11

Time as Acceptability of Events

Kasia Jaszczolt

University of Cambridgehttp://www.cus.cam.ac.uk/~kmj21

Chronos 7, Antwerp, 18-20 September 2006

22

SummarySummary Time as epistemic modality: a brief overview and Time as epistemic modality: a brief overview and

summarized argumentssummarized arguments

Modality as degrees of acceptability of the Modality as degrees of acceptability of the conveyed propositionconveyed proposition

Grice’s Grice’s AccAcc operator operator

EventEvent for Default Semantics: ACC e for Default Semantics: ACC e

Default Semantics: an introductionDefault Semantics: an introduction

A Default-Semantics analysis of temporality as A Default-Semantics analysis of temporality as modalitymodality

33

Part I: Time as ModalityPart I: Time as Modality

44

A series and B seriesA series and B series

‘…‘…I shall speak of the series of positions running I shall speak of the series of positions running from the far past through the near past to the from the far past through the near past to the present, and then from the present to the near present, and then from the present to the near future and the far future, as the A series. The series future and the far future, as the A series. The series of positions which runs from earlier to later I shall of positions which runs from earlier to later I shall call the B series.’ call the B series.’

McTaggart (1908: 111).McTaggart (1908: 111).

55

‘‘Why do we believe that events are to be Why do we believe that events are to be distinguished as past, present, and future? I distinguished as past, present, and future? I conceive that the belief arises from distinctions in conceive that the belief arises from distinctions in our own experience.our own experience.

At any moment I have certain perceptions, I At any moment I have certain perceptions, I have also the memory of certain other perceptions, have also the memory of certain other perceptions, and the anticipation of others again. The direct and the anticipation of others again. The direct perception itself is a mental state qualitatively perception itself is a mental state qualitatively different from the memory or the anticipation of different from the memory or the anticipation of perceptions.’perceptions.’

McTaggart (1908: 127)McTaggart (1908: 127)

66

A-series:A-series:

tensedtensed time belongs to eventstime belongs to events there is real changethere is real change A. Prior, P. Ludlow, J. Parsons, Q. Smith A. Prior, P. Ludlow, J. Parsons, Q. Smith

77

B-series:B-series:

untenseduntensed earlier-than/later-than relationsearlier-than/later-than relations time is psychological and belongs to the observertime is psychological and belongs to the observer there is no changethere is no change B. Russell, H. Reichenbach, A. Einstein, D. H. B. Russell, H. Reichenbach, A. Einstein, D. H.

Mellor, T. Sattig?Mellor, T. Sattig?

Mellor: experience of time as accumulation of Mellor: experience of time as accumulation of memoriesmemories

A-series

B-series

1010

Representing time in semantics:Representing time in semantics:An assumptionAn assumption

The categories of tense, aspect, and whole The categories of tense, aspect, and whole propositions are founded on mental representations propositions are founded on mental representations of events, organised on non-temporal principles.of events, organised on non-temporal principles.

1111

Questioning timeQuestioning time

Moens and Steedman 1988; Steedman 1997: Moens and Steedman 1988; Steedman 1997: temporality is supervenient on perspective and temporality is supervenient on perspective and contingency; tense and aspect systems are contingency; tense and aspect systems are founded on the same conceptual primitives as founded on the same conceptual primitives as evidentialityevidentiality

van Lambalgen and Hamm 2005: goals, planning, van Lambalgen and Hamm 2005: goals, planning, causation link the past with the present and the causation link the past with the present and the future. ‘[T]he future. ‘[T]he linguisticlinguistic coding of time is (…) driven coding of time is (…) driven by the future-oriented nature of our cognitive by the future-oriented nature of our cognitive makeup’ (p. 13)makeup’ (p. 13)

1212

Parsons (2002, 2003): counterfactual theory of Parsons (2002, 2003): counterfactual theory of tense: truth-at-a-time replaced with truth-at-a-world. tense: truth-at-a-time replaced with truth-at-a-world.

‘‘M was wholly future and will be wholly past.’M was wholly future and will be wholly past.’

‘‘There is some past time such that, were it that There is some past time such that, were it that time, M would be wholly future.’time, M would be wholly future.’

‘‘There is some future time such that, were it that There is some future time such that, were it that time, M would be wholly past.’time, M would be wholly past.’

1313

Time as degree of detachment from the content: Time as degree of detachment from the content: proposition, sentence, event…proposition, sentence, event…

1414

Semantic/pragmatic detachment as modality

Epistemic modality ‘refers to a judgement of the Epistemic modality ‘refers to a judgement of the speaker: a proposition is judged to be uncertain or speaker: a proposition is judged to be uncertain or probable relative to some judgement(s). …probable relative to some judgement(s). …epistemic modality concerns (has scope over) the epistemic modality concerns (has scope over) the whole proposition.’ whole proposition.’

van der Auwera and Plungian (1998: 81-82) van der Auwera and Plungian (1998: 81-82)

1515

Modality vs. evidentiality

Inferential evidentiality overlaps with epistemic Inferential evidentiality overlaps with epistemic necessity (cf. van der Auwera and Plungian 1998)necessity (cf. van der Auwera and Plungian 1998)

vs.vs.

‘‘the grammatical means of expressing information the grammatical means of expressing information source’. ‘To be considered as an evidential, a source’. ‘To be considered as an evidential, a morpheme has to have ‘source of information’ as its morpheme has to have ‘source of information’ as its core meaning; that is, the unmarked, or default core meaning; that is, the unmarked, or default interpretation’. Aikhenvald (2004: xi, 3).interpretation’. Aikhenvald (2004: xi, 3).

1616

Futurity as modality

Ludlow (1999): the future is modality understood as Ludlow (1999): the future is modality understood as predictability or potentiality (‘disposition of the predictability or potentiality (‘disposition of the world’)world’)

Fleischman (1982): future is closely related to Fleischman (1982): future is closely related to irrealis or nonfactive modality and deontic modality irrealis or nonfactive modality and deontic modality (bidirectional semantic shift: modals (bidirectional semantic shift: modals tense tense modalsmodals

remodalization cycle (van der Auwera and Plungian remodalization cycle (van der Auwera and Plungian 1998): participant-external necessity 1998): participant-external necessity the future the future epistemic necessityepistemic necessity

1717

Pastness as modality

Ludlow (1999): ‘past-tense morphology’ is an Ludlow (1999): ‘past-tense morphology’ is an evidential marker – an assumption compatible with evidential marker – an assumption compatible with A-theoryA-theory

Thomason (2002): pastness as Thomason (2002): pastness as historical necessityhistorical necessity: : if wif w11 tt w w22, , then wthen w11 and w and w22 share the same past up to share the same past up to

and including and including tt. Historical possibilities diminish . Historical possibilities diminish monotonically with the passage of time. monotonically with the passage of time.

1818

Futurity and the uses of the English will: two interrelated problems

(1) Tom will go to Brussels on Friday.

(regular future)

(2) On Friday Tom is going to Brussels.

(futurative progressive)

(3) On Friday (This Friday) Tom goes to Brussels.

(‘tenseless future’, Dowty 1979)

(4) Tom is going to go to Brussels on Friday.

1919

Clearly modal uses of will:

(5)(5) Tom will be in Brussels now. Tom will be in Brussels now.

(epistemic necessity)(epistemic necessity)

(6)(6) Tom will sometimes smoke at the dinner table just Tom will sometimes smoke at the dinner table just to annoy Sue. to annoy Sue.

(dispositional necessity)(dispositional necessity)

2020

Planning and predictabilityPlanning and predictability

(7)(7) Mary is drawing a rabbit.Mary is drawing a rabbit.

??(8)(8) Mary is feeling unwell tomorrow night.Mary is feeling unwell tomorrow night.

??(9) (9) Mary feels unwell tomorrow night.Mary feels unwell tomorrow night.

2121

Temporality and tense in DRT (Kamp and Reyle Temporality and tense in DRT (Kamp and Reyle 1993)1993)

Temporality and tense in Default Semantics Temporality and tense in Default Semantics (Jaszczolt 2003, 2005, 2006)(Jaszczolt 2003, 2005, 2006)

2222

‘The algorithm must represent the temporal information that is contained in the tense of a sentence and in its temporal adverb (if there is one).’

Kamp & Reyle (1993: 512)

Cf. the feature TENSECf. the feature TENSE

2323

(10)(10) Michel n’est pas lMichel n’est pas là. Il sera toujours au lit. à. Il sera toujours au lit. (11)(11) There’s the doorbell: that’ll be the delivery There’s the doorbell: that’ll be the delivery

boy.boy.

2424

(5) Tom will go to Brussels on Friday. (regular future)

n e t x

et n<t

on Friday (t) Tom (x)

e

go to Brussels (x)

Gradation of epistemic modality: strength of informative intention

tf fp rf

1 0

Degree of modality

rf fp tf

1 0

2828

The PastThe Past

(12) Tom went to Brussels yesterday.(simple past)

…(13) Tom would have gone to Brussels by then.

(epistemic necessity past/inferential evidentiality)…(14) Tom may have gone to Brussels yesterday.

(epistemic possibility past)…(15) This is what happened yesterday. Tom goes to Brussels,

meets Mary at the station, and says…(past of narration)

The Past: Degree of informative intention

SP, PN INP EPP

1 0

The Past: Degree of modality

EPP INP SP, PN

1 0

3131

The Past: Towards a typology

INP inferential necessity past (‘would have gone’)

[ACCΔinp e]WS, CPI 1

INP ENP

?ENP epistemic necessity past (subsuming a set of constructions of different degree of intention and modality)

?EPP epistemic possibility past (subsuming a set of constructions of different degree of intention and modality)

3232

Grice’s (2001) Equivocality Thesis::

Modals are univocal across the practical/ alethic divide.

[ → deontic/epistemic]

Acc – modal operator, ‘it is (rationally)

acceptable that’

3333

Acc ￂ p ‘it is acceptable that it is the case that p’

Acc ! p ‘it is acceptable that let it be that that let it be that pp’’

Operator on propositions or other abstract Operator on propositions or other abstract objects?objects?

3434

Part II: Analysis of Temporality in Default Part II: Analysis of Temporality in Default SemanticsSemantics

3535

Grice’s Modified Occam’s Razor (1978):

Do not multiply senses beyond necessity.

– against semantic ambiguity

sense-generality, underdetermined semantics

Default Semantics (Jaszczolt 2005)

Stage I

combination of word meaning

and sentence structure

conscious pragmatic inference1

social-cultural defaults1

cognitive defaults

Stage II

social-cultural defaults2

conscious pragmatic inference2

compositional

merger representation

3737

Pragmatic information, such as the output of pragmatic inference or defaults, contributes to the truth-conditional content.

The representation of the truth-conditional content is a merger of information from (i) word meaning and sentence structure, (ii) (conscious) pragmatic processes, and (iii) default meanings.

Merger representations have truth conditions.

3838

Default Semantics uses an adapted and extended formalism of DRT but applies it to the output of the merger of these sources of meaning.

3939

Truth-conditional semantics (DRT, DS) or truth-conditional pragmatics (F. Recanati)?

top-down pragmatic processes

Compositional semantic theory of acts of Compositional semantic theory of acts of communication communication

4040

Truth-conditional pragmatics (e.g. Recanati 2003, 2004): truth value is predicated of an utterance – what is said by the speaker.

‘I haven’t eaten.’

Problem: degree of the contextual contribution (contextualism)

4141

Principle of compositionality for merger representations:

The meaning of the act of communication is a function

of the meaning of the words, the sentence structure

(WS), defaults (CD and SCD 1), and conscious

pragmatic inference (CPI 1).

4242

ACC as operator on events and statesACC as operator on events and states

ACC eACC e

ACCACCΦΦ*m *m ee

ACCACCΔΔnn e e ‘it is acceptable, to the degree‘it is acceptable, to the degree n n, ,

that it is the case that that it is the case that ee’’

4343

Interlude: Constructing EventsInterlude: Constructing Events

4444

Kamp, van Genabith & Reyle (forthc.): Kamp, van Genabith & Reyle (forthc.):

Discourse referents for individuals, times, events, Discourse referents for individuals, times, events, and states (the universe of a model and states (the universe of a model MM).).

‘‘Whether any one of these categories can be Whether any one of these categories can be reduced to any combination of the others is left reduced to any combination of the others is left open.’ (p. 108).open.’ (p. 108).

4545

Events and the A-seriesEvents and the A-series

How many events took place in the last hour?How many events took place in the last hour?

‘‘It is not part of linguistics to decide whether all It is not part of linguistics to decide whether all matter is atomic or all happenings are reducible to matter is atomic or all happenings are reducible to little granules of process. Indeed, if contemporary little granules of process. Indeed, if contemporary physical theories are to be believed, such ultimate physical theories are to be believed, such ultimate questions are basically incoherent.’questions are basically incoherent.’

Bach (1986: 68)Bach (1986: 68)

4646

Granularity of eventsGranularity of events

The origin of the dispute: Ramsey (1927), Davidson The origin of the dispute: Ramsey (1927), Davidson (1967) [(1967) [ Parsons (1990), Landman (2000)]; Kim Parsons (1990), Landman (2000)]; Kim (1976)(1976)

Kim (1976): events are linguistically differentiated Kim (1976): events are linguistically differentiated (stabbing vs. violent stabbing vs. knifing…). (stabbing vs. violent stabbing vs. knifing…). Temporal particulars.Temporal particulars.

Montague (1969): events are properties of Montague (1969): events are properties of moments or intervals of timemoments or intervals of time

Chisholm (1970): events are states of affairsChisholm (1970): events are states of affairs Schein (2002): events vs. finely-grained scenesSchein (2002): events vs. finely-grained scenes

cf. also Pianesi and Varzi 2000cf. also Pianesi and Varzi 2000

Events and time

Asher (2000): atemporal facts vs. temporal eventsAsher (2000): atemporal facts vs. temporal events van Lambalgen and Hamm (2005): an event type + time = van Lambalgen and Hamm (2005): an event type + time =

an event tokenan event token

Rothstein (2004): events are theoretical constructs, made up Rothstein (2004): events are theoretical constructs, made up according to the current needs:according to the current needs:

‘‘Mary built three houses in three months.’Mary built three houses in three months.’

Default Semantics:Default Semantics: finely-grained events (cf. Kim)finely-grained events (cf. Kim) time-independent events (cf. Chisholm)time-independent events (cf. Chisholm)

4848

End of InterludeEnd of Interlude

Generalized MR for (1)-(3): rf, fp, tf

x t e [Tom]CD (x) on Friday (t) ACC

n e e: [x go to Brussels]WS

MR for (2): Futurative progressive

x t e [Tom]CD (x) on Friday (t) [ACC

fp e]WS, CPI 1 e: [x go to Brussels]WS

MR for (5): Epistemic necessity

x t s [Tom]CD (x) now (t) [ACCΔ

rf s]WS, CPI 1

s: [x be in Brussels]WS

MR for (12): Simple Past

x t e [Tom]CD (x) yesterday (t) [ACC

sp e]WS, CD

e: [x go to Brussels]WS

MR for (15), Tom goes to Brussels: Past of Narration

x e [Tom]CD (x) [ACC

pn e]WS, CPI 1

e: [x go to Brussels]WS

s〚Pt1,…,tn〛s'M iff s = s' and {〚t1〛M,s,…, 〚tn〛M,s} I(P)

So,

s〚ACCn e〛s'

M iff s= s' and

i. 〚e〛M,s I(ACCn)

ii. ACCn {[ACC

n]CD , [ACCn]CPI}

iii. = ├

5555

Conclusions

ACCACCΔΔnn, an operator on eventualities, combined with , an operator on eventualities, combined with

CD and CPI 1, allows for representing different CD and CPI 1, allows for representing different degrees of modality and different degrees of degrees of modality and different degrees of informative intentions associated with acts of informative intentions associated with acts of communication.communication.

This notion of gradable modality can be applied to This notion of gradable modality can be applied to representing utterances about the future, the past, representing utterances about the future, the past, and the present (analogously).and the present (analogously).

Merger representations of DS are one example of Merger representations of DS are one example of such an application.such an application.

5656

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