforts on behalf of the Panama Canal treaties demonstrated that under- standing. Subsequent policy decisions, however, failed to alter Central American realities. The requirement for improvement in human rights conditions as a prerequisite for United States economic and social assistance resulted in the severance of military aid to Guatemala and El Salvador in

32 Thomas C. Mann, "Democratic Ideal in Our Policy toward Latin America," Department of State Bulletin, 50 (June 29, 1964), 95-1000; James D. Cochrane, "U.S. Policy toward Recognition of Gov- ernments and Promotion of Democracy in Latin America Since 1963," Journal of Latin American Studies, 4:1 (Spring, 1972), 275-293; and Frederico Gil, "The Kennedy-Johnson Years," in John D. Martz (ed.) United States Policy in Latin America: A Quarter Century of Crisis and Challenge (Lincoln, 1988), pp. 3-27.

33 Milton Henry Jamail, "Guatemala 1944-1972: The Politics of Aborted Revolution," (Ph.D. dissertation, University of Arizona, 1972); Adolfo Guilly, "The Guerrilla Movement in Guatemala," Monthly Review, 17:1 (May, 1965), 9-40 and 17:2 (June, 1965), 7-40; Lawrence A. Yates, "The United States and Rural Insurgency in Guatemala, 1960-1970," in Ralph Lee Woodward, Jr. (ed.),Central America: Historical Perspectives on the Contemporary Crisis (Westport, 1988); and Michael McClin- tock, The American Connection: State and Popular Resistance in Guatemala (London, 1985), pp. 76-122.

34 Ben F. Stephansky, "New Dialogue with Latin America: The Cost of Political Neglect," in Hellman and Rosenbaum (eds.), New International Order; Jerome Slater, "The United States and Latin America: The New Radical Orthodoxy," Economic Development and Cultural Change, 25:4 (Fall, 1977) 747-762; Frederico Gil, "United States-Latin American Relations in the Mid 1970s," SECOLAS Annals (1976), 5-19; and Michael J. Francis, "United States Policy toward Latin America During the Kissinger Years," in Martz (ed.), Quarter Century, pp. 28-60.



1977, but not the lessening of human rights violations which continued and even worsened by 1980. Carter's Nicaraguan policy was equally ineffec- tive. He failed to negotiate with the Sandinistas the composition of a post- Somoza government. The problems in El Salvador threatened to make it "another Nicaragua," and, if the tide was not stemmed there, wouldn't Guatemala and Honduras soon be victimized?

As Carter prepared to leave office, he began to act like his predecessors. "In order to maintain our ties with Nicaragua, to keep it from turning to Cuba and the Soviet Union," Carter sought $8 million in reconstruction assistance and $80 million in long term economic aid. He pursued a dual policy of military and economic assistance to El Salvador to prevent a leftist guerrilla victory. He instigated the revival of CONDECA and signed a military agreement with Honduras that provided helicopters and a training mission. These actions appeared as part of a grand design to contain the San- dinista movement. Subsequently, he approved the CIA's support of political opposition groups within Nicaragua and signed a CIA Finding that called for an end to economic aid to the Sandinista government.35 But Carter did not pull the plug.

If Carter had vacillated, not so Ronald Reagan, who came to the White House determined that Nicaragua had to be saved from Soviet-Cuban ex- pansionism, otherwise the dominoes would fall in Central America. Reagan rationalized that failure to act close to home would also encourage the So- viets to seek advances elsewhere. To oust the Sandinistas, a program of economic destabilization was undertaken, followed by the training and support of a counter-revolutionary group, the contras. To contain the "enemy" Honduras became not only a base camp for the contras, but also an armed bastion itself. Guatemala again became eligible for military assistance and, El Salvador, already involved in an internal conflict, received special assistance. Only Costa Rica successfully resisted the United States pressure to purge the isthmus of communism. The Reagan administration concluded that all Soviet and Eastern European assistance to the Sandinistas demonstrated Moscow's intentions to establish a base of operations in Central America.36

5 Robert A. Pastor, "The Carter Administration and Latin America: A Test of Principle," in Martz (ed.), Quarter Century, pp. 61-97; Pastor, Condemned to Repetition: The United States and Nicaragua (Princeton, 1987), pp. 49-229; Anthony Lake, Somoza Falling: The Nicaraguan Dilemma: A Portrait of Washington at Work (Boston, 1989); Shirley Christian, Nicaragua: Revolution in the Family (New York, 1985), pp. 69-192; and Robert Woodward, Veil: The Secret Wars of the CIA, 1981-1987 (New York, 1987), pp. 112-113.

36 Margaret Daly Hayes, "Not What I Say, But What I Do: Latin American Policy in the Reagan Administration," in Martz (ed.), Quarter Century, pp. 98-133; Cynthia J. Arnson, Crossroads: Con- gress, The Reagan Administration and Central America (New York, 1989); Timothy Ashby, The Bear



Reagan's policy objective appeared no different than that of his predecessors since 1945. Correct or not, the post war administrations linked local communist movements to an international communist conspiracy that needed to be contained and, in the case of Nicaragua reversed.

Conclusion

Since 1900, the United States sought to insulate Central America from foreign intervention for its own security purposes. At first, the policy was predicated upon the need to secure the Panama Canal. In effect, it meant that any development inviting foreign intrusion needed to be addressed. Until the 1920s, this meant the imposition of consitutional government and financial stability upon the isthmian republics. No sooner had the European threat receded and the North Americans tired of their self assumed responsibility, when World War II prompted new efforts to secure Central America from both external attack and internal sabotage. Finally, in the late 1940s the threat of international communism justified for greater intrusion into the internal affairs of the five republics.

In pursuit of its security interests, United States policymakers neglected to deal with the structural problems that plagued Central America. With the possible exception of the Alliance for Progress, United States policymakers consistently dealt with the region's ruling elite. In the early twentieth century the United States sought to impose political and financial stability upon it. Subsequently, the ruling elite cooperated with the United States to contain the Axis threat during World War II and to suppress communism after the war. In its quest for security, however, United States policy served the interests of region's ruling elite. Given the contemporary changes within the Soviet Union, which apparently will lessen the threat of international communism, will the United States alter the pattern of its relationship with Cen- tral America? Given its record, most likely not. As with the 1920s, the lessening of a foreign threat will lessen the desire to intervene.

University of North Florida THOMAS M. LEONARD Jacksonville, Florida

in the Backyard: Moscow's Caribbean Strategy (Boston, 1987); Roy Gutman, Banana Diplomacy: The Making of American Policy in Nicaragua, 1981-1987 (New York, 1988); Thomas M. Leonard, "The United States, Costa Rica and the Nicaraguan Revolution," in Howard Jones (ed.), The Foreign and Domestic Dimensions of Modern Warfare: Vietnam, Central America and Nuclear Strategy (University, 1988); Woodward, Veil; John Tower, et. al., Report of the President's Special Review Board (Wash- ington, February 26, 1987); and U.S. Congress, 100th Congress, Ist Session, House Report No. 100-433, Senate Report No. 100-216, Iran-Contra Affair: With Supplemental, Minority and Additional Views, November 1987.


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Issue Table of ContentsThe Americas, Vol. 47, No. 4 (Apr., 1991), pp. 383-544Volume Information [pp. 529-542]Front MatterCreating a Growth Pole: The Industrialization of Belo Horizonte, Brazil, 1897-1987 [pp. 383-410]Charles Lennox Wyke and the Clayton-Bulwer Formula in Central America, 1852-1860 [pp. 411-445]Financial Development in Peru under Agrarian Export Influence, 1884-1950 [pp. 447-476]Research IssuesSearch for Security: The United States and Central America in the Twentieth Century [pp. 477-490]

Inter-American Notes [pp. 491-499]Book ReviewsReview: untitled [pp. 501-503]Review: untitled [pp. 503-504]Review: untitled [pp. 504-506]Review: untitled [pp. 506-508]Review: untitled [pp. 508-509]Review: untitled [pp. 509-511]Review: untitled [pp. 511-513]Review: untitled [pp. 513-515]Review: untitled [pp. 515-516]Review: untitled [pp. 516-518]Review: untitled [pp. 518-519]Review: untitled [pp. 519-521]Review: untitled [pp. 521-524]Review: untitled [pp. 524-525]Review: untitled [pp. 525-527]

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