10 02 25 Chatham

21
New Common Fisheries Policy Wealth of fisheries Chatham House, London 25-26 th February 2010 Mogens Schou: [email protected] More material at www.fvm.dk/yieldoffish

Transcript of 10 02 25 Chatham

Page 1: 10 02 25 Chatham

New Common Fisheries Policy

Wealth of fisheries

Chatham House, London 25-26th February 2010 Mogens Schou: [email protected]

More material at www.fvm.dk/yieldoffish

Page 2: 10 02 25 Chatham

Wealth of fisheries

1. When the capital used to catch the fish does not exceed the necessary

2. When the value of the resource is obtained on basis of its full productive capacity, not just the highest valued fraction.

3. When impacts other than outtake of target species are competitive to other uses or to protection

Page 3: 10 02 25 Chatham

0

0,1

0,2

0,3

0,4

0,5

0,6

0,7

0,8

0,9

1985 1990 1995 2000 2005

1,4

Note: World Bank

First issue: Optimizing capital input

Catch pr unit vessel – The more you invest the lower the productivity !

Page 4: 10 02 25 Chatham

0

20

40

60

80

100

120

2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008

'00

0 t

on

ne

s

Year

Landings

Cod in the North Sea

Unallocated mortality

Discard

Second issue: Optimizing stock output

Page 5: 10 02 25 Chatham

1. Management by transferable rights gives the optimal incentive to optimize capital input

It is the key to balancing fleet capacity to catch opportunities and to regain a sound economy

2. Management by catch quotas will replace the incentive to discard with the incentive to fish selectively and to bring all fish to the market

It is the key to optimal outtake of fish stocks

New Fisheries Policy

Two strategic principles

- and a facility to solve Relative Stability rigidity

Page 6: 10 02 25 Chatham

Danish ITQ expectations

ITQ would result in

• Balance in fleet capacity• High profitability• Freedom to plan the fishery• Increased investment in added value

ITQ could offer

• A competitive coastal fishery• Thriving fishing communities• Improved entrance for young fishermen• Reduction of discards

Page 7: 10 02 25 Chatham

Danish ITQ model

Allocation and Ownership• Only for active fishermen• Initial allocation based on historic fishery• Public resource (withdrawal with 8 years notice)

Flexible transferability• Structural adaptation: Selling of rights• Daily adaptation: Leasing and pooling

Societal policies• Rules of concentration• Fishfund • Support young fisher’s entrance• Coastal fishery premium (demersal vessels below 17 m)

Page 8: 10 02 25 Chatham

Danish ITQ effects

• Balance in capacity v Obtained in less than 2 years

• High profitability v from 9% to 20%

• Freedom to plan the fishery v landing pattern have changed

• Increased investment in added value v Investments doubled+

• Coastal communities are competitive v• A viable coastal fishery v Increased share of total catch

• Improved entrance for young fishermen v The FishFund

• The “blue license” attractive to young fishermen v• Reduction of discards (v) less capacity and a new code

Reports by the Danish University and The Nordic Council. The results are prior to the ”levelling down effect ”of the financial crisis

Page 9: 10 02 25 Chatham

Conclusion on ITQ

• ITQ is a strong tool – and it works

• It will adapt fleet capacity to fishing opportunities

• Objectives must be clear

• It can be designed to support policy issues e.g. coastal fishery and exit/entry policy

Page 10: 10 02 25 Chatham

Are ITQ’s enough to ensure sustainability?

No

It gives the fisher the choice of quota portfolio and planning of fishery

It will balance capacity to catch opportunities (which may include upgrading)

- It does not exclude upgrading or ensure selective fishing

- It may lead to specialized one-species catches in mixed fisheries

Page 11: 10 02 25 Chatham

Catch quota management (CQM)

1. Allocate catch quotas – not landing quotas, and make the fisher accountable for his total catches

2. Make it voluntary and give the fisher a quota premium, reflecting that all fish are registered and counted

3. To participate in the scheme, the fisher must take upon him to document his fishery by CCTV

----------------

It will exchange the fisher’s incentive to optimize the value

of the fish landed by discarding with his incentive to optimize the value of his total catch by fishing selectively

Page 12: 10 02 25 Chatham

CQM effects

• Precise outtake of each stock (single stock management)

• Reliable biological data – better advice

• User driven development of selective fishing methods

• General rules to protect most vulnerable species (e.g. kW, by catch rules etc) are replaced by a requirement for the individual fisher to adapt his fishery to the catch quota available

Page 13: 10 02 25 Chatham

“We believe there are strong arguments for making

fishermen more accountable for their total catches. It would

improve information and management of removal levels of

fish stocks and incentivise the development of selective

fishing methods…..We would wish that fishermen choosing

such an option carry the responsibility of documenting their

total catches”

Page 14: 10 02 25 Chatham

Can it be done?

England, Denmark, Germany, Scotland, Swedenplan for app. 80 vessels in 2010 with CCTV

Danish results september 2009 (6 vessels with CCTV and sensors)See report and video at www.fvm.dk/yieldoffish)

•Technically simple with high reliability

•Positive incentive effect

•Better utilization pattern

•Reliable data

Page 15: 10 02 25 Chatham

Size

grades

Vessel A

Tonnes

Vessel A

1.000

DKK

Vessel B

Tonnes

Vessel B

1.000

DKK

Fish

price

DKK/kg

Share of

catch

kept on

vessel A

Size 1 10 290 8 224 28 1

Size 2 18 453 14 3500 25 1

Size 3 48 1053 37 814 22 1

Size 4 19 272 30 420 14 0,5

Size 5 4 34 11 88 8 0,3

Total 100 2101 100 1896

Discard 29 0

Comparing landing quota with catch quota managementSimplified figures for cod based on findings in Danish camera project

A landing quota management (A) compared to catch quota management (B)If ICES figures had been used the discard would be 65 instead of 29

Page 16: 10 02 25 Chatham

Wealth to be made by ITQ and CQM

Baseline ITQ ITQ and CQM

Landings (tonnes) 100.000 100.000 100.000

Profit (million €) 9 46 39

Profit (million €)

discard included -16 21 39

Note: Model calculations by www.foi.dk, for assumptions used, contact Hans Frost, associate professor at Institute of Food and Resource Economics, University of Cph. See background paper at www.fvm.dk/yieldoffish

Baseline: Landings of 100.000 tonnes demersal fish. An over capacity of 38% and a discard of 20% is assumed

ITQ show the improvement in profit with an ITQ system with full market effect (discard 20%). This can generate a catch surplus of 34.200 tonnes that can be distributed for sociopolitical purposes

ITQ and CQM show the profit introduction of an ITQ and CQM management

Page 17: 10 02 25 Chatham

What is in it for the fisher?

1st year• Quota premium• Correct data for biologists

2nd year• Doing away with kW restrictions• Simplified regulation and control• Better advice

Succeeding years• Market appreciation – reliable certifications• Multiannual management and effective year to year flexibility• Simplified gear regulation• Establishing the fishers own integrated management system for

optimal use of the resources

Page 18: 10 02 25 Chatham

A ”tracebase” for documentation, control and certification

CCTV Documented catch data

added data added data added data

vessel 1. sale process sale consumer

Data base

Output of informations designed for individual user groups

control certification labelling

Process and sale

consumer

Page 19: 10 02 25 Chatham

Relative Stability – a new facility for 2012

ObjectiveOptimal use of yearly quotas

No need of:• Changing relative stability• EU ITQ’s

Introduce a facility for Relative Stability 1. An EU quota pool for swapping or leasing between fishermen2. Let Member states define the level of transnational activity

EffectsReduction of discards , improved economy, better planning

Page 20: 10 02 25 Chatham

The Danish pool

• Transparency

• Swap fish to fish

• Lease fish

Cover your by-catches

by leasing

Do it from day to day

Page 21: 10 02 25 Chatham

New Common Fisheries Policy

Wealth of fisheries

A comprehensive CFP model based on CQM, that can

• Be implemented gradually in a ”second management track”• Be adapted to national or regional priorities• Release of fisher’s choice of methods and innovation