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State retrenchments and class dynamics: the “new” middle class(es) under strain

Louis ChauvelPr at Sciences-Po University Paris and Institut Universitaire de France

Site : http://louis.chauvel.free.fr

chauvel@sciences-po.fr

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Intentions

Developing aspects of my book in cohort dynamics of inequality “Destiny of Generations”

Questioning the cohort sustainability of the French welfare regime

Focusing less on the extremes (poverty, exclusion, or the élite) than on inequality “at the center”

Are the middle classes facing new challenges ?

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Facing a French paradox/contradiction:1- France as a country of stable, comfortable, equalitarian, protected middle class 2- France as a country of political instability, uncertainty and problems: April 21st 2002 extreme right wing candidate Jean-Marie Le Pen qualification for the 2nd turn of presidential elections, rejection of the European Treaty May 29 2005, populist streams, xenophobia, fears, youth despair, strikes and riots, CPE…

« Yes » at two European referendums in France by socio-occupational group (%)

Source : My own computation of CEVIPOF 1995 microdata and CSA postelectoral survey 2005.

Maastricht treaty referendum

20 September 1992

European constitutional treaty referendum

29 may 2005 Change

Higher service class 66 67 1

Non agric. Self employed 49 53 4

Lower service class 55 46 -9

Routine white collars 47 37 -10

Blue collar workers 43 30 -13

Diff = 23% Diff = 37%

Tot = 51% Tot = 46%

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Precision: the French “Middle class” = the class of the middle Frenchmen and Frenchwomen

Income (and other resources) close to the national averageOccupational status in an intermediate position(Representations, culture and consciousness, notably adhesion

to an optimistic vision of upward mobility…)

Plan

France Middle class in an apparent stability Back to a schmollerian definition The middle class dynamics and welfare state retrenchmentsConclusion: post-affluent societies and the middle class(es)

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The French apparent stability

Gini Coef. and interdecile ratios of after tax and transfer incomes (by consumption units)

Gini Interdecile ratio Gini Interdecile ratio Coefficent (9th decile/1st decile) Coefficent (9th decile/1st decile)

Belgium 1985 0,227 2,73 Belgium 2000 0,277 3,31 France 1979 0,293 3,47 France 1999 0,292 3,50 Israel 1979 0,303 4,02 Israel 2001 0,346 5,01

Mexico 1984 0,445 8,63 Mexico 2000 0,491 10,38 Spain 1980 0,318 4,37 Spain 2000 0,34 4,78

Sweden 1981 0,197 2,43 Sweden 2000 0,252 2,96 Taiwan 1981 0,267 3,29 Taiwan 2000 0,296 3,81

U.K. 1979 0,27 3,53 U.K. 1999 0,345 4,59 U.S. 1979 0,301 4,67 U.S. 2000 0,368 5,45

Source : The Luxembourg Income Study database : http://www.lisproject.org and French Family expenditure surveys-INSEE 2000 for France 1999-2000

(archives : Maurice Halbwachs Center).

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Age groups

Relative income (1=Tot)

France wave of intercohort inequalities

Cohort wave

0,6

0,7

0,8

0,9

1,0

1,1

1,2

1,3

1,4

20 30 40 50 60

1979

1984

1989

1994

1999

Source : The Luxembourg Income Study database : http://www.lisproject.org and French Family expenditure surveys-INSEE 2000 for France 1999-2000

(data archives : Maurice Halbwachs Center).

after tax and transfer incomes (by consumption units)

Decline of 25 pts

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-

1,0

2,0

3,0

4,0

5,0

6,0

20 30 40 50 60

Série1

Série2

Série3

Série4

Série5

Age groups

Interdecile ratio

France decline in senior intracohort inequalitiesand increase for juniors

1979

1984

1989

1994

1999

1979

1984

1989

1994

1999

Source : The Luxembourg Income Study database : http://www.lisproject.org and French Family expenditure surveys-INSEE 2000 for France 1999-2000

(archives : Maurice Halbwachs Center).

after tax and transfer incomes (by consumption units)

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Back to a schmollerian definitionSchmoller G., 1897, Was verstehen wir unter dem Mittelstande? Hat er

im 19. Jahrhundert zu oder abgenommen?, Göttingen, Vandenhoeck und Ruprecht.

Against the Marxist theory of absolute pauperization :

=> Late Nineteenth century and the expansion of large state and private technical, managerial and expertise bureaucracies – supported and institutionalized by increasing social rights – foster the constitution of a culturally educated and economically comfortable “neu mittelstand”

Educational ressources

Economic Ressources

Higher strata

Lower Strata

New higher middle class

Old higher middle class

New lower middle class

Old lower middle class

=> The state is not simply an equalitarian ruler, a provider of decommodified resources, it is also a specific employer

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The middle class dynamics and Welfare state expansions and retrenchments

The demography of the middle classes (% of the total population, 20 to 59 year old)

0

2

4

6

8

10

12

1980 1985 1990 1995 2000 2005

Pub Higher Service Class

Priv Higher Service Class

Higher independants

Pub Lower Service Class

Priv Lower Service Class

Lower independants

Sources : Enquêtes emploi 1982-2002 INSEE, Lasmas Iresco/ Institut Quételet (Each year, N=70.000).

Note : Higher independents are self-employed professionals, managers of private companies with 10 employees or more; Lower independents are self employed craftsmen and tradesmen. Pub is for public status wage earners in public or national companies, public hospitals or in local government administrations. Private is for wage earners in private contracts.

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Which is the gap between real positions and candidates ?

We consider 4 occupational groups : Higher service class with public long term contract, higher service class with private contract, the same for lower service class.

In 1982, we estimate the probability of membership to these 4 occupational groups by education, gender, social origin (polytomic logistic reg.) for two age groups (30-34 and 50-54 age groups)

We estimate from 1983 to 2000 the probabilities of theoretical membership (“candidates” given education, gender, social origin) (=> higher level of education = multiplication of candidates)

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Empirical and theoretical % in different occupational groups

evolution of different social groups in %

Age Group 50-55 year old Age Group 30-35 year old

Sources : Enquêtes emploi 1982-2002 INSEE, Lasmas Iresco/ Institut Quételet.

Pub Higher SC

0

1

2

3

4

5

6

1980 1985 1990 1995 2000

Empi

Theo

Priv Higher SC

0

1

2

3

4

5

6

7

1980 1985 1990 1995 2000

Empi

Theo

Pub Lower SC

0

1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

1980 1985 1990 1995 2000

Empi

Theo

Priv Lower SC

0

1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

1980 1985 1990 1995 2000

Empi

Theo

Pub Higher SC

0

1

2

3

4

5

6

1980 1985 1990 1995 2000

Empi

Theo

Priv Higher SC

0

1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

1980 1985 1990 1995 2000

Empi

Theo

Pub Lower SC

0

2

4

6

8

10

12

1980 1985 1990 1995 2000

Empi

Theo

Priv Lower SC

0

2

4

6

8

10

12

14

1980 1985 1990 1995 2000

Empi

Theo

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Conclusions:

Decline in youth relative incomeIncrease of inequality indexes for the young Excess of candidates for available positions in public intermediate positionsThe young generation with short university curricula face a backlash in the

intergenerational mobility opportunities Strong frustrations of the youth in a society where seniors

benefit from a clear real expansionBut is the “new” middle class really new ?

(Declining return to “cultural capital”)

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Farewell to cultural capital : No more books to sell The former “Librairie des PUF” (Presses universitaires de France) Place de la Sorbonne (closed on december 2005 - a kind of lower middle class “Zara” will open soon)

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Working classes 1960

Upper Middle Classes 2006

Working classes 2006

Associationnism

,

stronger partic

ipation to

civil society, lo

cal

groups of pressure, etc.

Upper Middle Classes 1960

Trade union decline,

dismantlement of large

production sites,

individualization of the

assessment of performance,

etc.

Regulation +(Heteronomy)

Regulation –(Autonomy)

Integration +(social capital +)

Integration -(social capital -)

The upper middle and working classes in the durkheimian space